Journal of Contemporary Asia

ISSN: 0047-2336 (Print) 1752-7554 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjoc20

The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysia and

the Electoral Authoritarian Regime

Ross Tapsell

To cite this article: Ross Tapsell (2013) The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysia and
the Electoral Authoritarian Regime, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 43:4, 613-635, DOI:
10.1080/00472336.2013.765138

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2013.765138

Published online: 22 Feb 2013.

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Journal of Contemporary Asia, 2013
Vol. 43, No. 4, 613635, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2013.765138

The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysia

and the Electoral Authoritarian Regime
ROSS TAPSELL
School of Culture, History & Language, College of Asia & the Pacific, Australian National University,
Canberra, Australia

ABSTRACT This article will provide an outline of the Malaysian media freedom movement from
reformasi in 1998 until today. Research for this article includes testimony from those journalists and
activists who attempted to implement reform in the media industry, including detailing reported
instances of direct editorial intervention. This article explains that the advent of new media
technologies has pushed journalism in new directions in Malaysia, but rather than accept these
changes as part of a media liberalisation process, the government has retaliated through constraints
and controls over the media and its practitioners. Seen through the prism of media liberalisation,
this article adds to the body of scholarly work which examines Malaysias electoral authoritarian
regime.

KEY WORDS: Malaysia, media, journalism, press freedom, reformasi, politics

This article examines the Malaysian media freedom movement from 1998 to the present
day. It draws upon personal interviews with journalists and activists who have supported
greater media liberalisation in Malaysia, and documents the difficulties they faced when
pursuing this cause. The media freedom movement in Malaysia is assessed as: the
sprouting of online news and commentary, establishment of independent journalism
ventures, active and vociferous media freedom non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
and critical discussions inside the mainstream media on the role of journalists. It is argued
that the Malaysian government has hardened in its attitude and actions toward media
freedom in various waves since reformasi, and thus the period 19982012 has not been
one of sustained media liberalisation. Rather, the process has been potential media
liberalisation followed by backlash and retaliation from the ruling power. Thus, this article
provides further insights as to the way the Malaysian political regime operates, seen
through the prism of government control over media practitioners.
Scholarship has looked to classify regimes which fall under the messy, middle
ground between the poles of democracy and dictatorship (Schedler 2006). As
Schedler (2006) has noted, concepts such as hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002),
semi-democracies (Smith 2005), semi-authoritarianism (Ottoway 2000), semi-dic-
tatorship (Brooker 2000) and competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010)
have been used to understand such regimes. The concept of electoral authoritarianism

Correspondence Address: R. Tapsell, School of Culture, History & Language, College of Asia & the Pacific,
Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia. Email: Ross.Tapsell@anu.edu.au

2013 Journal of Contemporary Asia

614 R. Tapsell

has been adeptly applied to regimes such as Malaysias (Schedler 2006). Electoral
authoritarianism theory argues that while regimes might give the impression of demo-
cratic elections and imply that the country is moving toward liberalisation, in reality
elections are manipulated, and perceived institutional reform is actually sporadic or
ineffective. Case (2006, 95112) argues that Southeast Asia is the homeland of
electoral authoritarianism. In Malaysia, the Barisan National (BN) has refrained
from grossly rigging or stealing elections, instead perpetuating its dominance through
subtler stratagems for more than three decades (Case 2009, 312). Pepinsky (2009, 115)
has argued that electoral authoritarianism is a good fit for Malaysia, where elections are
integral to the regimes stability but where they are neither free enough nor fair enough
to be democratic.
If we follow the argument by Linz and Stepan (1996) that there is a period of liberal-
isation before democratisation then in Malaysia there is renewed hope that the process of
liberalisation is currently occurring. The 2008 national election, one of the most studied
contests in the Southeast Asia setting, was seen by many as a victory for the opposition
(see Case 2010, 111). It offered the prospect of a new beginning in Malaysia, or at the
very least, was heartening for the future of electoral democracy in the country. But as
Pepinsky (2009, 117) concluded: For the 2008 elections to yield true liberalisation, the
BNs soft-liners must come to believe that liberalisation holds the key to their political
survival, while hard-liners must be contained. In his 2011 analysis, Case (2011, 453)
predicted that Malaysia would not take further steps toward democratisation, but rather
might descend into harder authoritarian rule. Thus, just as the opposition parties and
reformists begin to make new inroads, the ruling government inevitably strikes back or
retaliates, revoking any such liberalising steps.
The liberalisation process can involve a lessening of censorship of the media (Linz and
Stepan 1996, 3). The 2008 elections were seen as particularly encouraging for media
liberalisation in Malaysia because of the role played by the Internet and social media in
circumventing various government controls. To date, Abbotts (2011) work is the only
study which attempts to prove government control over the media through the prism of
electoral authoritarianism. He does so through quantitative analysis to attempt to measure
pro-government bias in his coding of two Malay-language newspapers, Utusan Malaysia
and Berita Harian. He found that both newspapers displayed a strong bias toward the
ruling coalition, and that legislative pressures, combined with corporate ownership, links
the overwhelming majority of Malaysian newspapers directly or indirectly to the consti-
tuent political parties of the governing coalition, encouraging self-censorship among
Malaysian journalists (Abbott 2011, 24). This research aims to build on the study of
electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia by examining the pressures placed upon journalists
and activists who pursue liberalisation of the media. Through crucial testimony from those
involved in the movement for greater media reforms, an assessment of the media liberal-
isation process in an electoral authoritarian regime is explained.
This research will begin in 1998, when the reformasi period and arrival of the Internet
brought about acute change in the media landscape, and when journalists and activists
were encouraged by evidence that these new technologies were pushing journalism in new
directions. Assessing the movement over a fourteen-year period gives greater credence
when assessing the current movement for media freedom in Malaysia, as many of the
activists and journalists prevalent in media reform today were involved in the push for
reforms in 1998.
 The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysia 615

As such, this research examines the people behind the movement those who have
struggled to implement change within the industry since reformasi. Seventeen personal
interviews were conducted with the author in Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Kota Kinabalu.
A further two interviews were conducted in Australia. Interviewees were selected if they
were considered to have been involved in pursuing media freedom during the period
19982012.1 Government ministers or editors of pro-government newspapers were not
interviewed. The scope of this research was to hear the story of those who have attempted
to pursue the media liberalisation process within the industry and to gain a sense, through
personal interviews, of their thoughts as they attempted to pursue the cause of media
freedom. As such, those who were interviewed for this article were journalists, NGO
workers and some journalism academics and authors. Further research could examine the
role of those inside government, and government-appointed editors, in hindering or
flourishing potential media freedom movements in Malaysia. The reform attempts out-
lined in this article shed light on the liberalisation movement within the Malaysian media,
and the response it incurred from Malaysias electoral authoritarian regime.

Reforming the Media

The ruling BN party has been Malaysias ruling political force since it was formed in
1973 as a successor to the previous Alliance (Perikatan) Party which ruled since
Malaysias independence in 1957. It has never convincingly attempted to advocate for
greater media freedom in the country (Mohd Azizuddin 2005; Jaifei Yin 2003). While
legal restrictions on the Malay press occurred during British colonisation (Mustafa
2002, 140142), laws which concern media practitioners in Malaysia include the
Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA), the Official Secrets Act (OSA), the
Sedition Act and the Internal Security Act (ISA).2 In particular, the ISA has been
used to subjugate individual journalists, editors or writers considered overtly critical
of the ruling power. The PPPA of 1984 is the most explicit form of legislative control
over media freedom and central to the curbing mechanism of the State. Section 22(1) of
the PPPA empowers the Home Minister to revoke or suspend a printing or publishing
licence if that publication is deemed prejudicial to security, morality, public order
public interest or national interest. This act requires media operators to apply for a
new publishing permit every year (Loo 2000, 220221). As we shall see, activists for
media freedom have focused their energies on convincing the government (and the
Malaysian people) that the PPPA is unnecessary and constricting, and hinders any
development of independent media. The overall result of all these legislative regulations
and pressures, particularly pressures from the threat of permit denial, means the media
has been described as shackled (Mohd Azizuddin 2005) and subject to stringent
controls (Abbott 2011, 16). Prime Minister Mahathirs decision in 1996 not to regulate
or censor the Internet meant the strict PPPA laws subjected to the printed press were less
relevant to those producing news and views online.3 Indeed, online publications such as
Malaysiakini and Aliran, have at certain times continued to produce content online
despite not officially having their PPPA licence renewed. While the PPPA may be less
relevant for online journalists and bloggers, the ISA and defamation charges have still
been used to intimidate those who criticise the regime through the Internet. Thus, the
online media in Malaysia are not exempt from legal pressures, despite their attempts to
operate under different rules from the mainstream print media.
616 R. Tapsell

As well as the strict laws and regulatory mechanisms noted above, virtually all main-
stream newspapers in Malaysia are owned or controlled by parties allied to the ruling BN
(Abbott 2004; 2011). The government has consistently denied the opposition broadcast
time on the national radio and television corporation, Radio Television Malaysia, making
it difficult for alternative voices to reach the public via mainstream media (Abbott 2004,
82). A decisive moment in Malaysias history was May 13, 1969, at the General Elections,
when The Alliance accused the opposition of using freedom of expression and public
demonstrations to exploit racial sentiments and dissatisfaction amongst non-Malays. Riots
and inter-communal violence followed, and a State of Emergency was declared by the
government (Zaharom 2002, 124125). The print and television media was to remain
muzzled its role projected by the government and many within the industry became
predominantly good news regarding government policy, racial harmony and national
identity. As such, the media role as watchdog of the governments activities has
struggled to take hold in Malaysia post-May 13, 1969 (Mohd Azizuddin 2005, 347).
The concept of developmental journalism was fostered in Malaysia (and elsewhere in
Asia) as a form of journalism which assists with the process of development and one
where the press is not a natural adversary of government (see Loo 2000, 216218).
Current Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak echoed this sentiment when he said in
2010: A symbiotic relationship between the press and the government is absolutely
critical for our future and development as a nation (CIJ 2011, 34). While there were
periods of increased media freedom before reformasi in 1998, the official line has been,
and continues to be, that the country is not ready for greater freedom of the press as it
would lead to political instability and inter-ethnic unrest (Mahathir 1989, 107117; Mohd
Azizuddin 2005, 345).4 While one of the obvious benefits of the Internet was that it
provided a way for independent media to overcome the hindrances of pro-government
media ownership, online journalists and editors still face pressures to self-censor.
Government officials have continued to argue that the role of journalists and media
institutions (online or otherwise) in Malaysia is to maintain communal harmony, rather
than provoke political or social change (Gan 2002; see Bernama, June 24, 2012).
Conversely, despite the mainstream media operating under a more institutionally con-
strictive and legally restrictive environment, there have been mainstream Malaysian
journalists who have advocated for greater media freedom in the country. Thus, activists
and journalists who have attempted to encourage media liberalisation have generally
focused their attention on two main causes. The first has been reforming strict laws
governing the media, particularly the PPPA. The second is promoting greater autonomy
for journalists within the media industry itself. This ultimately meant addressing institu-
tional practice of self-censorship amongst media workers. Of course, the two causes do
overlap, as a central reason for the continual practice of self-censorship amongst journal-
ists and editors is intrusive laws such as the PPPA.
The instigator for media reform movements has often been changes in platform
technology used to disseminate news. In Malaysia, the reformasi period in 1998 coincided
with the arrival of the Internet, and many activists and commentators believed that this
new medium would drive political change and greater reforms. The next phase of media
liberalisation occurred with the onset of social media, particularly Twitter and Facebook,
which helped mobilise a movement for reform driven by Bersih 2.0. Thus, changes in
media technologies and platforms has pushed journalism in new directions, and ultimately
sparked attempts at greater liberalisation of media. The crucial issue was whether the
 The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysia 617

Malaysian regime would embrace this liberalisation process as inevitable and crucial to
BNs survival, or whether its response would be one of retaliation and backlash against
the reformists.

The Media Freedom Movement during Reformasi

The Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 led to unexpected protests and violence across the
Southeast Asian region. In Malaysia, as Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim positioned
himself as a reformer who spoke out against then Prime Minister Mahathir he was soon
arrested and charged with sodomy and corruption in September 1998. He became the key
figure in the movement pressuring for rapid political reform in Malaysia. The term
reformasi was first introduced to Malaysia when political agitation against President
Soeharto was near its peak in Indonesia, with calls for greater transparency in government.
As Heryanto and Mandal (2003, 5) have explained, it was the media that accorded
primacy to it, and oppositional actors found it difficult to avoid its use. The open-
endedness of the term has been the source of its success, allowing disparate oppositional
groups to find in it something that spoke to their cause and thereby galvanise their forces
(Noor 1999; Khoo Boo Tiek 2003).
In November 1998, a number of Southeast Asian journalists met in Bangkok to discuss
pursuing a collective movement for greater media freedom in the region. The group
included Sheila Coronel (Philippines), Gayathry Venkiteswaran and Prangtip Daorueng
(Thailand), and Andreas Harsono and Wisnu Hanggoro (Indonesia). The journalists
formed the Southeast Asia Press Alliance (SEAPA) and became key figures for media
freedom in the region. The Malaysian journalists at SEAPA included Steven Gan, Sharaad
Kuttan and Premesh Chandran. They were all former colleagues from The Sun, hired in
1994 by former Fairfax and Australian Broadcasting Corporation journalist Kean Wong.
Gan recalls: Through SEAPA we pushed for a freer media. In Malaysia, we knew the
restrictions and felt that we werent allowed to do our job as journalists (Interview,
December 10, 2011). Kuttan, who had been expelled from Singapore for his anti-govern-
ment writings, recalled that SEAPA helped solidify links with like-minded journalists in
the region, and to improve the possibility for taking collective action: I promised at
SEAPA to get more involved [in the media freedom movement] in Malaysia (Interview,
December 12, 2011). Kuttan was writing for Mens Review, a glossy colour magazine that
maintained a mix of mainstream presentation yet also discussed sensitive political issues.5
Despite the commercial nature of the magazine, journalists at this publication claimed it
was an important start in their process of presenting issues more forthrightly to a
Malaysian audience. Kuttan, for example, reported about the build-up to reformasi in
Indonesia from Jakarta in 1996 for Mens Review.6 The Indonesian and Malaysian
journalists in particular formed important friendships. Andreas Harsono said the group
shared important goals of improving the quality of journalism in the region (Interview,
November 20, 2011). Santoso, who had started an underground magazine in Jakarta,
Independent, was arrested under the Soeharto regime and fled to Malaysia. He stated: We
were all open minded and wanting more freedom of the press. In Malaysia, there were
hard laws and harsh censorship conditions. We felt similar conditions in Indonesia
(Interview, November 30, 2011). Santoso lived underground in Kuala Lumpur with
the assistance of his Malaysian colleagues. As the New Order regime collapsed in
Indonesia, Malaysians journalists watched the reformasi movement there. Optimism
618 R. Tapsell

amongst political activists, some politicians, and concerned citizens in Malaysia began to
grow, buoyed by the dramatic fall of Suharto (Mustafa 2005: 132).
The government, used to censoring journalists through press permits and through the
mainstream media institutional practice of self-censorship, soon found it difficult to stop
the criticism on the Internet by pro-reformasi activists (Sudibyo 2010; Weiss 2006, 192
240). One of the first journalists to have seen the potential of the Internet was M.G.G.
Pillai (formerly of Far Eastern Economic Review, Reuters and Asiaweek) who had formed
an online mailing list Sang Kancil (The Mouse Deer) in 1996, which later became
commentaries and reporting on the political turmoil occurring in Malaysia during refor-
masi. Sites carrying anti-Mahathir stories mushroomed. By the end of 1998, at least 30
anti-government sites had appeared (McCargo 2003, 47), including Laman Reformasi,
Anwar Online, Jiwa Merdeka, Freemalaysia and Reformasi Dot Com. Some of these
websites saw several million hits in early 1999 (Kelly 2003, 70). The content of the
reformasi websites was incredibly diverse, but the impact of some of the more serious of
them challenged the regimes media monopoly (Khoo Boo Teik 2003, 106). AC Nielson
in 2001 found that readership amongst some of the main newspapers in Malaysia had
declined by around 30% in the period 19982000 (Chin 2003, 131).
The alternative print press also increased its readership during this time. Harakah, the
publication of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party or PAS, reportedly saw its circulation
grow from 80,000 prior to Anwars arrest in September 1998, to 380,000 by the end of
1999, numbers which exceeded that of Malaysias leading daily newspaper, Utusan
Malaysia (Weiss 2006, 147; George 2006, 140). Other newly established Malay-language
magazines critical of the government were Tamadun, Detik, Wasilah and Eksklusif. Aliran
was Malaysias pioneer civil rights group and, during reformasi, its Penang-based maga-
zine Aliran Monthly, saw its circulation figures increase from 10,000 in mid-1998 to
35,000 by 2000.
The most significant new venture was Malaysiakini, a news website created by
SEAPAs Gan and Chandran which received US$100,000 in start-up funds from
SEAPA through the Media Development Loan Fund (McDaniel 2002, 174).
Malaysiakini became so popular at the end of 2000 that it had daily hits of more than
120,000 (174). While other websites, such as Harakahdaily.com and Freeanwar.com, were
receiving daily hits of 140,000 and over, Malaysiakinis explicit positioning was as an
independent, online newspaper (Chin 2003, 132). In 2001 Gan and Chandran were ranked
18th in Asiaweeks annual ranking of the 50 most powerful people in the region (Rodan
2004, 155). Malaysiakini received the Free Media Pioneer Award from the International
Press Institute earlier that year. Much has been written about the importance of
Malaysiakini as a thorn in the side of the Malaysian regime. Cherian George (2006,
162163) defines Malaysiakini as a political but non-partisan brand of independent
journalism, where he quotes Gans views on the sites role: If we had no competition
out there, we would provide the positive and the negative. But, as things stand, our
mission is to highlight the negative.
Sensing the political brand of journalism might be being stressed over the non-
partisan, Kean Wong and Kuttan, amongst others, started a project to provide critical
analysis of the issues of reformasi. Wong explained:

in 1998 there was a hugely partisan movement. Malaysia was stuck with this mire of
you are either with us or against us. We wanted to foster independent journalism. I
 The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysia 619

am against this notion of the journalist as crusader or as partisan to a cause

(Interview, February 10, 2012).

They created the online news portal Saksi (Witness) which maintained a desk at the
Malaysiakini office, and began an independent radio project, RadiQRadio, which colla-
borated with Santoso at Radio68H Indonesia. The idea was to broadcast from the
Radio68H transmitter from Indonesian into Malaysia from Kalimantan and Sumatra.
Kuttan said their aim was to change the practices of journalists on the net. Be more
professional and have journalism ethics (Interview, December 12, 2011). This meant
criticising all sides, including the opposition:

Anwar had cronies as well, and we were critical of Anwar. We didnt want to cast
reformasi as good versus evil. In fact, it was really about factionalism within UMNO.
We wanted to be clear to everyone what was happening. I think good journalism will
deliver the reforms that activists are fighting for. Counterpropaganda wont [sic]. This
view was not held by all.

Although in their infancy, these new journalism ventures were an important part of the
media freedom movement which attempted to encourage balanced reporting rather than
partisan news. In addition to these small and independent journalism ventures, active and
vociferous media freedom NGOs were also formed. Out of the Saksi venture came the
Centre for Independent Journalism (CIJ). CIJ aimed to target the practice of self-censor-
ship and enhance the quality of journalism in mainstream journalism. CIJ recruited Sonia
Randhawa, who was retrenched at Agenda Malaysia when the news website folded in late
2000. She became the Executive Director of CIJ from September 2002 until 2007. She
recalls that when she began with CIJ: The government had little respect for the main-
stream press and why should they? They had very little credibility (Interview, January
16, 2012). As we shall see, the only journalists union, the National Union of Journalists
(NUJ) has been largely subject to nepotism and cronyism for journalists who did not want
to make changes from within the industry. At its core, CIJ aimed to change this mentality,
and held workshops for journalists on topics such as media ethics and quality journalism
practice. CIJ also expanded their advocacy to include Freedom of Expression and
Freedom of Information laws. In addition to CIJ, Charter 2000, launched out of Aliran
in Penang in 2000, was also an important initiative in calling for freedom of expression to
be respected and higher standards of professionalism in media reporting (Aliran Charter,
2012). Aliran had long been considered an oppositional imaginative space to subvert the
dominant power of Malaysias political establishment and mainstream media (Kelly
2003, 70) but with the Charter 2000 movement it specifically addressed issues relating
to media freedom, including monitoring the mainstream media, and joined lobby groups
in appealing to the government for media reforms. In the Malay language press,
Kumpulan Aktivis Media Inedpenden (or KAMI) was an independent media activist
group started by Ahmad Lutfi and Fathi Aris Omar to promote independent journalism
perspectives amongst the Malay-language journalists, while Inisiatif Wartawan
(Concerned Journalists from the Traditional and New Media) campaigned for an end to
the PPPA and for an independent media council (Rodan 2004, 164). The sprouting of
these media freedom groups was a positive sign for the future pursuit for a discourse for
collective action within the journalism industry.
620 R. Tapsell

The greatest achievement of these media freedom NGOs was to organise a memor-
andum calling for the repeal of the PPPA. It was initially signed by 581 journalists in May
1999, with a further 370 signatures added by April 2000. Masjaliza Hamzah was involved
in the petition, and said: I felt it was time some journalists make a stand, otherwise we
would seem complicit with the government and not interested in reform. The aim of the
partition was to show that there are journalists who want change to take place in this
country (Interview, December 12, 2011). She recalled that the task was not easy: We
had to lobby a lot of journalists and explain why we were advocating for this; that we
were not simply just being pro-opposition but [rather] were advocating for greater press
freedom. Then Home Affairs Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi received the petition,
promising to read it and get back to them.
This petition led many activists to believe change was occurring inside the mainstream
press (Mustafa 2002, 163). Some mainstream journalists began to openly debate inside
their newsrooms the nature of journalistic professional practice. In the Chinese-language
press, which had relatively speaking been more independent in its coverage of politics
during reformasi, with the China Press in particular providing consistent coverage of the
Anwar trial and subsequent protests (Abbott 2004, 83), there was discussion about more
balanced coverage of all parties (Teoh Kian Hoon, Interview, December 11, 2011). In the
English-language press, The Sun was positioning itself as a paper where its journalists
would write more openly on politics than its main competitors, The New Straits Times and
The Star. Re-launched as a free daily, it hired Jason Tan in March 2000 to establish a
Sunday magazine. Tan had previously worked with Wong and Kuttan at Mens Review,
and was considered a reformer within the industry. He said: I was optimistic that the
Malaysian press and overall media scene would become more open, and claimed The
Sun was a chance to use a national platform to sow new ideas, relook received wisdom
and get your message across without being interdicted (Interview, March 3, 2012). The
first edition of The Suns magazine, Vox, carried an extensive cover interview with ousted
Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam (see Weiss 2006, 105). According to journalists who
worked at The Star in Kuala Lumpur during 19982001, there was confrontation within
the newsroom about whether the newspaper should cover the opposition more regularly,
and whether journalists should be able to report with greater autonomy. While the move-
ment took hold in Peninsula Malaysia, in Sabah and Sarawak many journalists saw Anwar
and reformasi as a largely Kuala Lumpur-centric movement; they considered the pro-
Anwar split in the political elite had limited significance outside of the Peninsula (Abbott
2004, 9194). Anwars Keadilan party had little support in the 1999 elections in these
states (Weiss 2006, 143). Ruben Sario, senior journalist for The Star in Kota Kinabalu,
Sabah during this time, recalls: Here in Sabah we were mentally and physically removed
from the reformasi movement. We were still very cautious about what we could write
(Interview, December 18, 2011).
Access to the Internet has been less widespread in the rural areas in Malaysian Borneo.
However, websites such as Sabahkini and The Sarawak Report, which commented on
otherwise politically sensitive local government figures and discussed contentious topics,
showed the potential for the Internet to create forums critical of the regime outside of the
Peninsula.
In the first few years of the new century, optimism for change was prevalent amongst
these media freedom activists in Malaysia. They wrote about a new generation intro-
duced to the Internet that would soon demand greater access to free and independent
 The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysia 621

news. Wong wrote in 2000 that the traditional medias audience seems tired of playing
safe, especially since September 1998 and that it can only be hoped that the present
political crisis will give way to a more democratic and a larger civil society, so that the
media can assume a critical role in dialogue and debate (Wong 2000, 135137). Gan
(2002, 65) wrote that the Internet has helped put press freedom on the front burner
and that there are journalists who are willing to draw a line in the sand and tell the
government: This far, no further. While Gan also warned we are not near breaking
[the governments] monopoly on power, he claimed that the Internet has enabled us to
finally break through the governments barriers. He cited the petition signed by over
900 journalists as a crucial moment in spurring mainstream journalists into action.
Anil Netto (2002, 19) wrote that Websites might not have exactly taken over from
governments, but they have helped to fan the winds of change, and sustain movements
for reform. Through online ventures, there were now news sites openly critical of the
government, and the Internet allowed for like-minded activists and individuals to
communicate with each other and to a wider audience. This sparked models of inde-
pendent, non-partisan journalism, and a sprouting of lobby groups and NGOs advocat-
ing for reform within the mainstream media and repeal of laws which regulated the
press. The movement had spread from online ventures to a small but vocal minority
inside the mainstream media who began to push for reforms from within the industry.
Crucially, the movement had begun to implement some journalists inside mainstream
media, particularly regarding opposition to the PPPA and against the concentration of
media ownership. All this suggested a vibrant movement that would eventually succeed
in its push for greater media freedom.

Government Retaliation
Despite the optimism displayed by activists of the Internet as a liberalising force, the
response from the BN after reformasi was one of retaliation and backlash. The November
1999 elections saw half the Malay vote go to the opposition, with the Partai Islam
SeMalaysia the main beneficiary, tripling its representation to 27 seats and becoming
leader of the parliamentary opposition. The initial reaction of some political leaders was
that the BN needed to reform. However, Prime Minister Mahathir rejected this idea. He
explained the result in terms of lies spread by Anwar and others, and that the govern-
ment should counter lies by clamping down on or discrediting opposition parties
(Funston 2001). In the aftermath of the 1999 election, the annual publishing licences of
Detik, Wasilah and Esklusif were all withdrawn. Harakah was forced to restrict its
publication from twice-weekly to twice-monthly (Abbott 2004, 80). Malaysiakini was
denied media accreditation, ostensibly because it did not have a permit for publication.
The mainstream press continued to be governed by as many as 35 strict laws. The most
intrusive of laws, the PPPA, was not repealed by Abdullah Badawi, either in his role as
Home Minister or later as Prime Minister. The 951 mainstream journalists who signed a
petition requesting the repeal of this law were ultimately disappointed. The government
used the Internal Security Act (ISA) to include seditious messages posted online, even if
pseudonyms were used. In Sarawak in 2002, just as the online media was beginning to
gain popularity in the region, police chief Mohammad Yusoff Jaafar threatened to find and
crackdown those who posted inflammatory messages online (Mohd Azizuddin 2005,
348). In 2003, the police entered Malaysiakinis offices and confiscated its computers
622 R. Tapsell

after it published a readers letter which was considered seditious, as it questioned the
special rights for Malays (George 2006; Sudibyo 2010).
While the strict laws stayed, government set about changing the mentality of journalists
who spoke out for reform. Some important examples are detailed here, including testi-
mony from those journalists who were subjected to more blunt measures of subjugation.
Alirans Mustafa K Anuar sums up the response to the governments backlash after
reformasi: People got scared. The government caught hold of the [reformasi] leaders
and the movement died off. The people, including journalists, stopped pushing the
boundaries after that (Interview, December 6, 2011). Other journalists stressed that the
main reason for the decline in the media freedom movement in Malaysia during and after
reformasi was the Malaysian governments ability to weed out any reformists so that
others who might support their ideals were reluctant to do so. Wan Hamidi was reporting
for the New Straits Times (NST) in 2000 and 2001, when he was reprimanded by his
superiors. He recalls:

I was had to sit down with editors of my newspaper because I was writing too
critically. They said: You know you have a reputation [as a journalist critical of the
government] and we cant protect you. I said: The people have spoken out for
change, why cant we change a bit? The Chief Editor responded: I too would like
to change, but you know my hands are tied (Interview, December 9, 2011).

NST eventually refused to publish his stories, and he was moved to graveyard shift
editor (5 p.m.-2 a.m.). Not long after, he decided to quit the NST. Wan Hamidi concludes:
In the industry, we kept convincing each other there was no point. Perhaps we were too
scared. Of what exactly? I dont know (Interview, December 9, 2011). Masjaliza, now
with CIJ, recalls speaking out in an editorial meeting while working for The Star. She
complained in an editorial meeting about a front page story which emphasised the police
as injured during a riot, when according to Masjaliza, it was the protestors who sustained
serious injuries: I questioned the bosses. But I didnt get the support from my colleagues
that I thought I would. They mostly remained silent. People who I thought would support
me didnt (Interview, December 12, 2011).
Masjaliza left The Star, and argues that journalists who were activists and pushing for
reform largely abandoned the mainstream media. They became disillusioned with chan-
ging the system from within. Critical journalists were placed in cold storage a term
used in Malaysia when journalists are demoted to another desk, or a midnight editorial
shift. Sario, who was working with The Star in Kota Kinabalu, recalls hearing the news of
critical journalists being sacked at The Star headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. He said:

There was a feeling of resignation after reformasi. Everyone knows what happened
when journalists lost their job in KL. We think why bother? We are stuck with
reporting in this level of restrictions unless BN goes. How can we change it? We
cant. Why should I fight it? (Interview, December 12, 2011).

Many activists, journalists and NGOs pushing for greater media freedom dissipated,
folded or have re-evaluated their aims. But the greatest disappointment for the media
freedom movement was reserved for Malaysias only journalists union. The National
Union of Journalists (NUJ) did not speak out for media freedom during reformasi. NUJ
 The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysia 623

continued to see its main role as advocating for better pay conditions of mainstream
journalists. As a result, they needed the support of the government and the major media
owners. This meant they were reluctant to criticise those in power; those who also
hindered the freedom of the press. This infuriated some journalists involved with NUJ.
Jacqueline Surin and a number of other journalists from The Star tried to take over the
leadership of NUJ in 2000. Surin ran on a platform of trying to produce reform from
within the industry, but her campaign failed. She said: A common united front was
difficult to get, and explained further:

Trying to make reform from within [the industry] was very difficult. It would require
doing union work for years so that the reforms could happen. And there is little
incentive for anyone to keep on being in the union because it means having to give
up promotions into a higher grade, and putting aside ones career in order to fight
these battles (Interview, December 16, 2011).

Masjaliza was an NUJ committee member from 19942003. She blames cronyism within
the NUJ. There is always politics about who will be President, and it usually comes from
[conservative newspapers] Utusan or NST, and said: During the reformasi NUJ simply
maintained the status quo. Some of us wanted them to discuss press freedom but they
werent interested (Interview, December 12, 2011). The CIJ had continual difficulty with
funding and resources. Randhawa said that CIJ could never really penetrate the Malay-
language newsroom as the Malay-language journalists were less interested in press
freedom issues, particularly in conservative newspapers like Utusan Malaysia. She
claimed NUJ often discouraged journalists from working with them, suggesting they
would be considered radicals (Interview, January 16, 2012).
Retaliation on the more reformist elements of the mainstream press continued in the
immediate years after reformasi. In March 2001, The Suns new editorial team, which
included Jason Tan, was called into the Chief Editors office and told to hand over
operations back to the old management. Tan said this decision was due to Mahathir
being angered by The Suns sustained coverage of [a] by-election in Kedah, where for the
first time, news items such as such as busloads of phantom voters were reported on
(Interview, March 3, 2012). In May 2001, a coerced take-over of Nanyang Press publish-
ers by the Malaysian Chinese Association, a constituent party of the BN, saw many
journalists leave the Chinese press to pursue other career options.7 The Chinese press had
showed strong support for SUQIU which represented the Chinese communitys call for
reformasi (Cheah 2002, 74).8 Nanyang Press was the publisher of two of the four Chinese
daily newspapers, Nanyang Siang Pau and China Press. The other two dailies, Sin Chew
and Guang Ming, were part of the Sin Chew group allied to BN. This meant the two
conglomerates commanded about 90% of the total Chinese dailies readership (Ng 2003).
Teoh Kian Hoon was the chief leader writer of Nanyang Siang Pau during the reformasi
period, and recalls that: Chinese newspapers all became controlled by businessmen
linked to the government. They care only for making money and have no idea about
the values of journalism. There is no channel for discussion, [as] that is the way the
company is structured (Interview, December 11, 2011). This takeover inspired a com-
munity of writers and journalists who protested against the takeover and who boycotted
from writing for the occupied Nanyang Press Dailies and the collaborating Sin Chew
Group Dailies. They formed Writers Action for Media Independence (WAMI) and the
624 R. Tapsell

528 Yellow Ribbon Movement. It was hoped that through these movements there would
be greater collaboration between the more vibrant, outspoken journalists in the Chinese
press. WAMI included Wong Chin Huat, who was to become a key figure in the
Malaysian media freedom movement. He described WAMI as the product of the
reformasi era which highlighted the general pro-reformasi or anti-government stand
held by many writers and some journalists (Interview, March 6, 2012). But the take-over
went ahead and, although many of its members still remain active in the movements
causes, WAMI was not sustained:

The movement within the entire Chinese community was mainly driven by an
ethno-nationalist concern to save two established Chinese newspapers from forces
allied to UMNO. Three or four years down the road, it was quite clear that
rescuing the Nanyang Press became an impossible goal. The movement lost
the support of Chinese traditional NGOs and business communities (Wong,
Interview, March 6, 2012).

Other media freedom lobby groups, such as KAMI and Inisiatif Wartawan, also died out,
unable to enlist more members or maintain the enthusiasm amongst those who had
initially joined. Aliran continued to survive but its readership had clearly reached its
peak during reformasi.9 CIJs Masjaliza argues that the governments actions meant young
journalists coming through the system were hard pressed to find role models in main-
stream Malaysian journalism, as those that remained were forced to tow the BN line in
their professional practice (Interview, December 12, 2011). As McCargo (2003, 48)
writes: The Mahathir government to a large extent relied on a well-established culture
of journalistic self-censorship. Despite very considerable support for reformasi, and for
Anwar, opposition forces were never able to mainstream their views through the media.
The government had retaliated effectively so that journalists feared repercussions if they
campaigned for greater openness in their reporting.
In addition to the government crackdowns on media freedom organisations and indi-
viduals, the situation for activists became even more difficult as independent journalism
ventures did not succeed in their aims to gain a mainstream following. RadiQradio
ultimately failed. The attempt to broadcast from Indonesian transmitters hit numerous
technical difficulties, and funding from the MDLF was not renewed after 18 months.
Saksi did not survive; those involved moving their energies to CIJ and other causes. Kean
Wong said they failed in the sense that they were not sustainable financially (Interview,
February 10, 2012). However, these innovations raised the question as to whether there
was a market for non-partisan, independent journalism ventures at a time of deep
polarisation in political views, a theme which we will return to later. Despite the useful-
ness of the Internet during reformasi, the space for independent journalism remained
tenuous, transient, and vulnerable to the commercial pressures (Rodan 2004, 172).
There was some optimism that reforms would take place as Mahathir stepped down on
October 31, 2003, and when Anwar was released from jail the following year. But BN
maintained its hold on power, winning around 90% of parliamentary seats in the 2004
elections, its best result (in terms of overall seats gained) since 1955. The mainstream
media sustained their pro-government bias in news coverage and advertisements (Weiss
2006, 243). Prime Minister Abdullah Badawis promises of reforms in the lead up to the
election never materialised. Although in the early years of his Presidency there was an
 The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysia 625

opening up of greater public discussion and criticism, these were seen as appearing by
default than as a matter of policy, and the overall quality of reforms has been very low
(Ooi 2008, xviii). In terms of Abdullah Badawis dealings with the media, it was business
as usual as it had been during the Mahathir years (Zaharom 2008). Self-censorship
continued to permeate the professional practice of the mainstream media industry. The
PPPA was not repealed, while other organisations, publications and activist movements
died out. While Malaysiakini continued to survive and practise critical journalism
throughout the decade, almost all other independent journalism initiatives which were
formed during reformasi were not sustained. Media freedom activists lost momentum and,
in some cases, lost their belief that reforms would ever take place in Malaysia. The
retaliation of the regime left some journalists to change careers, while others left the
country altogether. Some media freedom activists maintained the cause, but a larger
process of mobilisation was to be placed on hold until the general elections of 2008,
and the rise of social media as a platform for change.

Social Media and Bersih 2.0

In its election year of 2008, Malaysia saw an economic downturn in the region.
Furthermore, Anwar was out of jail and free to take on the role as opposition leader.
Protests and rallies were held by activist groups, including the highly influential Bersih
movement. Although the BN ultimately won the election, they lost their crucial two-thirds
majority in parliament, their worst election result since 1955.10 Their share of the popular
vote was 52% nationally, and less on the Peninsula (Case 2010, 78). As described earlier,
the election led to a discussion amongst scholars as to whether it would be the start of a
transition to democracy. The build-up to the election saw a renewed push for greater
media freedom, with the re-emergence of a vibrant blogosphere featuring political dis-
cussions, and the effective use of social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter. In
particular, the Bersih 2.0 movement used social media to great effect to publicise their
cause.11 One of Bersihs five demands included free and fair access to media, and once
again demands were made to abolish the PPPA (CIJ 2008). Analysts argued that the 2008
election was determined by the swing votes of young voters who had access to the
Internet and read websites that offered alternative news and commentary to that of
mainstream media (Kee 2008; Jun-E Tan, and Zawawi 2008). Internet penetration in
Malaysia had increased from 3.7 million in 2000 to 16.9 million in early 2009, an increase
of 356% since reformasi began (Samsudin 2011, 4).12 While blogging did not begin in
2008, bloggers were important voices during this campaign. Gobind Runda, former editor
at The Star, established Uppercaise, while Raja Petra Kamarudin (hereafter Raja Petra),
who had taken to blogging during reformasi with the Free Anwar Campaign, created
Malaysia Today (Jun-E Tan, and Zawawi 2008). Although there are little data on whether
political blogs affected voting results, Gong (2008, 320325) found that 77% of blogs in
the 2008 election period belonged to opposition candidates, suggesting a political advan-
tage when appealing to the young, urban, middle-class. When Prime Minister Abdullah
Badawi lamented after the election: We certainly lost the Internet war (Malaysiakini,
March 26, 2008), media freedom activists saw the Internet through social media as crucial
for implementing wider change in the media industry.
However, doubts continued as to the ability of mainstream media to implement the
broader reforms activists were looking for. A government official stated bluntly in 2008:
626 R. Tapsell

Although there were numerous bloggers, the mainstream newspapers would ultimately
hold sway over the majority of the people (cited in Gong 2008, 308), suggesting that
some within the government were not overly concerned with the rise of opposition blogs.
Even bloggers themselves admitted that the online media were fragmented and needed to
be more professional, and that a crucial aspect of media reform would be whether
mainstream journalists have the ability to speak out (Goodtimes, September 9, 2008).
Malaysiakini continued to operate and, as Steele (2009, 108) argues, it is actually the
norms and values of independent journalism that have made Malaysiakini such a threat to
government authorities. The establishment and continued survival of independent news
publications to complement Malaysiakini, both in print and online, which could gain a
more mainstream readership was crucial to reform. These publications included Off the
Edge, The Nutgraph, The Merdeka Review and The Malaysian Insider. Jason Tan, who
had created the monthly magazine Off the Edge in 2005 to explore Malaysian politics and
culture observed:

I wanted to persuade the countrys business classes, in whatever way or measure, of

the need to help make room in our public spaces for a thriving, dynamic culture,
where people can come together wherever and however they like Frankly, I was
tired of the smugness of some in the media who overtly close relationships with
advertisers were no different in nature from the ones between politicians and journal-
ists (Interview, March 3, 2012).

Surin had started The Nutgraph in 2008 to improve the standards and benchmark of
journalism and to be fair and kind to all sexualities and genders (Interview, December
16, 2011). Both these publications appealed to the young, politically-minded English-
speaking, urban elite. The Malaysian Insider was created as an independent online
newspaper in February 2008 by former Reuters journalist Jahabar Sadiq. After quitting
the NST, Wan Hamidi joined The Malaysian Insider. He said the news site was trying
to be mainstream but fairer in our dimension, in a way that Malaysians have never seen
(Interview, December 9, 2011). While this approach may not have been something
Malaysians were accustomed to, The Malaysian Insider (n.d.) believes the market for
this type of news is expanding. The Merdeka Review, an independent Chinese-language
news site established in 2005 by the former WAMI representative Teck Peng Chang,
began to build up its audience to include a Malay-language section. After his previous
attempt with RadiQradio failed, Kuttan began working as a producer for a new radio
project, BFM (The Business Station) which was launched in 2008 as an independent
radio station focused on business news and current affairs (see BFM, n.d.). Once again,
independent journalism ventures were being created to provide access to voices critical
of the regime, and where an increasing cohort of Malaysians would appreciate (and
hopefully subscribe to) news and analysis free from pro-government slant. For many of
these activists, journalists, and media entrepreneurs, reformasi was only the beginning.
The movement which began in 1998 was regarded as still worth fighting for, and in their
view the Bersih movements were a continuation of some of the ideals fostered during
reformasi. The persistence of Malaysiakini and now the rise of these other independent
news sites represented the next stage. The emergence of the Internet, which began under
reformasi, had produced a larger platform for freedom of expression, and once again it
was doing so. In a political climate where the 2008 election was seen as a victory for
 The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysia 627

the opposition, journalists and activists pursuing greater media freedom in Malaysia
saw the potential to argue for media reforms. As stated earlier, Pepinsky (2009, 117)
argued that for reforms to be implemented on a wider scale, BNs soft-liners must be
convinced liberalisation holds the key to their political survival while hard-liners must
be contained. With regard to media liberalisation, would those journalists and activists
who publicly spoke out for media reforms be allowed to do so in a political environment
of greater openness? Or would the government retaliate once again, cracking down on
those looking to reform the media industry?

Electoral Authoritarian Backlash and Retaliation

Despite the optimism shown by many media freedom activists since 2008, the post-
election media liberalisation movement was, indeed, subjected to a further government
backlash. The decision to use the ISA against journalists in August and September
2008 was an early sign of the governments determination to silence dissent after the
election. Raja Petra was arrested, and his popular website Malaysia Today was banned
for a few days. Tan Hoon Cheng, reporting for Sin Chew Daily in Penang, was also
arrested the same week under ISA after she had reported on former UMNO members
alleged racist remarks while he was campaigning for a local by-election (The
Nutgraph, September 13, 2008). While the government is not officially censoring
the Internet, those bloggers who are seen to threaten national security or touch on
sensitive issues as prescribed in the constitutions face increasing scrutiny (Samsudin
2011, 6). On March 13, 2009, six bloggers were arrested for writing critically about
the Sultan of Perak. That same month, four Internet content authors were charged for
spreading rumours via email about an imminent riot by Indonesian guest workers in
Malaysia. The government was now fully aware of the existence and usefulness of
online and social media, and became more proactive in getting the message out via the
Internet, including hiring public relations firms to help with their political campaign
and improve their online image (The Malaysian Insider, October 11, 2011). The
government employs cybertroopers to slander the opposition online (The Star,
June 13, 2011),13 while attempts to discredit the opposition online went viral due
to their sordid nature, such as the fake videos of Anwar having sex with a prostitute
(Associated Press, June 24, 2011). Thus, rather than see the Internet and social media
sites as a realm of greater freedom of expression, the government has instead
retaliated by discouraging dissenting voices, and producing their own anti-opposition
content.
The government also continues to issue show cause letters (where newspapers must
explain or apologise for certain articles or face suspension) to printing firms, and in 2010
did so to The Star, Suara Keadilan, The Rocket and Harakah. On September 25, 2010,
Malaysiakini cartoonist Zunar was arrested under the Sedition Act and police seized a
collection of his political cartoons (Freedom House 2011). This was all dutifully and
uncritically reported in the mainstream media, creating a sense of fear behind what people
can say (or draw) online (see New Straits Times, July 18, 2009). Also in 2010, the newly
elected NUJ President Hata Wahari, a journalist from the pro-government Malay-language
newspaper Utusan Melayu, vowed to revitalise the union, which he said had been too
timid in the past. His press release boldly stated:
628 R. Tapsell

The government of the day should not stifle journalists and tell them what they can
write or not. If any print media is seen as aggressive, the government will take away
and not renew our license. The government should not give any time frame for
renewing newspaper licenses. Let the newspaper circulations determine whether a
newspaper can keep its license or not (CIJ 2011, 36).

This was the first time the NUJ President publicly called for an end to PPPA. As Kuttan
commented, it showed that there are good people within vile systems. I mean, Hata came
from Utusan Melayu, one of the most pro-government newspapers in Malaysia, and he
spoke out (Interview, December 12, 2011). But again, the government response was to
retaliate. Wahari was fired from his job at Utusan Melayu in April 2011 for tarnishing the
image of his employer through the statements he issued regarding a free press
(Malaysian Insider, April 14, 2011). He subsequently resigned from his role as NUJ
President and retired from journalism. Raja Petra (of Malaysia Today) reportedly faces
defamation cases and sedition charges, plus the further threat of the ISA (Malaysia
Chronicle, January 5, 2012). He has been criticised for switching from supporting the
opposition to being its critic, most famously while declaring during the Anwar sodomy
trial that Anwar was morally unfit to be Prime Minister (Malaysia Today, January 1,
2012). When well-known figures who spoke out against the regime are publicly humi-
liated or seen to have been pressured to switch their allegiances, many others who
maintained the cause of media freedom became despondent. Randhawa said despite the
best efforts of many in CIJ, everyone has a limit for how long they can push for reform
within the industry. She now lives in Melbourne, Australia, and is completing a PhD on
Malaysian politics: You can only bang your head against the wall for so long until
eventually you leave, she said (Interview, January 16, 2012). CIJ has faced numerous
funding crises, and now looks to run seminars and workshops for journalists, rather than
directly advocating for change within the industry. CIJ claims many mainstream journal-
ists are still wary of being involved in any capacity with the organisation, for fear of being
considered a reformer. Masjaliza, now head of CIJ, says the organisation has had to tone
down its role to simply build awareness of press freedom issues (Interview, December
12, 2011).
While the BNs retaliation is, of course, a large part of the hindrances to media
liberalisation, the situation is more complex than simply government controls hindering
an otherwise thriving independent journalism market. As in the post-reformasi period,
where most independent journalism ventures did not survive, those new publications
established in 2008 elections have also not been financially sustainable. In 2010, Off
the Edge ceased publication after a string of losses. Jason Tan said the lessons he learnt
from his experience with Off the Edge were that you should never take your eye off the
ball; the ball being the business, and all the different parts that make it work (Interview,
February 5, 2012). The Nutgraph shut its office and laid-off its staff in August 2010,
although the online site is still partially maintained. Among the many lessons that The
Nutgraphs co-founder Surin (2010) learnt was that providing good journalism is expen-
sive. Both these publications had perhaps aimed at the high-end, politically minded,
English-language market. But other online sites that aim at a general audience also face a
crisis of funding. The Chinese-language Merdeka Review had to reinvent itself in 2011,
when its anonymous funders declined to continue their support. It has teamed up with
Malaysiakinis Chinese edition in an attempt to gain subscriptions. The Malaysian Insider
 The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysia 629

faces financial ruin, a huge defamation suit naming the news portal and two of its
employees (New Straits Times, October 1, 2011).
Some activists argue that greater press freedom will help assist these publications as
they are able to enter a wider market, in an environment where independent news is easily
accessible both online and in print. Wong Chin-Huat said: A more promising future for
independent journalism would come only when the market entry for print and broadcast
media is removed. That will of course take a regime change (Interview, March 6, 2012).
Others interviewed suggest there are broader issues in Malaysian journalism that will
mean that even a simple transfer of political party power will not automatically lead to a
rapid liberalisation of the media. These include the financial difficulties of independent
media companies discussed above; the suggestion that Pakatan Rakyat may not keep
their hands off the media; and the need to develop a vibrant public sphere including a
broad understanding of what media freedom means. Even so, the establishment of more
news sites in 2010 such as The Malaysia Chronicle and Free Malaysia Today suggest
there is still potential for successful new ventures. Free Malaysia Today was established
because they saw the need for more reliable information sorely lacking in the mainstream
media (see Free Malaysia Today, n.d.). However, the financial difficulties faced by all of
these private media projects since 1998 suggests that greater media freedom will not be
driven by a thriving market of independent journalism. Circulation figures of most main-
stream newspapers have steadily declined since 2005, but this is true of newspaper
circulation and readership figures in most parts of the world. Meanwhile, Harian Metro,
a freely distributed newspaper owned by the pro-government NST group, has seen
circulation figures rise.14
In addition to the financial difficulties suffered by many independent journalism
ventures, there are other reasons which suggest that the larger process of media freedom
involves more than the opposition defeating BN at an election. Academics have noted that
the journalism education courses at Malaysian universities have fallen short, failing to
produce critical thinkers. Ng Miew Luan and Lim Lai Hoon (2008) have explained that
the quality of journalism education has not improved since reformasi, and thus, there have
emerged a group of writers who are not particularly critical or independent minded. Some
academics within the journalism education field argue that it is difficult to produce the
kind of journalists that independent media outlets are seeking. They blame a stifling
environment that does not encourage citizens to take an active interest in political and
social issues, and thus it is no surprise that when journalists go to report news, the result is
largely a sanitised analysis (Netto 2002; Mustafa 2005). Zaharom Nain (2011), a lecturer
in Communications at Nottingham University in Kuala Lumpur (also on the board of CIJ),
argues it is the subservient nature of university courses for future journalists: I have
seen how many of the policy makers in [university] departments are constantly in awe of
top media editors and owners, desperately wanting their acknowledgement, indeed
approval, of the courses being offered. Again, the concern of many journalists inter-
viewed for this research was whether there were sufficient role models for younger
journalists. Gan states:

I wish there were more journalists who had the skill to write well and the mindset to
be critical. But the years of depoliticising at university have made it difficult, and if
they come from the mainstream media they get complacent and comfortable and fall
into bad habits (Interview, December 10, 2011).
630 R. Tapsell

Transforming the institutionalised practice of self-censorship in journalism may not be a

swift process, particularly if the ownership of mainstream media remains concentrated and
linked to constituent political parties. Studies of self-censorship in present-day Indonesian
journalism have found that despite the countrys transition to a democracy in 1998, the
practice remains prevalent today. Media owners who were successful under the previous
authoritarian regime (196598) re-organised themselves under new democratic systems,
and Indonesian journalists claim that issues relating to media ownership continue to
hinder their autonomy and encourage self-censorship as a crucial journalistic practice
(Tapsell 2012; Darudoyo 2009). While media liberalisation in Malaysia may take on a
completely different form to that of post-reformasi Indonesia, it is important to recognise
that the process of reform of journalistic practice is not necessarily changed overnight, and
thus media reforms within the industry itself may, indeed, be more prolonged, even if the
opposition wins the next election.

Conclusion
The Malaysian media freedom movement has been spurred by new media technologies
pushing journalism in new directions. The emergence of the Internet during the political
environment of reformasi was important in promoting change in the media. The Internet
encouraged independent journalism ventures, vibrant media freedom NGOs, and
increased debate amongst journalists as to their role. Ten years on, and social media
was crucial in disseminating information and in pushing for reforms voiced by Bersih 2.0.
Once again, independent journalism ventures and NGOs sprouted, and media freedom
activists attempted to create new initiatives to encourage a lessening of government
manipulation or control over the media. Yet recent surveys of the Malaysian media
indicate further erosion of any independent, vibrant and free media. In their 2011/2012
press freedom survey, Reporters Without Borders (2011) ranked Malaysia at 122 out of
179 countries while Freedom House (2011) categorises the countrys media in 2011 as
Not Free. These surveys reach similar conclusions, that while the Internet and social
media have been important in voicing anti-government causes, there is a considerable lack
of independent journalism. While social networking sites contain vigorous debates on
political issues, media observers are concerned that new laws would be introduced to
govern sedition in cyberspace.
Prime Minister Najib Razak declared on September 15, 2011 that the government
will revoke the PPPA by abolishing the clause which requires publishing permits to be
renewed annually. At the very least, it was a public concession by the premier that the
governments old ways of regulating the press were in need of some cosmetic changes.
On April 12, 2012, Najib invited Malaysians to walk with him in his journey to
transform Malaysia. Critics have since labelled this moon-walking, giving the
illusion of moving forward but which is actually a backpedal taking you nowhere
(The Malaysia Chronicle, June 2, 2012). Journalists and activists interviewed for this
research see Najibs promises of media reforms as unlikely to assist with greater media
liberalisation. They argue that while there are occasional positive aspects of reforms
being implemented by BN, these reforms are packaged under the illusion of broader
change, when in reality they do not meet the demands of reformists. One example of
this is the establishment of a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC), which was
established after approximately 50,000 marched in support of free and fair elections
 The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysia 631

on July 9, 2011. Nearly all proposals from the PSC are expressions of intent and
without a time limit for implementation, and thus none of these proposals must be
acted on before the next elections are held. Bersih has concluded that few of its
proposals including access to free and fair media for the opposition have been
accepted by the government. The Bersih movements Ambiga Sreenevasan said: The
glaring absence of true reform speaks volumes. The report was rushed through
Parliament without debate (The Malaysian Insider, April 21, 2012). The amendment
to the PPPA was rushed through despite uproar from the opposition bench, who
wanted a broader discussion of the law and possible further reforms. Prime Minister
Najib has proposed amending the PPPA further, but only in return for the formation of
a Media Council, designed to monitor online media and its practitioners. CIJ and other
media freedom activists have described the proposed council as a new regime of
media control (see Malaysiakini, June 5, 2012). Another recent example of media
control includes the Malaysian Election Commissions decision to ban caricatures
during the next election. As Case (2011, 451) has argued more broadly, and what
has been shown here with regard to media liberalisation, the Malaysian government
has retaliated again since the election of 2008, and the result is a hardening of the
regime. With regard to media liberalisation, the current regimes hardening is more
covert. As Schedler (2006, 12) argues: Electoral authoritarian regimes set up the
whole institutional landscape of representative democracy, including the permitting of
private media, interest groups and civic associations. Although none of these institu-
tions are meant to constitute countervailing powers. This can certainly be said of the
Malaysian governments attitude toward media freedom activists and civic groups. As
Case (2010, 107) states: Direct action, when mounted autonomously from below, is
prohibited under any competitive authoritarian regime. After all, the logic of its
hybridity lies in its squeezing the activism of often unruly civil society into manage-
able electoral arenas. The media freedom movement in Malaysia illustrates that the
Internet can assist the opposition and create a space for greater openness and debate.
Yet despite the increase in Internet usage and creation of all forms of online discourse,
the Malaysian regime has managed to subvert or supress many publications, organisa-
tions or individuals who pursued the goal of greater media freedom. Since 1998, the
Malaysian regime has reacted to the process of media liberalisation by retaliating
against dissenters and media freedom groups, in an effort to consolidate the regime.
Although this was done more overtly after reformasi, the period post-2008 has also
seen the regime hinder the media liberalisation process. Despite the arrival of new
media technologies, the electoral authoritarian regime has actually been very success-
ful in managing the media environment in the country. However, the financial viability
of independent journalism ventures suggests a more complex set of forces than a
hostile ruling power controlling the media landscape. Future research could examine
the commercial viability of independent journalism in electoral authoritarian regimes.
Internal and structural weaknesses, from lack of resources and stamina, were also to
blame for the lack of progress here. This article sheds light on the stage of democra-
tisation currently occurring in Malaysia one that is complex and tense, but one that
suggests a hardening of a ruling power intent on surviving as an electoral authoritar-
ianism regime, rather than pursuing a swift transition to democracy through an
acceptance of media liberalisation.
632 R. Tapsell

Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank all those who were interviewed for this research, Dr John Funston, and the three
anonymous reviewers.

Notes
1
Interviews in Malaysia were conducted in November and December 2011. The interviews were semi-
structured, in which interviewees were asked to recall their time as journalists or in pursuing greater press
freedom through their organisation. The snowballing technique followed. At the conclusion of the inter-
view, interviewees were asked to recommend others who were involved in attempting to liberalise the media
from within, and many interviewees were identified and found upon the recommendation of other inter-
viewees. Interviewees were selected if they were considered to be involved in pursuing greater press freedom
in Malaysia. Some interviewees were selected largely through their publications on the topic. Some potential
interviewees discussed in this article, such as Premesh Chandran, Tan Hoon Chen and Hata Wahari, were
approached but were unable to be interviewed. Other interviewees were unable to be personally interviewed
but responded to questions via other means. This included Wong Chin Huat (email), Jason Tan (email) and
Jacqueline Surin (telephone).
2
The ISA allows for detention without trial at the Home Affairs Ministers discretion. According to CIJ (2011)
this law still looms large in the Malaysian psyche as calls for arrest under ISA are still commonly
employed. The Sedition Act states that offenders can be charged for seditious tendencies or affecting
disaffection or raising discontent and ill-will amongst Malaysians of different races. The Official Secrets
Act allows the government to classify documents as secret thereby making it a crime to communicate any
information contained in them. It is particularly effective in negating the courage of potential whistle blowers.
3
Mahathir wanted to give Malaysia an advantage over its neighbour, Singapore, which had strict controls over
Internet Service Providers, and to encourage foreign investment in Malaysias Multimedia Super Corridor
Project.
4
For example, the deregulation of the media industry by the Mahathir administration in the 1980s had some
activists hoping it would foster a growth of independent media. But publishing licences found their way into
the hands of the ruling elite and their economic allies (Ng and Lim 2008, 85). Furthermore, the internal
struggles within the BN have also meant certain newspapers at certain times would write more critically of the
government, depending on whether the Chief Editor was aligned to the Deputy Prime Minister. For example,
see Rehman Rashid (1993).
5
A cursory examination of Mens Review editions in 199697 showed it included stories about Megawati
Sukarnoputri and George Soros, amongst others, but other stories included Brigitte Bardot, threesomes,
playboys & lyle; hipster slang decoded; 50 years of Vespa fashion and Simply Red: soul survivor.
6
For example, see November 1996 edition with the cover story and photo of Megawati: Megawati: Indonesia
on the cusp of change with Kuttans report from Jakarta.
7
Many ended up in Chinese broadcast media (TV2, NTV7, 8TV, Astro, the now-defunct online ETV), which
have been more vibrant and vocal than their counterparts in other languages.
8
SUQUI is the Malaysian Chinese Organisation Election Appeals Committee established in 1999. It was
essentially a lobby group advocating for national unity, advance democracy and to defend Chinese education
and places of worship. In 1999 the government accepted in principle their push for reforms, including demand
number 13: Develop a fair media, but after the 1999 election tended to dismiss SUQUI as troublemakers.
9
By 2005 Aliran was selling only a few thousand copies per month of Aliran Monthly (Brown 2005, 42). In
March 2011 Aliran stopped producing the magazine for news-stands. It now produces only subscription-
based copies.
10
The two-thirds majority is crucial in a practical sense because to change the constitution in parliament, a
two-thirds majority is required, but also psychologically the ability to gain the two-thirds majority has always
been a key factor in how many Malaysians view the success or failure of BN in the election.
11
Statistics from politweet.org showed that between June 9 and August 14, the #bersih hashtag was used by
33,940 users in 263,228 tweets.
12
Malaysias internet penetration was almost 63% in 2011, and growing (see Weiss 2013).
13
See also http://www.facebook.com/pages/UMNO-cybertroopers-club/197067584569
14
The ABCs figures for the full year 30 June 201030 June 2011 showed drops in circulation for Utusan
Melayu (5.9%), The Star (3.1%), The New Straits Times (9.5%) and Berita Harian (12.3%). Harian
 The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysia 633

Metros circulation figures in West Malaysia were 386,742 from July-December 2011, up from 249,575 in
July-December 2005. See http://www.abcm.org.my (accessed July 12, 2012).

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