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1. HAGAD vs. HON. GOZO-DADOLE
G.R. No. 108072 December 12, 1995
HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, Presiding Judge, Branch XXVIII, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City,
Mandaue City Mayor ALFREDO M. OUANO, Mandaue City Vice-Mayor PATERNO CAETE and
Mandaue City Sangguniang Panlungsod Member RAFAEL MAYOL, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The determination of whether the Ombudsman under Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6770,1 otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative
investigations over local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. No.
7160,2 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is the pivotal issue before the Court in
this petition.
The petition seeks (a) to annul the writ of preliminary injunction, dated 21 October 1992, issued against
petitioner by respondent trial court and (b) to prohibit said court from further proceeding with RTC
Case No. MDE-14.3
Parenthetically, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Arturo Mojica assumed the office of Juan Hagad,
now resigned,4 who took the initiative in instituting this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition.
The controversy stemmed from the filing of criminal and administrative complaints, on 22 July 1992,
against herein respondents Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor Paterno Caete and Sangguniang
Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors
Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.
The respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019, as amended,5 Articles 1706 and
1717 of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713.8Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that
respondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance
No. 018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00
without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. The complaints were separately
docketed as Criminal Case No. OMB-VIS-92-391 and as Administrative Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015.
A day after the filing of the complaints, or on 23 July 1992, a sworn statement was executed by
Mandaue City Council Secretary, Atty. Amado C. Otarra, Jr., in support of the accusations against
respondent officials. The next day, petitioner ordered respondents, including Acting Mandaue City
Treasurer Justo G. Ouano and Mandaue City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, to file their counter-
affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt of the order. Forthwith, Councilors Dionson and Bercede
moved for the preventive suspension of respondent officials in the separately docketed administrative
case.
Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials, on 05 August 1992,
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft
of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63
of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions
against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with
the Office of the President.
In their opposition, filed on 10 August 1992, Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government
Code of 1991 could not have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all public officials and
that, in any case, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act
had remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991.
During the hearing on the motion for preventive suspension, the parties were directed by the Deputy
Ombudsman to file their respective memoranda.
In his memorandum, Mayor Ouano reiterated that, under Sections 61 and 63 of the Local Government
Code of 1991, the Office of the President, not the Office of the Ombudsman, could lawfully take
cognizance of administrative complaints against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized
city or an independent component city and to impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive
suspensions, and that there was nothing in the provision of the Constitution giving to the Office of the
Ombudsman superior powers than those of the President over elective officials of local governments.
In an Order,9 dated 10 September 1992, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to
dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of respondent officials, except City Budget
Officer Pedro M. Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the
Ombudsman.10 Respondent officials were formally placed under preventive suspension by the Deputy
Ombudsman pursuant to an Order11 of 21 September 1992.
On 25 September 1992, a petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order, was filed by respondent officials with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City. Acting favorably on the pleas of petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued, on even date, a
restraining order directed at petitioner, enjoining him ". . . from enforcing and/or implementing the
questioned order of preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015."
Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition but it was to no avail. The court a quo, on 15 October 1992,
denied the motion to dismiss and issued an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
holding thusly:
So by following and applying the well-established rules of statutory construction
that endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of these two laws in
order that each shall be effective, it is the finding of this Court that since the
investigatory power of the Ombudsman is so general, broad and vague and gives
wider discretion to disciplining authority to impose administrative sanctions
against a responsible public official or employee while that of Section 60 of the
New Local Government Code provides for more well defined and specific
grounds upon which a local elective official can be subjected to administrative
disciplinary action, that it Could be considered that the latter law could be an
exception to the authority and administrative power of the Ombudsman to
conduct an investigation against local elective officials and as such, the
jurisdiction now to conduct administrative investigation against local elective
officials is already lodged before the offices concerned under Section 61 of
Republic Act No. 7160.
xxx xxx xxx
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WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Order is hereby issued:
1) Expanding the restraining order dated September 25, 1992 issued by the Court
into an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting
of the petitioners of the bond in the amount of Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs that may be
adjudged to the adverse party and/or damages which he may sustain by reason
of the injunction, if the Court will finally adjudge that the petitioners are not
entitled thereto, and
2) Denying the respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated September 28, 1992 for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED. 12
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued on 21 October 1992.13 A motion for reconsideration made by
petitioner was denied by the trial court.
The instant recourse seeks the nullification of the order of 15 October 1992 and the writ of preliminary
injunction of 21 October 1992 both issued by the trial court and prays that respondent judge be directed
to desist from further proceeding with RTC Case No. MDE-14.
There is merit in the petition.
The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13 (1,) Article XI, of the 1987
Constitution,14 thus:
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;
while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section 19
of R.A. No. 6770 that reads:
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which:
1. Are contrary to law or regulation;
2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in
accordance with law;
4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of
justification.
Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman, viz.:
Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
(Emphasis supplied)
Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that the
Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive
suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it. Said section of the
law provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the
Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except
when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the
period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension
herein provided.
Respondent officials, upon the other hand, argue that the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman
over local officials must be deemed to have been removed by the subsequent enactment of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which vests the authority to investigate administrative charges, listed under
Section 6015 thereof, on various offices. In the case specifically of complaints against elective officials
of provinces and highly urbanized cities, the Code states:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint
against any erring local elective officials shall be prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city,
an independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office
of the President.
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Thus respondents insist, conformably with Section 63 of the Local Government Code,
preventive suspension can only be imposed by: ". . . the President if the respondent is an
elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city; . . . "
under sub-paragraph (b) thereof:
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined,
when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there
is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
and other evidence; Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local
elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That
in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official,
he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a
single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the
first suspension.
In his comment, which the Court required considering that any final resolution of the case would be a
matter of national concern, the Solicitor-General has viewed the Local Government Code of 1991 as
having conferred, but not on an exclusive basis, on the Office of the President (and the various
Sanggunians) disciplinary authority over local elective officials. He posits the stand that the Code did
not withdraw the power of the Ombudsman theretofore vested under R.A. 6770 conformably with a
constitutional mandate. In passing, the Solicitor General has also opined that the appropriate remedy
that should have been pursued by respondent officials is a petition for certiorari before this Court
rather than their petition for prohibition filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the
specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only
uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are
not favored,16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent application.17 The two laws must
be absolutely incompatible,18 and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied
repeal may be drawn.19 The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est
optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other
laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.20 The fundament is that the legislature should be
presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting
statutes.21 Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal,22 and all efforts should be
exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. 23
Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that underlies the
creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate said office from the long
tentacles of officialdom."24
Quite interestingly, Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local Government Code run almost parallel with
the provisions then existing under the old code. Section 61 and Section 63 of the precursor local
Government Code of 1983, 25 under the heading of "Suspension and Removal," read:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Complaints. Verified complaints against local
elective officials shall be prepared as follows:
(a) Against any elective provincial or city official, before the Minister of Local
Government.
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by
the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official,
by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by
the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined,
when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed
the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when
the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension
shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed
reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
against him until its termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the
case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be
counted in computing the time of suspension.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension
over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local
Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A.
No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant.
The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from
what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the
Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President.
Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section
24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by
Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even now maintain its application. The two provisions
govern differently. In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of
R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee
should involve dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b)
the charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office
would prejudice the case filed against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive
suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon
the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed
in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are
joined), it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong, (c) the gravity of the
offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses
or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
Respondent officials, nevertheless, claim that petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion when he
caused the issuance of the preventive suspension order without any hearing.
The contention is without merit. The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of preventive
suspension after the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the motion for preventive
suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum in compliance with the directive of petitioner.
Be that, as it may, we have heretofore held that, not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive
suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before
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the charges are heard. Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt
or innocence. In the early case of Nera vs. Garcia,26 reiterated in subsequent cases,27 we have said:
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer
to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a
punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but
only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore,
nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before
the charges against him are heard and be given an opportunity to prove his
innocence.
Moreover, respondent officials were, in point of fact, put on preventive suspension only after
petitioner had found, in consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda vs. Flavier,28 that the evidence of guilt
was strong. Petitioner gave his justification for the preventive suspension in this wise:
After a careful and honest scrutiny of the evidence submitted on record, at this
stage, it is the holding of this office that the evidence of guilt against the
respondents in the instant case is strong. There is no question that the charge
against the respondents involves dishonesty or gross misconduct which would
warrant their removal from the service and there is no gainsaying the fact that
the charge for falsification of veritable documents like city ordinances are very
serious charges that affect the very foundations of duly established
representative governments. Finally, it is likewise the holding of this office at this
stage that the continued stay in office of respondents may prejudice the judicious
investigation and resolution of the instant case.29
Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the Solicitor General, that respondent official's petition for
prohibition, being an application for remedy against the findings of petitioner contained in his 21
September 1992 order, should not have been entertained by the trial court. The proscription in Section
14 of R.A. No. 6770 reads:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay
an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there
is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside
the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
Likewise noteworthy is Section 27 of the law which prescribes a direct recourse to this Court
on matters involving orders arising from administrative disciplinary cases originating from
the Office of the Ombudsman; thus:
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. . . .
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of
the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
All told, petitioner is plainly entitled to the relief prayed for, and we must, accordingly; grant the
petition.
WHEREFORE, the questioned writ of preliminary injunction of 21 October 1992 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE, and RTC Case No. MDE-14 is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 124067. March 27, 1998]
PERLA A. SEGOVIA, REYNALDO C. SANTIAGO and WINIFREDO SM. PANGILINAN, petitioners vs. The
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and the PRESIDENT of the NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
The special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar seeks nullification of two (2)
Resolutions of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued in Criminal Case No. 21711 -- in which
petitioners are prosecuted for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act : Republic Act No.
3019, as amended. The resolution assailed are:
1) that dated February 1, 1996, which ordered petitioners preventive suspension for ninety (90) days in
accordance with Section 13 of said R.A 3019; and
2) that dated February 23, 1996, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the suspension
order.
The primary issue raised is whether it is mandatory or discretionary for the Sandiganbayan to
place under preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it, pursuant to said
Section 13 of the law. Section 13 reads:
Sec. 13 Suspension and Loss of benefits. -- Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or propertty, whether as a simple or as a complex offense in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
** **
It is petitioners' submission that preventive suspension under this section rest in the sound
discretion of the Sandiganbayan despite the ostensibly mandatory language of the statute, and that that
discretion was gravely abused by the Sandiganbayan, or it exceeded its jurisdiction, when it decreed
their suspension.
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Petitioners -- Perla Segovia, Reynaldo Santiago, and Winifredo SM Pangilinan -- all hold regular
executive positions in the National Power Corporation (NPC). They -- together with two other officers
who have since resigned from the NPC, namely: Gilberto A. Pastoral and Cecilia D. Vales -- were
designated by the NPC Board to compose the Contracts Committee for said NPCs Mindanao Grid LDC
& SCADA/EMS System Operation Control Center and Facilities Project.
The Contracts Committee thus constituted conducted the prequalification and bidding
procedures for the project. The lowest and second lowest bidders were the Joint Venture of INPHASE
and T & D, and Urban Consolidated Constructors, Inc., respectively. The Technical Task Force on Bid
Evaluation of the NPC reviewed all the bids submitted and recommended approval of the results. The
contracts Committee, however, declared the lowest bidder (Joint Venture) disqualified after
verification from the Philippines Contractors Accredition Board that that group, as well as the second
lowest bidder (Urban) had been downgraded, thereby rending both ineligible as bidders.
The Contracts Committee also stated that since a review of relevant factors disclosed that the
other bids had exceeded the Approved Agency Estimates and the Allowable Government Estimates
for Options A and B of the Project, it was was needful for the NPC Board to declare a failure of bidding
and direct a re-bidding. The recommendation was unanimously approved by the NPC Board; but for
reasons not appearing on record (and, in any event, not relevant to the inquiry), the project was
eventually cancelled.
Obviously feeling aggrieved by the turn of events, Urban filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against the Chairman and Members of the Board of Directors of NPC; the Chairman
(Gilberto Pascual) and Members of the NPC Contracts Awards Committee; the Chairman (Perla
Segovia) of the Pre-Qualification Bids & Awards Committee; the Manager (Cecilia D. Vales) of the
Contracts Management Office, and two others.[1]Urban alleged that before the bidding, Joint
Venture had been disqualified, but the Contracts Committee, without basis and in order to favor it,
reconsidered its disqualification and thus enabled it to take part in the bidding and in fact to submit
the lowest bid; that the NPC was already poised to award the contract to Joint Venture but
because Urban protested, it was compelled to "post-disqualify" the former; however, intead of
awarding the contract for the project to Urban as the second lowest bidder, the Committee and the
NPC Board declared a failure of bidding and ultimately cancelled the project. These acts, it is claimed,
constituted a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
A preliminary investigation was conducted by the Ombudsmans Office after which Graft
Investigation Officer A.A. Amante submitted a Resolution dated August 2, 1994 [2]recommending,
among others, that:
1) petitioners Perla Segovia, Reynaldo Santiago, Winifredo SM Pangilinan, as well as Gilberto Pastoral
and Cecilia Vales be charged with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 of having in one way or the
other extended undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and
gross inexcusable negligence; and
2) the NPC President, NPC charman and Members of the Board of Directors be cleared of the **
complaint as their official actuation of sustaining a failure of bidding and the consequent re-bidding is
supported by factual and legal basis.
Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr., favorably endorsed the recommendation
which was eventually approved on December 6, 1994 by Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez, then the
Ombudsman.[3]
An information was accordingly filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioners Segovia,
Santiago, and Pangilinan, as well as Pastoral and Vales, docketed as Criminal Case No. 21711. They were
charged with infringement of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019: i,e., causing undue injury to any party, including
the Government, or giving any party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial function through manifest partiality, evident bad
faithy or gross inexcusable negligence.
Petioners sought and obtained a reinvestigation of their case but gained no benefit thereby. For
although the reinvestigating officer made a recommendation on March 7, 1995 that the information
against petitioners be withdrawn -- because the prima facie case had already been overthrown,
considering that, as it now stands, the evidence at hand cannot stand judicial scrunity[4] -- and that
recommendation met with the aprroval of the Special Prosecutor, it was ultimately turned down by
the chief Special Prosecutor[5] on April 18, 1995, and on April 20, 1995, by the Ombudsman himself.[6]
The case thus proceeded in the Sandiganbayan. The accused were arraigned and entered pleas
of not guilty; and a pre-trial was held which resulted in stipulation of facts embodied in an order dated
January 11, 1996.[7]
Earlier, the People had filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite dated October 24, 1995,
invoking Section 13 of RA 3019., as amended, and relevant jurisprudence, and alleging that the
information/s is /are valid.[8]
Petitioner opposed the motion.[9] In their pleading dated November 28, 1995, the theorized that
the explicit terms of the law notwithstanding, their suspension was not mandatory in the premises.
They claimed that the admissions at the pre-trial show that the transactions in question resulted in no
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, or injury, to anyone; that two of the five accused were
no longer employees of the NPC; that two of the five accused were no longer employees of the NPC;
that the positions that Segovia, Pangilinan and Santiago continued to occupy in the NPC were quite
sentitive and had no relation to prequalification of contractors, biddings or awards -- which was an
additional function temporarily assigned to them and for which the received no compensation at all --
and their suspension might cause delay of vital projects of the NPC; and that under the circumstances
obtaining, they were in no position to tamper with any evidence.
Petitioners opposition was overruled. On January 31, 1996 the Sandiganbayan[10] handed down
its Resolution suspending them for a period of ninety (90) days.[11] The Sandiganbayan held that the
suspension was mandated under the law upon a finding that a proper preliminary investigation had
been conducted , the information was valid, and the accused were charged with any of the crimes
specified in the law; and stressed that its authority and power to suspend the accused had been
repeatedly upheld in several precedents. It subsequently denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration dated February 14, 1996, (c)onsidering the paucity of the(ir) arguments ** and in the
light of the mass of jurisprudence involving the power and authority of this Court to issue orders for
preventive suspension of the accused **.[12]
Petitioners would now have this Court strike down these resolution because supposedly
rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The court will not do so. In no sense
may the challeged resolutions be stigmatized as so clearly capricious, whimsical, oppressive,
egregiously erroneous or wanting in logic as to call for invalidation by the extraordinary writ
of certiorari. On the contrary, in promulgating those resolution, the Sandiganbayan did but adhere to
the clear command of the law and what it calls a mass of jurispudence emanating from this Court,
sustaining its authority to decree suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
Indeed, that the theory of discretionary suspension should still be advocated to this late date, despite
the mass of jurisprudence relevant to the issue, it little short of amazing, bordering on contumacious
disregard of the solemn magisterial pronouncements of the Highest court of the land.
Republic Act no. 3019 was enacted by Congress more than 37 years ago, on August 17, 1960,
becoming effective on the same date. The law was later amended by Republic Act No. 3047,
Presidential Decree 677 and Presidential Decree No. 1288. The last amendment -- to Section 13 thereof
-- was introduced by Batas Pambansa Bilang 195, approved on March 16, 1972.
The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended -- treating of the suspension pendente lite of an
accused public officer -- may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court. As
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early as 1984, in Bayot v. Sandiganbayan,[13] the Court held by this Court. As suspension was not penal
in character but merely a preventive measure before final judgement; hence, the suspension of a public
officer charged with one of the crimes listed in the amending law, committed before said amendment,
does not violate the constitutional provision against an ex post facto law. The purpose of suspension is
to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating or hampering his prosecution by intimidating or
influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence, or from committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office.[14] Substantially to the same effect was the Courts holding in 1991, in
Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan,[15] that preventive suspension is not violative suspension remains entitled
to the constitutional presumption of innocence since his culpability must still be established.
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive
suspension lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed; once a case is filed in court, all other
acts connected with the discharge of court functions -- including preventive suspension -- should be
aknowledged as within the competence of the court that has taken cognizance thereof, no violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers being perceivable in that acknowledgment. [16]
The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicated upon a valid
information under Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permenent or temporary
employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service.[17] It appears to a Public High School
Principal;[18] a Municipal Mayor;[19] a Governor;[20] a Congressman;[21] a Department of Science and
Technology (DOST) non-career Project Manager;[22] a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG).[23] The term office in Section 13 of the law applies to any office in relation
to which he is charged.[24]
It is mandatory for the court to place under preventive suspension a public officer accused
before it.[25] Imposition of suspension, however, is not automatic or self-operative. A precondition
therefor is the existence of a valid information, determined at a pre-suspension hearing. Such a hearing
is in accord with the spirit of the law, considering the serious and far-reaching consequences of a
suspension of a public official even before his conviction, and the demands of public interest for speedy
determination of the issues involved in the case.[26] The purpose of the pre-suspension hearing is
basically to detrmine the validity of the information and thereby furnish the court with a basis to either
suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or refuse suspension of the
latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. 27 The
accused should be given adequate oppurtunity to challege the validity or regularity of the criminal
proceedings against him; e.g. that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation;
that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation; that the acts imputed to him
do not constitute a specific crime (under R.A. 3019 or the Revised Penal Code) warranting his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act; or that the information is subject to
quashal on any of the grounds set out in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 28 But once a proper
determination of the validity of the Information has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of the
court to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension of the accused official on the pretext that
the order denying the latters motion to quash is pending review before the appellate courts.29
However, the preventive suspension may not be of indefinite duration or for an unreasonable
length of time; it would be constitutionally proscribed otherwise as it raises, at the very least, questions
of denial of due process and equal protection of the laws.30 The Court has thus laid down the rule that
preventive suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days in consonance with
Presidential Decree No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree), noew Section 52 of the Administrative Code of
1987.31
While petitioners concede that this Court has almost consistently ruled that the preventive
suspension contemplated in Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandantory in character, they nonetheless urge
the Court to consider their case an exception because of the peculiar circumstances thereof. They
assert that the evils sought to be avoidedby seperating a public official from the scene of his alleged
misfeasance while the same is being investigated32 -- e.g., to preclude the abuse of the prerogative of
** (his) office, such as through intimidation of witnesses,33 or the tampering with documentary
evidence -- will not occur in the present situation where:
1. The Project has been cancelled.
2. (Their) ** official duties no longer pertain, in any manner, to the prequalification of
contractors dealing with the NPC. Neither are they now involved in any bidding for or awarding of
contracts, ** it (being) emphasized (in this connection) that they were merely designated as ad hoc
members of the Committee without additional compensation for their additional duties.
3. All the relevant documentary evidence had been submitted either to the Ombudsman or the
Honorable Sandiganbayan.
They conclude that their preventive suspension at this point would actually be purposeless, as
there is no more need for precautionary measures against their abuse of the prerogatives of their
office.
The arguments are not new. They have been advanced and rejected in earlier cases. They will
again be so rejected in this case.
The Courts pronouncements in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, supra.,34 are germane:
Our holding that, upon the filing of a valid information charging violation of Republic Act No. 30
19, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or fraud upon government or public property, it is the
duty of the court to place the accused under preventive suspension disposes of petitioners other
contention that since the trial in the Sandiganbayan is now over with respect to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution there is no longer any danger that petitioner would intimidate
prosecutions witnesses. The fact is that the possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or
otherwise hamper his prosecution is just one of the grounds for preventive suspension. The other one
is, ** to prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.
Bolastig also disposes of the other contention that vital projects of NPC may be delayed by their
preventive suspension, viz.:35
Finally, the fact that petitioners preventive suspension may deprive the people of Samar of the
services of an official elected by them, at least temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for reducing what
is otherwise a mandatory period prescribed by law. The vice governor, who has likewise been elected
by them, will act as governor. (The Local Government Code of 1991, sec. 46[a]) Indeed, even the
Constitution authorizes the suspension for not more than sixty days of members of Congress found
guilty of disorderly behavior, (Art. VI, sec. 16[3]) thus rejecting the view expressed in one case
(Alejandrino v. Quezon. 46 Phil. 83, 96 [1924]) that members of the legislature could not be suspended
because in the case of suspension, unlike in the case of removal, the seat remains filled but the
constitutents are deprived of reprensation.
The firmly entrenched doctrine is that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after a determination has been made of the validity
of the information in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose.
In Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,36 decided fairly recently, the Court again expatiated on the
mandatory character of suspension pendente lite under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 and the nature of
the pre-suspension hearing.
This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a public officer
is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a pre-suspension hearing
conducted for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the
validity of the information, from which the Court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and
proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismissed
the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. That hearing may be treated
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in the same manner as a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash (See
People vs. Albano, etc., et. al., L-45376-77, July 28, 1988, 163 SCRA 511)
In the leading case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et al. (L-32950, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 187), we
have set out the guidelines to be followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the power of
suspension under Section 13 of the law, to wit:
(c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension
from office of public officers charged under a valid information under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to section 13 of said
Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an
order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why
he shoud not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act.
Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in
turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order
of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear
the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down
its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the information
or withhold such suspension in the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that
the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal
proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation,
the act for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019 or of bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension
from office under Section 13 of the Act, or he may present a motion to quash the information on any
of the grounds provided in the Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed by
the act upon determination of the pendency in court or crimianl prosecution for violation of the Anti-
Graft Act or for bribery under a valid information requires at the same time that the hearing be
expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the
Act. Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the ground alleged in the quashal motion not to be indubitable,
then it shall be called upon to issue the suspension order upon its upholding the validity of the
information and setting the same for trial on the merits.
With the aforequoted jurisrudential authority as the basis, it is evident that upon a proper
determination of the validity of the information, it bacomes mandatory for the court to immmediately
issue the suspension order. The rule on the matter is specific and categorical. It leaves no room for
interpretation. It is not within the courts discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused
officer on the pretext that the order denying the motion to quash is pending review before the
appellate courts. Its discretion lies only during the pre-suspension hearing where it is required to
ascertain whether or not (1) the accused had been afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the
filling of the information against him, (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of
the provisions of Republic Act. No. 3019 or of the provisions of title 7, Book II of the revised Penal Code,
or (3) the information against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section 2,
Rules 117 of the Rules of Court. (People vs. Albana, etc., at al. Supra, fn. 26)
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court must issue
the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is because a
preventive suspension is not penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if
acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension. In view of this latter provisions, the accused elective
public officer does not stand to be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension order
in the event that the information is subsequently declared null and void on appeal and the case
dismissed as against him. Taking into consideration the public policy involved in preventively
suspending a public officer charged under a valid information, the protection of public interest will
definitely have to prevail over the private interest of the accused. (Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R.
Nos. 61776-61861, March 23, 1984, 128 SCRA 383)
To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019,
it is said that the court trying the case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether or not a
preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses
or frustrate his prosecution or continue commiting malfeasance in office. The presumption is that
unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or do both, in same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge
to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine
whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.
The Court is satisfied that the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, after upholding the validity
of the information against petitioners, correctly ordered their preventive suspension from any public
office for period of ninety (90) days.
As was stressed in Libanan v. Sandiganbayan 37
** When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court
ratiocination or rationalization of the law. Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the
suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution against him. This Court has
repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is mandatory **, and there are no ifs and buts about
it.
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Cost against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE
S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF
THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in
ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in
connection with pending criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.The investigating panel, that took over the case from
Investigator Gualberto dela Llana after having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
upon petitioners request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the
Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against petitioner. On 13 May 1991,
OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance; approved, forthwith, three
informations were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly:
8|Page ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PUBLIC OFFICERS
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That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public
officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of the stay of the following aliens:
Jhamtani Shalini Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong
Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Quiu, Wu Hong Guan Qui @ Betty
Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing,
Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian,
Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan,
Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order no. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which
prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified,
thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully
legalized by said accused.[1]
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and
the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-
94555 and no. 91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand
(P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical appearance as she was then
recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her
provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant her physical
appearance in court. Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to
come unaided to his office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on
27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be
allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition and
Preliminary Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the Sandiganbayan
to meanwhile defer her arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition issued a temporary
restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus, informed, issued an order deferring petitioners arraignment and the
consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the
temporary restraining order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner proved
unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioners intention to accept a
fellowship from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Sandiganbayan
issued an order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena
from the case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09 November
1992, her motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed
G.R. No. 99289-90. At the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with the
Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens whose applications she purportedly
approved and thereby supposedly extended undue advantage were conspicuously omitted in the
complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioners
arraignment not later than five days from receipt of notice thereof.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
admit thirty-two amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations. The
court, in its 11th March 1993 resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and directed
her to post bail on the criminal cases, docketed Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed against her.
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R.
No. 109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to
disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well as its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended
Informations, and seeking the nullification thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena
to cease and desist from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the 11th March 1993 resolution
ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 amended informations, and from proceeding with her
arraignment on 12 April 1993 until the matter of his disqualification would have been resolved by the
Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP and
Ombudsman to consolidate the 32 amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32
informations were consolidated into one information under Criminal Case No. 16698.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Redetermine probable Cause and to
dismiss or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31
July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one Rodolfo
Pedellaga (Pedellaga). The presentation was scheduled on 15 September 1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31st July 1995
motion for the prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of
its 03rd August 1995 order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by
the Sandiganbayan, was elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled Miriam
Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, docketed G.R. No. 123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend
her. On 25 January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under consideration and hereby
suspends the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines and from any other government position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her
suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take effect immediately upon notice.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate President, Senate of the
Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of the Senate, for the
implementation of the suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this court
of the action taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of implementation of the suspension
order as well as the expiry of the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be lifted at the time.[2]
9|Page ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PUBLIC OFFICERS
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Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a
ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the
Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple
or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in
the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has
already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. (As amended
by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982).
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan,[3] the Court reiterated:
The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended --- treating of the suspension pendente lite of an
accused public officer --- may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under
the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or
pertaining to the career or non-career service.[4]
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension
upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to
be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of
course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it.[5] Explaining the nature of the preventive
suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan[6] observed:
x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted,
the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed
to receive during suspension.[7]
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the
clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more
than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and
employees indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.[8]
En passan, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity of
the information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to
the conduct thereof. It has been said that-
x x x No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions
of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the revised Penal Code which would warrant his
mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash
the information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the
acts for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on
bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to quash the information on any
other grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for which
the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the
provisions on bribery of the revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a
challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph
(a), section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. In other words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such
ground, should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically
admitted, constitute the elements of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on
bribery of the Revised Penal Code.[9]
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine
(1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3)
whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the records an other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing
preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has
not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not
constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in
Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure. [10]
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioners case before the
Sandiganbayan has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called upon
the resolve several other matters on the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez,[11] petitioner sought
to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal case No. 16698 for violation of Republic
Act No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez,[12] petitioner sought the nullification of the hold departure
order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold
Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs.
Garchitorena,[13] petitioner sought the nullification of the resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal
10 | P a g e A D M I N I S T R A T I V E L A W A N D P U B L I C O F F I C E R S
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Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena
disqualified from acting in said criminal case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed
as filed the 32 amended informations against her; and (4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs.
Sandiganbayan,[14] petitioner assailed the denial by the Sandiganbayan of her motion for her
reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these
cases,[15] the Court declared:
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. 16698
(G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue
of the delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in those
petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense punishable under
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under
Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted
the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of
qualified aliens even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31 1983.She concludes
that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the
information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in
her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official
functions.
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019.[16]
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner,
behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive
suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.[17]
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon
an erring member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr., vs. Sandiganbayan, et
al.,[18] the Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan,
despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The Court
ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power
of each House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or
expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty
of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite
distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes
each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own
sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs
of either branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also in the determination of whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave
abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality has evidently been couched in
general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging
milieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question,
however, pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to
the view[19] that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres
the Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches
of government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or
provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not,
or ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly
react in the manner prescribed by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court,
nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue
raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 130872. March 25, 1999]
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
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FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, father and son, were convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of thirteen (13) counts of estafa through falsification of public documents.[1] They now
seek a review of their conviction as they insist on their innocence.
Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his
son, his co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of
Barangay Bagong Silang, Municipality of Santa Cruz, and concurrently a member of its Sangguniang
Bayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays.
In the 1985 election for the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red[2] won as KB Chairman of Barangay
Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Parenthetically, Lenlie Lecaroz did not run as candidate in this electoral exercise
as he was no longer qualified for the position after having already passed the age limit fixed by law.
Sometime in November 1985 Red was appointed by then President Ferdinand Marcos as
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. Imee
Marcos-Manotoc, then the National Chairperson of the organization, sent a telegram to Red
confirming his appointment and advising him further that copies of his appointment papers would be
sent to him in due time through the KB Regional Office.[3] Red received the telegram on 2 January 1986
and showed it immediately to Mayor Francisco M. Lecaroz.
On 7 January 1986, armed with the telegram and intent on assuming the position of sectoral
representative of the KBs to the SB, Red attended the meeting of the Sanggunian upon the invitation
of one of its members, Kagawad Rogato Lumawig. In that meeting, Mayor Francisco M. Lecaroz
informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until his appointment had
been cleared by the Governor of Marinduque. Nonetheless, the telegram was included in the agenda
as one of the subjects discussed in the meeting.
Red finally received his appointment papers sometime in January 1986. [4] But it was only on 23
April 1986, when then President Corazon C. Aquino was already in power, [5] that he forwarded these
documents to Mayor Lecaroz. This notwithstanding, Red was still not allowed by the mayor to sit as
sectoral representative in the Sanggunian.
Meanwhile, Mayor Lecaroz prepared and approved on different dates the payment to Lenlie
Lecaroz of twenty-six (26) sets of payrolls for the twenty-six (26) quincenas covering the period 16
January 1986 to 30 January 1987. Lenlie Lecaroz signed the payroll for 1-15 January 1986 and then
authorized someone else to sign all the other payrolls for the succeeding quincenas and claim the
corresponding salaries in his behalf.
On 25 October 1989, or three (3) years and nine (9) months from the date he received his
appointment papers from President Marcos, Red was finally able to secure from the Aquino
Administration a confirmation of his appointment as KB Sectoral Representative to the Sanggunian
Bayan of Santa Cruz.
Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against
Mayor Francisco Lecaroz and Lenlie Lecaroz arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him
assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman
filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) Informations for estafa through falsification of public
documents against petitioners, and one (1) Information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against Mayor Lecaroz alone.
On 7 October 1994 the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two (2) accused guilty on
all counts of estafa through falsification of public documents and sentenced each of them to -
a) imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a minimum of FIVE (5) YEARS,
ELEVEN (11) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional to a maximum of TEN
(10) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prison mayor FOR EACH OF THE ABOVE CASES;
b) a fine in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000) FOR EACH OF THE ABOVE
CASES or a total of SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P65,000), and
c) perpetual special disqualification from public office in accordance with Art. 214 of the
Revised Penal Code.
x x x (and) to pay jointly and severally the amount of TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS (P23,675), the amount unlawfully obtained, to the Municipality of Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque in restitution.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that since Red was elected president of the KB and took his oath of
office sometime in 1985 before then Assemblywoman Carmencita O. Reyes his assumption of the KB
presidency upon the expiration of the term of accused Lenlie Lecaroz was valid. Conversely, the
accused Lenlie Lecaroz ceased to be a member of the KB on the last Sunday of November 1985 and, as
such, was no longer the legitimate representative of the youth sector in the municipal council of Sta.
Cruz, Marinduque.
In convicting both accused on the falsification charges, the Sandiganbayan elucidated -
x x x x when, therefore, accused MAYOR FRANCISCO LECAROZ entered the name of his son, the
accused LENLIE LECAROZ, in the payroll of the municipality of Sta. Cruz for the payroll period starting
January 15, 1986, reinstating accused LENLIE LECAROZ to his position in the Sangguniang Bayan, he
was deliberately stating a falsity when he certified that LENLIE LECAROZ was a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan. The fact is that even accused LENLIE LECAROZ himself no longer attended the
sessions of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz, and starting with the payroll for January 16 to 31, 1986,
did not personally pick up his salaries anymore.
The accused MAYOR's acts would fall under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister. - The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee,
or notary public who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing
any of the following acts: x x x x 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
xxxx
Clearly, falsification of public documents has been committed by accused MAYOR LECAROZ.
Likewise from these acts of falsification, his son, accused LENLIE LECAROZ, was able to draw salaries
from the municipality to which he was not entitled for services he had admittedly not rendered. This
constitutes Estafa x x x x the deceit being the falsification made, and the prejudice being that caused
to the municipality of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque for having paid salaries to LENLIE LECAROZ who was not
entitled thereto.
Conspiracy was alleged in the Informations herein, and the Court found the allegation sufficiently
substantiated by the evidence presented.
There is no justifiable reason why accused MAYOR LECAROZ should have reinstated his son LENLIE in
the municipal payrolls from January 16, 1986 to January 31, 1987, yet he did so. He could not have had
any other purpose than to enable his son LENLIE to draw salaries thereby. This conclusion is
inescapable considering that the very purpose of a payroll is precisely that -- to authorize the payment
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of salaries. And LENLIE LECAROZ did his part by actually drawing the salaries during the periods
covered, albeit through another person whom he had authorized.
By the facts proven, there was conspiracy in the commission of Estafa between father and son.
However, with respect to the charge of violating Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3.019, the
Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Francisco Lecaroz. It found that Red was neither authorized to sit as
member of the SB because he was not properly appointed thereto nor had he shown to the mayor
sufficient basis for his alleged right to a seat in the municipal council. On this basis, the court a
quo concluded that Mayor Lecaroz was legally justified in not allowing Red to assume the position
of Kagawad.
On 1 October 1994 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration of its decision filed
by the accused. This prompted herein petitioners to elevate their cause to us charging that the
Sandiganbayan erred:
First, in holding that Red had validly and effectively assumed the office of KB Federation
President by virtue of his oath taken before then Assemblywoman Carmencita Reyes on 27 September
1985, and in concluding that the tenure of accused Lenlie Lecaroz as president of the KB and his
coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB had accordingly expired;
Second, assuming arguendo that the term of office of the accused Lenlie Lecaroz as youth
representative to the SB had expired, in holding that accused Lenlie Lecaroz could no longer occupy
the office, even in a holdover capacity, despite the vacancy therein;
Third, granting arguendo that the tenure of the accused Lenlie Lecaroz as federation president
had expired, in holding that by reason thereof accused Lenlie Lecaroz became legally disqualified from
continuing in office as KB Sectoral Representative to the SB even in a holdover capacity;
Fourth, in not holding that under Sec. 2 of the Freedom Constitution and pursuant to the
provisions of the pertinent Ministry of Interior and Local Governments (MILG) interpretative circulars,
accused Lenlie Lecaroz was legally entitled and even mandated to continue in office in a holdover
capacity;
Fifth, in holding that the accused had committed the crime of falsification within the
contemplation of Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and in not holding that the crime of estafa of which
they had been convicted required criminal intent and malice as essential elements;
Sixth, assuming arguendo that the accused Lenlie Lecaroz was not legally entitled to hold over,
still the trial court erred in not holding - considering the difficult legal questions involved - that the
accused acted in good faith and committed merely an error of judgment, without malice and criminal
intent; and,
Seventh, in convicting the accused for crimes committed in a manner different from that alleged
in the Information under which the accused were arraigned and tried.
The petition is meritorious. The basic propositions upon which the Sandiganbayan premised its
conviction of the accused are: (a) although Jowil Red was duly elected KB Chairman he could not validly
assume a seat in the Sanggunian as KB sectoral representative for failure to show a valid appointment;
and, (b) Lenlie Lecaroz who was the incumbent KB representative could not hold over after his term
expired because pertinent laws do not provide for holdover.
To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the terms of office of KB youth
sectoral representatives to the SB and of the KB Federation Presidents. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec.
1 of the KB Constitution respectively provide -
Sec. 7. Term of Office. - Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove
mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of
March 1980.
In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of barangay councils and
the president of the federation of kabataang barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous with
their tenure is president of their respectiveassociation and federation .
xxxx
Sec 1. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to hold office until the last
Sunday of November 1985 or such time that the newly elected officers shall have qualified and assumed
office in accordance with this Constitution.
The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB
since he did not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid
oath of office. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of the SB
although in a holdover capacity since his term had already expired. The Sandiganbayan however
rejected this postulate declaring that the holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only
to positions in the KB, clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg. 51,
there can be no holdover with respect to positions in the SB.
We disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer
implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. [6] It is
usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not
only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is
found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor
elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is
elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.[7]
In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to
occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say
that he is proscribed from holding over.Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory
provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen
and has qualified.[8] The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least
implied in the legislative enactment,[9] otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body
favors the same.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices,[10] and courts generally indulge in the strong
presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an
executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by
one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions.[11] This is founded on obvious considerations of public
policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public convenience from
suffering because of a vacancy[12] and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions.[13]
The Sandiganbayan maintained that by taking his oath of office before Assemblywoman Reyes
in 1985 Red validly assumed the presidency of the KB upon the expiration of the term of Lenlie
Lecaroz. It should be noted however that under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in
force, specifically Sec. 21, Art. VI thereof, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not
authorized to administer oaths. It was only after the approval of RA No. 6733[14]on 25 July 1989 and its
subsequent publication in a newspaper of general circulation that members of both Houses of
Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority to administer oaths. Clearly, under
this circumstance, the oath of office taken by Jowil Red before a member of the Batasang Pambansa
who had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid and amounted to no oath at all.
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To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the
full investiture with the office.[15] Only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that
his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. Until then, he has none at all. And
for as long as he has not qualified, the holdover officer is the rightful occupant. It is thus clear in the
present case that since Red never qualified for the post, petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz remained KB
representative to the Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a de
jure officer,[16] or at least a de facto officer[17] entitled to receive the salaries and all the emoluments
appertaining to the position. As such, he could not be considered an intruder and liable for
encroachment of public office.[18]
On the issue of criminal liability of petitioners, clearly the offenses of which petitioners were
convicted, i.e., estafa through falsification of public documents under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised
Penal Code, are intentional felonies for which liability attaches only when it is shown that the
malefactors acted with criminal intent or malice.[19] If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the
part of the person committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to
him. Was criminal intent then demonstrated to justify petitioners' conviction? It does not so appear in
the case at bar.
Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance
or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious
responsibility. The exception of course is neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference to
consequences, which is equivalent to a criminal intent, for in this instance, the element of malicious
intent is supplied by the element of negligence and imprudence[20] In the instant case, there are clear
manifestations of good faith and lack of criminal intent on the part of petitioners.
First. When Jowil Red showed up at the meeting of the Sanggunian on 7 January 1986, what he
presented to Mayor Francisco Lecaroz was a mere telegram purportedly sent by Imee Marcos-Manotoc
informing him of his supposed appointment to the SB, together with a photocopy of a "Mass
Appointment." Without authenticated copies of the appointment papers, Red had no right to assume
office as KB representative to the Sanggunian, and petitioner Mayor Lecaroz had every right to
withhold recognition, as he did, of Red as a member of the Sanggunian.
Second. It appears from the records that although Red received his appointment papers signed
by President Marcos in January 1986, he forwarded the same to Mayor Francisco Lecaroz only on 23
April 1986 during which time President Marcos had already been deposed and President Aquino had
already taken over the helm of government. On 25 March 1986 the Freedom Constitution came into
being providing in Sec. 2 of Art. III thereof that -
Sec. 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by. proclamation or executive order or upon the designation of their
successors if such appointment is made within a period of one (1) year from February 26,
1986 (underscoring supplied).
Duty bound to observe the constitutional mandate, petitioner Francisco Lecaroz through the
provincial governor forwarded the papers of Jowil Red to then Minister of Interior and Local
Government Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., requesting advice on the validity of the appointment signed by
former President Marcos. The response was the issuance of MILG Provincial Memorandum-Circular No.
86-02[21] and Memorandum-Circular No. 86-17[22] stating that -
PROVINCIAL MEMORANDUM-CIRCULAR NO. 86-02
2. That newly elected KB Federation Presidents, without their respective authenticated appointments
from the president, cannot, in any way, represent their associations in any sangguniang
bayan/sangguniang panlalawigan, as the case may be, although they are still considered presidents of
their federations by virtue of the July 1985 elections.
MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 86-17
It is informed, however, that until replaced by the Office of the President or by this Ministry the
appointive members of the various Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panlunsod, and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall continue to hold office and to receive compensation due them under existing laws,
rules and regulations.
The pertinent provisions of the Freedom Constitution and the implementing MILG Circulars
virtually confirmed the right of incumbent KB Federation Presidents to hold and maintain their
positions until duly replaced either by the President herself or by the Interior Ministry. Explicit therein
was the caveat that newly elected KB Federation Presidents could not assume the right to represent
their respective associations in any Sanggunian unless their appointments were authenticated by then
President Aquino herself. Truly, prudence impelled Mayor Lecaroz to take the necessary steps to verify
the legitimacy of Red's appointment to the Sanggunian.
Third. Petitioners presented six (6) certified copies of opinions of the Secretaries of Justice of
Presidents Macapagal, Marcos and Aquino concerning the doctrine of holdover. This consistently
expressed the view espoused by the executive branch for more than thirty (30) years that the mere
fixing of the term of office in a statute without an express prohibition against holdover is not indicative
of a legislative intent to prohibit it, in light of the legal principle that just as nature abhors a vacuum so
does the law abhor a vacancy in the government.[23] Reliance by petitioners on these opinions, as well
as on the pertinent directives of the then Ministry of Interior and Local Government, provided them
with an unassailable status of good faith in holding over and acting on such basis; and,
Fourth. It is difficult to accept that a person, particularly one who is highly regarded and
respected in the community, would deliberately blemish his good name, and worse, involve his own
son in a misconduct for a measly sum ofP23,675.00, such as this case before us. As aptly deduced by
Justice Del Rosario[24]
If I were to commit a crime, would I involve my son in it? And if I were a town mayor, would I ruin my
name for the measly sum of P1,894.00 a month? My natural instinct as a father to protect my own son
and the desire, basic in every man, to preserve one's honor and reputation would suggest a resounding
NO to both questions. But the prosecution ventured to prove in these thirteen cases that precisely
because they were father and son and despite the relatively small amount involved, accused Mayor
Francisco Lecaroz conspired with Lenlie Lecaroz to falsify several municipal payrolls for the purpose of
swindling their own town of the amount of P1,894.00 a month, and the majority has found them
guilty. I find discomfort with this verdict basically for the reason that there was no criminal intent on
their part to falsify any document or to swindle the government.
The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good
faith.[25] In Cabungcal v. Cordova[26] we affirmed the doctrine that an erroneous interpretation of the
meaning of the provisions of an ordinance by a city mayor does not amount to bad faith that would
entitle an aggrieved party to damages against that official. We reiterated this principle in Mabutol v.
Pascual[27] which held that public officials may not be liable for damages in the discharge of their official
functions absent any bad faith. Sanders v. Veridiano II[28] expanded the concept by declaring that under
the law on public officers, acts done in the performance of official duty are protected by the
presumption of good faith.
In ascribing malice and bad faith to petitioner Mayor Lecaroz, the Sandiganbayan cited two (2)
circumstances which purportedly indicated criminal intent. It pointed out that the name of accused
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Lenlie Lecaroz was not in the municipal payroll for the first quincena of 1986 which meant that his term
had finally ended, and that the reinstatement of Lenlie Lecaroz by Mayor Francisco Lecaroz in the
payroll periods from 15 January 1986 and thereafter for the next twelve and a half (12 -1/2) months was
for no other purpose than to enable him to draw salaries from the municipality.[29] There is however no
evidence, documentary or otherwise, that Mayor Francisco Lecaroz himself caused the name of Lenlie
Lecaroz to be dropped from the payroll for the first quincena of January 1986. On the contrary, it is
significant that while Lenlie Lecaroz' name did not appear in the payroll for the first quincena of January
1986, yet, in the payroll for the next quincenaaccused Lenlie Lecaroz was paid for both the first and
second quincenas, and not merely for the second half of the month which would have been the case if
he was actually "dropped" from the payroll for the first fifteen (15) days and then "reinstated" in the
succeeding payroll period, as held by the court a quo.
From all indications, it is possible that the omission was due to the inadequate documentation
of Red's appointment to and assumption of office, or the result of a mere clerical error which was later
rectified in the succeeding payroll. This however cannot be confirmed by the evidence at hand. But
since a doubt is now created about the import of such omission, the principle of equipoise should
properly apply. This rule demands that all reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not a
crime should be resolved in favor of the accused. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction.[30]
Petitioners have been convicted for falsification of public documents through an untruthful
narration of facts under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised Penal Code. For the offense to be established,
the following elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a document statements in a narration
of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts
narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and, (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts
was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
The first and third elements of the offense have not been established in this case. In approving
the payment of salaries to Lenlie Lecaroz, Mayor Francisco Lecaroz signed uniformly-worded
certifications thus -
I hereby certify on my official oath that the above payroll is correct, and that the services above stated
have been duly rendered. Payment for such services is also hereby approved from the appropriations
indicated.
When Mayor Lecaroz certified to the correctness of the payroll, he was making not a narration
of facts but a conclusion of law expressing his belief that Lenlie Lecaroz was legally holding over as
member of the Sanggunian and thus entitled to the emoluments attached to the position. This is an
opinion undoubtedly involving a legal matter, and any "misrepresentation" of this kind cannot
constitute the crime of false pretenses.[31] In People v. Yanza[32] we ruled -
Now then, considering that when defendant certified she was eligible for the position, she practically
wrote a conclusion of law which turned out to be inexact or erroneous - not entirely groundless - we
are all of the opinion that she may not be declared guilty of falsification, specially because the law
which she has allegedly violated (Art. 171, Revised Penal Code, in connection with other provisions),
punishes the making of untruthful statements in a narration of facts - emphasis on facts x x x x
Unfortunately, she made a mistake of judgment; but she could not be held thereby to have
intentionally made a false statement of fact in violation of Art. 171 above-mentioned.
The third element requiring that the narration of facts be absolutely false is not even adequately
satisfied as the belief of Mayor Francisco Lecaroz that Lenlie Lecaroz was a holdover member of the
Sanggunian was not entirely bereft of basis, anchored as it was on the universally accepted doctrine of
holdover. La mera inexactitude no es bastante para integrar este delito.[33] If the statements are not
altogether false, there being some colorable truth in them, the crime of falsification is deemed not to
have been committed.
Finally, contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan, we hold that conspiracy was not proved in
this case. The court a quo used as indication of conspiracy the fact that the accused Mayor certified the
payrolls authorizing payment of compensation to his son Lenlie Lecaroz and that as a consequence
thereof the latter collected his salaries. These are not legally acceptable indicia, for they are the very
same acts alleged in the Informations as constituting the crime of estafa through falsification. They
cannot qualify as proof of complicity or unity of criminal intent. Conspiracy must be established
separately from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable
doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together
however, the evidence must reasonably be strong enough to show community of criminal design.[34]
Perhaps subliminally aware of the paucity of evidence to support it, and if only to buttress its
finding of conspiracy, the Sandiganbayan stressed that the two accused are father and son. Granting
that this is not even ad hominem, we are unaware of any presumption in law that a conspiracy exists
simply because the conspirators are father and son or related by blood.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of 7 October 1994 and Resolution
of 1 October 1997 of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioners FRANCISCO M.
LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ are ACQUITTED of all the thirteen (13) counts of estafa through
falsification of public documents (Crim. Cases Nos. 13904-13916). The bail bonds posted for their
provisional liberty are cancelled and released. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109455 November 11, 1993
RAUL A. GALAROSA, in his capacity as incumbent President and Representative of the Association of
Barangay Captains of the Municipality of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EUDARLIO B. VALENCIA, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Branch 52, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SORSOGON; and RODOLFO SALAY, respondents.
Villanueva, Bernardo & Gabionza for petitioner.
Elizalde D. Diaz for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
At the hub of the present controversy is Section 494 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, which provides as follows:
Sec. 494. Ex officio Membership in Sanggunians. The duly elected presidents of
the Liga [ng mga Barangay] at the municipal, city and provincial levels, including
the component cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, shall serve as ex-
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officio members of the sanggunian bayan, sanggunian panglunsod, and
sanggunian panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as such only during their
term of office as presidents of the liga chapters, which in no case shall be beyond
the term of office of the sanggunian concerned.
Petitioner Raul A. Galarosa (hereinafter GALAROSA) is the incumbent president of the katipunang
bayan or Association of Barangay Councils (ABC)1 of the municipality of Sorsogon, province of
Sorsogon, and was appointed as a member of the Sanggunian Bayan (SB) of Sorsogon pursuant to
Executive Order No. 342 in relation to Section 146 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the quondam local
government code. The salient issue in this case is whether or not GALAROSA can continue to serve as
a member of the SB beyond 30 June 1992, the date when the term of office of the elective members
of the SB of Sorsogon expired. The respondent Judge ruled that GALAROSA could not; GALAROSA
thinks otherwise and asks us to set aside the decision of the court a quo.
In August 1992, private respondent Rodolfo Lasay (hereinafter LASAY), the incumbent barangay
captain of barangay Gimaloto of the municipality of Sorsogon and an aspirant for the position of
president of the ABC of the said municipality, filed with the court a quo against the public respondent
SB of Sorsogon a petition for declaratory relief and injunction with a prayer for the issuance a
temporary restraining order. LASAY sought the determination by the court of the "appropriate, proper
interpretation of the provision of Sec. 494 of Republic Act No. 7160" and of "whether or not the
President of the Association of Barangay Captains can continue holding office despite the termination
of the Terms of Office of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon on June 30, 1992. 2 He posited the theory
that the term of office of GALAROSA as an ex officio member of the SB of Sorsogon is coterminous
with that, of the said SB which expired on 30 June 1992; hence there was a need for the new election
of an ABC representative. He further alleged that during its session, the SB of Sorsogon accepted and
recognized the participation of GALAROSA over his (LASAY's) protest, allegedly on the basis of the
memorandum of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) allowing the ABC presidents
elected before 30 June 1992 to continue in office until the election of new ones. LASAY then prayed for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the SB of Sorsogon from recognizing
GALAROSA as an ex officio member thereof and from allowing him to participate in its deliberations,
for the holding in abeyance of GALAROSA's salaries, and, after hearing, for a judgment "embodying
the literal interpretation of Sec. 494 of the New Local Government Code to the effect that the term of
office of the ex officio membership to the Sangguniang Bayan of the President; of [the] ABC should in
no case be beyond the term of office of said Sangguniang Bayan." The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 5755.
In its Answer,3 the SB of Sorsogon, represented by the Provincial Prosecutor, asked for the dismissal
of the petition because (a) LASAY "has no legal right to file the petition or the petition "is based on
pure speculative rights," and (b) the petition is premature since the resolution of the issues raised may
still be the subject of rules and regulations to implement Section 494 of the Code.
On 9 September 1992, the trial. court, per respondent Judge Eudarlio B. Valencia issued a temporary
restraining order directing the SB of Sorsogon "to desist from recognizing the participation of the
old Ex officio membership of the President of the Association of Barangay Captains and to hold in
abeyance the taking and/or payment of salaries from the Municipal Government of Sorsogon relative
thereto." 4 It set the hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on 22 September
1992. On the latter date, the court heard LASAY and the SB of Sorsogon. It then issued an order
granting the parties thirty days within which to file their memoranda in support of their respective
positions, after which both the incident on the preliminary injunction and the merits of the case shall
be deemed submitted for decision.5
On 22 October 1992, the respondent Judge issued an order granting the application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond of P40,000.00. 6
On 26 January, 1993, GALAROSA filed with the court a quo an Appearance with Motion to Annul
Injunction order. 7He prayed therein that the 22 October 1992 Order be annulled, that the SB of
Sorsogon be directed to recognize his participation as an ex officio member thereof, that he be allowed
to enjoy all the benefits and emolument's of the and that his appearance be noted.
On 26 February, 1993, the respondent Judge issued an order noting the above pleading of GALAROSA
and directing LASAY to file his "comment and/or opposition thereto" within five days from receipt of a
copy of the said order, after which "the incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution." 8
The trial court never resolved that "incident."
On 24 March 1993, the respondent Judge handed down a decision9 in favor of LASAY, the adjudicatory
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered:
(1) Declaring the incumbent President
of the Association of Barangay
Captains of Sorsogon as without any
further right or legal basis to continue
in office as ex-officio member of the
present Sangguniang Bayan of
Sorsogon pursuant to and
conformably with Section 494 of
Republic Act No, 7160; and
(2) Ordering the respondent
Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon to
cease and desist from recognizing the
participation of the old ex-
officio membership of the President
of the Association of Barangay
Captains of the town of Sorsogon.
In holding for LASAY, the respondent Judge rejected the claim of the SB of Sorsogon that (1) pursuant
to DILG Memorandum Circular No. 92-38 dated 29 June 1992, Section 494 of the Local Government
Code was reconciled with Article 210 (d)(3), Rule XXIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
said Code which provides that incumbent ABC presidents shall continue to serve as ex officio members
of their respective sanggunians unless sooner removed for cause or the new officers shall have been
elected and qualified; (2) LASAY is not the proper party in interest and even if he is, he did not exhaust
all available administrative remedies; and (3) what is involved is a political question which is beyond
the province of the trial court. As to the first, the respondent judge ruled that Article 210 of the Rules
and Regulations does not expressly provide that the term of office of the ABC presidents asex
officio members of the SB shall go beyond the term of the SB concerned; since the term of
the sanggunianconcerned expired on 30 June 1992, it stands to follow that the ex officio membership
of the liga president in the said sanggunian, by express mandate of law, likewise ended on the said
date. As to the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the respondent Judge ruled that it is not
applicable since the issue involved is "purely a legal one". He rejected the "political question" issue by
stating that the interpretation of laws, rules, and regulations is a judicial function and prerogative.
Furthermore, he invoked Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution on the scope of judicial review.
The respondent Judge did not squarely tackle the issue regarding the locus standi of LASAY, although
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he described LASAY as "the incumbent Barangay Captain of Gimaloto . . . a declared aspirant for
President of the [ABC] . . . as well as being a taxpayer claiming direct interest to complain, protest and
seek the proper relief."
Unable to accept the decision, GALAROSA filed this petition which we have decided to treat as one
for certiorariunder Rule 65. He submits therein that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED WHEN HE RULED THAT THE PETITIONER,
DESPITE HIS INCUMBENCY AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
BARANGAY COUNCILS OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON, HAS NO LONGER
ANY LEGAL BASIS OR RIGHT TO HIS EX-OFFICIO MEMBERSHIP IN THE
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON.
We required the respondents to comment on the petition, and on 3 June 1993 we issued a temporary
restraining order directing the respondent Judge to cease and desist from implementing and effecting
the challenged decision.
In his comment, LASAY states that GALAROSA, not being a party to the case before the trial court, has
no right to file the instant petition. LASAY argues that although GALAROSA had filed a motion for
intervention, that pleading was not acted upon by the trial court. As to the merits of the petition, he
asks that we sustain the challenged decision because it is in accord with existing jurisprudence and the
principles of statutory construction; he also avers that Memorandum Circular No. 92-38 of the DILG,
which is relied upon by GALAROSA, violates and contravenes the clear mandate of Section 494 of the
Code which provides that in no case shall the membership of the ex officiomembers of the SB extend
beyond the term of the SB concerned, which ended on 30 June 1992. GALAROSA filed a Reply to this
Comment to which LASAY filed a rejoinder. Not to be out done, the former filed a Sur-rejoinder.
On 14 July 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its comment. While not explicitly saying so, it
asks us to grant the petition and to set aside the challenged decision because there respondent Judge
should have dismissed the action on the following grounds: (a) LASAY failed to present a justiciable
controversy since he is not an ABC president but a mere aspirant thereto, or, elsewise stated, his right
to an ex officio membership in the SB is purely anticipatory; (b) not being an ABC president, LASAY is
not a proper party to assail the ex officio membership of GALAROSA; and (c) the latter, who was to be
directly affected by the petition of LASAY, was not named a party-respondent; in view of this "non-
joinder of proper part[y]," respondent Judge should have dismissed the petition outright pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court.
We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda, which the subsequently complied with.
Before proceeding to the main issue, we will address some issues which the parties have raised, to wit:
(a) the legal personality of LASAY to file the petition for declaratory relief and injunction with the trial
court, (b) the absence of a justiciable controversy, (c) the non-joinder of an indispensable party in the
said petition, and (d) the precipitateness of the trial court's decision.
It must be stressed that the petition filed by LASAY with the trial court is one for declaratory relief and
injunction and not solely for the former. The latter can be either prohibitory or mandatory in character.
LASAY sought to enjoin the SB of Sorsogon from recognizing GALAROSA as an ex officio member of
the SB and from allowing him to participate in its deliberations, and to direct it to hold in abeyance the
payment of GALAROSA's salaries. LASAY brought the action in his capacity as a barangay captain who
is seeking the presidency of the ABC of Sorsogon and in his capacity as a taxpayer. This Court agrees
with GALAROSA and the Office the Solicitor General that with respect to the first, LASAY does have
the legal standing to institute the action for he is a mere aspirant to the presidency of the ABC and his
right thereto is a mere expectancy. We do rule, however, that as a taxpayer he has a sufficient legal
standing, because the injunction he prayed for is founded on what he believed to be an illegal
disbursement of public funds of his municipal government. In this jurisdiction, the strict, rule relative
to the determination of real parties in interest has been sufficiently relaxed to allow a taxpayer to bring
an action to restrain the unlawful disbursement of public funds. 10
We also hold that the requisites for an action for declaratory relief were present, namely: (a) that there
is justiciable controversy, (b) that the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse, (c)
that the party seeking relief has a legal interest in the controversy, and (d) that the issue invoked is ripe
for judicial determination.11 The controversy is whether GALAROSA can continue to serve as a member
of the SB after 30 June 1992. LASAY, as a taxpayer, has the locus standi to have it resolved because a
decision against GALAROSA would mean that he is not entitled to receive his salary and other benefits
as a member of the SB and any such payment to him beyond 30 June 1992 would be illegal.
Nonetheless, the form and nature of the action filed by LASAY required the inclusion of GALAROSA as
an adverse party. It is his right to his office that is challenged and he is the person who would be directly
affected by any decision therein. No final determination of an action can be had unless he is joined
therein. He is therefore, an indispensable party. Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the joinder of indispensable parties iscompulsory; consequently, no action can proceed unless they are
joined. 12 The absence of an indispensable party in a case render ineffectual all the proceedings
subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment. 13LASAY should have been required
to implead GALAROSA and should he fail to do so, the petition should be dismissed. 14 GALAROSA in
fact sought to intervene in the case by filing on 26 January 1993 an "Appearance with Motion to Annul
the Injunction Order." Unfortunately, after it was noted and LASAY was directed to file his "comment
and/or opposition thereto" after which the incident would be submitted for resolution, the respondent
Judge, for reasons known only to him, never did resolve it. Then with undue and precipitate haste, he
rendered the challenged decision on 24 March 1993. That decision must be set aside for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since an indispensable party,
GALAROSA was not effectively impleaded and recognized as a party in the case and given the
opportunity to file a responsive pleading.
A remand of this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the above disquisition
would be the natural course of action to follow. However, considering that the principal issue posed is
purely legal and the pleadings of the parties have exhaustively discussed the main issue and all
collateral matters, the controversy could be forthwith resolved on the basis thereof. The remand of
the case to the trial court would only delay the final disposition of the case and would not serve the
public interest, especially here where our decision would affect all ABC presidents throughout the
country. We have consistently ruled that the remand of a case to a lower court for the reception of
evidence is not necessary if this Court can already resolve the dispute on the basis of the records before
it.15
We shall then take up the core issue.
Section 494 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides for the ex officio membership in the
respective sanggunians of the duly elected presidents of the liga at the municipality, city, and provincial
levels, including the component cities and municipalities of Metro Manila. The liga referred to therein
is the liga ng mga barangay. Section 491 of the Code provides for its creation and purpose:
Sec. 491. Purpose of organization. There shall be an organization of all
barangays to be known as the Liga ng mga Barangay for the primary purpose of
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determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians and for ventilating,
articulating, and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government
administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.
Every barangay is represented in the liga ng mga barangay by the punong barangay, or in his absence or
incapacity, by a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose among its members.16 The principal
aim of the liga ng mga barangay is to promote the development of barangays and secure the general
welfare of their inhabitants.17
The forerunner of the liga ng mga barangay is the katipunan ng mga barangay under Section 108 of B.P.
Blg. 337, which was known as the katipunang bayan in municipalities, katipunang panglungsod in
cities, katipunang panlalawigan in provinces, and katipunan ng mga barangay on the national level.
Each barangay therein was represented by the punong barangay. The katipunang bayan was also
referred to as the Association of Barangay Councils or ABC for short. Pursuant to the first paragraph of
Section 146 of B.P. Blg. 337, the president of the said organization was among the members of
the sangguniang bayan the legislative body of the municipality subject, however, to appointment
by the President of the Philippines. Under Section 110(3) thereof, the term of office of all officers of
the katipunang bayan, including its president, was to be governed by "the by-laws of the organization,
without prejudice, however, to their term of office as member of the sanggunian to which they may be
correspondingly appointed." Section 25 of the By-Laws of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay18 provides
that "the term of office of all officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from the date of their
elections until the next katipunan elections following general barangay elections, subject to the
limitations of Section 4 and the succeeding sections hereof."19
On 7 March, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum Circular No. 51 providing for policy
guidelines on the representation of certain sectors, including the president of the katipunang bayan, in
the legislative bodies of local governments. Then on 28 November 1988 she issued E.O. No. 342
delegating to the Secretary of Local Government the power to appoint certain local offices under
certain sections, including Section 146(1) of B.P. Blg. 337. Thereafter, appointments of the presidents
of the katipunang bayan as members of the sangguniang bayanwere made by the Secretary of Local
Government.
Immediately prior to the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991, the katipunang bayan or ABC
in a municipality was composed of the barangay captains who were elected in the barangay elections
of 28 March 1989 held pursuant to R.A. No. 6679. In the case at bar, it is presumed that GALAROSA was
an elected punong barangay in the municipality of Sorsogon and was later elected president of the ABC
of Sorsogon.
On 7 April 1989, the Department of Local Government issued Circular No. 89-09 providing for the
reorganization of the katipunan ng mga barangays in all levels and prescribing the guidelines for the
election of their officers. Guideline 2.2 thereof on terms of office reads:
The terms of office of all officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from the
date of their election until their successors shall have been duly elected and
qualified, without prejudice, however, to the terms of their appointments as
member of the sanggunian, to which they may be correspondingly appointed.
Accordingly, the president of the katipunang bayan became, after an appointment extended by the
President through the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, a member of the
first sangguniang bayan organized under the 1987 Constitution following the local elections held on 18
January 1988. That GALAROSA was extended such appointment is not disputed.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not explicitly provide that upon its effectivity the katipunan
ng mga barangay under B.P. Blg. 337 automatically became the liga ng mga barangay under the Local
Government Code and that the president of the ABC automatically became the president of the liga
whose term as ex officio member of the first sangguniang bayan under the 1987 Constitution is
coterminous with that of the other regular members of the SB or until 30 June 1992 pursuant to Section
494 of the Local Government Code in relation to Section 2, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution 20 and
Section 5 of R.A. No. 6636.21 Absent such explicitness and considering (1) that the opening clause of
Section 491 is expressed in the future tense such that the liga can only be deemed to exist upon the
effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991 and (2) that Section 494 speaks of "duly elected
presidents of the liga" thereby clearly implying an election after the organization of the liga, the
conclusion to be drawn is that the legislature never intended that Section 494 would apply to the
incumbent presidents of thekatipunang bayan.
In short, there is no indication at all that Section 491 and Section 494 should be given retroactive effect
to adversely affect the presidents of the ABC. They should thus be applied prospectively. There is a
substantive rationale for this. The Local Government Code significantly altered the previous law and
rules relative to the membership of the presidents of the katipunang bayan or the ABC. In the first
place, a prior appointment by the President, as required under Section 110(3) of B.P. Blg. 337 or by him
through the Secretary of Interior and Local Government pursuant to E.O. No. 342, is no longer
necessary. It may be pointed out that B.P. Blg. 337 has been expressly repealed under paragraph (a),
Section 534 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Accordingly, E.O. No. 342 is likewise deemed
repealed either as a consequence thereof or under paragraph (f) of the said section which repeals, inter
alia, executive orders inconsistent with any provisions of the said Code. In the second place, Section
494 specifically provides that the term of office of the liga presidents shall in no case go "beyond the
term of office of the sanggunianconcerned." Consequently, the expiration of their term of office of the
regular members thereof. The section however, does not fix the specific duration of their term
as liga president. This is left to the by-laws of the ligapursuant to Article 211(g) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code (IRR for brevity). It may be recalled that under
R.A. No. 6679, the term of office of the punong barangay elected in the 28 March 1989 election for
barangay officials was five years commencing on 1 May 1989 and ending 31 May 1994. It also provides
that the next regular election of barangay officials shall be on the second Monday of May 1994 and on
the same day every five years thereafter and that their term of office shall begin on the first day of
June following their election and until their successors shall have been elected an qualified. On the
other hand, Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code of 1991 fixes the term of elective barangay
officials at three years which, insofar as those first elected under it are concerned, shall begin "after
the regular election . . . on the second Monday of May 1994.
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the prospective character of Section 494 of the Local Government Code
of 1991, the fact remains that the presidents of the katipunang bayan or ABC who were appointed as
members of thesangguniang bayan by the President through the Secretary of Local Government by
virtue of E.O. No. 342 were appointed to the sangguniang bayan whose regular members were elected
in the 18 January 1988 local elections and whose terms expired on 30 June 1992. It is t be presumed
that they could not have been appointed for a term beyond that of the sangguniang bayan. This is
evident from both Section 110(3) of B.P. Blg. 337 and Circular No. 89-09 of the Department of Local
Government which respectively provide that the term of office of the ABC presidents therein
determined is "without prejudice to their term of office as member of the sanggunian to which they
were accordingly appointed' and "without prejudice however, to the terms on [sic] their appointments
as members of the sanggunian, to which they may be correspondingly be appointed." Accordingly,
while ABC presidents could remain as such after 30 June 1992 because their term of office as ABC
presidents have not yet ended, their term of office as members of the sangguniang bayan has expired.
There is, however, no law which prohibits them from holding over as members of the sangguniang
bayan. On the contrary, the aforementioned IRR, prepared and issued by the Oversight Committee
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upon specific mandate of Section 533 of the Local Government Code, expressly recognizes and grants sanggunian concerned, unless sooner
that hold-over authority to ABC presidents. Pertinent portions of paragraphs (d) and (f), Article 210 of removed for cause, pending the
the IRR read as follows: election of the first set of officials on
the national Liga and local chapters.
Art. 210 Liga ng mga barangay.
3. The election of the first set of
officials of the national Liga and local
xxx xxx xxx
chapters shall be within six (6)
months (not to go beyond March 9,
(d) Ex officio membership in the sanggunian 1993) from ratification by the
National Liga and its constitution and
xxx xxx xxx by-laws.

(3) The incumbent presidents of the 4. The ratification of

municipal, city, and provincial the Liga Constitution and by-laws
chapters of the liga shall continue to shall -be within six (6) months (not to
serve as ex officio members of go beyond September 9, 1992) from
the sanggunianconcerned until the the promulgation of the
expiration of their term of office, Implementing Rules and Regulation
unless sooner revoked for cause. (IRR) of the Local Government Code
on March 9, 1992.

xxx xxx xxx

And on 29 June 1992, the DILG issued Memorandum Circular No. 92-38 which reads as follows:

(f) Organizational structure

(l) . . . . Pending election of the presidents of the municipal, city, provincial, and
metropolitan chapters of the liga, the incumbent presidents of the association of
barangay councils in the municipality, city, province, and Metropolitan Manila
shall continue to act as presidents of the corresponding liga chapters under this
Rule.
In view of the numerous issues and concerns reaching this Department
requesting for a clarificatory ruling regarding the term of office of the incumbent
ABC Presidents as ex-officio members of the respective sanggunian pending the
reorganization and election of the new liga chapter, the following guidelines are
hereby promulgated for the guidance and reference of all concerned:
Section 494 Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160)

This was further elaborated in an unnumbered Circular of the DILG dated 15 June 1992 on the subject
"Clarifying the Term of Office of Liga Chapter Presidents (ABC) as Members of the Sanggunian which The duly elected presidents of the liga at the municipal, city
reads: and provincial levels, including the component cities and
municipalities of Metro Manila, shall serve as ex
officio members of the sangguniang bayan, sangguniang
In order to clarify issues arising from various interpretations of pertinent panglunsod [and] sangguniang panlalawigan, respectively.
provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 and the Implementing Rules They shall serve as such only during their term of office as
and Regulations relative to the term of office of the Liga chapter presidents as presidents of theliga chapters which in no case shall be
members of the sanggunian, the following guidelines are hereby issued. beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned.

1. The incumbent presidents of the
ABC at the municipal, city, province
and Metropolitan Manila shall
continue [sic] to act as presidents of
the corresponding Liga chapters.
2. To ensure continued
representation of the barangay in the
sanggunian, they shall continue to
serve as ex-officio members of the
Article 210 (d) (3), Rule XXIX of the IRR
The incumbent presidents of the municipal, city and
provincial chapters of the Liga shall continue to serve as ex
officio members of the sanggunian concerned until the
expiration of their term of office, unless sooner removed
for cause.
The aforequoted provisions of the Code and its IRR clearly provide that upon the
cessation from office of the elective sanggunian members, these ex-
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officio members shall likewise cease to hold office upon the election and Costs against private respondent Rodolfo Lasay.
qualification of their successors since they cannot serve beyond the end of the
term of office of the elective members (See Laspinas vs. Santos, G.R. No. 83520,
SO ORDERED.
June 23, 1988; Cadugon vs. Singuat-Guerra, G.R. No. 85884, March 9, 1989).

Be that as it may, following the generally accepted principle that laws shall have
prospective effect unless the contrary if expressly provided (Section 19, Chapter
5, Introductory Provisions, Administrative Code of 1987), the applicability of the
aforequoted provisions does not contemplate of the incumbent sanggunian
members, appointive or elective. [G.R. No. 118883. January 16, 1998]

This principle is buttressed by Article 210 (f), Rule XXIX of the IRR which declares,
in part, the "pending election of the presidents of the municipal, city, provincial,
and metropolitan chapters of the liga, the incumbent presidents of the
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES, CATANDUANES, Represented by VICE MAYOR NENITO
association of barangay councils in the municipality, city, province, and
AQUINO and MAYOR LYDIA T. ROMANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AUGUSTO
Metropolitan Manila shall continue to act as presidents of the corresponding liga
T. ANTONIO, respondents.
chapters under this Rule.

DECISION
xxx xxx xxx
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The application of the hold-over doctrine in both the aforementioned provisions of the IRR and the
issuances of the DILG should be upheld. The rule is settled that unless " "holding over be expressly or Although a resignation is not complete without an acceptance thereof by the proper authority,
impliedly prohibited, the incumbent may continue to hold over until some one else is elected and an office may still be deemed relinquished through voluntary abandonment which needs no
qualified to assume the office." 22 This rule is demanded by the most obvious must requirements of acceptance.
public policy, for without it there must frequently be cases where, from a failure to elect or a refusal or
neglect to qualify, the office would be vacant and the public service entirely suspended." 23 Otherwise
stated, the purpose is to prevent the hiatus in the government pending the time when the successor
may be chosen and inducted into office.24 Section 494 of the Local Government Code could not have Statement of the Case
been intended to allow a gap in the representation of the barangays, through the presidents of the
ABC, in thesanggunian. Since the term of office of the punong barangays elected in the 28 March 1989
election and the term of office of the presidents of the ABC have not yet expired and taking into
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the
account the special role conferred upon and the broader powers and functions invested in the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] promulgated on January 31, 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34158, which
barangays by the Code as a basic political unit, a primary planning and implementing unit of
modified the Decision dated February 18, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court [3] of Virac, Catanduanes,
government policies in the community, and as forum wherein the collective views of the people may
Branch 42, in Sp. Civil Case No. 1654.
be expressed and considered and where disputes may be amicably settled, 25 it would be in harmony
with sound logic to infer that the Code never intended to deprive the barangays of their representation The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision of the appellate court reads:
in thesangguniang bayan during the interregnum when the liga has yet to be formally organized with
the election of its officers.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED such that paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 thereof
are deleted. Paragraph 3 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.[4]
Besides, the promulgation of the IRR by the Oversight Committee and the pertinent issues of the DILG
are in the nature of executive construction and are thus entitled to great weight and respect by the
Court,26 especially that of the former since the composition of the Oversight Committee includes six
Members of Congress of the Philippines three Senators, one of whom was the Chairman of the Antecedent Facts
Senate Committee on Local Government, and three Congressmen, one of whom was the Chairman of
the House Committee on Local Government who are presumed to know the intent of the law.
Private Respondent Augusto T. Antonio was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay, San
We therefore hold that GALAROSA, as president of the ABC of Sorsogon, can legally and validly hold Andres, Catanduanes in March 1989. He was later elected president of the Association of Barangay
over as a member of the sangguniang bayan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, until the election of the first set of Councils (ABC)[5] for the Municipality of San Andres, Catanduanes. In that capacity and pursuant to the
officers of the liga ng mga barangay, unless he is sooner removed for cause. Local Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the President as member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of San Andres.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the decision of the
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 5575 of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
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Meanwhile, then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Interior and Local Government province and Metropolitan Manila, shall continue to act as president of the corresponding liga chapters
(DILG) declared the election for the president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Councils under this Rule.
(FABC) of the same province, in which private respondent was a voting member, void for want of a
quorum. Hence, a reorganization of the provincial council became necessary. Conformably, the DILG
In view of the foregoing, considering that the annuled designation is only an additional duty to your
secretary designated private respondent as a temporary member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
primary function, which is the ABC President, we find no legal obstacle if you re-assume your
the Province of Catanduanes, effective June 15, 1990.
representation in thesanggunian bayan as ex-officio member.[16]
In view of his designation, private respondent resigned as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan. He tendered his resignation[6] dated June 14, 1990 to Mayor Lydia T. Romano of San Andres, Despite this clarification, the local legislative body issued another resolution[17] reiterating its
Catanduanes, with copies furnished to the provincial governor, the DILG and the municipal previous stand.
treasurer. Pursuant to Section 50 of the 1983 Local Government Code[7] (B.P. Blg. 337), Nenito F.
Aquino, then vice-president of the ABC, was subsequently appointed by the provincial governor as In response to private respondents request,[18] Director Montesa opined that Antonio did not
member of the Sangguniang Bayan[8] in place of private respondent. Aquino assumed office on July 18, relinquish or abandon his office; and that since he was the duly elected ABC president, he could re-
1990 after taking his oath.[9] assume his position in the Sanggunian.[19] A copy of said reply was sent to the members of the local
legislative body.
Subsequently, the ruling of DILG Secretary Santos annulling the election of the FABC president
was reversed by the Supreme Court in Taule vs. Santos.[10] In the same case, the appointment of Private Notwithstanding, the Sanggunian refused to acknowledge the right of private respondent to re-
Respondent Antonio as sectoral representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was declared void, assume office as sectoral representative.
because he did not possess the basic qualification that he should be president of the federation of
barangay councils.[11] This ruling of the Court became final and executory on December 9, 1991. On December 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order before the RTC. On February 18, 1994, the
On March 31, 1992, private respondent wrote to the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San trial court rendered its decision holding that Augusto T. Antonios resignation from the Sangguniang
Andres advising them of his re-assumption of his original position, duties and responsibilities as sectoral Bayan was ineffective and inoperative, since there was no acceptance thereof by the proper
representative[12] therein. In response thereto, the Sanggunian issued Resolution No. 6, Series of 1992, authorities. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
declaring that Antonio had no legal basis to resume office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.[13]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and
On August 13, 1992, private respondent sought from the DILG a definite ruling relative to his right
against the respondents and ordering the latter:
to resume his office as member of the Sangguniang Bayan.[14] Director Jacob F. Montesa, department
legal counsel of the DILG, clarified Antonios status in this wise:
(1) to pay the petitioner jointly and severally the amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees
and the cost of the suit;
Having been elected President of the ABC in accordance with the Departments Memorandum Circular
No. 89-09,[15] you became an ex-officio member in the sanggunian. Such position has not been vacated
inasmuch as you did not resign nor abandon said office when you were designated as temporary (2) to allow petitioner to assume his position as sectoral representative of
representative of the Federation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes on June 7, 1990. The the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes;
Supreme Court in Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees (192 SCRA 327), declared that:
designation implies temporariness. Thus, to designate a public officer to another position may mean
(3) to pay the petitioner jointly and severally his uncollected salaries similar to those
to vest him with additional duties while he performs the functions of his permanent office. In some
received by the other members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres,
cases, a public officer may be designated to a position in an acting capacity as when an undersecretary
Catanduanes as certified to by the Municipal Budget Officer and Municipal
is designated to discharge the functions of the Secretary pending the appointment of a permanent
Treasurer of the same municipality from April 8, 1992 up to the date of this
Secretary.
judgment; and

Furthermore, incumbent ABC presidents are mandated by the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
(4) declaring Resolution No[s]. 7 & 28 series of 1992 null and void and to have no effect.[20]
1991 Local Government Code to continue to act as president of the association and to serve as ex-officio
members of the sangguniang bayan, to wit:
Petitioners appealed this judgment to the Court of Appeals.
Article 210 (d) (3), Rule XXIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 7160, provides
that:
Appellate Courts Ruling
The incumbent presidents of the municipal, city and provincial chapters of the liga shall continue to
serve as ex-officio members of the sanggunian concerned until the expiration of their term of office,
unless sooner removed for cause. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling but deleted the first, second and
fourth paragraphs of its dispositive portion. It held that private respondents resignation was not
(f) x x x Pending election of the presidents of the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan chapters accepted by the proper authority, who is the President of the Philippines. While the old Local
of the liga, the incumbent presidents of the association of barangay councils in the municipality, city, Government Code is silent as to who should accept and act on the resignation of any member of the
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Sanggunian, the law vests in the President the power to appoint members of the local legislative
unit. Thus, resignations must be addressed to and accepted by him. It added that, though the secretary
of the DILG is the alter ego of the President and notice to him may be considered notice to the
President, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that the DILG secretary received and
accepted the resignation letter of Antonio.
Moreover, granting that there was complete and effective resignation, private respondent was
still the president of the ABC and, as such, he was qualified to sit in the Sangguniang Bayan in an ex
officio capacity by virtue of Section 494[21] of R.A. 7160[22] and Memorandum Circular No. 92-38.[23] In
view, however, of the May 1994 elections in which a new set of barangay officials was elected, Antonios
reassumption of office as barangay representative to the Sangguniang Bayan was no longer legally
feasible.
The appellate court added that private respondent could not be considered to have abandoned
his office. His designation as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was merely temporary and not
incompatible with his position as president of the ABC of San Andres, Catanduanes.
Finally, Respondent Court deleted the award of attorneys fees for being without basis, and held
that Resolution Nos. 6 and 28 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres involved a valid exercise of the
powers of said local body. It thus modified the trial courts judgment by affirming paragraph 3 and
deleting the other items. Unsatisfied, petitioners brought the present recourse.[24]
Issues
The petitioner, in its memorandum,[25] submits before this Court the following issues:
I. Whether or not respondents resignation as ex-officio member of Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan ng
San Andres, Catanduanes is deemed complete so as to terminate his official relation thereto;
II. Whether or not respondent had totally abandoned his ex-officio membership in Petitioner
Sangguniang Bayan;
III. Whether or not respondent is entitled to collect salaries similar to those received by other members
of Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan from April 8, 1992 up to date of judgment in this case by the Regional
Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes.[26]
In sum, was there a complete and effective resignation? If not, was there an abandonment of
office?
This Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious. Although the terms of office of barangay captains, including private
respondent, elected in March 1989 have expired, the Court deemed it necessary to resolve this case,
as the Court of Appeals had ordered the payment of the uncollected salaries allegedly due prior to the
expiration of Respondent Antonios term.
First Issue: Validity of Resignation
The petitioner submits that the resignation of private respondent was valid and effective despite
the absence of an express acceptance by the President of the Philippines. The letter of resignation was
submitted to the secretary of the DILG, an alter ego of the President, the appointing authority. The
acceptance of respondents resignation may be inferred from the fact that the DILG secretary himself
appointed him a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes.[27]
In Ortiz vs. COMELEC,[28] we defined resignation as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by
which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of the
incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish
the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete and
operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term;
(b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.[29] The last one is required
by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.[30]
The records are bereft of any evidence that private respondents resignation was accepted by
the proper authority. From the time that he was elected as punong barangay up to the time he resigned
as a member of Sangguniang Bayan, the governing law was B.P. 337 or the Local Government Code of
1983. While said law was silent as to who specifically should accept the resignation of an appointive
member of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sec. 6 of Rule XIX of its implementing rules states that the
[r]esignation of sanggunian members shall be acted upon by the sanggunian concerned, and a copy of
the action taken shall be furnished the official responsible for appointing a replacement and the
Ministry of Local Government. The position shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance of the
resignation.
It is not disputed that private respondents resignation letter was addressed only to the
municipal mayor of San Andres, Catanduanes. It is indicated thereon that copies were furnished the
provincial governor, the municipal treasurer and the DILG. Neither the mayor nor the officers who had
been furnished copies of said letter expressly acted on it. On hindsight, and assuming arguendo that
the aforecited Sec. 6 of Rule XIX is valid and applicable, the mayor should have referred or endorsed
the latter to the Sangguniang Bayan for proper action. In any event, there is no evidence that the
resignation was accepted by any government functionary or office.
Parenthetically, Section 146 of B.P. Blg. 337 states:
Sec. 146. Composition. - (1) The sangguniang bayan shall be the legislative body of the municipality and
shall be composed of the municipal mayor, who shall be the presiding officer, the vice-mayor, who shall
be the presiding officer pro tempore, eight members elected at large, and the members appointed by
the President consisting of the president of the katipunang bayan and the president of the kabataang
barangay municipal federation. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory provisions as to
whom they should be submitted, should be tendered to the appointing person or body. [31] Private
respondent, therefore, should have submitted his letter of resignation to the President or to his alter
ego, the DILG secretary. Although he supposedly furnished the latter a copy of his letter, there is no
showing that it was duly received, much less, that it was acted upon. The third requisite being absent,
there was therefore no valid and complete resignation.
Second Issue: Abandonment of Office
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While we agree with Respondent Court that the resignation was not valid absent any acceptance
thereof by the proper authority, we nonetheless hold that Private Respondent Antonio has effectively
relinquished his membership in the Sangguniang Bayan due to his voluntary abandonment of said post.
Abandonment of an office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the
holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof.[32] Indeed, abandonment
of office is a species of resignation; while resignation in general is a formal
relinquishment, abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser.[33] Nonuser refers to a
neglect to use a privilege or a right (Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.) or to exercise an easement or
an office (Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed.).
Abandonment springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. [34] Its
concomitant effect is that the former holder of an office can no longer legally repossess it even by
forcible reoccupancy.[35]
Clear intention to abandon should be manifested by the officer concerned. Such intention may
be express or inferred from his own conduct.[36] Thus, the failure to perform the duties pertaining to
the office must be with the officers actual or imputed intention to abandon and relinquish the
office.[37] Abandonment of an office is not wholly a matter of intention; it results from a complete
abandonment of duties of such a continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment. [38] Therefore,
there are two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and, second, an overt
or external act by which the intention is carried into effect. [39]
Petitioner argues that the following clearly demonstrate private respondents abandonment of
his post in the Sangguniang Bayan:
Admittedly, the designation of respondent as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Catanduanes was worded temporary, but his acts more than clearly established his intention to totally
abandon his office, indicating an absolute relinquishment thereof. It bears to emphasize that
respondent actually tendered his resignation and subsequently accepted an ex-officio membership in
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes. He performed his duties and functions of said office
for almost two (2) years, and was completely aware of the appointment and assumption on July 18,
1990 of Nenito F. Aquino, who was then Vice-President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC)
of San Andres, Catanduanes, as ex-officio member of petitioner Sangguniang Bayan representing the
ABC.
xxxxxxxxx
Moreover, it may be well-noted that ABC Vice President Nenito Aquino assumed respondents former
position for twenty (20) months, without him questioning the term of office of the former if indeed
respondents designation as ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was only
temporary. Likewise, for almost eight (8) months after knowledge of the decision in Taule vs. Santos,
et. al., Ibid., nullifying his designation as representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, respondent
opted to remain silent, and in fact failed to seasonably act for the purpose of reassuming his former
position. Evidently, respondent had clearly abandoned his former position by voluntary relinquishment
of his office through non-user.[40] [Underscoring supplied.]
We agree with petitioner. Indeed, the following clearly manifest the intention of private
respondent to abandon his position: (1) his failure to perform his function as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan, (2) his failure to collect the corresponding remuneration for the position, (3) his
failure to object to the appointment of Aquino as his replacement in the Sangguniang Bayan, (4) his
prolonged failure to initiate any act to reassume his post in the Sangguniang Bayan after the Supreme
Court had nullified his designation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On the other hand, the following overt acts demonstrate that he had effected his intention: (1)
his letter of resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan;[41] (2) his assumption of office as member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, (3) his faithful discharge of his duties and functions as member of said
Sanggunian, and (4) his receipt of the remuneration for such post.
It must be stressed that when an officer is designated to another post, he is usually called upon
to discharge duties in addition to his regular responsibilities. Indeed, his additional responsibilities are
prescribed by law to inhere, as it were, to his original position. A Supreme Court justice, for instance,
may be designated member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. In some cases, a public
officer may be designated to a position in an acting capacity, as when an undersecretary is tasked to
discharge the functions of a secretary for a temporary period.[42] In all cases, however, the law does
not require the public servant to resign from his original post. Rather, the law allows him to
concurrently discharge the functions of both offices.
Private respondent, however, did not simultaneously discharge the duties and obligations of
both positions. Neither did he, at that time, express an intention to resume his office as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan.His overt acts, silence, inaction and acquiescence, when Aquino succeeded him to
his original position, show that Antonio had abandoned the contested office. His immediate and
natural reaction upon Aquinos appointment should have been to object or, failing to do that, to file
appropriate legal action or proceeding. But he did neither. It is significant that he expressed his
intention to resume office only on March 31, 1992, after Aquino had been deemed resigned on March
23, 1992, and months after this Court had nullified his designation on August 12, 1991. From his passivity,
he is deemed to have recognized the validity of Aquinos appointment and the latters discharge of his
duties as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
In all, private respondents failure to promptly assert his alleged right implies his loss of interest
in the position. His overt acts plainly show that he really meant his resignation and understood its
effects. As pointed out by the eminent American commentator, Mechem:[43]
Public offices are held upon the implied condition that the officer will diligently and faithfully execute
the duties belonging to them, and while a temporary or accidental failure to perform them in a single
instance or during a short period will not operate as an abandonment, yet if the officer refuses or
neglects to exercise the functions of the office for so long a period as to reasonably warrant the
presumption that he does not desire or intend to perform the duties of the office at all, he will be held
to have abandoned it, not only when his refusal to perform was wilful, but also where, while he
intended to vacate the office, it was because he in good faith but mistakenly supposed he had no right
to hold it.
Lastly, private respondent, who remained ABC president, claims the legal right to be a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan by virtue of Section 146 of B.P. Blg. 337. However, his right thereto is not
self-executory, for the law itself requires another positive act -- an appointment by the President or the
secretary of local government per E.O. 342.[44] What private respondent could have done in order to be
able to reassume his post after Aquinos resignation was to seek a reappointment from the President
or the secretary of local government. By and large, private respondent cannot claim an absolute right
to the office which, by his own actuations, he is deemed to have relinquished. [45]
We reiterate our ruling in Aparri vs. Court of Appeals: [46]
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit
of the public x x x. The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural
right. It exists, when it exists at all, only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly
creating and conferring it x x x. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or
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even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its
salary x x x.
Third Issue: Salary
Having ruled that private respondent had voluntarily abandoned his post at the Sangguniang
Bayan, he cannot be entitled to any back salaries. Basic is the no work, no pay[47] rule. A public officer
is entitled to receive compensation for services actually rendered for as long as he has the right to the
office being claimed.[48] When the act or conduct of a public servant constitutes a relinquishment of his
office, he has no right to receive any salary incident to the office he had abandoned.[49]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON
GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO
B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
[G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada
alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the
President. The warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the
constitutional issues embedded on the parties dispute. While the significant issues are many, the
jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the
President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some (10) million Filipinos voted for
the petitioner believing he would rescue them from lifes adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent
were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that
slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4,
2000. Ilocos Sur Governos, Luis Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.[1]
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator
Teofisto Guingona Jr, then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege
speech entitled I Accuse. He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money
from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took
from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege
speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then
headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato
Cayetano) for joint investigation.[2]
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security,
then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On
the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor
spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal
Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking
petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern. [3] Two days
later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the
resignation of the petitioner.[4] Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino
also demanded that the petitioner take the supreme self-sacrifice of resignation.[5] Former President
Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services[6] and later asked for petitioners
resignation.[7] However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of
Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister
Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.[8] On November 2, Secretary Mar
Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry.[9] On November 3, Senate President
Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected
from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.[10]
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House
Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment[11] signed by 115 representatives, or more than
1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions
in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate
President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentabella.[12] On November 20, the Senate
formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as
judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.[13]
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment
trial started.[14] the battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal
profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and
Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib
Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by
a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor
General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former
Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose
Flamiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty.
Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest
viewing rating. Its high and low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering
classes. The dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior
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vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada
when he affixed the signature Jose Velarde on documents involving a P500 million investment
agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.[15]
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines.[28] At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang
Palace.[29] He issued the following press statement:[30]

After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of
Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the 20 January 2001
prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioners Secretary of Finance took
the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. STATEMENT FROM
Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.[16] Then came the fateful day of January 16, when
by a vote of 11-10[17] the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelop which allegedly
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name
Jose Velarde. The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator
Pimentel resigned as Senate President.[18] The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish
senators. to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their
collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the
impeachment tribunal.[19] Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the
impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of
resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.[20]
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for
the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our
people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from
any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioners resignation. A 10- I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino reconciliation and solidarity.
Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the peoples solidarity in
demanding petitioners resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila
to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people.[21]
MABUHAY!
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the
petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At
3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:[31]
of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.[22] In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and
Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that on behalf
of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that Sir:
we are withdrawing our support to this government.[23] A little later, PNP Chief, Director General
Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement. [24] Some By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and
their posts.[25] Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the
highly controversial second envelop.[26] There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a
tsunami. (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for
the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacaangs Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive
Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political
Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the
presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by
now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary
of Justice Hernando Perez.[27] Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between
pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The
negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would
administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m., on January 20.[32] Another
copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at
9:00 p.m.[33]
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged
the powers and duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution
in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
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A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office
as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of
Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines,
addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which
request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the
authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January
20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that maybe filed by a
proper party.
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special
envoys.[34] Recognition of respondent Arroyos government by foreign governments swiftly
followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d honneurat Malacaang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic
Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the
government of respondent Arroyo.[35] US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone
call from the White House conveying US recognition of her government. [36]
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives.[37] The House then passed Resolution No. 175 expressing the full support of the House
of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines.[38] It also approved Resolution No. 176 expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President
of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the nations goals under the Constitution.[39]
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.[40] A few days
later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising Ban and Fair Election Practices Act.[41]
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice
President.[42] the next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the
nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.[43] Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and
John Osmea voted yes with reservations, citing as reason therefore the pending challenge on the
legitimacy of respondent Arroyos presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-
Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.[44] The House of Representatives also approved Senator
Guingonas nomination in Resolution No. 178.[45] Senator Guingona took his oath as Vice President two
(2) days later.[46]
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court
is functus officio and has been terminated.[47] Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated for the record
that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed
to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada
was still qualified to run for another elective post.[48]
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyos public acceptance rating
jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.[49] In another survey conducted by
the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide
accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that
President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the
Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by
majorities in all social classes:
58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass, and 54% among the Es or very
poor class.[50]
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in
clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in
motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for
bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious
misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-
1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture,
graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo
Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and
property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28,
2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and
corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to
investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito
P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz:Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol,
Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing
the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting
documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR
No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-
1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office,
until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Thru another
counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment
confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution. Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6,
required the respondents to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February
2001. On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and
the filing of the respondents comments on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15.
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the
hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.,[51] and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban[52] recused themselves
on motion of petitioners counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of
counsel Saguisag that they have compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their
weight on one side but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short
period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press
statement for Gag Order on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738,
the Court resolved:
(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the
office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying
the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being
cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases
at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and
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(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman
from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner
Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent
Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days
after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and
academic.[53]
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed
submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President
on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal
prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still
President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial
publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question
Private respondents[54] raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question,
and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its
embroideries, the cases at bar assail the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration. They stress that
respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her
oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that
she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground
constitute the political thicket which the Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift
the shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by
the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation
of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills constitutional law.[55] In
the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were
spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr,[56] viz:
x x x Prominent on the surface on any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretions; or the impossibility
of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on question.Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there
should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political questions presence. The
doctrine of which we treat is one of political questions, not of political cases.
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a
firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question. [57] Our leading case
is Tanada v. Cuenco,[58] where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that
political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. To a great degree, the 1987
Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of
judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government.[59] Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the thou shalt nots of the Constitution
directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.[60] With the new provision, however, courts are given a
greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the
new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this
intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket.Prominent
of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to x x x
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the
extension thereof x x x.
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A.
Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.[61] and related cases[62] to support their thesis that since
the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a
political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In
the cited cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful
revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom
Constitution[63] declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended. It is
familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power
is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In
checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath
that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.[64] In her oath, she
categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she
is discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is
clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
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government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly
to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the
President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from
it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the
sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to
judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse
on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights
was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the
clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among the
reforms sine quibus non.[65] The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress
in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express
his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the
right of association for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of
the right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively. These fundamental rights
were preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the instruction
to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically
provided that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights
of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. The
guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law,
the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.[66]
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,[67] and
the 1973[68] Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, viz:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
The indispensability of the peoples freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now
self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means
of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and
discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of
society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community
of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus. [69] In this
sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the conflict necessary to
the progress of a society can take place without destroying the society.[70] In Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization,[71] this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus
curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized
that the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk
rather than force; and this means talk for all and by all.[72] In the relatively recent case of
Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,[73]this Court similarly stressed that "... it should be clear even to those with
intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all
should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances
are ciphers.
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably
section 1 of Article II,[74] and section 8[75]of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under
section 11[76] of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity
from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial
publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,[77] the doctrine has been laid down that it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . . Thus,
respondents invocation of the doctrine of political is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political
question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records
of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers
from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when
respondent Arroyo took her oath as president.
The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution
which provides:
Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the
Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President
of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then acts as
President until President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x.
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned
as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the
Republic. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are
beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment.[78] The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to
form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation
before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his
acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on
the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to
follow the succession of events after the expos of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioners alleged misgovernance in the
Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House
of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express
speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of
Representatives. Soon, petitioners powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo
quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and Former Speaker Villar defected with 47
representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his
Secretary of Trade and Industry.
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As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the peoples call for his resignation The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red
intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of
tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their
grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the
I just want to clear my name, then I will go.[88]
countryside like a brush fire.

As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of
the petitioner. The window is provided in the Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the diary of
Executive Secretary Angara serialized in thePhilippine Daily Inquirer.[79] The Angara Diary reveals that
in morning of January 19, petitioners loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at
EDSA, hence, they decided to crate an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At
1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and
exclaimed: Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has
defected.)[80] An hour later or at 2:30, p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential
election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in
May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the
presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators
demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically announced the AFPs withdrawal of
support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of
support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel
to advise petitioner to consider the option ofdignified exit or resignation.[81] Petitioner did nor
disagree but listened intently.[82] The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator
Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the
proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would allowed to go abroad with enough funds to
support him and his family.[83] Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion
for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.[84] At 10:00 p.m., petitioner
revealed to Secretary Angara, Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in
the palace.[85] This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to
resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It
was a matter of time.
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when
he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the
following happened:
Oppositions deal
7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagals spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this
round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled Negotiating Points. It reads:
1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective
on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the
Republic of the Philippines.
2. Beginning today, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new
administration shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice president to various positions and
offices of the government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent
officials concerned.

The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary
Angara and requested, Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (lets cooperate to ensure
a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power.[86]There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara
readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and
orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20
a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the
transition period of five days after the petitioners resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the
petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of
the petitioner.[87] Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed
the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of
the petitioner,viz:
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the
president and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings
account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant
to the request to the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:

xxx
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as
follows:
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses
that he just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to
clear his name. 1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

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2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and The rest of the agreement follows:
property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are
guaranteed freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January
throughout their natural lifetimes.
2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start
orientation activities with incumbent officials.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief
of Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities Vice President (Macapagal).
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security
of the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military
3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate siting as an impeachment court will authorize and police authority Vice President.
the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account
does not belong to President Estrada.
4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national
military and police authorities.
4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the Transition
Period), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing
5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial,
Cabinet officials as part of the orientation program.
the contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to
the President.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under Vice
President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex B
heretofore attached to this agreement.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the
necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance
xxx
thereof.

11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided
awaiting the signature of the United Opposition.
for in Annex A heretofore attached to this agreement.[89]

And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will
Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again
treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken
by the parties during and after the transition period. Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (Why couldnt you wait? What about the
agreement)? I asked.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement which was premised on the resignation of
the petitioner was further refined. It was then signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General
Reyes answered: Wala na, sir (Its over, sir).
Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by
the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara Diary narrates the
fateful events, viz:[90] I asked him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?

xxx And General Reyes answer: Oo nga, i-delete na natin, sir (Yes, were deleting that part).

11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to
effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is
with. I hear voices in the background.
Agreement
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be
effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is
already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the
documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel to Nene Pimentel and General
Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other
side, as it is important that the provision on security, at least, should be respected.

xxx
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I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer
the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The president is too stunned for words.
Final meal
12 noon Gloria takes her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The President is having his final meal at the Presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet
members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the
PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support
for the President.
1 p.m. The Presidents personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada familys personal
possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronie Puno mentions that the President needs to release a final statement before
leaving Malacaang.
The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation
as president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil
society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for
the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our
people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shrik from
any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by
his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the
oath-taking of the respondent as Presidentof the Republic albeit with the reservation about its
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due
to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he
assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of
our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press
release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave of
absence due to his inability to govern. In support of this thesis, the letter dated January 20, 2001 of the
petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the
said letter, viz:
Sir
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and
the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.[91] The pleadings filed by the petitioner
in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the circumstances that led to its
preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during
the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never
referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint
of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino
people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins
of government to respondent Arroyo for the time being. Under any circumstance, however, the
mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press
release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must
prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal
significance. Petitioners resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice
nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. There
is another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance to petitioners letter and this shall
be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he
could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the
petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated from Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was
submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now
stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, reserved
to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public
official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative
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investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire.[92] During the period of amendments, the
following provision was inserted as section 15:
Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under
the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under
this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency.[93]
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second
paragraph of the provision and insisted that the Presidents immunity should extend even after his
tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar to Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed.
Section 15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision
mainly focused on the immunity of the President which was one of the reasons for the veto of the
original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a
public official with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent
of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used
by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or
administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or
prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to
render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right.[94] A public official has the right
not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a
public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or
retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He
cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the
records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the
Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While
these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune
from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked
jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for
it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal
obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that,
under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an
impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative
proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process
already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second
envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There
was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to
perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated,
the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to
Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the
inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant
submittal is that Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the
President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article
VII.[95] This contention is the centerpiece of petitioners stance that he is a President on leave and
respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties
shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers
and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within
five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session,
within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session within
twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and
duties of his office."
That is the law. Now the operative facts:
(1) Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President
and Speaker of the House;
(2) Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20,
2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
(3) Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175;[96]
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176[97]which
states:
RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE
ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS
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PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS
CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS
A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the peoples loss of confidence on the ability of former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine
National Police and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their
recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national
healing and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided,
thus by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of
the individual members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of
Representatives must ensure to the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must
remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the
nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of
national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the
whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrendering its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for
the House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her
Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the
national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its
congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the
Nations goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 178[98] which
states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION
OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the
Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such
vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both
Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence
and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator
of the Philippines - qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the
Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of
the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioners letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of
the Senate signed the following:
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RESOLUTION This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful (Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
change and challenge;
Secretary of the Senate
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of
purpose and resolute cohesive resolute (sic) will;
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83[101] which states:

WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity
RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
despite diversities in perspectives;

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria
officio and has been terminated.
Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge our duties to attain desired changes and overcome the
nations challenges.[99]
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court of Monday, January 15, Tuesday,
January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82[100] which states:

RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION
OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is it vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President due to the assumption to the
Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the second envelope be
transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with
the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of
the Senate President.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such Adopted,
vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
Houses voting separately;

President of the Senate

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Phillippines;
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence, and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism; (Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice. Senator
of the land - which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
Secretary of the Senate
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held
simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the
thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr.
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo
as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition
from any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only
momentary.
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What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that
the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners
claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability
of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco,[102] we hold that this
Court cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an issue in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislative x x x branch of the government. Or to use the language
in Baker vs. Carr,[103] there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it. Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers
and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing
the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made
by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the
respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment
proceedings against him; and second, he enjoysimmunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or
civil.
Before resolving petitioners contentions, a revisit of our legal history on executive immunity will
be most enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In
the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco tiaco and Crossfield,[104] the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese
citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, J.E. Harding
and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively,
for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to
touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will,
unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the
execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly
free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by
the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in
silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the Governor-General, like the judges of the courts and
the members of the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences
of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will,
when the matter is properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the
Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been
deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however
humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the
highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General
personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more that it can a
member of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at
all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from
the discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew
an analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he
acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercise
discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be
protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when
he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty,
in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in
determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the
question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might
honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could
not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, he acts, not as Governor-General but as a
private individual, and, as such, must answer for the consequences of his act.
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity
from suit, viz: x x x. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the
chief executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the
highest officials of the State and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder; resulting
in a way, in a distrust as to the integrity of government itself.[105]
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive
immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos
and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved
executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for
official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this
Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco Professional Chair Lecture entitled, Presidential Immunity And All The
Kings Men: The Law Of Privilege As A Defense To Actions For Damages,[106] petitioners learned counsel,
former Dean of the UP college of Law, Atty. Pacifico Agabin, brightlined the modifications effected by
this constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the
absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only from civil claims but
also from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even
acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as
to include not only the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private
individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were
suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome).
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of
executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by then Member of Parliament, now
Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to
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President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity
as a return to the anachronism the king can do no wrong.[107] The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the
People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not
reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was
given by delegate J. Bernas, viz:[108]
Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the committees omitting in the draft proposal the immunity
provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in
striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit
under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least
the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if
we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as
the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution
was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his
argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout
of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001,
the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court isFunctus
Officio.[109] Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand
that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted,
would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself
for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates
in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become
moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed
against him, viz:[110]
xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the
President, for example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been
rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment
proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his
resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the
criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts.
This is in accord with our ruling in In re: Saturnino Bermudez[111]that incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but
not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the
petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand
as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in
the impeachment proceedings. His reliance in the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan[112] and related
cases[113]are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder
which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that
immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts
of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.[114] Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on
executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v.
Nixon,[115] US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain
recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of
President Nixons associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses
which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washingtons
Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an
unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among
others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and
removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was
rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that when the ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice. In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,[116] the US Supreme Court
further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only official acts. Recently,
the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v.
Jones[117] where it held that the US Presidents immunity from suits for money damages arising out of
their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive
immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is
a public trust.[118] It declared as a state policy that (t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."[119] It ordained
that (p)ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.[120] It set the rule that (t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches or estoppel.[121] It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.[122] It
created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to
"(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.[123] The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.[124] These constitutional
policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioners claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity
from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
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V case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting
the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in
violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the
rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. [125] The British
approach the problem with thepresumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts
readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a
threat.[126] The American approach is different. US courts assume a skepticalapproach about the
potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed
different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong
likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the
trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases.[127] In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,[128] later
reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[129] we laid down the doctrine that:
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like
all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to
a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds
right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the
trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible
to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight
to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the
facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who
is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly
protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are learned in the
law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their
impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v.
Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual
prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his
a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence
presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged
the burden.
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon,
etc.[130] and its companion cases. viz.:
Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the
substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and
oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications
industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended
the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case
continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of
which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents,
their lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media
abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to
the press and public. Inn the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was wisely held:
xxx
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates
conclusively that the time this Nations organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were
conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions
based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public
trials was recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public
protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic
purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is
important that societys criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice, Offutt v. United States, 348
US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such
process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in
centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a
criminal trial under this Nations system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed
2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share
a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning
of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment
can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit
guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials,
that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing
courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was
adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an
independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment
rights with which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where
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the people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their
presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the public the
right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been
recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial
is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which
people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could
be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we
held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at
bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that
attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ
Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed
of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal
investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights
of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear
that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The
length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with
which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no
instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the
ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity. (emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin
the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to
offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.[131] He needs to show more weighty
social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free
decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoingpreliminary investigation by
a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever
has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been
infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has
yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will
be unfavorable to the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with
bias. To quote petitioners submission, the respondent Ombudsman has been influenced by the barrage
of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the
mobs.[132] News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has
already prejudged the cases of the petitioner[133]and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating
the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of
the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court
especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the
presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor
can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent
Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give
investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit
they are reviewable by their superiors.[134] They can be reversed but they can not be compelled to
change their recommendations nor can they be compelled to prosecute cases which they believe
deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot
machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner
and the latter believes that the finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has
the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the hooting throng. The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a
different dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the
call from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the
minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the
right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial
which has been categorized as the most fundamental of all freedoms. [135] To be sure, the duty of a
prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the
restraint against what Lord Bryce calls the impatient vehemence of the majority. Rights in a democracy
are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights
necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not
and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of
government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that it is
wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to mans
progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some peoples
prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1606 December 10, 1978
REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1486 CREATING A SPECIAL COURT TO BE KNOWN AS
"SANDIGANBAYAN" AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, the new Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust and ordains that public
officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people;
WHEREAS, to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees,
Section 5, Article XIII of the New Constitution provides for the creation of a special court to be known
as Sandiganbayan;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in
me vested by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as follows:
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Section 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications; tenure; removal and composition. A special court,
of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice,
to be known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a Presiding Justice and eight
Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President.

No person shall be appointed Presiding Justice or Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan; unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40 years of age and for at least ten years has been a
judge of a court of record or been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held office
requiring admission to the bar as a pre-requisite for a like period.

The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his commission and the other Justices shall have
precedence according to the dates of their respective commissions, or, when the commissions of two
or more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their commissions have been
issued by the President.

The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices shall not be removed from office except on
impeachment upon the grounds and in the manner provided for in Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Article XIII of
the 1973 Constitution.

The Presiding Justice shall receive an annual compensation of P60,000.00 and each Associate Justice
P55,000.00 which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. They shall have the same
rank, privileges and other emoluments, be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and
enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those provided for under existing laws of the Presiding
Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals.

Whenever the salaries of the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals are
increased, such increases in salaries shall be correspondingly extended to and enjoyed by the Presiding
Justice and the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan.

They shall hold office until they reach the age of 65 years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office.