Teofisto Guingona vs Neptali Gonzales

HRETs Composition Rounding Off

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3
LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must
have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a
political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5
members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-
LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded
off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the
CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a
member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the CoA.

HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on
the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to
do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate
converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to
7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly
reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in
compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP
and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party
should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more
than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In
order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional
representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.
Jean Arnault vs Nazareno
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation

This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by the
special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of
the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to
reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms
and imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.
Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus

ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional
hearing in aid of legislation.

HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry
in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the
Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should
not be too long as to violate the witness right to due process of law.

Garcillano vs HR Committees on Public

Information
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation Senate Rules of Procedure

In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between GMA and COMELEC Commissioner
Garcillano surfaced. The said conversation contained a plan to rig the elections to favor GMA. The
recordings then became subject to legislative hearings conducted separately by each House. In his privilege
speech, Sen. Escudero motioned a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on
Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and
Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During
the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. Lacsons motion for a senate inquiry
was referred to the Committee on National Defense and Security headed by Biazon. Garci subsequently
filed to petitions. One to prevent the playing of the tapes in the each house for they are alleged to be
inadmi8ssible and the other to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped
conversation.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci.

HELD: Garcis petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be granted. The tapes were already played
in Congress and those tapes were already highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken by these
incidents hence it has become moot and academic. The second petition must be granted however. The
Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended
to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the
Civil Code, which provides that [l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

The Senate admits in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in
1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of
half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these
rules when they first opened their session.

De La Paz vs The Senate Committee

Inquiry in Aid of Legislation Jurisdiction and Publication

In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to attend an Interpol
GA. De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled GA, de la Paz is also scheduled to
retire. After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the departure area for he was carrying with him
105,000.00 (P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him 45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He failed to
declare in writing that he is carrying such an amount and this is in violation of the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime. De La Paz and his group was later released but the s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon
arrival to the Philippines, De La Paz was issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
for the investigation it was to conduct involving the Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that the said
committee does not have jurisdiction of the case. De La Paz argued that the Committee is devoid of any
jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state relations as
provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). They
further claim that respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest
without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee. They likewise
assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by the Constitution, and
thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD: The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution
states:Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings. This provision has been traditionally
construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption
and promulgation of its own rules. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is
within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question. Also, the
signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by the approval of the Senate president and it is shown that
the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with the Rules. It is also shown that the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published in two newspapers of general circulation.

Senate of the Philippines vs Executive

Secretary Ermita
495 SCRA 170 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Branch Question Hour
Constitutionality of E.O. 464

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes
surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies
particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to
certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita
submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters
that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate
president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and
scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.

EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are
covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered
by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the
President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents
approval.

The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO
464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts
and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged
that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and
conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of
EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power
to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly
and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words,
the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others
who do possess it.

Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The
appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check
and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas,
Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter,
may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made
between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22,
therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to
the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation,
the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the
power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress
oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress
to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive
official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the
highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government
which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under
Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section
22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary
on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid
of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to
appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which
it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of
legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

Read full text

NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.

On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No.
464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide
by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita
when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.

Jose Bengzon, Jr. vs Senate Blue Ribbon

Committee
203 SCRA 767 Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department Inquiry in Aid of
Legislation When not Allowed

It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and
unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the
Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law, among others, control over some of the
biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet
Consolidated Mining Corporation.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various
government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused
to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon
likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically
denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.

Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry
regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance
and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in
clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice
and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA
No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In other words, the purpose of
the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of
Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39
corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation
involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation because it is not
related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out
whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts
rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during
the pendency of this case.

Case Digest: Romulo L. Neri vs. Senate Committee on

Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et. al.
G.R. No. 180643 25 March 2008

FACTS:

On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the
NBN Project in the amount of nearly Php6B and was to be financed by the Republic of China. Several
Resolutions regarding the investigation and implications on national security and government-xto-government
contracts regarding the NBN Project were introduced in Senate. Respondent Committees initiated the
investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project.
Petitioner was summoned to appear and he testified to the Committees for eleven (11) hours, but refused to
answer three important questions, invoking his right to executive privilege. For failing to appear in the other
days that he was summoned, Neri was held in contempt.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Neri can invoke executive privilege;

2. Whether the invocation of executive privilege violate Sec. 28, Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III; and
3. Whether the Committees gravely abused their discretion by holding Neri in contempt.

RULING:

1. The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by executive privilege. Despite the
revocation of E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of executive privilege. The privilege is said to be
a necessary guarantee of presidential advisors to provide the President and those who assist him with
freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in
a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. Furthermore, the claim was properly
invoked by the letter provided by Executive Secretary Ermita stating the precise and certain reason
that the said information may impair the countrys diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
Republic of China.
2. The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the days where he was summoned and expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of
those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information and full public
disclosure of transactions, like any other right, is subject to limitation. These include those that are
classified by the body of jurisprudence as highly confidential. The information subject to this case
belongs to such kind.
3. The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution for having failed to publish its Rules of
Procedure. Inquiries are required to be in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure. Without these, the aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.

Camilo Sabio vs Richard Gordon

504 SCRA 704 Political Law Inquiry in aid of legislation public officers

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 directing an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in
their operations by their respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises
and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.
At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs unhampered
performance of its task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he
threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.

HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,
where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to
exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in
public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation.

Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative vs

Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete
155 SCRA 421 Political Law Inquiry in Aid of Legislation LGUs

In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection
with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of
NORECO II (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO
II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear
before the SP and they alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged
inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification
Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power. The SP averred that inherent in the legislative
functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and
with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.

HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting
local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for
contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible
justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious
behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative
power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be
implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of
legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers
without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being no
provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and
the power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres
and Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that
it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue
the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The
contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject
matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.

Antonio Araneta vs Judge Rafael Dinglasan

84 Phil. 368 Political Law First Emergency Powers Cases

Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals for
houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case. Araneta
appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62
was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO
has no legal basis.

Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe
exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to
him.

L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant
to EO 225.

L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold the national
elections.

They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL
EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE
PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or
simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had
likewise ceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became inoperative ex proprio
vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225
and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the
first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the
purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may consider general
legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate. Such acts were to be good only up to the
corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, unless sooner amended or
repealed by the National Assembly. Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and
approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.

Eulogio Rodriguez vs Vicente Gella

92 Phil. 603 Political Law Second Emergency Powers Cases

Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first
appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the
sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes,
volcanic action and other calamities. They sought to have Vicente Gella, then National Treasurer, be
enjoined from releasing funds pursuant to said EOs. These EOs were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671.
Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but
the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting
as a fact. Note also that CA 671 was already declared inoperative by the Supreme Court in the same case of
Araneta vs Dinglasan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid.

HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be
rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the
last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president
cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671.
Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would
be absurd to contend otherwise. For while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it
might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to
delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law. Act
No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary
only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot
be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the
agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.

Republic Act No. 6826 December 20, 1989

AN ACT TO DECLARE, IN VIEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY, A NATIONAL

POLICY IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AND TO AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS, TO EXERCISE
POWERS NECESSARY AND PROPER TO CARRY OUT THE DECLARED NATIONAL POLICY AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. State of National Emergency. - On December 1, 1989, a rebellion committed by certain

elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines aided and abetted by civilians gave rise to an emergency
of national proportions.

The emergency continues even with the cessation of military hostilities. More than 2,000 persons who
participated in the failed coup, including the masterminds and plotters, are said to be still at large. There is
a clear threat to national security posed by the rebels who have just "returned to their barracks," and the
fence-sitters among the military. Bombings in Metropolitan Manila continue causing loss of lives, maiming
of limbs and destruction of property.

On December 6, 1989, Proclamation No. 503 was issued by the President declaring a state of national
emergency.

Meanwhile, secessionist elements in Mindanao, seeking to establish a common cause with rebels and their
sympathizers, or taking advantage of the instability occasioned by the coup, are reported to have taken
overt acts to dismember the country.

Communist rebels have taken advantage of the situation by attacking Government personnel and
installations.

The economy has suffered and continues to suffer a serious setback, severely disrupting the momentum of
our economic recovery.

A state of national emergency is hereby declared.

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The mutiny and rebellion by certain elements of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines launched to seize state power, destabilize the duly constituted Government and supplant it
with a military government by means of force and violence and other illegal means, has caused loss of lives
and destruction of property and has set back the economic program of the Government. Due to and by
reason thereof, and in order to optimize the efforts of the President to carry out the difficult task of
economic reconstruction, it is imperative to grant her emergency powers subject to such limitations as
hereinafter provided.

Section 3. Authorized Powers. - Pursuant to Article VI, Section 23 (2) of the Constitution, and to
implement the declared national policy, the President is hereby authorized to issue such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out any or all of the following powers:

(1) To protect the people from hoarding, profiteering, injurious speculations, manipulation of prices,
product deceptions, and cartels, monopolies or other combinations in restraint of trade, or other
pernicious practices affecting the supply, distribution and movement of food, clothing, medicine and
medical supplies, office and school supplies, fuel, fertilizers, chemicals, building materials,
implements, machinery equipment and spare parts required in agriculture, industry and other
essential services, and other articles of prime necessity, whether imported or locally produced or
manufactured;

(2) Towards the above ends, (a) to purchase any of the articles or commodities hereinabove
mentioned, for storage, sale, or distribution for the relief of hunger and want of the population,
and/or to stabilize the prices of such foodstuffs, articles and other commodities; (b) to fix the
maximum selling prices thereof; (c) to regulate the fees charged by establishments in connection
with the production, processing, milling, storage and distribution of such articles or commodities; (d)
to seize and confiscate hoarded foodstuffs and commodities: Provided, That goods which are
determined to have been seized wrongfully shall be subject to the subsequent determination and
payment of just compensation; and (e) to call upon and deputize recognized nongovernment and
people's organizations and volunteers as well as local government units to assist the Government
to carry out these powers through the monitoring or implementation of orders, rules and
regulations, as the case may be;

(3) To temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest that violates the herein declared national policy: Provided, however,
That to the extent feasible, management shall be retained, under the direction and supervision of
 the President or her duly designated representative who shall render a full accounting to the
President of the operations of the utility or business taken over: Provided, further, That whenever
the President shall determine that the further use or operation by the Government of any such
public service or enterprise is no longer necessary under existing conditions, the same shall be
restored to the person entitled to the possession thereof;

(4) To liberalize the importation and/or grant incentives for the manufacture, assembly,
reconditioning, or importation of needed vehicles or vessels, including the necessary parts thereof,
for public transportation to relieve the transportation crises;

(5) To ensure the availability of credit to the productive sectors of the economy especially in the
countryside through measures such as, but not limited to, lowering the effective lending rates of
interest and reserve requirements of lending institutions;

(6) To stagger the working hours of, and adopt a flexible working schedule for, employees and
workers in government, and whenever it becomes necessary, in the private sector;

(7) To conserve and regulate the distribution and use of power, fuels and energy and ensure
adequate supply of the same;

(8) Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5, Section 25, Article VI of the Constitution, to decrease
expenditures of the Executive Department of the National Government and government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries through the suspension of services, activities or
operations which are of no immediate necessity, and for this purpose the President shall order that
all departments, agencies and instrumentalities of the government create a reserve fund equivalent
to ten percent (10%) of their respective appropriations, except those pertaining to personnel
services, construction and repair of school buildings and hospitals: Provided, however, That in all
cases, the security of tenure of civil service employees shall be respected;

(9) To issue lawful orders for the recovery and accounting of all firearms, explosives and military
equipage, including, but not limited to, those belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police and licensed firearms which have fallen into
the possession of unauthorized persons or entities, or are being used by their holders for unlawful
purposes, and pursuant thereto, adopt such measures as are reasonably necessary to take
custody of such firearms, explosives and equipage and/or otherwise accomplish the purposes
herein stated: Provided, That this authority can be exercised only upon specific orders of the
President or her duly authorized representative;

(10) To ensure that military uniforms, equipment and supplies of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police are possessed and used
only by authorized officers and members thereof pursuant to law; and

(11) To undertake such other measures as may be reasonable and necessary to enable the
President to carry out the declared national policy subject to the Bill of Rights and other
constitutional guarantees.

Section 4. Reports to Congress. - The President, within ten (10) days from the issuance of any of the
executive acts, orders, rules and regulations promulgated and issued by her under the powers herein
granted shall report to Congress the issuance thereof and the justification therefor: Provided, That within
the first ten (10) days of every month, the President shall likewise submit a monthly report to Congress of
all acts performed pursuant to this Act during the preceding month.
Section 5. Penalties. - Any violation of the rules or regulations issued pursuant hereto, shall be punishable
with imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or a fine of not less than
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or both such
imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court: Provided, however, That if the offender is a
corporation, association, partnership or any other juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the
president, directors, managers, managing partners, as the case may be, who participated in the
commission of the offense or who shall have knowingly permitted or failed to prevent the commission of the
same. If the offender is an alien, he shall, in addition to the penalties herein prescribed, be deported without
further proceedings; Provided, further, That if the offender is a public official or employee, he shall, in
addition to the penalties prescribed herein, suffer perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification from
office, as the case may be.

Section 6. Construction or Interpretation. - Nothing in this Act shall be construed or interpreted as a

restriction of the Bill of Rights or of the Constitution.

Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

235 SCRA 630 (1994) 249 SCRA 635 (1995) Political Law Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT
Amendment by Substitution

Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded
Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from
the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter
Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have
done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way the
bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. (Its
ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.

HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in
the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come
from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather
than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter
of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over
what has been done.

Demetrio Demetria vs Manuel Alba

148 SCRA 208 Political Law Transfer of Funds Power of the President to Realign Funds

Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel
Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the
Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the
said PD. This Section provides that:

The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.

However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the
Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau,
office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau
or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to
be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is
to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed,
such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the
GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one
department to another here.

Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino

III
Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund Realignment Constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program

Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment

W hen President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of

the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary
Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive
to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken
slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once
withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted
to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in
fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of
then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was
disbursed upon the request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the
CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front),
P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several
other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the
DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).

Issues:

I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).

II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

HELD:

I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending.
As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In
DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law
would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents
power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government
budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar because
whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the
heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of
funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus,
no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-
Executive agencies.

Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects
are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they
were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis.

On the issue of what are savings

These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in
the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the
transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds
are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under
the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that
the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured
before unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate
the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries
of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the
DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and
proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that
they have not acted in good faith.

Greco Belgica vs Executive Secretary

Paquito Ochoa
710 SCRA 1 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government Invalid Delegation

Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority Development Assistance
Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act
(GAA).

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard projects
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);

b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects;

c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may
request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is
approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential
pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has
been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of
PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle
blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system
had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork
barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit
was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy
et al.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD:

I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the
following principles:

a. Separation of Powers

As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of.
Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats happening was that,
after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF
funds should be allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle
of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel,
then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That
being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was
delegated to it by the Constitution.

Exceptions to the rule are:

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;

(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program
of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged
in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate
the power to the individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that
once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.

d. Local Autonomy

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives,
whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied
in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system
but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance
energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated
to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Valentin Tio vs Videogram Regulatory

Board
151 SCRA 208 Political Law The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill

Delegation of Power Delegation to Administrative Bodies

In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board was
enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said
law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms
as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened
the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are
to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.

In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the
subject matter of the law.

2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law
allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in
enforcing the said PD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tios arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general
purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane
to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the
regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate.
What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution,
enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of
the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a fixed and limited period with the deputized agencies
concerned being subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].

Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84,
Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said
Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their
business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers.
Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord
84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR
CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of
police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due
process.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly
the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of
the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify
under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be
attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and
can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

Insular Lumber vs Court of Tax Appeals

104 SCRA 710 Political Law One Subject Embraced in the Title of a Bill

Insular Lumber Company (ILC) is an American company engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire. The
ILC purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession. In
1956, Republic Act No. 1435 was passed. Section 5 thereof provides that there should be a partial tax
refund to those using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions.
In 1964, ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to have a tax refund of P19,921.37
pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled that ILC is not covered by such
provision because Sec. 5, RA 1435 is only effective 5 years from its enactment. Hence, in 1961 the
provision ceased to be effective. ILC appealed the issue to the CTA and the CTA ruled the operation of a
sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession, hence, the refund provision of Sec 5, RA 1435
allowing partial refund to forest and mining concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a
sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37 claimed, only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in
logging operations. The CTA did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the ILCs
right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid during the period from January 1, 1963
to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence, ICL was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both
parties appealed from the decision of the CTA.

The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this way: The title of RA 1435 is An Act to Provide
Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund. The CIR contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to
increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the
partial exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on which the Company based its claim
for refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for
a decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ILC.

HELD: Yes, but only in the amount as found by the CTA. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no merit
in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy, namely,
the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax
on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed
increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the
general subject of the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit
duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the
nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. But that is not so for in the passage of RA 1435
since, as the records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title
reflects its complete subject was held by Congress which passed it.

Santiago Alalayan vs National Power

Corporation
 24 SCRA 172 Political Law Title Must Express One Subject

In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred
Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One) was passed. This law
amended the charter of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation). Section 3 of RA 3043 provides that:

a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed an annual profit of 12%;

b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their customers;

c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of
energy.

Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company (PPDC) assailed the said
provision.They averred that Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included in the title of the amending
law nor was it included in the amended law. Second, the main purpose of RA 3043 was to increase the
capital stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al believed that Section 3 was not germane to RA 3043.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in
the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand
that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the
body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or
fraud upon the legislators.

Manuel Cordero vs Jose Cabatuando

SCRA 418 Political Law One Title, One Subject Rule Tenancy Act

Manuel Cordero was the trial lawyer of the Tenancy Counsel Unit (TCU) of the Agricultural Tenancy
Commission of the Department of Justice. He later appeared as the counsel of indigent tenant Vicente
Salazar who filed a case against landlord Leonardo Sta. Romana in order to reinstate and reliquidate past
harvests. Sta. Romana filed a motion to disqualify Cordero as counsel for Salazar and he invoked Sec. 54 of
Republic Act No. 1199 or The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. The said section indicates that
representation by counsel of tenants who cannot afford to pay should be done by the public defenders of the
Department of Labor.

Judge Jose Cabatuando ruled in favor of Sta. Romana. Cordero appealed. During pendency of the appeal
Republic Act No. 2263, AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES, was passed. This law, particularly Sections
19 and 20 thereof, amended the previous law and now allows trial lawyers from the TCU to represent
indigent tenants and it is also the basis of the creation of the Tenancy Mediation Division. Cordero filed a
Manifestation averring that by virtue of the amendment the issue has now become moot and academic.
Cabatuando countered that the provisions were not embraced in the title of the amending law nor in the
amended law hence void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the TMD is embraced in the title of the bill and whether or not to
allow trial lawyers from TCU to appear as counsel for indigent tenants should be allowed.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that that the constitutional requirement in question is satisfied if all
parts of the law are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title of the bill.The
constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the instant case, has a single general
subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they
may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid.
To declare sections 19 and 20 of RA 2263 null and void would in effect upset the transfer of the duty of
representing indigent tenants from the public defenders of the Department of Labor to the trial attorneys in
the Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the Department of Justice. In other
words, a declaration of nullity of these provisions of RA 2263 would do harm to, and would be nugatory of,
the intention of Congress to consolidate the function of enforcing our tenancy laws in the Department of
Justice.

Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy

Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law

Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been
finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in
the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law
allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products
from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities
and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the
imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates
the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three
existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do
not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be
taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the
Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free
competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the
oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and
Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their
immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the
heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to
equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend
billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge
disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The
argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in
refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted
by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell
and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.

RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players insofar
as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by requiring them to
meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

Juan Bengzon vs Secretary of Justice

 68 Phil. 912 (299 U.S. 410) Political law Bill Veto Veto a Bill

Juan Bengzon was appointed as Justice of the Peace in 1912 in Lingayen, Pangasinan. Upon reaching 65
years of age in 1933 he would have to retire in accordance with the law. He later sought to claim gratuity
pursuant to Act 4051 An Act to provide for the payment of retirement gratuities to officers and employees
of the Insular Government retired from the service as a result of the reorganization or reduction of
personnel thereof, including the justices of the peace who must relinquish office in accordance with the
provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes.

Section 7 thereof specifically provides that gratuity may be availed of by justices like Bengzon but that
provision has been vetoed by the governor-general. Bengzon said the veto is beyond the power of the
governor-general hence he filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Secretary of Justice to implement
the gratuity provision of the said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bengzon is entitled to the gratuity provision of the Retirement Gratuity Law.

HELD: No. The governor-general in vetoing the said item of the law has acted within his power; for this is
also in compliance with the Organic Act. Section 19 of the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, established the practice for the enactment of a law, including the sanctioning of the veto
power by the Governor-General. Specifically it provided:

The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

The SC then is constrained to rule against Bengzon and to hold that the veto by the Governor-General of
section 7 of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative purpose and the provisions of the Organic
Act.

Read full text

NOTE: Quite interestingly, while I was doing some research on this, it appears that this case was further
appealed (via certiorari) to the U.S. Supreme Court (299 U.S. 410). That was allowed then because the
Philippines was under the Commonwealth regime. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision. You can
read it here. It was ruled that the Governor-General did not have the power to veto such item in the said law
because in truth and in fact, the said law was not an appropriations law. hence, no line item veto can be had.
Bolinao Electronics Corporation vs Brigido
Valencia
11 SCRA 486 Political Law Veto Power Condition Attached to an Item

Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network,
Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and
radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of
Communications, for operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBNs
continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damages to his department.

ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.

HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the
refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to
operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963
Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in
Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are
expenditures made by Valencias department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim
damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act,
such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill.

Note: This ruling, that the executives veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same
produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.

Neptali Gonzales vs Macaraig

Political Law Veto Power Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill

Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Corys veto of Section 55 of the
1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990
Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY 90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the Presidents line-veto power as
regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her
authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provision; (2) when the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should
veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the
power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law
and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that
power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or
differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions of an Appropriations Bill.

HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more
properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must
be treated as item, which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC
went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive
power to veto, and Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) were not provisions in the budgetary
sense of the term, they are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of
the Presidents veto power.

Cesar Bengzon vs Franklin Drilon

208 SCRA 133 Political Law Veto Power of the President

In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were repealed during
the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to
retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore
these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among government officials. However, President
Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give
preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.

Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court
to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the
said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the
repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme
Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992,
Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in
the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: General Fund Adjustment; included therein are
allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of the government; among such obligations is the
allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.

However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired
justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed
when she vetoed H.B. 16297.

This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the constitutionality
of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin
Drilon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.

HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and
override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend
statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.

The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to
disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item
and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed
some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in
its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case,
the president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion
which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the
other departments of the government.
Philippine Constitution Association vs
Salvador Enriquez
235 SCRA 506 Political Law Veto Power Part of the Legislative Process

Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel Countrywide Development Fund

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the
General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said
that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be
applied for since that is already the function of the executive.

In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither
house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Taada and Alberto Romulo
sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto
Guingona et al. Taada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to
items in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of
certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid.

HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is
constitutional. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.

Veto on special provisions

The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The
president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is
already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy.
He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al averred that the
president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the
president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in fact the Sc found that
such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a
log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs

The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions
which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was
likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the
National expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is
valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding and redundancy.

Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance

The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The
funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to
the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be
expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by
Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed
separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are appropriate in the budgetary sense. The
veto herein is then not valid.

Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment

As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional
mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively alter the original
intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the
AFP. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or
requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
Therefore, being inappropriate provisions.

Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds

According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in
Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the
president.

Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs

Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the payment of separation benefits. The
President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the
CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The
SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it
would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.

Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc

In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under
Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law. I
am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully
adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization. Taada et al claim that the
conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court,
the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions
questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto
Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only
be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of
appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as
superfluities.

Pork Barrel Constitutional

The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local districts
know more about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government or the president for
that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as to
where funds should be allocated.

Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines,

Inc. vs City of Butuan
24 SCRA 789 Political Law Uniformity in Taxation

In 1960, Ordinance No. 110 was passed in Butuan. It was later amended by Ordinance 122. This Ordinance
imposes a tax on any person, association, etc., of P0.10 per case of 24 bottles of Pepsi- Cola. Pepsi operates
within Butuan and it paid under protest the amount of P4.926.63 from August 16 to December 31, 1960 and
the amount of P9,250.40 from January 1 to July 30, 1961 pursuant to said ordinance. Pepsi filed a complaint
for the recovery of the total amount of P14,177.03 paid under protest and those that it may later on pay until
the termination of this case on the ground that Ordinance No. 110 as amended of the City of Butuan is
illegal, that the tax imposed is excessive and that it is unconstitutional. Pepsi averred it is unconstitutional
because of the following reasons:

1. it partakes of the nature of an import tax because the tax shall be based and computed from the cargo
manifest or bill of lading . . . showing the number of cases not sold;

2. it is highly unjust and discriminatory because some dealers engaged in selling of carbonated drinks are
exempt while others are covered and such exemption is not justified in the ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance is valid.

HELD: No, it is invalid. The tax prescribed in said Ordinance, as originally approved, was imposed upon
dealers engaged in selling soft drinks or carbonated drinks. Thus, it would seem that the intent was then
to levy a tax upon the sale of said merchandise. As amended by Ord No. 122, the tax is, however, imposed
only upon any agent and/or consignee of any person, association, partnership, company or corporation
engaged in selling . . . soft drinks or carbonated drinks. As a consequence, merchants engaged in the sale
of soft drinks or carbonated drinks, are not subject to the tax, unless they are agents and/or consignees of
another dealer, who, in the very nature of things, must be one engaged in business outside the City. Besides,
the tax would not be applicable to such agent and/or consignee, if less than 1,000 cases of soft drinks are
consigned or shipped to him every month.

When we consider, also, that the tax shall be based and computed from the cargo manifest or bill of lading
. . . showing the number of cases not sold but received by the taxpayer, the intention to limit the
application of the ordinance to soft drinks and carbonated drinks brought into the City from outside thereof
becomes apparent. Viewed from this angle, the tax partakes of the nature of an import duty, which is
beyond defendants authority to impose by express provision of law. It is true that the uniformity essential
to the valid exercise of the power of taxation does not require identity or equality under all circumstances,
or negate the authority to classify the objects of taxation.

The classification made in the exercise of this authority, to be valid, must, however, be reasonable and this
requirement is not deemed satisfied unless: (1) it is based upon substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the legislation or ordinance; (3) the classification
applies, not only to present conditions, but, also, to future conditions substantially identical to those of the
present; and (4) the classification applies equally to all those who belong to the same class. These
conditions are not fully met by the ordinance in question.

Indeed, if its purpose were merely to levy a burden upon the sale of soft drinks or carbonated beverages,
there is no reason why sales thereof by dealers other than agents or consignees of producers or merchants
established outside the City of Butuan should be exempt from the tax.

Province of Abra vs Harold Hernando

107 SCRA 104 Political Law Exemption From Taxes The Church

The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of Bangued. Judge
Harold Hernando dismissed the petition of Abra without hearing its side. Hernando ruled that there is no
question that the real properties sought to be taxed by the Province of Abra are properties of the respondent
Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties including their
produce are actually, directly and exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for
religious or charitable purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this case) is exempt from taxes.

HELD: No, they are not tax exempt. It is true that the Constitution provides that charitable institutions,
mosques, and non-profit cemeteries are required that for the exemption of lands, buildings, and
improvements, they should not only be exclusively but also actually and directly used for religious
or charitable purposes. The exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted
it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. However, in this case, there is no showing that the said
properties are actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses.

Apostolic Prefect of Mt. Province vs

Treasurer of Baguio
71 phil. 547 Political Law Exemption From Taxation Assessment

In 1937, an ordinance (Ordinance No. 137: Special Assessment List, City of Baguio) was passed in the City
of Baguio. The said ordinance sought to assess properties of property owners within the defined city limits.
The Apostolic Prefect of Mt. Province (APMP), on the other hand, is a religious corporation duly
established under Philippine laws. Pursuant to the ordinance, it paid a total amount of P1,019.37 in protest.
APMP later averred that it should be exempt from the said special contribution since as a religious
institution, it has a constitutionally guaranteed right not to be taxed including its properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not APMP is exempt from taxes.

HELD: No. In the first place, the ordinance was in the nature of an assessment and not a taxation.

The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
Based on Justice Cooleys words:

While the word tax in its broad meaning, includes both general taxes and special assessments, and in a
general sense a tax is an assessment, and an assessment is a tax, yet there is a recognized distinction
between them in that assessment is confined to local impositions upon property for the payment of the cost
of public improvements in its immediate vicinity and levied with reference to special benefits to the property
assessed. The differences between a special assessment and a tax are that (1) a special assessment can be
levied only on land; (2) a special assessment cannot (at least in most states) be made a personal liability of
the person assessed; (3) a special assessment is based wholly on benefits; and (4) a special assessment is
exceptional both as to time and locality. The imposition of a charge on all property, real and personal, in a
prescribed area, is a tax and not an assessment, although the purpose is to make a local improvement on a
street or highway. A charge imposed only on property owners benefited is a special assessment rather than
a tax notwithstanding the statute calls it a tax.

In the case at bar, the Prefect cannot claim exemption because the assessment is not taxation per se but
rather a system for the benefits of the inhabitants of the city.

Wenceslao Pascual vs Secretary of Public

Works and Communications
110 Phil. 331 Political Law Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed

In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals. Wenceslao Pascual, then
governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to
be used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The
said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and
approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those
terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA
would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be
restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought,
donated the said property to the City of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.

HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent
donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional
defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be
ignored. In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only,
money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private
individuals. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged
then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

Gregorio Aglipay vs Juan Ruiz

64 Phil. 201 Political Law Appropriation Religious Sect Religious Freedom

The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church took place sometime
in 1936. In commemoration thereof. then Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz, initiated the production of certain
stamps the design of which would have in their center a chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat as border
design. Eventually, the stamps were produced and some were sold pursuant to Act No. 4052, which
provides for appropriation.

Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the production and sale of such
stamps. Aglipay contends that the funding of said stamps commemorative to a particular religious event is
in violation of Sec 13, Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution which prohibits the appropriation or usage of
public money for the use or benefit of any church or denomination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the said stamps violate the Constitution.

HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized on the
stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as being the seat of such event. Act
No. 4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any public money to a religious event. Act No. 4052
appropriated the sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs
and other expenses incident thereto, and merely authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner
indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. The fact that the fund is being
used for such is only incidental to the function of Director of Posts and under his discretion.

On religious freedom

The Supreme Court noted however that the elevating influence of religion is recognized here as elsewhere.
Evidence would be our preamble where we implored the aid of divine providence to establish an ideal
government. If should also be further noted that religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not an
inhibition of profound reverence to religion.

Manuel Alba vs Francisco Perez

154 SCRA 225 Political Law Appropriation

Dr. Francisco Perez, the City Health Officer of San Pablo City, was named Outstanding Health Worker in
1980. Being an awardee, he is entitled to have a salary increase pursuant to Letter Of Instruction 562. The
Ministry of Health submitted to the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City to have the funds be
appropriated for Perez salary. The SP however denied the request claiming that the said LOI only applies
to employees or officials of the national government and Perez is a local government employee hence not
covered. Upon appeal, the Office of the Budget and Management determined that Perez is a national
government employee hence he is entitled to such increase. However, Manuel Alba the Minister of
Budget refused to recognize Perez right to such increase because he averred that the constitution provides
that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Perez
then filed a mandamus case against Alba. The trial court judge granted the petition for mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether or not Perez is entitled to such increment per the said LOI.

HELD: Yes. Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government officials irrespective
of the source of funds of their salary because the preservation of health is a national service. Besides, Perez
is an employee of the Ministry of Health and not of the city of San Pablo. Also their positions are partially
funded by the national government. Some are receiving one-half of their salary from the national funds and
the other one-half from local funds. Others are wholly paid by either the local or the national government.

There is no basis in Albas allegations that they cannot be compelled by mandamus as the appropriation is
not authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part of the Ministry of the Budget whether or not to
allocate. Perez has been proven to be a national government official, hence covered by the merit promotion
plan of the government more particularly the Health Ministry wherein Perez is its lone beneficiary for the
year 1980 in Region IV. It thus becomes the ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the request
for allotment. Having failed to do so, he could be compelled by mandamus.

Teresita Fabian vs Aniano Desierto

295 SCRA 470 Political Law Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court

Remedial Law Civil Procedure Appeal from Decisions of Quasi-Judicial Bodies

Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin.
Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).

Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to
terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of
employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed an administrative case against
Agustin which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited
himself. But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.

The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the
case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) pertinently provides that:

In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may
be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section 27
of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument
has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional
provision was intended to give the SC a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the SC.

Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC
contemplated therein is to be exercised over final judgments and orders of lower courts, that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.

But what is the proper remedy?

Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the
Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.

Miriam Defensor Santiago et al vs

COMELEC
March/June 1997

Amendment to the Constitution

On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift
Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the
time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said
petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and
volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action
for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples
initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such
law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely,
initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were
specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for
initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and
if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is
unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides:
Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress
shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right This provision is obviously not self-
executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Con-Con stated without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this
mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional action in the last
analysis is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in the
cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise
such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its
implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled that
RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution
which reads in part:

Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given
when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend
the Constitution thru a peoples initiative.

As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis. See discussion here