REMEDIAL Law
Prepared by:
REYNALDO U. AGRANZAMENDEZ
DEAN, COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
(FORMERLY BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION)
BAGUIO CITY
2. What is the mode of appeal from the decision of a Regional Trial Court
sitting as a special agrarian court?
It is by petition for review under Rule 42, not through an ordinary appeal under
Rule 41. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 190660, April 11, 2011)
3. Does the fresh period to appeal laid down in Neypes v. CA apply to the
period of appeal in criminal cases?
Yes, it also applies to the period of appeal in criminal cases. (Yu v. Samson-Tatad,
et al., G.R. No. 170979, Feb. 9, 2011)
In Republic v. Nisaida Sumera Nishina, G.R. No. 186053, Nov. 15, 2010, it was held
that record on appeal is not required in petition for cancellation of entry in the civil
registry and change of name.
6. The ten-day period for Spouses Leynes (defendants in the case for
forcible entry before the MCTC) to file their Answer expired on May 20, 2000 (a
Saturday). They filed their answer on May 22, 2000. The MTC declared Spouses
Leynes in default and rendered its Judgment on May 29, 2000, because, according
to the MTC, they had only up to May 20, 2000 to file their Answer, and although
May 20, 2000 was a Saturday, the court was open and court personnel were
present at that time to receive cases and motions filed with the court. Is the MTC
correct?
The MTC is not correct. Section 1, Rule 22 states: In computing any period of
time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable
statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to
run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period,
as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the
court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. Thus, Saturdays, Sundays,
and legal holidays are excluded from the counting of the period only when the last day
of the period falls on such days. SC Adm. Circular No. 2-99, which took effect on
February 1, 1999, requires certain trial court judges and employees to be present on
Saturdays primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters. An answer
cannot be considered as among such urgent matters. (Leynes v. CA, et al., G.R. No.
154462, Jan. 19, 2011)
7. At the hearing on the motion for DNA testing in a paternity case, is the
petitioner required to present prima facie evidence of paternity?
Yes. Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011, holds that a prima facie
showing of possibility of paternity is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
order. During the hearing on the motion for DNA testing in paternity cases, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.
9. If the offense of reckless imprudence under Art. 365 of the RPC affects
several persons, does Art. 48 of the RPC on complex crimes apply?
No, Art. 48 of the RPC does not apply to acts penalized under Art. 365 of the RPC.
The quasi offense of reckless imprudence under Art. 365 of the RPC is a single crime,
whether its injurious result should affect one person or several persons or whether it
results in one or more consequences. It cannot be split into several crimes and
prosecutions.
10. The CBA between PAL and FASAP fixes the compulsory retirement age
for females at 55 years and for males at 60 years. Several flight attendants filed a
special civil action for declaratory relief against PAL with the RTC, alleging that
the said provision is discriminatory against female flight attendants and in
violation of the Constitution, the Labor Code (on right to equal work and
employment opportunities) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) ratified by the Senate in 1981. The
petitioners prayed that the RTC declare said provision null and void. Respondent
PAL moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the matter
is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrators Panel
which has jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from
the interpretation and implementation of the CBA. Upholding its jurisdiction
over the case, RTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. Is the RTC
correct?
Yes. The allegations in the petition and the relief prayed for show that the issue
raised is whether the CBA provision in question is constitutional. The said issue cannot
be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application of the
Constitution, labor laws, law on contracts and the CEDAW.
The subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation exclusively cognizable
by the RTC. Being a civil action, it is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals. Here,
the employer-employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental.
(Halaguena, et al. v. PAL, G.R. No. 172013, Oct. 2, 2009)
case below). Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was
denied. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. Is the petition for certiorari the proper remedy?
No. The resolutions of the CA which petitioner seeks to nullify are orders of
dismissal. An order of dismissal is a final order which is a proper subject of an appeal,
not certiorari. Where what is being assailed is a decision, final order or resolution of
the CA, then appeal to the Supreme Court is by means of a verified petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In cases where appeal is available,
certiorari will not prosper even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. The
existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of the
special civil action for certiorari, although where it is shown that the appeal would be
inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious
effects of the order complained of, or where the appeal is inadequate or ineffectual, the
extraordinary writ of certiorari may be granted. (San Miguel Bukid Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. City of Mandaluyong, et al., G.R. No. 153653, citing Magestrado v.
People, G.R. No. 148072, July 10, 2007, and Pasiona v. CA, G.R. No. 165471, July 21,
2008)
12. Alleging that the substituted service of summons upon him is not valid,
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court
has not acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Yes. Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: The
defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance. Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction
of the court over his person is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the
court even if he raises other grounds.
b) Suppose after the defendant had filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over his person, he
filed an answer ad cautelam setting forth affirmative defenses and a counterclaim
for damages, did he abandon his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person?
No. The current view is that a special appearance before the court - challenging
its jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through a motion to dismiss even if the
defendant invokes other grounds is not tantamount to estoppel or waiver by the
defendant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person. (Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 170122 and G.R. No. 171381, Oct. 12, 2009, citing La Naval Drug Corp. v. CA,
G.R. No. 103200, Aug. 31, 1994)
13. The rule on declaratory relief is stated in Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and it reads:
In Danao, et al. v. Tappa, et al., G.R. No. 181303, Sept. 17, 2009, the
petitioners (plaintiffs in the case below) filed an action against the respondents
(defendants in the case below) for quieting of title over a parcel of land with an
assessed value of P410.00. They filed their complaint with the Regional Trial
Court because, according to them, under the second paragraph of the aforecited
rule, an action for quieting of title may be brought under Rule 63; and under the
first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63, the action should be brought in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court. The RTC, however, dismissed their complaint
motu proprio for lack of jurisdiction. Is the RTC correct?
The first paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule 63 must be differentiated from the second
paragraph. The first paragraph deals with action for declaratory relief which should be
filed with the appropriate RTC. The second paragraph refers to (1) action for
reformation of instrument; (2) action to quiet title; (3) action to consolidate ownership.
The second paragraph must be read in relation to R.A. No. 7691. Thus, where the
assessed value of the land in an action for quieting of title does not exceed P50,000 (in
Metro Manila) or P20,000 (in other places), it is the Municipal Trial Court that has
jurisdiction.
14. Plaintiff filed with the RTC a complaint against defendant, praying that
defendant be ordered to pay: P300,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorneys fees; P20,000.00 as litigation
expenses; and costs of the suit. The claim for damages was based on the
allegation in the complaint that defendant uttered to the plaintiff, in the presence
of other persons, the following: How many rounds of sex did you have last night
with your boss? You fuckin bitch! Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that it was the MTC, not the RTC, that had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action. According to the defendant, the claim for moral damages
was not more than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00 because the claim
for exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses should be
excluded in computing the total claim for purposes of determining what court
had jurisdiction. Holding that plaintiffs total claim as stated in the complaint was
P420,000.00, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that it had
jurisdiction. Is the RTC correct?
Yes, the RTC is correct. In this case, the complaint is for the recovery of damages
for the alleged malicious acts of the defendant. The complaint principally sought an
award of moral damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and
litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by the plaintiff because of
defendants utterance made in the presence of other persons. Based on the allegations
in the complaint, plaintiffs main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of
damages being claimed by the plaintiff, e.g., exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and
litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but
constitute the primary reliefs prayed for in the complaint. Therefore, the total amount
of all the damages claimed is the basis for determining the jurisdictional amount.
(Sante v. Claravall, et al., G.R. No. 173915, Feb. 22, 2010).
Yes, the RTC may allow the amendment of the complaint. The rule that
amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original
complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court does
not apply in the problem presented because, here, the RTC had jurisdiction over the
original complaint. (Sante v. Claravall, et al., G.R. No. 173915, Feb. 22, 2010).
As already held in a long line of cases, the remedy against an order dismissing a
complaint is appeal. This is so because an order dismissing a complaint is not merely
interlocutory, but a final order as it finally disposes of the case. (GSIS v. Olisa, G.R. No.
126874, March 10, 1999)
Where, however, there are several defendants, one or some of whom file a
motion to dismiss which is granted by the court, such order of dismissal is a final order
because it terminates the proceedings against said defendants, although the case
remains pending as to the other defendants. Hence, the order is not appealable
because it falls within exception (f) of Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which reads: No appeal may be taken from (f) A judgment or final order
for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-
claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court
allows an appeal therefrom.
Since there is no appeal [as said order is not appealable], or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the remedy of special civil action
for certiorari is proper as there is need to promptly relieve the aggrieved party from the
injurious effects of the acts of a lower court or tribunal. (Palma v. Galvez, et al., G.R. No.
165273, March 10, 2010.)
Yes. In Zayco, et al. v. Hinlo Jr., G.R. No. 170243, April 16, 2008, it was held that an
order appointing an administrator of a deceased persons estate is appealable because
it is a final order. It constitutes a final determination of the rights of the parties in
connection with the administration, management, and settlement of the decedents
estate.
Where the alleged misbehavior constituting the indirect contempt is within the
knowledge of the court, then the court may initiate the proceedings for indirect
contempt motu proprio. This applies even if a motion to cite respondent in contempt
was filed, provided that independently of such motion, the court may very well issue a
show-cause order because the misbehavior constituting the indirect contempt is well
within its knowledge. (Leonidas v. Supnet, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1433, Feb. 21, 2003.)
But where the court has no knowledge of the misbehavior allegedly committed
by the respondent, then the proceedings for indirect contempt should be initiated by a
verified petition, not by a mere motion. If such misbehavior is brought to the attention
of the court through a motion to cite respondent in indirect contempt, the court cannot,
on the basis of such motion, issue an order requiring the respondent to show cause why
he should not be punished for contempt. (Regalado v. Go, G.R. No. 167988, Feb. 6,
2007.)
18. If an appeal is taken to the wrong court, may this erroneous appeal be
transferred to the correct appellate court?
No. Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: An appeal
erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court but shall be dismissed outright.
Where the accused is a public officer occupying a position lower than Salary
Grade 27, and he commits an offense in relation to his office, jurisdiction over the
offense shall be vested in the RTC or MTC pursuant to their respective jurisdictions. In
Quileste v. People, G.R. No. 180334, Feb. 18, 2009, the accused was a low-ranking
government employee who was charged with malversation. After he was convicted by
the RTC, he appealed to the CA. HELD: Accused filed his appeal in the wrong court. The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions, or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction.
In Balaba v. People, G.R. No. 169519, July 17, 2009, the accused, a low-ranking
government employee, was also charged with malversation. He was convicted by the
RTC. In his notice of appeal, he specified the CA as the court to which he was taking his
appeal. The Supreme Court reiterated its pronouncement in Melencion v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150684, June 12, 2008 that an error in designating the
appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in designating the
proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. If the
correction is not made within the said 15-day period, the second paragraph of Section 2,
Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure will apply. It states: An appeal
erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court but shall be dismissed outright.
In Estarija v. People, et al., G.R. No. 173990, Oct. 27, 2009, the accused, a public
officer occupying a position lower than Salary Grade 27, was charged with violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He was convicted by the RTC and was meted a
straight penalty of seven years. The CA, to which Estarija brought his appeal, affirmed
the judgment of the RTC but modified the sentence to six years and one month to nine
years of imprisonment. HELD: The CA erred in entertaining the appeal. Although the
penalty imposed by the RTC is erroneous as it did not apply the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the decision of the RTC has long become final and cannot be modified anymore.
Thus, the writ of habeas corpus was held available where an accused was
deprived of his right against self-incrimination. (cited in de Villa v. The Director, New
Bilibid Prisons, G.R. No. 158802, Nov. 17, 2004).
But habeas corpus is not available as post-conviction remedy where the appeal
is still pending. (People v. Maquilan, G.R. No. 126170, Aug. 27, 1998).
biological sample exists, (b) such sample is relevant to the case, and (c)
the testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the
judgment of conviction. (Rule on DNA Evidence, A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC,
Effective Oct. 15, 2007)
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