Layno vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 65848, May 24, 1985

Facts: Layno was charged with violating paragraph (e), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. was then arraigned on
October 3, 1983, and was suspended pendente lite, by respondent Sandiganbayan on October 26, 1983.

The validity of the mandatory provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, suspending from office any public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under such statute, is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding on
the ground that it is violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Issue: Whether or not the provision is violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Held: Yes.
It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective
officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in
this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the
constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable
length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had
been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted
likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in
sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of
suspension should be lifted.

Taada vs. Tuvera

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

FACTS: Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973
constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its enforcement.

RULING: Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

Cojuangco vs PCGG
190 SCRA 226

Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy
funds. Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a thorough study of the possible
involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds. Upon the creation of the PCGG under EO. 1 issued by
President Aquino, the PCGG was charged with the task of assisting the President not only in the recovery of ill gotten wealth or
unexplained wealth accumulated by the former President, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates but also in
the investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from time to time and to prevent
a repetition of the same in the future. Petitioner alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary investigation ofthe complaints
filed by the Solicitor General without violating petitioner's rights to due process and equal protection of the law, and that the PCGG has
no right to conduct such preliminary investigation.

Issue: WON the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has the power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the
anti-graft and corruption cases filed by the Solicitor General against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other respondents for the alleged
misuse of coconut levy funds.

Held: the court ruled in the negative. Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the authority to grant provisional
remedies of (1) sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is indispensable that, as in the case of attachment
and receivership, there exists a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for these questration order, freeze order or takeover order, an
adequate and fair opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both are assured under the foregoing
executive orders and the rules and regulations promulgated by the PCGG. The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG may
be divided into two stages. The first stage of investigation which is called the criminal investigation stage is the fact finding inquiring
which is usually conducted by the law enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence and interview witnesses after which they
assess the evidence and if they find sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation. The second stage is
the preliminary investigation stage of the said complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed, where it is ascertained if there is
sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial. It is in such instances that we say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at the same
time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the
preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public prosecutor.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting
the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and that the records of the same
should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature,
to conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.

PEOPLE vs. ALCANTARA

G.R. No. 157669. April 14, 2004

Facts: This is an appeal from the decision[1] dated September 26, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15,
convicting appellant Juan Alcantara of the crime of robbery with homicide.
Juan Alcantara armed with a bladed weapon, conspiring and confederating together with his co-accused one Alias Aying, with intent to
gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously took and carted away the waist bag
containing cash of P5,450.00 belonging to one Liza Cabaral who was then asleep and willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stabbed the
said victim, at which juncture Alias Aying divested Liza Cabaral of her wristwatch, which injuries consisted of: STAB WOUND OF THE
CHEST which caused her death.
appellant pleaded not guilty.
Appellant recounted to Atty. Sunga that during said visit Leonila appeared surprised at the sight of him, stepped back and
without saying a word left the premises. Leonila purportedly admitted that her surprise at seeing appellant was due to the fact that he
was not the person she had in mind.
Atty. Sunga offered to prepare a Supplemental Affidavit[13] stating these details and Leonila agreed to sign it before the City
Prosecutor in Davao City. Atty. Sunga further added that the atmosphere during the meeting was very cordial and that the victims
family even prepared snacks and made them watch the video of the victims burial. However, when the Supplemental Affidavit was
ready, Leonila changed her mind about signing it and maintained the involvement of appellant in the crime. Leonila then filed cases of
grave coercion and grave threats against Atty. Sunga and his companions to Matan-ao for allegedly forcing her to sign the affidavit and
threatening to send her to prison if she does not do so. Atty. Sunga and his companions were subsequently acquitted by the trial court
of the charges
Cenon Amargo, uncle of appellant, corroborated the testimony of Atty. Sunga on what transpired when the latter met Leonila
and the victims mother Diosdada. He testified that he was present when Leonila confirmed that she was surprised when she went to
visit appellant in jail since he was not the person she had in mind. He also testified as to the subsequent refusal of Leonila to sign the
Supplemental Affidavit prepared by Atty. Sunga which excluded appellant
On September 26, 2002, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states :
Wherefore, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, Juan Alcantara is hereby sentenced to
Reclusion Perpetua.
Appellant likewise testified and interposed the defense of alibi. According to him, on March 6, 1998, he and his wife attended a
consultation meeting organized by then Barangay Captain Elmer Isonza. He attended the meeting since his wifes family were friends of
Isonza. The meeting lasted until about 2:00 in the morning of March 7, 1998. After the meeting, Kagawad Antonio Lo, who was also
present, invited their group to a barbeque place in Magallanes Street. Appellant and his wife accepted the invitation and they were able
to go home at around 3:00 the same morning. Appellant also testified that he was arrested about a year later and detained at Camp
Domingo Leonor. A few days after his arrest, prosecution witness Leonila and the victims mother Diosdada, visited him in jail.
Hence this appeal

Issue: Whether or not the weakness of the defense leads to the acquittal.

Ruling:
No. For any conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecutions case and not on the weakness of the defense.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant questions the credibility and the trial courts reliance upon the testimony of prosecution witness Leonila Quimada.
Appellant points out that Leonila failed to identify the person who stabbed the victim and merely described him as being between 20 to
25 years old.Appellant also questions how Leonila came to name three persons as the perpetrators of the crime in the two affidavits
she executed when initially, she identified no one during her interview with the police as shown by the entries in the police blotter. More
importantly, appellant reiterates the alleged admission made by Leonila to his counsel Atty. Sunga that she made a mistake in naming
appellant as the person who stabbed the victim Liza Cabaral.
Leonila was nonetheless able to give a candid narration of the crime which she claimed to have transpired in a well-lit area
and at an arms length distance from where she was.Her positive identification of appellant in open court as the person who stabbed the
victim was unerring. A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of time and
treachery of human memory.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15, finding appellant Juan Alcantara guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to pay the heirs of Liza Cabaral the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant
is further ordered to pay the heirs of Liza Cabaral the sum of P53,552.00 as actual damages representing the hospital, funeral and
burial expenses incurred and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

MAYOR BAYANI ALONTE VS. JUDGE SAVELLANO

287 SCRA 245

Facts: Mayor Alonte of Binan, Laguna was charged of rape before Branch 25, RTC of Laguna. However, as a result of a petition for a
transfer of venue filed by the prosecution and granted by the SC, his case was transferred to RTC Branch 53, Manila, presided over by
the respondent judge.
After the petitioners arraignment, the prosecution submitted an AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE signed by the private
complainant JUVIE-LYN PUNONGBAYAN where she prayed for the withdrawal of the case because she is no longer interested in
pursuing the same with no intention of re-filing the said case in the future.
Pending resolution of the said motion to withdraw, the petitioner filed a motion for bail. The same was not resolved despite
several motions filed by the petitioner to resolve the same.
On December 17, 1997, counsel for the petitioner, ATTY. PHILIP SIGFRID FORTUN, received a notice from the respondent
judge notifying him of the promulgation of the decision in this case despite the fact that the prosecution and the defense have not
presented their evidence in court.
On December 18, 1997, the respondent judge issued a Decision convicting the petitioner of rape and sentenced to suffer a
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to due process of law.

Held: Yes. In order that an accused in a criminal proceedings is deemed to have been given the right to due process of law, the
following requisites must be complied with before a decision is rendered:
1. the court or tribunal trying the case is clothed with jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter before it;
2. that jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
3. that the accused is given the opportunity to be heard; and
4. that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing (PEOPLE VS. DAPITAN, 197 SCRA 378)
The act of the respondent judge in rendering a decision without even giving the petitioner the right to adduce evidence in his behalf is a
gross violation of his right to due process of law. The Decision rendered is NULL AND VOID for want of due process.

Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
Former First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos is the defendant in several criminal cases for violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), now pending in the Sandiganbayan and in the regular courts.
In two of these cases, she was found guilty by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan and was sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 9-12 years, with perpetual disqualification from office. A motion for reconsideration is pending.
December 24, 1993 - After her conviction, she filed a Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad to seek diagnostic tests and
treatment in China because of a serious and life-threatening medical condition requiring facilities not available in the
Philippines. This was denied cause of failure to give notice to the prosecution and the time asked was too short for the court to inform
itself of the basis of the motion.
December 29, 1993 Marcos filed in another case an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad to undergo
diagnosis and treatment in China. This motion was supported by medical reports conducted by her physician and cardiologist, Dr.
Roberto V. Anastacio and other doctors from Makati Medical Center.
January 4, 1994 She filed in another case a Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad to place including the United States and
Europe, if necessary, for treatment of hypertensive heart diseases, uncontrolled angina pectoris and anterior myocardial infarction.
Alleged that these tests are not available locally.
The Chairman of Sandiganbayans First Division, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena wrote a letter to Dr. Gregorio B.
Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center asking for an expert opinion on coronary medicine. The questions
asked were the following:
o Is petitioners condition life-threatening?
o What are the sophisticated biochemical tests necessary (not merely desirable, in any are needed at all, to ascertain
and remedy her condition?
o Are these tests available here?
o Is the present level of expertise in the Philippines adequate to respond to her condition?
The Presidential Commission on Good Government filed a manifestion interposing no objection based on humanitarian
reasons, as long as petitioner complies with the terms and conditions for the travel.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed the motionssince necessaity to go abroad was not demonstrated and that her
conviction in two previous criminal cases may motivate her not to return.
January 7, 1994 Hearing on the motion. Petitioners counsel asked the court to add a further question to be sent to Dr.
Patacsil. (Without the Biochemical test, may proper treatment be administered to Mrs. Marcos?). They also included the list of
medicines being taken by petitioner as part of the study.
January 17, 1994 another Supplement to the Motion for Leave Abroad was filed together with letters and endorsement
from various doctors and hospitals from the United States and China.
January 20, 1994 The Sandiganbayan received the report from the Philippine Heart Center done by a committee of
cardiologists led by Dr. Abarquez. This contained findings which were contrary to the conclusions of petitioners physicians.
February 18, 1994 The court denied the petitioners motions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for
Reconsideration. The clinical summary was a recent medical report conducted at the Philippine Heart Center.
Petitioner also filed a Motion to Admit Recognizance in Support of, and to Resolve Soonest, the Motion for Reconsideration to
Travel Abroad. Attached to this were letter from Vice President Joseph Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and
letters from 24 congressmen (including Speaker Jose de Venecia) requesting the court to allow petitioner to travel abroad.
April 19, 1994 Respondent Court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. It also expressed
disapproval of the interventions of the Vice President and the congressmen.
Hence this petition. Petitioners claim the following:
o The Sandiganbayan arbitrarily disregarded the testimonies and medical findings of Imeldas attending physicians and
merely substituted them with the academic views of the committee from the Philippine Heart Center, who never
examined the victim personally.
o It adopted an unusual and unorthodox conduct of trial since it contacted a third part asking for an opinion on
petitioners motion and medical findings and that this evidence was not presented by the petitioner.
o It failed to resolve that, in the clash between basic constitutional rights of the petitioner and the authority of
the court over the petitioner, the basic constitutional rights must prevail.
o It considered the conviction of petitioner in two criminal cases which are pending reconsideration as factors in
denying her rights.
 o The perception that there is no imperative necessity for petitioner to avail of medical treatment abroad cannot
constitute a cause to deny or deprive petitioner of her constitutional rights.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners request to travel abroad for medical
treatment. NO!!!

Held: Regarding Expert Opinions / Amici-Curiae

o Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician.
The court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her request for
permission to travel.
o The subject lay beyond the competence of the court, and hence, it only followed the prudent course available of
seeking the opinion of specialists in that field.
o Indeed, when even in their own field of expertise (law) courts are allowed to invite amici curiae to shed light on
recondite points of law, there is no reason for denying them assistance on other subjects
o Presiding Justice Garchitorena's letter to Dr. Patacsil is notable in this regard for its sedulous concern for "greater
need for information and expert advise" to the end that respondent court may be able to determine "whether or not it
is necessary and urgent for petitioner to travel abroad.
o What would be objectionable would be if respondent court obtained information without disclosing its source to the
parties and used it in deciding a case against them. Then the parties could justifiably complain that their right to due
process has been violated. But, in this case, everything was on the level, with the parties taking part in the
proceedings of the court.
o Also, petitioner is estoped from questioning what she now calls the "unusual and unorthodox" manner of resolving
her request for permission to travel abroad since her counsel even submitted additional questions and later on cross-
examined the leader of the committee (Dr. Abarquez)
The Sandiganbayan disregarded the findings and recommendations of petitioners own physicians because petitioner
failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad.
considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two of which she was convicted
although the decision is still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden
was on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign
countries
it was unnecessary for the Philippine Heart Center's specialists to examine the petitioner personally. Given the
findings of petitioner's own physicians, they found that petitioner had not been shown to be suffering from coronary artery disease
and uncontrolled high blood pressure (labile hypertension).
Relevant portions of the Dr. Abarquez and The Committes findings:
o The diagnosis of hypertensive heart disease is questionable.
o The committee questioned the need for petitioner to have biochemical tests abroad. Even without these tests, it
noted, Dr. Anastacio had "already been treating her with medicines that are used for hypertension and coronary heart
disease."
o With respect to Dr. Anastacio's claim that petitioner is in the high risk group of sudden cardiac death, the committee
stated that a history of sudden death in the family alone will not support such a conclusion
o The tests we have recommended are available in the Philippines. Proper treatment can be given to Mrs. Marcos
even in the absence of the suggested biochemical tests.
o The present facilities and expertise in the Philippines are more than adequate to diagnose and treat patients with
hypertension and/or coronary heart disease.
The evidence submitted to it, according to the Abarquez committee, "[did] not confirm the allegation that Mrs. Marcos
is in the high risk group of sudden cardiac death." Perhaps the best proof that she is not in the group is the fact that she ran in the
last election for a seat in the House of Representative and won. It may be assumed that she waged an arduous political campaign
but apparently is none the worse for it.
Despite the fact that Imelda was given permission to travel on three previous occasions before, her later conviction in
two cases dictated the need for greater caution.
Indeed, conviction is not yet final due to the motion for reconsideration. But a person's right to travel is subject to the
usual contraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should
be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reason is a matter of the court's sound discretion.
The active intervention of the Presiding Judge is justified by the fact that the subject with which the court was dealing
was a highly technical one and he wanted to clarify for himself a number of medical question.
The Courts Suggestion
 o Petitioner should have requested an examination of her medical condition by a joint team of cardiologist and other
medical experts instead of having the findings of her physician reviewed by the other specialists. A joint investigation
will have the advantage of not being unduly adversarial since the purpose is the common objective of arriving at a
consensus among the experts.
o It is not yet late for the petitioner to ask for this. She can file another motion before the Sandiganbayan. This is
suggested because during the pendency of this action, petitioner filed a motion for leave to travel, this time on the
ground that she is suffering from a difficult type of glaucoma which threatens to make her blind.
o This is supported by a medical certificate of Dr. Manuel B. Agulto, opthalmologist and glaucoma expert, who
recommends that petitioner see Dr. Richard J. Simmons of Boston, Massachusetts, and avail herself of his
"internationally renowned expertise and recognized authority in this particularly difficult glaucoma type."

Govt of USA vs. Purganan

GR No 148571

FACTS: Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies
of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez
was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government
of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance
of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act
on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his application for an arrest warrant be
set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative
prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the
required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is
still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of
PD No. 1069
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

i. YES. By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a
good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already
evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie
finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The
silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing
every little step in the entire proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature.
Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would
give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only
the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
The Proper Procedure to Best Serve The Ends Of Justice In Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a
prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses
of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the
discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately
issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of
the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.

ii. Yes. The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not
be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended finds application only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one
in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He
should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest
court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice
and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic
forcefulness.

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public
knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should have been prepared for
the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a
compelling reason to grant him bail.

Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the
power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even
more. Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and
Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that
purpose.

That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our
government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.

iii. NO. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to due
process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is
enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition.
Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness
that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been
conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to
improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the
latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.

3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does
not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state
where he will be extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a
fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case
d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts
may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is
restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to
determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper

5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged
with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially Executive

Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and
to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
Labels: bail, Case Digest, due process, extradition, extradition process, GR. NO. 148571, public international law, public international
law case digest, Sept. 24 2002, USA v. Hon. Purganan
 EL BANCO ESPANOL-FILIPINO vs. PALANCA
G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918

Facts: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng executed a mortgage upon various parcels of real property situated in Manila in favor of El
Banco Espanol-Filipino as security for a loan. After he executed the mortgage, Engracio returned to China and never went back to RP
until he eventually died. Because of non-payment, the bank filed a suit to foreclose the mortgage (at this point Engracio was stillalive).
Since defendant was a non-resident, the bank gave notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the
summons to the defendants last known address, which was in China. However, it was not shown whether the Clerk complied with this
requirement. Nevertheless, the CFI proceeded with the case and a judgment by default was rendered in favor of the bank. Mortgage
was foreclosed and the properties were sold in a public auction. After 7 years, Vicente
Palanca, as administrator of Engracios estate, filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default and to vacate all subsequent
proceedings on the ground that the judgment rendered was void since the court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.

Issue: WON the CFI acquired jurisdiction over the defendant

Held: YES. Tanquinyeng is a non-resident and having refused to appear in court voluntarily, the court never acquired jurisdiction over
him. This is, however, not essential since the foreclosure of mortgage is an action quasi in rem and what is essential is the courts
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the property is based on the following:
(1)That the property is located within the district;
(2)That the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and
(3)That the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into custody, if necessary, and exposes it to sale for the
purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. And since jurisdiction is exclusively over property, the relief granted by the court must be
limited only to that which can be enforced against the property itself. Therefore, whatever may be the effect in other respects of the
failure of the Clerk of the Court to mail the proper papers to the defendant in Amoy, China, such irregularity could impair or defeat the
jurisdiction of the court.
BANCO ESPANOL VS. PALANCA, 37 Phil. 921

Requisites:
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings;
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard;
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

PADERANGA vs. AZURA

136 SCRA 266

Facts: Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental. He petitioned that J Azura inhibits himself from deciding on
pending cases brought before him on the grounds that they have lost confidence in him, that he entertained tax suits against the city
and had issued TROs on the sales of properties when it is clearly provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that the remedy to stop auction
is to pay tax, that J Azura is bias, oppressive and is abusive in his power.

Issue: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself from the trial.

Held: The SC ruled that Azura must. As decided in the Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should
be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide
fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from
sitting in a litigation But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or
prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful
self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. . .
The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner
as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge

PEOPLE vs. ADORA

G.R. No. 116528-31. July 14, 1997
Facts: When Cecilia Cotornos mother dies, she was entrusted to Apolonia, sister of Cecilias father, Ricardo, and Adora husband of
Apolonia. However, Cecilia underwent a painful experience. She was raped for four times by Adora whom he had revered as a father.
She had no choice but yields her body and honor because the accused had threatened to behead her and her aunt, Apolonia, wife of
the accused. It was only after she was noticed to be pregnant that she revealed the bestial deeds of accused. Adora was convicted
with the crime of rape by the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not there was an impartial decision by the trial judge?

Ruling: Trial judges must be accorded a reasonable leeway in directing questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant
facts and to make the record speak the truth. In such an effort, a judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may seek to draw
out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party.
This is not only the right but also the duty of a trial judge. Under our system of legal procedure where he is judge of both the law and
the facts, it is often expedient or even necessary in the due and faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge, in the exercise
of sound discretion, to question a witness in order that his judgment may rest upon a full and clear understanding of the facts. In this
case, the Court do not believe that the trial judge transgressed the permissible limits of what questions he could propound to a witness.
the trial judge sought to elicit information on whether appellant used sufficient intimidation on the victim. For the record, he wanted
only to elucidate how the witness appeared to the court as she was testifying on the stand. That the answers of the witness formed part
of the decision are not a proof of prejudgment or bias towards the prosecution.

People v. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 452, the lack of impartiality of

the judge who will decide a case violates procedural due process.

ASIDE and a new order is hereby issued ACQUITTING the

[G.R. No. 128986. June 21, 1999] accused of the crimes charged.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF xxx xxx xxx
APPEALS and CASAN MAQUILING, respondents. Costs de oficio.[4]
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the RTC
The rule against double jeopardy proscribes an appeal from Decision reads:
a judgment of acquittal. If said judgment is assailed in a petition WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as in the present hereby rendered declaring the accused guilty beyond reasonable
case, the petitioner must prove that the lower court, in acquitting doubt of homicide for killing the deceased Frederick Pacasum,
the accused, committed not merely reversible errors, but grave and of serious physical injuries for having physically injured
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A Oligario Villarimo.
judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due For killing Frederick Pacasum, there being no aggravating or
process is void, does not exist in legal contemplation and, thus, mitigating circumstances attendant, accused is condemned to
cannot be the source of an acquittal. However, where the petition suffer an indeterminate penalty of [n]ine (9) years of prision mayor
demonstrate mere errors in judgment not amounting to grave to [f]ifteen (15) years reclusion temporal, and pay the civil liability
abuse of discretion or deprivation of due process, the writ herein above-awarded, including the cost of the suit.
of certiorari cannot issue. A review of alleged errors of judgments For the physical injuries of Oligario Villarimo, there being no
cannot be made without trampling upon the right of the accused aggravating and mitigating circumstance attendant too, accused is
against double jeopardy. condemned to suffer a straight penalty of six (6) months ar[r]esto
The Case mayor.
Through the solicitor general, Petitioner People of the The period of detention that accused underwent during the
Philippines brings before this Court a special civil action pendency of trial shall be credited in full, in the service of his
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 65- sentence.[5]
page March 24, 1997 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals The Facts

(CA).[2] Petitioner prays that said Decision be annulled and the Both the prosecutions and the defenses versions of the
case remanded to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del incident that gave rise to this controversy were adequately
Norte, Branch 5, so that the latter can effect the entry of its summarized by the appellate court as follows:
judgment[3] convicting herein Respondent Casan Maquiling of The prosecutions witnesses insisted that it was Ramil Maquiling
homicide and serious physical injuries. who first boxed the deceased Frederick Pacasum who was
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as compelled to box back. That the appellant, elder brother of Ramil,
follows: appeared from nowhere and boxed the deceased. Thereafter the
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao accused and his brother (Ramil) ran out of the disco but when the
del Norte, Branch 5 dated September 25, 1995 is hereby SET deceased and his companions followed outside, Ramil Maquiling
and his companions were waiting and another fist fight ensued.
While the commotion was going on, appellant went to his parked
Isuzu Trooper and got his .45 caliber pistol. Appellant then
approached the deceased. Before he could reach him, Audie
Pacasum who was with the group of the deceased, tried to
prevent appellant from using his gun. Appellant then fired a
warning shot causing the people around to scamper for
safety. The deceased turned his back to see what was going
on. At that moment, appellant shot the deceased twice on the left
thigh. The deceased fell on the ground lying on his back with his
hands clutching his left thigh. Appellant then approached the
deceased and fired another shot hitting the deceased on the
chest. Jojo Villarimo was himself shot in the leg. As a
consequence of the gunshot wounds, Frederick Pacasum died
while Jojo Villarimo suffered gunshot wounds on his upper right
leg which required medical attendance for six (6) months.
The accused and his witnesses on the other hand, maintained that
while the accused was entertaining his guests at the Spectrum
Disco located in the basement of Iligan Village Hotel, he saw
Frederic[k] Pacasum and Ramil Maquiling, his younger brother,
pointing at each other, then Frederick boxed Ramil who was hit on
the face and fell on the floor. As he approached Ramil and
Frederick, he saw Frederick hit Ramil on his head with a bottle as
the latter was attempting to stand up causing him to fall anew on
the floor. He also saw Frederick kick Ramil in several parts of his
body. Hence, he attempted to intervene to stop Frederick from
mauling Ramil. Instead, Frederick boxed appellant on the side of
the cheek below his right eye. Appellant wanted to retaliate by
boxing Frederick but could not do so because of Raden Pacasum
and Jojo Villarimo who were standing beside Frederick and who
were much larger and bigger than appellant. The accused then
opted to back out and left the disco. He then noticed the deceased
Frederick and Raden Pacasum and Jojo Villarimo following him
outside. He proceeded to his Isuzu Trooper which was parked
about 12 meters from the entrance of the disco. As he was about
to open the door of his vehicle, he looked back and saw Frederick
coming from his vehicle and holding a shotgun. He then opened
his trooper vehicle and got his .45 caliber pistol. Frederic[k]
approached appellant holding the shotgun at hip level with the
barrel pointed at the appellant. Appellant then fired two (2)
warning shots to the air to deter the deceased from coming any
closer. He then heard Raden Pacasum shout: Barilin mo
na. Frederick fired the shotgun hitting the accused in the hip. The
accused fell to the ground with his elbow and knees, his right hand
still holding the pistol.He tried to stand up but could not. In a
kneeling position with his right foot extended backward, he aimed
at Frederick and shot him twice in the hip. His intention was not to
kill but to disarm. But Frederick would not release the shotgun and
instead prepared to aim the same at the accused. Left with no
choice, the accused shot Frederick on the chest. Then Jojo
Villarimo ran towards Frederick and picked up the shotgun. The
accused then aimed at his leg to disarm him.
After shooting Jojo Villarimo, appellant examined his pistol and
finding the same to be empty, released the pistols slide. He
attempted to stand up but could not and just crawled to his
trooper. Raden Pacasum then went near him and grabbed the
pistol from his hand [,] pointed same at him and squeezed the
trigger but the gun did not fire as it had no more bullets. Raden
Pacasum then went away taking with him the pistol. The accused
was thereafter loaded into a [T]amaraw vehicle which brought him
to the Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital where he was treated.[6]
On June 13, 1988, Iligan City Fiscal Ulysses V. Lagcao
charged Respondent Casan Maquiling with homicide and
frustrated homicide. Acting on the petition of the private
complainants, the Department of Justice subsequently directed
the upgrading of the charge of homicide to murder. The Amended
Information reads:[7]
That on or about June 3, 1988, in the City of Iligan, Philippines,
and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with a deadly weapon, to wit[,] a cal. 45 pistol, by
means of treachery and abuse of superior strength, and with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, shoot and wound one Frederick Pacasum, thereby
inflicting upon him the following physical injuries, to wit:
- gunshot wounds
- hemorrhage shock
which caused his death.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse
of superior strength.
To both charges, Respondent Maquiling, assisted by
Counsel de Parte Moises Dalisay Jr., entered a plea of not guilty
upon his arraignment on June 5, 1989.[8] Trial ensued. Thereafter,
the trial court rendered its Decision convicting private respondent
of homicide and serious physical injuries.
Appellate Courts Ruling
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals accepted the
claim of self-defense and ruled:
xxx The witnesses have uniformly testified that a fight ensued
between the deceased Frederick Pacasum and Ramil Maquiling in
the course of which Frederick boxed Ramil causing him to fall on
the floor. When the accused-appellant tried to pacify and stop
Frederick from inflicting further harm on his brother, he was
instead boxed on the right cheek by Frederick. And while he
wanted to retaliate he could not do so because of the superiority in
numbers and in strength of Frederick and his companions who
were not only more in [number] but likewise taller and
bigger. Hence accused had opted to leave the disco but was
followed to his car by Frederick with a shotgun [i]n hand. The
deceased Frederick not only aimed the shotgun [at] him but
actually fired at the accused. And the accused shot at the
deceased only after he was himself injured by the deceased who
fired a shotgun at him. He likewise shot at Olegario Jojo Villaremo
to disarm him as he likewise took possession of the shotgun.
There was reasonable necessity of the means used to prevent
and[/]or repel the unlawful aggression.The accused fired a
warning shot to deter the deceased from attacking and even after
he was himself hit by the shotgun. He had fired first at the left
thigh of the deceased, as his intention was merely to disarm
Frederick, not to kill him. But when the appellant perceived that
Frederick was still aiming the shotgun [at] him, xxx he decided to
fire the fatal shot.
There was likewise lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. It was the deceased Frederick, with a
shotgun [in] hand, [who] approached the accused who was then
about to open his Isuzu trooper. When accused looked back, he
saw Frederick coming with a shotgun. Accused then opened his
trooper and got his .45 caliber pistol. The deceased also
disregarded the warning shots fired by the accused and was the
first to shoot at the accused.[9]
The appellate court also noted various flaws and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, in
effect strengthening the version set forth by the accused. It held:
To the mind of the court, the discrepancies as to the manner the
accused killed the deceased are material.
Major and evident discrepancies in the testimony of witnesses on
various aspects, cannot but raise well founded and overriding
doubts on their credibility. (xxx) Irreconcilable and unexplained
contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution cast doubt on the
guilt of the accused and such contradictory statements will not
sustain a judgment of conviction (xxx).[10]
Through this special civil action for certiorari before us, the
solicitor general now seeks[11] to set aside Respondent Courts
Decision, for having been allegedly rendered with grave abuse of
discretion.
Assignment of Errors
In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General raises
a single issue:
Whether or not the Assailed Decision, dated 24 March 1997, of
respondent court is void ab initio, for having been rendered in
denial of due process and with grave abuse of discretion.[12]
The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Preliminary Matter:
Procedural Remedies
Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to
appeal the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and
thereafter, to the Supreme Court in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In such cases, this tribunal is limited
to the determination of whether the lower court committed
reversible errors[13] or, in other words, mistakes of judgment.[14] A
direct review by the Supreme Court is the normal recourse of the
accused, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, prohibits the state
from appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of
acquittal that was based on the merits of the case. Thus, Section
2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court reads:
"Sec. 2. Who may appeal. -- Any party may appeal from a final
judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed thereby
in double jeopardy."
This rule stems from the constitutional mandate stating that
no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same
offense. xxx"[15] It is rooted in the early case U.S. v. Kepner,[16] in
which the United States Supreme Court, reviewing a Philippine
Supreme Court decision, declared that an appeal by the
prosecution from a judgment of acquittal would place the
defendant in double jeopardy.[17]
Double jeopardy is present if the following elements
concur: (1) the accused individuals are charged under a complaint
or an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their
conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have
been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or
acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their express
consent.[18]
In the case at bar, there are no questions as regards the
existence of the first, third and fourth elements. Petitioner,
however, questions the presence of the second element and
submits that Respondent Court of Appeals was ousted of its
jurisdiction, because it denied the petitioner due process and
because it committed grave abuse of discretion.
To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency
exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions, the remedy is a
special civil action forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the
public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[19] Grave
abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers to
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility."[20]
It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion
may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged
misappreciation of facts and evidence.[21] A writ of certiorari may
not be used to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the evidence
and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere
errors of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal or a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[22]
In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or
conclusions of the lower court.[23] As long as a court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment
which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil
action for certiorari.[24]
A denial of due process likewise results in loss or lack of
jurisdiction. Accordingly, no double jeopardy would attach where
the state is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case,[25] or where the dismissal of an information or complaint is
purely capricious or devoid of reason,[26] or when there is lack of
proper notice and opportunity to be heard.[27]
First Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
To show grave abuse of discretion, herein petitioner
contends that Respondent Court of Appeals committed manifest
bias and partiality in rendering the assailed Decision. It claims that
Respondent Court ignored and discarded uncontroverted physical
evidence which the trial judge had relied upon.Furthermore, it
allegedly erred in finding that he had base[d] his decision on the
testimony of witnesses whose demeanor he did not personally
witness. In addition, it supposedly harped on insignificant
inconsistencies in the testimonies of some prosecution witnesses,
while unquestioningly accepting the private respondents claim of
self-defense.
 Finally, the solicitor general maintains that the assailed
Decision (1) failed to discuss the effect of Maquilings escape from
confinement during the pendency of the case; (2) shifted the
burden of proof on the prosecution to prove Maquilings guilt,
although he admitted killing the victim in self defense; (3) ignored
the physical evidence particularly the downward trajectory of the
bullets that had hit the two victims, thereby showing that private
respondent was still standing when he shot them; and the shotgun
wound sustained by private respondent, which disabled him and
rendered him incapable of shooting the victims.
It is quite obvious from the foregoing allegations that
petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion to Respondent Court
because of the latter's supposed misappreciation and wrongful
assessment of factual evidence. However, as earlier stressed, the
present recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is a
fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is
not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which
isextra ordinem -- beyond the ambit of appeal.[28] Stated elsewise,
factual matters cannot normally be inquired into by the Supreme
Court in a certiorariproceeding. This Court cannot be tasked to go
over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and
weigh them again, in order to ascertain if the trial and the
appellate courts were correct in according superior credit to this or
that piece of evidence of one party or the other.[29]
The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a case does
not necessarily deprived it of jurisdiction. Thus,
assuming arguendo that a court commits a mistake in its
judgment, the error does not vitiate the decision, considering that
it has jurisdiction over the case.[30]
An examination of the 65-page Decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals shows no patent and gross error amounting to
grave abuse of discretion.Neither does it show an arbitrary or
despotic exercise of power arising from passion or hostility. In
concluding that private respondent acted in self-defense, the
Court of Appeals found the three requisites were present, viz.:
This Court is convinced that the accused acted in self-
defense. There was unlawful aggression. The witnesses have
uniformly testified that a fight ensued between the deceased
Frederick Pacasum and Ramil Maquiling in the course of which
Frederick boxed Ramil causing him to fall on the floor. When the
accused-appellant tried to pacify and stop Frederick from inflicting
further harm on his brother, he was boxed on the right cheek by
Frederick. And while he wanted to retaliate he could not do so
because of the superiority in number and in strength of Frederick
and his companions who were not only more in number but
likewise taller and bigger. Hence accused had opted to leave the
disco but was followed to his car by Frederick with a shotgun [i]n
hand. The deceased Frederick not only aimed the shotgun [at] him
but actually fired at the accused. And the accused shot at the
deceased only after he was himself injured by the deceased who
fired a shotgun at him. He likewise shot at Olegario Jojo Villaremo
to disarm him as he likewise took possession of the shotgun.
There was reasonable necessity of the means used to prevent
and[/]or repel the unlawful aggression.The accused fired a
warning shot to deter the deceased from attacking and even after
he was himself hit by the shotgun. He had fired first at the left
thigh of the deceased as his intention was merely to disarm
Frederick[,] not to kill him. But when the appellant perceived that
Frederick was still aiming the shotgun [at] him, xxx he decided to
fire the fatal shot.
There was likewise lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. It was the deceased Frederick with a
shotgun [i]n hand [who] approached the accused who was then
about to open his Isuzu trooper. When [the] accused looked back,
he saw Frederick coming with a shotgun. Accused then opened
his trooper and got his .45 caliber pistol. The deceased also
disregarded the warning shots fired by the accused and was the
first to shoot at the accused.[31]
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the appellate
court based its findings of self-defense on the strength of private
respondents evidence, not on the witness or inconsistencies of the
prosecutions own.
Regarding the physical evidence, the Court of Appeals found
that the gunshot wound sustained by the accused is the best
evidence that there was an exchange of gunfire. Since the
prosecution witnesses were silent on how it occurred, Respondent
Court was indeed left with only the defense version to
evaluate. Explaining the downward trajectory of the bullets that hit
the victims thigh, private respondent stated that he was able to
shoot in a kneeling position by using his elbows and his left knee
to prop himself up. This fact, together with the various
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
cast doubt on their credibility and led the appellate court to believe
that Casan Maquiling did act in self-defense; hence, his acquittal.
Second Issue:
Denial of Due Process
Petitioner also argues that the prosecution was denied due
process when the Respondent Court reviewed the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, despite its not having
been raised as an issue in the appeal brief.[32]
Such argument is untenable. Basic is the rule that an appeal
in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review;
and that the appellate court can correct errors, though
unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.[33] The
appeals court may even reverse the trial court's decision on the
basis of grounds other than those that the parties raised as
errors.[34] We, therefore, find no denial of due process in
Respondent Courts decision to review the entire
case. Significantly, it did not entertain new evidence. Moreover,
petitioner was not deprived of any opportunity to rebut any
evidence on record.
Epilogue
We commend the solicitor general for his vigilance in
questioning the acquittal of private respondent. We appreciate the
tenacity of his arguments and his effort to protect the rights of the
People and the State. However, the present Constitution bars an
appeal or a review of an acquittal based upon mere errors of
judgment of a lower court.
While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal,
the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice. On the other hand, if the petition, regardless of its
nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of
the court a quo, the constitutional right against double jeopardy
would be violated.Such recourse is tantamount to converting the
petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express
injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence on double jeopardy.
In dismissing this petition for certiorari, this Court is not ruling
on the guilt or the innocence of Private Respondent
Maquiling. Neither is it agreeing with the findings of the Court of
Appeals that the accused is innocent. Such conclusions are
rendered only in an appeal properly brought before this Court.But
as already stated, an appeal or a petition for review of a judgment
of acquittal is barred by the rule on double jeopardy.
In short, by rejecting this petition, the Court is merely ruling
that the petitioner failed to show (1) that the Court of Appeals has
committed grave abuse of discretion to such extent as to deprive it
of the power to decide the case, or (2) that it denied due process
of law to the People of the Philippines to such extent as to
annulled the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for its
failure to clearly show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Court of Appeals. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Romero, (Chairman), J., abroad on official leave.