G.R. No.
L-40789 February 27, 1987 the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C.
ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
the question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother
can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V.
Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband
Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and
Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind
a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein
petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court
appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated
June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased
and prescribing their respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes
(daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales
son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4,
1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the
estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of
the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together
with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders.
The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is
a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are
estate in question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit
by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated,
an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate
succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation
provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil
Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from
him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of
other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in
their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by
right of representation, and if any one of them should have died,
leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided
among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or
widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate
child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse)
is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision
which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the
right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of
intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude
the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The
conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate
heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature
intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it
would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of
Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 1
 (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded
by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes
mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in
which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does
not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of
the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v.
Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in
Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it
affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-
law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is
nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ...
(Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does
not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that
the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate
which is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of
the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the
estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the
inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970
and 971 of the Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which
the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law
and not by the person represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one whom the person
represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by
law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio
Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra
Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot
assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her
mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio
Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales
as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished
by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from
Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased
father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary
to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse
is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON,
ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 2
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the
Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed
counter-project of partition.1
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate
children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon
(herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of
Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these
seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the
oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in
the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named
compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo
Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson,
Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties
appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at
P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of
P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at
P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced2 and by order dated March
13, 1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and
admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed
executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office,
letters testamentary were duly issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of
Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the
estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in
toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a
total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven
compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11.3 (/7 of the half of the estate reserved
for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants).4 In her will, the testatrix
"commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary
disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties
comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight
grandchildren. The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively
devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance
adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina
(exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly
considered to have received in the will more than their respective
legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela,
Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their
respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties
respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to
complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the
other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that
they received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary
to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren
remain untouched.<re||an1w>
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project
of partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the
distribution of the estate on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced
to the value of one-half () of the entire estate, the value of the
said one-half () amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the
Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their legitime, plus the
devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the
total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties
devised to them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or
cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who
are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties
respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert
D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor
should be proportionally reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition
made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above
stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of
the
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting
the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided
among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 3
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of
partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically
provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be
completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and
adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the
oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be
taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the
oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in
controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has
chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted.
This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With
reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix
as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors
(excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court
ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with
the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been impaired is, in
our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of
the testatrix."
From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this
appeal, and raise anew the following issues: .
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the
nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject
to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article
1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil
Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account
of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the
testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will."5 In consonance therewith, our Civil
Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a
testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and
"(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico6 for violation of these rules of
interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's
decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly
expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions
raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's
words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the
matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only
law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by
his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested
parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will.
Guided and restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the
appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition
was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of
her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the
expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will
and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she
expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided"
in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she
specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among
her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she
bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated
and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that
"(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will,
such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to
the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the
safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by
any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that
the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the
legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the
same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project
of partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela,
Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the
properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the
testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective
legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or
properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-
oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 4
 testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080
of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article
1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his
estate by act inter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing
doctrine 12 that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must
first make a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators
doubt the efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us,
for this is a clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce
must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and
907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project
of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of
partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the
testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the
same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the
estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to
payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal
would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the
testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to
the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made
confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the
deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his
daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as
being a partition by will, which should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice
the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil
Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations
thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by
the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of
law, became the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made
confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him'
(Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights
and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto
except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil
Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of
her share of the proposed partition of the properties, especially when, as in the
present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs
..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their
favor are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use
of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to
the respective heirs. From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally
erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by
operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is,
the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ...
and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of
devises or legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate
constituting the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the
testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all
devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition
by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value
already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to
partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I
bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to
convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable
portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary
dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as
mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the
respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth
paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the
third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of
those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his
forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the
properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of
the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be
taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second
paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has
compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by
oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code
covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by
the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is
entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value does not
exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as
legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a
testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally,
of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by
mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions
upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected
insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is
not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the
legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction
thereof given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this
article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it
may have some plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 5
present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire
estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her
lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor
having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of
Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime of
the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the
secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to
demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has
been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer
demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed
and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real
properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of
partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had
specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called
upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the
testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of
transmitting the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the
executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by
the commissioner appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint
petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any question and
none is presented as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitime of
the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the
purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix'
death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the
wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and
accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates
would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent
fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate. There is
evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors,
Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which,
per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any way affect the adjudication made
to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of
the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash
by way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the
law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the
testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. 21That her co-oppositors
would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has
declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at
the time of approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing
value was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.
G.R. No. L-46903 July 23, 1987
BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as
Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and
Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration
proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private
respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in
due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the
ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the
fruits thereof, had not been included.1
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth
P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot
agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent
rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for
her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the
decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory
heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the
donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation
should be reduced as inofficious.
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court,* which
held that the decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay,
expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair the
legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be accommodated in,
and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate.3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent
court** holding that the deed of donation contained no express prohibition
to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 6
 and equally divided the net estate of the decedent, including the fruits of
the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda.4
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi
sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella
Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at
naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa
pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay,
ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang
mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa
ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay
ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja
declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't
samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga
mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa
sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang
legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga
lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may
layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre
Disposicion. 5
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions
expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court
correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not
be construed as an express prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a donation is
irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation
required under Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed
of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he
understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to
suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included
therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear
language of Article 1062.1awphil The suggestion that there was
an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free
portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the
question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious The sole
issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see
none.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and
unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062.
Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the
rule, which is categorical enough.
There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner
regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the
12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As
we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said provision was merely directory and failure to
decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render
their decisions invalid.
It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in
Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the
courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition
of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious
studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992
MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B.
LOCSIN, MATILDE L. CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL
ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN,
MERCEDES JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS
OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN, respondents.
Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186
affirming with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in
favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano
B. Locsin, et al.," an action for recovery of real property with damages is sought.
in these proceedings initiated by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was
however reinstated upon a second motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners, and the respondents were required to comment thereon. The petition
was thereafter given due course and the parties were directed to submit their
memorandums. These, together with the evidence, having been carefully
considered, the Court now decides the case.
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 7
First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena,
all surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in
the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided
among his three (3) children as follows:
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were
adjudicated to his daughter, Magdalena Locsin;
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the
petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed
Locsin;
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18)
hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in
Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his marriage to
Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled
properties which she had inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona
Anson. These were augmented by other properties acquired by the spouses in the
course of their union,1 which however was not blessed with children.
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens
System. Those that Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were
surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin, married to
Catalina Jaucian.'' 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as
the sole and universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his
wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney
Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their
properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides
of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives"
(i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her
"Jaucian relatives." 4
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness.
In due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay
without any opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doa
Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate
proceeding was Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's estate 5 which
she submitted to the probate court for approval, 6Catalina declared that "all items
mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased and form
part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items
Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doa Catalina was closest to her
nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-
Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio
Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she
made him custodian of all the titles of her properties; and before she disposed of
any of them, she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador
Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal documents and, more often
than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria
Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece, Elena
Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house.
Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact,
hence, nine (9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave,
and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began
transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own,
properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She made the following sales
and donation of properties which she had received from her husband's estate, to
his Locsin nephews and nieces:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES
Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming
and ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her
husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives
agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the
properties devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by
the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies which the executor of
her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian
nephews and nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares
from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII,
Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the
Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without
consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those
who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs
(Jaucian), and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and
against the defendants:
(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja
and Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled
to the entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de
Locsin, being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 8
 of Juan and Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood
brothers of Catalina;
(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and
exchange and all other instruments conveying any part of the
estate of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to
those in the inventory of known properties (Annex B of the
complaint) as null and void ab-initio;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to
cancel all certificates of title and other transfers of the real
properties, subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and
derivatives therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;
(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey
ownership and possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs,
together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and
delivered, and all the fruits and incomes received by the
defendants from the estate of Catalina, with legal interest from the
filing of this action; and where reconveyance and delivery cannot
be effected for reasons that might have intervened and prevent
the same, defendants shall pay for the value of such properties,
fruits and incomes received by them, also with legal interest from
the filing, of this case
(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the
amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further
sum of P20,000.00 each as moral damages; and
(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees
and litigation expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without
prejudice to any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.
Costs against the defendants.9
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which
rendered its now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's
decision.
The petition has merit and should be granted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents,
nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the
properties which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her
death. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the
property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the
decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession." 10 The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the
moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time.11 Property which
Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no
longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay
claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the
time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one
and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to
impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter
vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are
compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in
transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews
and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents'
rights to her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is
not pretended that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could
conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that
the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to
dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750,
Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property
of the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full
ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of
himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of
the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor.
Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on
petition of any person affected. (634a)
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90 years old
when she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years
she may have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by
her husband's nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the
properties which she had inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not
support that conjecture.
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doa Catalina
had already begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties
which she received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26,
1957 to his nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19
years before she passed away, she also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin
nephew, Jose R. Locsin.14 The next year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-
sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin.15
On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doa Catalina,
Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete.17 At least Vicente Jaucian,
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 9
among the other respondents in this case, is estopped from assailing the
genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself,
Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and the partition agreement that he (Vicente)
concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.
Among Doa, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of
property which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975.18
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa Catalina was mentally
incompetent when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such
suggestion be made in light of the fact that even as she was transferring properties
to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties
in favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16,
1964 (21 years before her death) one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three
years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to
Julian Locsin.19
From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her
relatives and other persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia,
Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan
Saballa and Rogelio Marticio. 20 None of those transactions was impugned by the
private respondents.
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some lots not only to
Don Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was competent to
make that conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was
equally competent to transfer her other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II?
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his
wife, from a "consciousness of its real origin" which carries the implication that said
estate consisted of properties which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in
the teeth of Doa Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1
to 33 are the private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part
of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34
to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." She would have
known better than anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal
property so it is safe to assume that none was in fact included. The inventory was
signed by her under oath, and was approved by the probate court in Special
Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the
assistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely
would not have prepared a false inventory that would have been prejudicial to his
aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to inherit from her eventually.
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before
Don Mariano died, he and his wife (Doa Catalina), being childless, had agreed
that their respective properties should eventually revert to their respective lineal
relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of
Doa Catalina, he would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also
prejudice his own interest.
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doa
Catalina's nephews and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew
Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her
nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective
husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul
and undo the dispositions of property which she made in favor of the Locsins,
although it would have been to their advantage to do so. Their desistance
persuasively demonstrates that Doa Catalina acted as a completely free agent
when she made the conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact, considering
their closeness to Doa Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the
petitioners to employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to
make her sell or donate her properties to them. Doa Catalina's niece, Elena
Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her
nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her properties.
The sales and donations which she signed in favor of the petitioners were prepared
by her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1) deed
of donation dated November 19,
197423 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4,
1975 24 in favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September 9,
1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who
is married to Doa Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is
married to another niece, Maria Olbes.26 The sales which she made in favor of
Aurea Locsin on July 15, 1974 27 were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena
Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions could not have been
anything but free and voluntary acts on her part.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
erred in not dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground
of prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions had been
consummated, and six (6) years after Doa Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4)
years after the subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of
Property,28 whether considered an action based on fraud, or one to redress an
injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign ignorance
of said transactions because the registration of the deeds was constructive notice
thereof to them and the whole world.29
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14,
1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The private respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts and
reconveyance of properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is DISMISSED, with costs against the private
respondents, plaintiffs therein.
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 10
SO ORDERED.
[G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003]
MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO
MANONGSONG, petitioners, vs. FELOMENA JUMAQUIO ESTIMO,
EMILIANA JUMAQUIO, NARCISO ORTIZ, CELESTINO ORTIZ,
RODOLFO ORTIZ, ERLINDA O. OCAMPO, PASTOR ORTIZ, JR.,
ROMEO ORTIZ BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, SR., BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ,
JR., AURORA NICOLAS, GLORIA RACADIO, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ,
JOSELITO DELA CRUZ and LEONCIA S. LOPEZ, respondents.
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of 26 June
1998 and the Resolution of 21 December 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51643. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision dated 10 April 1995 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 92-1685,
partitioning the property in controversy and awarding to petitioners a portion of the
property.
Antecedent Facts
Spouses Agatona Guevarra (Guevarra) and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6)
children, namely: (1) Dominador Lopez; (2) Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio, the mother
of respondents Emiliana Jumaquio Rodriguez and Felomena Jumaquio Estimo
(Jumaquio sisters); (3) Victor Lopez, married to respondent Leoncia Lopez; (4)
Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, the mother of respondents Narciso, Celestino, Rodolfo,
Pastor Jr. and Romeo Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo; (5) Rosario Lopez-dela
Cruz, married to respondent Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. and the mother of
respondents Benjamin Jr., Roberto, and Joselito, all surnamed dela Cruz, and of
Gloria dela Cruz Racadio and Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas; and (6) Vicente Lopez, the
father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong (Manongsong).
The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo Uno,
Las Pias, Metro Manila with an area of approximately 152 square meters
(Property). The records do not show that the Property is registered under the
Torrens system. The Property is particularly described in Tax Declaration No. B-
001-00390[3] as bounded in the north by Juan Gallardo, south by Calle Velay, east
by Domingo Lavana and west by San Jose Street. Tax Declaration No. B-001-
00390 was registered with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Las Pias on 30
September 1984 in the name of Benigna Lopez, et al.[4] However, the
improvements on the portion of the Property denominated as No. 831 San Jose St.,
Manuyo Uno, Las Pias were separately declared in the name of Filomena J. Estimo
under Tax Declaration No. 90-001-02145 dated 14 October 1991.[5]
Milagros and Carlito Manongsong (petitioners) filed a Complaint[6] on 19 June
1992, alleging that Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro indiviso of
the Property. Invoking Article 494 of the Civil Code,[7] petitioners prayed for the
partition and award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property
or its prevailing market value, and for damages.
Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon
Guevarras death, her children inherited the Property. Since Dominador Lopez died
without offspring, there were only five children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the
five children, including Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a
fifth of the Property. As Vicente Lopez sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her
fathers 1/5 share in the Property by right of representation.
There is no dispute that respondents, who are the surviving spouses of
Guevarras children and their offspring, have been in possession of the Property for
as long as they can remember. The area actually occupied by each respondent
family differs, ranging in size from approximately 25 to 50 square
meters. Petitioners are the only descendants not occupying any portion of the
Property.
Most respondents, specifically Narciso, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr., and Celestino
Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo (Ortiz family), as well as Benjamin Sr., Benjamin
Jr., and Roberto dela Cruz, Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas and Gloria Dela Cruz
Racadio (Dela Cruz family), entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners. Under the Stipulation of Facts and Compromise Agreement[8] dated 12
September 1992 (Agreement), petitioners and the Ortiz and Dela Cruz families
agreed that each group of heirs would receive an equal share in the Property. The
signatories to the Agreement asked the trial court to issue an order of partition to
this effect and prayed further that those who have exceeded said one-fifth (1/5)
must be reduced so that those who have less and those who have none shall get
the correct and proper portion.[9]
Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez who each
occupy 50 square meter portions of the Property and Joselito dela Cruz, did not
sign the Agreement.[10] However, only the Jumaquio sisters actively opposed
petitioners claim. The Jumaquio sisters contended that Justina Navarro (Navarro),
supposedly the mother of Guevarra, sold the Property to Guevarras daughter
Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio.
The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 911 [11] for the
year 1949 in the sole name of Navarro. Tax Declaration No. 911 described a
residential parcel of land with an area of 172.51 square meters, located on San
Jose St., Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal with the following boundaries: Juan Gallardo to
the north, I. Guevarra Street to the south, Rizal Street to the east and San Jose
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 11
Street to the west. In addition, Tax Declaration No. 911 stated that the houses of
"Agatona Lopez" and "Enriquita Lopez" stood on the Property as improvements.
The Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN
NG LUPA[12] (Kasulatan) dated 11 October 1957, the relevant portion of which
states:
AKO SI JUSTINA NAVARRO, sapat ang gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa
LAS PIAS, ay siyang nagma-may-ari at nagtatangkilik ng isang lagay na lupa na
matatagpuan sa Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal, lihis sa anomang pagkakautang lalong
napagkikilala sa pamamagitan ng mga sumusunod na palatandaan:
BOUNDARIES:
NORTH: JUAN GALLARDO SOUTH: I. GUEVARRA ST.
EAST: RIZAL ST., WEST: SAN JOSE ST.,
na may sukat na 172.51 metros cuadrados na may TAX DECLARATION
BILANG 911.
NA DAHIL AT ALANG ALANG sa halagang DALAWANG DAAN LIMANGPUNG
PISO (P250.00), SALAPING PILIPINO, na sa akin ay kaliwang iniabot at ibinayad ni
ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, may sapat na gulang, Pilipino, may asawa at naninirahan sa Las
Pias, Rizal, at sa karapatang ito ay aking pinatutunayan ng pagkakatanggap ng nasabing
halaga na buong kasiyahan ng aking kalooban ay aking IPINAGBILI, ISINALIN AT
INILIPAT sa nasabing, ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, sa kanyang mga tagapagmana at kahalili,
angkabuuang sukat ng lupang nabanggit sa itaas nito sa pamamagitan ng bilihang walang
anomang pasubali. Ang lupang ito ay walang kasama at hindi taniman ng palay o mais.
Simula sa araw na ito ay aking ililipat ang pagmamay-ari at pagtatangkilik ng nasabing lupa
kay ENRIQUETA LOPEZ sa kanilang/kanyang tagapagmana at kahalili x x x.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila certified on 1 June
1994 that the KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA, between Justina Navarro
(Nagbili) and Enriqueta Lopez (Bumili), was notarized by Atty. Ruperto Q. Andrada
on 11 October 1957 and entered in his Notarial Register xxx. [13] The certification
further stated that Atty. Andrada was a duly appointed notary public for the City of
Manila in 1957.
Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their portion of
the Property for more than thirty years, they also invoked the defense of acquisitive
prescription against petitioners, and charged that petitioners were guilty of
laches. The Jumaquio sisters argued that the present action should have been filed
years earlier, either by Vicente Lopez when he was alive or by Manongsong when
the latter reached legal age. Instead, petitioners filed this action for partition only in
1992 when Manongsong was already 33 years old.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision [14] of 10 April 1995 ruled
in favor of petitioners. The trial court held that the Kasulatan was void, even absent
evidence attacking its validity. The trial court declared:
It appears that the ownership of the estate in question is controverted. According to
defendants Jumaquios, it pertains to them through conveyance by means of a Deed of Sale
executed by their common ancestor Justina Navarro to their mother Enriqueta, which deed
was presented in evidence as Exhs. 4 to 4-A. Plaintiff Milagros Manongsong debunks the
evidence as fake. The document of sale, in the observance of the Court, is however duly
authenticated by means of a certificate issued by the RTC of the Manila Clerk of Court as
duly notarized public document (Exh. 5). No countervailing proof was adduced by
plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the documents legality or its validity.
xxx The conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property
conveyed had a conjugal character. No positive evidence had been introduced that it was
solely a paraphernal property. The name of Justina Navarros spouse/husband was not
mentioned and/or whether the husband was still alive at the time the conveyance was made
to Justina Navarro. Agatona Guevarra as her compulsory heir should have the legal right to
participate with the distribution of the estate under question to the exclusion of others. She
is entitled to her legitime. The Deed of Sale [Exhs 4 & 4-1(sic)] did not at all provide for
the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against Agatona
Guevarra and her six (6) legitimate children including the grandchildren, by right of
representation, as described in the order of intestate succession. The same Deed of Sale
should be declared a nullity ab initio. The law on the matter is clear. The compulsory heirs
cannot be deprived of their legitime, except on (sic) cases expressly specified by law like
for instance disinheritance for cause. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Since the other respondents had entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners, the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision was directed against
the Jumaquio sisters only, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs
and against the remaining active defendants, Emiliana Jumaquio and Felomena J.
Estimo, jointly and severally, ordering:
1. That the property consisting of 152 square meters referred to above be immediately
partitioned giving plaintiff Milagros Lopez-Manongsong her lawful share of 1/5 of the area
in square meters, or the prevailing market value on the date of the decision;
2. Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as compensatory damages for having
deprived the latter the use and enjoyment of the fruits of her 1/5 share;
3. Defendants to pay plaintiffs litigation expenses and attorneys fee in the sum
of P10,000.00; and
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 12
4. Defendants to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
When the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration, the Jumaquio
sisters appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners, in their appellees brief before the Court of Appeals, presented for
the first time a supposed photocopy of the death certificate [16] of Guevarra, which
stated that Guevarras mother was a certain Juliana Gallardo. Petitioner also
attached an affidavit[17] from Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. attesting that he knew Justina
Navarro only by name and had never met her personally, although he had lived for
some years with Agatona Guevarra after his marriage with Rosario Lopez. On the
basis of these documents, petitioners assailed the genuineness and authenticity of
the Kasulatan.
The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate and
affidavit presented by petitioners on the ground that petitioners never formally
offered these documents in evidence.
The appellate court further held that the petitioners were bound by their
admission that Navarro was the original owner of the Property, as follows:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees themselves admitted before the trial court that Justina
Navarro and not Juliana Gallardo was the original owner of the subject property and was
the mother of Agatona Navarro (sic). Plaintiffs-appellees in their Reply-Memorandum
averred:
As regards the existence of common ownership, the defendants clearly admit as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
History of this case tells us that originally the property was owned by JUSTINA
NAVARRO who has a daughter by the name of AGATONA GUEVARRA who on the
other hand has six children namely: xxx xxx xxx.
which point-out that co-ownership exists on the property between the parties. Since this is
the admitted history, facts of the case, it follows that there should have been proper
document to extinguish this status of co-ownership between the common owners either by
(1) Court action or proper deed of tradition, xxx xxx xxx.
The trial court confirms these admissions of plaintiffs-appellees. The trial court held:
xxx xxx xxx
With the parties admissions and their conformity to a factual common line of relationship of
the heirs with one another, it has been elicited ascendant Justina Navarro is the common
ancestor of the heirs herein mentioned, however, it must be noted that the parties failed to
amplify who was the husband and the number of compulsory heirs of Justina
Navarro. xxx xxx xxx
Therefore, plaintiffs-appellees cannot now be heard contesting the fact that Justina Navarro
was their common ancestor and was the original owner of the subject property.
The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court erred in assuming that the
Property was conjugal in nature when Navarro sold it. The appellate court
reasoned as follows:
However, it is a settled rule that the party who invokes the presumption that all property of
marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coveture is a condition sine
qua nonfor the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that the subject property
was acquired by Justina Navarro during her marriage. xxx
The findings of the trial court that the subject property is conjugal in nature is not supported
by any evidence.
To the contrary, records show that in 1949 the subject property was declared, for taxation
purposes under the name of Justina Navarro alone. This indicates that the land is the
paraphernal property of Justina Navarro.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered DISMISSING plaintiffs-appellees complaint in
so far as defendants-appellants are concerned.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied
the same in its Resolution of 21 December 1998.[19]
On 28 January 1999, petitioners appealed the appellate courts decision and
resolution to this Court. The Court initially denied the petition for review due to
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 13
certain procedural defects. The Court, however, gave due course to the petition in
its Resolution of 31 January 2000.[20]
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:
1. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE
ON THE ALLEGED SALE BY ONE JUSTINA NAVARRO;
2. WHETHER THERE IS PRETERITION AND THE ISSUES RAISED
ARE REVIEWABLE;
3. WHETHER THERE IS CO-OWNERSHIP PRO INDIVISO;
4. WHETHER THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY CO-OWNERS ON THE
LAND SHOULD PREVAIL;
5. WHETHER THE ALLEGED SALE IS VALID AND BINDS THE OTHER
CO-HEIRS;
6. WHETHER PRESCRIPTION APPLIES AGAINST THE SHARE OF
PETITIONERS.[21]
The fundamental question for resolution is whether petitioners were able to
prove, by the requisite quantum of evidence, that Manongsong is a co-owner of the
Property and therefore entitled to demand for its partition.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issues raised by petitioners are mainly factual in nature. In general, only
questions of law are appealable to this Court under Rule 45. However, where the
factual findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals conflict, this Court has the
authority to review and, if necessary, reverse the findings of fact of the lower
courts.[22] This is precisely the situation in this case.
We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules
of evidence and the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this Court
in Jison v. Court of Appeals :[23]
xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and
upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of
trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the
burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a
verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The
concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of the
Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa
Petitioners anchor their action for partition on the claim that Manongsong is a
co-owner or co-heir of the Property by inheritance, more specifically, as the heir of
her father, Vicente Lopez. Petitioners likewise allege that the Property originally
belonged to Guevarra, and that Vicente Lopez inherited from Guevarra a 1/5
interest in the Property. As the parties claiming the affirmative of these issues,
petitioners had the burden of proof to establish their case by preponderance of
evidence.
To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties presented tax
declarations and the testimonies of witnesses. However, the Jumaquio sisters also
presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA which controverted
petitioners claim of co-ownership.
The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a
public document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To
assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized document, the evidence
must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.[24] Otherwise the
authenticity and due execution of the document should be upheld.[25] The trial court
itself held that (n)o countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or
impugn the documents legality or its validity.[26]
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient
document and thus still presumed to be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more than
30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration
or by any circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to be genuine.[27]
Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Kasulatan was void because the
Property was conjugal at the time Navarro sold it to Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio. We
do not agree. The trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal was not
based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article
160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 14
essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership.[28]
There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the
Property during her marriage. There is no basis for applying the presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code to the present case. On the contrary, Tax Declaration
No. 911 showed that, as far back as in 1949, the Property was declared solely in
Navarros name.[29] This tends to support the argument that the Property was not
conjugal.
We likewise find no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale
embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their
legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a
valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the
seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of
the estate but merely a substitution of values,[30] that is, the property sold is
replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration.
Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale
are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3)
price certain in money or its equivalent.[31] The presence of these elements is
apparent on the face of the Kasulatan itself. The Property was sold in 1957
for P250.00.[32]
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting the documents
presented by petitioners for the first time on appeal
We find no error in the Court of Appeals refusal to give any probative value to
the alleged birth certificate of Guevarra and the affidavit of Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.
Petitioners belatedly attached these documents to their appellees brief.Petitioners
could easily have offered these documents during the proceedings before the trial
court. Instead, petitioners presented these documents for the first time on appeal
without any explanation. For reasons of their own, petitioners did not formally offer
in evidence these documents before the trial court as required by Section 34, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.[33] To admit these documents now is contrary to due
process, as it deprives respondents of the opportunity to examine and controvert
them.
Moreover, even if these documents were admitted, they would not controvert
Navarros ownership of the Property.Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.s affidavit stated
merely that, although he knew Navarro by name, he was not personally acquainted
with her.[34] Guevarras alleged birth certificate casts doubt only as to whether
Navarro was indeed the mother of Guevarra.These documents do not prove that
Guevarra owned the Property or that Navarro did not own the Property.
Petitioners admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the mother of
Guevarra. However, petitioners denied before the Court of Appeals that Navarro
was the mother of Guevarra. We agree with the appellate court that this constitutes
an impermissible change of theory. When a party adopts a certain theory in the
court below, he cannot change his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is not
only unfair to the other party, it is also offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process.[35]
If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further undermine
petitioners case. Absent any hereditary relationship between Guevarra and
Navarro, the Property would not have passed from Navarro to Guevarra, and then
to the latters children, including petitioners, by succession. There would then be no
basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership by virtue of inheritance from
Guevarra. On the other hand, this would not undermine respondents position since
they anchor their claim on the sale under the Kasulatan and not on inheritance from
Guevarra.
Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners
failed to refute by clear and convincing evidence, this Court holds that petitioners
were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that the Property belonged to
Guevarras estate. There is therefore no legal basis for petitioners complaint for
partition of the Property.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51643, dismissing the complaint of petitioners against Felomena
Jumaquio Estimo and Emiliana Jumaquio, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126376 November 20, 2003
SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION JOAQUIN,
SPOUSES JUANITO EDRA and NORA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES RUFINO VALDOZ
and EMMA JOAQUIN, and NATIVIDAD JOAQUIN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN and FELICIANA
LANDRITO, SPOUSES FIDEL JOAQUIN and CONCHITA BERNARDO,
SPOUSES TOMAS JOAQUIN and SOLEDAD ALCORAN, SPOUSES ARTEMIO
JOAQUIN and SOCORRO ANGELES, SPOUSES ALEXANDER MENDOZA and
CLARITA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES TELESFORO CARREON and FELICITAS
JOAQUIN, SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and FE JOAQUIN, and SPOUSES
GAVINO JOAQUIN and LEA ASIS, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 to annul the Decision2 dated 26 June 1996
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41996. The Court of Appeals affirmed
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 15
the Decision3 dated 18 February 1993 rendered by Branch 65 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati ("trial court") in Civil Case No. 89-5174. The trial court dismissed
the case after it found that the parties executed the Deeds of Sale for valid
consideration and that the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action against the
defendants.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of
plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel,
Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The
married Joaquin children are joined in this action by their respective spouses.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real
property executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito
in favor of their co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title
issued in their names, to wit:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-7 of subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-256395 executed on 11 July 1978, in favor of defendant Felicitas
Joaquin, for a consideration of 6,000.00 (Exh. "C"), pursuant to which
TCT No. [36113/T-172] was issued in her name (Exh. "C-1");
2. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-3 of subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-256394 executed on 7 June 1979, in favor of defendant Clarita
Joaquin, for a consideration of 1[2],000.00 (Exh. "D"), pursuant to which
TCT No. S-109772 was issued in her name (Exh. "D-1");
3 Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-1 of subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-256394 executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses
Fidel Joaquin and Conchita Bernardo, for a consideration of 54,[3]00.00
(Exh. "E"), pursuant to which TCT No. 155329 was issued to them (Exh.
"E-1");
4. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-2 of subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-256394 executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses
Artemio Joaquin and Socorro Angeles, for a consideration of [54,3]00.00
(Exh. "F"), pursuant to which TCT No. 155330 was issued to them (Exh.
"F-1"); and
5. Absolute Sale of Real Property covering Lot 168-C-4 of subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-256395 executed on 9 September 1988, in favor of Tomas
Joaquin, for a consideration of 20,000.00 (Exh. "G"), pursuant to which
TCT No. 157203 was issued in her name (Exh. "G-1").
6. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-1 of subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-256395 executed on 7 October 1988, in favor of Gavino Joaquin, for a
consideration of 25,000.00 (Exh. "K"), pursuant to which TCT No. 157779
was issued in his name (Exh. "K-1").]
In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of
title, plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver:
- XX-
The deeds of sale, Annexes "C," "D," "E," "F," and "G," [and "K"] are simulated as
they are, are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO because
a) Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale xxx
over the properties in litis;
b) Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected
in the questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold times
more valuable than the measly sums appearing therein;
c) Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of
the parties (vendors and vendees); and
d) Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a
deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the
compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.
- XXI -
Necessarily, and as an inevitable consequence, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
36113/T-172, S-109772, 155329, 155330, 157203 [and 157779] issued by the
Registrar of Deeds over the properties in litis xxx are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action
against them as well as the requisite standing and interest to assail their titles over
the properties in litis; (2) that the sales were with sufficient considerations and
made by defendants parents voluntarily, in good faith, and with full knowledge of
the consequences of their deeds of sale; and (3) that the certificates of title were
issued with sufficient factual and legal basis.4 (Emphasis in the original)
The Ruling of the Trial Court
Before the trial, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case against defendant
spouses Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis.5 Instead of filing an Answer with their co-
defendants, Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis filed a Motion to Dismiss.6In granting the
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 16
dismissal to Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis, the trial court noted that "compulsory
heirs have the right to a legitime but such right is contingent since said right
commences only from the moment of death of the decedent pursuant to Article 777
of the Civil Code of the Philippines."7
After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the
complaint. The trial court stated:
In the first place, the testimony of the defendants, particularly that of the xxx father
will show that the Deeds of Sale were all executed for valuable consideration. This
assertion must prevail over the negative allegation of plaintiffs.
And then there is the argument that plaintiffs do not have a valid cause of action
against defendants since there can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of
their parents. The court finds this contention tenable. In determining the legitime,
the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered (Art.
908 of the New Civil Code). Hence, the legitime of a compulsory heir is computed
as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an
impairment of their legitime while their parents live.
All the foregoing considered, this case is DISMISSED.
In order to preserve whatever is left of the ties that should bind families together,
the counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED.
No costs.
8
SO ORDERED.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.1wphi1 The appellate
court ruled:
To the mind of the Court, appellants are skirting the real and decisive issue in this
case, which is, whether xxx they have a cause of action against appellees.
Upon this point, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellants, like their defendant
brothers and sisters, are compulsory heirs of defendant spouses, Leonardo
Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito, who are their parents. However, their right to the
properties of their defendant parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and
vests only upon the latters death. While still alive, defendant parents are free to
dispose of their properties, provided that such dispositions are not made in fraud of
creditors.
Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of sale in question.
Neither do they claim to be creditors of their defendant parents. Consequently, they
cannot be considered as real parties in interest to assail the validity of said deeds
either for gross inadequacy or lack of consideration or for failure to express the true
intent of the parties. In point is the ruling of the Supreme Court in Velarde, et al. vs.
Paez, et al., 101 SCRA 376, thus:
The plaintiffs are not parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not principally or
subsidiarily bound thereby; hence, they have no legal capacity to challenge their
validity.
Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their action on the supposed impairment of their
legitime by the dispositions made by their defendant parents in favor of their
defendant brothers and sisters. But, as correctly held by the court a quo, "the
legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the
decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an impairment of their legitime while
their parents live."
With this posture taken by the Court, consideration of the errors assigned by
plaintiffs-appellants is inconsequential.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs
against plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues
Petitioners assign the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
CONVEYANCE IN QUESTION HAD NO VALID CONSIDERATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT EVEN
ASSUMING THAT THERE WAS A CONSIDERATION, THE SAME IS
GROSSLY INADEQUATE.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
DEEDS OF SALE DO NOT EXPRESS THE TRUE INTENT OF THE
PARTIES.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
CONVEYANCE WAS PART AND PARCEL OF A CONSPIRACY AIMED
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 17
 AT UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING THE REST OF THE CHILDREN OF THE
SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN AND FELICIANA LANDRITO OF
THEIR INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
PETITIONERS HAVE A GOOD, SUFFICIENT AND VALID CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition without merit.
We will discuss petitioners legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds
of Sale before discussing the issues on the purported lack of consideration and
gross inadequacy of the prices of the Deeds of Sale.
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds
of Sale
Petitioners Complaint betrays their motive for filing this case. In their Complaint,
petitioners asserted that the "purported sale of the properties in litis was the result
of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory
heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime." Petitioners strategy was to have the
Deeds of Sale declared void so that ownership of the lots would eventually revert to
their respondent parents. If their parents die still owning the lots, petitioners and
their respondent siblings will then co-own their parents estate by hereditary
succession.11
It is evident from the records that petitioners are interested in the properties subject
of the Deeds of Sale, but they have failed to show any legal right to the properties.
The trial and appellate courts should have dismissed the action for this reason
alone. An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.12
[T]he question as to "real party-in-interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."
xxx
In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are
those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or
subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting
parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the
contract even though they did not intervene in it (Ibaez v. Hongkong & Shanghai
Bank, 22 Phil. 572 [1912]) xxx.
These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. The
phrase present substantial interest more concretely is meant such interest of a
party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under the substantive
law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand
and the defendant will be protected in a payment to or recovery by him."13
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds
of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners right to their parents properties is
merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents death. While still living, the
parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In their
overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that
theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not affect the value of their
parents estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent
value replaced the lots taken from the estate.
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for lack of consideration
Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the prices
stated in the Deeds of Sale to their respondent father. Thus, petitioners ask the
court to declare the Deeds of Sale void.
A contract of sale is not a real contract, but a consensual contract. As a consensual
contract, a contract of sale becomes a binding and valid contract upon the meeting
of the minds as to price. If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the
price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the
breach of that manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then
the contract of sale is valid but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the
minds of the parties as to the price, because the price stipulated in the contract is
simulated, then the contract is void.14 Article 1471 of the Civil Code states that if the
price in a contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void.
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale.
Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment
of the price goes into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the
consideration is different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to
demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid
contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.15
Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely
simulated. To prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdozs
testimony stating that their father, respondent Leonardo Joaquin, told her that he
would transfer a lot to her through a deed of sale without need for her payment of
the purchase price.16The trial court did not find the allegation of absolute simulation
of price credible. Petitioners failure to prove absolute simulation of price is
magnified by their lack of knowledge of their respondent siblings financial capacity
to buy the questioned lots.17 On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which petitioners
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 18
presented as evidence plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only did
respondents minds meet as to the purchase price, but the real price was also
stated in the Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of the complaint, respondent siblings
have also fully paid the price to their respondent father.18
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for gross inadequacy of price
Petitioners ask that assuming that there is consideration, the same is grossly
inadequate as to invalidate the Deeds of Sale.
Articles 1355 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not
invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as
may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation
or some other act or contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and
1470 of the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale.
Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the
subject matter of sale. All the respondents believed that they received the
commutative value of what they gave. As we stated in Vales v. Villa:19
Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains,
protect him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or
annul the effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of
persons who are not legally incompetent. Courts operate not because one person
has been defeated or overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or
overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use
miserable judgment, and lose money by them indeed, all they have in the world;
but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in addition,
a violation of the law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable
wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it.
(Emphasis in the original)
Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on the parties
and carry greater weight when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial
court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over again unless there has been a
showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are
clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.20 In the instant
case, the trial court found that the lots were sold for a valid consideration, and that
the defendant children actually paid the purchase price stipulated in their respective
Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by the buyer to the seller is a
factual finding that is now conclusive upon us.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians,
AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings,
namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters1 Agnes
P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and
Miguel N. Pascual.2
In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of
Administration," docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034, filed by
respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located
in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the
decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be
considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner.
Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of
the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.3
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which
respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it "may be
considered as an advance legitime" to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate
court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated
property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the
decedents estate,4 the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of
the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it is
subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads:5
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 19
gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime
of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate. Thus
it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that:
1. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of
Makati as part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;
2. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to collation;
3. 1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the mezzanine and
the 3rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City form part of the estate of
Angel N. Pascual;
4. The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual:
a. 1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal Village
Makati TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the rental income
thereon;
b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square meters
located at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT No. 119063;
c. Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at Puerta
Galera Mindoro covered by OCT No. P-2159;
d. Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by the
following Certificate Numbers: A0011036, A006144, A082906,
A006087, A065796, A11979, A049521, C86950, C63096,
C55316, C54824, C120328, A011026, C12865, A10439,
A021401, A007218, A0371, S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309;
e. Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the
following Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309,
A006708, 07680, A020786, S18539, S14649;
f. share in Eduardo Pascuals shares in Baguio Gold Mining
Co.;
g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in
the name of Nona Arellano;
i. Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now covered
by TCT No. 181889, Register of Deeds of Makati City;
j. Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by
Branch 64 of the Court on November 17, 1995.
5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:
a. To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT No.
181889;
b. To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual-the real
properties covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063 of the
Register of Deeds of Makati City and the property covered by
OCT No. 2159, to be divided equally between them up to the
extent that each of their share have been equalized with the
actual value of the property in 5(a) at the time of donation, the
value of which shall be determined by an independent appraiser
to be designated by Amelia P. Arellano, Miguel N. Pascual and
Francisco N. Pascual. If the real properties are not sufficient to
equalize the shares, then Franciscos and Miguels shares may be
satisfied from either in cash property or shares of stocks, at the
rate of quotation. The remaining properties shall be divided
equally among Francisco, Miguel and Amelia. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that
I
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO
IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.
II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF DECEASED
ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS ENTITLED TO
LEGITIMES.
xxxx
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 20
 and . . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO
PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE AT THE
V TIME OF HIS DEATH.

. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL II

JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.6 (underscoring
supplied) . . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
By Decision7 of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioners appeal "partly
meritorious." It sustained the probate courts ruling that the property donated to III
petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR DECEASED
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality of BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
division, We hold that the property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia
is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent and IV
we believe that under the circumstances, the value of such immovable though not
strictly in the concept of advance legitime, should be deducted from her share in
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL,
the net hereditary estate. The trial court therefore committed no reversible error
JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL OR
when it included the said property as forming part of the estate of Angel N.
INTESTATE HEIRS.12 (underscoring supplied)
Pascual.8 (citation omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvph!1

Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner is
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate court,
subject to collation; and whether the property of the estate should have been
herein petitioner "was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of stocks
ordered equally distributed among the parties.
owned by the [decedent] which have not been included in the inventory submitted
by the administrator."
On the first issue:
Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY
value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of
GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.13
Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of inclusion of
properties of the Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as the partition The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so
and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are concerned. far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so
that inofficious donations may be reduced.14
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings in
accordance with the disquisitions herein.9 (underscoring supplied) Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to
determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is
no legitime to be safeguarded.15
Petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration10 having been denied by the
appellate court by Resolution11 of October 7, 2009, the present petition for review
on certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate court its ruling The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his
I collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the
testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for
compulsory heirs.16

SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 21

The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3)
concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over
and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are
primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed
only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are
secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who
succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the
illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.17
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he
was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-
collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was
valid,18 is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free
portion of the estate.19There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation.
On the second issue:
The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his
heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. (underscoring supplied)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering
the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate
of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of the
Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the
case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate, and
thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154942 August 16, 2005
ROLANDO SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
CONSTANCIA SANTOS ALANA, Respondent.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision1 dated March 7, 2002 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 40728.
A brief narration of the factual antecedents follows:
Rolando Santos, petitioner, and Constancia Santos Alana, respondent, are half-
blood siblings both asserting their claim over a 39-square meter lot located at 1339-
B Andalucia St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. It was registered in the name of their father,
Gregorio Santos, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14278 of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila. He died intestate on March 10, 1986.
During his lifetime, or on January 16, 1978, Gregorio donated the lot to petitioner
which the latter accepted on June 30, 1981. The deed of donation ("Pagsasalin ng
Karapatan at Pag-aari") was annotated on Gregorios title.
On April 8, 1981, Gregorio sold the lot to petitioner as per a Deed of Absolute Sale.
On June 26, 1981, by virtue of the annotated deed of donation, TCT No. 14278 in
Gregorios name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 144706 was issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Manila in petitioners name.
On January 11, 1991, respondent Constancia Santos filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 15, a complaint for partition and reconveyance against
petitioner. She alleged that during his lifetime, her father Gregorio denied having
sold the lot to petitioner; that she learned of the donation in 1978; and that the
donation is inofficious as she was deprived of her legitime.
In his answer, petitioner countered that respondents suit is barred by prescription
considering that she is aware that he has been in possession of the lot as owner for
more than ten (10) years; and that the lot was sold to him by his father, hence,
respondent can no longer claim her legitime.
The trial court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was not signed by the parties
nor was it registered in the Registry of Deeds. Thus, it is not a valid contract. What
is valid is the deed of donation as it was duly executed by the parties and
registered.
The trial court then held that since Gregorio did not own any other property, the
donation to petitioner is inofficious because it impaired respondents legitime.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 22
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
Deed of Donation inofficious insofar as it impair the legitime of the plaintiff which is
the of the subject property.
The Registry of Deeds of Manila is hereby ordered to cancel the entry in TCT No.
14278 of the Deed of Donation dated January 16, 1978 and to cancel TCT No.
144706 issued based on said entry.
The parties are enjoined to institute the proper action for the settlement of the
Estate of Gregorio Santos and for the eventual partition of the estate."2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts Decision, holding that:
"There are in the instant case two documents by which the subject property was
purportedly transferred to the defendant a deed of donation and a deed of sale.
xxx
There can, therefore, be no way by which the appellant may successfully
convince us that Gregorio Santos sold the property in dispute to him and
such sale can bind the appellee so as to remove the case from the realm of
the law on donations.
Moreover, as aptly put by the trial court:
In general one who has disposed his property would not and could not have
disposed the same again unless the previous act was rendered invalid or
ineffective.
The validity of the Deed of Donation was never assailed by the defendant. In fact, it
was impliedly recognized as valid by defendant by registering the same to the
Registry of Deeds.
It is the honest belief of this Court, given the circumstances, i.e., the existence of
the vendor and the vendee in the Deed of Absolute Sale and the registration of the
Deed of Donation despite the supposed previous execution of (the) Deed of
Absolute Sale, that there was no valid deed of sale executed and that the true
and real agreement between Gregorio Santos and Rolando Santos was that
of a donation.
Furthermore, considering that defendant himself registered the Deed of Donation,
he cannot now close his eyes and deny the existence of the same by alleging that
there had been a deed of sale executed previously." (Appealed Decision, supra, at
pp. 238-239)
xxx
While a person may dispose of his property by donation, there is a limitation to the
same. The law provides that no person may give or receive, by way of donation,
more than he may give or receive by will, and any donation which may exceed the
foregoing is considered inofficious. x x x The donation shall be inofficious in all that
it may exceed this limitation. (Article 752, Civil Code) The said donation may
correspondingly be reduced insofar as it exceeds the portion that may be freely
disposed of by will (ART. 761).
xxx
It has been undisputedly shown that the subject property was the only property of
the deceased Gregorio Santos at the time of his death on March 10, 1986 (Exhibit
K, Original Record, p. 163); and that he made no reservation for the legitime of the
plaintiff-appellee, his daughter (See paragraph 2, Complaint and paragraph 2,
Answer, Ibid., at pp 1 and 12) and compulsory heir. Clearly, the rule on
officiousness applies. x x x
xxx
Defendant-appellant finally argues that since plaintiff-appellee knew of the donation
since 1978, while the donor Gregorio Santos was still alive, her assailing the said
donation only on January 11, 1991 or thirteen years after, has effectively barred her
from instituting the present action. The foregoing is apparently groundless and
without merit.
The inofficiousness of a donation cannot be determined until after the death of the
donor because prior to his death, the value of his estate cannot be determined or
computed. Determination of the value of the deceaseds estate will require the
collation of all properties or rights, donated or conveyed by gratuitous title to the
compulsory heirs in order that they may be included in the computation for the
determination of the legitime of each heir and for the account of partition (Art. 1061,
Civil Code)."3
Hence, the instant petition.
The findings of the courts below that (1) Gregorio donated to petitioner the subject
lot; (2) the Deed of Absolute Sale is void; and (3) Gregorios only property is the
said lot are all
factual in nature which are not within the domain of this Court for it is not a trier of
facts.4 Basic is it that findings of fact by the trial court, especially when affirmed on
appeal, as in this case, are conclusive and binding upon this Court. 5
The issues which involve questions of law are: (1) whether the donation is
inofficious; and (2) whether the respondents action has prescribed.
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 23
I. Whether the donation is inofficious.
It bears reiterating that under Article 752 of the Civil Code, the donation is
inofficoius if it exceeds this limitation no person may give or receive, by way of
donation, more than he may give or receive by will. In Imperial vs. Court of
Appeals,6 we held that inofficiousness may arise only upon the death of the donor
as the value of donation may then be contrasted with the net value of the estate of
the donor deceased.
At this point, we emphasize that as found by the trial court, Gregorio did not sell the
lot to petitioner. He donated it. The trial court also found that the donation is
inofficious as it impairs
respondents legitime; that at the time of Gregorios death, he left no property other
than the lot now in controversy he donated to petitioner; and that the deceased
made no reservation for the legitime of respondent, his daughter and compulsory
heir. These findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Pursuant to Article 752 earlier cited, Gregorio could not donate more than he may
give by will. Clearly, by donating the entire lot to petitioner, we agree with both
lower courts that Gregorios donation is inofficious as it deprives respondent of her
legitime, which, under Article 888 of the Civil Code, consists of one-half (1/2) of the
hereditary estate of the father and the mother. Since the parents of both parties are
already dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each being entitled to one-half (1/2)
thereof.
II. Whether respondents suit is barred by prescription.
In Imperial vs. Court of Appeals,7 we held that "donations, the reduction of which
hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime (as in this case), are not
controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason, we must resort to
the ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions
upon an obligation created by law must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year
prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations,
required under Article 771 of the Civil Code,8 to the extent that they impair the
legitime of compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? In Mateo vs. Lagua,9 involving
the reduction, for inofficiousness, of a donation propter nuptias, we held that the
cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-
decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained
and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined.
Here, Gregorio died in 1986. Consequently, respondent had until 1996 within which
to file the action. Records show that she filed her suit in 1992, well within the
prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40728 are hereby AFFIRMED, with
modification in the sense that the subject deed of donation being inofficious, one
half (1/2) of the lot covered by TCT No. 14278 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila is
awarded to Constancia Santos Alana, respondent, the same being her legitime.
The remaining one-half (1/2) shall be retained by petitioner, Rolando Santos, as his
legitime and by virtue of the donation.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118449 February 11, 1998
LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City,
and RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two
children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of the five
siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children
of Rafael and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de
Leon, and RicardoNicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and
is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children.
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of
10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property)
covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand
Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by a "Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na
Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT No. T-36734".1 In view thereof, TCT No. V-554
covering the Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita. 2 On March 30, 1990,
Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad
Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred
Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00).3 In June of the same year, Estrellita bought
from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements situated at
Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paraaque (hereafter Paraaque property) using a
portion of the proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela property. The remaining
amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was
deposited in a bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner's life occurred. Estrellita
and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991,
an incident popularly known as the "Vizconde Massacre". The findings of the
investigation conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her
daughters.4 Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded
Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 24
was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered
into an "Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares", 5 with Rafael and Salud, Estrellita's
parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the
properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and
spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car and
the Paraaque property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral
and other related expenses in the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer,
amounts to Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).6 The settlement gave fifty
percent (50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her
daughters to Rafael, except Savings Account No. 104-111211-0 under the
name of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The other fifty percent
(50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Paraaque property and the car and
were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their "claims,
rights, ownership and participation as heirs" 7 in the said properties.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafael's estate, Teresita
instituted an intestate estate proceeding8 docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679,
with Branch 120 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing as
heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo, and the wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio.
Teresita prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate.
Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of Salud, now
senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother Herein private respondent
Ramon filed an opposition9 dated March 24, 1993, praying to be appointed
instead as Salud and Ricardo's guardian. Barely three weeks passed, Ramon
filed another opposition 10 alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given
the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not less than Six Million
Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded for the
court's intervention "to determine the legality and validity of the intervivos
distribution made by deceased Rafael to his children," 11Estrellita included.
On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-
1699, entitled "In The Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and
Ricardo G. Nicolas" and averred that their legitime should come from the
collation of all the properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his
lifetime. 12 Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafael's children "by
right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of
Estrellita." 13
In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon
as the guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed
as the Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate. The court's Order did not
include petitioner in the slate of Rafael's heirs. 14 Neither was the Paraaque
property listed in its list of properties to be included in the
estate. 15 Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994, removed
Ramon as Salud and Ricardo's guardian for Selling his ward's property
without the court's knowledge and permission. 16
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner
"ten (10) days . . . within which to file any appropriate petition or motion
related to the pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file
any opposition to any pending motion that has been filed by both the
counsels for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita de Leon." In response, petitioner
filed a Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing that he was neither a
compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to
participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said Manifestation in its Order
dated February 2, 1994. 17Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion
dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate
proceeding and asked that the Paraaque property, as well as the car and the
balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be
collated. 18 Acting on Ramon's motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994
granted the same in an Order which pertinently reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate
proceedings in instant case and considering the comment on
his Manifestation, the same is hereby granted.19
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which
Ramon opposed. 20 On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. It provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The centerpoint of oppositor-applicant's argument is that
spouses Vizconde were then financially incapable of having
purchased or acquired for a valuable consideration the
property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living
with the deceased Rafael Nicolas in the latter's ancestral
home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses
were dependent for support on the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. And, Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in, de-
facto separation, from the family for sometime and returned
to the Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths
of Estrellita and her two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were
financially incapable to buy the property from the late Rafael
Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have been engaged
in business venture such as taxi business, canteen
concessions and garment manufacturing.However, no
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 25
 competent evidence has been submitted to indubitably
support the business undertakings adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the
acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was for a
valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in
favor of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the
subject property in Paraaque which was purchased out of
the proceeds of the said transfer of the property by the
deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to
collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED. 21 (Emphasis added)
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
respondent Court of Appeals. In its decision of December 14, 1994,
respondent Court of Appeals 22 denied the petition stressing that the
RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the title of the Valenzuela
property as "the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in
handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1,
Rule 90, Revised Rules of Court)." 23 Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari. Finding prima faciemerit, the
Court on December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate court's Order, which
respondent Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the
Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Paraaque
property as subject to collation.
The appeal is well taken.
Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article
1061 of the Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation,
or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed
in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who
intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the
common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the
division may be made according to law and the will of the
testator. 24 Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with
other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation
or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. 25 The purpose is to
attain equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as possible for it is
presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest making
a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in
advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessor's will
is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the
contrary. 26 Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject
matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the
property donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it
was donated, 27 the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which
conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. 28
The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. We find that the
probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible
errors.
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the
intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of
Rafael's compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude
one another.
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 26
 In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three
classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and
to the extent established by this Code.
With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who was not
even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or
a stranger. 29 As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the
intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed
to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said
proceeding, 30 which petitioner correctly argued in his
manifestation. 31
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title
or ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate
proceedings. 32 Such determination is provisional in character and is subject
to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. 33 In the case at bench,
however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its
jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the
Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer
of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The
interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as
well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matters outside the
probate court's jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in an
appropriate action. We reiterate:
. . . we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which
takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has
power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
properties included therein or excluded therefrom
belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a
determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without
prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper
action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit.34
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to
collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings
is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the
legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. We
thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:
We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In
accordance with the provisions of article 1035 35 of the Civil
Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to allege and prove that
the donations received by the defendants were inofficious in
whole or in part and prejudiced the legitime or hereditary
portion to which they are entitled. In the absence of evidence
to that effect, the collation sought is untenable for lack of
ground or basis therefor.
Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the
probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of
the Paraaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by
way of deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property
which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela
property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed,
collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory basis. 36 The order of the
probate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously
conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the
Paraaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of
P900,000.00, 37 by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has
no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present
owner of the Paraaque property is not one of Rafael's heirs. Thus, the
probate court's order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the
obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein
petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafael's estate. As it stands,
collation of the Paraaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation
covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime
to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the
Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and
willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir" 38 in
the Paraaque property.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the
Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be
stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from
Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. 39 Hence,
even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may
not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been
returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate
court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I.
SUAREZ, JR., EVELYN SUAREZ-DE LEON and REGINIO I.
SUAREZ, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, VALENTE
RAYMUNDO, VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA. CONCEPCION VITO and
VIRGINIA BANTA, Respondents.
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 27

1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; PROPRIETARY
INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN, DIFFERENT AND ADVERSE FROM THEIR
MOTHER. The legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime
of each child. The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and
auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their mother.
Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their
mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father.
Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the
action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.
NOCON, J.:
The ultimate issue before Us is whether or not private respondents can
validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-owned by petitioners
and registered in the name of petitioners deceased father. Marcelo
Suarez, whose estate has not been partitioned or liquidated, after the
said properties were levied and publicly sold en masse to private
respondents to satisfy the personal judgment debt of Teofista Suarez,
the surviving spouse of Marcelo Suarez, mother of herein
petitioners.chanrobles law library
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and
since then his estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land in
Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977,
petitioners widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the
consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages, and were
ordered by Branch 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now
Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay, jointly and severally, herein
respondents the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as
damages. 1
The judgment against petitioners mother and Rizal Realty Corporation
having become final and executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in
Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then) were levied and sold on
execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private respondents as the
highest bidder for the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were
then issued a certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or
August 1, 1983.
On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period,
petitioners filed a reinvindicatory action 2 against private respondents
and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil Case No.
51203, for the annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the
ownership of the levied pieces of property. Therein, they alleged, among
others, that being strangers to the case decided against their mother,
they cannot be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land,
of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on
execution.
On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to private
respondents a final deed of sale 3 over the properties.
On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein petitioners filed
with Branch 151 a Motion for Reconsideration 4 of the Order dated
October 10, 1984, claiming that the parcels of land are co-owned by
them and further informing the Court the filing and pendency of an
action to annul the auction sale (Civil Case No. 51203), which motion
however, was denied.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
On February 25, 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued
enjoining private respondents from transferring to third parties the
levied parcels of land based on the finding that the auctioned lands are
co-owned by petitioners.
On March 1, 1985, private respondent Valente Raymundo filed in Civil
Case No. 51203 a Motion to Dismiss for failure on the part of the
petitioners to prosecute, however, such motion was later denied by
Branch 155, Regional Trial Court, Pasig.
On December 1985, Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 an Ex-Parte
Motion to Dismiss complaint for failure to prosecute. This was granted by
Branch 155 through an Order dated May 29, 1986, notwithstanding
petitioners pending motion for the issuance of alias summons to be
served upon the other defendants in the said case. A motion for
reconsideration was filed but was later denied.
On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-
21739 an Order directing Teofista Suarez and all persons claiming right
under her to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale; to desist from
removing or alienating improvements thereon; and to surrender to
private respondents the owners duplicate copy of the torrens title and
other pertinent documents.
Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari to annul the Orders of Branch 151 dated October 10, 1984
and October 14, 1986 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739.
SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 28
On December 4, 1986 petitioners filed with Branch 155 a Motion for
reconsideration of the Order 5 dated September 24, 1986. In an Order
dated June 10, 1987, 6 Branch 155 lifted its previous order of dismissal
and directed the issuance of alias summons.chanrobles law library : red
Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
orders dated February 25, 1985, 7 May 19, 1989 8 and February 26,
1990 9 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 and further ordering respondent
Judge to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The appellate court rendered its
decision on July 27, 1990, 10 the dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the
questioned orders dated February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989 and February
26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby annulled, further
respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203." 11
Hence, this appeal.
Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both
petitioner and private respondents and the developments subsequent to
the filing of the complaint, We cannot but notice the glaring error
committed by the trial court.
"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the
surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of
each of the legitimate children or descendants."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to
the legitime of each child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned
property is different from and adverse to that of their mother.
Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their
mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father.
Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the
action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990
as well as its Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and
set aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that
portion which belongs to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to
said portion.chanrobles law library
SO ORDERED.

It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the

execution and the manner of publicly selling en masse the subject
properties for auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of
land should have been the subject of the auction sale.

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the
time of the institution of the case.

"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 888 further provides:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-

half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights
of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter
provided."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

SUCCESSION - LEGITIME AND COLLATION - 29