The Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi): An Elusive Conglomerate

Daiki Shibuichi

East Asia: An International Quarterly

Volume 34, Issue 3, pp 179196

This document is the accepted manuscript version. The final publication is available at
link.springer.com.

Abstract: This study has focused on the organizational and structural aspects of Nippon
Kaigi, a major rightist lobbying group in Japan. It argues that Nippon Kaigi may not be that
powerful despite the groups influential outlook. By examining the elements of the organization
and their relationships with each other, this study observes that Nippon Kaigi as a whole may
not be very cohesive.

1. Introduction

Nippon Kaigi, a rightist advocacy group that has existed in Japan since 1997, captured
the attention of Western mass media outlets in September 2014 when Japanese Prime Minister
Abe Shinzo reshuffled his cabinet. The New York Times [10] stated: Fifteen of the nineteen new
cabinet members belong to Nippon Kaigi, the Japan Conference, a nationalistic right-wing
group that was all but unknown until recently. The Economist [8] stated: as one of Japans
most powerful lobby groups it has a shopping list of nationalist, indeed blatantly revisionist,
clauses: applaud Japans wartime liberation of East Asia from Western colonialism; rebuild the
armed forces; inculcate patriotism among students brainwashed by left-wing teachers; and
revere the emperor as he was worshipped in the good old days before the warOddly, the
group receives little attention from the media in Japan, despite its strong and growing influence
at the heart of the government.

Is Nippon Kaigi really an untouchable, powerful organization of far-right fanatics that

strongly influences Japans political leadership, as The Economist suggests? The present writer is
rather skeptical of this kind of viewpoint. While Nippon Kaigi is certainly a large lobbying group
that does include fierce nationalists, it is still possible to argue that the group as a whole may
not be very cohesive. For example, it is not at all clear whether the fifteen Nippon Kaigi
members of the Abe cabinet1 mentioned in The New York Times all applaud Japans wartime
liberation of East Asia from Western colonialism.2 Equally unclear is whether those who
revere the emperor as he was worshipped before the war all really wish to rebuild the armed
forces.

The complexity of Nippon Kaigi is well documented in several recent publications in

Japanese that shine a light on this erstwhile mysterious group. Three of those studies are now
available in bookstores nationwide: Nippon Kaigi no Kenky (A Study of the Japan Conference)
authored by freelance writer Sugano Tamotsu [29]; Nippon Kaigi: Senzenkaiki e no Jnen (The
Japan Conference: Their Passion to Revert to Pre-War Society) written by historian Yamazaki
Masahiro [36]; and Nippon Kaigi no Shtai (The True Colors of the Japan Conference), by
journalist Aoki Osamu [2]. Meanwhile, as of mid-2017 there are few academic analyses of
Nippon Kaigi written in English (A study by Mizohata [12], which focuses on Nippon Kaigis goals
and ideologies and criticizes them from a leftist/progressive standpoint, is one such work). The
present study intends to fill this gap.

Each study on Nippon Kaigi introduced above has its own strong points. Suganos book
has a chapter of valuable analysis on Nippon Kaigis ability to influence local assemblies, along
with interviews with younger grassroots members; Yamazakis book takes an orthodox,
academic approach to explaining a social movement; and Aokis book contains wide-ranging
interviews with Nippon Kaigi stake-holders, which was especially helpful to the present study.
They fashion elaborate narratives dating back to late 1960s of literally dozens of key figures
activists and politicians who formed the Nippon Kaigi we know today, which is conducive to
measuring the groups influence. However, analyses of the structural and organizational aspects
of Nippon Kaigi do not seem to have been fully developed in those studies.

Hence, this study, which focuses mainly on Nippon Kaigis structural aspects, argues that:
(1) examining Nippon Kaigis organization the group appears to have a tripod structure, so to
speak is helpful in gauging the group's power to exert influence; and (2) The Economist's view
that Nippon Kaigi has strong and growing influence at the heart of the (central) government is
still debatable. With respect to the ideologies and goals3 of Nippon Kaigi, this study touches on
them only when they are closely related to structural matters, since the volumes by Sugano,
Yamazaki and Aoki, as well as the article by Mizohata, have already introduced them in detail
together with those authors criticisms of Nippon Kaigi.

For the sake of analysis, this study posits the following: the organizational structure of
Nippon Kaigi is, as stated above, akin to a tripod, where each leg has different characteristics:
the first leg has the characteristics of a united front organization cum salon of conservative

1
For a list of Nippon Kaigi members in the current Abe cabinet, see Appendix 1.
2
For example, Ishiba Shigeru, then a cabinet minister and a Nippon Kaigi member, has consistently
expressed a contrary view.
3
For a list of Nippon Kaigis main activities and goals, see Appendix 2.
groups and elites; the second, the nature of an association of legislators; and the third, the traits
of a right-wing advocacy group with a nationwide network of branches guided by an
administrative body. This structure has apparently given Nippon Kaigi a foundation from which
it has some power of influence. The components of the first leg, which are mainly religious
groups, and of the third leg, the right-wing advocacy group, are organizations that have
respectively been able to mobilize a substantial amount of resources membership, networks
and funds by functioning as the core of more or less successful social, political, religious or
cultural movements. Thus the legislators, who may want to utilize such resources to be re-
elected (and they may of course be sympathetic to tenets espoused by those groups), are likely
to be motivated to join the second leg, which is the association of legislators. By doing so, the
legislators could in turn bring in first and third leg resources such as legitimacy, networks and
influence in lawmaking.

This article thus argues that, in theory, Nippon Kaigi could become truly influential just
as The Economist, Yamazaki and Mizohata argue the group already is if the three legs
supported each other fully, effectively and consistently. However, interviews by Aoki and
Sugano have revealed that, in reality, such a situation has not yet materialized, and likely would
not in the future.

Sections of this study are sequenced as follows: the upcoming section examines each leg
of Nippon Kaigi. The second and third sections investigate in what way the three legs actually
have supported or failed to support each other. The fourth section sums up the arguments
introduced in this article. Particular attention is paid to the relationship between Nippon Kaigi
legislators and other components of Nippon Kaigi, as this factor should determine the extent of
influence Nippon Kaigi might have over the legislature, as well as over government policy-
making and implementation.

2. The Three Legs of Nippon Kaigi

2.1 A United Front of Various Conservative Groups and Forces

This leg, or facet, of Nippon Kaigi can be understood by first taking a look at the group's
website [16]. According to the website, its group representatives include two kinds of people.
One category consists of around two dozen elite individuals, including conservative academics
who hold honorary professorships or the position of university president, retired government
and judicial elites and business elites. Writer and politician Ishihara Shintaro, who has been the
rock star of the right-wing camp, is also one of the group representatives. The other category
consists of representatives of various large organizations, including top cadres of conservative-
oriented religious groups and Shinto shrines, top cadres of the Japan Association of War-
Bereaved Families (Nihon Izokukai, hereinafter Izokukai)and the former hereditary head of an
established traditional tea ceremony school, Urasenke. The above-mentioned groups are all
formally affiliated with Nippon Kaigi.
 According to Aoki [2], however, many such representatives themselves are essentially
honorary, as daily decision-making and operations are delegated to the administrative body,
which is led by Kabashima Yz, who is originally from the religious group Seich no Ie. In the
meantime, Nippon Kaigi's general policies are decided at the annual national conference of
directors the directors being cadres of affiliated groups and representatives of Nippon Kaigis
local branches , and by the standing conference of directors, which is overseen by the
president and vice president. Nippon Kaigi's proclamations and resolutions are drafted by the
policy committee, consisting of around 10 members, including well-known rightist academics
Momochi Akira, Ohara Yasuo and Takahashi Shiro (ibid).

The composition of the representatives reflects the origin of Nippon Kaigi. Nippon Kaigi
was established in 1997 by merging two conservative groups [2]: the National Conference to
Defend Japan (Nihon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi) and the Association to Defend Japan (Nihon o
Mamoru Kai). The former was established in 1981 by some 800 rightist and conservative elites
from business, political, academic and religious circles. The group has its origin in the Movement
to Formalize the Imperial Calendar4 (Geng hseika undo: This issue is elaborated in a later
Section). The latter, the Association to Defend Japan, was established in 1974 as an umbrella
organization of conservative and rightist religious groups. At that time, a high-ranking priest of
the Rinzaish school of Zen Buddhism personally took the lead and invited chief priests of major
Shinto shrines and figures representing various religious groups to establish the organization.
The priest invited some philosophers and cultural luminaries as well. What was noteworthy
about this was that the late Taniguchi Masaharu, an influential and charismatic founder of the
syncretic religious group Seich no Ie, was among the religious figures invited (ibid).

What factor precipitated the merger of the two groups? According to Aoki [2], the two
conservative groups had shared an administrative body led by Kabashima Yz, as well as by the
Meiji Jing Shrine's then chief priest, who had been obliged to gain the consent of
representatives of the two groups separately when the two groups intended to take any
concerted action. People involved in the decision-making process thought it very cumbersome,
and they agreed that a merger would streamline the process, while at the same time
anticipating that the new organization would be able to serve as a wider base for national
conservative movements (ibid).

As for religious groups, a major Shinto organization affiliated with Nippon Kaigi is the
Association of Shinto Shrines (Jinja Honch). Jinja Honch, whose predecessor was once a
government entity before Japans defeat in World War II, represents about 80,000 Shinto
shrines some are large but the majority are tiny and do not have resident priests
nationwide. The chief priests of the prestigious Ise Jing Shrine, the well-known Atsuta Jing
Shrine, the popular Meiji Jing Shrine (these Shrines are represented by Jinja Honch) and of

4
The Japanese Imperial Calendar is a system of regnal years. For example, 1979 is Year 54 of Showa
under the previous Emperor and 2017 is Year 29 of Heisei under the incumbent Emperor. In Japan this
system was once legalized in the Meiji era, but the clause was nullified when Imperial Household Law was
amended under the 1946 Constitution.
the aforementioned Yasukuni Shrine (the Shrine is not represented by Jinja Honch but
maintains friendly relations) separately hold positions as Nippon Kaigis group representatives.
Contemporary Shintoism draws significantly on the early-modern Kokugaku school of thought,
which has nativist elements. Other Shinto-related groups are Kurozumi Ky, Oisca International
and Taiwa Kydan. In addition to these, there is a syncretic religious group, Sky Mahikari,
which claims to have 1.2 million members (including overseas members) and have some Shinto
elements in its beliefs. Speaking of syncretic religious groups, the aforementioned Seich no Ie is
no longer affiliated with Nippon Kaigi, though its founder and members played critical roles in
the formation of Nippon Kaigi. The fact that the successors to the late Taniguchi Masaharu have
disagreed with some political aspects of Taniguchis ideology and with the decision to become
involved in politics accounts for this disengagement.

Large and influential Buddhist groups include: Reiykai, whose website claims that it has
a membership of over 5 million (including overseas members), Bussho Gonenkai, which claims
that 500,000 households have joined the group, Nenp Shinky, which touts its membership of
800,000 and the Hieizan Enryakuji Temple, which represents the Tendai or Tiantai school of
Buddhism in Japan. Other Buddhism-related groups are Shinsei Bukky Kydan and Gedatsukai.
It is worth noting that all the above Buddhist groups revere Hokke Ky or Lotus Sutra.5 While the
Hieizan Enryakuji Temple can boast an ancient history and Shinto shrines can enjoy authority
based on ancient Shinto tradition, the other groups are new religions, which in Japanese
terminology are those established after the mid-19th century.

It appears that the institutions of Zen schools and Jdo Sh or Pure Land schools of
Buddhism are not affiliated with Nippon Kaigi. But this would not necessarily mean that revering
Hokke Ky is related to being nativist, nationalistic or right-wing. The largest group in Japan that
reveres Hokke Ky, the Ska Gakkai, is known for pacifism and is not affiliated with Nippon Kaigi.
It appears that no legislator from the Kmeito Party the political branch of Ska Gakkai is a
member of Nippon Kaigi. This absence, which is curious because the Kmeito Party has been the
choice of coalition partner for almost two decades by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP), could also be explained partly by the sense of rivalry that has been said to exist [3]
between Jinja Honch and Ska Gakkai. Watching Ska Gakkai and its political branch Kmeito
Party rapidly gaining ground throughout the 1960s, Jinja Honch, which had been extremely
concerned, established in 1969 the Diet Members Roundtable of the Shinto Association of
Spiritual Leadership (Shinto Seiji Renmei Kokkai Giin Kondankai), whose current membership of
legislators is assumed to considerably overlap with the Japan Conference Diet Members
Roundtable (Nippon Kaigi Kokkai Giin Kondankai) (ibid).

2.2 An Association of Legislators

5
This may have something to do with modern Nichirenism (Nichiren shugi). For Nichiren shugi, see
Matsuoka [11] and Otani [18].
 The second leg of Nippon Kaigi is that of an association of legislators. As of late 2015,
Nippon Kaigis political branch for national-level legislators, the aforementioned Japan
Conference Diet Members Roundtable, is said to have 289 members, most of whom belong to
the LDP, but some are in the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) as well as other political parties,
from both the upper chamber (242 seats) and lower chamber (475 seats) of the Diet.6 According
to Aoki [2], the Roundtable was established a day before Nippon Kaigi was established in 1997.
Membership numbered 115 at the time of establishment, but it increased to 204 in a couple of
weeks (ibid).

Nippon Kaigis political branch for prefectural- and municipal-level legislators, the Japan
Conference League of Local Assembly Members (Nippon Kaigi Chih Giin Renmei), is currently
said to have more than 1,700 members. According to Aoki [2], this League was established in
2007 by approximately 1,000 prefectural- and municipal-level legislators. The League is divided
into prefectural blocs, which are further subdivided into municipal (district, in the case of Tokyo)
blocs. At the League's annual bloc meetings, member legislators make an activity schedule.
Once every month, each member receives specific requests via facsimile for assistance from
Nippon Kaigis administrative body. (ibid).

2.3. An Advocacy Group

The third leg of Nippon Kaigi is that of an efficient and well-structured right-wing
advocacy group with a nationwide network of about 240 local branches guided by an
administrative body whose staff members are staunchly nationalistic. This could be regarded as
the main body of Nippon Kaigi itself. The organization per se is not large compared to Western
advocacy groups in terms of formal membership: the mass media estimates around 38,000.
According to Aoki [2], the formal membership fee is 10,000 Japanese yen annually. Speaking of
the groups income, in addition to the membership fee, from time to time Nippon Kaigi and the
events it holds can expect financial contributions from the Meiji Jing Shrine, Jinja Honch, as
well as from some retired businesspeople, according to one of Aokis interviewees (ibid).
Incidentally, the Meiji Jingu Shrine has been known in Japan as an exceptionally affluent Shinto
shrine that owns vast precincts in prime locations in Tokyo and operates a lucrative bridal
business as well as a famous baseball stadium, etc. [27]. In contrast, the small Shinto shrines
dotted throughout towns and villages in Japan are maintained financially by donations from
local supporters (ujiko). Resident priest(s), if any, contribute to the shrine's budget by collecting
fees during various traditional Shinto ceremonies. Meanwhile, there is no available information
on financial contributions to Nippon Kaigi by Buddhist-related groups, or even whether they
contribute at all.

6
These numbers are based on an Asahi Shimbun article cited on the website of the Hiroshima branch of
Nippon Kaigi [17].
 Both Sugano [30] and Aoki [3] state that Nippon Kaigi's administrative body, led by the
aforementioned Kabashima Yz, is staffed by a right-wing group called the Japan Youth Council
(Nihon Seinen Kygikai, hereinafter Nisseiky), which was established in 1970 as a non-student
branch of a nationwide rightist student group, the All-Japan Student-Body Liaison Council
(Zenokoku Gakusei Jichitai Renraku Kygikai, hereinafter Zenkoku Gakky). Zenkoku Gakky,
which was dominated by members of Seich no Ie [9, 33], was established in the late 1960s to
counter the New Left student movement, which was very strong at the time. Incidentally, the
first chairman of Zenkoku Gakky was Suzuki Kunio, who was leading the Issuikai, the most vocal
radical right-wing activist group [22]. According to Suzuki, however, he and his comrades were
soon purged from the organization for not having strong faith in Seich no Ie and being too
violent [33]. The Zenkoku Gakky movement crumbled and waned as its rival New Left
movement likewise faded and disintegrated during the 1970s [33, 9].

How the Nisseiky managed to maintain its momentum after the rightist student
movement waned and crumbled is explained in the fourth Chapter of Aokis volume [5]. Since
1976, the rightists have rallied around certain events and activities: in 1976, the dovish LDP
Prime Minister, Miki Takeo, declared that his cabinet would not promote constitutional
amendment despite the LDPs longstanding policy that the party would pursue amendment in
particular the so-called pacifist clause of the 1946 constitution. In view of this, Nisseiky tied
up with hawkish LDP legislators and organized the National Meeting to Protest the
Constitutional Anniversary Ceremony Held by the Government (ibid).

In 1977, the aforementioned Association to Defend Japan, with its administrative body
Nisseiky, cooperated with Izokukai, Bussho Gonenkai, Seich no ie, the Meiji Jing Shrine and
Jinja Honch, etc. to promote the Movement to Formalize the Imperial Calendar. This
movement is said to have been able to effectively rally grassroots conservatives and
conservative and rightist elites and legislators, culminating in October 1978 in the National
Meeting to Stand Up and Realize the Formalization of the Imperial Calendar, which succeeded
in mobilizing as many as 10,000 participants at the Budkan Stadium in Tokyo. In parallel with
their efforts in Tokyo, the rightist groups sent out their delegates nationwide Jinja Honch's
network of Shinto shrines was particularly helpful to lobby prefectural- and municipal-level
legislators to pass resolutions in local assemblies requesting the formalization of the Imperial
Calendar. These efforts to display their determination and to boost morale bore fruit in 1979
when the Diet passed the law to legalize the use of Imperial Calendar (ibid).

Some notable activities of the rightist groups in the 1980s were: the National
Conference to Defend Japan and the Association to Defend Japan, with Nisseiky, advanced the
movement to celebrate the late Shwa Emperor marking 60 years on the throne. In 1985, the
National Conference to Defend Japan published its own rightist history textbook in response to
the history textbook controversy of 1981, whose outcome had dissatisfied the rightists and
conservatives who considered the 1981 dispute as a defeat for the Japanese government in the
face of pressure from China and South Korea [23]. In 1989, the rightist groups mourned the
passing of the Shwa Emperor and celebrated the accession of the new Emperor, while strongly
insisting that mourning and accession ceremonies should be conducted in the Shinto style. With
respect to Imperial institutions, these rightist groups spent the 1980s trying to persuade the
reluctant government to organize Shinto-style ceremonies to celebrate the day when the
mythical Emperor Jinmu acceded to the throne as Japans first Emperor.

In 1991, The National Conference to Defend Japan and other groups kicked off their
program to draft the outline of a new constitution. In 1992, the National Conference to Defend
Japan and the Association to Defend Japan advanced the Movement to Oppose the Emperor
Visiting China. In 1994 and 1995, the rightist groups strongly advanced the movement to oppose
the Murayama cabinet's proclamation of a no war resolution in the Diet. The resolution is
today known as The Murayama Statement or the Prime Ministers Statement on the Occasion
of the 50th Anniversary of the War's End, in which socialist Premier Murayama Tomiichi
apologized for the damage and suffering caused by Japan to its Asian neighbors in World War II.
Cadres of the Association to Defend Japan, with the help of conservative or rightist legislators,
expended great efforts to persuade LDP heavyweights to help water down the expressions in
the statement, with which they did not agree. In 1996, the rightist groups organized the
Movement to Oppose Legalizing the System of Husband and Wife Retaining Separate Family
Names (ibid).

Aside from the Movement to Formalize the Imperial Calendar, which successfully rallied
both elites and grassroots, how many of these movements boasted any meaningful grassroots
participation is not clear. However, it is possible that those who had been involved in the
defunct Zenkoku Gakky and wanted to continue their political activities maintained a network
just like those of the leftist students who participated in the New Left movement. Sugano [31]
implies that there is such a network, and that many key activists of Nippon Kaigi today are
children of first-generation activists. According to Steinhoff [28], those who had a New Left
background have come to form Japans vibrant but invisible civil society, which engages in
political advocacy. Perhaps there is a right-wing version of this invisible civil society.

Meanwhile, Nippon Kaigis regional branches seem to include some rather odd or
bigoted activists. According to recent mass media reports, the principal of a far-right school who
implicated Abe Akie, spouse of Abe Shinzo, in an alleged influence-peddling scandal, used to be
a member of the Osaka branch of Nippon Kaigi. The schools practices, not to mention the
remarks and actions of the principal and his spouse surprised society by their eccentricity.
Moreover, according to Sugano [31], grassroots members of Nippon Kaigi appear to include
those who are close to Conservative in Action groups, including the largest hate group
Zaitokukai.7

Interestingly, despite its influential outlook, Nippon Kaigi is an unincorporated

association (Nini Dantai). Pekkanen [19] explains that the Japanese government has effectively
limited the size of Japans advocacy groups by making it difficult for them to attain corporate

7
For these groups, for example, see Shibuichi [24].
status. Nippon Kaigi seems to have been able to bypass this restriction by aligning with religious
groups, which can gain corporate status relatively easily. Izokukai and Urasenke have corporate
status, too.

3. How the Three Legs are Related

3.1 Affiliated Groups and Nippon Kaigi Legislators

This section examines the relationship between large groups affiliated with Nippon Kaigi
and Nippon Kaigi as association of legislators. The degree of cooperation between groups of
new religions and Nippon Kaigi legislators appears to vary. Regardless, in the cases of Urasenke
and Hieizan Enryakuji, it is difficult to find signs or evidence that they cooperate with Nippon
Kaigi legislators. However, in the cases of Jinja Honch and Izokukai, it is readily observable that
they have closely cooperated with Nippon Kaigi legislators.

Sugano [29] states that cases of members of religious groups affiliated with Nippon Kaigi
helping Nippon Kaigi Diet legislators in election campaigns have been observed. It is not
surprising that large and influential groups of new religions are linked with legislators. As stated
previously, for legislators to be re-elected, it is often crucial that they secure the support of large
constituency organizations, whose members could help them in the election campaign and vote
as a bloc. In turn, new religious groups, which are viewed with varying degrees of suspicion by
the populace, can gain legitimacy by having links with legislators. New religious groups can also
expect to have a better chance of seeing their values reflected in laws, e.g. on whether or not to
legalize the system of wife and husband retaining separate family names.

Having said this, the degree of involvement of affiliated new religious groups in Nippon
Kaigis political activities seems to vary. While a group called Kokuchkai8 has issued a statement
that it does not see any problem with engaging in political activities as long as they are not in
breach of the constitution, the aforementioned Shinsei Bukky Kydan and Kurozumi Ky have
indicated that, as religious groups, they prefer to keep their distance from political activities [2].

The decision of some large groups to be affiliated with Nippon Kaigi in the first place
makes us wonder. One such case is Urasenkes tea school. The School does offer many honorary
positions in its numerous local branches, which are often happily taken by legislators. However,
how Urasenke can benefit from legislators is not necessarily clear, because its activity consists of
offering instruction in the tea ceremony and thereby spreading traditional tea culture. Moreover,
Urasenke is one of three families descended from legendary 16th century tea master Senno
Riky, and is firmly established historically, culturally and socially. It does not need to boost
legitimacy and name value by linking up with legislators. It is likewise unheard of for Urasenke to
promote a specific ideological agenda. It is possible that Nippon Kaigi is connected to Urasenke

8
Kokuchkai was founded in 1914 by Tanaka Chigaku, who promoted modern Nichirenism.
only through personal ties its group representatives or administrative cadres may have with
Urasenkes former hereditary leader, a navy war-veteran who has written columns in the rightist
Sankei Shimbun newspaper (This former leader does sometimes express political views in the
column, though his writings appear to touch mostly on traditional tea culture and ancient
Chinese classics).

Similarly, the case of the prestigious Hieizan Enryakuji Temple is equally hard to
understand. Since its establishment in the 9th Century, the temple has been revered by members
of the imperial family, aristocrats, daimyo lords, samurais, and more recently, by political and
intellectual elites. The institution would not need to ask for help from legislators. In medieval
times, the Hieizan Enryakuji Temple and the affiliated Tendai Temples were known as major
political actors that maintained a strong military and espoused specific religious-political beliefs,
but of course it is different today. It is unheard of for the modern-day Hieizan Enryakuji Temple
to adopt a specific political-ideological position.

In contrast, Jinja Honchs pursuit of close ties to legislators has a reasonable

explanation. Although Shintoism may enjoy better acceptance among the Japanese people than
any other religion, today certain Shintoists seem to suffer political anxiety and harbor grievances.
In the modern era, Shinto shrines have experienced tumultuous changes in political and social
status. In medieval times, Shinto deities were regarded as embodiments of Buddhist deities and
Shinto institutions were built literally side by side or even together with Buddhist institutions.
However, when the nativist Kokugaku school of thought held sway in the early Meiji era, the
vernacular belief of Shintoism was institutionally separate from Buddhism. It was later elevated
to a position similar to that of a state religion.9 It lost that special status when Japan was
defeated in World War II. Today Shintoism and Shinto shrines are still labeled by leftist
progressives as one of the causes of militarism and excessive emperor-worship in pre-war Japan.
Jinja Honch adherents who are likely to harbor grievances thus try to maintain connections
with politics through the aforementioned Diet Members Roundtable of the Shinto Association of
Spiritual Leadership, whose membership of legislators is, as stated previously, assumed to
considerably overlap with the Japan Conference Diet Members Roundtable.

The case of Izokukai is similar to that of Jinja Honch in that its cadres often seem to
harbor grievances related to Japans modern history. Izokukai members generally wish their
husbands, fathers and grandfathers who died in World War II as soldiers or officers to be
honored. Some of them lament that their deceased relatives are regarded as murderous
invaders and war criminals. They believe that their relatives honor would be redeemed or
reaffirmed - and their souls pacified if they were honored by the State and legislators at the
Yasukuni Shine, which lost its State-sponsored position after the war, so they pressure
legislators in this direction. Meanwhile, Izokukai also demands better welfare for bereaved

9
The characteristics of pre-war Shintoism have been open to debate. For example, see Murakami [13] and
Ashizu [7].
families. In this regard, Izokukai has achieved considerable success [21] in exchange for
supporting friendly legislators.

3.2. Nippon Kaigi Legislators and Nippon Kaigi as an Advocacy Group

This section examines the relationship between Nippon Kaigi legislators and Nippon
Kaigi as a right-wing advocacy group. It seems that Diet legislators belonging to LDPs far right
wing, which is currently led by incumbent Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, have solid links to the core
of Nippon Kaigi as an advocacy group. As an advocacy group, Nippon Kaigi seems to enjoy a
certain level of influence in local politics as well.

As for links between the Diet legislators of LDPs far right wing and Nippon Kaigi, Sugano
[31] states that Eto Seiichi, currently an LDP member of the House of Councilors and Special
Advisor to Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, used to be the vice-representative of Nisseiky. Eto Seiichi
was also one of the founders of Zenkoku Gakky. According to the Japan Communist Party daily
newspaper Akahata [1], Abe Shinzo, who currently holds the vice-presidency of the Japan
Conference Diet Members Roundtable, has been close to Eto Seiichi since at least 1997, when
both of them were cadres of the Younger Group of Diet Members to Study Japans Future and
History Education (Nihon no Zento to Rekishi Kyiku o Kangaeru Wakate Giin no Kai), which was
founded in that year. Eight out of nineteen members of Abe Shinzos September 2014 cabinet
were members of that group. Here we can discern a strong and lasting connection both in
terms of human relationships and ideology between Diet legislators who belong to the LDP's
far-right wing and the core of Nippon Kaigi as an advocacy group.

However, other legislators participating in the Japan Conference Diet Members

Roundtable may not be so firmly linked to Nippon Kaigi. Tawara Yoshifumi, a leftist activist and
seasoned observer of right-wing politics, explains to the weekly Shkan Asahi [26] that many
Diet legislators join Nippon Kaigi just because they want to demonstrate their support for Abe
Shinzo, since under the current single-member constituency system, candidates who are not
endorsed by the party, i.e. party leaders, are handicapped in elections. An anonymous Diet
legislator interviewed by Shkan Asahi also stated that he and many others joined just because
they felt that the odds of securing a position as cabinet minister or party cadre under Abe
Shinzos leadership would increase (ibid).

Some prefectural- and municipal/district-level legislators have expressed similar views.

One of Aokis interviewees, a veteran rightist activist since the 1960s and currently a
prefectural-level LDP legislator, even states [3] that many of the LDP legislators join Nippon Kaigi
not out of ideological conviction but for the sake of building or maintaining relationships
(otsukiai). Another of Aoki's [2] interviewees, who is a district-level legislator in Tokyo, states
that while she can still expect some manpower support from Nippon Kaigis local branch during
election campaigns, she has not counted on any financial assistance because, during the course
of her career as a rightist activist and district legislator, she has learned well that the budget of
Nippon Kaigis administrative body has been quite tight (ibid).

Speaking of Nippon Kaigis administrative body, i.e. Nisseiky, however, Sugano [31]
observes that it is well organized and must have a not inconsiderable number of highly-skilled
staff members. It appears that in every election in Japan both national and local Nippon
Kaigi sends detailed surveys to all candidates for public office. Nippon Kaigis nationwide
network of branches led by the administrative body is supposed to be in charge of this arduous
and formidable task: the Diet has more than 700 seats and the number of prefectural and
municipal governments currently stands at about 1,700,10 each with a head and an assembly
(ibid).

Nippon Kaigi appears to be utilizing the data obtained in finding prefectural- and
municipal-level legislators with whom they can work. Nippon Kaigi asks these legislators to
adopt in local assemblies memorandums or resolutions that are actually drafted by Nippon Kaigi.
A memorandum or resolution adopted by the majority in a local assembly is sent to the Diet and
the central government. The Japan Communist Party and the Kmeito Party are known to be
keen on this activity (ibid).

As of March 2015, for example, the assemblies of 27 prefectures (out of 47 in total) and
of 36 municipalities have passed memorandums or resolutions urging the Diet to amend the
1946 constitution, actions that are attributed to lobbying by Nippon Kaigi [35]. However, it must
be noted that there is no institutional mechanism in the Diet and the central government to
incorporate memorandums and resolutions received from local assemblies into national
lawmaking and governance. They have no such obligation. Therefore, those memorandums and
resolutions have no effect beyond the rightist camp boosting its morale and showcasing its
determination and influence to the Diet legislators as well as to society at large.

3.3. Nippon Kaigi as an Advocacy Group and Affiliated Groups

This section examines the relationship between large groups affiliated with Nippon Kaigi
and Nippon Kaigi as a right-wing advocacy group. Sugano [31] states that he has observed
members of Izokukai, Shinto-related groups and Sky Mahikari being mobilized in various local
events held by Nippon Kaigi, such as petitions or collecting signatures to oppose the
government project to promote gender equality in the workplace or to support revisionist
textbooks. It is assumed that they are also mobilized in the campaign to demand amendment of
the 1946 constitution by collecting 10 million signatures, an activity which Nippon Kaigi is
currently ramping up. However, precisely what arrangement those groups and Nippon Kaigis
administrative body have, and how close their leaderships are is not clear.

10
The number of local governments in Japan has decreased from about 3,300 in 1999 to 1,700 in 2014.
 Regardless, there is more detailed information available on how Jinja Honch has
helped Nippon Kaigi as an advocacy group by utilizing its network of Shinto shrines. One of
Aokis interviewees [4], a Shinto priest and an ardent supporter of Nippon Kaigi, estimates that
approximately 15-20% of Shinto priests in Kanagawa Prefecture, where his shrine is located,
actively participate in Nippon Kaigis events (Incidentally, the total number of Shinto priests
nationwide is estimated to be around 22,000). As for Nippon Kaigis campaign to collect
signatures to demand amendment of the 1946 constitution, the priest estimates approximately
10% of Shinto shrines in Kanagawa Prefecture under Jinja Honch have cooperated by putting
up posters in the shrine precinct and setting up a booth where shrine visitors can sign up. While
10% is by no means insignificant, given the sheer number of shrines under Jinja Honch, in the
interview the priest concedes that many Shinto priests are hesitant when it comes to holding
Nippon Kaigi events in their own shrine precincts; they worry about the response from ordinary
shrine visitors, despite the fact that, according to the priest, Shintoists in general are
sympathetic to the Nippon Kaigi agenda (ibid). This hesitancy on the part of Shinto priests is
natural, because the degree and type of faith of visitors and local ujiko supporters may vary
widely.

4. Just How United is Nippon Kaigi?

When the relationships between Nippon Kaigi legislators and Nippon Kaigi as an
advocacy group, as well as Nippon Kaigi legislators and affiliated large groups, are examined, the
view that Nippon Kaigis influence is strong and growing in national politics appears less valid.
While the core of Nippon Kaigi as an advocacy group does seem to enjoy a solid relationship
with the far-right wing of LDP Diet legislators, other LDP legislators currently join Nippon Kaigis
political branch because the incumbent Prime Minister, who is also the president of the LDP,
favors it, not because of the strength of ideological influence or the power of Nippon Kaigi as an
advocacy group. Throughout the 1990s, Japanese politics saw a strengthening of the Prime
Minister's institutional power under the slogan of political reform, hoping that it would
extricate the Japanese economy from a long and painful recession [34]. Lack of political
leadership, rampant factionalism and corruption within the ruling party were blamed for Japans
troubles. Modified institutional environments11 enabled shrewd 21st century leaders such as
Koizumi Junichiro who has never been a member of Nippon Kaigi and more recently, Abe
Shinzo, to keep a strong grip over their party's fellow legislators.

This means that LDP Diet legislators would likely become less interested in Nippon Kaigi
if Abe Shinzo were to step down from the premiership and be replaced by a centrist or
moderate right-wing figure within the LDP. The same thing would happen if the LDP went out of
power again. Either or both of those scenarios are likely when Abe Shinzos term as LDP

11
These included electoral reforms, legal reforms concerning political funding and administrative reforms
to the central bureaucracy.
president eventually ends.12 Just how loyal in the long run anyone who has joined the group for
the sake of building relationships will be is worth questioning.

Meanwhile, as previously stated, legislators are also likely motivated to join Nippon
Kaigi because they see potential advantages in elections by linking up with large organizations of
new religions affiliated with Nippon Kaigi and with local branches of Nippon Kaigi. The benefits
will be tangible even after Abe Shinzo resigns. However, Nippon Kaigi and affiliated groups are
not the sole large organizations that legislators or candidates can count on; there are many
others. Moreover, not all legislators think that votes from large organizations affiliated with
Nippon Kaigi can be counted upon, because votes from those groups have been dispersed as the
number of Nippon Kaigi legislators has increased.13 From the viewpoint of the legislators, having
some large religious groups affiliated with Nippon Kaigi openly express that they are not
comfortable with engaging in political activities must be discouraging.

Having said all this, Nippon Kaigi seems to wield a certain amount of influence in local
politics. Japan is not a federation, but local governments have a say in certain issues such as, for
example, education. 14 Subsidies provided by local governments to resident North Korean
schools have been criticized by the rightist camp. Prefectural and municipal legislators belonging
to the Japan Conference League for Members of Local Assemblies have pressured local
governments to terminate the subsidies [15]. Members of local education boards, which select
textbooks for local public schools, are nominated by the heads of the prefectural and municipal
governments with the consent of the local assembly. Nippon Kaigis local legislators may be able
to exercise some influence in this process as well.

With respect to the relationships between Nippon Kaigi as an advocacy group and
affiliated large organizations, they do not appear very solid because those large organizations
tend not to be monolithic. Even the Shintoists, who have often been regarded as the main pillar
sustaining Nippon Kaigi, do not seem overly enthusiastic on the whole. Some large affiliates, like
the Hieizan Enryakuji temple with its Tendai school temples and tea ceremony group Urasenke,
have apparently not contributed to Nippon Kaigis events in any substantial manner. Other
groups attitudes those of various syncretic and Buddhism-related new religious groups, as
well as of groups of war-bereaved families may be somewhere in between the Shinto shrines
led by Jinja Honcho and the inactive Hieizan Enryakuji temple or Urasenke, which means they
are lukewarm, if not cold.

12
Japanese politics follows the British system, where the Prime Minister is chosen by a majority vote in
parliament.
13
The aforementioned district level legislator [2] complains that votes from Nippon Kaigis affiliated
groups are dispersed and not as helpful as before, as the numbers of Nippon Kaigi district-level legislators
has seen a substantial increase.
14
Other areas where local governments enjoy certain decision-making power are daily public services,
infrastructure building, medical issues and welfare.
 5. Conclusion

Aoki [6] and Sugano [32] separately state that, in their view, Nippon Kaigi is not very
influential. Aoki asserts that Nippon Kaigi appears to be powerful only because the ideological
tenets held by the group and by the Abe Shinzo administration are similar. According to Aoki,
their relationship is that of sympathy and resonance rather than one of influence or control.
Sugano states that the apparent rise of Nippon Kaigi is an outcome of the relative decline of
other pressure groups, especially of the leftist ones.

In depicting Nippon Kaigi, an approach that presupposes that all the affiliated groups
and legislators seriously subscribe to more of the tenets or the most extreme ones upheld
by elements of Nippon Kaigi, and that everybody affiliated with the group acts cohesively and in
earnest based on such tenets, would no doubt make Nippon Kaigi appear to be a terrifying right-
wing behemoth capable of taking over the core of the Japanese polity or even the entire society.
The Economist article and studies by Yamazaki and Mizohata seem to have implicitly taken this
approach overall.

However, this study has taken a different approach that focuses on the organizational
and structural aspects of Nippon Kaigi. It argues, as Aoki or Sugano does, that Nippon Kaigi may
not be that powerful. By examining the legs of the tripod and their relationships with each
other, this study observes that Nippon Kaigi as a whole may not be very cohesive. When
examined closely, the stake-holders of Nippon Kaigi may not necessarily have clear common
denominator(s). Some groups and individuals seem to be motivated to join chiefly because of
nationalistic passion or a sense of historical grievance, while others may be motivated by
religious feeling. Yet others, such as legislators, may be driven primarily by a desire to be
reelected or to be promoted in a political party or in the government. Speaking of legislators,
their votes for bills in line with Nippon Kaigis tenets are perhaps more often an institutional
outcome of Westminster-style party politics15 than a result of any influence that Nippon Kaigis
group representatives, administrative body or affiliated organizations may exert. Thus, the
relationships between the legs may be better described as porous and tenuous rather than
dense and solid.

This situation may reflect the reality that Nippon Kaigi as a whole has not necessarily
been able to provide its participants with a clear and coherent frame16 the organization could
use to turn itself into a truly united social movement despite the fact that Nippon Kaigi has the
potential to command a very large amount of resources by combining those of its organizational
components. Viewed in this light, Nippon Kaigi appears more like a fragmented and elusive
conglomerate that has failed to become a right-wing juggernaut.

15
Japans political reforms in the 1990s aimed to forge a typical Westminster system where legislators
are strongly bound to the intentions of their partys leadership. The Westminster system was originally
formed in the UK and has spread to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, etc.
16
A frame can mean a set of specific interpretations and a certain understanding of events, situations
and the world as held or defended by participants of a given social movement.
 Lastly, then, how does this study evaluate the apparent rise of Nippon Kaigi in light of
the evolution of the politics of ideology in Japan? A recurring thesis in the Western mass media
and in academia posits that Japanese society is shifting to the right, while a handful of
academics, such as Penny and Wakefield [20], as well as Nagy [14], suggest that this viewpoint
may not be well founded. This writer argues that the politics of ideology in Japan may indeed be
changing, but the change may not be exactly that being reported by, for example, The New York
Times and The Economist. This writer perhaps agrees with Sugano with respect to the character
of such changes; one significant factor that has made Nippon Kaigi appear to be on the rise is
probably the relative decline of its rival leftist groups. Although they were able to counter
rightist movements until recently, the strategies and tactics adopted by the leftists such as
the Save Article 9 Association (Ky J no Kai) may no longer be as effective as before. This
issue is discussed elsewhere.17

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Appendix 1:

Members of the Abe cabinet (as of 4 July 2017) and their relationship with Nippon Kaigi

Cabinet Post Name Nippon Kaigi

Membership

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo member

Minister of Finance Aso Taro member

Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Takaichi Sanae member

Minister of Justice Kaneda Katsutoshi member

Minister of Foreign Affairs Kishida Fumio member

Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science Matsuno Hirokazu member

and Technology

Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare Shiozaki Yasuhisa member

Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Yamamoto Yuji member

Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Seko Hiroshige

Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Ishii Keiichi

Tourism

Minister of Environment Yamamoto Koichi member

Minister of Defense Inada Tomomi member

Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide member

Minister for Reconstruction Yoshino

Masayoshi

Chairman of the National Public Safety Matsumoto Jun

Commission

Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Tsuruho Yosuke

Territories Affairs

Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy Ishihara Nobuteru

Minister of State for Measures for Declining Kato Katsunobu member
Birthrate

Minister of State for the Promotion of Yamamoto Kozo member

Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing
Local Economy in Japan

Minister of State (2020 Tokyo Olympic Marukawa Tamayo member

Preparation)

This chart is based on Aoki [2] and Tawara Yoshifumi, 2016, Nippon Kaigi no Zenbo:
Shirarezaru Kyodaisoshiki no Jittai, Tokyo: Kadensha.
Appendix 2:

Nippon Kaigis main activities and goals

Historical perception related

Justify Japans war efforts in World War Two

Oppose Japanese government making apologies for wars and colonialism

Argue against China on Nanjing Massacre and South Korea on comfort women

Pressure legislators to visit Yasukuni Shrine

Education related

Promote patriotic education

Oppose over-emphasizing citizens rights in education

Oppose what they call liberal gender education

Promote loyalty to the state and emperor

Publish and promote school textbooks that fit its views

Amendment of constitution/policy related

Rebuild the armed forces

Promote the notion of collective self-defense

Re-designate the emperor as Head of the State (Kokka-genshu)

Oppose the government project to promote gender equality in the workplace

Oppose giving voting rights to non-citizens

Imperial institutions and Shinto related

Legalize the Imperial Calendar (achieved)

 Commemorate the late Shwa Emperor

Pressure the government so that mourning and accession ceremonies for emperors
should be conducted in the Shinto style

Pressure the government to organize Shinto-style ceremonies to celebrate the day when
the mythical Emperor Jinmu acceded to the throne as Japans first Emperor

Oppose female emperor as well as female-line succession of emperors

Custom related

Oppose legalizing the system of husband and wife retaining separate family names

Foreign relation related

Oppose subsidies provided by local governments to resident North Korean schools

Demand North Korea to return Japanese hostages

Demand North Korea to stop developing WMDs

Demand China to stop sending government vessels to Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

Demand South Korea to return Takeshima/Dokdo island

Demand Russia to return Northern Territories

Others

Oppose and criticize leftist/liberal mass media outlets

Oppose leftist Japan Teachers Union

Legalize national flag and anthem (achieved)