as eo eo COPY SUMMER STEPHAN Ln District Attorne’ atte D MARK A, AMADOR ere Deput istrict Attorney ne Sara & @ Training Division SEP 08 29.7 Deputy District Attorey, SBN 195111 BYR SCHACH, Deputy lest Broadway San Diego, CA 92101 Tel. (619) 531-3606 Fax (619) 315-8632 Email: christine.bannon@sdeda.org Attorneys for the People, Respondent SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO IN RE: Case No.: HC22238 Superior Court Case No.: SCD230596 DA No.: ACV800 FLORENCIO DOMINGUEZ, RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE Petitioner. OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATION Date: September 8, 2017 Dept: 57 Comes now the respondent, the People of the State of California, by and through their attorneys, SUMMER STEPHAN, District Attorney, CHRISTINE BANNON, Deputy District Attorney, and respectfully submits the following respondent's points and authorities relating to materiality and prejudice of pre-trial discovery violation. INTRODUCTION Evidence that was favorable to petitioner and in the possession of the San Diego Police Department (SDPD) crime lab was not disclosed at trial. That evidence was a change in lab guidelines that took effect on or about April 1, 2011. The new guidelines related to the manner in which the lab would, moving forward, interpret complex DNA mixtures (Exhibit [Exh] 1 [1 RT 106}.) Following the suggestion of SWGDAM, the body which had in 2010 suggested 7 RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONuniform guidelines relating to the interpretation of complex mixed DNA samples, the SDPD crime lab reviewed the policies and procedures it had in place prior to the adoption of the new guidelines and determined that no re-testing of samples was necessary and that its analysts could still confidently testify to results obtained prior to the April 2011 guideline changes (1 RT 106; 129-130; 177.) Just like the 2010 SWGDAM guidelines, the new 2011 SDPD guidelines would not apply retroactively (1 RT 154). SDPD DNA analyst and lab technical director Shawn Montpetit testified in petitioner's first trial in 2010, which ended in a mistrial when the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. In early April 2011, just days after adopting the forward-looking guidelines, Mr. Montpetit was again called to testify about both single-source and mixed DNA results that had been rendered prior to the guideline change. At that time, the crime lab had not yet informed the District Attorney’s Office of the new guidelines and, believing the changes were not relevant to the DNA analysis performed in petitioner's case since the casework was completed before implementation of the new guidelines, Mr. Montpetit did not specifically inform the trial attorney of the changes (I RT 113; 2 RT 210-211.) A short time after the trial concluded however, Mr. Montpetit as the lab’s technical director sent a memo to the District Attomney’s Office explaining the change in guidelines (1 RT 108-111; 156.) That memo was then disseminated office-wide. ‘Though the failure to disclose the guideline change was not raised in his original petition as an alleged Brady violation and therefore a basis for habeas relief, when the timing outlined above became apparent to petitioner’s attorney in the course of the evidentiary hearing relating to his petition arguing new and/or false evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1473, the parties agreed that this court could take evidence relating to the potential Brady issue and would consider it among those already raised in the pleading without taking formal leave to amend the original habeas petition. Respondent does not dispute that the evidence described above was in the possession of the prosecution team, that it was favorable to petitioner, or that it was not disclosed prior to or during trial. The evidence, however, was not material on the issue of petitioner's guilt or punishment. Petitioner was therefore not prejudiced by its suppression because there is no 2 RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONreasonable probability that had it been disclosed the result at his trial would have been different. The discovery violation therefore does not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENT I A FINDING OF BRADY ERROR REQUIRES THAT THE SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE BE MATERIAL A.criminal defendant has no general constitutional right to discovery. (Weatherford v. Bursey (1977) 429 U.S. 545, 559; People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1258.) “Brady [v. Maryland (1963) 373 US. 83 (Brady)] exculpatory evidence is the only substantive discovery mandated by the United States Constitution.” (People v. Superior Court (Barrett) (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1314; see Gray v. Netherland (1996) 518 U.S. 152.) “Under Brady, the State violates a defendant's right to due process if it withholds evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.” (Smith v. Cain (2012) 565 U.S. 73, 75.) “The prosecution has a duty under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause to disclose evidence to a criminal defendant” when the evidence is “both favorable to the defendant and material on either guilt or punishment.” [Citations.] Evidence is “favorable” if it hurts the prosecution or helps the defense. [Citation.] “Evidence is ‘material’ ‘only if there is a reasonable probability that, had [it] been disclosed to the defense, the result ... would have been different.’ ” [Citations.] (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 866; see, e.g., United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 674-678; Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87; In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-545.) “For Brady purposes, evidence is favorable if it helps the defense or hurts the prosecution, as by impeaching a prosecution witness.” (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1132; see also People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 256; but see People v. Lewis (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 257, 266 [“whether exculpatory evidence includes impeachment evidence may be unsettled”; Kennedy v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 359, 377 [“‘there is reason to think the electorate intended to use the term ‘exculpatory evidence’ in its narrow sense and thus did not intend [Penal Code] section 1054.1(e) to require the disclosure of impeachment evidence”].) “The showing that defendants must make to establish a violation of the prosecution’s 3 RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONduty to disclose exculpatory evidence differs from the showing necessary merely to receive the evidence. ... To prevail on a claim the prosecution violated this duty, defendants challenging a conviction ... have to show materiality, but they do not have to make that showing just to be entitled to receive the evidence before trial.” (Barnett v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 890, 901; see also People v. Lewis, supra, 240 Cal.App.Ath at p. 266.) “{The] touchstone of materiality is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result. «The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’ ” (Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 435.) (People v. Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 256.) “Materiality ... requires more than a showing that the suppressed evidence would have been admissible [citation], that the absence of the suppressed evidence made conviction ‘more likely’ [citation], or that using the suppressed evidence to discredit a witness's testimony ‘might have changed the outcome of the trial’ [citation].” (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1043.) Put another way, “the prosecutor will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.” (United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 108.) That is, the defendant must show the lack of disclosure was prejudicial: “Evidence is not ‘material’ unless it is ‘prejudicial’ and not ‘prejudicial’ unless it is ‘material.” (Baily v. Rae (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1107, 116, fn. 6; see also People v. Lucas (2014) 0 Cal.4th 153, 274 [the prejudice that must ensue for a true Brady violation to occur “focuses on ‘the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt or innocence”’J.) In Jn re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535 (Sassounian), the California Supreme Court specifically disapproved of California decisions that defined the materiality of evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause more broadly than as described above. (Id. at p. 544 [overruling People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 30, fin. 14 and Jn re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 595].) The Sassounian court admonished: “[It is not correct to state, for example, that ‘evidence is “material” which “tends to influence the trier of fact because of its logical 4 RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONSocaiyidvs\H kB wN rer 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 connection with the issue.’ ” (Sassounian, supra, at p. 545, fn. 6.) Finally, whether there is a reasonable probability of a different result is an objective test, “based on an ‘assumption that the decision maker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision,’ and not dependent on the “idiosyncrasies of the particular decision maker,’ including the ‘possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, “nullification,” and the like.’ [Citation].” (Sassounian, supra, at p. 544.) IL EVIDENCE OF THE SDPD’S GUIDELINE CHANGE REGARDING MIXED DNA INTERPRETATION WAS NOT MATERIAL TO THE ISSUE OF GUILT OR PUNISHMENT ‘A. The People Presented Overwhelming Evidence of Guilt at Trial Separate and Apart from the DNA Glove Evidence to Which the Suppressed Evidence Related The People called a number of lay and expert witnesses at trial, each of whom detailed petitioner’s primary role in the murder. These witnesses unwittingly corroborated one another to recount petitioner's participation in the violent beating and execution of Moises. During the defense presentation of evidence, several of petitioner’s own witnesses further supported the People’s account. In addition to the compelling witness testimony, the People presented devastating physical evidence indisputably placing petitioner within feet of Moises’ body in direct contradiction to petitioner’s singular assertion in his defense - that he never entered that area of the park. By the conclusion of trial, the totality of the evidence unequivocally pointed to petitioner’s guilt independent of Montpetit’s testimony that petitioner was a possible minor contributor to a mixture of DNA found inside a pair of gloves collected from the scene. The only] alleged Brady error relates to a change in the crime lab’s policy regarding testing mixed DNA samples such as those found in the gloves. ‘Andres L.’s testimony was sufficiently compelling to independently and persuasively prove petitioner’s guilt. Andres was the sole member of the Shelltown gang to testify against petitioner for killing one of his own “homies.” The atmosphere during Andres’ testimony was tense, and designed to intimidate Andres to benefit petitioner’s case. Before trial, the gang communicated several death threats to Andres through his friends and family, prompting Andres 3 RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONCaraueun 10 12 13 14 1S 16 = 18 - 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 to move to a secluded village in Mexico for his own safety. Then, at trial, several gang members also arrived in court to watch as Andres took the stand. Despite knowing the deadly penalty for “‘snitching” against a fellow gang member, ‘Andres described how he watched petitioner shoot Moises several times while standing over ‘Moises’ prone body. Andres was unequivocal in his identification of petitioner as the shooter. Critically, Andres also explained petitioner’s motive to the jury. Andres testified petitioner was upset that Moises had run away when Edwin, or “Little Crooks,” was killed by a rival gang. Petitioner blamed Moises, at least in part, for Little Crooks’ death. Although the gang sub- culture provided Andres every reason to lie and deny petitioner’s involvement, Andres remained steadfast and brave when he told the jury the truth about Moises’ murder and petitioner's involvement. Andres’ persuasive testimony was corroborated by two unlikely yet damning sources: Josue Gutierrez and Marla Quintanila. Josue, a Shelltown gang member was not called as a witness by either party in petitioner’s first trial in 2010. (See Exh. 2.) When called in petitioner's 2011 trial, he repeatedly denied witnessing the crime. However, Josue had previously admitted otherwise to Glennys Berumen and Carol Martinez. Thus, Josue’s denials in the 2011 trial allowed his prior inconsistent statements to the contrary made to both Glenys and Carol made close in time to the murder to be admitted, and for the jury to be instructed pursuant to CALCRIM 318 that they may consider the prior inconsistent statements for their substantive ‘truth. Glenys, Moises” former girlfriend who also did not testify in petitioner’s 2010 trial, testified that Josue tearfully told her he watched petitioner beat and shoot Moises. Like Andres, Glenys testified in the face of great pressure. Before trial, Josue threatened to label Glennys as a “snitch” and threatened to “get her” if she went to court and “mess{ed] with [his] town.” Despite fearing for her family and herself, Glennys took the stand to recount Josue’s inculpatory statements. According to Glennys, Josue told her that petitioner had argued with Moises about Little Crooks’ death and then proceeded to beat and shoot Moises. Glennys’ account matched ‘Andres’ testimony. More compelling is the corroboration because Glenys and Andres had never met. Each of the two witnesses spoke with police without knowing of the other’s 6 RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONCer anunaeune 10 u 12 13, 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 existence. And yet both witnesses provided nearly identical accounts of how and why the petitioner killed Moises. Like Josue and Glenys, Carol was also not called by either party in the first trial in 2010, but was called by the defense in 2011. And, like Josue, Carol allowed the trial prosecutor to capitalize on her failed attempt to create a false alibi for Josue. Carol claimed Josue was at a quinceanera and therefore could not have witnessed Moises' murder. Carol’s lie was exposed on cross-examination and easily disproved. Carol’s concoction also allowed the 2011 jury to hear that Carol previously reported to SDPD Detective Jana Beard that Josue told her petitioner was with Moises on the night of the murder. Even more damning was that she told Detective Beard that Josue told her petitioner was angry with Moises for leaving Little Crooks to die so petitioner beat and shot Moises. Carol's unconvincing performance allowed the admissibility of evidence which demonstrated that Josue indeed told the same story of petitioner's participation in the murder to multiple people. The combined effect of the two new witnesses called in petitioner’s second trial, Josue and Carol, did two critical things. First, it allowed for the presentation of other evidence of petitioner’s motive and actions that was not presented in 2010 (Josue’s prior statement to Glenys and Carol’s prior statement to Detective Beard). In addition, when the two witnesses so blatantly attempted to provide false testimony and false alibi evidence in an effort to exonerate their friend, petitioner's case lost valuable credibility on the whole and more specifically when petitioner would ask jurors to believe other evidence he presented in his defense, including his ‘own testimony. Although not a specifically tangible effect, it is fair to conclude that the defense strategy with respect to the new witness backfired and critically undermined the defense position with the jury — without any relationship to a mixture of DNA on a pair of gloves. Independent of Josue, Marla also told the police about petitioner’s motive to kill Moises. Two days after her brother, Little Crooks, was killed by a rival gang, Marla told police that petitioner said he was “gonna get those dudes because ... they [left her] brother there [lying] down.” SDPD Detective Gasca, a gang expert, explained to the jury that petitioner's sentiment ‘was consistent with gang sub-culture. In gang sub-culture, itis disrespectful to run in the face of a rival, like Moises ran when he left Little Crooks. According to Detective Gasca, gang 7 RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONSecamryrd \H ke ow = 12 13 14 ey 16 an 18 19 20 21 23 24 25 26 27 28 = members who fail to adequately “back a homie” regularly face discipline for such misconduct. This punishment would be doled out by a senior member of the gang who had attained the status of “OG” or “shot caller.” Additionally, only an “OG” or “shot caller” has the ability to murder a fellow gang member with impunity. Detective Gasca and Andres testified that petitioner was an “OG” in the Shelltown gang. Petitioner was the highest ranking member of the gang present in the park that night and the only member with the appropriate street credentials to murder Moises for his indiscretion. The fact that neither Moises nor any of the 20 to 30 members of the Shelltown gang fought back against Moises” attacker despite the requirement that gang members “back up” one another was compelling corroborative circumstantial evidence of Detective Gasca’s opinion testimony that a senior member, such as petitioner, was responsible for the crime. The final nail in petitioner's coffin was the People’s physical evidence placing the petitioner at the scene of the murder. SDPD Officers Euler and Weaver were patrolling Oceanview Boulevard, near the southern edge of Oceanview Park, when they heard the fatal gunshots. When they entered the park just moments later, everyone had fled the scene, From that point forward, only police personnel were permitted to enter the park. One responder, SDPD Officer Crenshaw, noticed a cold half-full bottle of Budweiser (Item 8) located inside the park between Moises’ body and Siria Ford's Nissan Maxima. Criminalists later swabbed Item 8 for DNA and recovered a single-source sample matching petitioner's DNA profile. Only | in 3.2 sextillion persons randomly selected from the U.S. Hispanic population would match that sample. The proximity of the bottle to Moises’ body and the condition of the bottle at the time police arrived on scene immediately after hearing the shots, was conclusive evidence that petitioner was present at the murder scene. This single-source DNA evidence and the physical condition of the beer bottle ‘completely undermined the petitioner’s sole argument in his defense — that he could not have kill Moises because he simply was not there. Petitioner repeatedly claimed that he stayed with Diana Banuelos next to her Toyota Camry on Franklin Avenue. Petitioner stated that he stayed at that location until he heard the gunshots, at which point he fled eastbound on Franklin Avenue. 8 RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONCer anawn 10 TT 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 The effect of the testimony of Andres, Glennys, and Marla, together with the unintended consequences of Josue and Carol’s false testimony, the evidence of petitioner's status in the Shelltown gang, and the cold beer bottle with petitioner's DNA on the mouth of the bottle just feet from Moises' dead body, combined to establish petitioner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Regardless of any evidence of the possibility of petitioner, among several others, being a minor contributor to a mixture of at least 3-5 people’s DNA found inside the gloves, the jury would have returned a guilty verdict, and evidence that the SDPD crime lab changed its guidelines on how it interpreted mixed DNA samples such as those obtained from the gloves would not have affected that outcome. B. SDPD DNA Analyst Montpetit’s Trial Testimony Relating to the DNA Mixtures on the Gloves was Insignificant to the Outcome of the Retrial Suppressed evidence in the form of the change in SDPD guidelines relating to casework performed after April 1, 2011, which directed analysts to report as “inconclusive” mixed DNA sample results such as those at issue in this case, was not material since the DNA samples from the gloves were not any sort of "lynchpin" of the People’s case at petitioner's trial. At best, the evidence from the gloves as presented at trial may have further discredited the illogical defense theory that petitioner was not at the scene of the crime, However, the more damning evidence ‘was provided through the aforementioned lay witness testimony and the cold beer bottle containing petitioner’s single-source DNA recovered by Moises’ body. Any real probative value of petitioner's guilt the mixed DNA results from the gloves may have had was rendered insignificant after cross-examination regarding the lab’s analytical methods and certain criticisms within the scientific community regarding those methods. To begin, Mr. Montpetit admitted that he was unable to exclude nearly every person present in the park that night as a possible minor contributor to the samples found on the inside of the gloves. He explained that the statistical probability that the DNA profile of any Hispanic individual selected from the U.S. population at random would be included in the DNA mixtures ‘was over 1 in 3 persons. Petitioner and Josue only stood out as possible contributors because their DNA profiles exceeded that I in 3 number. Although Montpetit included petitioner as a possible minor contributor to Samples 16-3 and 17-3 taken from the right and left gloves, the = RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONSwocwmrxaanunanun rT 13, 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 ve) 24 25 26 27 28 oo likelihood that petitioner's DNA profile would be included in those samples was only 1 in 450 and 1 in 65 in the Hispanic population, respectively. As compared to the staggeringly high 1 in 3.2 sextillion inclusion ratio provided for the sample from the cold beer bottle found near Moises’s body, the statistics Mr. Montpetit provided for the gloves were hardly significant to the question of guilt. Further, on cross-examination Mr. Montpetit repeatedly explained the alternative, less- inclusive interpretations of the DNA samples from the gloves pursuant to the guidelines propounded by Dr. Budowle. Dr. Budowle’s guidelines were essentially the same as those later adopted by SWGDAM in 2010 as well as those adopted by the crime lab in 2011, which forms the basis of petitioner's Brady error claim. In cross-examining Mr. Montpetit, defense counsel exhaustively pointed to the large number of possible DNA contributors, the unknown identity of those contributors, and the high inclusion ratios provided by Mr. Montpetit. At one point, defense counsel went so far as to demonstrate that their own DNA expert could be included as a minor contributor to the DNA mixture. Defense counsel further effectively minimized the probative value of the glove evidence by arguing that due to the lack of tests showing gunshot residue on the gloves there was no evidence that the gloves were worn by the shooter. ‘There is a phenomenon recognized in psychology as it relates to things remembered known as primacy and recency effect: there is the beginning, a very long middle that blurs together, and the end. Primacy effect is the beginning; you remember it because that is where you started. Recency effect is the finish; you tend to remember the end the best. This notion is ‘well-known to experienced trial lawyers, though lawyers may tend to state it simply as: “always finish strong.” That theory and practice was well-demonstrated by petitioner's trial counsel at the end of a very lengthy, exhaustive and effective direct and cross-examination of Mr. ‘Montpetit when the following exchange occurred: Q: You can’t say for certain that Mr. Dominguez’s DNA is in the glove, can you? ‘A: That’s why in our conclusions I basically said that he’s included as a possible DNA contributor to the mixture. Q: And you used the word possible because you don’t know for sure if he is. A: Correct. Q: Nothing further, Your Honor. 10 RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONScar dH B® oN ll ce 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 el 22 = 24 25 26 27 28 29 Petitioner sufficiently undermined the probative value of the glove evidence through both in-chief. The absence of the cross-examination and his own expert witness in his case suppressed evidence - that the lab changed its guidelines for interpreting mixed DNA results for casework completed after April 1, 2011, but that results achieved prior to April Ist, petitioner's results, would stand - would not have affected the outcome of the trial because the defense would have asked the same questions and received the same answers, and the methods used by the lab to test the samples at issue would have been subject to the same criticisms that the jury indeed heard. As a result, the suppressed evidence cannot be said to have been material to petitioner’s guilt to the extent that its suppression would undermine confidence in the outcome. C. The 2010 Trial Jury’s Inability to Reach a Decision is Not Evidence of Materiality' Any argument that evidence relating to a second set of DNA swabs offered in petitioner's 2011 trial (Items 16-3 and 17-3) taken from the same gloves as DNA swabs offered in petitioner’s 2010 trial (Items 16-2 and 17-2), which were also offered in evidence in petitioner’s 2011 trial, constituted the difference between the hung jury in 2010 and the conviction in 2011 lacks merit and is wholly speculative. “Juries fail to agree for a variety of reasons and the rules of evidence prohibit inquiry into the jurors’ subjective reasoning process.” (See In re Richards (2016) 63 Cal. 4th 291, 316 (Richards 11) (cone. opn. of Corrigan, J.), citing Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a).) ‘An examination of the master index of the trial transcripts for both the 2010 and the 2011 trials which identify the witnesses called by the prosecution and defense demonstrates that each side, particularly the defense, presented differing witnesses in each instance, In 2010, the defense called approximately 25 witnesses, including the petitioner. (See Exh. 2.) Again in 2011, the defense called approximately 25 witnesses including the petitioner. (See Exh. 3.) While a simple tally of the number of witnesses called may make it may appear as if “the same ' This court invited respondent and petitioner to submit briefing on the materiality ‘component of the alleged Brady error. While this section does not speak to Brady materiality, given that all other materiality arguments made in this briefing relative to alleged Brady error would likewise be made against granting relief under Penal Code section 1473 based on new or false evidence, respondent has included this section for the court’s overall consideration with respect to materiality. u RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONwitnesses” were presented, when the names are compared, only 18 of the 25 called by the defense in the 2011 trial were the same witnesses called in the 2010 trial. For the people, 4 witnesses were called in 2011 who were not called in 2010 and 2 witnesses were called in 2010 who were not called in 2011. This examination helps make the point that Justice Corrigan was making in her Richards II concurrence. Just as it is said that one can never cross the same river twice, no two trials are ever “the same.” It is unknowable what one fact, what two facts, what three or more facts are those facts a jury’s decision turns upon. Truly, it is unknowable whether a jury’s decision “turns upon” any singular fact or whether a jury's decision is reached based on the synergistic effect of the totality of all the evidence and circumstances and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them. This court must not give any weight to the “evidence” of a prior hung jury in determining, the materiality of the undisclosed evidence. The evidence presented in petitioner's first and second trials and all its attendant nuances were different, the judges were different, the objections and rulings were different, the jurors were different, and the result was therefore different. Accordingly, the court should only consider the evidence presented in the second trial to determine whether the alleged new and/or false and/or suppressed evidence, the change in SDPD lab guidelines, was material. D. The Suppressed Evidence was Cumulative Impeachment Only and Petitioner Suffered No Prejudice by Its Suppression “In general, impeachment evidence has been found to be material where the witness at issue ‘supplied the only evidence linking the defendant(s) to the crime’ [citations], or where the likely impact on the witness’s credibility would have undermined a critical element of the prosecution’s case [citation].’ ” (People v. Letner (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 177; People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1050; see also Smith v. Cain (2012) 565 U.S. 73, 76. [finding undisclosed statements impeaching witness’ testimony regarding identification of defendant were material where testimony was only evidence linking defendant to crime]; United States v. Ruiz (2002) 536 U.S. 622, 628 [characterizing Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 154 ty,” where as defining “exculpatory evidence” to include “ ‘evidence affecting’ witness ‘credil the witness’ ‘reliability’ is likely ‘determinative of guilt or innocence’”]; United States v. Blanco a RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATION(9th Cir.2004) 392 F.3d 382, 387 [“Impeachment evidence is favorable Brady/Giglio material ‘when the reliability of the witness may be determinative of a criminal defendant's guilt or innocence”].) On the other hand, “evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the State’s other evidence is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict.” (Smith v. Cain (2012) 565 USS. 73, 76.) “{I]mpeachment evidence is not material if the testimony of the witness was corroborated, or when the suppressed evidence ‘merely furnishes an additional basis on which to impeach a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable.’ ” (Gotti v. United States (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 622 F.Supp.2d 87, 95, citing to United States v. Payne (2nd Cir. 1995) 63 F.3d 1200, 1210.) At petitioner's 2011 trial, Mr. Montpetit acknowledged that his conclusions would be reported as “inconclusive” if he were to apply 2010 SWGDAM mixture interpretation guidelines, which were ultimately the guidelines adopted by the lab that is the subject of the suppressed evidence. In other words, substantively, the jury heard it all. As explained by Mr. Montpetit during his testimony in the evidentiary hearing for this, habeas proceeding, the lab’s policy was that the lab stood by any opinions and conclusions rendered prior to the April Ist adoption of the 2011 mixture interpretation guidelines since the methods used prior to April 1, 2011, were pursuant to the lab’s then existing protocols and SOP’s, were scientifically reasonable, and that the newly adopted guidelines would be prospective in nature for case work not yet performed by the lab (1 RT 155; 2 RT 210-211.) Therefore, the suppressed evidence at issue here, the change in interpretation guidelines of the SDPD relating to mixed DNA samples, merely furnished an additional basis upon which to impeach Mr. Montpetit whose opinions and methods had already been attacked at great length when cross-examined about the criticisms in the forensic DNA field relating to the methods employed by Mr. Montpetit in arriving at the conclusions regarding the mixture of DNA found inside the gloves. The credibility of Mr. Montpetit was not determinative of the petitioner's guilt or innocence as he did not provide the only evidence linking petitioner to the crime. Rather, the evidence linking petitioner to the crime was multi-layered with at least one eye-witness to the 13 RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONmurder, another witness who tearfully recounted the petitioner’s admission to the killing, strong retaliation motive evidence, including evidence of petitioner’s stated intent to “get” the victim for not backing up a fellow gang member, and physical evidence in the form of the petitioner's single-source DNA on a beer bottle near the victim’s dead body, which directly refuted the only defense offered, alibi. As a result, the suppressed evidence cannot be deemed material or prejudicial. E. The Suppressed Evidence Did Not Preju Investigation or Trial Strategy Itis sometimes said that “[mJateriality includes consideration of the effect of the nondisclosure on defense investigations and trial strategies.” (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 279; People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 454; People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1132.) However, the focus in deciding materiality is not on the ability of the defense to prepare for trial unless the prosecution misleads the defense. In United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97 (Agurs), the high court specifically rejected a standard that focused “on the impact of the undisclosed evidence on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial, rather than the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt or innocence.” (Ud. at p. 113.) The Agurs court stated: “Such a standard would be unacceptable for determining the materiality of what has been generally recognized as ‘Brady material’ for two reasons. First, that standard would necessarily encompass incriminating evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, since knowledge of the prosecutor's entire case would always be useful in planning the defense. Second, such an approach would primarily involve an analysis of the adequacy of the notice given to the defendant by the State, and it has always been the court’s view that the notice component of due process refers to the charge rather than the evidentiary support for the charge.” (Id. at p. 113, fin. 20; see also United States v. Benes (6th Cir. 1994) 28 F.3d 555, 560 [“Materiality pertains to the issue of guilt or innocence, and not to the defendant’s ability to [prepare for trial”]; Com. v. Williams (Pa. 2014) 105 A.3d 1234, 1244 [The United States Supreme Court has never held Brady materiality is measured in terms of ‘effects on the defense ‘strategy’ ” and finding defendant did not make out a Brady violation based on a claim that essentially amounted to his arguing the failure to disclose led him to perjure himself at trial]; 14 RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONwe I AHAWN 10 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 DeLuca v. State (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) 553 A.2d 730, 746 [Brady is concerned with a direct impact on guilt or innocence rather than an impact on the conduct of the trial].) Whether the prosecution will be viewed as misleading the defense, however, can rest on whether the defense has made a specific request for information and whether there has been an incomplete or misleading response by the prosecution in assessing the impact of nondisclosure. If there has been a request followed by an incomplete or misleading response, then emphasis may be more heavily placed on the impact of nondisclosure on trial strategy and tactics. (See United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 682, [‘‘the reviewing court may consider directly any adverse effect that the prosecutor's failure to respond might have had on the preparation or presentation of the defendant’s case.”] In this case, there is nothing to suggest the prosecution attempted to mislead the defense in any way. ‘Any argument that may be asserted by petitioner that had he been aware of the newly adopted guidelines he would have been able to challenge the admissibility of the earlier mixed DNA results based on People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly), fails for two reasons: (1) nothing precluded petitioner from attempting to make a Kelly challenge irrespective of the failure to disclose the newly adopted April 2011 guidelines if he believed Kelly applied to the pre-April 2011 methods used by the SDPD crime lab, which were already the subject of some criticism in the scientific literature as demonstrated by petitioner’s cross-examination of Mr. Montpetit at petitioner's trial; and (2) Mr. Montpetit’s 2017 testimony in this habeas evidentiary hearing acknowledging that the method used six or seven years ago is no longer (today) accepted in the scientific community cannot be applied retroactively. All of the underlying scientific evidence and arguments presented by petitioner in support of his habeas petition alleging new evidence, false evidence, and the alleged Brady violation in the failure to disclose evidence of changes to interpretation guidelines, existed at the time of his trial in 2011. That is, the 2010 SWGDAM guidelines regarding mixed sample interpretation, the published scientific studies and articles by Dr. Budowle and others in the field critical of using the CPI statistic when the number of contributors to a mixture are undefined, and the published scientific studies and articles critical of the so-called “suspect centric” method of including an individual for comparison in a mixed sample. In addition, the electronic DNA data, Mr. 7 RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONCer AKneon 10 ll 12 13, 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 21 28 29 Montpetit’s bench notes and the final DNA reports provided to petitioner at trial demonstrated that the SDPD crime lab was using some methods that were indeed the subject of criticism by some within the forensic DNA community. Finally, petitioner’s trial counsel demonstrated his understanding of the science, and the relevant issues and criticisms in the forensic DNA ‘community related to that science through his cross-examination of Mr. Montpetit and the expert witness testimony offered by the defense. The decision in April of 2011 by the SDPD crime lab to adopt the SWGDAM guidelines relating to mixed samples (which themselves state were not retroactive) for all casework moving forward, but specifically standing by results of casework already completed, would not have been the thing that did or did not render a particular analytical or statistical method no longer accepted in the scientific community. Any scientific evidence that petitioner’s trial counsel may have used for a Kelly challenge existed at the time of petitioner’s trial. Rightly however, petitioner's trial counsel recognized the futility of making a Kelly challenge at petitioner’s 2011 trial. Further, Mr. Montpetit’s acknowledgement that today the methods that were being used by the SDPD lab six or seven years ago are no longer accepted in the scientific community because the scientific community began to shift in 2010 - carrying through to about 2015 - toward uniformly answering a broader statistical question using the combined probability of inclusion statistic rather than the narrower statistical question the SDPD lab was answering prior to April of 2011 (1 RT 126-129; 171; 2 RT 202) does not support the conclusion that the method | used by the SDPD crime lab prior to 2011 was not accepted in the scientific community at the time, which would have been the only question asked in a Kelly hearing at the time of petitioner’s trial. In other words, at petitioner’s trial he would not have been permitted to argue that the methods used by SDPD appear to be the subject of some criticism in the scientific community and at some time in the future the method used might be rejected by the scientific ‘community at large in favor of a more precise method. If petitioner wanted to challenge the method based on Kelly, he could have done so without the suppressed evidence of the guideline change relating to future casework not yet completed, and critically, the failure to disclose the guideline change was not an attempt by the prosecution to mislead the defense. As such, any 16 RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONargument from petitioner that the suppressed evidence regarding the 2011 lab guideline change deprived him the opportunity to prepare or present his case in a different manner by attempting to exclude the mixed DNA evidence based on Kelly and therefore the evidence was material must be rejected. CONCLUSION ‘The significance of the DNA mixture evidence obtained from the gloves as it relates to guilt or innocence has been artificially elevated by virtue of the laser focused attention that has been paid to it throughout this habeas litigation. In reality, as the totality of evidence was presented, cross-examined and argued in petitioner’s 2011 trial, the DNA evidence from the gloves was of insignificant probative value in determining the final outcome at trial. There is no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result had it heard the suppressed evidence. Viewing the evidence objectively in light of the totality of the evidence and circumstances at trial, this court's confidence in the outcome of the trial should not be undermined. Petitioner received a fair trial and was thus not prejudiced as a result of the failure to disclose the SDPD Crime Lab mixed DNA interpretation guideline change. Based on the foregoing, the People respectfully request that this court find that petitioner ‘was not denied his due process right to a fair trial as defined by Brady because the suppressed evidence was not material to petitioner's guilt or innocence. Dated: September 8, 2017 Respectfully submitted, SUMMER STEPHAN District Attorney MARK A. AMADOR Deputy District Attorney Chief, raining Division Deputy District Attorney Attorneys for Respondent fue RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATIONsox pct nec Tb Onsen snruacucneneoe oom ‘sone or0%* source: 90% POW Recycled Tab cron GRE -2- cane rsCOURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, MASTER INDEX COURT OF APPEAL RESPONDENT, NO. DO58541 vs. SUPERIOR COURT NO. SCD225579 FLORENCIO JOSE DOMINGUEZ, VOLUME 0 APPELLANT. FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY HONORABLE JEFFREY F. FRASER, JUDGE REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL COPY FOR THE RESPONDENT: EDMUND G. BROWN, OR. ATTORNEY GENERAL 110 WEST C STREET SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101 APPEARANCES: FOR THE APPELLANT: IN PROPRIA PERSONA MONIQUE MINAHAN, CSR NO. 10818 OFFICIAL REPORTER SAN DIEGO SUPERIOR COURTIN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO DEPARTMENT 37 BEFORE HON. JEFFREY F. FRASER, JUDGE THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, PLAINTIFF, vs. NO. SCD225579 FLORENCIO JOSE DOMINGUEZ, DEFENDANT. REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT MASTER INDEX APPEARANCES: FOR THE PEOPLE: BONNIE M. DUMANIS DISTRICT ATTORNEY BY: KRISTIAN TROCHA DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 330 WEST BROADWAY SAN DIEGO, CA 92101 FOR THE DEFENDANT: HULLINGER & SPEREDELOZZI BY: MATTHEW J. SPEREDELOZZI RETAINED COUNSEL 5752 OBERLIN DRIVE, SUITE 106 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92121 MONIQUE MINAHAN, CSR NO. 10818 OFFICIAL REPORTER SAN DIEGO SUPERIOR COURTMASTER ALPHABETICAL INDEX PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ scp225579 WITNESSES: VOLUME PAGE ISMAEL ACEVES - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 16 4224 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA. 16 4232 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 16 4236 RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 16 4237 FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 16 4238 RAUL AGUILAR - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 16 4301 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 16 © 4307 CARLOS ALVARA - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 20 2502 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA. 10 2506 CHRISTIAN AVITIA - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 12 3050 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 12 3054 DIANA BANUELOS - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 13 3584 DIRECT EXAMINATION (RESUMED) BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 14 3712 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 14 3729 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 14 3750 RANDY BARNES-DELEON - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 15 4095 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA. 15 4100 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 15 4108 RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 15 4110 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 15 41a HESNEYDA BUENDIA - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 5 1068 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 5 1075 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR, TROCHA 5 1076 CHAD CRENSHAW - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 8 1973 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 8 1981 PLORENCIO DOMINGUEZ - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 16 4375 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 1604419 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 16 4440MASTER ALPHABETICAL INDEX (cONT.) PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ scp225579 WITNESSES: VOLUME PAGE, VICTOR DOMINGUEZ - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 14 3701 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 14 3709 TANYA DULANEY - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 9 2209 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 9 2214 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 9 2218 NATALIE ELIAS - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 5 1126 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 5 1132 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 5 1144 RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 5 1145 GREGORY ESTEVANE - DEFENSE WITNESS 402 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 4 733 402 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA. 4 766 402 EXAMINATION BY THE COURT 4 799 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 15 4131 DIRECT EXAMINATION (RESUMED) BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 15 4174 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 15 4179 DIRECT EXAMINATION (RESUMED) BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 15 4181 DIRECT EXAMINATION (RESUMED) BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 16 4238 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 16-4242 CROSS-EXAMINATION (RESUMED) BY MR. TROCHA 16 4312 SAMUEL EULER - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 8 1915 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 8 1934 ANTHONY EWING - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 1s 4074 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 15 4076 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 15 4076 RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR, TROCHA 15 4077 MARY FLOWERS - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 9 2189 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2I 9 2205 SIRIA FORD - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR, SPEREDELOZZI 13 3542 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 13 3563 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 13 3582MASTER ALPHABETICAL INDEX (CONT.) PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ scp225579 WITNESSES: MARTHA GASCA - PEOPLE'S WITNESS 402 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA 402 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA DIRECT EXAMINATION (RESUMED) BY MR. TROCHA DIRECT EXAMINATION (RESUMED) BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION (RESUMED) BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR, SPEREDELOZZI FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA JOHN GONZALEZ - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA JOSEPH HOWIE - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA MELVIN KONG - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI KILA KRUEGER - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA. ANDRES L. - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA DIRECT EXAMINATION (RESUMED) BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION (RESUMED) BY MR. TROCHA. RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI MICHAEL LAMBERT - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA ALEXIS LOPEZ - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR, SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA JESSICA LOPEZ - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA ‘VOLUME PAGE 649 696 2988 3043 3059 3130 3410 3442 3455 3458 1951 1939 3054 3860 3862 4078 4088 1149 1304 1349 1467 1621 1628 2313 2509 2595 4170 4174 1039 1060 1067MASTER ALPHABETICAL INDEX (CONT.) PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ scD225579 WITNESSES: MAGDALENA LOPEZ - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR, TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI SIMON LOPEZ - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI MARK LUCCHESI - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR, TROCHA KELVIN LUJAN - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CHRISTIAN MARTINEZ - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI. RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR, TROCHA OTHON MENA, M.D. - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA GREGORY MENDOZA - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA SUSAN MERCURIO - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR, TROCHA ROGER MILLER - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI DIRECT EXAMINATION (CONT.) BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA ‘VOLUME 14 14 14 aoe 12 14 14 14 14 PAGE 1010 1030 1036 1038 2105 2109 1982 1992 1994 1903 1913 3752 3765 3773 3775 2045 2091 2096 3024 3032 3777 3806 3813 3815 3461 3493 3505 3530 3534MASTER ALPHABETICAL PEOPLE V. DOMIN scp225579 WITNESSES : SHAWN MONTPETIT - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI TAERANCE OH - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA BRAD POWELL - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2ZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA EDUARDO PUENTE - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI MELITON PUENTE - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI JONATHAN QUINTANILLA - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA MARLA QUINTANILLA - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR, TROCHA EVELYN QUINTERO - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA. JULIO RAMIREZ - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2I REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI INDEX (CONT.) GUEZ VOLUME a re 1 14 vou PAGE 2803 2874 2974 2979 2801 4016 4024 1078 1088 1601 1615 4047 4051 4068 4069 1997 2020 2035 2043 2044 3841 3844 1095 1111 1118 1123MASTER ALPHABETICAL INDEX (cONT.) PEOPLE Vv, DOMINGUEZ scbD225579 WITNESSES: JENNIFER SANDERS - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI FRANCISCO SANDOVAL - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA EVELYN SOTO - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI LARRY THOMPSON - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI NICOLE VILLALOBOS - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI MICHAEL. WEAVER - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI DANIEL ZEPEDA - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI VOLUME wove PAGE 2126 2168 2184 2188 4112 4124 3847 3848 3853 3816 3823 3829 4026 4037 4046 2110 2123 2219 2284 2307 2312CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF WITNESSES OCTOBER 4, 2010 PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ CASE NO. SCD225579 VOLUME 3 WITNESSES PAGE MARTHA GASCA - PEOPLE'S 402 WITNESS "DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR, TROCHA 649 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI 696CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF WITNESSES OCTOBER 5, 2010 PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ CASE NO. SCD225579 VOLUME 4 WITWESSES GREGORY ESTEVANE - DEFENSE'S 402 WITNESS IINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA. EXAMINATION BY THE COURT PAGE 733 766 739{Drover incnes 4 es ne. s0rzn811 Reoeat Pager @)oo ad Gel aay a a4 TIS COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, vs. FLORENCIO JOSE DOMINGUEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. DIVISION ONE FROM SAN DIEGO COUNTY HON. CHARLES G. ROGERS, JUDGE COURT OF APPEAL No, D060019 SUPERIOR COURT NO. SCD230596 REPORTER'S APPEAL TRANSCRIPT APPEARANCES: FOR THE PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT: FOR THE DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT: REPORTED BY: VOLUME 0 MASTER INDEX KAMALA D. HARRIS ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF CALIFORNIA 110 WEST A STREET, SUITE 1100 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101 IN PROPRIA PERSONA. PEGGY C. SIINO, CSR NO. 6263 OFFICIAL COURT’ REPORTERfa) oor) 1 8 8 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO DEPARTMENT 48 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, PLAINTIFF, vs. FLORENCIO JOSE DOMINGUEZ, DEFENDANT. HON. CHARLES G. ROGERS, JUDGE CASE NO. SCD230596 D.A, NO. ACVB0O REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT APPEARANCES : FOR THE PEOPLE: FOR THE DEFENDANT: REPORTED BY: MARCH 8, 2011 BONNIE M, DUMANIS DISTRICT ATTORNEY BY: KRISTIAN P. TROCHA DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 330 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 750 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101 HULLINGER & SPEREDELOZZI RETAINED COUNSEL BY: MATTHEW J. SPEREDELOZZI 5752 OBERLIN DRIVE, SUITE 106 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92121 PEGGY C. SIINO, CSR NO. 6263 OFFICIAL COURT’ REPORTER2) 2) 1 1 7 CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF WITNESSES PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ WITNESSES MELITON PUENTE DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI MAGDALENA LOPEZ DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI JESSICA LOPEZ DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI EDUARDO PUENTE DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA JOSUE GUTIERREZ DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI PAGE’ VOL 219 237 245 248 251 269 281 283 285 315 337 344 346 358 364 366 385 403 407 aaaa a aaa a wa ascorey | cee ee) ee) ee) ee) ee) ee) ee) ee) ee ee) ee) ee) ee) ee) CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF WITNESSES PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ WITNESSES HESNEYDA BUENDIA DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2ZI NATALIE ELIAS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2I REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI MARLA QUINTANILLA DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR, TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR, SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA SAMUEL EULER DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2ZI JOHN GONZALEZ DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2ZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA JULIO RAMIREZ DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR, SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI PAGE 409 412 414 423 429 430 437 465 472 477 490 496 $20 524 541 559 565 566 vou wuss 2 2 @ @a4 CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF WITNESSES PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ WITNESSES KELVIN LUJAN DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2I MICHAEL WEAVER DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI GLENNYS BERUMEN (401. DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR, SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI FURTHER DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI GLENNYS BERUMEN DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2ZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA. RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2I PAGE 568 582 584 619 600 605 608 610 611 614 626 655 683 691 692 693 I< IS 2 2 @ © © @CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF WITNESSES PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ WITNESSES CHAD CRENSHAW DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI MARK LUCCHEST DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR, SPEREDELOZ2I JENNIFER SANDERS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RAUL AGUILAR DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR, SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI MARY JANE FLOWERS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI PAGE 695 706 707 708 710 722 728 m 779 796 806 839 849 857 860 877 voL © 2 @ @ © © © © ©I 324 coe) CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF WITNESSES PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ WITNESSES ANGELICA NAVARRO-MORAN DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI SHAWN MONTPETIT DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2I REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA ANDRES L. DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR, TROCHA SERGEANT JOSEPH HOWIE - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA SIMON LOPEZ - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI PAGE 883 898 906 909 910 986 1099 119 1123 1133 1233 1340 1343 1345 1354 1361 1365 1367 1371 VoL we wo 10 10 10 10 1 1 coy 1 1 13 13 13 1321434 3 CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF WITNESSES PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ WITNESSES OTHON MENA, M.D. ~ PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA DETECTIVE GREG PINARELLI - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI DETECTIVE MICHAEL LAMBERT - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2ZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI FURTHER REDIRECT BY MR. TROCHA TANYA L. DULANEY - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI FURTHER REDIRECT BY MR. TROCHA FURTHER RECROSS BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI PAGE 1373 1419 1421 1423 1428 1429 1470 1502 1508 1509 1511 1519 1521 1522 1524 1526 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13ol at aad aT TVW TVI TIA aT IIIa TAI alo CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF WITNESSES PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ WITNESSES DETECTIVE MARTHA GASCA - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA DIRECT EXAMINATION (RESUMED) BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS (RESUMED) BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI FURTHER REDIRECT BY MR. TROCHA OFFICER TERRANCE OH - PEOPLE'S WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CAROL MARTINEZ - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA FURTHER REDIRECT BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI ANTRIEL MATTHEWS - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CARLOS E. ALVARA - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA PAGE 1527 1673 1735 1766 1793 1809 1g12 1580 1583 1594 1633 1637 1638 1645 1651 1658 1659 1668 1671 voL 13 14 1 15 15 15 1s 14 14 14 14 1 14 14 14 14 14 14 14aT VITA TIO CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF WITNESSES PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ WITNESSES LUIS JONATHAN QUINTANILLA - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR, TROCHA ANTHONY J. EWING - DEFENSE WITNESS. DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR, TROCHA CARLOS RIOS - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2I CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA FURTHER REDIRECT BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI ANA MARTINEZ ~ DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR, TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA RONALD MARTINEZ - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA PAGE 1823 1826 1845 1847 1850 1865 1870 1874 1876 1888 1893 1896 1897 1898 1910 1911 1912 vor 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15a4 CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF WITNESSES PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ WITNESSES ALEXIS LOPEZ - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA JOSUE GUTIERREZ - DEFENSE WITNESS (RECALLED) DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA FURTHER RECROSS BY MR. TROCHA RANDY BARNES-DE LEON DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA FURTHER REDIRECT BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI EVELYN SOTO - DEFENSE WITNESS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CHRISTIAN JESUS AVITA DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI (CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA PAGE 1913 1921 1927 1944 1958 1961 1964 1975 1978 1982 1984 1986 1992 1992 2006 2009 2019 2020 vou 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 16 16 16 16243-2 TITS A a4 CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF WITNESSES PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ WITNESSES SIRIA FORD DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI FRANCISCO SANDOVAL DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA VICTOR DOMINGUEZ DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA DIANA BANUELOS DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2I SUSAN ELAINE MERCURIO DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA PAGE 2021 2041 2081 2088 2092 2110 2126 2140 2141 2144 2150 2152 2169 2196 2199 2201 2203 2211 vou 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16a) om) 14 28 A ft td CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF WITNESSES PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ WITNESSES LARRY ALTON THOMPSON DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CHRISTIAN MARTINEZ DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZ2I RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA ROGER VINCENT MILLER, PH.D. DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA MARTHA GASCA FURTHER DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI EVELYN ESTEPHANIA QUINTERO DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA PAGE 2216 2222 2227 2228 2229 2231 2261 2286 2290 2293 2347 2399 2409 2411 2419 2424 2427 you 16 16 16 16 16 7 a7 vv 7 17 a 17a4 TTA TITS 7a IaI TIT’ IAAI AA CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF WITNESSES PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ WITNESSES SHAWN MONTPETIT DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA, ELORENCIO JOSE DOMINGUEZ DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA, REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SPEREDELOZZI RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA JANA BEARD DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TROCHA CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR, SPEREDELOZZI PAGE 2430 2435 2437 2474 2554 2558 2585 2589 vou Wa w 7 17 18 18 18 18SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO For Court Use Only INRE: IFLORENCIO DOMINGUEZ, Petitioner. Case No.: HC22238 Superior Court Case No.: SCD230596 PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL I, the undersigned, declare as follows: Tam employed in the County of San Diego, over eighteen years of age and not a patty to the within action. My business address is 330 West Broadway, Suite 860, San Diego, CA 92101. On September 8, 2017, a member of our office served a copy of the within RESPONDENT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RELATING TO MATERIALITY AND PREJUDICE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATION to the interested parties in the within action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, with postage fully prepaid, in the United States Mail, addressed as follows: Matthew J. Speredelozzi Law Office of Matthew J. Speredelozzi 110 WC St, Ste 712 San Diego, CA 92101 Attorney for Florencio Dominguez I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on September 8, 2017 at 330 West Broadway, San Diego, CA 92101. oebe Le