Marcos V COMELEC

8/31/2015 G.R. No.
119976
TodayisMonday,August31,2015
RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.119976September18,1995
IMELDAROMUALDEZMARCOS,petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONONELECTIONSandCIRILOROYMONTEJO,respondents.
KAPUNAN,J.:
Aconstitutionalprovisionshouldbeconstruedastogiveiteffectiveoperationandsuppressthemischiefatwhichit
isaimed.1The1987ConstitutionmandatesthatanaspirantforelectiontotheHouseofRepresentativesbe"aregistered
voterinthedistrictinwhichheshallbeelected,andaresidentthereofforaperiodofnotlessthanoneyearimmediately
precedingtheelection."2Themischiefwhichthisprovisionreproducedverbatimfromthe1973Constitutionseeksto
prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identifiedwiththelatter,fromanelectiveofficetoservethatcommunity."3
PetitionerImeldaRomualdezMarcosfiledherCertificateofCandidacyforthepositionofRepresentativeoftheFirst
DistrictofLeytewiththeProvincialElectionSupervisoronMarch8,1995,providingthefollowinginformationinitem
no.8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY

PRECEDINGTHEELECTION:__________YearsandsevenMonths.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition,
privaterespondentcontendedthatMrs.MarcoslackedtheConstitution'soneyearresidencyrequirementforcandidatesfor
theHouseofRepresentativesontheevidenceofdeclarationsmadebyherinVoterRegistrationRecord94No.33497726
andinherCertificateofCandidacy.Heprayedthat"anorderbeissueddeclaring(petitioner)disqualifiedandcancelingthe
certificateofcandidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven"
months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election
SupervisorofLeyteinformedpetitionerthat:
[T]hisofficecannotreceiveoraccepttheaforementionedCertificateofCandidacyonthegroundthatit
isfiledoutoftime,thedeadlineforthefilingofthesamehavingalreadylapsedonMarch20,1995.The
Corrected/AmendedCertificateofCandidacyshouldhavebeenfiledonorbeforetheMarch20,1995
deadline.9
Consequently,petitionerfiledtheAmended/CorrectedCertificateofCandidacywiththeCOMELEC'sHeadOfficein
Intramuros,Manilaon
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95009 was likewise filed with the head
office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original
Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the
words"sincechildhood"inherAmended/CorrectedCertificateofCandidacyandthat"shehasalwaysmaintainedTacloban
City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she
notedthat:
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When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her
intendedregistrationbywritingaletterstatingthat"sheisnotaresidentofsaidcitybutofBarangay
Olot,Tolosa,Leyte.AfterrespondenthadregisteredasavoterinTolosafollowingcompletionofhersix
month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of
TolosafromtheFirstDistricttotheSecondDistrictandpursuedsuchamoveuptotheSupremeCourt,
hispurposebeingtoremoverespondentaspetitioner'sopponentinthecongressionalelectioninthe
FirstDistrict.Healsofiledabill,alongwithotherLeyteCongressmen,seekingthecreationofanother
legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose.
However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the
instantpetitionforthesameobjective,asitisobviousthatheisafraidtosubmitalongwithrespondent
for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful,freeandcleanelectionsonMay8,1995.12
OnApril24,1995,theSecondDivisionoftheCommissiononElections(COMELEC),byavoteof2to1,13cameup
with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95009 meritorious 2) striking off
petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995 and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14Dealingwithtwoprimaryissues,namely,thevalidityofamendingtheoriginalCertificateofCandidacyafter
the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency
requirement,theSecondDivisionheld:
RespondentraisedtheaffirmativedefenseinherAnswerthattheprintedword"Seven"(months)wasa
result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment
should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual
andphysical"presenceinTolosaandnotresidenceoforiginordomicileintheFirstLegislativeDistrict,
towhichshecouldhaveresponded"sincechildhood."Inanaccompanyingaffidavit,shestatedthather
domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always intended to return
wheneverabsentandwhichshehasneverabandoned.Furthermore,inhermemorandum,shetriedto
discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First
LegislativeDistrictofLeytesincechildhood,althoughsheonlybecamearesidentoftheMunicipalityof
Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a
componentoftheFirstDistrict,beforecomingtotheMunicipalityofTolosa.
Alongthispoint,itisinterestingtonotethatpriortoherregistrationinTolosa,respondentannounced
thatshewouldberegisteringinTaclobanCitysothatshecanbeacandidatefortheDistrict.However,
this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow
respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and
insteadimplicitlyaccededtoitbyregisteringinTolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the
CertificateofCandidacyonlyasksforRESIDENCE.SinceonthebasisofherAnswer,shewasquite
awareof"residenceoforigin"whichsheinterpretstobeTaclobanCity,itiscuriouswhyshedidnotcite
TaclobanCityinherCertificateofCandidacy.Herexplanationthatshethoughtwhatwasaskedwas
heractualandphysicalpresenceinTolosaisnoteasytobelievebecausethereisnoneinthequestion
that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of
"Residencyin the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
Thus,theexplanationofrespondentfailstobepersuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is

devoidofmerit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case of
Alialyv.COMELEC(2SCRA957).TherelianceofrespondentonthecaseofAlialyismisplaced.The
case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or
deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The
Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant
case,theamendmentcannotbeconsideredasamatterofformoraninconsequentialdeviation.The
change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a
substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to
suppress,accuratematerialrepresentationintheoriginalcertificatewhichadverselyaffectsthefiler.To
admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating
candidate,ofthedetrimentoftheintegrityoftheelection.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to
prolongitbyclaimingitwas"sincechildhood"istoallowanuntruthfulnesstobecommittedbeforethis
Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her
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certificateofcandidacycanbegleanedfromherentryinherVoter'sRegistrationRecordaccomplished
onJanuary28,1995whichreflectsthatsheisaresidentofBrgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leytefor6monthsat
thetimeofthesaidregistration(AnnexA,Petition).Saidaccuracyisfurtherbuttressedbyherletterto
theelectionofficerofSanJuan,MetroManila,datedAugust24,1994,requestingforthecancellationof
herregistrationinthePermanentListofVotersthereatsothatshecanbereregisteredortransferred
toBrgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte.Thedatesofthesethree(3)differentdocumentsshowtherespondent's
consistentconvictionthatshehastransferredherresidencetoOlot,Tolosa,LeytefromMetroManila
onlyforsuchlimitedperiodoftime,startinginthelastweekofAugust1994whichonMarch8,1995
will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the
respondent'scontentionthatitwasanerror.
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BasedonthesereasonstheAmended/CorrectedCertificateofCandidacycannotbeadmittedbythis
Commission.
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Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not
compliedwiththeoneyearresidencyrequirementoftheConstitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile"
whichimportsnotonlytheintentiontoresideinafixedplacebutalsopersonalpresenceinthatplace,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto
Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294 Romualdez vs. RTCTacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not
TaclobanbutSanJuan,MetroManila.Thus,heranimusrevertendiispointedtoMetroManilaandnot
Tacloban.
ThisDivisionisawarethatherclaimthatshehasbeenaresidentoftheFirstDistrictsincechildhoodis
nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally
disqualified.Itcannotholdgroundinthefaceofthefactsadmittedbytherespondentinheraffidavit.
ExceptforthetimethatshestudiedandworkedforsomeyearsaftergraduationinTaclobanCity,she
continuouslylivedinManila.In1959,afterherhusbandwaselectedSenator,shelivedandresidedin
San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila
whereshewasagainaregisteredvoter.In1978,sheservedasmemberoftheBatasangPambansa
astherepresentativeoftheCityofManilaandlateronservedastheGovernorofMetroManila.She
couldnothaveservedthesepositionsifshehadnotbeenaresidentoftheCityofManila.Furthermore,
whenshefiledhercertificateofcandidacyfortheofficeofthePresidentin1992,sheclaimedtobea
residentofSanJuan,MetroManila.AsamatteroffactonAugust24,1994,respondentwrotealetter
withtheelectionofficerofSanJuan,MetroManilarequestingforthecancellationofherregistrationin
the permanent list of voters that she may be reregistered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte.ThesefactsmanifestthatshecouldnothavebeenaresidentofTaclobanCitysincechildhood
up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places,
includingMetroManila.ThisdebunksherclaimthatpriortoherresidenceinTolosa,Leyte,shewasa
residentoftheFirstLegislativeDistrictofLeytesincechildhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She
registeredasavoterindifferentplacesandonseveraloccasionsdeclaredthatshewasaresidentof
Manila.AlthoughshespentherschooldaysinTacloban,sheisconsideredtohaveabandonedsuch
placewhenshechosetostayandresideinotherdifferentplaces.InthecaseofRomualdezvs.RTC
(226SCRA408)theCourtexplainedhowoneacquiresanewdomicilebychoice.Theremustconcur:
(1)residenceorbodilypresenceinthenewlocality(2)intentiontoremainthereand(3)intentionto
abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non
revertendi.WhenrespondentchosetostayinIlocosandlateroninManila,coupledwithherintention
tostaytherebyregisteringasavoterthereandexpresslydeclaringthatsheisaresidentofthatplace,
sheisdeemedtohaveabandonedTaclobanCity,whereshespentherchildhoodandschooldays,as
herplaceofdomicile.
Pureintentiontoresideinthatplaceisnotsufficient,theremustlikewisebeconductindicativeofsuch
intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban,
withouttheaccompanyingconducttoprovethatintention,isnotconclusiveofherchoiceofresidence.
Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election,
showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in
Tolosa,shehadbeenaresidentofManila.
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ItisevidentfromthesecircumstancesthatshewasnotaresidentoftheFirstDistrictofLeyte"since
childhood."
TofurthersupporttheassertionthatshecouldhavenotbeenaresidentoftheFirstDistrictofLeytefor
morethanoneyear,petitionercorrectlypointedoutthatonJanuary28,1995respondentregisteredas
a voter at precinct No. 18A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration
Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequentialasarguedbytherespondentsinceitrefersonlytoherresidenceinTolosa,Leyte.But
herfailuretoprovethatshewasaresidentoftheFirstDistrictofLeytepriortoherresidenceinTolosa
leavesnothingbutaconvincingproofthatshehadbeenaresidentofthedistrictforsixmonthsonly.15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC enbanc denied petitioner's
MotionforReconsideration16oftheApril24,1995ResolutiondeclaringhernotqualifiedtorunforthepositionofMember
oftheHouseofRepresentativesfortheFirstLegislativeDistrictofLeyte.17TheResolutionterselystated:
AfterdeliberatingontheMotionforReconsideration,theCommissionRESOLVEDtoDENYit,nonew
substantialmattershavingbeenraisedthereintowarrantreexaminationoftheresolutiongrantingthe
petitionfordisqualification.18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the
canvassshowthatsheobtainedthehighestnumberofvotesinthecongressionalelectionsintheFirstDistrictof
Leyte.Onthesameday,however,theCOMELECreverseditselfandissuedasecondResolutiondirectingthatthe
proclamationofpetitionerbesuspendedintheeventthatsheobtainsthehighestnumberofvotes.19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the
electionsforthecongressionalseatintheFirstDistrictofLeyteheldMay8,1995basedonthecanvasscompleted
by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she
obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said
CertificateofCanvasswasannexedtotheSupplementalPetition.
OnaccountoftheResolutionsdisqualifyingpetitionerfromrunningforthecongressionalseatoftheFirstDistrictof
Leyteandthepublicrespondent'sResolutionsuspendingherproclamation,petitionercomestothiscourtforrelief.
PetitionerraisesseveralissuesinherOriginalandSupplementalPetitions.Theprincipalissuesmaybeclassified
intotwogeneralareas:
I.TheissueofPetitioner'squalifications
Whetherornotpetitionerwasaresident,forelectionpurposes,oftheFirstDistrictofLeyteforaperiod
ofoneyearatthetimeoftheMay9,1995elections.
II.TheJurisdictionalIssue
a)Priortotheelections
WhetherornottheCOMELECproperlyexerciseditsjurisdictionindisqualifyingpetitioneroutsidethe
periodmandatedbytheOmnibusElectionCodefordisqualificationcasesunderArticle78ofthesaid
Code.
b)AftertheElections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over
thequestionofpetitioner'squalificationsaftertheMay8,1995elections.
I.Petitioner'squalification
AperusaloftheResolutionoftheCOMELEC'sSecondDivisionrevealsastartlingconfusionintheapplicationof
settledconceptsof"Domicile"and"Residence"inelectionlaw.WhiletheCOMELECseemstobeinagreementwith
thegeneralpropositionthatforthepurposesofelectionlaw,residenceissynonymouswithdomicile,theResolution
revealsatendencytosubstituteormistaketheconceptofdomicileforactualresidence,aconceptionnotintended
forthepurposeofdeterminingacandidate'squalificationsforelectiontotheHouseofRepresentativesasrequired
bythe1987Constitution.Asitwere,residence,forthepurposeofmeetingthequalificationforanelectiveposition,
hasasettledmeaninginourjurisdiction.
Article50oftheCivilCodedecreesthat"[f]ortheexerciseofcivilrightsandthefulfillmentofcivilobligations,the
domicileofnaturalpersonsistheirplaceofhabitualresidence."InOngvs.Republic 20thiscourttooktheconceptof
domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one
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intendstoreturn,anddependsonfactsandcircumstancesinthesensethattheydiscloseintent."21Basedontheforegoing,
domicileincludesthetwinelementsof"thefactofresidingorphysicalpresenceinafixedplace"andanimusmanendi,orthe
intentionofreturningtherepermanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the
physicalpresenceofapersoninagivenarea,communityorcountry.Theessentialdistinctionbetweenresidence
anddomicileinlawisthatresidenceinvolvestheintenttoleavewhenthepurposeforwhichtheresidenthastaken
uphisabodeends.Onemayseekaplaceforpurposessuchaspleasure,business,orhealth.Ifaperson'sintentbe
toremain,itbecomeshisdomicileifhisintentistoleaveassoonashispurposeisestablisheditisresidence.22It
isthus,quiteperfectlynormalforanindividualtohavedifferentresidencesinvariousplaces.However,apersoncanonly
have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of
choice.InUytengsuvs.Republic,23welaidthisdistinctionquiteclearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicileinanother.Residenceisnotdomicile,butdomicileisresidencecoupledwiththeintentionto
remainforanunlimitedtime.Amancanhavebutonedomicileforthesamepurposeatanytime,but
hemayhavenumerousplacesofresidence.Hisplaceofresidenceisgenerallyhisplaceofdomicile,
butitisnotbyanymeansnecessarilysosincenolengthofresidencewithoutintentionofremainingwill
constitutedomicile.
Forpoliticalpurposestheconceptsofresidenceanddomicilearedictatedbythepeculiarcriteriaofpoliticallaws.As
these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residenceforelectionpurposesisusedsynonymouslywithdomicile.
InNuvalvs.Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention."25Larenavs.Teves26reiteratedthesamedoctrineinacaseinvolvingthequalificationsoftherespondenttherein
to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from
residencetopursuestudiesorpracticeaprofessionorregistrationasavoterotherthanintheplacewhereoneiselected
doesnotconstitutelossofresidence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other
electionlawcases,thisCourthasstatedthatthemereabsenceofanindividualfromhispermanentresidencewithoutthe
intentiontoabandonitdoesnotresultinalossorchangeofdomicile.
Thedeliberationsofthe1987Constitutionontheresidencequalificationforcertainelectivepositionshaveplaced
beyonddoubttheprinciplethatwhentheConstitutionspeaksof"residence"inelectionlaw,itactuallymeansonly
"domicile"towit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there
wasanattempttorequireresidenceintheplacenotlessthanoneyearimmediatelyprecedingtheday
oftheelections.Somyquestionis:WhatistheCommittee'sconceptofresidenceofacandidateforthe
legislature?Isitactualresidenceorisittheconceptofdomicileorconstructiveresidence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in
thedistrictforaperiodofnotlessthanoneyearprecedingthedayoftheelection.Thiswasineffect
liftedfromthe1973Constitution,theinterpretationgiventoitwasdomicile.29
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Mrs.RosarioBraid:ThenextquestionisonSection7,page2.IthinkCommissionerNolledohasraised
thesamepointthat"resident"hasbeeninterpretedattimesasamatterofintentionratherthanactual
residence.
Mr.DelosReyes:Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residenceratherthanmereintentiontoreside?
Mr.DelosReyes:Butwemightencountersomedifficultyespeciallyconsideringthataprovisioninthe
ConstitutionintheArticleonSuffragesaysthatFilipinoslivingabroadmayvoteasenactedbylaw.So,
wehavetosticktotheoriginalconceptthatitshouldbebydomicileandnotphysicalresidence.30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987
Constitutionobviouslyadheredtothedefinitiongiventothetermresidenceinelectionlaw,regardingitashavingthesame
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meaningasdomicile.32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency
requirementmandatedbyArticleVI,Sec.6ofthe1987Constitution?Ofwhatsignificanceisthequestionedentryin
petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whetherornotandindividualhassatisfiedtheconstitution'sresidencyqualificationrequirement.Thesaidstatement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
whichwouldotherwiserenderacandidateineligible.Itwouldbeplainlyridiculousforacandidatetodeliberatelyand
knowinglymakeastatementinacertificateofcandidacywhichwouldleadtohisorherdisqualification.
Itstandstoreasontherefore,thatpetitionermerelycommittedanhonestmistakeinjottingtheword"seven"inthe
spaceprovidedfortheresidencyqualificationrequirement.Thecircumstancesleadingtoherfilingthequestioned
entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her
actualstayinTolosa,LeyteinsteadofherperiodofresidenceintheFirstdistrict,whichwas"sincechildhood"inthe
space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's
questionedresolution,albeitwithadifferentinterpretation.Forinstance,whenhereinpetitionerannouncedthatshe
would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo
opposedthesame,claimingthatpetitionerwasaresidentofTolosa,notTaclobanCity.Petitionerthenregisteredin
herplaceofactualresidenceintheFirstDistrict,whichisTolosa,Leyte,afactwhichshesubsequentlynoteddown
inherCertificateofCandidacy.Acloselookatsaidcertificatewouldrevealthepossiblesourceoftheconfusion:the
entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a
candidateseekselectionthus:
7.RESIDENCE(completeAddress):Brgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte
POSTOFFICEADDRESSFORELECTIONPURPOSES:Brgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte
8.RESIDENCEINTHECONSTITUENCYWHEREISEEKTO
BEELECTEDIMMEDIATELYPRECEDINGTHEELECTION:_________YearsandSevenMonths.
HavingbeenforcedbyprivaterespondenttoregisterinherplaceofactualresidenceinLeyteinsteadofpetitioner's
claimeddomicile,itappearsthatpetitionerhadjotteddownherperiodofstayinherlegalresidenceordomicile.The
juxtapositionofentriesinItem7andItem8thefirstrequiringactualresidenceandthesecondrequiringdomicile
coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
writingdownanunintendedentryforwhichshecouldbedisqualified.Thishonestmistakeshouldnot,however,be
allowedtonegatethefactofresidenceintheFirstDistrictifsuchfactwereestablishedbymeansmoreconvincing
thanamereentryonapieceofpaper.
Wenowproceedtothematterofpetitioner'sdomicile.
Insupportofitsasseverationthatpetitioner'sdomicilecouldnotpossiblybeintheFirstDistrictofLeyte,theSecond
Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when
(petitioner)studiedandworkedforsomeyearsaftergraduationinTaclobanCity,shecontinuouslylivedinManila."
TheResolutionadditionallycitescertainfactsasindicativeofthefactthatpetitioner'sdomicileoughttobeanyplace
where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in
1959,residedinSanJuan,MetroManilawhereshewasalsoregisteredvoter.Then,in1965,followingtheelection
of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and
thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not,
haveservedthesepositionsifshehadnotbeenaresidentofMetroManila,"theCOMELECstressed.Hereiswhere
theconfusionlies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given
placeforvariouspurposes.Theabsencefromlegalresidenceordomiciletopursueaprofession,tostudyortodo
otherthingsofatemporaryorsemipermanentnaturedoesnotconstitutelossofresidence.Thus,theassertionby
theCOMELECthat"shecouldnothavebeenaresidentofTaclobanCitysincechildhooduptothetimeshefiled
hercertificateofcandidacybecauseshebecamearesidentofmanyplaces"fliesinthefaceofsettledjurisprudence
inwhichthisCourtcarefullymadedistinctionsbetween(actual)residenceanddomicileforelectionlawpurposes.In
Larenavs.Teves,33supra,westressed:
[T]hiscourtisoftheopinionandsoholdsthatapersonwhohashisownhousewhereinheliveswith
hisfamilyinamunicipalitywithouthavingeverhadtheintentionofabandoningit,andwithouthaving
livedeitheraloneorwithhisfamilyinanothermunicipality,hashisresidenceintheformermunicipality,
notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having
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beenacandidateforvariousinsularandprovincialpositions,statingeverytimethatheisaresidentof
thelattermunicipality.
Moresignificantly,inFayponvs.Quirino,34Weexplainedthat:
Acitizenmayleavetheplaceofhisbirthtolookfor"greenerpastures,"asthesayinggoes,toimprove
his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in
business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may
desiretoreturntohisnativetowntocasthisballotbutforprofessionalorbusinessreasons,orforany
other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business activities so there he
registershimselfasvoterashehasthequalificationstobeoneandisnotwillingtogiveuporlosethe
opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections.
Despitesuchregistration,theanimusrevertenditohishome,tohisdomicileorresidenceoforiginhas
notforsakenhim.Thismaybetheexplanationwhytheregistrationofavoterinaplaceotherthanhis
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
residence.Itfindsjustificationinthenaturaldesireandlongingofeverypersontoreturntohisplaceof
birth.Thisstrongfeelingofattachmenttotheplaceofone'sbirthmustbeovercomebypositiveproofof
abandonmentforanother.
Fromtheforegoing,itcanbeconcludedthatinitsabovecitedstatementssupportingitspropositionthatpetitioner
wasineligibletorunforthepositionofRepresentativeoftheFirstDistrictofLeyte,theCOMELECwasobviously
referringtopetitioner'svariousplacesof(actual)residence,notherdomicile.Indoingso,itnotonlyignoredsettled
jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisionsoftheOmnibusElectionCode(B.P.881).35
Whatisundeniable,however,arethefollowingsetoffactswhichestablishthefactofpetitioner'sdomicile,whichwe
liftverbatimfromtheCOMELEC'sSecondDivision'sassailedResolution:36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to
1949whenshegraduatedfromhighschool.ShepursuedhercollegestudiesinSt.Paul'sCollege,now
DivineWordUniversityinTacloban,wheresheearnedherdegreeinEducation.Thereafter,shetaught
intheLeyteChineseSchool,stillinTaclobanCity.In1952shewenttoManilatoworkwithhercousin,
the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married exPresident Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and
registeredthereasavoter.WhenherhusbandwaselectedSenatoroftheRepublicin1959,sheand
her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her
husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang
PalaceandregisteredasavoterinSanMiguel,Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu,
Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as
PresidentofthePhilippinesandfiledherCertificateofCandidacywhereinsheindicatedthatsheisa
residentandregisteredvoterofSanJuan,MetroManila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held
variousresidencesfordifferentpurposesduringthelastfourdecades.Noneofthesepurposesunequivocallypoint
toanintentiontoabandonherdomicileoforigininTacloban,Leyte.Moreover,whilepetitionerwasborninManila,
asaminorshenaturallyfollowedthedomicileofherparents.ShegrewupinTacloban,reachedheradulthoodthere
andeventuallyestablishedresidenceindifferentpartsofthecountryforvariousreasons.Evenduringherhusband's
presidency,attheheightoftheMarcosRegime'spowers,petitionerkeptherclosetiestoherdomicileoforiginby
establishingresidencesinTacloban,celebratingherbirthdaysandotherimportantpersonalmilestonesinherhome
province, instituting wellpublicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a
political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by
appointment,alwayswitheitherherinfluenceorconsent.Thesewellpublicizedtiestoherdomicileoforiginarepart
ofthehistoryandloreofthequartercenturyofMarcospowerinourcountry.Eithertheywereentirelyignoredinthe
COMELEC'SResolutions,orthemajorityoftheCOMELECdidnotknowwhattherestofthecountryalwaysknew:
thefactofpetitioner'sdomicileinTacloban,Leyte.
PrivaterespondentinhisComment,contendsthatTaclobanwasnotpetitioner'sdomicileoforiginbecauseshedid
not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her
residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) reestablish her domicile in said place by merely
expressingherintentiontolivethereagain."Wedonotagree.
First,minorfollowsthedomicileofhisparents.Asdomicile,onceacquiredisretaineduntilanewoneisgained,it
follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
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operationoflaw.ThisdomicilewasnotestablishedonlywhenherfatherbroughthisfamilybacktoLeytecontraryto
privaterespondent'saverments.
Second,domicileoforiginisnoteasilylost.Tosuccessfullyeffectachangeofdomicile,onemustdemonstrate:37
1.Anactualremovaloranactualchangeofdomicile
2.Abonafideintentionofabandoningtheformerplaceofresidenceandestablishinganewoneand
3.Actswhichcorrespondwiththepurpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residenceberebutted,forachangeofresidencerequiresanactualanddeliberateabandonment,andonecannot
havetwolegalresidencesatthesametime.38Inthecaseatbench,theevidenceadducedbyprivaterespondentplainly
lacksthedegreeofpersuasivenessrequiredtoconvincethiscourtthatanabandonmentofdomicileoforigininfavorofa
domicileofchoiceindeedoccurred.Toeffectanabandonmentrequiresthevoluntaryactofrelinquishingpetitioner'sformer
domicilewithanintenttosupplanttheformerdomicilewithoneofherownchoosing(domiciliumvoluntarium).
Inthisconnection,itcannotbecorrectlyarguedthatpetitionerlostherdomicileoforiginbyoperationoflawasa
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established
distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife
automaticallygainsthehusband'sdomicilebyoperationoflawuponmarriagecannotbeinferredfromtheuseoftheterm
"residence"inArticle110oftheCivilCodebecausetheCivilCodeisoneareawherethetwoconceptsarewelldelineated.
Dr.ArturoTolentino,writingonthisspecificareaexplains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply
relationsbetweenapersonandaplacebutinresidence,therelationisoneoffactwhileindomicileit
islegalorjuridical,independentofthenecessityofphysicalpresence.40
Article110oftheCivilCodeprovides:
Art.110.Thehusbandshallfixtheresidenceofthefamily.Butthecourtmayexemptthewifefrom
livingwiththehusbandifheshouldliveabroadunlessintheserviceoftheRepublic.
AsurveyofjurisprudencerelatingtoArticle110ortotheconceptsofdomicileorresidenceastheyaffectthefemale
spouseuponmarriageyieldsnothingwhichwouldsuggestthatthefemalespouseautomaticallylosesherdomicile
oforigininfavorofthehusband'schoiceofresidenceuponmarriage.
Article110isavirtualrestatementofArticle58oftheSpanishCivilCodeof1889whichstates:
Lamujerestaobligadaaseguirasumaridodondequieraquefijesuresidencia.LosTribunales,sin
embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su
residenciaaultramaro'apaisextranjero.
Notetheuseofthephrase"dondequierasufijederesidencia"intheaforequotedarticle,whichmeanswherever
(the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence
because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further
strengthenedbythephrase"cuandoelmaridotransladesuresidencia"inthesameprovisionwhichmeans,"when
thehusbandshalltransferhisresidence,"referringtoanotherpositiveactofrelocatingthefamilytoanotherhomeor
placeofactualresidence.Thearticleobviouslycannotbeunderstoodtorefertodomicilewhichisafixed,
fairlypermanentconceptwhenitplainlyconnotesthepossibilityoftransferringfromoneplacetoanothernotonly
once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the
conceptofactualresidence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and
unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of
origin).Thisdifferencecould,forthesakeoffamilyunity,bereconciledonlybyallowingthehusbandtofixasingle
placeofactualresidence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONSBETWEENHUSBANDANDWIFE.ImmediatelyprecedingArticle110isArticle109whichobliges
thehusbandandwifetolivetogether,thus:
Art.109.Thehusbandandwifeareobligatedtolivetogether,observemutualrespectandfidelity
andrendermutualhelpandsupport.
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Thedutytolivetogethercanonlybefulfilledifthehusbandandwifearephysicallytogether.Thistakesintoaccount
thesituationswherethecouplehasmanyresidences(asinthecaseofthepetitioner).Ifthehusbandhastostayin
or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live
together."Hence,itisillogicaltoconcludethatArt.110refersto"domicile"andnotto"residence."Otherwise,we
shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other
reasons,staysinoneoftheir(various)residences.AsDr.Tolentinofurtherexplains:
ResidenceandDomicileWhethertheword"residence"asusedwithreferencetoparticularmatters
issynonymouswith"domicile"isaquestionofsomedifficulty,andtheultimatedecisionmustbemade
fromaconsiderationofthepurposeandintentwithwhichthewordisused.Sometimestheyareused
synonymously,atothertimestheyaredistinguishedfromoneanother.
xxxxxxxxx
Residenceinthecivillawisamaterialfact,referringtothephysicalpresenceofapersoninaplace.A
personcanhavetwoormoreresidences,suchasacountryresidenceandacityresidence.Residence
isacquiredbylivinginplaceontheotherhand,domicilecanexistwithoutactuallylivingintheplace.
Theimportantthingfordomicileisthat,onceresidencehasbeenestablishedinoneplace,therebean
intentiontostaytherepermanently,evenifresidenceisalsoestablishedinsomeother
place.41
Infact, eventhe matterofacommon residencebetweenthe husbandand the wife during the marriageis not an
ironclad principle In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our
jurisprudencehasrecognizedcertainsituations42wherethespousescouldnotbecompelledtolivewitheachothersuch
thatthewifeiseitherallowedtomaintainaresidencedifferentfromthatofherhusbandor,forobviouslypracticalreasons,
reverttoheroriginaldomicile(apartfrombeingallowedtooptforanewone).InDelaVinavs.Villareal 43thisCourtheld
that"[a]marriedwomanmayacquirearesidenceordomicileseparatefromthatofherhusbandduringtheexistenceofthe
marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new
residenceortochooseanewdomicileinsuchanevent.Ininstanceswherethewifeactuallyopts,.undertheCivilCode,to
liveseparatelyfromherhusbandeitherbytakingnewresidenceorrevertingtoherdomicileoforigin,theCourthasheldthat
thewifecouldnotbecompelledtolivewithherhusbandonpainofcontempt.InArroyovs.VasquesdeArroyo 45theCourt
heldthat:
Uponexaminationoftheauthorities,weareconvincedthatitisnotwithintheprovinceofthecourtsof
thiscountrytoattempttocompeloneofthespousestocohabitwith,andrenderconjugalrightsto,the
other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of
suchrightscanbemaintained.Butwearedisinclinedtosanctionthedoctrinethatanorder,enforcible
(sic)byprocessofcontempt,maybeenteredtocompeltherestitutionofthepurelypersonalrightof
consortium.Atbestsuchanordercanbeeffectivefornootherpurposethantocompelthespousesto
live under the same roof and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is
extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the
restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife and if the facts were found to
warrantit,thatcourtwouldmakeamandatorydecree,enforceablebyprocessofcontemptincaseof
disobedience,requiringthedelinquentpartytolivewiththeotherandrenderconjugalrights.Yetthis
practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in
Weldonv.Weldon(9P.D.52),decidedin1883,SirJamesHannen,PresidentintheProbate,Divorce
and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the
subjectwasnotthesameasthatwhichprevailedinScotland,whereadecreeofadherence,equivalent
tothedecreefortherestitutionofconjugalrightsinEngland,couldbeobtainedbytheinjuredspouse,
butcouldnotbeenforcedbyimprisonment.Accordingly,inobediencetothegrowingsentimentagainst
the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment though a
decreefortherestitutionofconjugalrightscanstillbeprocured,andincaseofdisobediencemayserve
inappropriatecasesasthebasisofanorderfortheperiodicalpaymentofastipendinthecharacterof
alimony.
InthevoluminousjurisprudenceoftheUnitedStates,onlyonecourt,sofaraswecandiscover,has
everattemptedtomakeapreemptoryorderrequiringoneofthespousestolivewiththeotherandthat
was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his
domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was
based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It
was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of
Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of
contemptisrejected.(21Cyc.,1148).
InadecisionofJanuary2,1909,theSupremeCourtofSpainappearstohaveaffirmedanorderofthe
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Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the
alternative,uponherfailuretodoso,tomakeaparticulardispositionofcertainmoneyandeffectsthen
inherpossessionandtodelivertoherhusband,asadministratoroftheganancialproperty,allincome,
rents,andinterestwhichmightaccruetoherfromthepropertywhichshehadbroughttothemarriage.
(113Jur.Civ.,pp.1,11)Butitdoesnotappearthatthisorderforthereturnofthewifetothemarital
domicilewassanctionedbyanyotherpenaltythantheconsequencesthatwouldbevisiteduponherin
respect to the use and control of her property and it does not appear that her disobedience to that
orderwouldnecessarilyhavebeenfollowedbyimprisonmentforcontempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by
virtueofArticle110oftheCivilCodetofollowherhusband'sactualplaceofresidencefixedbyhim.Theproblem
hereisthatatthattime,Mr.Marcoshadseveralplacesofresidence,amongwhichwereSanJuan,RizalandBatac,
IlocosNorte.ThereisnoshowingwhichoftheseplacesMr.Marcosdidfixashisfamily'sresidence.Butassuming
thatMr.Marcoshadfixedanyoftheseplacesastheconjugalresidence,whatpetitionergaineduponmarriagewas
actualresidence.Shedidnotloseherdomicileoforigin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a
resultofourjurisprudentialexperiencesafterthedraftingoftheCivilCodeof1950,intotheNewFamilyCode.To
underscorethedifferencebetweentheintentionsoftheCivilCodeandtheFamilyCodedrafters,thetermresidence
hasbeensupplantedbythetermdomicileinanentirelynewprovision(Art.69)distinctlydifferentinmeaningand
spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's
rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the
spouses.46
Withoutasmuchbelaboringthepoint,thetermresidencemaymeanonethingincivillaw(orundertheCivilCode)
andquiteanotherthinginpoliticallaw.WhatstandsclearisthatinsofarastheCivilCodeisconcernedaffectingthe
rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence."Theinescapableconclusionderivedfromthisunambiguouscivillawdelineationtherefore,isthatwhen
petitionermarriedtheformerPresidentin1954,shekeptherdomicileoforiginandmerelygainedanewhome,not
adomiciliumnecessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only
acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country
clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by
operationoflaw)asherdomicile.This"choice"wasunequivocallyexpressedinherletterstotheChairmanofthe
PCGGwhenpetitionersoughtthePCGG'spermissionto"rehabilitate(our)ancestralhouseinTaclobanandFarmin
Olot,Leyte...tomakethemlivablefortheMarcosfamilytohaveahomeinourhomeland."47Furthermore,petitioner
obtainedherresidencecertificatein1992inTacloban,Leyte,whilelivinginherbrother'shouse,anactwhichsupportsthe
domiciliaryintentionclearlymanifestedinherletterstothePCGGChairman.Shecouldnothavegonestraighttoherhomein
SanJuan,asitwasinastateofdisrepair,havingbeenpreviouslylootedbyvandals.Her"homes"and"residences"following
herarrivalinvariouspartsofMetroManilamerelyqualifiedastemporaryor"actualresidences,"notdomicile.Moreover,and
proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of
origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she
cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where
situationsexistwithinthesubsistenceofthemarriageitselfwherethewifegainsadomiciledifferentfromherhusband.
Inthelightofalltheprinciplesrelatingtoresidenceanddomicileenunciatedbythiscourtuptothispoint,weare
persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's
claimoflegalresidenceordomicileintheFirstDistrictofLeyte.
II.Thejurisdictionalissue
PetitionerallegesthatthejurisdictionoftheCOMELEChadalreadylapsedconsideringthattheassailedresolutions
wererenderedonApril24,1995,fourteen(14)daysbeforetheelectioninviolationofSection78oftheOmnibus
Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the
COMELECwhichhasjurisdictionovertheelectionofmembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesinaccordancewithArticleVI
Sec.17oftheConstitution.Thisisuntenable.
Itisasettleddoctrinethatastatuterequiringrenditionofjudgmentwithinaspecifiedtimeisgenerallyconstruedto
bemerelydirectory,49"sothatnoncompliancewiththemdoesnotinvalidatethejudgmentonthetheorythatifthestatute
hadintendedsuchresultitwouldhaveclearlyindicatedit."50Thedifferencebetweenamandatoryandadirectoryprovision
isoftenmadeongroundsofnecessity.AdoptingthesameviewheldbyseveralAmericanauthorities,thiscourtinMarcelino
vs.Cruzheldthat:51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
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enforcingtheletterofthelaw.
InTrappv.McCormick,acasecallingfortheinterpretationofastatutecontainingalimitationofthirty
(30)dayswithinwhichadecreemaybeenteredwithouttheconsentofcounsel,itwasheldthat"the
statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of
statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is
essentialtoeffecttheaimandpurposeoftheLegislatureorsomeincidentoftheessentialact."Thus,
insaidcase,thestatuteunderexaminationwasconstruedmerelytobedirectory.
Themischiefinpetitioner'scontendingthattheCOMELECshouldhaveabstainedfromrenderingadecisionafter
the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and
otherquasijudicialbodieswouldthenrefusetorenderjudgmentsmerelyonthegroundofhavingfailedtoreacha
decisionwithinagivenorprescribedperiod.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is
evidentthattherespondentCommissiondoesnotlosejurisdictiontohearanddecideapendingdisqualificationcaseunder
Section78ofB.P.881evenaftertheelections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner'squalificationsaftertheMay8,1995elections,sufficeittosaythatHRET'sjurisdictionasthesolejudge
of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidatehasbecomeamemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives. 53PetitionernotbeingamemberoftheHouseof
Representatives,itisobviousthattheHRETatthispointhasnojurisdictionoverthequestion.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or
deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a
distinctionwasmadeonsuchagroundhere.Surely,manyestablishedprinciplesoflaw,evenofelectionlawswere
floutedforthesakeperpetuatingpowerduringthepreEDSAregime.Werenegeonthesesacredideals,including
themeaningandspiritofEDSAourselvesbendingestablishedprinciplesofprinciplesoflawtodenyanindividual
whatheorshejustlydeservesinlaw.Moreover,indoingso,wecondemnourselvestorepeatthemistakesofthe
past.
WHEREFORE,havingdeterminedthatpetitionerpossessesthenecessaryresidencequalificationstorunforaseat
intheHouseofRepresentativesintheFirstDistrictofLeyte,theCOMELEC'squestionedResolutionsdatedApril
24,May7,May11,andMay25,1995areherebySETASIDE.RespondentCOMELECisherebydirectedtoorder
theProvincialBoardofCanvasserstoproclaimpetitionerasthedulyelectedRepresentativeoftheFirstDistrictof
Leyte.
SOORDERED.
Feliciano,J.,isonleave.
SeparateOpinions
PUNO,J.,concurring:
ItwasAristotlewhotaughtmankindthatthingsthatarealikeshouldbetreatedalike,whilethingsthatareunalike
should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness. 1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the
residencerequirementprovidedbySection6,ArticleVIoftheConstitution.2Wecannotdisqualifyherandtreatherunalike,
fortheConstitutionguaranteesequalprotectionofthelaw.Iproceedfromthefollowingfactualandlegalpropositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in
Tacloban.TheirancestralhouseisinTacloban.Theyhavevastrealestateintheplace.Petitionerwenttoschool
andthereafterworkedthere.IconsiderTaclobanasherinitialdomicile,bothherdomicileoforiginandherdomicile
ofchoice.Herdomicileoforiginasitwasthedomicileofherparentswhenshewasaminorandherdomicileof
choice,asshecontinuedlivingthereevenafterreachingtheageofmajority.
Second.ThereisalsonoquestionthatinMay,1954,petitionermarriedthelatePresidentFerdinandE.Marcos.By
contractingmarriage,herdomicilebecamesubjecttochangebylaw,andtherighttochangeitwasgivenbyArticle
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110oftheCivilCodeprovides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from
living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis
supplied)
InDelaViav.VillarealandGeopano,4thisCourtexplainedwhythedomicileofthewifeoughttofollowthatof
thehusband.Weheld:"Thereasonisfoundeduponthetheoreticidentityofpersonandinterestbetweenthehusband
andthewife,andthepresumptionthat,fromthenatureoftherelation,thehomeofoneisthehomeoftheother.Itis
intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and
harmonyprevail."5Inaccordwiththisobjective,Article109oftheCivilCodealsoobligatedthehusbandandwife"to
livetogether."
Third.Thedifficultissuesstartaswedeterminewhetherpetitioner'smarriagetoformerPresidentMarcosipsofacto
resultedinthelossofherTaclobandomicile.Irespectfullysubmitthathermarriagebyitselfalonedidnotcauseher
toloseherTaclobandomicile.Article110oftheCivilCodemerelygavethehusbandtherighttofixthedomicileof
the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitlychoose the prior domicile of his wife, in which
case,thewife'sdomicileremainsunchanged.Thehusbandcanalsoimplicitlyacquiescetohiswife'spriordomicile
evenifitisdifferent.SoweheldindelaVia,6
....Whenmarriedwomenaswellaschildrensubjecttoparentalauthoritylive,withtheacquiescence
of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own
independentdomicile....
Itisnot,therefore,themerefactofmarriagebutthedeliberatechoiceofadifferentdomicilebythehusband
thatwillchangethedomicileofawifefromwhatitwaspriortotheirmarriage.Thedomiciliarydecisionmade
bythehusbandintheexerciseoftherightconferredbyArticle110oftheCivilCodebindsthewife.Anyand
allactsofawifeduringhercoverturecontrarytothedomiciliarychoiceofthehusbandcannotchangeinany
way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the
capacitytochooseherdomicilebutalsobecausetheyarecontrarytolawandpublicpolicy.
Inthecaseatbench,itisnotdisputedthatformerPresidentMarcosexercisedhisrighttofixthefamilydomicileand
established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and
throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has
beenfixedbyoperationoflaw,itwasnotaffectedin1959whenherhusbandwaselectedasSenator,whenthey
livedinSanJuan,Rizalandwheresheregisteredasavoter.Itwasnotalsoaffectedin1965whenherhusband
waselectedPresident,whentheylivedinMalacaangPalace,andwhensheregisteredasavoterinSanMiguel,
Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human
SettlementsandGovernorofMetroManiladuringtheincumbencyofherhusbandasPresidentofthenation.Under
Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the
evidenceshowshedidnoteffectanysuchchange.Toalargedegree,thisfollowsthecommonlawthat"awoman
onhermarriagelosesherowndomicileandbyoperationoflaw,acquiresthatofherhusband,nomatterwherethe
wifeactuallylivesorwhatshebelievesorintends."7
Fourth.ThemoredifficulttaskishowtointerprettheeffectofthedeathonSeptember28,1989offormerPresident
Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of
thoughtcontend foracceptance.One isespousedbyourdistinguishedcolleague, Mr. JusticeDavide, Jr.,heavily
relyingonAmericanauthorities.8Heechoesthetheorythatafterthehusband'sdeath,thewiferetainsthelastdomicileof
herhusbanduntilshemakesanactualchange.
Idonotsubscribetothissubmission.TheAmericancaselawthatthewifestillretainsherdeadhusband'sdomicile
isbasedonancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today.Thecommonlaw
identifiedthedomicileofawifeasthatofthehusbandanddeniedtoherthepowerofacquiringadomicileofher
ownseparateandapartfromhim.9Legalscholarsagreethattwo(2)reasonssupportthiscommonlawdoctrine.Thefirst
reasonas pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal existence of the
womanissuspendedduring
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the
desirabilityofhavingtheinterestsofeachmemberofthefamilyunitgovernedbythesamelaw."11Thepresumptionthatthe
wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its
extensionhaveprovidedsomeofthemostiniquitousjurisprudenceagainstwomen.Itwasundercommonlawthatthe1873
AmericancaseofBradwellv.Illinois12wasdecidedwherewomenweredeniedtherighttopracticelaw.Itwasunblushingly
ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupationsofcivillife...ThisisthelawoftheCreator."Indeed,therulingsrelieduponbyMr.JusticeDavideinCJS13and
AMJUR2d14areAmericanstatecourtdecisionshandeddownbetweentheyears191715and1938,16orbeforethetime
when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in far
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rangingstatelegislationsintheUnitedStatestoeliminategenderinequality.17Startinginthedecadeoftheseventies,the
courtslikewiseliberalizedtheirrulingsastheystartedinvalidatinglawsinfectedwithgenderbias.Itwasin1971whentheUS
SupremeCourtinReedv.Reed,18struckabigblowforwomenequalitywhenitdeclaredasunconstitutionalanIdaholaw
that required probate courts to choose male family members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere
administrativeinconveniencecannotjustifyasexbaseddistinction.Thesesignificantchangesbothinlawandincaselawon
the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of married women to their
husbandsbasedonthedubioustheoryoftheparties'theoreticoneness.TheCorpusJurisSecundumeditorsdidnotmiss
the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has been declared that under modern
statuteschangingthestatusofmarriedwomenanddepartingfromthecommonlawtheoryofmarriage,thereisnoreason
why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law." 19 In publishing in 1969 the
RestatementoftheLaw,Second(ConflictofLaws2d),thereputableAmericanLawInstitutealsocategoricallystatedthatthe
viewofBlackstone"...isnolongerheld.Astheresultofstatutesandcourtdecisions,awifenowpossessespracticallythe
samerightsandpowersasherunmarriedsister."20
Inthecaseatbench,wehavetodecidewhetherweshouldcontinueclingingtotheanachronisticcommonlawthat
demeanswomen,especiallymarriedwomen.IsubmitthattheCourthasnochoiceexcepttobreakawayfromthis
commonlawrule,therootofthemanydegradationsofFilipinowomen.Before1988,ourlawsparticularlytheCivil
Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth
Romero,citedafewofthemasfollows:21
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LegalDisabilitiesSufferedbyWives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or
disabilities.Forinstance,thewifecannotacceptgiftsfromothers,regardlessofthesexofthegiveror
thevalueofthegift,otherthanfromherverycloserelatives,withoutherhusband'sconsent.Shemay
accept only from, say, her parents, parentsinlaw, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so
calledfourthcivildegree.Shemaynotexerciseherprofessionoroccupationorengageinbusinessif
her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufficient to support their family in
accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for objecting, this is
withinthediscretionofthehusband.
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Becauseofthepresentinequitablesituation,theamendmentstotheCivilLawbeingproposedbythe
UniversityofthePhilippinesLawCenterwouldallowabsolutedivorcewhichseveresthematrimonial
ties,suchthatthedivorcedspousesarefreetogetmarriedayearafterthedivorceisdecreedbythe
courts.However,inordertoplacethehusbandandwifeonanequalfootinginsofarasthebasesfor
divorceareconcerned,thefollowingarespecifiedasthegroundsforabsolutedivorce:(1)adulteryor
having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways specified in the Revised Penal
Codeor(2)anattemptbytherespondentagainstthelifeofthepetitionerwhichamountstoattempted
parricideundertheRevisedPenalCode(3)abandonmentofthepetitionerbytherespondentwithout
justcauseforaperiodofthreeconsecutiveyearsor(4)habitualmaltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal
property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or
enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such
administrator.Consequently,thehusbandisauthorizedtoengageinactsandenterintotransactions
beneficialtotheconjugalpartnership.Thewife,however,cannotsimilarlybindthepartnershipwithout
thehusband'sconsent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law
designatesasthelegaladministratorofthepropertypertainingtotheunemancipatedchild.
TakingtheleadinAsia,ourgovernmentexertedefforts,principallythroughlegislations,toeliminateinequality
betweenmenandwomeninourland.ThewatershedcameonAugust3,1988whenourFamilyCodetook
effect which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and
responsibilities.22
TheFamilyCodeattainedthiselusiveobjectivebygivingnewrightstomarriedwomenandbyabolishingsexbased
privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the family
property, whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal partnership 23 joint parental
authorityovertheirminorchildren,bothovertheirpersonsaswellastheirproperties24jointresponsibilityforthesupportof
thefamily25therighttojointlymanagethehousehold26and,therighttoobjecttotheirhusband'sexerciseofprofession,
occupation,businessoractivity.27OfparticularrelevancetothecaseatbenchisArticle69oftheFamilyCodewhichtook
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awaytheexclusiverightofthehusbandtofixthefamilydomicileandgaveitjointlytothehusbandandthewife,thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide.
Thecourtmayexemptonespousefromlivingwiththeotherifthelattershouldliveabroadorthereare
othervalidandcompellingreasonsfortheexemption.However,suchexemptionshallnotapplyifthe
sameisnotcompatiblewiththesolidarityofthefamily.(Emphasissupplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live
together,formerMadamJusticeAliceSempioDiyoftheCourtofAppealsspecifiedtheinstanceswhenawife
maynowrefusetolivewithherhusband,thus:28
(2)Thewifehasthedutytolivewithherhusband,butshemayrefusetodosoincertaincaseslike:
(a)IftheplacechosenbythehusbandasfamilyresidenceisdangeroustoherLife
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making
commonlifeimpossible
(c)Ifthehusbandcompelshertolivewithhisparents,butshecannotgetalongwithher
motherinlaw and they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG
6122)
(d)Wherethehusbandhascontinuouslycarriedillicitrelationsfor10yearswithdifferent
womenandtreatedhiswiferoughlyandwithoutconsideration.(Dadivasv.Villanueva,54
Phil.92)
(e)Wherethehusbandspenthistimeingambling,givingnomoneytohisfamilyforfood
and necessities, and at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her.
(Panunciov.Sula,CA,34OG129)
(f)Ifthehusbandhasnofixedresidenceandlivesavagabondlifeasatramp(1Manresa
329)
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La.
Ann.70).
TheinescapableconclusionisthatourFamilyCodehascompletelyemancipatedthewifefromthecontrolof
the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this
insightfulviewinoneofhisrarelecturesafterretirement:29
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TheFamilyCodeisprimarilyintendedtoreformthefamilylawsoastoemancipatethewifefromthe
exclusivecontrolofthehusbandandtoplaceheratparitywithhiminsofarasthefamilyisconcerned.
The wife and the husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code. They are now joint
administratorsofthefamilypropertiesandexercisejointauthorityoverthepersonsandpropertiesof
their children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no longer prevail over the
wifebutshehastoagreeonallmattersconcerningthefamily.(Emphasissupplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and
perpetuatedbythecommonlaw,thereisnoreasoninespousingtheanomalousrulethatthewifestillretains
thedomicileofherdeadhusband.Article110oftheCivilCodewhichprovidesthestatutorysupportforthis
stancehasbeenrepealedbyArticle69oftheFamilyCode.Byitsrepeal,itbecomesadeadletterlaw,and
we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the
petitionerisstillboundbythedomiciliarydeterminationofherdeadhusband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due
processandequalprotectionof
law.30Itcanhardlybedoubtedthatthecommonlawimpositiononamarriedwomanofherdeadhusband'sdomicileeven
beyondhisgraveispatentlydiscriminatorytowomen.Itisagenderbaseddiscriminationandisnotrationallyrelatedtothe
objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous
fundamentallaws,the1987Constitutionismoreconcernedwithequalitybetweensexesasitexplicitlycommandsthatthe
State"...shallensurefundamentalequalitybeforethelawofwomenandmen."Tobeexact,section14,ArticleIIprovides:
"TheStaterecognizestheroleofwomeninnationbuilding,andshallensurefundamentalequalitybeforethelawofwomen
andmen.Weshallbetransgressingthesenseandessenceofthisconstitutionalmandateifweinsistongivingourwomen
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thecaveman'streatment.
Prescindingfromthesepremises,Irespectfullysubmitthatthebetterstanceistorulethatpetitionerreacquiredher
Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that
petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband's death otherwise, she would have no
domicileandthatwillviolatetheuniversalrulethatnopersoncanbewithoutadomicileatanypointoftime.This
stancealsorestorestherightofpetitionertochooseherdomicilebeforeitwastakenawaybyArticle110oftheCivil
Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the
fairnessofthecommonlawrequiringpetitionertochooseagainherTaclobandomicilebeforeshecouldbereleased
from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased
husbandwhenhefixedtheirdomicileinBatac.Herhusbandisdeadandhecannotruleherbeyondthegrave.The
lawdisablinghertochooseherowndomicilehasbeenrepealed.Consideringallthese,commonlawshouldnotput
the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor
reasonforthisgenderbasedburden.
ButevenassumingarguendothatthereisneedforconvincingproofthatpetitionerchosetoreacquireherTacloban
domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent
COMELEC,petitioneraverred:
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36.InNovember,1991,Icamehometoourbelovedcountry,afterseveralrequestsformyreturnwere
denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my
passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos,whichtheGovernmentconsideredathreattothenationalsecurityandwelfare.
38.Uponmyreturntothecountry,IwantedtoimmediatelyliveandresideinTaclobanCityorinOlot,
Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and
cannibalized.ThePCGG,however,didnotpermitandallowme.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a
friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and
PacificPlaza,allinMakati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San
Jose,TaclobanCity,andpursuedmynegotiationswithPCGGtorecovermysequesteredresidences
inTaclobanCityandBarangayOlot,Tolosa,Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I
renovated my parents' burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been
excalvated,unearthedandscattered.
41.OnNovember29,1993,IformallywrotePCGGChairmanMagtanggolGunigundoforpermissions
to
...rehabilitate...(o)urancestralhouseinTaclobanandfarmhouseinOlot,Leyte...to
makethemlivableforustheMarcosfamilytohaveahomeinourownmotherland.
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42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col.
Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte
residences.Iquotepartofhisletter:
DearCol.Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to
visitoursequesteredpropertiesinLeyte,pleaseallowheraccessthereto.Shemayalso
cause repairs and renovation of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be
understoodthatherundertakingsaidrepairsisnotauthorizationforhertotakeoversaid
properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please
extendthenecessarycourtesytoher.
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43.Iwasnotpermitted,however,toliveandstayintheSto.NioShrineresidenceinTaclobanCity
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where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I
transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when
PCGGpermittedmetostayandlivethere.
Itisthenclearthatin1992petitionerreestablishedherdomicileintheFirstDistrictofLeyte.Itisnotdisputed
thatin1992,shefirstlivedatthehouseofherbrotherinSanJose,TaclobanCityandlater,inAugust1994,
she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of
OlotarewithintheFirstDistrictofLeyte.Sincepetitionerreestablishedherolddomicilein1992intheFirst
DistrictofLeyte,shemorethancompliedwiththeconstitutionalrequirementofresidence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8,
1995elections.
TheevidencepresentedbytheprivaterespondenttonegatetheTaclobandomicileofpetitionerisnil.Hepresented
petitioner'sVoter'sRegistrationRecordfiledwiththeBoardofElectionInspectorsofPrecinct10AofBarangayOlot,
Tolosa,Leytewhereinshestatedthatherperiodofresidenceinsaidbarangaywassix(6)monthsasofthedateof
herfilingofsaidVoter'sRegistrationRecordonJanuary28,1995.31Thisstatementinpetitioner'sVoter'sRegistration
Recordisanonprejudicialadmission.TheConstitutionrequiresatleastone(1)yearresidenceinthedistrict in which the
candidateshallbeelected.Inthecaseatbench,thereferenceistheFirstDistrictofLeyte.Petitioner'sstatementprovedthat
sheresidedinOlotsix(6)monthsbeforeJanuary28,1995butdidnotdisprovethatshehasalsoresidedinTaclobanCity
starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months
residenceinOlotshouldbecountednotagainst,butinherfavor.Privaterespondentalsopresentedpetitioner'sCertificateof
Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 32 where she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information
regarding"residenceintheconstituencywhereIseektobeelectedimmediatelyprecedingtheelection."Again,thisoriginal
certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,33 petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a
certificateofcandidacytocorrectabonafidemistakehasbeenallowedbythisCourtasamatterofcourseandasamatter
ofright.AsweheldinAlialyv.COMELEC,34viz.:
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The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate of
candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid.
The amendment of the certificate, although at a date after the deadline, but before the election, was
substantialcompliancewiththelaw,andthedefectwascured.
Itgoeswithoutsayingthatpetitioner'serroneousCertificateofCandidacyfiledonMarch8,1995cannotbe
usedasevidenceagainsther.Privaterespondent'spetitionforthedisqualificationofpetitionerrestedalone
onthesetwo (2)brittlepiecesofdocumentaryevidencepetitioner'sVoter'sRegistration Record and her
original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless
contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify
petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have
overwhelminglyvotedforher.
Fifth.Section10,ArticleIXCoftheConstitutionmandatesthat"bonafidecandidatesforanypublicofficeshallbe
free from any form of harassment and discrimination."35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will
showthatallformsoflegalandextralegalobstacleshavebeenthrownagainstpetitionertopreventherfromrunningasthe
people'srepresentativeintheFirstDistrictofLeyte.Inpetitioner'sAnswertothepetitiontodisqualifyher,sheaverred:36
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10.Petitioner's(hereinprivaterespondentMontejo)motiveinfilingtheinstantpetitionisdevious.When
respondent(petitionerherein)announcedthatshewasintendingtoregisterasavoterinTaclobanCity
and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner
herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her sixmonth actual residence
therein,petitioner(Montejo)filedapetitionwiththeCOMELECtotransferthetownofTolosafromthe
First District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's)
opponentinthecongressionalelectionintheFirstDistrict.Healsofiledabill,alongwithotherLeyte
Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the
FirstDistrictandtomakeitapartofthenewdistrict,toachievehispurpose.However,suchbilldidnot
passtheSenate.Having,failedonsuchmoves,petitionernowfiledtheinstantpetition,forthesame
objective,asitisobviousthatheisafraidtosubmithimselfalongwithrespondent(petitionerherein)for
thejudgmentandverdictoftheelectorateoftheFirstDistrictofLeyteinanhonest,orderly,peaceful,
freeandcleanelectionsonMay8,1995.
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Theseallegationswhichprivaterespondentdidnotchallengewerenotlost
totheperceptiveeyeofCommissionerMaambongwhoinhisDissentingOpinion,37held:
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Prior to the registration date January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo)
wrotetheElectionOfficerofTaclobanCitynottoallowrespondent(petitionerherein)toregisterthereat
since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner
(Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95001 (In the matter of the Legislative
Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the New Provinces of
Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
Representative,FirstDistrictofLeyte,wantedtheMunicipalityofTolosa,intheFirstDistrictofLeyte,
transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the
SecondDistrictofLeyte,opposedthemoveofthepetitioner(Montejo).UnderComelecResolutionNo.
2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections refused to make the proposed transfer.
Petitioner(Montejo)filed"MotionforReconsiderationofResolution
No.2736"whichtheCommissiondeniedinaResolutionpromulgatedonFebruary1,1995.Petitioner
(Montejo)filedapetitionforcertioraribeforetheHonorableSupremeCourt(CiriloRoyG.Montejovs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing
that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure
thattherespondent(petitionerherein)willregisterasavoterinTolosasothatshewillbeforcedtorun
asRepresentativenotintheFirstbutintheSecondDistrict.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a
"Decision,"pennedbyAssociateJusticeReynatoS.Puno,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the

municipalityofCapoocanoftheSecondDistrictandthemunicipalityofPalomponofthe
FourthDistricttotheThirdDistrictoftheprovinceofLeyte,isannulledandsetaside.We
alsodenythePetitionprayingforthetransferofthemunicipalityofTolosafromtheFirst
DistricttotheSecondDistrictoftheprovinceofLeyte.Nocosts.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to
registerintheMunicipalityofTolosawhereherhouseisinsteadofTaclobanCity,herdomicile.Inany
case,bothTaclobanCityandTolosaareintheFirstLegislativeDistrict.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious
discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any
hermeneuticviolencetotheConstitutionbytorturingthemeaningofequality,theendresultofwhichwillallow
the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light
and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different"
Constitution,andtheworstwaytointerprettheConstitutionistoinjectinitsinterpretation,bileandbitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera, 38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or
newcomer,unacquainted,withtheconditionsandneedsofacommunityandnotidentifiedwiththelatter,fromanelective
officetoservethatcommunity...."Petitioner'slifetimecontactswiththeFirstDistrictofLeytecannotbecontested.Nobody
canclaimthatsheisnotacquaintedwithitsproblemsbecausesheisastrangertotheplace.Nonecanargueshecannot
satisfytheintentoftheConstitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate.
The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventyone (70,471) votes,
while private respondent got only ThirtySix Thousand Eight Hundred ThirtyThree (36,833) votes. Petitioner is
clearlytheoverwhelmingchoiceoftheelectorateoftheFirstDistrictofLeyteandthisisnotasleightofstatistics.
Wecannotfrustratethissovereignwillonhighlyarguabletechnicalconsiderations.Incaseofdoubt,weshouldlean
towardsarulethatwillgivelifetothepeople'spoliticaljudgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status
betweenwomenandmenbyrejectingtheiniquitouscommonlawprecedentsonthedomicileofmarriedwomenand
by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is
eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous
balance of advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the
glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this genderbased
discriminationagainstmarriedwomenandweshouldnotexcavatewhathasbeenentombed.Moreimportantly,the
Constitutionforbidsit.
Ivotetograntthepetition.
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BellosilloandMelo,JJ.,concur.
FRANCISCO,J.,concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of the
First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's
domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of
removingtherefrom,andthatplaceisproperlythedomicileofapersoninwhichhehasvoluntarilyfixedhisabode,
orhabitation,notforamerespecialortemporarypurpose,butwithapresentintentionofmakingithispermanent
home(28C.J.S.1).Itdenotesafixedpermanentresidencetowhichwhenabsentforbusiness,orpleasure,orfor
likereasonsoneintendstoreturn,anddependsonfactsandcircumstances,inthesensethattheydiscloseintent.
(OngHuanTinv.Republic,19SCRA966,969)
Domicileisclassifiedintodomicileoforiginanddomicileofchoice.Thelawattributestoeveryindividualadomicile
oforigin,whichisthedomicileofhisparents,oroftheheadofhisfamily,orofthepersononwhomheislegally
dependentatthetimeofhisbirth.Whilethedomicileoforiginisgenerallytheplacewhereoneisbornorreared,it
maybeelsewhere(28C.J.S.5).Domicileofchoice,ontheotherhand,istheplacewhichthepersonhaselected
andchosenforhimselftodisplacehispreviousdomicileithasforitstruebasisorfoundationtheintentionofthe
person (28C.J.S. 6).In ordertoholdthataperson hasabandonedhis domicileand acquired a new one called
domicileofchoice,thefollowingrequisitesmustconcur,namely,(a)residenceorbodilypresenceinthenewlocality,
(b) intention to remain there or animusmanendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animusnon
revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by
operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence,
ordinarilyresultingfromlegaldomesticrelations,asthatofthewifearisingfrommarriage,ortherelationofaparent
andachild(28C.J.S.7).
Inelectionlaw,whenourConstitutionspeaksofresidenceforelectionpurposesitmeansdomicile(Cov.Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713 Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind,
public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner's
disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated oneyear residence
requirement.Apparently,publicrespondentCommissiondeemedasconclusivepetitioner'sstayandregistrationas
voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban,
Leyte.Inseveraldecisions,though,theCourthaslaiddowntherulethatregistrationofavoterinaplaceotherthan
hisplaceoforiginisnotsufficienttoconstituteabandonmentorlossofsuchresidence(Fayponv.Quirino,96Phil.
294,300).RespondentCommissionofferednocogentreasontodepartfromthisruleexcepttosurmisepetitioner's
intentofabandoningherdomicileoforigin.
Ithasbeensuggestedthatpetitioner'sdomicileoforiginwassupplantedbyanewdomicileduetohermarriage,a
domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her
husband'sdomicile,i.e.,Batac,IlocosNorte,untilshemakesanactualchangethereof.Ifindthispropositionquite
untenable.
Tacloban,Leyte,ispetitioner'sdomicileoforiginwhichwasinvoluntarilysupplantedwithanother,i.e.,Batac,Ilocos
Norte,uponhermarriagein1954withthenCongressmanMarcos.Bylegalfictionshefollowedthedomicileofher
husband.Inmyview,thereasonforthelawisforthespousestofullyandeffectivelyperformtheirmaritaldutiesand
obligationstooneanother.1Thequestionofdomicile,however,isnotaffectedbythefactthatitwasthelegalormoral
dutyoftheindividualtoresideinagivenplace(28C.J.S.11).Thus,whilethewiferetainshermaritaldomicilesolongas
the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases.
Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and
unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any
meaningfulpurpose.
ItismyviewthereforethatpetitionerrevertedtoheroriginaldomicileofTacloban,Leyteuponherhusband'sdeath
without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to
disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other
place/s.Theclearruleisthatitistheparty(hereinprivaterespondent)claimingthatapersonhasabandonedorlost
his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino,
supra at 298 28 C.J.S. 16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as
against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the
recordisdevoidofconvincingproofthatpetitionerhasacquiredwhethervoluntarilyorinvoluntarily,anewdomicile
toreplaceherdomicileoforigin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional oneyear residence
requirement.Afterherexileabroad,shereturnedtothePhilippinesin1991toresideinOlot,Tolosa,Leyte,butthe
Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential house and other properties
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forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the
Petition).In1992,sheranforthepositionofpresidentwritinginhercertificateofcandidacyherresidenceasSan
Juan,MetroManila.Afterherlosstherein,shewentbacktoTaclobanCity,acquiredherresidencecertificate2and
residedwithherbrotherinSanJose.SheresidedinSanJose,TaclobanCityuntilAugustof1994whenshewasallowedby
the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).3 It was in the
samemonthofAugustwhensheappliedforthecancellationofherpreviousregistrationinSanJuan,MetroManilainorder
toregisteranewasvoterofOlot,Tolosa,Leyte,whichshedidonJanuary28,1995.Fromthissequenceofevents,Ifindit
quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the oneyear residence requirement the date when she applied for the
cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to
disproveisthatpetitionertransferredherresidenceafterthe1992presidentialelectionfromSanJuan,MetroManilatoSan
Jose,TaclobanCity,andresidedthereinuntilAugustof1994.ShelatertransferredtoOlot,Tolosa,Leyte(AnnexI,p.7).It
appearingthatbothTaclobanCityandTolosa,LeytearewithintheFirstCongressionalDistrictofLeyte,itindubitablystands
that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has
satisfactorilycompliedwiththeoneyearqualificationrequiredbythe1987Constitution.
ROMERO,J.,separateopinion:
PetitionerhasappealedtothisCourtforreliefaftertheCOMELECruledthatshewasdisqualifiedfromrunningfor
Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her
proclamationshouldbesuspended.NotbyastraightforwardrulingdidtheCOMELECpronounceitsdecisionashas
been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its
shiftingstancevisavispetitioner'scertificateofcandidacywerefirst,theactionofitsSecondDivisiondisqualifying
her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 21 on April 24, 1995 then the denial by the
COMELECenbancofherMotionforReconsiderationonMay7,1995,adaybeforetheelectionthenbecauseshe
persistedinrunning,itsdecisionon
May11,1995orthreedaysaftertheelection,allowingherproclamationintheeventthattheresultsofthecanvass
should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won
overwhelminglyoverheropponent),butalmostsimultaneouslyreversingitselfbydirectingthatevenifshewins,her
proclamationshouldnonethelessbesuspended.
Crucialtotheresolutionofthedisqualificationissuepresentedbythecaseatbenchistheinterpretationtobegiven
totheoneyearresidencyrequirementimposedbytheConstitutiononaspirantsforaCongressionalseat.1
Bearinginmindthattheterm"resident"hasbeenheldtobesynonymouswith"domicile"forelectionpurposes,itis
important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had
resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents
livedatthetimeofherbirth.Dependingonwhattheoryoneadopts,thesamemayhavebeenchangedwhenshe
married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly
releasedherfromtheobligationtolivewithhimattheresidencefixedbyhimduringhislifetime.Whatmayconfuse
thelaymanatthispointisthefactthattheterm"domicile"mayreferto"domicileoforigin,""domicileofchoice,"or
"domicilebyoperationoflaw,"whichsubjectweshallnotbelaborsinceithasbeenamplydiscussedbytheponente
andintheotherseparateopinions.
Inanycase,whatassumesrelevanceisthedivergenceoflegalopinionastotheeffectofthehusband'sdeathon
thedomicileofthewidow.Somescholarsopinethatthewidow'sdomicileremainsunchangedthatthedeceased
husband'swishesperforcestillbindthewifehehasleftbehind.Giventhisinterpretation,thewidowcannotpossibly
gofarenoughtoseverthedomiciliarytieimposedbyherhusband.
Itisbadenoughtointerpretthelawasempoweringthehusbandunilaterallytofixtheresidenceordomicileofthe
family,aslaiddownintheCivilCode,2buttocontinuegivingobeisancetohiswishesevenaftertherationaleunderlying
themutualdutyofthespousestolivetogetherhasceased,istocloseone'seyestothestarkrealitiesofthepresent.
Attheotherextremeisthepositionthatthewidowautomaticallyrevertstoherdomicileoforiginuponthedemiseof
herhusband.Doesthelawsoabhoravacuumthatthewidowhastobeendowedsomehowwithadomicile?To
answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile.
Everyonemusthaveadomicile.Thenonemusthaveonlyasingledomicileforthesamepurposeatanygiventime.
Once established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as
definedbythelawbeissubjectto.
Atthisjuncture,weareconfrontedwithanunexploredlegalterraininthisjurisdiction,renderedmoremurkybythe
conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to
illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of according
petitionerherrighttochooseherdomicileinkeepingwiththeenlightenedglobaltrendtorecognizeandprotectthe
humanrightsofwomen,nolessthanmen.
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Admittedly,thenotionofplacingwomenatparwithmen,insofarascivil,politicalandsocialrightsareconcerned,is
arelativelyrecentphenomenonthattookseedonlyinthemiddleofthiscentury.Itisahistoricalfactthatforover
threecenturies,thePhilippineshadbeencolonizedbySpain,aconservative,Catholiccountrywhichtransplantedto
ourshorestheOldWorldcultures,moresandattitudesandvalues.Throughtheimpositiononourgovernmentof
theSpanishCivilCodein1889,thepeople,bothmenandwomen,hadnochoicebuttoacceptsuchconceptsas
thehusband'sbeingtheheadofthefamilyandthewife'ssubordinationtohisauthority.Insuchrole,hiswasthe
righttomakevitaldecisionsforthefamily.Manyinstancescometomind,foremostbeingwhatisrelatedtotheissue
beforeus,namely,that"thehusbandshallfixtheresidenceofthefamily." 3Becauseheismaderesponsibleforthe
supportofthewifeandtherestofthefamily,4heisalsoempoweredtobetheadministratoroftheconjugalproperty,witha
fewexceptions5andmay,therefore,disposeoftheconjugalpartnershippropertyforthepurposesspecifiedunderthelaw6
whereas,asageneralrule,thewifecannotbindtheconjugalpartnershipwithoutthehusband'sconsent.7Asregardsthe
propertypertainingtothechildrenunderparentalauthority,thefatheristhelegaladministratorandonlyinhisabsencemay
themotherassumehispowers.8Demeaningtothewife'sdignityarecertainstricturesonherpersonalfreedoms,practically
relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's
consent,acquireanygratuitoustitle,exceptfromherascendants,descendants,parentsinlaw,andcollateralrelativeswithin
thefourthdegree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her
profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the family, according to its social
standingandhisoppositionisfoundedonseriousandvalidgrounds.10Mostoffensive,ifnotrepulsive,totheliberalminded
is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the death of her husband,
unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the
parentalauthorityoverherchildren,unlessthedeceasedhusband,fatherofthelatter,hasexpresslyprovidedinhiswillthat
hiswidowmightmarryagain,andhasorderedthatinsuchcasesheshouldkeepandexerciseparentalauthorityovertheir
children.12Again,aninstanceofahusband'soverarchinginfluencefrombeyondthegrave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from them
until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found hospitable
lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the
Spanish"conquistadores"hadbeenoverthrownbytheAmericanforcesattheturnofthecentury.Thebedrockof
theU.N.Charterwasfirmlyanchoredonthiscredo:"toreaffirmfaithinthefundamentalhumanrights,inthedignity
andworthofthehumanperson,intheequalrightsofmenandwomen."(Emphasissupplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the
feministmovement.Whatmayberegardedastheinternationalbillofrightsforwomenwasimplantedinthe
ConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(CEDAW)adoptedbytheU.N.
GeneralAssemblywhichenteredintoforceasaninternationaltreatyonSeptember3,1981.Inratifyingthe
instrument,thePhilippinesbounditselftoimplementitsliberatingspiritandletter,foritsConstitution,noless,
declaredthat"ThePhilippines...adoptsthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawaspartofthe
lawofthelandandadherestothepolicyofpeace,equality,justice,freedom,cooperation,andamitywithall
nations."13OnesuchprincipleembodiedintheCEDAWisgrantingtomenandwomen"thesamerightswithregard
to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile." 14
(Emphasissupplied).
CEDAW'sprowomenorientationwhichwasnotlostonFilipinowomenwasreflectedinthe1987Constitutionofthe
Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily approved by the first lady President of the
country,CorazonC.Aquino.Notableforitsemphasisonthehumanrightsofallindividualsanditsbiasforequalitybetween
thesexesarethefollowingprovisions:"TheStatevaluesthedignityofeveryhumanpersonandguaranteesfullrespectfor
humanrights"16and"TheStaterecognizestheroleofwomeninnationbuilding,andshallensurethefundamentalequality
beforethelawofwomenandmen."17
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory
provisionsoflawwasthedeletionintheFamilyCodeofalmostalloftheunreasonablestricturesonwivesandthe
granttothemofpersonalrightsequaltothatoftheirhusbands.Specifically,thehusbandandwifearenowgiventhe
rightjointlytofixthefamilydomicile18concomitanttothespouses'beingjointlyresponsibleforthesupportofthefamily
istherightanddutyofbothspousestomanagethehousehold19theadministrationandtheenjoymentofthecommunity
propertyshallbelongtobothspousesjointly20thefatherandmothershallnowjointlyexerciselegalguardianshipoverthe
propertyoftheirunemancipatedcommonchild21andseveralothers.
Awareofthehiatusandcontinuinggapsinthelaw,insofaraswomen'srightsareconcerned,Congresspasseda
lawpopularlyknownas"WomeninDevelopmentandNationBuildingAct"22Amongtherightsgiventomarriedwomen
evidencingtheircapacitytoactincontractsequaltothatofmenare:
(1)Womenshallhavethecapacitytoborrowandobtainloansandexecutesecurityandcreditarrangementsunder
thesameconditionsasmen
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(2)Womenshallhaveequalaccesstoallgovernmentandprivatesectorprogramsgrantingagriculturalcredit,loans
andnonmaterialresourcesandshallenjoyequaltreatmentinagrarianreformandlandresettlementprograms
(3)Womenshallhaveequalrightstoactasincorporatorsandenterintoinsurancecontractsand
(4)Marriedwomenshallhaverightsequaltothoseofmarriedmeninapplyingforpassports,securevisasandother
traveldocuments,withoutneedtosecuretheconsentoftheirspouses.
AstheworlddrawsthecurtainontheFourthWorldConferenceofWomeninBeijing,letthisCourtnowbethefirst
to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full
participation in decisionmaking at all levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself a
MemberofthePhilippineDelegationtotheInternationalWomen'sYearConferenceinMexicoin1975,thiswriteris
only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not
excluded,tobeacceptedasequalsofmenandtoteardownthewallsofdiscriminationthatholdthembackfrom
theirproperplacesunderthesun.
Inlightoftheinexorablesweepofevents,localandglobal,legislative,executiveandjudicial,accordingmorerights
towomenhithertodeniedthemandeliminatingwhateverpocketsofdiscriminationstillexistintheircivil,politicaland
social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their
husbandsbutmustretainthesame,regardless?
Isubmitthatawidow,likethepetitionerandotherssimilarlysituated,cannolongerbeboundbythedomicileofthe
departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but
exercisingfreewill,shemayopttoreestablishherdomicileoforigin.InreturningtoTaclobanandsubsequently,to
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by
overtacts,herelectionofadomicileofchoice,inthiscase,areversiontoherdomicileoforigin.Addedtogether,the
time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the oneyear requirement to run as
RepresentativeoftheFirstDistrictofLeyte.
Inviewoftheforegoingexpatiation,IvotetoGRANTthepetition.
VITUG,J.,separateopinion:
ThecaseatbenchdealswithexplicitConstitutionalmandates.
TheConstitutionisnotapliableinstrument.Itisabedrockinourlegalsystemthatsetsupidealsanddirectionsand
rendersteadyourstrideshence.Itonlylooksbacksoastoensurethatmistakesinthepastarenotrepeated.A
compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well
becomeoutdatedbytherealitiesoftime.Whenitdoes,itmustbechangedbutwhileitremains,weoweitrespect
and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory
needs,letalonesocietalattitudes,ortheConstitutionmightloseitsveryessence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by
necessaryimplication,adifferentintentionismanifest(seeMarcelinovs.Cruz,121SCRA51).
ThetwoprovisionsinitiallybroughttofocusareSection6andSection17ofArticleVIofthefundamentallaw.These
provisionsread:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a naturalborn

citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twentyfive years of age, able to
readandwrite,and,exceptthepartylistrepresentatives,aregisteredvoterinthedistrictinwhichhe
shallbeelected,andaresidentthereofforaperiodofnotlessthanoneyearimmediatelypreceding
thedayoftheelection.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respectiveMembers.EachElectoralTribunalshallbecomposedofnineMembers,threeofwhomshall
beJusticesoftheSupremeCourttobedesignatedbytheChiefJustice,andtheremainingsixshallbe
MembersoftheSenateortheHouseofRepresentatives,asthecasemaybe,whoshallbechosenon
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registeredunderthepartylistsystemrepresentedtherein.TheseniorJusticeintheElectoralTribunal
shallbeitsChairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws and
regulationsrelativetotheconductofelection..."(Art.IX,C,Sec.2,Constitution)that,therebeingnothingsaidto
the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law of
candidates to an elective office. Indeed, preproclamation controversies are expressly placed under the
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COMELEC'sjurisdictiontohearandresolve(Art.IX,C,Sec.3,Constitution).
Thematterbeforeusspecificallycallsfortheobservanceoftheconstitutionaloneyearresidencyrequirement.The
issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least
inextricablylinkedtosuchdetermination.ThefindingsandjudgmentoftheCOMELEC,inaccordancewiththelong
establishedruleandsubjectonlytoanumberofexceptionsunderthebasicheadingof"graveabuseofdiscretion,"
arenotreviewablebythisCourt.
Idonotfindmuchneedtodoacomplexexerciseonwhatseemstometobeaplainmatter.Generally,theterm
"residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official
dutiesmayrequirehimtostay)ortemporary(theplacewherehesojournsduringaconsiderablelengthoftime).For
civillawpurposes,i.e.,asregardstheexerciseofcivilrightsandthefulfillmentofcivilobligations,thedomicileofa
naturalpersonistheplaceofhishabitualresidence(see Article 50,Civil Code).Inelection cases, thecontrolling
ruleisthatheretoforeannouncedbythisCourtinRomualdezvs.RegionalTrialCourt,Branch7,TaclobanCity(226
SCRA408,409)thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term
"residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicativeofsuchintention.""Domicile"denotesafixedpermanentresidencetowhichwhenabsentfor
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus acquired,
however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new
domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intentiontoremainthere,and(3)anintentiontoabandontheolddomicile.Inotherwords,theremust
basicallybeanimusmanendicoupledwithanimusnonrevertendi.Thepurposetoremaininoratthe
domicileofchoicemustbeforanindefiniteperiodoftimethechangeofresidencemustbevoluntary
andtheresidenceattheplacechosenforthenewdomicilemustbeactual.
Usingtheabovetests,IamnotconvincedthatwecanchargetheCOMELECwithhavingcommittedgrave
abuseofdiscretioninitsassailedresolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunalconcernedbegins.Itsignifiesthattheprotesteemusthavetheretoforebeendulyproclaimedandhassince
becomea"member"oftheSenateortheHouseofRepresentatives.Thequestioncanbeaskedonwhetherornot
theproclamationofacandidateisjustaministerialfunctionoftheCommissiononElectionsdictatedsolelyonthe
numberofvotescastinanelectionexercise.Ibelieve,itisnot.Aministerialdutyisanobligationtheperformanceof
which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its
particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be
requiredbylawbeforeaproclamationisproperlydone.
TheCourt,onitspart,should,inmyviewatleast,refrainfromanyundueencroachmentontheultimateexerciseof
authoritybytheElectoralTribunalsonmatterswhich,bynolessthanaconstitutionalfiat,areexplicitlywithintheir
exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory
pronouncementontheabilityoftheElectoralTribunaltolatercomeupwithitsownjudgmentinacontest"relatingto
theelection,returnsandqualification"ofitsmembers.
Prescindingfromalltheforegoing,IshouldliketonexttouchbaseontheapplicabilitytothiscaseofSection6of
RepublicActNo.6646,inrelationtoSection72ofBatasPambansaBlg.881,eachprovidingthusly:
REPUBLICACTNO.6646
xxxxxxxxx
Sec.6.EffectofDisqualificationCase.Anycandidatewhohasbeendeclaredbyfinaljudgmentto
bedisqualifiedshallnotbevotedfor,andthevotescastforhimshallnotbecounted.Ifforanyreason
acandidateisnotdeclaredbyfinaljudgmentbeforeanelectiontobedisqualifiedandheisvotedfor
andreceivesthewinningnumberofvotesinsuchelection,theCourtorCommissionshallcontinuewith
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidatewhenevertheevidenceofhisguiltisstrong.
BATASPAMBANSABLG.881
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give
prioritytocasesofdisqualificationbyreasonofviolationofthisActtotheendthatafinaldecisionshall
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berenderednotlaterthansevendaysbeforetheelectioninwhichthedisqualificationissought.
Anycandidatewhohasbeendeclaredbyfinaljudgmenttobedisqualifiedshallnotbevotedfor,and
thevotescastforhimshallnotbecounted.Nevertheless,ifforanyreason,acandidateisnotdeclared
by final, judgment before an election to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
preventhisproclamationandassumptiontooffice.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the specific
instancestheyostensiblywouldcoverastheprincipletheyclearlyconvey.Thus,Iwillnotscoffattheargumentthat
it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as
such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The
argument,nevertheless,isfaroutweighedbytherationaleofthenowprevailingdoctrinefirstenunciatedinthecase
ofTopaciovs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzonvs. Comelec (103 SCRA
687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of
Geronimovs.Ramos(136SCRA435[1985]),bytheLabo(176SCRA1(1989]),Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]),
Labo(211SCRA297[1992])and,mostrecently,Benito(235SCRA436[1994])rulings.Benitovs.Comelecwasa
unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano,
Padilla,Bidin,Regalado,Davide,Romero,Melo,Quiason,Puno,VitugandMendoza(JusticesCruzandBellosillo
wereonofficialleave).Foreasyreference,letmequotefromthefirstLabodecision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto
petition,canreplacethepetitionerasmayor.Hecannot.Thesimplereasonisthatasheobtainedonly
thesecondhighestnumberofvotesintheelection,hewasobviouslynotthechoiceofthepeopleof
BaguioCity.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740)
decidedin1985.Inthatcase,thecandidatewhoplacedsecondwasproclaimedelectedafterthevotes
for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a noncandidate, were all
disregardasstray.Ineffect,thesecondplacerwonbydefault.Thatdecisionwassupportedbyeight
membersoftheCourtthen,(Cuevas,J.,ponente,withMakasiar,Concepcion,Jr.,Escolin,Relova,De
laFuente,AlampayandAquino,JJ.,concurring.)withthreedissenting(Teehankee,ActingC.J.,Abad
SantosandMelencioHerrera,JJ.)andanothertworeservingtheirvote.(PlanaandGutierrez,Jr.,JJ.)
Onewasonofficialleave.(Fernando,C.J.)
Reexamining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the
earliercaseofGeronimov.Ramos,(136SCRA435)whichrepresentsthemorelogicalanddemocratic
rule.Thatcase,whichreiteratedthedoctrinefirstannouncedin1912inTopaciov.Paredes,(23Phil.
238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad
Santos,MelencioHerrera,Plana,Escolin,Relova,DelaFuente,CuevasandAlampay,JJ.,concurring)
withoutanydissent,althoughonereservedhisvote,(Makasiar,J.)anothertooknopart,(Aquino,J.)
andtwootherswereonleave.(Fernando,C.J.andConcepcion,Jr.,J.)TheretheCourtheld:
...itwouldbeextremelyrepugnanttothebasicconceptoftheconstitutionallyguaranteed
right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimedawinnerandimposedastherepresentativeofaconstituency,themajorityof
whichhavepositivelydeclaredthroughtheirballotsthattheydonotchoosehim.
Soundpolicydictatesthatpublicelectiveofficesarefilledbythosewhohavereceivedthe
highestnumberofvotescastintheelectionforthatoffice,anditisafundamentalideain
allrepublicanformsofgovernmentthatnoonecanbedeclaredelectedandnomeasure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
castintheelection.(20CorpusJuris2nd,S243,p.676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidatewhoobtainedthesecondhighestnumberofvotestobedeclaredthewinneroftheelective
office.Thevotescastforadead,disqualified,ornoneligiblepersonmaynotbevalidtovotethewinner
intoofficeormaintainhimthere.However,intheabsenceofastatutewhichclearlyassertsacontrary
political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidatewasalive,qualified,oreligible,theyshouldnotbetreatedasstray,voidormeaningless.(at
pp.2021)
Consideringalltheforegoing,Iamconstrainedtovoteforthedismissalofthepetition.
MENDOZA,J.,separateopinion:
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InmyviewtheissueinthiscaseiswhethertheCommissiononElectionshasthepowertodisqualifycandidateson
thegroundthattheylackeligibilityfortheofficetowhichtheyseektobeelected.Ithinkthatithasnoneandthatthe
qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo
warrantooranelectionprotestintheappropriateforum,notnecessarilyintheCOMELECbut,asinthiscase,inthe
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the
COMELECisofnomoment.Suchproceedingswereunauthorizedandwerenotrenderedvalidbytheiragreement
tosubmittheirdisputetothatbody.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's
qualificationsforanofficebeforehiselection.TherearenoneintheOmnibusElectionCode(B.P.Blg.881),inthe
ElectoralReformsLawof1987(R.A.No.6646),orinthelawprovidingforsynchronizedelections(R.A.No.7166).
There are, in other words, no provisions for preproclamation contests but only election protests or quo warranto
proceedingsagainstwinningcandidates.
Tobesure,thereareprovisionsdenominatedfor"disqualification,"buttheyarenotconcernedwithadeclarationof
theineligibilityofacandidate.Theseprovisionsareconcernedwiththeincapacity(duetoinsanity,incompetenceor
convictionofanoffense)ofapersoneithertobeacandidateortocontinueasacandidateforpublicoffice.Thereis
alsoaprovisionforthedenialorcancellationofcertificatesofcandidacy,butitappliesonlytocasesinvolvingfalse
representationsastocertainmattersrequiredbylawtobestatedinthecertificates.
TheseprovisionsarefoundinthefollowingpartsoftheOmnibusElectionCode:
12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent,orhasbeensentencedbyfinaljudgmentforsubversion,insurrection,rebellionorforany
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involvingmoralturpitude,shallbedisqualifiedtobeacandidateandtoholdanyoffice,unlesshehas
beengivenplenarypardonorgrantedamnesty.
Thedisqualificationstobeacandidatehereinprovidedshallbedeemedremoveduponthedeclaration
bycompetentauthoritythatsaidinsanityorincompetencehadbeenremovedoraftertheexpirationof
aperiodoffiveyearsfromhisserviceofsentence,unlesswithinthesameperiodheagainbecomes
disqualified.(Emphasisadded)
68.Disqualifications.Anycandidatewho,inanactionorprotestinwhichheisapartyisdeclared
byfinaldecisionofacompetentcourtguiltyof,orfoundbytheCommissionofhaving(a)givenmoney
orothermaterialconsiderationtoinfluence,induceorcorruptthevotersorpublicofficialsperforming
electoralfunctions(b)committedactsofterrorismtoenhancehiscandidacy(c)spentinhiselection
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code (d) solicited, received or made any
contributionprohibitedunderSections89,95,96,97and104or(e)violatedanyofSections80,83,
85,86and261,paragraphsd,e,k,v,andcc,subparagraph6,shallbedisqualifiedfromcontinuingas
acandidate,orifhehasbeenelected,fromholdingtheoffice.Anypersonwhoisapermanentresident
of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis
added)
78.Petitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateof
candidacy.Averifiedpetitionseekingtodenyduecourseortocancelacertificateofcandidacymay
befiledbyanypersonexclusivelyonthegroundthatanymaterialrepresentationcontainedthereinas
requiredunderSection74hereofisfalse.Thepetitionmaybefiledatanytimenotlaterthantwenty
fivedaysfromthetimeofthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacyandshallbedecided,afterduenotice
andhearing,notlaterthanfifteendaysbeforetheelection.(Emphasisadded)
theElectoralReformsLawof1987(R.A.No.6646):
6.EffectofDisqualificationCase.Anycandidatewhohasbeendeclaredbyfinaljudgmenttobe
disqualifiedshallnotbevotedfor,andthevotescastforhimshallnotbecounted.Ifforanyreasona
candidateisnotdeclaredbyfinaljudgmentbeforeanelectiontobedisqualifiedandheisvotedforand
receivesthewinningnumberofvotesinsuchelection,theCourtorCommissionshallcontinuewiththe
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and upon motion for the complainant or any
candidatewhenevertheevidenceofhisguiltisstrong.(Emphasisadded).
7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure

hereinaboveprovidedshallapplytopetitionstodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacy
asprovidedinSection78ofBatasPambansaBlg.881.
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andtheLocalGovernmentCodeof1991(R.A.No.7160):
40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishablebyone(1)yearormoreofimprisonment,withintwo(2)yearsafterservingsentence
(b)Thoseremovedfromofficeasaresultofonadministrativecase
(c)ThoseconvictedbyfinaljudgmentforviolatingtheoathofallegiancetotheRepublic
(d)Thosewithdualcitizenship
(e)Fugitivefromjusticeincriminalornonpoliticalcaseshereorabroad
(f)Permanentresidentsinaforeigncountryorthosewhohaveacquiredtherighttoresideabroadand
continuetoavailofthesamerightaftertheeffectivityofthisCodeand
(g)Theinsaneorfeebleminded.
ThepetitionfiledbyprivaterespondentCiriloRoyMontejointheCOMELEC,whileentitled"ForCancellationand
Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda RomualdezMarcos made material
representationsinhercertificateofcandidacywhichwerefalse,itsoughtherdisqualificationonthegroundthat"on
the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the
positionofRepresentative,consideringthatonelectionday,May8,1995,[she]wouldhaveresidedlessthanten
(10)monthsinthedistrictwheresheisseekingtobeelected."Foritspart,theCOMELEC'sSecondDivision,inits
resolutionofApril24,1995,cancelledhercertificateofcandidacyandcorrectedcertificateofcandidacyonthebasis
ofitsfindingthatpetitioneris"notqualifiedtorunforthepositionofMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesforthe
First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any finding that she had made false representations as to
materialmattersinhercertificateofcandidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy
under 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is
important to note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under 78 have for their purpose to
disqualifyapersonfrombeingacandidate,whereasquowarrantoproceedingshavefortheirpurposetodisqualifya
person from holding public office.Jurisdictionoverquowarranto proceedings involving members of the House of
RepresentativesisvestedintheElectoralTribunalofthatbody.
Indeed,intheonlycasesinwhichthisCourtdealtwithpetitionsforthecancellationofcertificatesofcandidacy,the
allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy
withregardtotheircitizenship,1age,2orresidence.3ButinthegeneralityofcasesinwhichthisCourtpasseduponthe
qualificationsofrespondentsforoffice,thisCourtdidsointhecontextofelectionprotests4orquowarrantoproceedings5
filedaftertheproclamationoftherespondentsorprotesteesaswinners.
Threereasonsmaybecitedtoexplaintheabsenceofanauthorizedproceedingfordeterminingbeforeelectionthe
qualificationsofacandidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his
eligibilityfortheoffice.Incontrast,whetheranindividualshouldbedisqualifiedasacandidateforactsconstituting
electionoffenses(e.g., votebuying, overspending, commissionof prohibited acts) is a prejudicialquestion which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is
whyitisprovidedthatifthegroundsfordisqualificationareestablished,acandidatewillnotbevotedforifhehas
beenvotedfor,thevotesinhisfavorwillnotbecountedandifforsomereasonhehasbeenvotedforandhehas
won,eitherhewillnotbeproclaimedorhisproclamationwillbesetaside.6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstratedinthecompanioncase(G.R.No.120265,AgapitoA.Aquinov.COMELEC)wherethedetermination
ofAquino'sresidencewasstillpendingintheCOMELECevenaftertheelectionsofMay8,1995.Thisiscontraryto
thesummarycharacterofproceedingsrelatingtocertificatesofcandidacy.Thatiswhythelawmakesthereceiptof
certificatesofcandidacyaministerialdutyoftheCOMELECanditsofficers.7Thelawissatisfiedifcandidatesstatein
theircertificatesofcandidacythattheyareeligibleforthepositionwhichtheyseektofill,leavingthedeterminationoftheir
qualificationstobemadeaftertheelectionandonlyintheeventtheyareelected.Onlyincasesinvolvingchargesoffalse
representationsmadeincertificatesofcandidacyistheCOMELECgivenjurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against preproclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
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President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges"undertheConstitutionoftheelection,returnsandqualificationsofmembersofCongressorofthePresident
andVicePresident,asthecasemaybe.
By providing in 253 for the remedy of quowarranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after the
resultsofelectionsareproclaimed,whilebeingconspicuouslysilentaboutapreproclamationremedybasedonthe
same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any
inquiryintothequalificationsofcandidatesunlesstheyhavebeenelected.
Apparentlyrealizingthelackofanauthorizedproceedingfordeclaringtheineligibilityofcandidates,theCOMELEC
amendeditsrulesonFebruary15,1993soastoprovideinRule25,1thefollowing:
Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by
lawtobegroundsfordisqualificationmaybedisqualifiedfromcontinuingasacandidate.
Thelackofprovisionfordeclaringtheineligibilityofcandidates,however,cannotbesuppliedbyamererule.Such
anactisequivalenttothecreationofacauseofactionwhichisasubstantivematterwhichtheCOMELEC,inthe
exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualificationsbased on age,residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C,
2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings,asalreadystated,arebasedongroundsspecifiedin12and68oftheOmnibusElectionCodeand
in40oftheLocalGovernmentCodeandareforthepurposeofbarringanindividualfrombecomingacandidateor
fromcontinuingasacandidateforpublicoffice.Inaword,theirpurposeistoeliminate acandidate fromthe race
either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications
prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for
declarationofineligibilityistoremovetheincumbentfromoffice.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not
disqualifiedfrombecomingacandidateorcontinuingasacandidateforapublicofficeandviceversa.Wehavethis
sortofdichotomyinourNaturalizationLaw.(C.A.No.473)Thatanalienhasthequalificationsprescribedin2of
thelawdoesnotimplythathedoesnotsufferfromanyofdisqualificationsprovidedin4.
Indeed,provisionsfordisqualificationsonthegroundthatthecandidateisguiltyofprohibitedelectionpracticesor
offenses,likeotherpreproclamationremedies,areaimedatthedetestablepracticeof"grabbingtheproclamation
andprolongingtheelectionprotest,"8throughtheuseof"manufactured"electionreturnsorresorttoothertrickeryforthe
purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's
qualificationsforofficebeforetheelection.Tothecontrary,itisthecandidateagainstwhomaproceedingfordisqualification
isbroughtwhocouldbeprejudicedbecausehecouldbepreventedfromassumingofficeeventhoughinendheprevails.
Tosummarize,thedeclarationofineligibilityofacandidatemayonlybesoughtinanelectionprotestoractionfor
quo warranto filed pursuant to 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With
respecttoelectivelocalofficials(e.g.,Governor,ViceGovernor,membersoftheSangguniangPanlalawigan,etc.)
such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as
providedinArt.IX,C,2(2)oftheConstitution.InthecaseofthePresidentandVicePresident,thepetitionmustbe
filedwiththePresidentialElectoralTribunal(Art.VII,4,lastparagraph),andinthecaseoftheSenators,withthe
SenateElectoralTribunal,andinthecaseofCongressmen,withtheHouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal.
(Art.VI,17)Thereisgreaterreasonfornotallowingbeforetheelectionthefilingofdisqualificationproceedings
basedonallegedineligibilityinthecaseofcandidatesforPresident,VicePresident,Senatorsandmembersofthe
HouseofRepresentatives,becauseofthesamepolicyprohibitingthefilingofpreproclamationcasesagainstsuch
candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95009 that its
proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda
RomualdezMarcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the
HRET.
Accordingly,IvotetograntthepetitionandtoannultheproceedingsoftheCommissiononElectionsinSPANo.95
009,includingitsquestionedordersdotedApril24,1995,May7,1995,May11,1995andMay25,1995,declaring
petitionerImeldaRomualdezMarcosineligibleandorderingherproclamationasRepresentativeoftheFirstDistrict
ofLeytesuspended.TotheextentthatRule25oftheCOMELECRulesofProcedureauthorizesproceedingsforthe
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disqualificationofcandidatesonthegroundofineligibilityfortheoffice,itshouldconsideredvoid.
Theprovincialboardofcanvassersshouldnowproceedwiththeproclamationofpetitioner.
Narvasa,C.J.,concurs.
PADILLA,J.,dissenting:
IregretthatIcannotjointhemajorityopinionasexpressedinthewellwrittenponenciaofMr.JusticeKapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the provision
itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular
controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that "no person shall be a member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least
twentyfive(25)yearsofage,abletoreadandwrite,andexceptthepartylistrepresentatives,aregisteredvoterin
thedistrictinwhichheshallbeelected,andaresidentthereofforaperiodofnotlessthanoneyearimmediately
precedingthedayoftheelection."(ArticleVI,section6)
Ithasbeenarguedthatforpurposesofourelectionlaws,thetermresidencehasbeenunderstoodassynonymous
withdomicile.ThisargumenthasbeenvalidatedbynolessthantheCourtinnumerouscases1 where significantly
thefactualcircumstancesclearlyandconvincinglyprovedthatapersondoesnoteffectivelylosehisdomicileoforiginifthe
intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
Withthisbasicthesisinmind,itwouldnotbedifficulttoconceiveofdifferentmodalitieswithinwhichthephrase"a
residentthereof(meaning,thelegislativedistrict)foraperiodofnotlessthanoneyear"wouldfit.
Thefirstinstanceiswhereaperson'sresidenceanddomicilecoincideinwhichcaseapersononlyhastoprovethat
hehasbeendomiciledinapermanentlocationfornotlessthanayearbeforetheelection.
Asecondsituationiswhereapersonmaintainsaresidenceapartfromhisdomicileinwhichcasehewouldhavethe
luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the oneyear residence period in the district as the
minimumperiodforeligibilitytothepositionofcongressionalrepresentativeforthedistrict.
Ineithercase,onewouldnotbeconstitutionallydisqualifiedforabandoninghisresidenceinordertoreturntohis
domicileoforigin,orbetterstill,domicileofchoiceneitherwouldonebedisqualifiedforabandoningaltogetherhis
domicileinfavorofhisresidenceinthedistrictwherehedesirestobeacandidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in different
districts.Sincehisdomicileoforigincontinuesasanoptionaslongasthereisnoeffectiveabandonment(animus
nonrevertendi),hecanpracticallychoosethedistrictmostadvantageousforhim.
Allthesetheoreticalscenarios,however,aretemperedbytheunambiguouslimitationthat"foraperiodofnotless
thanoneyearimmediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection",hemustbearesidentinthedistrictwherehedesires
tobeelected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be
synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in all
situationssatisfythelengthoftimeprescribedbythefundamentallaw.Andthis,becauseofadefiniteConstitutional
purpose.HemustbefamiliarwiththeenvironmentandproblemsofadistrictheintendstorepresentinCongress
andtheoneyearresidenceinsaiddistrictwouldbetheminimumperiodtoacquiresuchfamiliarity,ifnotversatility.
InthecaseofpetitionerImeldaR.Marcos,theoperativefactsaredistinctlysetoutinthenowassaileddecisionof
theComelec2ndDivisiondated24April1995(asaffirmedbytheComelecenbanc)
DivineWordUniversityofTacloban,wheresheearnedherdegreeinEducation.Thereafter,shetaught
intheLeyteChineseHighSchool,stillinTaclobanCity.In1952shewenttoManilatoworkwithher
cousin,thelateSpeakerDanielZ.RomualdezinhisofficeintheHouseofRepresentatives.In1954,
she married expresident Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She
livedwithhiminBatac,IlocosNorteandregisteredthereasavoter.Whenherhusbandwaselected
Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines,shelivedwithhiminMalacanangPalaceandregisteredasavoterinSanMiguel,Manila.
DuringtheMarcospresidency,respondentservedasaMemberoftheBatasangPambansa,Minister
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ofHumanSettlementsandGovernorofMetroManila.SheclaimedthatinFebruary1986,sheandher
family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to
Manila.In1992respondentranforelectionasPresidentofthePhilippinesandfiledherCertificateof
CandidacywhereinsheindicatedthatsheisaresidentandregisteredvoterofSanJuan,MetroManila.
On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila,
requestingforcancellationofherregistrationinthePermanentListofVotersinPrecinctNo.157ofSan
Juan,MetroManila,inorderthatshemaybereregisteredortransferredtoBrgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte.
(Annex2B,Answer).OnAugust31,1994,respondentfiledherSwornApplicationforCancellationof
Voter'sPreviousRegistration(Annex2C,Answer)statingthatsheisadulyregisteredvoterin157A,
Brgy.Maytunas,SanJuan,MetrothatsheintendstoregisteratBrgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte.
OnJanuary28,1995respondentregisteredasavoteratPrecinctNo.18AofOlot,Tolosa,Leyte.She
filedwiththeBoardofElectionInspectorsCEFormNo.1,VoterRegistrationRecordNo.943349772,
whereinsheallegedthatshehasresidedinthemunicipalityofTolosaforaperiodof6months(Annex
A,Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a
CertificateofCandidacyforthepositionofRepresentativeoftheFirstDistrictofLeytewhereinshealso
allegedthatshehasbeenaresidentintheconstituencywheresheseekstobeelectedforaperiodof
7months.Thepertinententriesthereinareasfollows:
7.PROFESSIONOROCCUPATION:Housewife/Teacher/SocialWorker
8.RESIDENCE(completeaddress):Brgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte
PostOfficeAddressforelectionpurposes:Brgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte
9.RESIDENCEINTHECONSTITUENCYWHEREINISEEKTOBE
ELECTEDIMMEDIATELYPRECEDINGELECTION:________YearsSeven
Months
10.IAMNOTAPERMANENTRESIDENTOF,ORIMMIGRANTTO,A
FOREIGNCOUNTRY.
THATIAMELIGIBLEforsaidofficeThatIwillsupportanddefendtheConstitutionoftheRepublicof
thePhilippinesandwillmaintaintruefaithandallegiancetheretoThatIwillobeythelaws,legalorders
anddecreespromulgatedbythedulyconstitutedauthoritiesThattheobligationimposedbymyoathis
assumedvoluntarily,withoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasionandThatthefactsstatedherein
aretruetothebestofmyknowledge.
(Sgd.)ImeldaRomualdezMarcos
(SignatureofCandidate)2
Petitioner'saforestatedcertificateofcandidacyfiledon8March1995containsthedecisivecomponentorseedof
her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "sevenmonths" to the query of "residence in the
constituencywhereinIseektobeelectedimmediatelyprecedingtheelection."
ItfollowsfromalltheabovethattheComeleccommittednograveabuseofdiscretioninholdingthatpetitioneris
disqualifiedfromthepositionofrepresentativeforthe1stcongressionaldistrictofLeyteintheelectionsof
8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than oneyear residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte)
immediatelyprecedingthedayofelection
(8May1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next important
issuetoresolveiswhetherornottheComeleccanordertheBoardofCanvasserstodetermineandproclaimthe
winneroutoftheremainingqualifiedcandidatesforrepresentativeinsaiddistrict.
IamnotunawareofthepronouncementmadebythisCourtinthecaseofLabovs.Comelec,G.R.86564,August1,
1989,176SCRA1whichgavetherationaleaslaiddownintheearly1912caseofTopaciovs.Paredes, 23 Phil.
238that:
....Soundpolicydictatesthatpublicelectiveofficesarefilledbythosewhohavereceivedthehighest
numberofvotescastintheelectionforthatoffice,anditisafundamentalideainallrepublicanformsof
governmentthatnoonecanbedeclaredelectedandnomeasurecanbedeclaredcarriedunlessheor
itreceivesamajorityorpluralityofthelegalvotescastintheelection.(20CorpusJuris2nd,S243,p.
676)
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candidatewasalive,qualified,oreligible,theyshouldnotbetreatedasstray,voidormeaningless.
UnderSec.6RA6646,(AnActIntroducingAdditionalReformsintheElectoralSystemandforotherpurposes)(84
O.G.905,22February1988)itisprovidedthat:
...Anycandidatewhohasbeendeclaredbyfinaljudgmenttobedisqualifiedshallnotbevotedfor,
andthevotescastforhimshallnotbecounted.Ifforanyreasonacandidateisnotdeclaredbyfinal
judgmentbeforeanelectiontobedisqualifiedandheisvotedforandreceivesthewinningnumberof
votesinsuchelection,theCourtorCommissionshallcontinuewiththetrialandhearingoftheaction,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency
thereoforderthesuspensionoftheproclamationofsuchcandidatewhenevertheevidenceofhisguilt
isstrong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision
quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final
judgementofdisqualificationonlybeforetheelection,butevenduringoraftertheelection.Thelawisclearthatinall
situations,thevotescastforadisqualifiedcandidateSHALLNOTBECOUNTED.Thelawhasalsovalidatedthe
jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a
candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final
judgmentbeforeanelectiontobedisqualified.
Sincethepresentcaseisanafterelectionscenario,thepowertosuspendproclamation(whenevidenceofhisguilt
is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared
disqualified?Then,votescastforhim"shallnotbecounted"andinlegalcontemplation,henolongerreceivedthe
highestnumberofvotes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a
"winningcandidateisdisqualified,"butthatthelawconsidershimasthecandidatewhohadobtainedthehighest
numberofvotesasaresultofthevotescastforthedisqualifiedcandidatenotbeingcountedorconsidered.
Asthislawclearlyreflectsthelegislativepolicyonthematter,thenthereisnoreasonwhythisCourtshouldnotre
examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications
prescribedforelectiveofficecannotbeerasedbytheelectoratealone.Thewillofthepeopleasexpressedthrough
theballotcannotcuretheviceofineligibility"mostespeciallywhenitismandatedbynolessthantheConstitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to
proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly
electedrepresentativeofthe1stdistrictofLeyte.
Hermosisima,Jr.J.,dissent.
REGALADO,J.,dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same
conclusiondrawntherefromHence,thisdissentwhichassuredlyisnotformulated"onthebasisofthepersonalityof
apetitionerinacase."
Igoalongwiththemajorityintheirnarrationofantecedentfacts,insofarasthesamearepertinenttothiscase,and
whichIhavesimplifiedasfollows:
1.Petitioner,althoughborninManila,residedduringherchildhoodinthepresentTaclobanCity,she
beingalegitimatedaughterofparentswhoappeartohavetakenuppermanentresidencetherein.She
alsowenttoschoolthereand,foratime,taughtinoneoftheschoolsinthatcity.
2.WhenshemarriedthenRep.FerdinandE.MarcoswhowasthendomiciledinBatac,IlocosNorte,
byoperationoflawsheacquiredanewdomicileinthatplacein1954.
3.Inthesuccessiveyearsandduringtheeventsthathappenedthereafter,herhusbandhavingbeen
electedasaSenatorandthenasPresident,shelivedwithhimandtheirfamilyinSanJuan,Rizaland
theninMalacanangPalaceinSanMiguel,Manila.
4.Overthoseyears,sheregisteredasavoterandactuallyvotedinBatac,IlocosNorte,theninSan
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Juan,Rizal,andalsoinSanMiguel,Manila,allthesemerelyintheexerciseoftherightofsuffrage.
5.Itdoesnotappearthatherhusband,evenafterhehadassumedthoseloftypositionssuccessively,
ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and
invariablyvotedinallelections.
6.Aftertheousterofherhusbandfromthepresidencyin1986andthesojournoftheMarcosfamilyin
Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different
placeswhichsheclaimedtohavebeenmerelytemporaryresidences.
7.In1992,petitionerranforelectionasPresidentofthePhilippinesandinhercertificateofcandidacy
sheindicatedthatshewasthenaregisteredvoterandresidentofSanJuan,MetroManila.
8.OnAugust24,1994,shefiledaletterforthecancellationofherregistrationinthePermanentListof
Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be reregistered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn
Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a
registeredvoterinPrecinctNo.157A,Brgy.Maytunas,SanJuan,MetroManilaandthatsheintended
toregisterinBrgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte.
9.OnJanuary28,1995,petitionerregisteredasavoteratPrecinctNo.18AofOlot,Tolosa,Leyte,for
whichpurposeshefiledwiththethereinBoardofElectionInspectorsavoter'sregistrationrecordform
allegingthatshehadresidedinthatmunicipalityforsixmonths.
10.OnMarch8,1995,petitionerfiledhercertificateofcandidacyforthepositionofRepresentativeof
theFirstDistrictofLeytewhereinsheallegedthatshehadbeenaresidentfor"SevenMonths"ofthe
constituencywhereshesoughttobeelected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her
answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or
replacedwithanewentryreading"SINCECHILDHOOD."
Thesoleissueforresolutioniswhether,forpurposesofhercandidacy,petitionerhadcompliedwiththeresidency
requirementofoneyearasmandatedbynolessthanSection6,ArticleVIofthe1987Constitution.
Idonotintendtoimposeuponthetimeofmycolleagueswithadissertationonthedifferencebetweenresidence
anddomicile.WehavehadenoughofthatandIunderstandthatforpurposesofpoliticallawand,forthatmatterof
international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our
jurisprudenceandinAmericanLaw,incontradistinctiontotheconceptofresidenceforpurposesofcivil,commercial
andprocedurallawswheneveranissuethereonisrelevantorcontrolling.
Consequently,sinceinthepresentcasethequestionofpetitioner'sresidenceisintegratedinandinseparablefrom
her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its
permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood in
Americanlawfromwhichforthiscasewehavetakenourjurisprudentialbearings.
Myreadingsinformmethatthedomicileoftheparentsatthetimeofbirth,orwhatistermedthe"domicileoforigin,"
constitutesthedomicileofaninfantuntilabandoned,oruntiltheacquisitionofanewdomicileinadifferentplace.1
Intheinstantcase,wemaygrantthatpetitioner'sdomicileoforigin,2atleastasof1938,waswhatisnowTaclobanCity.
Now,asIhaveobservedearlier,domicileissaidtobeofthreekinds,thatis,domicilebybirth,domicilebychoice,
and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the
secondisthatwhichisvoluntarilyacquiredbyapartyordomiciliumpropiomotuthelastwhichisconsequential,as
thatofawifearisingfrommarriage,3issometimescalleddomiciliumnecesarium.Thereisnodebatethatthedomicileof
origincanbelostorreplacedbyadomicileofchoiceoradomicilebyoperationoflawsubsequentlyacquiredbytheparty.
Whenpetitionercontractedmarriagein1954withthenRep.Marcos,byoperationoflaw,notonlyinternationalor
American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and
correspondinglylostherowndomicileoforigininTaclobanCity.
Her subsequent changes of residence to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu,
Hawaii,andbacktonowSanJuan,MetroManiladonotappeartohaveresultedinhertherebyacquiringnew
domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or
misfortunesofherhusbandandhisperegrinationsintheassumptionofnewofficialpositionsorthelossofthem.
HerresidenceinHonoluluand,ofcourse,thoseafterherreturntothePhilippineswere,assheclaimed,againsther
willoronlyfortransientpurposeswhichcouldnothaveinvestedthemwiththestatusofdomicilesofchoice.5
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After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency in
TaclobanCityorOlot,Tolosa,Leyte,thereisnoshowingthatsheeverattemptedtoacquireanyotherdomicileof
choicewhichcouldhaveresultedintheabandonmentofherlegaldomicileinBatac,IlocosNorte.Onthatscore,we
notethemajority'sownsubmission6that,tosuccessfullyeffectachangeofdomicile,onemustdemonstrate(a)anactual
removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishinganewone,and(c)actswhichcorrespondwiththepurpose.
Weconsequentlyhavetoalsonotethattheserequirementsfortheacquisitionofadomicileofchoiceapplywhether
whatissoughttobechangedorsubstitutedisadomicileoforigin(domiciliumoriginis)oradomicilebyoperationof
law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her
domiciliumnecesarium,itisthereforehercontinuingdomicileinBatac,IlocosNortewhich,ifatall,canbetheobject
oflegalchangeunderthecontingenciesofthecaseatbar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E.
MaambonginSPA95009oftheCommissiononElections,7andadvancesthisnovelproposition.
Itmaybesaidthatpetitionerlostherdomicileoforiginbyoperationoflawasaresultofhermarriageto
the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium
necesarium),herlegaldomicileatthetimeofhermarriagebecameBatac,IlocosNortealthoughthere
were no indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her
husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of the New Family Code
alreadyinforceatthetime,however,herlegaldomicileautomaticallyrevertedtoherdomicileoforigin.
...(Emphasissupplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domiciliumnecesarium in Batac,
IlocosNorte,themajorityinsistsonmakingaqualificationthatshedidnotintendtoabandonherdomicileoforigin.I
findthisbewilderingsince,inthissituation,itisthelawthatdeclareswherepetitioner'sdomicileisatanygiventime,
and not her selfserving or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own
admissionthatonecannothavemorethanonedomicileatatime,8the majority would be suggesting that petitioner
retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied as a
reserved,dormant,potential,orresidualdomicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law.
However,weareherebeingtitillatedwiththepossibilityofanautomaticreversiontoorreacquisitionofadomicileof
originaftertheterminationofthecauseforitslossbyoperationoflaw.Themajorityagreesthatsincepetitionerlost
her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am
impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions.
Regretfully,Ifindsomedifficultyinacceptingeitherthelogicorthevalidityofthisargument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarilyabandons the
formerinfavorofthelatter.If,thereafter,heabandonsthatchosendomicile,hedoesnotperserecoverhisoriginal
domicileunless,bysubsequentactslegallyindicativethereof,heevinceshisintentanddesiretoestablishthesame
ashisnewdomicile,whichispreciselywhatpetitionerbelatedlyand,evidentlyjustforpurposesofhercandidacy,
unsuccessfullytriedtodo.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not
onlybecausethereisnolegalauthoritythereforbutbecauseitwouldbeabsurdPursuedtoitslogicalconsequence,
that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have obtained
anotherdomicile,eitherofchoiceorbyoperationoflaw,otherthanhisdomicileoforigin.Significantlyandobviously
for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this
contingencysinceitwouldimpingeonone'sfreedomofchoice.
Now,intheinstantcase,petitionernotonlyvoluntarilyabandonedherdomicileofchoice(unlessweassumethat
she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed
throughheracquisitionofanewdomicilebyoperationoflaw.Infact,thisisevenacaseofbothvoluntaryandlegal
abandonmentofadomicileoforigin.Withmuchmorereason,therefore,shouldwerejectthepropositionthatwith
theterminationofhermarriagein1989,petitionerhadsupposedlyperseandipsofactoreacquiredherdomicileof
origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital
coverture,shewassimultaneouslyinpossessionandenjoymentofadomicileoforiginwhichwasonlyinastateof
suspendedanimation.
Thus,theAmericanruleislikewisetotheeffectthatwhileafterthehusband'sdeaththewifehastherighttoelect
herowndomicile,9sheneverthelessretainsthelastdomicileofherdeceasedhusbanduntilshemakesanactualchange.
10Intheabsenceofaffirmativeevidence,tothecontrary,thepresumptionisthatawife'sdomicileorlegalresidencefollows
thatofherhusbandandwillcontinueafterhisdeath.11
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Icannotappreciatethepremisesadvancedinsupportofthemajority'stheorybasedonArticles68and69ofthe
FamilyCode.Allthatisofanyrelevancethereinisthatunderthisnewcode,therightandpowertofixthefamily
domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was never
exercisedbythespouses,couldaffectthedomicilefixedbythelawforpetitionerin1954and,forherhusband,long
priorthereto.Itistruethatawifenowhasthecoordinatepowertodeterminetheconjugalorfamilydomicile,butthat
hasnobearingonthiscase. Withthe death ofherhusband,andeach ofherchildren having gotten married and
established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or
material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the
matterofherhavingacquiredornotherowndomicileofchoice.
Iagreewiththemajority'sdiscourseonthevirtuesofthegrowingandexpandedparticipationofwomenintheaffairs
ofthenation,withequalrightsandrecognitionbyConstitutionandstatutoryconferment.However,Ihavesearched
invainforaspecificlaworjudicialpronouncementwhicheitherexpresslyorbynecessaryimplicationsupportsthe
majority'sdesiredtheoryofautomaticreacquisitionoforreversiontothedomiciliumoriginisofpetitioner.Definitely,
asbetweenthesettledanddesirablelegalnormsthatshouldgovernthisissue,thereisaworldofdifferenceand,
unquestionably,thisshouldberesolvedbylegislativearticulationbutnotbytheeloquenceofthewellturnedphrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically
reacquiredanydomiciletherein,shecannotlegallyclaimthatherresidencyinthepoliticalconstituencyofwhichitis
apartcontinuedsinceherbirthuptothepresent.Respondentcommissionwas,therefore,correctinrejectingher
pretensiontothateffectinheramended/correctedcertificateofcandidacy,andinholdinghertoheradmissioninthe
original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election.
Theseconsiderationsrenderitunnecessarytofurtherpassupontheproceduralissuesraisedbypetitioner.
ONTHEFOREGOINGPREMISES,IvotetoDISMISSthepetitionforlackofmerit.
DAVIDE,JR.,J.,dissenting:
IrespectfullydissentfromtheopinionofthemajoritywrittenbyMr.JusticeSantiagoM.Kapunan,moreparticularly
ontheissueofthepetitioner'squalification.
UnderSection7,SubdivisionA,ArticleIXoftheConstitution,decisions,orders,orrulingsoftheCOMELECmaybe
brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs.
COMELEC,88SCRA251[1979]Dariovs.Mison,176SCRA84[1989]).
Accordingly,awritofcertiorarimaybegrantedonlyiftheCOMELEChasactedwithoutorinexcessofjurisdictionor
with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly,
jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of
discretionindisqualifyingthepetitioner.
Mycarefulandmeticulousperusalofthechallengedresolutionof24April1995oftheCOMELECSecondDivision
andtheEnBancresolutionof7May1995disclosestotalabsenceofabuseofdiscretion,muchlessgraveabuse
thereof.TheresolutionoftheSecondDivisiondispassionatelyandobjectivelydiscussedinminutedetailsthefacts
which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of
residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood
factsorcircumstancesofsubstancepertinenttotheissueofherresidence.
Themajorityopinion,however,overturnedtheCOMELEC'sfindingsoffactforlackofproofthatthepetitionerhas
abandonedTolosaasherdomicileoforigin,whichisallegedlywithintheFirstCongressionalDistrictofLeyte.
IrespectfullysubmitthatthepetitionerherselfhasprovidedtheCOMELEC,eitherbyadmissionorbydocumentary
evidence,overwhelmingproofofthelossorabandonmentofherdomicileoforigin,whichisTaclobanCityandnot
Tolosa,Leyte.Assumingthatshedecidedtoliveagaininherdomicileoforigin,thatbecameherseconddomicileof
choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then
disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A
holdingtothecontrarywouldbearbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte.
Nevertheless,shelost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman
(later,President)FerdinandE.Marcos.Adomicilebyoperationoflawisthatdomicilewhichthelawattributestoa
person,independentlyofhisownintentionoractualresidence,asresultsfromlegaldomesticrelationsasthatofthe
wifearisingfrommarriage(28C.J.S.Domicile7,11).Underthegoverninglawthen,Article110oftheCivilCode,
hernewdomicileorherdomicileofchoicewasthedomicileofherhusband,whichwasBatac,IlocosNorte.Said
Articlereadsasfollows:
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Commentingthereon,civilistArturoM.Tolentinostates:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right
becauseheisempoweredbylawtofixthefamilyresidence.Thisrightevenpredominatesoversome
rightsrecognizedbylawinthewife.Forinstance,underarticle117thewifemayengageinbusinessor
practiceaprofessionoroccupation.Butbecauseofthepowerofthehusbandtofixthefamilydomicile
hemayfixitatsuchaplaceaswouldmakeitimpossibleforthewifetocontinueinbusinessorinher
profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be exempted from living in the residence
chosenbythehusband.Thehusbandcannotvalidlyallegedesertionbythewifewhorefusestofollow
him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a suitable home
belongingtothewife,andthathischoiceofadifferenthomeisnotmadeingoodfaith.(Commentaries
andJurisprudenceontheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,vol.1,1985ed.,339).
Undercommonlaw,awomanuponhermarriagelosesherowndomicileand,byoperationoflaw,acquiresthatof
her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the
sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by
changinghisown(25AmJur2dDomicile48,37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no
longerthesoleprerogativeofthehusband,butisnowajointdecisionofthespouses,andincaseofdisagreement
thecourtshalldecide.Thesaidarticleusestheterm"familydomicile,"andnotfamilyresidence,as"thespouses
mayhavemultipleresidences,andthewifemayelecttoremaininoneofsuchresidences,whichmaydestroythe
duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIODIY, Handbook on the
FamilyCodeofthePhilippines,[1988],102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the
majorityopinionadoptstoovercomethelegaleffectofthepetitioner'smarriageonherdomicile,isunsupportedby
lawandbyjurisprudence.Thesettleddoctrineisthatafterthehusband'sdeaththewifehasarighttoelectherown
domicile,butsheretainsthelastdomicileofherhusbanduntilshemakesanactualchange(28C.J.S.Domicile
12,27).Or,onthedeathofthehusband,thepowerofthewifetoacquireherowndomicileisrevived,butuntilshe
exercisesthepowerherdomicileremainsthatofthehusbandatthetimeofhisdeath(25AmJur2dDomicile62,
45).Notethatwhatisrevivedisnotherdomicileoforiginbutherpowertoacquireherowndomicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of his
deathwhichwasBatac,IlocosNorte,sincetheirresidencesinSanJuan,MetroManila,andSanMiguel,Manila,
were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official duties. Their
residenceinSanJuanwasaconjugalhome,anditwastheretowhichshereturnedin1991whenshewasalready
awidow.InhersworncertificateofcandidacyfortheOfficeofthePresidentinthesynchronizedelectionsofMay
1992,sheindicatedthereinthatshewasaresidentofSanJuan,MetroManila.Shealsovotedinthesaidelections
inthatplace.
Onthebasisofherevidence,itwasonlyon24August1994whensheexercisedherrightasawidowtoacquireher
own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila,tocancelherregistrationinthepermanentlistofvotersinPrecinct157thereatandprayingthatshebe"re
registeredortransferredtoBrgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte,theplaceof[her]birthandpermanentresidence"(photocopy
of Exhibit "B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this
swornstatementregardingherplaceofbirthwhen,inherVoter'sAffidavitsworntoon15March1992(photocopyof
Exhibit"C,"attachedasAnnex"3,"Id.),herVoterRegistrationRecordsworntoon28January1995(photocopyof
Exhibit"E,"attachedasAnnex"5,"Id.),andherCertificateofCandidacysworntoon8March1995(photocopyof
Exhibit"A,"attachedasAnnex"1,"Id.),shesolemnlydeclaredthatshewasborninManila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit
attachedtoherAnswertothepetitionfordisqualification(Annex"I"ofPetition),shedeclaredunderoaththather
"domicileorresidenceisTaclobanCity."Ifshedidintendtoreturntosuchdomicileorresidenceoforiginwhydid
sheinformtheElectionOfficerofSanJuanthatshewouldtransfertoOlot,Tolosa,Leyte,andindicateinherVoter's
Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this
uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves
thatfortyoneyearshadalreadylapsedsinceshehadlostorabandonedherdomicileoforiginbyvirtueofmarriage
andthatsuchlengthoftimediminishedherpowerofrecollectionorblurredhermemory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the
subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to
pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of such
residenceordomicile.SoistherelianceonSection117oftheOmnibusElectionCodewhichprovidesthattransfer
of residence to any other place by reason of one's "occupation profession employment in private and public
service educational activities work in military or naval reservations service in the army, navy or air force, the
constabularyornationalpoliceforceorconfinementordetentioningovernmentinstitutionsinaccordancewithlaw"
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isnotdeemedaslossoforiginalresidence.Thosecasesandlegalprovisiondonotincludemarriageofawoman.
Thereasonfortheexclusionis,ofcourse,Article110oftheCivilCode.IfitweretheintentionofthisCourtorofthe
legislaturetoconsiderthemarriageofawomanasacircumstancewhichwouldnotoperateasanabandonmentof
domicile(oforiginorofchoice),thensuchcasesandlegalprovisionshouldhaveexpresslymentionedthesame.
ThisCourtshouldnotacceptasgospeltruththeselfservingclaimofthepetitionerinheraffidavit(Annex"A"ofher
AnswerinCOMELECSPANo.95009Annex"I"ofPetition)thather"domicileorresidenceoforiginisTacloban
City,"andthatshe"neverintendedtoabandonthisdomicileorresidenceoforigintowhich[she]alwaysintendedto
return whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code.
Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954
conclusivelyestablishthatshehadindeedabandonedherdomicileoforiginandhadacquiredanewoneanimoet
facto(KOSSUTHKENTKENNAN,ATreatiseonResidenceandDomicile,[1934],214,326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest
mistake"inwritingdowntheword"seven"inthespaceprovidedfortheresidencyqualificationrequirementinthe
certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is selfserving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all
sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise what she stated
wasthetruth.
Themajorityopinionalsodisregardsabasicruleinevidencethathewhoassertsafactortheaffirmativeofanissue
hastheburdenofprovingit(ImperialVictoryShippingAgencyvs.NLRC,200SCRA178[1991]P.T.CernaCorp.
vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the
petitionercouldnotdenythelegalconsequencethereofonthechangeofherdomiciletothatofherhusband.The
majorityopinionrulesoratleastconcludesthat"[b]yoperationoflaw(domiciliumnecesarium),herlegaldomicileat
thetimeofhermarriageautomaticallybecameBatac,IlocosNorte."ThatconclusionisconsistentwithArticle110of
the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived
powertoacquireherowndomicile,theburdenisuponhertoprovethatshehasexercisedherrighttoacquireher
owndomicile.Shemiserablyfailedtodischargethatburden.
Ivotetodenythepetition.
SeparateOpinions
PUNO,J.,concurring:
ItwasAristotlewhotaughtmankindthatthingsthatarealikeshouldbetreatedalike,whilethingsthatareunalike
should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness. 1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the
residencerequirementprovidedbySection6,ArticleVIoftheConstitution.2Wecannotdisqualifyherandtreatherunalike,
fortheConstitutionguaranteesequalprotectionofthelaw.Iproceedfromthefollowingfactualandlegalpropositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in
Tacloban.TheirancestralhouseisinTacloban.Theyhavevastrealestateintheplace.Petitionerwenttoschool
andthereafterworkedthere.IconsiderTaclobanasherinitialdomicile,bothherdomicileoforiginandherdomicile
ofchoice.Herdomicileoforiginasitwasthedomicileofherparentswhenshewasaminorandherdomicileof
choice,asshecontinuedlivingthereevenafterreachingtheageofmajority.
Second.ThereisalsonoquestionthatinMay,1954,petitionermarriedthelatePresidentFerdinandE.Marcos.By
contractingmarriage,herdomicilebecamesubjecttochangebylaw,andtherighttochangeitwasgivenbyArticle
110oftheCivilCodeprovides:
living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis
supplied)
InDelaViav.VillarealandGeopano,4thisCourtexplainedwhythedomicileofthewifeoughttofollowthatof
thehusband.Weheld:"Thereasonisfoundeduponthetheoreticidentityofpersonandinterestbetweenthehusband
andthewife,andthepresumptionthat,fromthenatureoftherelation,thehomeofoneisthehomeoftheother.Itis
intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and
harmonyprevail."5Inaccordwiththisobjective,Article109oftheCivilCodealsoobligatedthehusbandandwife"to
livetogether."
Third.Thedifficultissuesstartaswedeterminewhetherpetitioner'smarriagetoformerPresidentMarcosipsofacto
resultedinthelossofherTaclobandomicile.Irespectfullysubmitthathermarriagebyitselfalonedidnotcauseher
toloseherTaclobandomicile.Article110oftheCivilCodemerelygavethehusbandtherighttofixthedomicileof
the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitlychoose the prior domicile of his wife, in which
case,thewife'sdomicileremainsunchanged.Thehusbandcanalsoimplicitlyacquiescetohiswife'spriordomicile
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evenifitisdifferent.SoweheldindelaVia,6
....Whenmarriedwomenaswellaschildrensubjecttoparentalauthoritylive,withtheacquiescence
of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own
independentdomicile....
Itisnot,therefore,themerefactofmarriagebutthedeliberatechoiceofadifferentdomicilebythehusband
thatwillchangethedomicileofawifefromwhatitwaspriortotheirmarriage.Thedomiciliarydecisionmade
bythehusbandintheexerciseoftherightconferredbyArticle110oftheCivilCodebindsthewife.Anyand
allactsofawifeduringhercoverturecontrarytothedomiciliarychoiceofthehusbandcannotchangeinany
way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the
capacitytochooseherdomicilebutalsobecausetheyarecontrarytolawandpublicpolicy.
Inthecaseatbench,itisnotdisputedthatformerPresidentMarcosexercisedhisrighttofixthefamilydomicileand
established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and
throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has
beenfixedbyoperationoflaw,itwasnotaffectedin1959whenherhusbandwaselectedasSenator,whenthey
livedinSanJuan,Rizalandwheresheregisteredasavoter.Itwasnotalsoaffectedin1965whenherhusband
waselectedPresident,whentheylivedinMalacaangPalace,andwhensheregisteredasavoterinSanMiguel,
Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human
SettlementsandGovernorofMetroManiladuringtheincumbencyofherhusbandasPresidentofthenation.Under
Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the
evidenceshowshedidnoteffectanysuchchange.Toalargedegree,thisfollowsthecommonlawthat"awoman
onhermarriagelosesherowndomicileandbyoperationoflaw,acquiresthatofherhusband,nomatterwherethe
wifeactuallylivesorwhatshebelievesorintends."7
Fourth.ThemoredifficulttaskishowtointerprettheeffectofthedeathonSeptember28,1989offormerPresident
Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of
thoughtcontend foracceptance.One isespousedbyourdistinguishedcolleague, Mr. JusticeDavide, Jr.,heavily
relyingonAmericanauthorities.8Heechoesthetheorythatafterthehusband'sdeath,thewiferetainsthelastdomicileof
herhusbanduntilshemakesanactualchange.
Idonotsubscribetothissubmission.TheAmericancaselawthatthewifestillretainsherdeadhusband'sdomicile
isbasedonancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today.Thecommonlaw
identifiedthedomicileofawifeasthatofthehusbandanddeniedtoherthepowerofacquiringadomicileofher
ownseparateandapartfromhim.9Legalscholarsagreethattwo(2)reasonssupportthiscommonlawdoctrine.Thefirst
reasonas pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal existence of the
womanissuspendedduring
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the
desirabilityofhavingtheinterestsofeachmemberofthefamilyunitgovernedbythesamelaw."11Thepresumptionthatthe
wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its
extensionhaveprovidedsomeofthemostiniquitousjurisprudenceagainstwomen.Itwasundercommonlawthatthe1873
AmericancaseofBradwellv.Illinois12wasdecidedwherewomenweredeniedtherighttopracticelaw.Itwasunblushingly
ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupationsofcivillife...ThisisthelawoftheCreator."Indeed,therulingsrelieduponbyMr.JusticeDavideinCJS13and
AMJUR2d14areAmericanstatecourtdecisionshandeddownbetweentheyears191715and1938,16orbeforethetime
when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in far
rangingstatelegislationsintheUnitedStatestoeliminategenderinequality.17Startinginthedecadeoftheseventies,the
courtslikewiseliberalizedtheirrulingsastheystartedinvalidatinglawsinfectedwithgenderbias.Itwasin1971whentheUS
SupremeCourtinReedv.Reed,18struckabigblowforwomenequalitywhenitdeclaredasunconstitutionalanIdaholaw
that required probate courts to choose male family members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere
administrativeinconveniencecannotjustifyasexbaseddistinction.Thesesignificantchangesbothinlawandincaselawon
the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of married women to their
husbandsbasedonthedubioustheoryoftheparties'theoreticoneness.TheCorpusJurisSecundumeditorsdidnotmiss
the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has been declared that under modern
statuteschangingthestatusofmarriedwomenanddepartingfromthecommonlawtheoryofmarriage,thereisnoreason
why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law." 19 In publishing in 1969 the
RestatementoftheLaw,Second(ConflictofLaws2d),thereputableAmericanLawInstitutealsocategoricallystatedthatthe
viewofBlackstone"...isnolongerheld.Astheresultofstatutesandcourtdecisions,awifenowpossessespracticallythe
samerightsandpowersasherunmarriedsister."20
Inthecaseatbench,wehavetodecidewhetherweshouldcontinueclingingtotheanachronisticcommonlawthat
demeanswomen,especiallymarriedwomen.IsubmitthattheCourthasnochoiceexcepttobreakawayfromthis
commonlawrule,therootofthemanydegradationsofFilipinowomen.Before1988,ourlawsparticularlytheCivil
Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth
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Romero,citedafewofthemasfollows:21
xxxxxxxxx
LegalDisabilitiesSufferedbyWives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or
disabilities.Forinstance,thewifecannotacceptgiftsfromothers,regardlessofthesexofthegiveror
thevalueofthegift,otherthanfromherverycloserelatives,withoutherhusband'sconsent.Shemay
accept only from, say, her parents, parentsinlaw, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so
calledfourthcivildegree.Shemaynotexerciseherprofessionoroccupationorengageinbusinessif
her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufficient to support their family in
accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for objecting, this is
withinthediscretionofthehusband.
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Becauseofthepresentinequitablesituation,theamendmentstotheCivilLawbeingproposedbythe
UniversityofthePhilippinesLawCenterwouldallowabsolutedivorcewhichseveresthematrimonial
ties,suchthatthedivorcedspousesarefreetogetmarriedayearafterthedivorceisdecreedbythe
courts.However,inordertoplacethehusbandandwifeonanequalfootinginsofarasthebasesfor
divorceareconcerned,thefollowingarespecifiedasthegroundsforabsolutedivorce:(1)adulteryor
having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways specified in the Revised Penal
Codeor(2)anattemptbytherespondentagainstthelifeofthepetitionerwhichamountstoattempted
parricideundertheRevisedPenalCode(3)abandonmentofthepetitionerbytherespondentwithout
justcauseforaperiodofthreeconsecutiveyearsor(4)habitualmaltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal
property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or
enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such
administrator.Consequently,thehusbandisauthorizedtoengageinactsandenterintotransactions
beneficialtotheconjugalpartnership.Thewife,however,cannotsimilarlybindthepartnershipwithout
thehusband'sconsent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law
designatesasthelegaladministratorofthepropertypertainingtotheunemancipatedchild.
TakingtheleadinAsia,ourgovernmentexertedefforts,principallythroughlegislations,toeliminateinequality
betweenmenandwomeninourland.ThewatershedcameonAugust3,1988whenourFamilyCodetook
effect which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and
responsibilities.22
TheFamilyCodeattainedthiselusiveobjectivebygivingnewrightstomarriedwomenandbyabolishingsexbased
privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the family
property, whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal partnership 23 joint parental
authorityovertheirminorchildren,bothovertheirpersonsaswellastheirproperties24jointresponsibilityforthesupportof
thefamily25therighttojointlymanagethehousehold26and,therighttoobjecttotheirhusband'sexerciseofprofession,
occupation,businessoractivity.27OfparticularrelevancetothecaseatbenchisArticle69oftheFamilyCodewhichtook
awaytheexclusiverightofthehusbandtofixthefamilydomicileandgaveitjointlytothehusbandandthewife,thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide.
Thecourtmayexemptonespousefromlivingwiththeotherifthelattershouldliveabroadorthereare
othervalidandcompellingreasonsfortheexemption.However,suchexemptionshallnotapplyifthe
sameisnotcompatiblewiththesolidarityofthefamily.(Emphasissupplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live
together,formerMadamJusticeAliceSempioDiyoftheCourtofAppealsspecifiedtheinstanceswhenawife
maynowrefusetolivewithherhusband,thus:28
(2)Thewifehasthedutytolivewithherhusband,butshemayrefusetodosoincertaincaseslike:
(a)IftheplacechosenbythehusbandasfamilyresidenceisdangeroustoherLife
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making
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commonlifeimpossible
(c)Ifthehusbandcompelshertolivewithhisparents,butshecannotgetalongwithher
motherinlaw and they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG
6122)
(d)Wherethehusbandhascontinuouslycarriedillicitrelationsfor10yearswithdifferent
womenandtreatedhiswiferoughlyandwithoutconsideration.(Dadivasv.Villanueva,54
Phil.92)
(e)Wherethehusbandspenthistimeingambling,givingnomoneytohisfamilyforfood
and necessities, and at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her.
(Panunciov.Sula,CA,34OG129)
(f)Ifthehusbandhasnofixedresidenceandlivesavagabondlifeasatramp(1Manresa
329)
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La.
Ann.70).
TheinescapableconclusionisthatourFamilyCodehascompletelyemancipatedthewifefromthecontrolof
the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this
insightfulviewinoneofhisrarelecturesafterretirement:29
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TheFamilyCodeisprimarilyintendedtoreformthefamilylawsoastoemancipatethewifefromthe
exclusivecontrolofthehusbandandtoplaceheratparitywithhiminsofarasthefamilyisconcerned.
The wife and the husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code. They are now joint
administratorsofthefamilypropertiesandexercisejointauthorityoverthepersonsandpropertiesof
their children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no longer prevail over the
wifebutshehastoagreeonallmattersconcerningthefamily.(Emphasissupplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and
perpetuatedbythecommonlaw,thereisnoreasoninespousingtheanomalousrulethatthewifestillretains
thedomicileofherdeadhusband.Article110oftheCivilCodewhichprovidesthestatutorysupportforthis
stancehasbeenrepealedbyArticle69oftheFamilyCode.Byitsrepeal,itbecomesadeadletterlaw,and
we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the
petitionerisstillboundbythedomiciliarydeterminationofherdeadhusband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due
processandequalprotectionof
law.30Itcanhardlybedoubtedthatthecommonlawimpositiononamarriedwomanofherdeadhusband'sdomicileeven
beyondhisgraveispatentlydiscriminatorytowomen.Itisagenderbaseddiscriminationandisnotrationallyrelatedtothe
objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous
fundamentallaws,the1987Constitutionismoreconcernedwithequalitybetweensexesasitexplicitlycommandsthatthe
State"...shallensurefundamentalequalitybeforethelawofwomenandmen."Tobeexact,section14,ArticleIIprovides:
"TheStaterecognizestheroleofwomeninnationbuilding,andshallensurefundamentalequalitybeforethelawofwomen
andmen.Weshallbetransgressingthesenseandessenceofthisconstitutionalmandateifweinsistongivingourwomen
thecaveman'streatment.
Prescindingfromthesepremises,Irespectfullysubmitthatthebetterstanceistorulethatpetitionerreacquiredher
Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that
petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband's death otherwise, she would have no
domicileandthatwillviolatetheuniversalrulethatnopersoncanbewithoutadomicileatanypointoftime.This
stancealsorestorestherightofpetitionertochooseherdomicilebeforeitwastakenawaybyArticle110oftheCivil
Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the
fairnessofthecommonlawrequiringpetitionertochooseagainherTaclobandomicilebeforeshecouldbereleased
from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased
husbandwhenhefixedtheirdomicileinBatac.Herhusbandisdeadandhecannotruleherbeyondthegrave.The
lawdisablinghertochooseherowndomicilehasbeenrepealed.Consideringallthese,commonlawshouldnotput
the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor
reasonforthisgenderbasedburden.
ButevenassumingarguendothatthereisneedforconvincingproofthatpetitionerchosetoreacquireherTacloban
domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent
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COMELEC,petitioneraverred:
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36.InNovember,1991,Icamehometoourbelovedcountry,afterseveralrequestsformyreturnwere
denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my
passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos,whichtheGovernmentconsideredathreattothenationalsecurityandwelfare.
38.Uponmyreturntothecountry,IwantedtoimmediatelyliveandresideinTaclobanCityorinOlot,
Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a
friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and
PacificPlaza,allinMakati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San
Jose,TaclobanCity,andpursuedmynegotiationswithPCGGtorecovermysequesteredresidences
inTaclobanCityandBarangayOlot,Tolosa,Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I
renovated my parents' burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been
excalvated,unearthedandscattered.
41.OnNovember29,1993,IformallywrotePCGGChairmanMagtanggolGunigundoforpermissions
to
...rehabilitate...(o)urancestralhouseinTaclobanandfarmhouseinOlot,Leyte...to
makethemlivableforustheMarcosfamilytohaveahomeinourownmotherland.
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42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col.
Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte
residences.Iquotepartofhisletter:
DearCol.Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to
visitoursequesteredpropertiesinLeyte,pleaseallowheraccessthereto.Shemayalso
cause repairs and renovation of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be
understoodthatherundertakingsaidrepairsisnotauthorizationforhertotakeoversaid
properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please
extendthenecessarycourtesytoher.
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43.Iwasnotpermitted,however,toliveandstayintheSto.NioShrineresidenceinTaclobanCity
where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I
transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when
PCGGpermittedmetostayandlivethere.
Itisthenclearthatin1992petitionerreestablishedherdomicileintheFirstDistrictofLeyte.Itisnotdisputed
thatin1992,shefirstlivedatthehouseofherbrotherinSanJose,TaclobanCityandlater,inAugust1994,
she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of
OlotarewithintheFirstDistrictofLeyte.Sincepetitionerreestablishedherolddomicilein1992intheFirst
DistrictofLeyte,shemorethancompliedwiththeconstitutionalrequirementofresidence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8,
1995elections.
TheevidencepresentedbytheprivaterespondenttonegatetheTaclobandomicileofpetitionerisnil.Hepresented
petitioner'sVoter'sRegistrationRecordfiledwiththeBoardofElectionInspectorsofPrecinct10AofBarangayOlot,
Tolosa,Leytewhereinshestatedthatherperiodofresidenceinsaidbarangaywassix(6)monthsasofthedateof
herfilingofsaidVoter'sRegistrationRecordonJanuary28,1995.31Thisstatementinpetitioner'sVoter'sRegistration
Recordisanonprejudicialadmission.TheConstitutionrequiresatleastone(1)yearresidenceinthedistrict in which the
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candidateshallbeelected.Inthecaseatbench,thereferenceistheFirstDistrictofLeyte.Petitioner'sstatementprovedthat
sheresidedinOlotsix(6)monthsbeforeJanuary28,1995butdidnotdisprovethatshehasalsoresidedinTaclobanCity
starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months
residenceinOlotshouldbecountednotagainst,butinherfavor.Privaterespondentalsopresentedpetitioner'sCertificateof
Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 32 where she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information
regarding"residenceintheconstituencywhereIseektobeelectedimmediatelyprecedingtheelection."Again,thisoriginal
certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,33 petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a
certificateofcandidacytocorrectabonafidemistakehasbeenallowedbythisCourtasamatterofcourseandasamatter
ofright.AsweheldinAlialyv.COMELEC,34viz.:
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The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate of
candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid.
The amendment of the certificate, although at a date after the deadline, but before the election, was
substantialcompliancewiththelaw,andthedefectwascured.
Itgoeswithoutsayingthatpetitioner'serroneousCertificateofCandidacyfiledonMarch8,1995cannotbe
usedasevidenceagainsther.Privaterespondent'spetitionforthedisqualificationofpetitionerrestedalone
onthesetwo (2)brittlepiecesofdocumentaryevidencepetitioner'sVoter'sRegistration Record and her
original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless
contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify
petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have
overwhelminglyvotedforher.
Fifth.Section10,ArticleIXCoftheConstitutionmandatesthat"bonafidecandidatesforanypublicofficeshallbe
free from any form of harassment and discrimination."35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will
showthatallformsoflegalandextralegalobstacleshavebeenthrownagainstpetitionertopreventherfromrunningasthe
people'srepresentativeintheFirstDistrictofLeyte.Inpetitioner'sAnswertothepetitiontodisqualifyher,sheaverred:36
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10.Petitioner's(hereinprivaterespondentMontejo)motiveinfilingtheinstantpetitionisdevious.When
respondent(petitionerherein)announcedthatshewasintendingtoregisterasavoterinTaclobanCity
and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner
herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her sixmonth actual residence
therein,petitioner(Montejo)filedapetitionwiththeCOMELECtotransferthetownofTolosafromthe
First District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's)
opponentinthecongressionalelectionintheFirstDistrict.Healsofiledabill,alongwithotherLeyte
Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the
FirstDistrictandtomakeitapartofthenewdistrict,toachievehispurpose.However,suchbilldidnot
passtheSenate.Having,failedonsuchmoves,petitionernowfiledtheinstantpetition,forthesame
objective,asitisobviousthatheisafraidtosubmithimselfalongwithrespondent(petitionerherein)for
thejudgmentandverdictoftheelectorateoftheFirstDistrictofLeyteinanhonest,orderly,peaceful,
freeandcleanelectionsonMay8,1995.
Theseallegationswhichprivaterespondentdidnotchallengewerenotlost
totheperceptiveeyeofCommissionerMaambongwhoinhisDissentingOpinion,37held:
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Prior to the registration date January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo)
wrotetheElectionOfficerofTaclobanCitynottoallowrespondent(petitionerherein)toregisterthereat
since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner
(Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95001 (In the matter of the Legislative
Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the New Provinces of
Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
Representative,FirstDistrictofLeyte,wantedtheMunicipalityofTolosa,intheFirstDistrictofLeyte,
transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the
SecondDistrictofLeyte,opposedthemoveofthepetitioner(Montejo).UnderComelecResolutionNo.
2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections refused to make the proposed transfer.
Petitioner(Montejo)filed"MotionforReconsiderationofResolution
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No.2736"whichtheCommissiondeniedinaResolutionpromulgatedonFebruary1,1995.Petitioner
(Montejo)filedapetitionforcertioraribeforetheHonorableSupremeCourt(CiriloRoyG.Montejovs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing
that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure
thattherespondent(petitionerherein)willregisterasavoterinTolosasothatshewillbeforcedtorun
asRepresentativenotintheFirstbutintheSecondDistrict.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a
"Decision,"pennedbyAssociateJusticeReynatoS.Puno,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the

municipalityofCapoocanoftheSecondDistrictandthemunicipalityofPalomponofthe
FourthDistricttotheThirdDistrictoftheprovinceofLeyte,isannulledandsetaside.We
alsodenythePetitionprayingforthetransferofthemunicipalityofTolosafromtheFirst
DistricttotheSecondDistrictoftheprovinceofLeyte.Nocosts.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to
registerintheMunicipalityofTolosawhereherhouseisinsteadofTaclobanCity,herdomicile.Inany
case,bothTaclobanCityandTolosaareintheFirstLegislativeDistrict.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious
discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any
hermeneuticviolencetotheConstitutionbytorturingthemeaningofequality,theendresultofwhichwillallow
the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light
and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different"
Constitution,andtheworstwaytointerprettheConstitutionistoinjectinitsinterpretation,bileandbitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera, 38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or
newcomer,unacquainted,withtheconditionsandneedsofacommunityandnotidentifiedwiththelatter,fromanelective
officetoservethatcommunity...."Petitioner'slifetimecontactswiththeFirstDistrictofLeytecannotbecontested.Nobody
canclaimthatsheisnotacquaintedwithitsproblemsbecausesheisastrangertotheplace.Nonecanargueshecannot
satisfytheintentoftheConstitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate.
The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventyone (70,471) votes,
while private respondent got only ThirtySix Thousand Eight Hundred ThirtyThree (36,833) votes. Petitioner is
clearlytheoverwhelmingchoiceoftheelectorateoftheFirstDistrictofLeyteandthisisnotasleightofstatistics.
Wecannotfrustratethissovereignwillonhighlyarguabletechnicalconsiderations.Incaseofdoubt,weshouldlean
towardsarulethatwillgivelifetothepeople'spoliticaljudgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status
betweenwomenandmenbyrejectingtheiniquitouscommonlawprecedentsonthedomicileofmarriedwomenand
by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is
eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous
balance of advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the
glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this genderbased
discriminationagainstmarriedwomenandweshouldnotexcavatewhathasbeenentombed.Moreimportantly,the
Constitutionforbidsit.
BellosilloandMelo,JJ.,concur.
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of the
First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's
domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of
removingtherefrom,andthatplaceisproperlythedomicileofapersoninwhichhehasvoluntarilyfixedhisabode,
orhabitation,notforamerespecialortemporarypurpose,butwithapresentintentionofmakingithispermanent
home(28C.J.S.1).Itdenotesafixedpermanentresidencetowhichwhenabsentforbusiness,orpleasure,orfor
likereasonsoneintendstoreturn,anddependsonfactsandcircumstances,inthesensethattheydiscloseintent.
(OngHuanTinv.Republic,19SCRA966,969)
Domicileisclassifiedintodomicileoforiginanddomicileofchoice.Thelawattributestoeveryindividualadomicile
8/31/2015 G.R. No. 119976
oforigin,whichisthedomicileofhisparents,oroftheheadofhisfamily,orofthepersononwhomheislegally
dependentatthetimeofhisbirth.Whilethedomicileoforiginisgenerallytheplacewhereoneisbornorreared,it
maybeelsewhere(28C.J.S.5).Domicileofchoice,ontheotherhand,istheplacewhichthepersonhaselected
andchosenforhimselftodisplacehispreviousdomicileithasforitstruebasisorfoundationtheintentionofthe
person (28C.J.S. 6).In ordertoholdthataperson hasabandonedhis domicileand acquired a new one called
domicileofchoice,thefollowingrequisitesmustconcur,namely,(a)residenceorbodilypresenceinthenewlocality,
(b) intention to remain there or animusmanendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animusnon
revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by
operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence,
ordinarilyresultingfromlegaldomesticrelations,asthatofthewifearisingfrommarriage,ortherelationofaparent
andachild(28C.J.S.7).
Inelectionlaw,whenourConstitutionspeaksofresidenceforelectionpurposesitmeansdomicile(Cov.Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713 Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind,
public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner's
disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated oneyear residence
requirement.Apparently,publicrespondentCommissiondeemedasconclusivepetitioner'sstayandregistrationas
voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban,
Leyte.Inseveraldecisions,though,theCourthaslaiddowntherulethatregistrationofavoterinaplaceotherthan
hisplaceoforiginisnotsufficienttoconstituteabandonmentorlossofsuchresidence(Fayponv.Quirino,96Phil.
294,300).RespondentCommissionofferednocogentreasontodepartfromthisruleexcepttosurmisepetitioner's
intentofabandoningherdomicileoforigin.
Ithasbeensuggestedthatpetitioner'sdomicileoforiginwassupplantedbyanewdomicileduetohermarriage,a
domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her
husband'sdomicile,i.e.,Batac,IlocosNorte,untilshemakesanactualchangethereof.Ifindthispropositionquite
untenable.
Tacloban,Leyte,ispetitioner'sdomicileoforiginwhichwasinvoluntarilysupplantedwithanother,i.e.,Batac,Ilocos
Norte,uponhermarriagein1954withthenCongressmanMarcos.Bylegalfictionshefollowedthedomicileofher
husband.Inmyview,thereasonforthelawisforthespousestofullyandeffectivelyperformtheirmaritaldutiesand
obligationstooneanother.1Thequestionofdomicile,however,isnotaffectedbythefactthatitwasthelegalormoral
dutyoftheindividualtoresideinagivenplace(28C.J.S.11).Thus,whilethewiferetainshermaritaldomicilesolongas
the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases.
Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and
unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any
meaningfulpurpose.
ItismyviewthereforethatpetitionerrevertedtoheroriginaldomicileofTacloban,Leyteuponherhusband'sdeath
without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to
disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other
place/s.Theclearruleisthatitistheparty(hereinprivaterespondent)claimingthatapersonhasabandonedorlost
his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino,
supra at 298 28 C.J.S. 16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as
against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the
recordisdevoidofconvincingproofthatpetitionerhasacquiredwhethervoluntarilyorinvoluntarily,anewdomicile
toreplaceherdomicileoforigin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional oneyear residence
requirement.Afterherexileabroad,shereturnedtothePhilippinesin1991toresideinOlot,Tolosa,Leyte,butthe
Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential house and other properties
forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the
Petition).In1992,sheranforthepositionofpresidentwritinginhercertificateofcandidacyherresidenceasSan
Juan,MetroManila.Afterherlosstherein,shewentbacktoTaclobanCity,acquiredherresidencecertificate2and
residedwithherbrotherinSanJose.SheresidedinSanJose,TaclobanCityuntilAugustof1994whenshewasallowedby
the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).3 It was in the
samemonthofAugustwhensheappliedforthecancellationofherpreviousregistrationinSanJuan,MetroManilainorder
toregisteranewasvoterofOlot,Tolosa,Leyte,whichshedidonJanuary28,1995.Fromthissequenceofevents,Ifindit
quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the oneyear residence requirement the date when she applied for the
cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to
disproveisthatpetitionertransferredherresidenceafterthe1992presidentialelectionfromSanJuan,MetroManilatoSan
Jose,TaclobanCity,andresidedthereinuntilAugustof1994.ShelatertransferredtoOlot,Tolosa,Leyte(AnnexI,p.7).It
appearingthatbothTaclobanCityandTolosa,LeytearewithintheFirstCongressionalDistrictofLeyte,itindubitablystands
that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has
satisfactorilycompliedwiththeoneyearqualificationrequiredbythe1987Constitution.
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PetitionerhasappealedtothisCourtforreliefaftertheCOMELECruledthatshewasdisqualifiedfromrunningfor
Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her
proclamationshouldbesuspended.NotbyastraightforwardrulingdidtheCOMELECpronounceitsdecisionashas
been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its
shiftingstancevisavispetitioner'scertificateofcandidacywerefirst,theactionofitsSecondDivisiondisqualifying
her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 21 on April 24, 1995 then the denial by the
COMELECenbancofherMotionforReconsiderationonMay7,1995,adaybeforetheelectionthenbecauseshe
persistedinrunning,itsdecisionon
May11,1995orthreedaysaftertheelection,allowingherproclamationintheeventthattheresultsofthecanvass
should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won
overwhelminglyoverheropponent),butalmostsimultaneouslyreversingitselfbydirectingthatevenifshewins,her
proclamationshouldnonethelessbesuspended.
Crucialtotheresolutionofthedisqualificationissuepresentedbythecaseatbenchistheinterpretationtobegiven
totheoneyearresidencyrequirementimposedbytheConstitutiononaspirantsforaCongressionalseat.1
Bearinginmindthattheterm"resident"hasbeenheldtobesynonymouswith"domicile"forelectionpurposes,itis
important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had
resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents
livedatthetimeofherbirth.Dependingonwhattheoryoneadopts,thesamemayhavebeenchangedwhenshe
married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly
releasedherfromtheobligationtolivewithhimattheresidencefixedbyhimduringhislifetime.Whatmayconfuse
thelaymanatthispointisthefactthattheterm"domicile"mayreferto"domicileoforigin,""domicileofchoice,"or
"domicilebyoperationoflaw,"whichsubjectweshallnotbelaborsinceithasbeenamplydiscussedbytheponente
andintheotherseparateopinions.
Inanycase,whatassumesrelevanceisthedivergenceoflegalopinionastotheeffectofthehusband'sdeathon
thedomicileofthewidow.Somescholarsopinethatthewidow'sdomicileremainsunchangedthatthedeceased
husband'swishesperforcestillbindthewifehehasleftbehind.Giventhisinterpretation,thewidowcannotpossibly
gofarenoughtoseverthedomiciliarytieimposedbyherhusband.
Itisbadenoughtointerpretthelawasempoweringthehusbandunilaterallytofixtheresidenceordomicileofthe
family,aslaiddownintheCivilCode,2buttocontinuegivingobeisancetohiswishesevenaftertherationaleunderlying
themutualdutyofthespousestolivetogetherhasceased,istocloseone'seyestothestarkrealitiesofthepresent.
Attheotherextremeisthepositionthatthewidowautomaticallyrevertstoherdomicileoforiginuponthedemiseof
herhusband.Doesthelawsoabhoravacuumthatthewidowhastobeendowedsomehowwithadomicile?To
answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile.
Everyonemusthaveadomicile.Thenonemusthaveonlyasingledomicileforthesamepurposeatanygiventime.
Once established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as
definedbythelawbeissubjectto.
Atthisjuncture,weareconfrontedwithanunexploredlegalterraininthisjurisdiction,renderedmoremurkybythe
conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to
illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of according
petitionerherrighttochooseherdomicileinkeepingwiththeenlightenedglobaltrendtorecognizeandprotectthe
humanrightsofwomen,nolessthanmen.
Admittedly,thenotionofplacingwomenatparwithmen,insofarascivil,politicalandsocialrightsareconcerned,is
arelativelyrecentphenomenonthattookseedonlyinthemiddleofthiscentury.Itisahistoricalfactthatforover
threecenturies,thePhilippineshadbeencolonizedbySpain,aconservative,Catholiccountrywhichtransplantedto
ourshorestheOldWorldcultures,moresandattitudesandvalues.Throughtheimpositiononourgovernmentof
theSpanishCivilCodein1889,thepeople,bothmenandwomen,hadnochoicebuttoacceptsuchconceptsas
thehusband'sbeingtheheadofthefamilyandthewife'ssubordinationtohisauthority.Insuchrole,hiswasthe
righttomakevitaldecisionsforthefamily.Manyinstancescometomind,foremostbeingwhatisrelatedtotheissue
beforeus,namely,that"thehusbandshallfixtheresidenceofthefamily." 3Becauseheismaderesponsibleforthe
supportofthewifeandtherestofthefamily,4heisalsoempoweredtobetheadministratoroftheconjugalproperty,witha
fewexceptions5andmay,therefore,disposeoftheconjugalpartnershippropertyforthepurposesspecifiedunderthelaw6
whereas,asageneralrule,thewifecannotbindtheconjugalpartnershipwithoutthehusband'sconsent.7Asregardsthe
propertypertainingtothechildrenunderparentalauthority,thefatheristhelegaladministratorandonlyinhisabsencemay
themotherassumehispowers.8Demeaningtothewife'sdignityarecertainstricturesonherpersonalfreedoms,practically
relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's
consent,acquireanygratuitoustitle,exceptfromherascendants,descendants,parentsinlaw,andcollateralrelativeswithin
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9
thefourthdegree. With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her
profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the family, according to its social
standingandhisoppositionisfoundedonseriousandvalidgrounds.10Mostoffensive,ifnotrepulsive,totheliberalminded
is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the death of her husband,
unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the
parentalauthorityoverherchildren,unlessthedeceasedhusband,fatherofthelatter,hasexpresslyprovidedinhiswillthat
hiswidowmightmarryagain,andhasorderedthatinsuchcasesheshouldkeepandexerciseparentalauthorityovertheir
children.12Again,aninstanceofahusband'soverarchinginfluencefrombeyondthegrave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from them
until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found hospitable
lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the
Spanish"conquistadores"hadbeenoverthrownbytheAmericanforcesattheturnofthecentury.Thebedrockof
theU.N.Charterwasfirmlyanchoredonthiscredo:"toreaffirmfaithinthefundamentalhumanrights,inthedignity
andworthofthehumanperson,intheequalrightsofmenandwomen."(Emphasissupplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the
feministmovement.Whatmayberegardedastheinternationalbillofrightsforwomenwasimplantedinthe
ConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(CEDAW)adoptedbytheU.N.
GeneralAssemblywhichenteredintoforceasaninternationaltreatyonSeptember3,1981.Inratifyingthe
instrument,thePhilippinesbounditselftoimplementitsliberatingspiritandletter,foritsConstitution,noless,
declaredthat"ThePhilippines...adoptsthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawaspartofthe
lawofthelandandadherestothepolicyofpeace,equality,justice,freedom,cooperation,andamitywithall
nations."13OnesuchprincipleembodiedintheCEDAWisgrantingtomenandwomen"thesamerightswithregard
to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile." 14
(Emphasissupplied).
CEDAW'sprowomenorientationwhichwasnotlostonFilipinowomenwasreflectedinthe1987Constitutionofthe
Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily approved by the first lady President of the
country,CorazonC.Aquino.Notableforitsemphasisonthehumanrightsofallindividualsanditsbiasforequalitybetween
thesexesarethefollowingprovisions:"TheStatevaluesthedignityofeveryhumanpersonandguaranteesfullrespectfor
humanrights"16and"TheStaterecognizestheroleofwomeninnationbuilding,andshallensurethefundamentalequality
beforethelawofwomenandmen."17
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory
provisionsoflawwasthedeletionintheFamilyCodeofalmostalloftheunreasonablestricturesonwivesandthe
granttothemofpersonalrightsequaltothatoftheirhusbands.Specifically,thehusbandandwifearenowgiventhe
rightjointlytofixthefamilydomicile18concomitanttothespouses'beingjointlyresponsibleforthesupportofthefamily
istherightanddutyofbothspousestomanagethehousehold19theadministrationandtheenjoymentofthecommunity
propertyshallbelongtobothspousesjointly20thefatherandmothershallnowjointlyexerciselegalguardianshipoverthe
propertyoftheirunemancipatedcommonchild21andseveralothers.
Awareofthehiatusandcontinuinggapsinthelaw,insofaraswomen'srightsareconcerned,Congresspasseda
lawpopularlyknownas"WomeninDevelopmentandNationBuildingAct"22Amongtherightsgiventomarriedwomen
evidencingtheircapacitytoactincontractsequaltothatofmenare:
(1)Womenshallhavethecapacitytoborrowandobtainloansandexecutesecurityandcreditarrangementsunder
thesameconditionsasmen
(2)Womenshallhaveequalaccesstoallgovernmentandprivatesectorprogramsgrantingagriculturalcredit,loans
andnonmaterialresourcesandshallenjoyequaltreatmentinagrarianreformandlandresettlementprograms
(3)Womenshallhaveequalrightstoactasincorporatorsandenterintoinsurancecontractsand
(4)Marriedwomenshallhaverightsequaltothoseofmarriedmeninapplyingforpassports,securevisasandother
traveldocuments,withoutneedtosecuretheconsentoftheirspouses.
AstheworlddrawsthecurtainontheFourthWorldConferenceofWomeninBeijing,letthisCourtnowbethefirst
to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full
participation in decisionmaking at all levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself a
MemberofthePhilippineDelegationtotheInternationalWomen'sYearConferenceinMexicoin1975,thiswriteris
only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not
excluded,tobeacceptedasequalsofmenandtoteardownthewallsofdiscriminationthatholdthembackfrom
theirproperplacesunderthesun.
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Inlightoftheinexorablesweepofevents,localandglobal,legislative,executiveandjudicial,accordingmorerights
towomenhithertodeniedthemandeliminatingwhateverpocketsofdiscriminationstillexistintheircivil,politicaland
social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their
husbandsbutmustretainthesame,regardless?
Isubmitthatawidow,likethepetitionerandotherssimilarlysituated,cannolongerbeboundbythedomicileofthe
departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but
exercisingfreewill,shemayopttoreestablishherdomicileoforigin.InreturningtoTaclobanandsubsequently,to
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by
overtacts,herelectionofadomicileofchoice,inthiscase,areversiontoherdomicileoforigin.Addedtogether,the
time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the oneyear requirement to run as
RepresentativeoftheFirstDistrictofLeyte.
Inviewoftheforegoingexpatiation,IvotetoGRANTthepetition.
VITUG,J.,separateopinion:
ThecaseatbenchdealswithexplicitConstitutionalmandates.
TheConstitutionisnotapliableinstrument.Itisabedrockinourlegalsystemthatsetsupidealsanddirectionsand
rendersteadyourstrideshence.Itonlylooksbacksoastoensurethatmistakesinthepastarenotrepeated.A
compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well
becomeoutdatedbytherealitiesoftime.Whenitdoes,itmustbechangedbutwhileitremains,weoweitrespect
and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory
needs,letalonesocietalattitudes,ortheConstitutionmightloseitsveryessence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by
necessaryimplication,adifferentintentionismanifest(seeMarcelinovs.Cruz,121SCRA51).
ThetwoprovisionsinitiallybroughttofocusareSection6andSection17ofArticleVIofthefundamentallaw.These
provisionsread:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a naturalborn

citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twentyfive years of age, able to
readandwrite,and,exceptthepartylistrepresentatives,aregisteredvoterinthedistrictinwhichhe
shallbeelected,andaresidentthereofforaperiodofnotlessthanoneyearimmediatelypreceding
thedayoftheelection.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respectiveMembers.EachElectoralTribunalshallbecomposedofnineMembers,threeofwhomshall
beJusticesoftheSupremeCourttobedesignatedbytheChiefJustice,andtheremainingsixshallbe
MembersoftheSenateortheHouseofRepresentatives,asthecasemaybe,whoshallbechosenon
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registeredunderthepartylistsystemrepresentedtherein.TheseniorJusticeintheElectoralTribunal
shallbeitsChairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws and
regulationsrelativetotheconductofelection..."(Art.IX,C,Sec.2,Constitution)that,therebeingnothingsaidto
the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law of
candidates to an elective office. Indeed, preproclamation controversies are expressly placed under the
COMELEC'sjurisdictiontohearandresolve(Art.IX,C,Sec.3,Constitution).
Thematterbeforeusspecificallycallsfortheobservanceoftheconstitutionaloneyearresidencyrequirement.The
issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least
inextricablylinkedtosuchdetermination.ThefindingsandjudgmentoftheCOMELEC,inaccordancewiththelong
establishedruleandsubjectonlytoanumberofexceptionsunderthebasicheadingof"graveabuseofdiscretion,"
arenotreviewablebythisCourt.
Idonotfindmuchneedtodoacomplexexerciseonwhatseemstometobeaplainmatter.Generally,theterm
"residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official
dutiesmayrequirehimtostay)ortemporary(theplacewherehesojournsduringaconsiderablelengthoftime).For
civillawpurposes,i.e.,asregardstheexerciseofcivilrightsandthefulfillmentofcivilobligations,thedomicileofa
naturalpersonistheplaceofhishabitualresidence(see Article 50,Civil Code).Inelection cases, thecontrolling
ruleisthatheretoforeannouncedbythisCourtinRomualdezvs.RegionalTrialCourt,Branch7,TaclobanCity(226
SCRA408,409)thus:
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In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term
"residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicativeofsuchintention.""Domicile"denotesafixedpermanentresidencetowhichwhenabsentfor
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus acquired,
however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new
domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intentiontoremainthere,and(3)anintentiontoabandontheolddomicile.Inotherwords,theremust
basicallybeanimusmanendicoupledwithanimusnonrevertendi.Thepurposetoremaininoratthe
domicileofchoicemustbeforanindefiniteperiodoftimethechangeofresidencemustbevoluntary
andtheresidenceattheplacechosenforthenewdomicilemustbeactual.
Usingtheabovetests,IamnotconvincedthatwecanchargetheCOMELECwithhavingcommittedgrave
abuseofdiscretioninitsassailedresolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunalconcernedbegins.Itsignifiesthattheprotesteemusthavetheretoforebeendulyproclaimedandhassince
becomea"member"oftheSenateortheHouseofRepresentatives.Thequestioncanbeaskedonwhetherornot
theproclamationofacandidateisjustaministerialfunctionoftheCommissiononElectionsdictatedsolelyonthe
numberofvotescastinanelectionexercise.Ibelieve,itisnot.Aministerialdutyisanobligationtheperformanceof
which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its
particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be
requiredbylawbeforeaproclamationisproperlydone.
TheCourt,onitspart,should,inmyviewatleast,refrainfromanyundueencroachmentontheultimateexerciseof
authoritybytheElectoralTribunalsonmatterswhich,bynolessthanaconstitutionalfiat,areexplicitlywithintheir
exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory
pronouncementontheabilityoftheElectoralTribunaltolatercomeupwithitsownjudgmentinacontest"relatingto
theelection,returnsandqualification"ofitsmembers.
Prescindingfromalltheforegoing,IshouldliketonexttouchbaseontheapplicabilitytothiscaseofSection6of
RepublicActNo.6646,inrelationtoSection72ofBatasPambansaBlg.881,eachprovidingthusly:
REPUBLICACTNO.6646
xxxxxxxxx
Sec.6.EffectofDisqualificationCase.Anycandidatewhohasbeendeclaredbyfinaljudgmentto
bedisqualifiedshallnotbevotedfor,andthevotescastforhimshallnotbecounted.Ifforanyreason
acandidateisnotdeclaredbyfinaljudgmentbeforeanelectiontobedisqualifiedandheisvotedfor
andreceivesthewinningnumberofvotesinsuchelection,theCourtorCommissionshallcontinuewith
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
candidatewhenevertheevidenceofhisguiltisstrong.
BATASPAMBANSABLG.881
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give
prioritytocasesofdisqualificationbyreasonofviolationofthisActtotheendthatafinaldecisionshall
berenderednotlaterthansevendaysbeforetheelectioninwhichthedisqualificationissought.
Anycandidatewhohasbeendeclaredbyfinaljudgmenttobedisqualifiedshallnotbevotedfor,and
thevotescastforhimshallnotbecounted.Nevertheless,ifforanyreason,acandidateisnotdeclared
by final, judgment before an election to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
preventhisproclamationandassumptiontooffice.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the specific
instancestheyostensiblywouldcoverastheprincipletheyclearlyconvey.Thus,Iwillnotscoffattheargumentthat
it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as
such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The
argument,nevertheless,isfaroutweighedbytherationaleofthenowprevailingdoctrinefirstenunciatedinthecase
ofTopaciovs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzonvs. Comelec (103 SCRA
687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of
Geronimovs.Ramos(136SCRA435[1985]),bytheLabo(176SCRA1(1989]),Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]),
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Labo(211SCRA297[1992])and,mostrecently,Benito(235SCRA436[1994])rulings.Benitovs.Comelecwasa
unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano,
Padilla,Bidin,Regalado,Davide,Romero,Melo,Quiason,Puno,VitugandMendoza(JusticesCruzandBellosillo
wereonofficialleave).Foreasyreference,letmequotefromthefirstLabodecision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto
petition,canreplacethepetitionerasmayor.Hecannot.Thesimplereasonisthatasheobtainedonly
thesecondhighestnumberofvotesintheelection,hewasobviouslynotthechoiceofthepeopleof
BaguioCity.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740)
decidedin1985.Inthatcase,thecandidatewhoplacedsecondwasproclaimedelectedafterthevotes
for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a noncandidate, were all
disregardasstray.Ineffect,thesecondplacerwonbydefault.Thatdecisionwassupportedbyeight
membersoftheCourtthen,(Cuevas,J.,ponente,withMakasiar,Concepcion,Jr.,Escolin,Relova,De
laFuente,AlampayandAquino,JJ.,concurring.)withthreedissenting(Teehankee,ActingC.J.,Abad
SantosandMelencioHerrera,JJ.)andanothertworeservingtheirvote.(PlanaandGutierrez,Jr.,JJ.)
Onewasonofficialleave.(Fernando,C.J.)
Reexamining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the
earliercaseofGeronimov.Ramos,(136SCRA435)whichrepresentsthemorelogicalanddemocratic
rule.Thatcase,whichreiteratedthedoctrinefirstannouncedin1912inTopaciov.Paredes,(23Phil.
238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad
Santos,MelencioHerrera,Plana,Escolin,Relova,DelaFuente,CuevasandAlampay,JJ.,concurring)
withoutanydissent,althoughonereservedhisvote,(Makasiar,J.)anothertooknopart,(Aquino,J.)
andtwootherswereonleave.(Fernando,C.J.andConcepcion,Jr.,J.)TheretheCourtheld:
...itwouldbeextremelyrepugnanttothebasicconceptoftheconstitutionallyguaranteed
right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimedawinnerandimposedastherepresentativeofaconstituency,themajorityof
whichhavepositivelydeclaredthroughtheirballotsthattheydonotchoosehim.
Soundpolicydictatesthatpublicelectiveofficesarefilledbythosewhohavereceivedthe
highestnumberofvotescastintheelectionforthatoffice,anditisafundamentalideain
allrepublicanformsofgovernmentthatnoonecanbedeclaredelectedandnomeasure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
castintheelection.(20CorpusJuris2nd,S243,p.676.)
candidatewasalive,qualified,oreligible,theyshouldnotbetreatedasstray,voidormeaningless.(at
pp.2021)
Consideringalltheforegoing,Iamconstrainedtovoteforthedismissalofthepetition.
InmyviewtheissueinthiscaseiswhethertheCommissiononElectionshasthepowertodisqualifycandidateson
thegroundthattheylackeligibilityfortheofficetowhichtheyseektobeelected.Ithinkthatithasnoneandthatthe
qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo
warrantooranelectionprotestintheappropriateforum,notnecessarilyintheCOMELECbut,asinthiscase,inthe
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the
COMELECisofnomoment.Suchproceedingswereunauthorizedandwerenotrenderedvalidbytheiragreement
tosubmittheirdisputetothatbody.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's
qualificationsforanofficebeforehiselection.TherearenoneintheOmnibusElectionCode(B.P.Blg.881),inthe
ElectoralReformsLawof1987(R.A.No.6646),orinthelawprovidingforsynchronizedelections(R.A.No.7166).
There are, in other words, no provisions for preproclamation contests but only election protests or quo warranto
proceedingsagainstwinningcandidates.
Tobesure,thereareprovisionsdenominatedfor"disqualification,"buttheyarenotconcernedwithadeclarationof
theineligibilityofacandidate.Theseprovisionsareconcernedwiththeincapacity(duetoinsanity,incompetenceor
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convictionofanoffense)ofapersoneithertobeacandidateortocontinueasacandidateforpublicoffice.Thereis
alsoaprovisionforthedenialorcancellationofcertificatesofcandidacy,butitappliesonlytocasesinvolvingfalse
representationsastocertainmattersrequiredbylawtobestatedinthecertificates.
TheseprovisionsarefoundinthefollowingpartsoftheOmnibusElectionCode:
12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent,orhasbeensentencedbyfinaljudgmentforsubversion,insurrection,rebellionorforany
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involvingmoralturpitude,shallbedisqualifiedtobeacandidateandtoholdanyoffice,unlesshehas
beengivenplenarypardonorgrantedamnesty.
Thedisqualificationstobeacandidatehereinprovidedshallbedeemedremoveduponthedeclaration
bycompetentauthoritythatsaidinsanityorincompetencehadbeenremovedoraftertheexpirationof
aperiodoffiveyearsfromhisserviceofsentence,unlesswithinthesameperiodheagainbecomes
disqualified.(Emphasisadded)
68.Disqualifications.Anycandidatewho,inanactionorprotestinwhichheisapartyisdeclared
byfinaldecisionofacompetentcourtguiltyof,orfoundbytheCommissionofhaving(a)givenmoney
orothermaterialconsiderationtoinfluence,induceorcorruptthevotersorpublicofficialsperforming
electoralfunctions(b)committedactsofterrorismtoenhancehiscandidacy(c)spentinhiselection
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code (d) solicited, received or made any
contributionprohibitedunderSections89,95,96,97and104or(e)violatedanyofSections80,83,
85,86and261,paragraphsd,e,k,v,andcc,subparagraph6,shallbedisqualifiedfromcontinuingas
acandidate,orifhehasbeenelected,fromholdingtheoffice.Anypersonwhoisapermanentresident
of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis
added)
78.Petitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateof
candidacy.Averifiedpetitionseekingtodenyduecourseortocancelacertificateofcandidacymay
befiledbyanypersonexclusivelyonthegroundthatanymaterialrepresentationcontainedthereinas
requiredunderSection74hereofisfalse.Thepetitionmaybefiledatanytimenotlaterthantwenty
fivedaysfromthetimeofthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacyandshallbedecided,afterduenotice
andhearing,notlaterthanfifteendaysbeforetheelection.(Emphasisadded)
theElectoralReformsLawof1987(R.A.No.6646):
6.EffectofDisqualificationCase.Anycandidatewhohasbeendeclaredbyfinaljudgmenttobe
disqualifiedshallnotbevotedfor,andthevotescastforhimshallnotbecounted.Ifforanyreasona
candidateisnotdeclaredbyfinaljudgmentbeforeanelectiontobedisqualifiedandheisvotedforand
receivesthewinningnumberofvotesinsuchelection,theCourtorCommissionshallcontinuewiththe
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and upon motion for the complainant or any
candidatewhenevertheevidenceofhisguiltisstrong.(Emphasisadded).
7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure

hereinaboveprovidedshallapplytopetitionstodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacy
asprovidedinSection78ofBatasPambansaBlg.881.
andtheLocalGovernmentCodeof1991(R.A.No.7160):
40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishablebyone(1)yearormoreofimprisonment,withintwo(2)yearsafterservingsentence
(b)Thoseremovedfromofficeasaresultofonadministrativecase
(c)ThoseconvictedbyfinaljudgmentforviolatingtheoathofallegiancetotheRepublic
(d)Thosewithdualcitizenship
(e)Fugitivefromjusticeincriminalornonpoliticalcaseshereorabroad
(f)Permanentresidentsinaforeigncountryorthosewhohaveacquiredtherighttoresideabroadand
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continuetoavailofthesamerightaftertheeffectivityofthisCodeand
(g)Theinsaneorfeebleminded.
ThepetitionfiledbyprivaterespondentCiriloRoyMontejointheCOMELEC,whileentitled"ForCancellationand
Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda RomualdezMarcos made material
representationsinhercertificateofcandidacywhichwerefalse,itsoughtherdisqualificationonthegroundthat"on
the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the
positionofRepresentative,consideringthatonelectionday,May8,1995,[she]wouldhaveresidedlessthanten
(10)monthsinthedistrictwheresheisseekingtobeelected."Foritspart,theCOMELEC'sSecondDivision,inits
resolutionofApril24,1995,cancelledhercertificateofcandidacyandcorrectedcertificateofcandidacyonthebasis
ofitsfindingthatpetitioneris"notqualifiedtorunforthepositionofMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesforthe
First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any finding that she had made false representations as to
materialmattersinhercertificateofcandidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy
under 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is
important to note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under 78 have for their purpose to
disqualifyapersonfrombeingacandidate,whereasquowarrantoproceedingshavefortheirpurposetodisqualifya
person from holding public office.Jurisdictionoverquowarranto proceedings involving members of the House of
RepresentativesisvestedintheElectoralTribunalofthatbody.
Indeed,intheonlycasesinwhichthisCourtdealtwithpetitionsforthecancellationofcertificatesofcandidacy,the
allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy
withregardtotheircitizenship,1age,2orresidence.3ButinthegeneralityofcasesinwhichthisCourtpasseduponthe
qualificationsofrespondentsforoffice,thisCourtdidsointhecontextofelectionprotests4orquowarrantoproceedings5
filedaftertheproclamationoftherespondentsorprotesteesaswinners.
Threereasonsmaybecitedtoexplaintheabsenceofanauthorizedproceedingfordeterminingbeforeelectionthe
qualificationsofacandidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his
eligibilityfortheoffice.Incontrast,whetheranindividualshouldbedisqualifiedasacandidateforactsconstituting
electionoffenses(e.g., votebuying, overspending, commissionof prohibited acts) is a prejudicialquestion which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is
whyitisprovidedthatifthegroundsfordisqualificationareestablished,acandidatewillnotbevotedforifhehas
beenvotedfor,thevotesinhisfavorwillnotbecountedandifforsomereasonhehasbeenvotedforandhehas
won,eitherhewillnotbeproclaimedorhisproclamationwillbesetaside.6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstratedinthecompanioncase(G.R.No.120265,AgapitoA.Aquinov.COMELEC)wherethedetermination
ofAquino'sresidencewasstillpendingintheCOMELECevenaftertheelectionsofMay8,1995.Thisiscontraryto
thesummarycharacterofproceedingsrelatingtocertificatesofcandidacy.Thatiswhythelawmakesthereceiptof
certificatesofcandidacyaministerialdutyoftheCOMELECanditsofficers.7Thelawissatisfiedifcandidatesstatein
theircertificatesofcandidacythattheyareeligibleforthepositionwhichtheyseektofill,leavingthedeterminationoftheir
qualificationstobemadeaftertheelectionandonlyintheeventtheyareelected.Onlyincasesinvolvingchargesoffalse
representationsmadeincertificatesofcandidacyistheCOMELECgivenjurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against preproclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges"undertheConstitutionoftheelection,returnsandqualificationsofmembersofCongressorofthePresident
andVicePresident,asthecasemaybe.
By providing in 253 for the remedy of quowarranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after the
resultsofelectionsareproclaimed,whilebeingconspicuouslysilentaboutapreproclamationremedybasedonthe
same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any
inquiryintothequalificationsofcandidatesunlesstheyhavebeenelected.
Apparentlyrealizingthelackofanauthorizedproceedingfordeclaringtheineligibilityofcandidates,theCOMELEC
amendeditsrulesonFebruary15,1993soastoprovideinRule25,1thefollowing:
Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by
lawtobegroundsfordisqualificationmaybedisqualifiedfromcontinuingasacandidate.
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Thelackofprovisionfordeclaringtheineligibilityofcandidates,however,cannotbesuppliedbyamererule.Such
anactisequivalenttothecreationofacauseofactionwhichisasubstantivematterwhichtheCOMELEC,inthe
exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualificationsbased on age,residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C,
2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings,asalreadystated,arebasedongroundsspecifiedin12and68oftheOmnibusElectionCodeand
in40oftheLocalGovernmentCodeandareforthepurposeofbarringanindividualfrombecomingacandidateor
fromcontinuingasacandidateforpublicoffice.Inaword,theirpurposeistoeliminate acandidate fromthe race
either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications
prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for
declarationofineligibilityistoremovetheincumbentfromoffice.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not
disqualifiedfrombecomingacandidateorcontinuingasacandidateforapublicofficeandviceversa.Wehavethis
sortofdichotomyinourNaturalizationLaw.(C.A.No.473)Thatanalienhasthequalificationsprescribedin2of
thelawdoesnotimplythathedoesnotsufferfromanyofdisqualificationsprovidedin4.
Indeed,provisionsfordisqualificationsonthegroundthatthecandidateisguiltyofprohibitedelectionpracticesor
offenses,likeotherpreproclamationremedies,areaimedatthedetestablepracticeof"grabbingtheproclamation
andprolongingtheelectionprotest,"8throughtheuseof"manufactured"electionreturnsorresorttoothertrickeryforthe
purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's
qualificationsforofficebeforetheelection.Tothecontrary,itisthecandidateagainstwhomaproceedingfordisqualification
isbroughtwhocouldbeprejudicedbecausehecouldbepreventedfromassumingofficeeventhoughinendheprevails.
Tosummarize,thedeclarationofineligibilityofacandidatemayonlybesoughtinanelectionprotestoractionfor
quo warranto filed pursuant to 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With
respecttoelectivelocalofficials(e.g.,Governor,ViceGovernor,membersoftheSangguniangPanlalawigan,etc.)
such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as
providedinArt.IX,C,2(2)oftheConstitution.InthecaseofthePresidentandVicePresident,thepetitionmustbe
filedwiththePresidentialElectoralTribunal(Art.VII,4,lastparagraph),andinthecaseoftheSenators,withthe
SenateElectoralTribunal,andinthecaseofCongressmen,withtheHouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal.
(Art.VI,17)Thereisgreaterreasonfornotallowingbeforetheelectionthefilingofdisqualificationproceedings
basedonallegedineligibilityinthecaseofcandidatesforPresident,VicePresident,Senatorsandmembersofthe
HouseofRepresentatives,becauseofthesamepolicyprohibitingthefilingofpreproclamationcasesagainstsuch
candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95009 that its
proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda
RomualdezMarcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the
HRET.
Accordingly,IvotetograntthepetitionandtoannultheproceedingsoftheCommissiononElectionsinSPANo.95
009,includingitsquestionedordersdotedApril24,1995,May7,1995,May11,1995andMay25,1995,declaring
petitionerImeldaRomualdezMarcosineligibleandorderingherproclamationasRepresentativeoftheFirstDistrict
ofLeytesuspended.TotheextentthatRule25oftheCOMELECRulesofProcedureauthorizesproceedingsforthe
disqualificationofcandidatesonthegroundofineligibilityfortheoffice,itshouldconsideredvoid.
Theprovincialboardofcanvassersshouldnowproceedwiththeproclamationofpetitioner.
Narvasa,C.J.,concurs.
IregretthatIcannotjointhemajorityopinionasexpressedinthewellwrittenponenciaofMr.JusticeKapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the provision
itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular
controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that "no person shall be a member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least
twentyfive(25)yearsofage,abletoreadandwrite,andexceptthepartylistrepresentatives,aregisteredvoterin
thedistrictinwhichheshallbeelected,andaresidentthereofforaperiodofnotlessthanoneyearimmediately
precedingthedayoftheelection."(ArticleVI,section6)
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Ithasbeenarguedthatforpurposesofourelectionlaws,thetermresidencehasbeenunderstoodassynonymous
withdomicile.ThisargumenthasbeenvalidatedbynolessthantheCourtinnumerouscases1 where significantly
thefactualcircumstancesclearlyandconvincinglyprovedthatapersondoesnoteffectivelylosehisdomicileoforiginifthe
intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
Withthisbasicthesisinmind,itwouldnotbedifficulttoconceiveofdifferentmodalitieswithinwhichthephrase"a
residentthereof(meaning,thelegislativedistrict)foraperiodofnotlessthanoneyear"wouldfit.
Thefirstinstanceiswhereaperson'sresidenceanddomicilecoincideinwhichcaseapersononlyhastoprovethat
hehasbeendomiciledinapermanentlocationfornotlessthanayearbeforetheelection.
Asecondsituationiswhereapersonmaintainsaresidenceapartfromhisdomicileinwhichcasehewouldhavethe
luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the oneyear residence period in the district as the
minimumperiodforeligibilitytothepositionofcongressionalrepresentativeforthedistrict.
Ineithercase,onewouldnotbeconstitutionallydisqualifiedforabandoninghisresidenceinordertoreturntohis
domicileoforigin,orbetterstill,domicileofchoiceneitherwouldonebedisqualifiedforabandoningaltogetherhis
domicileinfavorofhisresidenceinthedistrictwherehedesirestobeacandidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in different
districts.Sincehisdomicileoforigincontinuesasanoptionaslongasthereisnoeffectiveabandonment(animus
nonrevertendi),hecanpracticallychoosethedistrictmostadvantageousforhim.
Allthesetheoreticalscenarios,however,aretemperedbytheunambiguouslimitationthat"foraperiodofnotless
thanoneyearimmediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection",hemustbearesidentinthedistrictwherehedesires
tobeelected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be
synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in all
situationssatisfythelengthoftimeprescribedbythefundamentallaw.Andthis,becauseofadefiniteConstitutional
purpose.HemustbefamiliarwiththeenvironmentandproblemsofadistrictheintendstorepresentinCongress
andtheoneyearresidenceinsaiddistrictwouldbetheminimumperiodtoacquiresuchfamiliarity,ifnotversatility.
InthecaseofpetitionerImeldaR.Marcos,theoperativefactsaredistinctlysetoutinthenowassaileddecisionof
theComelec2ndDivisiondated24April1995(asaffirmedbytheComelecenbanc)
DivineWordUniversityofTacloban,wheresheearnedherdegreeinEducation.Thereafter,shetaught
intheLeyteChineseHighSchool,stillinTaclobanCity.In1952shewenttoManilatoworkwithher
cousin,thelateSpeakerDanielZ.RomualdezinhisofficeintheHouseofRepresentatives.In1954,
she married expresident Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She
livedwithhiminBatac,IlocosNorteandregisteredthereasavoter.Whenherhusbandwaselected
Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines,shelivedwithhiminMalacanangPalaceandregisteredasavoterinSanMiguel,Manila.
DuringtheMarcospresidency,respondentservedasaMemberoftheBatasangPambansa,Minister
ofHumanSettlementsandGovernorofMetroManila.SheclaimedthatinFebruary1986,sheandher
family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to
Manila.In1992respondentranforelectionasPresidentofthePhilippinesandfiledherCertificateof
CandidacywhereinsheindicatedthatsheisaresidentandregisteredvoterofSanJuan,MetroManila.
On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila,
requestingforcancellationofherregistrationinthePermanentListofVotersinPrecinctNo.157ofSan
Juan,MetroManila,inorderthatshemaybereregisteredortransferredtoBrgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte.
(Annex2B,Answer).OnAugust31,1994,respondentfiledherSwornApplicationforCancellationof
Voter'sPreviousRegistration(Annex2C,Answer)statingthatsheisadulyregisteredvoterin157A,
Brgy.Maytunas,SanJuan,MetrothatsheintendstoregisteratBrgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte.
OnJanuary28,1995respondentregisteredasavoteratPrecinctNo.18AofOlot,Tolosa,Leyte.She
filedwiththeBoardofElectionInspectorsCEFormNo.1,VoterRegistrationRecordNo.943349772,
whereinsheallegedthatshehasresidedinthemunicipalityofTolosaforaperiodof6months(Annex
A,Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a
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CertificateofCandidacyforthepositionofRepresentativeoftheFirstDistrictofLeytewhereinshealso
allegedthatshehasbeenaresidentintheconstituencywheresheseekstobeelectedforaperiodof
7months.Thepertinententriesthereinareasfollows:
7.PROFESSIONOROCCUPATION:Housewife/Teacher/SocialWorker
8.RESIDENCE(completeaddress):Brgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte
PostOfficeAddressforelectionpurposes:Brgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte
9.RESIDENCEINTHECONSTITUENCYWHEREINISEEKTOBE
ELECTEDIMMEDIATELYPRECEDINGELECTION:________YearsSeven
Months
10.IAMNOTAPERMANENTRESIDENTOF,ORIMMIGRANTTO,A
FOREIGNCOUNTRY.
THATIAMELIGIBLEforsaidofficeThatIwillsupportanddefendtheConstitutionoftheRepublicof
thePhilippinesandwillmaintaintruefaithandallegiancetheretoThatIwillobeythelaws,legalorders
anddecreespromulgatedbythedulyconstitutedauthoritiesThattheobligationimposedbymyoathis
assumedvoluntarily,withoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasionandThatthefactsstatedherein
aretruetothebestofmyknowledge.
(Sgd.)ImeldaRomualdezMarcos
(SignatureofCandidate)2
Petitioner'saforestatedcertificateofcandidacyfiledon8March1995containsthedecisivecomponentorseedof
her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "sevenmonths" to the query of "residence in the
constituencywhereinIseektobeelectedimmediatelyprecedingtheelection."
ItfollowsfromalltheabovethattheComeleccommittednograveabuseofdiscretioninholdingthatpetitioneris
disqualifiedfromthepositionofrepresentativeforthe1stcongressionaldistrictofLeyteintheelectionsof8May
1995,forfailuretomeetthe"notlessthanoneyearresidenceintheconstituency(1stdistrict,Leyte)immediately
precedingthedayofelection(8May1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next important
issuetoresolveiswhetherornottheComeleccanordertheBoardofCanvasserstodetermineandproclaimthe
winneroutoftheremainingqualifiedcandidatesforrepresentativeinsaiddistrict.
IamnotunawareofthepronouncementmadebythisCourtinthecaseofLabovs.Comelec,G.R.86564,August1,
1989,176SCRA1whichgavetherationaleaslaiddownintheearly1912caseofTopaciovs.Paredes, 23 Phil.
238that:
....Soundpolicydictatesthatpublicelectiveofficesarefilledbythosewhohavereceivedthehighest
numberofvotescastintheelectionforthatoffice,anditisafundamentalideainallrepublicanformsof
governmentthatnoonecanbedeclaredelectedandnomeasurecanbedeclaredcarriedunlessheor
itreceivesamajorityorpluralityofthelegalvotescastintheelection.(20CorpusJuris2nd,S243,p.
676)
candidatewasalive,qualified,oreligible,theyshouldnotbetreatedasstray,voidormeaningless.
UnderSec.6RA6646,(AnActIntroducingAdditionalReformsintheElectoralSystemandforotherpurposes)(84
O.G.905,22February1988)itisprovidedthat:
...Anycandidatewhohasbeendeclaredbyfinaljudgmenttobedisqualifiedshallnotbevotedfor,
andthevotescastforhimshallnotbecounted.Ifforanyreasonacandidateisnotdeclaredbyfinal
judgmentbeforeanelectiontobedisqualifiedandheisvotedforandreceivesthewinningnumberof
votesinsuchelection,theCourtorCommissionshallcontinuewiththetrialandhearingoftheaction,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency
thereoforderthesuspensionoftheproclamationofsuchcandidatewhenevertheevidenceofhisguilt
isstrong.
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There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision
quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final
judgementofdisqualificationonlybeforetheelection,butevenduringoraftertheelection.Thelawisclearthatinall
situations,thevotescastforadisqualifiedcandidateSHALLNOTBECOUNTED.Thelawhasalsovalidatedthe
jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a
candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final
judgmentbeforeanelectiontobedisqualified.
Sincethepresentcaseisanafterelectionscenario,thepowertosuspendproclamation(whenevidenceofhisguilt
is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared
disqualified?Then,votescastforhim"shallnotbecounted"andinlegalcontemplation,henolongerreceivedthe
highestnumberofvotes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a
"winningcandidateisdisqualified,"butthatthelawconsidershimasthecandidatewhohadobtainedthehighest
numberofvotesasaresultofthevotescastforthedisqualifiedcandidatenotbeingcountedorconsidered.
Asthislawclearlyreflectsthelegislativepolicyonthematter,thenthereisnoreasonwhythisCourtshouldnotre
examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications
prescribedforelectiveofficecannotbeerasedbytheelectoratealone.Thewillofthepeopleasexpressedthrough
theballotcannotcuretheviceofineligibility"mostespeciallywhenitismandatedbynolessthantheConstitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to
proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly
electedrepresentativeofthe1stdistrictofLeyte.
Hermosisima,Jr.J.,dissent.
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same
conclusiondrawntherefromHence,thisdissentwhichassuredlyisnotformulated"onthebasisofthepersonalityof
apetitionerinacase."
Igoalongwiththemajorityintheirnarrationofantecedentfacts,insofarasthesamearepertinenttothiscase,and
whichIhavesimplifiedasfollows:
1.Petitioner,althoughborninManila,residedduringherchildhoodinthepresentTaclobanCity,she
beingalegitimatedaughterofparentswhoappeartohavetakenuppermanentresidencetherein.She
alsowenttoschoolthereand,foratime,taughtinoneoftheschoolsinthatcity.
2.WhenshemarriedthenRep.FerdinandE.MarcoswhowasthendomiciledinBatac,IlocosNorte,
byoperationoflawsheacquiredanewdomicileinthatplacein1954.
3.Inthesuccessiveyearsandduringtheeventsthathappenedthereafter,herhusbandhavingbeen
electedasaSenatorandthenasPresident,shelivedwithhimandtheirfamilyinSanJuan,Rizaland
theninMalacanangPalaceinSanMiguel,Manila.
4.Overthoseyears,sheregisteredasavoterandactuallyvotedinBatac,IlocosNorte,theninSan
Juan,Rizal,andalsoinSanMiguel,Manila,allthesemerelyintheexerciseoftherightofsuffrage.
5.Itdoesnotappearthatherhusband,evenafterhehadassumedthoseloftypositionssuccessively,
ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and
invariablyvotedinallelections.
6.Aftertheousterofherhusbandfromthepresidencyin1986andthesojournoftheMarcosfamilyin
Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different
placeswhichsheclaimedtohavebeenmerelytemporaryresidences.
7.In1992,petitionerranforelectionasPresidentofthePhilippinesandinhercertificateofcandidacy
sheindicatedthatshewasthenaregisteredvoterandresidentofSanJuan,MetroManila.
8.OnAugust24,1994,shefiledaletterforthecancellationofherregistrationinthePermanentListof
Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be reregistered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn
Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a
registeredvoterinPrecinctNo.157A,Brgy.Maytunas,SanJuan,MetroManilaandthatsheintended
toregisterinBrgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte.
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9.OnJanuary28,1995,petitionerregisteredasavoteratPrecinctNo.18AofOlot,Tolosa,Leyte,for
whichpurposeshefiledwiththethereinBoardofElectionInspectorsavoter'sregistrationrecordform
allegingthatshehadresidedinthatmunicipalityforsixmonths.
10.OnMarch8,1995,petitionerfiledhercertificateofcandidacyforthepositionofRepresentativeof
theFirstDistrictofLeytewhereinsheallegedthatshehadbeenaresidentfor"SevenMonths"ofthe
constituencywhereshesoughttobeelected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her
answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or
replacedwithanewentryreading"SINCECHILDHOOD."
Thesoleissueforresolutioniswhether,forpurposesofhercandidacy,petitionerhadcompliedwiththeresidency
requirementofoneyearasmandatedbynolessthanSection6,ArticleVIofthe1987Constitution.
Idonotintendtoimposeuponthetimeofmycolleagueswithadissertationonthedifferencebetweenresidence
anddomicile.WehavehadenoughofthatandIunderstandthatforpurposesofpoliticallawand,forthatmatterof
international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our
jurisprudenceandinAmericanLaw,incontradistinctiontotheconceptofresidenceforpurposesofcivil,commercial
andprocedurallawswheneveranissuethereonisrelevantorcontrolling.
Consequently,sinceinthepresentcasethequestionofpetitioner'sresidenceisintegratedinandinseparablefrom
her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its
permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood in
Americanlawfromwhichforthiscasewehavetakenourjurisprudentialbearings.
Myreadingsinformmethatthedomicileoftheparentsatthetimeofbirth,orwhatistermedthe"domicileoforigin,"
constitutesthedomicileofaninfantuntilabandoned,oruntiltheacquisitionofanewdomicileinadifferentplace.1
Intheinstantcase,wemaygrantthatpetitioner'sdomicileoforigin,2atleastasof1938,waswhatisnowTaclobanCity.
Now,asIhaveobservedearlier,domicileissaidtobeofthreekinds,thatis,domicilebybirth,domicilebychoice,
and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the
secondisthatwhichisvoluntarilyacquiredbyapartyordomiciliumpropiomotuthelastwhichisconsequential,as
thatofawifearisingfrommarriage,3issometimescalleddomiciliumnecesarium.Thereisnodebatethatthedomicileof
origincanbelostorreplacedbyadomicileofchoiceoradomicilebyoperationoflawsubsequentlyacquiredbytheparty.
Whenpetitionercontractedmarriagein1954withthenRep.Marcos,byoperationoflaw,notonlyinternationalor
American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and
correspondinglylostherowndomicileoforigininTaclobanCity.
Her subsequent changes of residence to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu,
Hawaii,andbacktonowSanJuan,MetroManiladonotappeartohaveresultedinhertherebyacquiringnew
domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or
misfortunesofherhusbandandhisperegrinationsintheassumptionofnewofficialpositionsorthelossofthem.
HerresidenceinHonoluluand,ofcourse,thoseafterherreturntothePhilippineswere,assheclaimed,againsther
willoronlyfortransientpurposeswhichcouldnothaveinvestedthemwiththestatusofdomicilesofchoice.5
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency in
TaclobanCityorOlot,Tolosa,Leyte,thereisnoshowingthatsheeverattemptedtoacquireanyotherdomicileof
choicewhichcouldhaveresultedintheabandonmentofherlegaldomicileinBatac,IlocosNorte.Onthatscore,we
notethemajority'sownsubmission6that,tosuccessfullyeffectachangeofdomicile,onemustdemonstrate(a)anactual
removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishinganewone,and(c)actswhichcorrespondwiththepurpose.
Weconsequentlyhavetoalsonotethattheserequirementsfortheacquisitionofadomicileofchoiceapplywhether
whatissoughttobechangedorsubstitutedisadomicileoforigin(domiciliumoriginis)oradomicilebyoperationof
law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her
domiciliumnecesarium,itisthereforehercontinuingdomicileinBatac,IlocosNortewhich,ifatall,canbetheobject
oflegalchangeunderthecontingenciesofthecaseatbar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E.
MaambonginSPA95009oftheCommissiononElections,7andadvancesthisnovelproposition.
Itmaybesaidthatpetitionerlostherdomicileoforiginbyoperationoflawasaresultofhermarriageto
the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium
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necesarium),herlegaldomicileatthetimeofhermarriagebecameBatac,IlocosNortealthoughthere
were no indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her
husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of the New Family Code
alreadyinforceatthetime,however,herlegaldomicileautomaticallyrevertedtoherdomicileoforigin.
...(Emphasissupplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domiciliumnecesarium in Batac,
IlocosNorte,themajorityinsistsonmakingaqualificationthatshedidnotintendtoabandonherdomicileoforigin.I
findthisbewilderingsince,inthissituation,itisthelawthatdeclareswherepetitioner'sdomicileisatanygiventime,
and not her selfserving or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own
admissionthatonecannothavemorethanonedomicileatatime,8the majority would be suggesting that petitioner
retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied as a
reserved,dormant,potential,orresidualdomicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law.
However,weareherebeingtitillatedwiththepossibilityofanautomaticreversiontoorreacquisitionofadomicileof
originaftertheterminationofthecauseforitslossbyoperationoflaw.Themajorityagreesthatsincepetitionerlost
her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am
impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions.
Regretfully,Ifindsomedifficultyinacceptingeitherthelogicorthevalidityofthisargument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarilyabandons the
formerinfavorofthelatter.If,thereafter,heabandonsthatchosendomicile,hedoesnotperserecoverhisoriginal
domicileunless,bysubsequentactslegallyindicativethereof,heevinceshisintentanddesiretoestablishthesame
ashisnewdomicile,whichispreciselywhatpetitionerbelatedlyand,evidentlyjustforpurposesofhercandidacy,
unsuccessfullytriedtodo.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not
onlybecausethereisnolegalauthoritythereforbutbecauseitwouldbeabsurdPursuedtoitslogicalconsequence,
that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have obtained
anotherdomicile,eitherofchoiceorbyoperationoflaw,otherthanhisdomicileoforigin.Significantlyandobviously
for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this
contingencysinceitwouldimpingeonone'sfreedomofchoice.
Now,intheinstantcase,petitionernotonlyvoluntarilyabandonedherdomicileofchoice(unlessweassumethat
she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed
throughheracquisitionofanewdomicilebyoperationoflaw.Infact,thisisevenacaseofbothvoluntaryandlegal
abandonmentofadomicileoforigin.Withmuchmorereason,therefore,shouldwerejectthepropositionthatwith
theterminationofhermarriagein1989,petitionerhadsupposedlyperseandipsofactoreacquiredherdomicileof
origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital
coverture,shewassimultaneouslyinpossessionandenjoymentofadomicileoforiginwhichwasonlyinastateof
suspendedanimation.
Thus,theAmericanruleislikewisetotheeffectthatwhileafterthehusband'sdeaththewifehastherighttoelect
herowndomicile,9sheneverthelessretainsthelastdomicileofherdeceasedhusbanduntilshemakesanactualchange.
10Intheabsenceofaffirmativeevidence,tothecontrary,thepresumptionisthatawife'sdomicileorlegalresidencefollows
thatofherhusbandandwillcontinueafterhisdeath.11
Icannotappreciatethepremisesadvancedinsupportofthemajority'stheorybasedonArticles68and69ofthe
FamilyCode.Allthatisofanyrelevancethereinisthatunderthisnewcode,therightandpowertofixthefamily
domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was never
exercisedbythespouses,couldaffectthedomicilefixedbythelawforpetitionerin1954and,forherhusband,long
priorthereto.Itistruethatawifenowhasthecoordinatepowertodeterminetheconjugalorfamilydomicile,butthat
hasnobearingonthiscase. Withthe death ofherhusband,andeach ofherchildren having gotten married and
established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or
material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the
matterofherhavingacquiredornotherowndomicileofchoice.
Iagreewiththemajority'sdiscourseonthevirtuesofthegrowingandexpandedparticipationofwomenintheaffairs
ofthenation,withequalrightsandrecognitionbyConstitutionandstatutoryconferment.However,Ihavesearched
invainforaspecificlaworjudicialpronouncementwhicheitherexpresslyorbynecessaryimplicationsupportsthe
majority'sdesiredtheoryofautomaticreacquisitionoforreversiontothedomiciliumoriginisofpetitioner.Definitely,
asbetweenthesettledanddesirablelegalnormsthatshouldgovernthisissue,thereisaworldofdifferenceand,
unquestionably,thisshouldberesolvedbylegislativearticulationbutnotbytheeloquenceofthewellturnedphrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically
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reacquiredanydomiciletherein,shecannotlegallyclaimthatherresidencyinthepoliticalconstituencyofwhichitis
apartcontinuedsinceherbirthuptothepresent.Respondentcommissionwas,therefore,correctinrejectingher
pretensiontothateffectinheramended/correctedcertificateofcandidacy,andinholdinghertoheradmissioninthe
original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election.
Theseconsiderationsrenderitunnecessarytofurtherpassupontheproceduralissuesraisedbypetitioner.
ONTHEFOREGOINGPREMISES,IvotetoDISMISSthepetitionforlackofmerit.
DAVIDE,JR.,J.,dissenting:
IrespectfullydissentfromtheopinionofthemajoritywrittenbyMr.JusticeSantiagoM.Kapunan,moreparticularly
ontheissueofthepetitioner'squalification.
UnderSection7,SubdivisionA,ArticleIXoftheConstitution,decisions,orders,orrulingsoftheCOMELECmaybe
brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs.
COMELEC,88SCRA251[1979]Dariovs.Mison,176SCRA84[1989]).
Accordingly,awritofcertiorarimaybegrantedonlyiftheCOMELEChasactedwithoutorinexcessofjurisdictionor
with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly,
jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of
discretionindisqualifyingthepetitioner.
Mycarefulandmeticulousperusalofthechallengedresolutionof24April1995oftheCOMELECSecondDivision
andtheEnBancresolutionof7May1995disclosestotalabsenceofabuseofdiscretion,muchlessgraveabuse
thereof.TheresolutionoftheSecondDivisiondispassionatelyandobjectivelydiscussedinminutedetailsthefacts
which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of
residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood
factsorcircumstancesofsubstancepertinenttotheissueofherresidence.
Themajorityopinion,however,overturnedtheCOMELEC'sfindingsoffactforlackofproofthatthepetitionerhas
abandonedTolosaasherdomicileoforigin,whichisallegedlywithintheFirstCongressionalDistrictofLeyte.
IrespectfullysubmitthatthepetitionerherselfhasprovidedtheCOMELEC,eitherbyadmissionorbydocumentary
evidence,overwhelmingproofofthelossorabandonmentofherdomicileoforigin,whichisTaclobanCityandnot
Tolosa,Leyte.Assumingthatshedecidedtoliveagaininherdomicileoforigin,thatbecameherseconddomicileof
choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then
disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A
holdingtothecontrarywouldbearbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte.
Nevertheless,shelost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman
(later,President)FerdinandE.Marcos.Adomicilebyoperationoflawisthatdomicilewhichthelawattributestoa
person,independentlyofhisownintentionoractualresidence,asresultsfromlegaldomesticrelationsasthatofthe
wifearisingfrommarriage(28C.J.S.Domicile7,11).Underthegoverninglawthen,Article110oftheCivilCode,
hernewdomicileorherdomicileofchoicewasthedomicileofherhusband,whichwasBatac,IlocosNorte.Said
Articlereadsasfollows:
Commentingthereon,civilistArturoM.Tolentinostates:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right
becauseheisempoweredbylawtofixthefamilyresidence.Thisrightevenpredominatesoversome
rightsrecognizedbylawinthewife.Forinstance,underarticle117thewifemayengageinbusinessor
practiceaprofessionoroccupation.Butbecauseofthepowerofthehusbandtofixthefamilydomicile
hemayfixitatsuchaplaceaswouldmakeitimpossibleforthewifetocontinueinbusinessorinher
profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be exempted from living in the residence
chosenbythehusband.Thehusbandcannotvalidlyallegedesertionbythewifewhorefusestofollow
him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a suitable home
belongingtothewife,andthathischoiceofadifferenthomeisnotmadeingoodfaith.(Commentaries
andJurisprudenceontheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,vol.1,1985ed.,339).
Undercommonlaw,awomanuponhermarriagelosesherowndomicileand,byoperationoflaw,acquiresthatof
her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the
sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by
changinghisown(25AmJur2dDomicile48,37).
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It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no
longerthesoleprerogativeofthehusband,butisnowajointdecisionofthespouses,andincaseofdisagreement
thecourtshalldecide.Thesaidarticleusestheterm"familydomicile,"andnotfamilyresidence,as"thespouses
mayhavemultipleresidences,andthewifemayelecttoremaininoneofsuchresidences,whichmaydestroythe
duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIODIY, Handbook on the
FamilyCodeofthePhilippines,[1988],102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the
majorityopinionadoptstoovercomethelegaleffectofthepetitioner'smarriageonherdomicile,isunsupportedby
lawandbyjurisprudence.Thesettleddoctrineisthatafterthehusband'sdeaththewifehasarighttoelectherown
domicile,butsheretainsthelastdomicileofherhusbanduntilshemakesanactualchange(28C.J.S.Domicile
12,27).Or,onthedeathofthehusband,thepowerofthewifetoacquireherowndomicileisrevived,butuntilshe
exercisesthepowerherdomicileremainsthatofthehusbandatthetimeofhisdeath(25AmJur2dDomicile62,
45).Notethatwhatisrevivedisnotherdomicileoforiginbutherpowertoacquireherowndomicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of his
deathwhichwasBatac,IlocosNorte,sincetheirresidencesinSanJuan,MetroManila,andSanMiguel,Manila,
were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official duties. Their
residenceinSanJuanwasaconjugalhome,anditwastheretowhichshereturnedin1991whenshewasalready
awidow.InhersworncertificateofcandidacyfortheOfficeofthePresidentinthesynchronizedelectionsofMay
1992,sheindicatedthereinthatshewasaresidentofSanJuan,MetroManila.Shealsovotedinthesaidelections
inthatplace.
Onthebasisofherevidence,itwasonlyon24August1994whensheexercisedherrightasawidowtoacquireher
own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila,tocancelherregistrationinthepermanentlistofvotersinPrecinct157thereatandprayingthatshebe"re
registeredortransferredtoBrgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte,theplaceof[her]birthandpermanentresidence"(photocopy
of Exhibit "B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this
swornstatementregardingherplaceofbirthwhen,inherVoter'sAffidavitsworntoon15March1992(photocopyof
Exhibit"C,"attachedasAnnex"3,"Id.),herVoterRegistrationRecordsworntoon28January1995(photocopyof
Exhibit"E,"attachedasAnnex"5,"Id.),andherCertificateofCandidacysworntoon8March1995(photocopyof
Exhibit"A,"attachedasAnnex"1,"Id.),shesolemnlydeclaredthatshewasborninManila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit
attachedtoherAnswertothepetitionfordisqualification(Annex"I"ofPetition),shedeclaredunderoaththather
"domicileorresidenceisTaclobanCity."Ifshedidintendtoreturntosuchdomicileorresidenceoforiginwhydid
sheinformtheElectionOfficerofSanJuanthatshewouldtransfertoOlot,Tolosa,Leyte,andindicateinherVoter's
Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this
uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves
thatfortyoneyearshadalreadylapsedsinceshehadlostorabandonedherdomicileoforiginbyvirtueofmarriage
andthatsuchlengthoftimediminishedherpowerofrecollectionorblurredhermemory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the
subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to
pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of such
residenceordomicile.SoistherelianceonSection117oftheOmnibusElectionCodewhichprovidesthattransfer
of residence to any other place by reason of one's "occupation profession employment in private and public
service educational activities work in military or naval reservations service in the army, navy or air force, the
constabularyornationalpoliceforceorconfinementordetentioningovernmentinstitutionsinaccordancewithlaw"
isnotdeemedaslossoforiginalresidence.Thosecasesandlegalprovisiondonotincludemarriageofawoman.
Thereasonfortheexclusionis,ofcourse,Article110oftheCivilCode.IfitweretheintentionofthisCourtorofthe
legislaturetoconsiderthemarriageofawomanasacircumstancewhichwouldnotoperateasanabandonmentof
domicile(oforiginorofchoice),thensuchcasesandlegalprovisionshouldhaveexpresslymentionedthesame.
ThisCourtshouldnotacceptasgospeltruththeselfservingclaimofthepetitionerinheraffidavit(Annex"A"ofher
AnswerinCOMELECSPANo.95009Annex"I"ofPetition)thather"domicileorresidenceoforiginisTacloban
City,"andthatshe"neverintendedtoabandonthisdomicileorresidenceoforigintowhich[she]alwaysintendedto
return whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code.
Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954
conclusivelyestablishthatshehadindeedabandonedherdomicileoforiginandhadacquiredanewoneanimoet
facto(KOSSUTHKENTKENNAN,ATreatiseonResidenceandDomicile,[1934],214,326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest
mistake"inwritingdowntheword"seven"inthespaceprovidedfortheresidencyqualificationrequirementinthe
certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is selfserving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all
sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise what she stated
wasthetruth.
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Themajorityopinionalsodisregardsabasicruleinevidencethathewhoassertsafactortheaffirmativeofanissue
hastheburdenofprovingit(ImperialVictoryShippingAgencyvs.NLRC,200SCRA178[1991]P.T.CernaCorp.
vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the
petitionercouldnotdenythelegalconsequencethereofonthechangeofherdomiciletothatofherhusband.The
majorityopinionrulesoratleastconcludesthat"[b]yoperationoflaw(domiciliumnecesarium),herlegaldomicileat
thetimeofhermarriageautomaticallybecameBatac,IlocosNorte."ThatconclusionisconsistentwithArticle110of
the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived
powertoacquireherowndomicile,theburdenisuponhertoprovethatshehasexercisedherrighttoacquireher
owndomicile.Shemiserablyfailedtodischargethatburden.
Ivotetodenythepetition.
Footnotes
1Jarroltv.Mabberly,103U.S.580(1881).
2CONST,art.VI,states:
Sec.6.NopersonshallbeamemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesunlessheisanatural
borncitizenofthePhilippinesand,onthedayoftheelection,isatleasttwentyfiveyearsofage,
abletoreadandwrite,andexceptthepartylistrepresentatives,aregisteredvoterinthedistrict
inwhichheshallbeelected,andaresidentthereofforaperiodofnotlessthanoneyear
immediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection.
See,Jarroltv.Mabberly,supra,note1.
3Gallegovs.Vera,73Phil.453(1941).
4Rollo,p.114,Annex"D".
5Rollo,p.110,Annex"D".
6Rollo,p.113.
7Rollo,p.111.
8Rollo,p.115,Annex"E".
9SignedbyVirgiloS.Oledan,ProvincialElectionSupervisorIV,LeyteRollo,
p.116,Annex"F".
10Rollo,p.117,Annex"G".Petitionerexplainedthecircumstancessurroundingthefillingupof
theoriginalcertificatethus:
1.OnMarch8,1995,IfiledmycertificateofcandidacyforMemberoftheHouseof
Representatives(Congresswoman)oftheFirstLegislativeDistrictoftheprovinceofLeyte,which
wasdraftedbyMr.FilomenoA.Zeta.
2.IlearnedlatelythatCongressmanCiriloMontejowantstodisqualifymeasIallegedlylack
residenceintheconstituencybecauseoftheentryoftheword"SEVEN"inItemNo.8ofmy
certificateofcandidacy.
3.Ireadmycertificateofcandidacybeforesigningitandthoughtoftheword"RESIDENCE"to
meanactualorphysicalresidence,andtheword"SEVEN"merelyreflectedmyactualand
physicalresidenceinBarangayOlot,Tolosa,Leyte.
3.1.Theword"SEVEN"wasplacedonmycertificateofcandidacytoindicatethatatleaseone
(1)monthhadpassedfrommyregistrationasvoterofTolosa,Leyte,onJanuary28,1995,when
Iwrote"06"monthsunder"PERIODOFRESIDENCE"asmyactualorphysicalresidenceinthe
town.
4.IthoughtthenthatthesenseinItemNo.10ofmycertificateofcandidacystating"THATIAM
eligibleforsaidOffice"wassufficienttoaffirmthatIpossessallthequalifications,includingmy
residence,forMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesforwhichIamaspiringintheMay8,
1995elections.
5.Thefact,however,isthatmydomicileorresidenceoforiginisTaclobanCity,acomponent
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cityoftheFirstLegislativeDistrictofLeyteIneverintendedtoabandonthisdomicileor
residenceoforigintowhichIalwaysintendedtoreturnwheneverabsentindeedin1992,I
returnedtoTaclobanCitytoliveandstaythere.OnNovember5,1992IboughtmyResidence
CertificateNo.15226186Lthere,whichismadeanintegralparthereofasAnnex"I"(Annex"2"
hereof).
11Id.,atp.120.Seealso,Rollo,p.130133,Annex"I",petitioner'sAffidavitexplainingher
residence:
13.Iestablishedmydomicile,howeverinTacloban,Leyte(TaclobanCityin1938,whenwas
littleovereight(8)yearsold.ShortlyaftermymotherdiedonApril7,1938,mywidowedfather,
VicenteOrestesRomualdez,broughtmeandmybrothers...andmysisterstoTacloban,Leyte
(nowTaclobanCity)hishometown.
xxxxxxxxx
18.IhavealwaysconsideredTaclobanCityasmypermanentresidenceorresidenceoforigin
havenotabandonedandhaveneverintendedtoabandonmypermanentresidenceorresidence
oforiginthere.ToitIalwaysintendtoreturnwheneverabsent.
19.In1952,IwenttoManilatoworkwithmycousin,thelatespeaker
DanielZ.RomualdezinhisofficeintheHouseofRepresentatives.
20.InMay,1954,ImarriedPresidentFerdinandE.Marcoswhenhewasstillthecongressman
ofIlocos,Norte.
21.Asadutifulwifewholovedhimdeeply,IlivedwithhiminBatac,IlocosNorteandregistered
asavoterthere.
22.In1965,myhusbandwaselectedPresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.Together,we
livedinMalacaangPalaceandIregisteredasavoterinSanMiguel,Manila.
23.MyregistrationasvoterinBatac,IlocosNorteSanJuan,Rizal(nowSanJuan,Metro
Manila)andSanMiguel,Manila,wasforconveniencebecauseIhadtolivewithmyhusbandto
servehimwhenhewascongressman,SenatorandPresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
Duringthoseyearshowever,Ineverintendednordesiredtoabandonmydomicileorresidence
oforigininTaclobanCity,whichIestablishedsinceIwasachild.
xxxxxxxxx
33.ThroughouttheMarcosPresidency,Ispentmostofmybirthdayanniversariesandattended
theSto.NiniFiestainTaclobanCity.Iregularlyvisitedmydomicileorresidenceoforiginin
Leyteandevenheldimportantfunctionsandentertainedguestsandforeigndignitariesthere.
34.AfterPresidentFerdinandE.MarcosandI,togetherwithourchildrenandinnocent
grandchildrenwereabductedandkidnappedtoHonolulu,Hawaii,inFebruary,1986,myLeyte
propertiesweresequesteredbythePCGG,andweredestroyedandcannibalized.
xxxxxxxxx
38.Uponmyreturntothecountry,IwantedtoimmediatelyliveandresideinTaclobanCityorin
Olot,Tolosa,Leyteevenifmyresidencestherewerenotlivableastheyhadbeendestroyedand
xxxxxxxxx
40.Afterthe1992PresidentialElections,Ilivedandresidedintheresidenceofmybrotherin
SanJose,TaclobanCity,andpursuedmynegotiationswithPCGGtorecovermysequestered
residencesinTaclobanCityandBarangayOlot,Tolosa,Leyte.
12Rollo,p.122.
13CommissionersManoloB.GorospeandTeresitaDyLiacoFloresformedthemajority
opinion.CommissionerRemediesA.SalazarFernandodissented.
14Rollo,p.64.
15Rollo,p.5764.
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16Petitionerfileda"MotiontoRecallResolutionPromulgatedonApril24,1995andtoDismiss
thePetitionBecauseofLapseofJurisdictionAlternatively,MotionforReconsideration."The
Commission'sMay7,1995ResolutiontreatedthesamesimplyasaMotionforReconsideration.
17CommissionersRegaladoE.Maambong,RemediosA.SalazarFernandoandJulioF.
Desamitodissented.Allfiledseparatedissentingopinions.Indisqualifyingpetitioner,themajority
held:
Asitstandsnow,onlytheCertificateofCandidacyrespondentfiledonMarch8,1995,stands,
andonthebasisoftheentriestherein,sheisdisqualifiedtorunforfailuretomeetthe
constitutionalrequirementofone(1)yearofresidenceintheplacewhereshewantedtobe
elected.
18Rollo,p.78,Annex"B".
19Rollo,Annex"D".
2019SCRA966(1967).Seealso,Correv.Corre,100Phil.221(1956).
21Id.at969.
22Uytengsuv.Republic,95Phil.890(1954).
23Id.
2452Phil.645(1928).
25CitingPeoplev.Bender144N.Y.S.,145.
2661Phil.36(1934).
2796Phil.294(1954).
28Id,seealsoUjanov.Republic,17SCRA147(1966)Nuvalv.Guray,supra
note22.
29IIRECORDOFTHE1987CONSTITUTIONALCONVENTION,110(July22,1986).
30Id.
31199SCRA692(1991).
32Id,at714.
3361Phil.36(1934).
3496Phil.294,299300(1954).
35B.P.881,sec.117states:
xxxxxxxxx
Anypersonwhotransfersresidencetoanothercity,municipalityorcountrysolelybyreasonof
hisoccupationprofessionemploymentinprivateorpublicserviceeducationalactivitieswork
inmilitaryornavalreservationsserviceinthearmy,navyorairforcetheconstabularyor
nationalpoliceforceorconfinementordetentioningovernmentinstitutionsinaccordancewith
lawshallnotbedeemedtohavelosthisoriginalresidence.
36Rollo,p.38.
3718AmJur219220.
3820AmJur71.
39TOLENTINO1COMMENTARIES&JURISPRUDENCEONTHECIVILCODE,220(1987).
40Id.
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41TOLENTINO,1COMMENTARIESANDJURISPRUDENCEONCIVILCODE,220(1987).
42Undermodernlaws,itisclearthatmanyexceptionstotherulethatthedomicileofthewifeis
determinedbythatofherhusbandmustobtain.Accordingly,thewifemayacquireanotherand
separatedomicilefromthatofherhusbandwherethetheoreticalunityofthehusbandandwife
isdissolved,asitisbytheinstitutionofdivorceproceedingsorwherethehusbandhasgiven
causefordivorceorwherethereisaseparationofthepartiesbyagreement,orapermanent
separationduetodesertionofthewifebythehusbandorattributabletocrueltreatmentonthe
partofthehusbandorwheretherehasbeenaforfeiturebythewifeofthebenefitofthe
husband'sdomicile.9R.C.L.,545,citedinDeLaVina,supra.Ifthelawallowsthewifeto
automaticallyreverttoheroriginaldomicileoracquireanewdomicileunderthesesituations,all
themoreshoulditsanctionareversionortheacquisitionofanewdomicilebythewife
uponthedeathofherhusband.
4341Phi.13(1920).
44Therulethatthewifeautomaticallyacquiresorfollowsherhusband'sdomicileisnotan
absoluteone.AspecificsituationrecognizedinSpanishjurisprudenceinvolvestheoneinwhich
husbandacquiesces(1Manresa223)orgiveshistacitconsent(Scaevola,CivilCode354.)
4542Phil.54(1921).
46JusticeAliciaSempioDiyrecognizesthesameCivilCodedistinction.However,taking
anotherapproach,shewrites:
(6)TheaboveArticle(Article69,FC)usestheterm"familydomicile"insteadoffamilyresidence
becausethespousesmayhavemultipleresidences,andthewifemayelecttoremaininoneof
suchresidences,whichmaydestroythedutyofthespousestolivetogetherandits
correspondingbenefits.SEMPIODIY,HANDBOOKONTHEFAMILYCODEOFTHE
PHILIPPINES,102(1988).
47Rollo,pp.132133.
48Theprovisionreads:Section78.Petitiontodenyduecourseortocancelacertificateof
candidacy.Averifiedpetitionseekingtodenyduecourseortocancelacertificateof
candidacymaybefiledbyanypersonexclusivelyonthegroundthatanymaterialrepresentation
containedthereinasrequiredunder
Section74hereofisfalse.Thepetitionmaybefiledatanytimenotlaterthantwentyfivedays
fromthetimeoffilingofthecertificateofcandidacyandshallbedecidedafterduenoticeand
hearing,notlaterthanfifteendaysbeforetheelection.
49Marcelinovs.Cruz,121SCRA51(1983).
50AmericanTupeFoundersCo.v.Justice'sCourt,133Cal.819,65Pac.742Heillenv.
Phillipps,88Cal.557,26Pac.366Drakev.Bagley,69Mo.App.39Statev.Davis,194Mo.
585.
51Supra,note39,citingHuffinesv.Gold154Tenn.583,588288S.W.353,354.
52Sec.6.EffectofDisqualificationCase.Anycandidatewhohasbeendeclaredbyfinal
judgmenttobedisqualifiedshallnotbevotedfor,andthevotescastforhimshallnotbe
counted.Ifforanyreasonacandidateisnotdeclaredbyfinaljudgmentbeforeanelectiontobe
disqualifiedandheisvotedforandreceivesthewinningnumberofvotesinsuchelection,the
CourtorCommissionshallcontinuewiththetrialandhearingoftheaction,inquiryorprotest
and,uponmotionofthecomplainantoranyintervenor,mayduringthethereoforderthe
suspensionoftheproclamationofsuchcandidatewhenevertheevidenceofhisguiltisstrong.
Sec.7PetitiontoDenyDueCourseortoCancelaCertificateCandidacy.
Theprocedurehereinaboveprovidedshallapplytopetitionstodenyduecoursetoorcancela
certificateofcandidacyasprovidedinSection78ofBatasPambansaBlg.881.
53CONST.,art.VI,sec.11states:
TheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshallhaveanElectoralTribunalwhichshallbe
thesolejudgeofallquestionsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsoftheir
respectiveMembers....
PUNO,J.,concurring:
8/31/2015 G.R. No. 119976
1Aristotle,EthicaNichomachea,bk.,v.3,1131(a)(W.Rosstranslation,1925ed).
2Itprovides:"NopersonshallbeamemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesunlessheisa
naturalborncitizenofthePhilippinesandonthedayoftheelection,isatleasttwentyfiveyears
ofage,abletoreadandwrite,andexceptthepartylistrepresentatives,aregisteredvoterinthe
districtinwhichheshallbeelected,andaresidentthereofforaperiodofnotlessthanoneyear
immediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection."(Emphasissupplied)
3Therearetwo(2)otherinstanceswhenamarriedwomanmayhaveadomiciledifferentfrom
thehusband:(1)iftheyarelegallyseparatedpursuanttopar.1,Art.106oftheCivilCode,and
(2)ifthehusbandforciblyejectsthewifefromtheconjugalhometohaveillicitrelationswith
another.(DelaViav.VillarealandGeopano,41Phil.13[1920]).
4Opcit.
5Id.,atpp.1617.
6Id.,atp.20,citing1Manresa223.
725AMJUR2ndS.48,p.37.
828CJSonDomicile,S.12,2725AMJUR2ndonDomicileS.62,46.
928CJS,S.12,p.24.
10RestatementoftheLaw,2d,ConflictofLaws2d.,S.21,p.84.
11Ibid.
1283U.S.44221LawEd.442S.C.16Wall130.
13Supra.
14Supra.
15InreGreen'sEstate,191N.Y.S.757,117Misc.800,165N.Y.S.1063,99Misc.582.
16Clarketal.v.Bakeretal.,196SE750,186Ga65.
17Lefcourt,WomenandTheLaw,1990ed.
18404US71.
1928CJSS.12,p.25citingShutev.Sargent,36A282,67N.H.305.
20Opcit.,p.84.
21Women'sStatusinPhilippineSociety,UPLawCenter,1979,pp.46.
22InsubmittingthedraftoftheFamilyCodetoPresidentCorazonAquino,theCivilCode
RevisionCommitteestated:
ClosetofortyyearsofexperienceundertheCivilCodeadoptedin1949andchangesand
developmentsinallaspectsofFilipinoLifesincethenhaverevealedtheunsuitabilityofcertain
provisionsofthatCode,implantedfromforeignsources,toPhilippineculturetheunfairness,
unjustness,andgapsorinadequaciesofothersandtheneedtoattunethemtocontemporary
developmentsandtrends.
Inparticulartociteonlyafewinstances(1)thepropertyregimeofconjugalpartnershipof
gainsisnotinaccordwithFilipinocustom,especiallyintheruralareas,whichismorecongenial
toabsolutecommunityofproperty(2)therehaveconsiderablybeenmoregroundsfor
annulmentofmarriagebytheChurchthanthoseprovidedbytheCode,thusgivingrisetothe
absurdsituationofseveralmarriagesalreadyannulledunderCanonLawbutstillconsidered
subsistingundertheCivilLawandmakingitnecessarytomakethegroundsforannulment
underbothlawstocoincide(3)unequaltreatmentofhusbandandwifeastorightsand
responsibilities,whichnecessitatesaresponsetothelongstandingclamorforequalitybetween
menandwomennowmandatedasapolicytobeimplementedundertheNewConstitution(4)
theinadequacyofthesafeguardsforstrengtheningmarriageandthefamilyasbasicsocial
institutionsrecognizedassuchbytheNewConstitution(5)recentdevelopmentshaveshown
8/31/2015 G.R. No. 119976
theabsurdityoflimitingthegroundsforlegalseparationtotheantiquatedtwogroundsprovided
undertheCivilCode(6)theneedforadditionalsafeguardstoprotectourchildreninthematter
ofadoptionbyforeignersand(7)tobringourlawonpaternityandfiliationinstepwithorabreast
ofthelatestscientificdiscoveries."(Emphasissupplied)
23Article96,FamilyCode.
28Opcit.,HandbookontheFamilyCodeofthePhilippines,pp.9899.
29AscitedinDiy,HandbookontheFamilyCodeofthePhilippines,pp.184185.
30Section1,ArticleIIIoftheConstitutionprovides:"Nopersonshallbedeprivedoflife,liberty,
orpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw,norshallanypersonbedeniedtheequalprotectionof
thelaws."
31Exhibit"E"seealsoExhibit"B"inSPANo.95001.
32Exhibit"A"inSPANo.95009.
33Exhibit"2"inSPANo.95009.
342SCRA957,960(1961)SeeCanceranv.COMELEC,107Phil.607(1960)Gabaldonv.
COMELEC,99Phil.898(1956).
35Section26,ArticleIIoftheConstitutionalsoprovides:"TheStateshallguaranteeequal
accesstoopportunitiesforpublicservice...."
36Annex"G,"Petition.
37Petition,Annex"B1"pp.67.
3873Phil.453,459(1951).
1SeeArticles6873ofE.O.209,asamended,otherwiseknownasTheFamilyCodeofthe
Philippines.
2ResidenceCertificateNo.15226186L,datedNov.5,1992.
3PCGGChairmanGunigundo'sletteraddressedtoCol.Kempis.
1Art.VI,Sec.6,Const.:"NopersonshallbeaMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesunless
heisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippinesand,onthedayoftheelection,isatleasttwenty
fiveyearsofage,abletoreadandwrite,and,exceptthepartylistrepresentatives,aregistered
voterinthedistrictinwhichheshallbeelected,andaresidentthereofforaperiodnotlessthan
oneyearimmediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection."
2Art.110:"Thehusbandshallfixtheresidenceofthefamily.Butthecourtmayexemptthewife
fromlivingwiththehusbandifheshouldliveabroadunlessintheserviceoftheRepublic.
3Art.110,CivilCode.
4Art.111,CivilCode.
5Art.112,CivilCode.
6Art.171,CivilCode.
8/31/2015 G.R. No. 119976
7Art.172,CivilCode.
8Art.320,CivilCode.
9Art.114,CivilCode.
10Art.117,CivilCode.
11Art.84,CivilCode.
12Art.328,CivilCode.
13Art.II,Sec.2,Const.
14PartIV,Art.15,Paragraph4,CEDAW.
15ExecutiveOrderNo.209,July6,1987,asamendedbyExecutiveOrderNo.227,July
17,1987,whichtookeffectonAugust3,1988.
16Art.IISec.11,Const.
17Art.II,Sec.14,Const.
18Art.69,FamilyCode.
22RepublicActNo.7192approvedFebruary12,1992.
23Ibid.,Sec.5.
1Labo,Jr.v.COMELEC,211SCRA297(1992)(formayor).
2Loongv.COMELEC,216SCRA760(1992)(forregionalvicegovernor).
3Abellav.Larrazabal,180SCRA509(1989)Abellav.COMELEC,201SCRA253(1991)(for
provincialgovernor).
4Co.v.HRET,199SCRA692(1991)(electionprotestagainstaCongressman).
5Fayponv.Quirino,96Phil.294(1954)(quowarrantoagainstagovernor)Gallegov.Verra,73
Phil.453(1941)(quowarrantoagainstamayor)Larenav.Teves,61Phil.36(1934)(quo
warrantoagainstaprovincialboardmember)Tansecov.Arteche,57Phil.227(1932)(quo
warrantoagainstagovernor):Yrav.Abao,52Phil.380(1928)(quowarrantoagainsta
municipalpresident)Viverov.Murillo,52Phil.694(1929)(quowarrantoagainstamunicipal
president).Cf.Aznarv.COMELEC,185SCRA703(1990)(quowarrantoalthoughprematurely
filed,againstagovernorelect).
6R.A.No.6646,6Labo,Jr.v.COMELEC,supranote1.
7OEC,76.
8Lagumbayv.COMELEC,16SCRA175(1966).
1Nuvalvs.Guray,G.R.No.30241,December29,1928Larenavs.Teves,G.R.
No.42439,December10,1934Gallegovs.Verra,G.R.No.48641,November24,1941Delos
Reyesvs.Solidum,G.R.No.42798.August31,1935butseeRomualdezvs.RTC,Br.7
TaclobanCity,whereasuddendeparturefromthecountrywasnotdeemed"voluntary"soasto
constituteabandonmentofdomicilebothinfactandinlaw.
2Annex"A"Petition,pp.24.
8/31/2015 G.R. No. 119976
1Strublevs.Struble,Tex.Civ.App.,177S.W.2d,279,283.
2Thisisalsoreferredtoasnaturaldomicileordomicilebybirth(Johnsonvs.TwentyOneBales,
13Fed.Cas.863).
3Story,ConflictofLaws,Sec.46RailroadCo.vs.Kimbrough,115Ky512,74S.W.229and
Johnsonvs.Harvey,261Ky.522,88S.W.2d42,46,47,ascitedinBlack'sLawDictionary,4th
ed.
4Article110,CivilCode.
5Towsonvs.Towson,126Va.640,102S.E.48,52Fishervs.Jordan,C.C.A.Tex.,116F.2d.
183,186Minickvs.Minick,111Fla.469,149So.483,488Hartzlervs.Radeka,265Mich.451,
251N.W.554.
6Citing18Am.Jur.219220.
7Montejovs.Marcos,EnBanc,May10,1995.
8Citing20Am.Jur.71.
9Cheelyvs.Clayton,D.C.,110U.S.701,L.Ed.298.
10InreGates'Estate,191N.Y.S.757,117Misc.800InreGreen'sEstate,164N.Y.S.1063,
99Misc.582,affirmed165N.Y.S.1088,179App.Div.890,asreportedin28C.J.S.27.
11Clarkvs.Baker,196S.E.750,186Ga.65,op.cit.37.
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RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the

Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a naturalborn

7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the

Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a naturalborn

7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure

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