AP, The quest for affordable urban we housing: a study of approaches and results in Harare, Zimbabwe Development Southern Africa Vol 18, No 1, March 2001 Amin Y Kamete! Approaches aimed at achieving housing affordability have long emphasised the housing unit. Conventional wisdom prescribes that affordability will be enhanced if the unit cost of a house is reduced. Classic solutions include the reduction of standards, use of indigenous technologies and materials, adopting self-help modes of delivery and addressing market imperfections. This study shows that while it is not unwise to reduce the cost of housing, there is a limit to this approach. Unit costs cannot be reduced indefinitely and non-cost-reducing strategies are therefore called for. The approaches hinge on improving the economic status of low-income groups by implementing measures that reduce household expenditure and/or boost their incomes. 1. INTRODUCTION Affordability is an important indicator of access to housing, especially by low-income groups in the developing world. Together with suitability, affordability determines how far down the income ladder a project or programme will reach (Kamete, 1994) A simple definition of affordability is ‘ability to pay’ (Davidson & Payne, 1983: 141). ‘This short definition is, at the same time, correct and misleading, the latter because it appears to be a simple matter, which is comprehensible and therefore achievable. The ability to pay for housing — which is here taken to mean shelter and related serv = determines the Success or failure of any strategy aimed at housing the poor. After projects to house the poor should benefit the poor with the minimum inconvenience to them (Kamete, 1994). As far back as the 1960s, it was observed that ‘only a minority can afford to pay the full cost-rent’ (Needleman, 1965: 158). The situation has hardly changed in the modern developing world In Zimbabwe, the constant experimentation with new policies and strategies for achieving affordable housing has been in progress since the start of urbanisation (GSR, 1963; Government of Zimbabwe, 1995). There has been little success, as evidenced by the growing number of families in the low-income sector who cannot afford any of the housing alternatives provided on the market (Rakodi & Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1989) + of ir hove mode it a subi The complexity and chisiveness of affordebility sundy. fn the process it. detihitic ousehulds tu ‘s, @ eee iced hat wiordabie Benen. y ag their copebi'ny ant willing ° implies income; willingness alludes to choice (cf Cotton & Franceys, 1991). I therefore follows that affordability implies that people can and want to spend on housing. The insinuation that households can afford to pay for housing still carries the original perception of ability to pay. This will now be the subject of this article. " Lecturer, Department of Rural and Urban Planning, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe ISSN 0376-835X print/ISSN 1470-3637 online/01/010031-14 © 2001 Development Bank of Southern Africa DOI: 10.1080/0376835012004530 332 AY Kamete 2. FACTORS AFFECTING AFFORDABILITY With respect to the target population, the ability to pay has two sides — external and internal ‘The external factors revolve around the features of the project. In this case, these have to do with the cost of housing. This is the sum of land acquisition, infrastructure, both on and off-site (Renaud, 1987), planning, designing, administration and community facilities (Davidson & Payne, 1983). Other factors affecting project costs are related to the financing of the project and include interest rates, amortisation periods and subsidies. The ii | factors that affect affordability have to do mainly with the socio-economic aaah target group. Beyer (1958: 7) refers to the first set of these as ‘the economic character of the community’. This is defined by employment opportunities, Kinds of occupation and incomes. Expenditure patterns are also an important part of the economic character. The second set of internal factors has to do with the target group's social character. Household sizes, family structures, needs, customs, aspirations and priorities are immortant, as they will determine, to a large extent, the behaviour of the group. In terms of significance, the social character of the community will determine its willingness to pay, whereas the economic character determines ability. This is not to ‘assume that the relationship is so neatly defined. There is an intricate network of influences between social and economic characteristics, where each affects the other, with the result that the allocation of influences proposed here becomes complex and almost incomprehensible. The distinction above has simply been undertaken on the basis of relative significance. 3. MEASURING AFFORDABILITY The definitions adopted for affordability have long influenced its measurement, the most popular of which focuses on income. Beyer (1958: 22) stresses the ‘paramount importance” of the family’s income ‘from the standpoint of home-buying and home maintenance’. The importance of family income is underlined by the fact that employment opportunities and kinds of occupations mentioned above affect the ultimate household income. Indeed, the economic character of the community funda- mentally refers to incomes. Expenditure is normally included in so far as it affects the resultant share of income available for housing (Sumka, 1987). It is not surprising, therefore, that effective demand, which is defined as need backed by the ability to pay, has been closely linked to affordability (see Rakodi, 1992) The most common measurement of affordability is to adopt the oldest methods of assessing effective demand. ,These rule-of-thumb methods assume ‘that urban house- of their income for housing’ (Pakodi, 1999 Various percentages have been mentioned as representing this mysterious proportion ‘These include 25 per cent (Rakodi, 1992), 20 per cent (Davidson & Payne, 1983; Cotton & Franceys, 1991), 15-25 per cent (Davidson & Payne, 1983) and 27,5 per cent (Rakodi & Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1989). The last figure was used by the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing in its housing projects and surveys in Zimbabwe. More recently, owing to the rise in housing costs, this percentage has been raised toAffordable housing in Harare, Zimbabwe 33 30 per cent (Fologwe, 1996). Rakodi & Withers (1995: 198) ‘lend support’ to the Ministry's rule of thumb, at least with respect to owner households. ‘The shortfalls of the method have been widely noted (Rakodi, 1992), the most notable flaw being that it assumes homogeneity among low-income houscholds and silently (and conveniently?) ignores the internal and external factors mentioned above. The economic and social characteristics of the houscholds have, therefore, not been seriously considered and incorporated into this measurement of affordability. Although altemative approaches have been proposed, the rule of thumb still dominates the measurement, but the fixed 25 per cent is now viewed as a ‘benchmark rather than a ceiling’ (Rakodi, 1992: 45). In a study of housing consumption in Harare, Rakodi & Mutizwa-Mangiza (1989: 26) propose a more comprehensive method of estimating ‘the ability of each group ... to consume housing". The assessment looks at two aspects: « The proportion of income available for housing and utilities. + The ability of houscholds to mobilise resources from other sources, including the household itself, the extended family and credit. In terms of income, it is obvious that this approach gives a more realistic picture of the ability of households to pay than the crude methods described above. It captures some of the important socio-economic characteristics of low-income groups in Zimbabwean cities with regard to total income available for housing, which includes the ability of the households to mobilise additional financial resources, apart from those offered by formal housing finance institutions. Incomes and the share of those incomes available for housing have been used extensively to assess affordability in Zimbabwean towns. Proposals to refine the measurements revolve around their adequacy and ability to capture all relevant variables. The recommendations still have to find their way into policy formulation. ‘The second method of assessing affordability which has been used in Zimbabwe, at least in studies (cf MPCNH, 1995), is the cost-to-income ratio. This method still has to establish the optimum ratio that is acceptable to academics, practitioners and policy-makers. This is a potentially meaningful ratio, more meaningful than the arbitrary rule of thumb. It has been observed that a cost-to-income ratio of 3 or 4 is ‘common in most developing economies (cf Wakely et al, 1976; Jorgensen, 1978). This means that, on average, a house should cost three to four times the annual household's income. The Zimbabwe Shelter and Urban Indicator Study revealed that the ratio was 7,2 in 1992 and 6,6 in 1994 (MPCNH, 1995). This ratio can be used in designing housing projects which aim to produce units that will fall within the ambit of a prescribed range of income-earners. More research needs wo be y wis ne in eny capturing socio-economic variables that are omitted by the mees designed; if not, it can be reduced to a descriptive measure with no practical relevance itied Out LO ver 4. ENHANCING HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN ZIMBABWE. ‘The strategies adopted to make housing affordable to urban low-income groups in Zimbabwe have tended to focus on three aspects: product type, reduction of standards34° AY Kamete and delivery strategies. In most cases, the three are so closely intertwined that they are difficult to separate. 4.1 Product-type strategies Product types here refer to the nature of housing delivered. Previous public sector projects by the central government in Zimbabwe's urban areas centred on delivering completed housing units. In the first few decades of urbanisation, local authorities initially delivered finished bachelor-type accommodation. In terms of quality these units were small, poor and appalling. In the 1930s, central government resolved to counter the ‘squalid and atrocious’ environment (Mafico, 1991) by providing finished family accommodation on larger plots (Ashton, 1969). It became apparent later that the intended beneficiaries of the houses could not afford the units unless a large subsidy was poured in. As early as 1962, the then Secretary for Local Government and Housing cautioned Cabinet on the increasing overall size of the subsidy required for every new ‘African township’ that was developed (GSR, 1962) The first official reaction to this crippling subsidy was to phase out the provision of complete housing units. The logic behind this was that since complete units were not affordable, serviced plots with minimal initial development would suit the financial means of low-income groups, thereby eliminating the need for subsidies. In the 1950s, the first sites and services project was commissioned in the African township of Kambuzuma, in Harare. At present, sites and services schemes continue to dominate housing delivery strategies in virtually all urban centres in Zimbabwe. This is largely a result of the advice of donors, mainly the World Bank and the United States Agency for Intemational Development (USAID). 4.2 Reduction of standards ‘The second popular approach aimed at achieving cheaper and, therefore, ‘affordable’ housing was to tackle the high and expensive building standards. The initial ambitious standards proved to be too costly even with a substantial state subsidy (GSR, 1964) The then Southern Rhodesian government questioned the high minimum standards (GSR, 1962), emphasising their cost implications. It was felt that lower standards should be introduced to reduce building costs (GSR, 1963). The result of the discourse was the introduction of the infamous ultra-low-cost houses. In this-approach, low-cost units were constructed using standard cement-reinforced chicken wire mesh. Later, cement blocks with asbestos roofs and rammed floors were introduced. These units were built on 200 square metre plots ‘Amid the euphoria of independence and majority rule in 1980, minimum standards ¢ revised upwards. Affected by this move were space and infrastructural standards ver, the spectre of high costs and afiordability continued w@ hava the new govemment (Mafico, 1991; Musenda-Nyane 1993) x 1999, the stendard: were once again reduced in the name of affordability (Chikowore, 1993). In line with the official onslaught on expensive s is, & government publication optirais’ easy referred to ‘affordable housing designs and economical use of land’ (MIPTC, 1992: 4) Much current building research in Zimbabwe concentrates on building materials and appropriate intermediate technologies to reduce housing costs (cf ITDG, 1997). The effort to provide affordable standards has yielded a number of proposals. The search wiAffordable housing in Harare, Zimbabwe 35 continues, as evidenced by the creation of a committee responsible for building technology in the National Housing Task Force. 4.3 Housing delivery strategies Delivery strategies have been targeted at potential cost-reducing areas. The national government has had its fair share of criticism for making housing expensive because of its overinvolvement in housing delivery which it (erroneously) views as a social commodity. On the international scene, calls have been made to make government roles ‘facilitatory rather than fundamental’ (Pugh, 1991: 275). Dwindling public sector resources and rising building costs have ensured that the Zimbabwean government, at various levels, needed little convincing to change its strategies for national housing delivery. The recipe for enabling strategies (cf World Bank, 1993) from international finance thus found a more-than-willing listener. Government started to withdraw from being the sole provider of housing delivery in favour of the new strategies which allowed the entry of other actors, with roles presumably being allocated according to comparative advantage (Kamete, 1994). According to the popular strategy of aided self-help, local authorities provide partici- pants with serviced stands, technical assistance and affordable loans, and sometimes on-site materials stores (Mafico, 1991). Participants build their houses using their own additional resources, such as labour, tools and materials (Mushamba, 1996). Almost all actors in housing are represented in the aided self-help housing delivery strategy: the prospective house-owner, non-governmental organisations, international finance, government and, after initial reluctance, local finance institutions (Rakodi, 1995). Even towns as small as Banket, with a population of less than 10 000, have embraced aided self-help (Kamete, 1994) 4.4 Housing levies : In the 1960s, the then Southern Rhodesian government used an interesting strategy of assuring affordable housing while minimising the overall subsidy borne by the public sector. This was the controversial Services Levy (Patel & Adams, 1981), which was a fixed fee that every employer was required to pay to the local authority for every employee other than domestic workers (GSR, 1960). The levy was short-lived as the authorities gave in to strong protests from employers. Interestingly, in 1996 the Urban Councils Association proposed a variant of the services levy for low-income housing. They chose to call it a ‘housing levy’, which would be used to create a revolving ‘housing fund’. The indifference with which the proposal was received suggests that no one took it seriously. THE RESU ‘The perception of a prvi: witecis is efinitioa cid Cecatcaily the solution to that problem (Dunn, 1981). As pointed out earlier, the problem of affordability in Zim- babwe is seen as an income problem (see also Sumka, 1987). Strangely enough, solutions advanced do not focus on improving the incomes or the economic character- istics of the target group. The type of solutions adopted reveal that the problem is defined as being external to‘the target group, namely lying in the project features, in particular the cost of housing. The common prescription to ‘reduce the initial cost of36 AY Kamete the Kuwadzana 5 low-income housing project Table 1: An analysis of affordabilit: {all costs in Z$) Housing levels ¢ Plot+wet — Plot+2_—Plot-+3 Payments Plot only core rooms rooms Cost of land 6500 18500-27500 33500 Deposit (25 per cent) 1625 4625 68758375 Principal 4875 13875-20625 25125 ‘A. Monthly repayments at 15 per cent 6 179 266 324 B. Total home ownership charges no 10 no no Total monthly cost (A +B) 13 289 376 434 Minimum income required 37 963 1253 1487 ‘Source: Adapted from Palmer Associates (1995), the project’ (Bridger & Winpenny, 1983: 108) has found committed disciples in Zimbabwe's public and private sector delivery systems for urban low-income housing A look at the results of Zimbabwe's approaches aimed at achieving affordable housing in urban areas provides some helpful insights into the above assertion. Focusing on product types, standards and delivery strategies seems to have done little to resolve the problem of affordability 5.1 Product-type strategies Product-type strategies, as detailed above, have been in fashion for about half a century, the rationale being to provide a product that the target group can afford without the need of a subsidy. The premise is simple and logical: the cheaper the production costs, the less the unit price and therefore the more affordable it will be. It is not surprising that numerous versions of sites and services have been embarked upon in Harare, the capital city. These include wet cores, one-room core houses and stands with the barest on-site infrastructure. Unserviced stands are slowly becoming a reality in the 1990s. Table 1 gives a summary of the cost structure of a housing project in Kuwadzana 5 in Harare. Table 1 shows the costs of various versions of sites and services schemes. The most minimal that can be provided is a 150 m? serviced plot, which costs around ZS6 500. (At the time of writing, US$1 was equivalent to about Z538.) Amortised for 25 years added at 1995 rates, the total amount the prospective plot-owner would be required to pay for housing costs is Z$173. Assuming that households can devote a maximum ol 30 per cent of their income to housing costs, this would imply a monthly household income of at least Z$576,67. These figures paint a gloomy picture, considering that the lowest-paid formally employed workers in the city are perhaps domestic workers, who had a monthly income of less than Z$500 in 1995. At the other end of the product range, a three-roomed coré house then necded a minimum monthly income of ZS$1 446,67. This amount was supposed to be paid by a group whose stipulated monthly income ceiling was Z$1 200 in 1995. Interestingly, the three-roomed core houses inAffordable housing in Harare, Zimbabwe 37 Table 2: A brief chronicle of minimum housing standards in pre- and post-indepen- dence Zimbabwe Period Space(m?) Superstructure _Infrastructure Materials Before 1980 200 One bedroom, semi- Individual on site” Standard. detached, terraced Approved non-standard 1980-92 3125 Two bedroomed As above Swietly standard From 1992 onwards 150 One room and wet core As above Standard, room for approved non-standard question ended up costing over Z$65 000. The vast majority of the half a million urban home-seekers in Zimbabwe are in the low-income group, with an income not exceeding ZS1 200 per month (MIPTC, 1992). This phenomenon is by no means a new development. Ashton (1969) calculated the economic cost of a two-bedroomed house in the then African townships at £225 ‘Adding £140 in services brought the cost to £395. At 7 per cent over 25 years this would require monthly repayments of about £6. If households could spend a maximum of 25 per cent of their monthly income on housing, as was then assumed, a total household monthly income of nearly £24 was required. The picture is made clearer if one notes that 82 per cent of the target population earned a monthly wage of below £22 at the time, with slightly over 71 per cent of these earning less than £18 (Ashton, 1969: 32), 5.2 Strategies for reducing standards The onslaught on what are perceived to be expensive housing standards has had affordability overtones since it started in the 1960s (GSR, 1960-63; MPCNH, 1991; MIPTC, 1992; Government of Zimbabwe, 1995). The government, which in the 1930s had introduced better-quality housing to counter the squalid houses provided by local authorities, was the first to admit that this was a costly exercise which consumed vast amounts of public financial resources in subsidies. Standards had to be lowered to make housing affordable (GSR, 1960). The post-independence government acted in the same manner. At independence, it was felt that the housing standards in the high-density areas were low and they were subsequently raised significantly. Slightly more than a decade later, central government acknowledged that they were expensive and ‘lowered’ them again (Chikowore, 1993). A look at the latest round of the standards rationalisation effort is instructive. Table 2 hooaicles some o7 the key € Yhe latest review of these ‘residcntial piansing, infrastructure aad sup standards’ (Chikowore, 1993: 3) was a result of 5 years of consultation. It was proved in the nationwide public sector housing projects that the reduction in space standards from 312 m? with a frontage of 12,5 m to 150 m? with a frontage of 8,5 m would result in a cost saving of 29 per cent. Cluster houses with a minimum of four rooms were also introduced. These had a plinth area of between 36 and 50 m?, compared with the old standard of 50 m?. The cost saving in this move was put at 30 per cent, compared with38 AY Kamete conventional detached houses of the same plinth area. This might explain the fall in the cost-to-income ratio in urban housing from 7,3 in 1992 to 6,6 in 1994 (MPCNH, 1995: 62). Research into the production and utilisation of cheaper building materials is ongoing Farm bricks, stabilised soil bricks and prefabricated concrete pancls have been approved for use in single-storey buildings. It is anticipated that these reforms will open the way for informal sector participation in housing which, it is hoped, will make housing affordable (Chikowore, 1993) ‘The revision of the minimum superstructural standards from four rooms and a wet core to one room plus a wet core was a significant step. (The effect of this revision was examined above. Further analysis follows below when housing delivery strategies are examined.) Infrastructural standards on water, sewerage, roads, drainage and power remain fundamentally the same, with small reductions in access roads and some flexibility in power supply. 5.3 Housing delivery strategies In the late 1980s, delivery strategies were reviewed amid growing international criticism of whole-unit production by the public sector (cf Okpala, 1992). Contrary to popular opinion, housing delivery strategies were not reviewed and changed for the first time when international finance came into Zimbabwe after independence. The role of the state in housing delivery was reviewed as far back as the 1950s, by the then Ministry of Local Government and Housing. In 1963, the government established @ Housing Advisory Council as a technical adviser to government. As noted above, an approach of progressive development was adopted with the first sites and services project in Kambuzuma. Interestingly, servicing and construction in low-income housing programmes in the colonial period were contracted to the private sector (GSR, 1962). Throughout the remainder of the colonial period, central government continued to invite the private sector, including employers, to participate in housing delivery. The explicit purpose, however, was not to make housing affordable, but to reduce the load on the public sector's dwindling and insufficient resources After independence, the socialist ethos adopted by the state required the exalting of self-reliance. Mistrust of the profit-making private sector meant that it was never considered seriously in housing delivery in the first half of the 1980s. Again govern- ment could not cope, and international finance did not have to go to great lengths to show the state the need for a change in its delivery strategy. (It should be noted that these developments took place well before the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in 1991.) Thus began a new and more intense phase of sites ‘and services under such strategies as Aided Self-Help (ASH), public-private partner- sha) Gint sontw-s3) and sole p vate sector par’ The explicit goals of this new phase include the concepts of comparative advantage and enabling approaches. These have overtones of affordability. Along the way, such modes as building brigades and cooperatives have found their way into housing delivery (MPCNH, 1991). All the approaches are aimed at making housing accessible to the majority of the people in the high-density areas. ‘Table 3 shows the outcomes, in terms of affordability, of the housing strategies beforeAffordable housing in Harare, Zimbabwe 39 Table 3: Housing affordability when 27,5 per cent of monthly income is devoted to housing in Harare (All costs in Z$) Monthly Minimum monthly —_% or urban population Type repayments _ income required that can afford it Site and service (no wet core) 21,47 78,07 37,5 Serviced site (with wet core) 38,25 139,09 BO One-room core an mai 9.0 Two-room core S714 207,78 55 ‘Three-room core 65,60 238,55 3.0 Four-room core 71,09 253,51 16,0 Unable to afford any option 16.0 Source: Adapted from Rakodi & Mutizwa-Mangiza (1989: 29), public-private partnerships. Foremost in these strategies were ASH sites and services schemes. The information in the table derives from a survey based on the then local rule of thumb, which assumed that a maximum of 27,5 per cent of income would be devoted to housing Using this method, it was discovered that 16 per cent of the urban population earned less than ZS80, which was the minimum required to afford any of the ayailable housing strategies. By far the majority of the urban low-income population (about 38 per cent) earned between Z$80 and Z$140. (The legislated minimum wage was Z$104.) They could therefore only afford a basic 300 m? serviced plot without a wet core. In fact, the most that just over three-quarters of them could afford was a plot with one room and a wet core. Using the empirically verified 17,5 per cent of income for housing, the number of people who could not afford any of the available alternatives rose sharply to 42 per cent (Rakodi & Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1989). Cumulatively, eight out of 10 households could only afford a maximum of a serviced plot and a wet core. ‘The dawn of partnerships was heralded as a momentous event for housing delivery in the country. Harare scrambled for this new hope for low-income home-seekers. Table 4 summarises information from the latest of these new joint ventures between the council and a building society that used the services of a reputable private contractor. The plots (averaging 200 m2) and a wet core cost on average Z$30 000. The revised local rule of thumb now requires that no more than 30 per cent of monthly income be devoted to housing costs. The table shows that, considering mortgages alone, only 10 per cent of the new home-owners pay a maximum of 30 per cent. If municipal rates are added, every beneficiary pays above this proportion, with the majority (40 per cent) payins between 46 and SO per cent. About one in three home-owners devote at least half taeit ancataiy Interestingly, the ratio of the lowest-priced private sector dwelling unit to the median annual household income rose from 2,7 in 1992 to 3,1 in 1994 (MPCNH, 1995: 62) The ratio was below the worldwide value of 4,4, Nevertheless, the rise was a blow to the reform of delivery strategies and the call for comparative advantages. Resistance to these dwellings, on grounds of suitability, is already beginning to build up.40. AY Kamete ‘Table 4: Monthly housing repayments of a sample of new home-owners in the ‘Tynwald South joint venture low-income housing project in Harare, 1996 Percentage of respondents that can afford it — Mortgages alone Mortgages + municipal Monthly repayments as a per cent of income charges 30 and below 10 0 31-35 20 0 36-40 40 20 41-45 30 10 46-50 0 40 50+ 0 30 Source: Adapted from Fologwe (1996: 37). 6. CONCLUSION: EMERGING ISSUES It can be seen from this survey of the main approaches to affordability that these measures are aimed mainly at reducing the cost of the housing unit. The nature of costreducing measures limits their success. Inflation, rising costs of living, building ‘eaterials and construction and time itself will always cause housing costs to escalate. Between 1985 and 1987, construction costs rose by 60 per, cent. During the same period, the monthly median household income rose by 42,2 per cent from Z$218 to 78310 (Plan Inc Zimbabwe, 1996). Clearly, the combined effect of cost reduction and ordinary periodic income increases could not keep pace with inflation. This explains the Tse inthe cost-to-income ratios in the lowest-priced houses detailed above. An valuation of a bilateral housing programme implied that 79 per cent of the residents were paying more for housing than before (Plan Inc Zimbabwe, 1996: 13). Only | per cent paid less. ‘The best that cost-reducing approaches have achieved in Zimbabwe is to introduce an aura of initial optimism, which is quickly followed by disillusionment, dejection, anger, suspicion and criticism. The case of an urban housing project that was projected to produce housing units costing not more than ZS40 000, but on completion cost upwards Of 2565 000 (The Herald, 4 July 1996), serves as a not uncommon example Cost-reducing approaches are not ineffective in their own right. The problem lies in the way in which they are implemented. The major weakness of the Zimbabwean strategies, like most other ;national strategies in the developing world, is that the delivers gvstems have tended to expect too much from them. It has been hoped that on their own, these strategies can perform wonders, thereby making housing affordable , inflation As indicated to the majority of the nation's usban low-income ci and time, which are harder to control at the local level, complicate matters. If we are not careful, we will continue providing ever-smaller housing units and eventually provide virtually nothing, because cost reduction will reach its Himit at some stage. Judging by the kind of political and civic resistance to what are perceived to be houses below the acceptable standards for human habitation (The Herald, 17 October 1996), it can be said that Zimbabwe's housing delivery systems seem to have reached thisAffordable housing in Harare, Zimbabwe 41 limit. As far as cost reduction is concerned, the systems appear to have reached a dead end. This is discouraging; the more so because it is the much-favoured private sector and joint-venture projects that are constantly in the news for providing this kind of housing for which people are not willing to pay. The latest of these ‘low-cost houses’ demands in the region of Z$400 per month (which requires a minimum monthly income of Z$1 333,33), meaning that all aspirants in the official low-income group (with a ceiling of Z$1 200) cannot afford them. It can be seen from the above that a variety of strategies for reducing the cost of a housing unit have been tried with little success, including: * The provision of a minimal product © The rationalisation of standards. + The adoption of new housing delivery strategies and production systems. Despite these efforts, however, housing is still unaffordable for a significant proportion of the urban poor. It can be argued that it is normal to have an irreducible core group that cannot afford any available housing alternatives (see Sumka, 1987). However, to insist that this ‘irreducible core’ comprises more than 75 per cent of the urban population, as is the case with Zimbabwe, would not be a sound argument. At the beginning of this article it was pointed out that affordability has two sides, one extemal and the other internal, to the target population. The cost of housing, which forms only part of one side (the external side), has been addressed. Unfortunately, this is the weaker of the two sides, hence its regrettable failures. ‘A fundamental aspect of the internal side has either been neglected or has had its significance underplayed. This is the economic and social character of the intended beneficiaries. It has been pointed out that the housing problem in Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, is an income problem. It is fundamentally a problem of poverty (if poverty is taken to mean very low incomes below a certain threshold required for basic needs) ‘Addressing the problems of income therefore appears to be a sound course of action, If the strategies adopted to reduce the cost of housing are backed by strategies that enhance the capacity of the population to repay the costs, the possibilities are virtually limitless. ‘The income problem in low-income housing can be viewed from two perspectives. Either the total household income is too low to pay for housing, or the share of income available for housing is inadequate. Correspondingly, there are two possibilities of what can be termed non-cost-reducing strategies for enhancing housing affordability. These are to boost income and reduce expenditure. Income boosting involves the support and creation of income-generation opportunities z pee eee ete ee i g-prot st 1 23 an ive which can‘ = used as an overall strategy for improving the socio-economic conditions of the uzb.. Jew-incorn2 populations, should bz linked explicitly to housing delivery In fact, this is more enabling than merely deploying vast amounts of resources in the endless search for new technologies, materials and lower standards. The following strategies could be adopted: 1. Creating formal and informal income-generating opportunities. This demands much more than merely desisting from harassing those who engage in informal sector enterprises.42 AY Kamete 2. Making demonstrable household initiatives to increase income an explicit criterion for qualifying for housing projects. 3. Facilitating the employment of these people in the many tasks in the housing delivery process and in other projects in which the local authority has a say. 4, Promoting labour-intensive investment in the city and making sure that beneficiaries who have, or might have, difficulties in repaying housing costs arc’ employed. 5. More actively and explicitly encouraging and facilitating the letting out of part of the housing space to lodgers. Strategies for reducing expenditure help the beneficiaries and prospective beneficiaries to save on basic necessities that they can provide for themselves, Urban agriculture is an exciting possibility that can lead to savings in food bills. It is not enough to accommodate these activities passively (see Mbiba, 1995). Actively promoting them and demonstrating the savings to the beneficiaries is a more superior and useful strategy. Research into ways in which households could minimise their expenditure should thus support the search for minimal housing units, elusive standards, building materials and delivery strategies. By facilitating large savings in basic necessities, this expenditure reduction strategy will ensure that a larger portion of household income is made available for housing. Other possibilities include reducing transport costs through ‘200d land-use planning when locating workplaces, homes, commerce and community facilities and actively encouraging cheaper modes of transport. ‘These non-cost-reducing strategies should be integrated with overall local economic development strategies, urban planning and management, and housing delivery. Select- ing certain aspects for the sake of publicity, visibility and convenience (see Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1989) will not help matters. Clearly, these should be integrated with the endless search for cost reduction. Rather than being regarded as mutually exclusive, cost-reducing and non-cost-reducing strategies should be viewed as being complemen- tary Most of these strategies require much more than tacit and passive permission by relaxing restrictive by-laws and instituting occasional deregulation. They need positive action. Permission is necessary but not sufficient; it has to be backed by active promotion. REFERENCES ASHTON, EH, 1969. The economics of African housing. Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 3(4): 29-33. BEYER, GH, 1958. Housing: @ factual analysis. New York: Macmillan, BRIDGER, GA & WINPENNY, JT, 1983. Planning development projects. London HMSO. CHIKOWORE, F 1003 Urban Councils of Zimbabwe. Masvingo Civic Centre, Masvingo, COTTON, A & FRANCEYS, R, 1991. Services for shelter, Liv 3. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. DAVIDSON, F & PAYNE, GK, 1983. The urban projects manual. Liverpool Planning Manual 1. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. DUNN, W, 1981. 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