GANZON VS CA
achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Facts: A series of administrative complaints, ten in number, was filed by various
city officials against Petitioner Mayor Ganzon. During the pendency of the
charges, Respondent Secretary of Department of Local Government issued a
preventive suspension order for a period of sixty (60) days. Later on, when
prima facie evidence was found to exist on the charges, the respondent ordered
the petitioner's second preventive suspension for another sixty (60) days. Then,
for the third time, respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively
suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days.
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government acted with grave
abuse of discretion in the manner by which he suspended petitioner
Held: Yes
Ratio Decidendi:
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension
may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the
respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial
governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by
the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective
barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the
issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe
that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained
of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity
of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of
the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all
cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty
days after the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall
be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation of the proceedings against him until its
termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of the
case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay
shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension
62
Under the Local Government Code, it cannot exceed sixty days, which is to
say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise
sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which
the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the
accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until
found guilty
Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides,
63
it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, a longer
suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less
than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a
remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make
him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents
and purposes, his suspension permanent
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the
Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for
naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have,
by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary
of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the
Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless
to say, with a grave abuse of discretion
The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that
any talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however,
that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of
suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the
corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code which
brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest
of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as
a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act
Espiritu v Melgar power is shown, public policy and a becoming regard for the principle of
Grio-Aquino, 1992 separation of powers demand that the action of said officer or body
should be left undisturbed.
Since the 60-day preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was
FACTS:
maintained by the TRO which we issued on August 6, 1991, and
Garing of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, filed 3 complaints against Mayor therefore has already been served, he is deemed reinstated in office
Melgar charging him with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative investigation
authority, culpable violation of the Constitution and conduct prejudicial to of the charges against him
the best interest of the public service. He alleges that Mayor Melgar
boxed and kicked him; and, ordered his arrest and detention in the
municipal jail without filing any charges.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed Resolution
No. 55, recommending to the Provincial Governor that Mayor Melgar be
preventively suspended for 45 days pending the investigation of the
administrative complaint. Mayor Melgars MD DISMISSED. Governor
Espiritu placed Mayor Melgar under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION.
RTC: Writ of Preliminary Injunction ISSUED. Governor Espiritu enjoined
from implementing the Order of suspension against Mayor Melgar.
Governor Espiritus MD and MR DENIED.

ISSUE & HELD: WON the Provincial Governor is empowered by Section 63 of

the LGC to place an elective municipal official under preventive suspension
(YES)

RATIO:
The provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to
preventively suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan at anytime after the
issues had been joined and any of the following grounds were shown to
exist:
o When there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent
has committed the act or acts complained of
o When the evidence of culpability is strong
o When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or
o When the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence.
There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges
against him are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his
innocence. Preventive suspension is allowed so that the respondent
may not hamper the normal course of the investigation through the use
of his influence and authority over possible witnesses.
Since Mayor Melgar believed that his preventive suspension was
unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought relief first
from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, not from the
courts. Mayor Melgar's direct recourse to the courts without exhausting
administrative remedies was PREMATURE.
As a general rule, the office or body that is invested with the power of
removal or suspension should be the sole judge of the necessity and
sufficiency of the cause. Unless a flagrant abuse of the exercise of that
Miranda vs Sandiganbayan (2005)
Jose C. Miranda, petitioner vs
Hon. Sandiganbayan, Office of the Ombudsman, Sec. Jose Lina, Jr., in his
capacity as Secretary of the DILG, and Faustino Dy, Jr., in his capacity as
Governor of the Province of Isabela, respondents
Nature: Review of Sandiganbayan decision
Summary: Mayor Miranda was placed under preventive suspension but while
suspended, he allegedly did official acts. Ombudsman then filed before the
Sandiganbayan an Information charging Mayor Miranda of Usurpation of
Authority which is punishable under the RPC. Sandiganbayan then ordered a
90-day preventive suspension against Mayor Miranda. Mayor Miranda
questioned the length of the preventive suspension and argued that it is
repugnant to the 60-day limit imposed by the LGC. Also, he raised the defense
that he did official acts in good faith believing that he can already reassume his
Facts:
position. The SC first held that Miranda cannot anymore question the sufficiency
of the Information as he is already estopped due to his act of entering his plea.
Also, the allegations in the Information are sufficient enough to raise the issue of
WON he committed fraud against the government. On the issue of the legality of
the 90-day period, the SC upheld its validity as the suspension is based on the
Ombudsman Law and not from the LGC. The differences between the said laws
were also explained. As to purpose, the limit in the LGC is motivated by the
prevention of being influenced by political will; the same is not a concern in the
Ombudsman Law since It is a constitutional body. Also, the Ombudsman law
provides for more stringent requirements before a public officer may be
preventively suspended; the requirements provided in the LGC are more lenient.
Accordingly, due to these differences, it cannot be said that the other is
repugnant to the other law.
Doctrine:
Under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, the
suspension of a public officer by the Sandiganbayan is mandatory after
a determination has been made of the validity of the Information. Once
the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the
Court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There
are no ifs and buts about it.
The Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 as
covering two types of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the
government; and (2) any offense involving public funds or property.
Nothing limits Section 13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds or
property.
Also, the difference between suspensions by the Ombudsman and the
President, governor and mayor under the LGC are clear. The latter are
political personages and so the possibility of extraneous factors
influencing their decision to impose preventive suspensions is not
remote. The Ombudsman, on the other hand, is given the independence
of the office which is protected by the Constitution.
The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the preventive
suspension by the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt should be strong,
and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve
dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) that the charges should warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would
prejudice the case filed against him.
On the other hand, the LGC requirements for suspension (at any time
after the issues are joined), are that (a) there is reasonable ground to
believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained
of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong, (c) the gravity of the offense
so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence.
The Ombudsman placed Mayor Miranda, then mayor of Santiago City,
Isabela, under preventive suspension for 6 months for alleged
violations of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees)
Subsequently, then Vice Mayor Navarro filed a Complaint with the
Ombudsman alleging that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of
usurpation of authority or official functions under Art. 177 RPC. Vice
Mayor Navarro said that Mayor Miranda committed the following
acts despite the continuing effectivity of the Ombudsmans
preventive suspension order:
o Issued a memorandum addressed to Navarro advising her that
he was assuming his position as City Mayor
o Gave directives to the heads of offices and other employees
o Issued an office order which authorized certain persons to start
work
o And insisted on performing the functions and duties of Mayor
despite Navarros requests to desist from doing so without valid
court order and in spite of the order of DILG Undersecretary
Sanchez directing him to cease from reassuming the position
In his counter-affidavit, Mayor Miranda defended himself on the
following grounds:
o That he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in
good faith
 o That under Sec. 63 LGC, local elective officials could not be
preventively suspended for a period beyond 60 days
o That on the day he reassumed office, he received a
memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Sanchez instructing
him to vacate his office and he immediately complied with the
same
o Mayor Miranda also stated that he left the mayoralty post after
coercion by the PNP
Ombudsman then filed with the Sandiganbayan an Information against
Mayor Miranda for violation of Art. 177 RPC, penalizing usurpation of
authority.
Sandiganbayan ordered a reinvestigation in light of the manifestations
made by prosecution and defense counsel.
After reinvestigation, Special Prosecution Officer Coquia recommended
the dismissal of the case and held that Miranda reassumed his office in
good faith and on mistake of fact due to the difficult questions of law
involved.
Ombudsman Desierto referred Coquias resolution to the Ombudsmans
Chief Legal Counsel for review. The Chief Legal Counsel disagreed with
Coquia and recommended the filing of the case against Mayor Miranda
based on the following grounds:
o That Mayor Miranda;s invocation of good faith was belied by the
fact that he received a memorandum from the DILG informing
him that his view of the preventive suspension period was
untenable and that he should serve out its remaining period
o That Miranda violated the orders of both the Ombudsman and
the DILG
Ombudsman Desierto addopted the recommendation of the Chief Legal
Counsel and the case was re-raffled.
Subsequently, the prosectuion filed an amended Information with
the Sandiganbayan, to which the Mayor Miranda interposed a
negative plea
The prosecution then filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to
suspend Mayor Miranda pendente lite based on Sec. 13 RA 3018 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
o Mayor Miranda opposed this motion on the ground that the
offense of usurpation of authority or official functions under Art.
177 RPC is not embraced by Sec. 13 RA 3019
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution suspending Mayor Miranda
from office for 90 days based on the finding that he violated Art. 177
RPC which involves fraud. It was further held that Mayor Mirandas act
fell within the catch-all provision or for any offense involving fraud
upon government
Mayor Mirandas MR was denied, hence this petition
Issue # 1: WON the acts alleged in the complaint falls under the scope of Sec.
1
13 RA 3019 (Yes)
. the government.
Ratio # 1:
Sec. 13 RA 3019 cannot be limited only to acts involving fraud on public
funds or property. Sandiganbayan properly construed Sec. 13 RA 3019
as covering two types of offenses:
o Any offense involving fraud on the government; and
o Any offense involving public funds or property
In the case at bar, Mayor Mirandas act fell within the catch-all
provision or for any offense involving fraud upon government
o Fraud upon government was committed when Mayor Miranda
allegedly assumed the duties and performed acts pertaining to
the Office of the Mayor under pretense of official position
o Mayor Mirandas acts in assuming the duties and function of the
Office of the Mayor despite his suspension from said office
resulted to a clear disruption of office and worst, a chaotic
situation in the affairs of the government as the employees,
as well as the public, suffered confusion as to who is the head
of the Office.
SC held that this actuation constitutes fraud which in
the general sense is deemed to comprise anything
calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and
concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable
duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in
damage to another or by which an undue and
unconscious advantage is taken of another
Also, the rule is that under Sec. 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory
after a determination has been made of the validity of the
Information.
o In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the information filed
is valid and Mayor Miranda in fact acquiesced to the validity of
the Information when he pleaded not guilty.
Further, the acts alleged in the Information constitute fraud upon
government or public funds or property, as required by law.
o When accused-mayor appointed persons in various positions,
he indirectly dealt with the city's funds as those persons
appointed will be given their respective salaries, benefits and
other monetary consideration which will be paid wholly or mainly
out of the city's funds.
o Additionally, when he performed acts pertaining to the Office of
the Mayor, i.e.[,] approval of vouchers, and payment of other
expenses which is subject to proof, he likewise indirectly dealt
with the funds of the city.
However, the dissenting opinion presents another view on this issue and
holds that there was actually no fraud.
o The dissent holds that:
it would be fraud of public funds if these public officials
just collected their salarieswithout rendering service to
 that "fraud upon government" must be read so as to In the case at bar, the SC expressly stated that its decision was
require that malversation of funds was committed. rendered without subscribing to the petitioners claim that the LGC as
o In answering the dissent, SC said that adopting the dissenting been violated. The Court only ruled that the Ombudsman acted with
opinion's line of reasoning would render superfluous the phrase grave abuse of discretion in imposing a 6-month preventive suspension
"fraud upon government" as malversation is subsumed by "any since it was admitted that the documents required were already
offense involving public funds or property." obtained by 19 July 1999 or 24 days after the imposition of the
Moreover, the SC is not convinced that Mayor Miranda reassumed preventive suspension. Therefore, the purpose for which the suspension
office under an honest belief that he was no longer under was imposed was already served.
preventive suspension. The dissent also cited the Rios case. The SC answered that said case is
o In Mayor Mirandas affidavit, he admitted that he refused to not applicable in the case at bar since the powers of the Sandiganbayan
leave his position despite the memorandum of Undersecretary were at issue in that case, not those of the Ombudsman as in this case.
Sanchez and left only a few days after recceipt thereof due to o It is also worth noting that Rios cited Sec. 63 LGC as its legal
the coercion of the PNP. This contradicts his assrtion that he basis wherein it is clear from the provision that it is only meant
immediately complied with the memorandum of Undersecretary as a cap on the discretionary power of the President, governor
Sanchez. and mayor to impose excessively long preventive suspensions.
o As the SC said in various cases, if petitioner (and his counsel) The Ombudsman, on the other hand, is not subject to
had an iota of respect for the rule of law, they should have political pressure given the independence of the office
assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court instead which is protected by no less that the Constitution.
of taking the law into their own hands. LGC vs Ombudsman Law: Difference in the requirements for
Issue # 2: WON the suspension is proper (yes)Ratio # 2: suspension to be valid (from Hagad case)
Ombudsman Law LGC
It should be stressed that petitioner was suspended by the
Sandiganbayan. Under Sec. 13 RA 3019, this suspension is Requirements the evidence of guilt there is reasonable
mandatory if the Information is sufficient. to justify should be strong, and ground to believe that
On the other hand, the dissent argues that the Information is insufficient preventive the charge against the respondent has
rendering the suspension invalid. the officer or committed the act or
suspension of
o The SC pointed out the fact that Mayor Miranda entered his employee should acts complained of
plea and that it is a basic rule that entering a plea waives any a public involve dishonestly, the evidence of
objection the petitioner may have to the validity of the official oppression or grave culpability is strong
information unless the case falls under the exceptions. misconduct or neglect the gravity of the
o Also, in determining the sufficiency of the information, the test is in the performance of offense so warrants, or
whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such duty; the continuance in
particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable that the charges office of the
certainty, of the offense charged. The Information in the case at should warrant respondent could
bar satisfied this test especially when it is stated therein the removal from the influence the
specific acts which constitute usurpation of official functions. service; or witnesses or pose a
If the purpose of the preventive suspension was to enable the the respondent's threat to the safety and
investigating authority to gather documents without intervention from continued stay in integrity of the records
petitioner, then, from respondents' submission, we can only conclude office would prejudice and other evidence
that this purpose was already achieved, during the nearly month-long the case filed against
suspension of petitioner. Granting that now the evidence against him
petitioner is already strong, even without conceding that initially it was The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated
weak, it is clear to us that the maximum six-month period is excessive by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without
and definitely longer than necessary for the Ombudsman to make its pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the
legitimate case against petitioner. Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
Issue # 3: WON suspension issued in this case violated the 60-day limit which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the
imposed by the LGC (No) period of suspension herein provided.

Ratio # 3:
 The six-month period of preventive suspension imposed by the
Ombudsman was indubitably within the limit provided by its enabling
law. This enabling law has not been modified by the legislature.
In answering the dissent that the difference between the two laws violates
the equal protection clause, SC holds that there is substantial distinction to
justify it.
o The Constitution has endowed the Ombudsman with unique
safeguards to ensure immunity from political pressure. Among these
statutory protections are fiscal autonomy,fixed term of office and
classification as an impeachable officer.
Disposition: Sandiganbayan decision affirmed; Mayor Miranda suspended for
90 days
Dissenting Opinion: J. Carpio
Summary: In sum, the offense of usurpation of authority or official
functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code filed against
Miranda in the present case does not involve fraud upon government or
public funds or property under Section 13 of RA 3019. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that
the charge against Miranda falls within Section 13 of RA 3019 requiring
the mandatory preventive suspension of Miranda by the
Sandiganbayan. In addition, the maximum period of a single preventive
suspension of local elective public officials like Miranda cannot exceed
60 days in accordance with Section 63(b) of the Local Government
Code.
Whether Sec. 13 RA 3019 applies only to fraud involving public funds or
property
o The provision clearly shows that the existence of a valid
information is not enough. The crime must be for:
A violation of RA 3019
An offense contained in Title 7, Book II, RPC
Any offense involvin fraud upon government or
public funds or property
o The charge of usurpation of authority or official functions is not a
violation of RA 3019. Neither is it a violation of any offense in
Title 7, Book II of the RPC. Thus, the Sandiganbayan can
impose the mandatory preventive suspension on Miranda under
Section 13 of RA 3019 only if the charge of usurpation of
authority or official functions against Miranda involves fraud
upon government or public funds or property.
o Nothing in RA 3019 evinces any legislative intent to limit Section
13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds or property. To
limit the use of government as an adjective that qualifies
funds is not merely baseless, it is also superfluous. The word
public already precedes funds, hence clearly distinguishing
the funds from private funds.
o In distinguishing in Section 13 between any offense involving
fraud upon government and any offense involving xxx public
funds or property, the law clearly intends to create two types of
offenses. To limit the applicability of Section 13 of RA 3019 only
to offenses involving public funds or property will exclude other
offenses of fraud against the government not involving public
funds or property.
Whether usurpation of authority automatically triggers application of
Sec. 13 RA 3019 (No)
o one may be liable for usurpation of authority or of official
functions without defrauding the government
The essence of usurpation of authority under Article
177 of the RPC is false and malicious representation.
The gravamen of the offense of usurpation of authority
is the false representation, maliciously made, that one
is an officer, agent or representative of the Philippine
Government or any foreign government. Fraud on the
government is not an essential element of the offense.
The mere act of making a false and malicious
representation that one is a government officer is
sufficient to constitute the of-fense, whether or not the
act defrauds the government.
On the other hand, the gravamen of fraud upon
government in Section 13 of RA 3019 is the public
officers act of defrauding the government. It is
necessary that the act should defraud the government.
Usurpation of authority, while involving fraudulent
means, does not necessarily involve fraud on the
government. The fraud may be committed only against
private parties and not against the government.
o Miranda did not re-assume office to defraud the government.
Before re-assuming office, Miranda wrote the Ombudsman and
all concerned local and national DILG officials informing them of
his stand and the legal basis for his re-assumption of office.
When the DILG informed him that he remained suspended,
Miranda immediately vacated his office. Mirandas actions do
not show any attempt to defraud the government. Mirandas
acts of re-assuming office and performing his official functions
reveal an honest intention to perform his duties as the duly
elected Mayor.
o The power of the Sandiganbayan to suspend preventively a
public officer rests on the sufficiency and validity of the
information.
Carpio finds the Information insufficient because the
acts alleged therein does not constitute fraud against
the government. . Hence, Miranda cannot be
suspended.
o Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code prohibits any
single preventive suspension of a local elective public official to
last for more than 60 days.
 Carpio says that when Miranda assumed office, he had
already served 60 days of preventive suspension.
Hence, there was no longer any legal impediment to his
resumption of office.
the Ombudsman must exercise the power to
preventively suspend public officers in conformity with
Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code, a later
law. Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code
governs specifically the duration of a single preventive
suspension of local elective public officials. In contrast,
Section 24 of RA 6770, imposing a maximum
suspension of six months, governs all other public
officials, whether appointive or elective.
the period of preventive suspension cannot exceed 60
days regardless of who is imposing the preventive
suspension. There is no language in the Local
Government Code exempting the Ombudsman from the
60-day preventive suspension cap. Where the law does
not distinguish, we should also not distinguish.
o The Ombudsmans power to suspend preventively a local
elective official for six months is repugnant to the Local
Government Code, which limits the preventive suspension to
only 60 days. Under Section 66(b) of the Local Government
Code, the maximum suspension of six months is already a
penalty. The power given by RA 6770 to the Ombudsman is
limited to the imposition of a preventive suspension while the
Ombudsman investigates the case of an elective official. A
preventive suspension is not a penalty. A person under
preventive suspension, especially in a criminal action, is still
entitled to the presumption of innocence. By upholding the
power of the Ombudsman to impose a preventive suspension of
six months on a local elective official, the Ombudsman is in
effect already penalizing the local elective official even before
the Ombudsmans investigation has begun.
Sangguniang Barangay of Don Marcos v Punong Barangay Martinez
(2008, Chico-Nazario)
PJ Navarro
DOCTRINE: The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) or Sangguniang Panglungsod
(SP) cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from
office, as the courts (RTC) are exclusively vested with this under Section
60 of the LGC.
Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave
nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the
case should be filed with the regional trial court. The most extreme penalty that
the Sanggunian may impose is suspension.
FACTS:
December 2004 Severino Martinez, Punong Barangay of Barangay Don
Mariano Marcos (Bayombong, Nueva Vizacaya) was administratively
charged with Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and violation of the Anti-Graft
and Practices Act by petitioner (Sanggunian Barangay) through the filing of
a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan.
Pursuant to Section 61 of the LGC, the SB is the disciplining authority over
elective barangay officials.
Charges, among others (6 in all) were for failure to submit and fully remit to
the Barangay Treasurer the income of their solid waste management
project particularly the sale of fertilizer and recyclable materials derived
from composting and garbage collection. There was also a charge for failure
to liquidate his travelling expenses for the 2003 Lakbay-aral.
Martinez failed to file an Answer, thus was declared by SB in default,
July 2005 - the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed
the penalty of removal from office.
August 2005 - The Decision was conveyed to the Municipal Mayor
(Severino Bagasao) for its implementation. Mayor issued a Memorandum,
stating that SB is not empowered to order Martinezs removal from service.
However, the Decision remains valid until reversed and must be executed
by him.
Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for TRO and
Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against SB and Mayor.
TC - Order of SB null and void. The proper courts, and not the petitioner, are
empowered to remove an elective local official from office, in accordance
with Section 60 of the Local Government Code.
Note: Although Martinezs term as Punong Baranggay expired in 2007 and,
thus, rendering this petition moot and academic, the Court will nevertheless
settle a legal question that is capable of repetition yet evading review.
ISSUE/HELD: WON the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective
local official, from office. NO. SC affirmed RTC. PETITION DENIED.
RATIO:
1. Textual
Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the
power to remove elective local officials from office: Section 60. Grounds for
Disciplinary Actions.An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated above by order of the proper court.
2. Legislative Intent Only RTC
During the deliberations of the Senate on the LGC, the legislative intent to
confine to the courts, i.e., RTCs, the Sandiganbayan and the appellate
courts, jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials
was evident.
In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc categorically ruled that the
Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials.
Court invalidated Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (which provides that An
elective local official may be removed from office by order of the proper
court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the other.
3. Ratio for making it an exclusive judicial prerogative
The Sanggunian Brgy contends that administrative cases involving elective
barangay officials may be filed with, heard and decided by the SP or SB
concerned, which can, thereafter, impose a penalty of removal from office. It
further claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of
removal, after the SP or SB finds that a penalty of removal is warranted.
This would counter the rationale for making the removal of elective officials
an exclusive judicial prerogative.
Pablico v. Villapando: It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove
erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the
courts. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be
strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of
suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for
what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the
 people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it
will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than
disciplining authority. removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme
penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may
The rule is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan
activity by the disciplining authority. impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension; if it
It must not be tainted with partisan politics and used to defeat the will of the deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it
voting public. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power in a more impartial can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court.
tribunal, the court. Furthermore, LGUs are not deprived of the right to
discipline local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from imposing
the extreme penalty of dismissal.
6. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not inflexible
4. Courts not merely an implementing arm of SB As a general rule, no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative
Argument of Sanggunian is an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on remedies have been exhausted. However, this rule is not applicable where
separation of powers, thus placing the courts under the orders of the the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
legislative bodies of local governments. The courts would be stripped of jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved are essentially
their power of review, and their discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of
judicial.
removal from office is thus left to be exercised by political factions which
stand to benefit from the removal from office of the local elective official
concerned, the very evil which Congress sought to avoid when it enacted
Section 60 of the Local Government Code. In this case, it is apparent that the SB acted beyond its jurisdiction when it
issued the assailed Order removing Martinez from office. Such act was
patently illegal and, therefore, Martinez was no longer required to avail
Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done himself of an administrative appeal in order to annul the said Order of the
only after a trial before the appropriate court, where court rules of procedure Sangguniang Bayan. Thus, his direct recourse to regular courts of justice
and evidence can ensure impartiality and fairness and protect against was justified.
political maneuverings. Elevating the removal of an elective local official
from office from an administrative case to a court case may be justified by
the fact that such removal not only punishes the official concerned but also,
in effect, deprives the electorate of the services of the official for whom they
voted.

5. Power of the Sanggunian

As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for
the procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an erring
elective barangay official before the SP or SB. However, the Sangguniang
cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from
office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under
Section 60 of the Local Government Code.

Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a

grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal
from office, the case should be filed with the regional trial court. Once
Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive
suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to
Facts: the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the
Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections
On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government
Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already
Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede. There respondents were prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the
charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President.
Act), as amended,Articles 170 (falsification of legislative documents) and 171
(falsification by public officers) of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). The respondent
officials were allegedly causing alteration of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing
the allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M without authority from
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue.
The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and
decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose
administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their
preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President.
On September 1992, a TRO against Hagad was filed and granted to the
petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing suspension.

Issue:

Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898) has
been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local
elective official by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160.

Held:

No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is
not removed by LG Code of 1991.
There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed,
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act.
The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let
alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the
other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored,
16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two
laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface,
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in
the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e.,
every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as
to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature
should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to
have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and
give effect to all laws on the subject.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez
July 23, 2010
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs.
ROLSON RODRIGUEZ, respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
SUMMARY: Two complaints for abuse of authority, dishonesty, misconduct, and
neglect were filed against P/B Rodriguez, one in the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of
Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, and another in the Ombudsman. The complaint
before the Ombudsman was filed on Aug. 26, 2003; complaint in the SB was
filed Sept. 1. SB served notice on Rodriguez on Sept. 8, while Ombudsman did
so on Sept. 10. After several motions filed, [allegation of forum shopping, motion
to dismiss filed by Rodriguez] the complainants eventually withdrew the SB
complaint so they could focus on the complaint with the Ombudsman. In the
Ombudsman proceeding, Rodriguez filed MTD, claiming that the SB still had
jurisdiction because he never received a decision or resolution dismissing that
complaint. Complainants argued that the case was dismissed after the Vice-
Mayor granted their motion to withdraw. Rodriguez replied that the dismissal
was invalid because only the vice-mayor signed it. Later, Ombudsman rendered
a decision dismissing Rodriguez from his position, disqualifying him from public
office, and forfeiting his benefits and CSC eligibility. On appeal, CA reversed,
holding that SB still had jurisdiction because it was the first to serve notice on
Rodriguez. On appeal by the Ombudsman, SC reversed CA and affirmed the
Ombudsman decision, ruling that the Ombudsman had concurrent jurisdiction
with the SB under RA 8749 and the LGC, because Rodriguez is a punong
barangay (SG 14). Contrary to CA conclusion and Rodriguez contention that
jurisdiction is acquired by service of summons [thus SB acquired jurisdiction
first], in cases of 2 agencies exercising concurrent jurisdiction, the body in w/c
the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case,
acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction continues until the case is terminated. CAB:
Complaint with the Ombudsman was filed first, so when it took of cognizance of
[opted to assume jurisdiction over] the case, jurisdiction had already vested, to
the exclusion of the SB. Ombudsman decision was thus rendered with
jurisdiction and should be upheld.
DOCTRINE: Under LGC 60, the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an
elective barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may
do so. Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman are not
merely recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly
remove an erring public official other than members of Congress and the
Judiciary who may be removed only by impeachment. Ombudsman has
concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases
against elective barangay officials with salary grade below 27, e.g., punong
barangay. The rule against forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or
proceedings, not to administrative cases.
NATURE: Petition for review under ROC 45. Administrative complaint filed with
the Ombudsman.
FACTS
Aug. 26, 2003 Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB) received a complaint
against P/B Rolson RODRIGUEZ of Sto. Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental. The complaint alleged abuse of authority, dishonesty,
oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty.
Sep. 1, 2003 Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Binalbagan, through Vice-
Mayor Jose G. YULO, received a similar complaint against Rodriguez.
[no statement as to who the complainants were]
Sep. 8, 2003 Yulo issued a notice ordering Rodriguez to file an
answer within 15 days from receipt of such notice.
Sep, 10, 2003 OMB required Rodriguez to file his answer.
Sep. 23, 2003 Rodriguez moved to dismiss the complaint in the SB for
being baseless in fact and in law. He also argued that the complainants
violated the rule against forum shopping.
Oct. 24, 2003 Rodriguez moved to dismiss the OMB complaint on the
grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping, arguing that the SB had
acquired jurisdiction on Sep. 8.
Complainants, through counsel, moved to withdraw the SB complaint to
prioritize the OMB complaint.
o Rodriguez insisted that the SB complaint be dismissed on the
ground of forum shopping
o Complainants admitted to forum shopping (LOL) and claimed
that they were not assisted by counsel when they filed the
complaint.
Nov. 4, 2003 Yulo dismissed the SB complaint.
Jan. 29, 2004 OMB ordered both parties to file position papers.
Rodriguez filed MR, citing pendency of his MTD.
o MR denied. MTD is a prohibited pleading under AO 17, Rule III,
Sec.5(g). OMB: Magfile ka ng position paper.
o Rodriguez: Sige fa-file ako. SB still had jurisdiction over his
person because he has not received any resolution or decision
indicating the dismissal of the SB case.
o Complainants: There was no more complaint in the SB because
Vice-Mayor Yulo granted their motion to withdraw.
o Rodriguez rejoinder: Dismissal not valid because only the Vice-
Mayor signed it.
Sep. 21, 2004 OMBUDSMAN DECISION
o Found Rodriguez GUILTY of dishonesty and oppression
o Rodriguez dismissed from service, w/ forfeiture of all benefits
and civil service eligibilites, and disqualification from public
office.
o Rodriguez filed MR.
Jan 12, 2005 OMB directed the Mayor of Binalbagan to dismiss
Rodriguez.
Rodriguez filed a petition for review with the CA.
May 8, 2006 CA DECISION
o OMB decision set aside for lack of jurisdiction
 o Directed SB to continue hearing the case, as it acquired primary
jurisdiction over Rodriguez, to the exclusion of the OMB.
o BASIS: RoC 46, Sec. 4. SB was the first to serve notice on
Rodriguez.
o OMB filed the present petition
OMB: Jurisdiction over the person is acquired once a body vested with
jurisdiction takes cognizance of the complaint. OMB was first to take
cognizance of the complaint because the SB complaint was filed later.
Summons or notices do not vest jurisdiction over the person in an
administrative case. Consistent with the rule on concurrent jurisdiction,
OMB exercise of jurisdiction must be to the exclusion of the SB.
Rodriguez: When a competent body has acquired jurisdiction over a
complaint and over the person of the respondent, other bodies are
excluded from exercising jurisdiction over the same complaint. LGC
IRR, Art. 124 provides that an elective official may be removed by the
proper court or by disciplining authority whichever acquires jurisdiction
first to the exclusion of the other. SB acquired jurisdiction first.
Jurisdiction in administrative cases is acquired by service of summons
or other compulsory processes. Complainants committed forum
shopping when they filed two identical complaints in two disciplining
authorities exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
ISSUES (HELD)
1) W/N the complainants violated the rule against forum shopping when they
filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints
against Rodriguez (NO)
2) Who acquired jurisdiction first - the sangguniang bayan or the Ombudsman?
(Ombudsman)
RATIO
1) FORUM SHOPPING NOT APPLICABLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
The facts in this case are analogous to those in Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman,
which likewise involved identical administrative complaints filed in both the
Ombudsman and the sangguniang panlungsod against a punong barangay for
grave misconduct. The Court held therein that the rule against forum
shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to
administrative cases. Thus, even if complainants filed in the Ombudsman and
the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against [Rodriguez], they did not
violate the rule against forum shopping because their complaint was in the
nature of an administrative case.
2) OMBUDSMAN HAS CONCURRENT JURISDICTION WITH SB BUT
COMPLAINT WAS FIRST FILED WITH OMBUDSMAN
Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 13(1): The Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate on its own, or
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office, or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Ombudsman Act, Sec. 15: The Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its
own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of Government, the investigations of such
cases.
LGC 61(c): Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. - A verified
complaint against any erring elective official shall be prepared as
follows: (c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be
filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan
concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.
Primary jurisdiction of Ombudsman applies only in cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan.
In cases cognizable by the regular courts, Ombudsmans jurisdiction is
concurrent with other investigative agencies.
RA 8749 limits cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to public
officials with positions salary grade 27 and higher. Punong barangay is
salary grade 14, so no jurisdiction.
From the applicable laws, it is clear that the Ombudsman has
concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative
cases against elective barangay officials with salary grade below 27,
such as Rodriguez.
In administrative cases involving concurrent jurisdiction of 2 or more
disciplining authorities, the body in w/c the complaint is filed first, and
which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
CAB: Since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and it
opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the Ombudsmans
exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan.
Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Once acquired, it is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. CAB:
When complainants filed their case before the Ombudsman, jurisdiction
was already vested. Jurisdiction could no longer be transferred to the
sangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by the
same complainants.
Under LGC 60, the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an
elective barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper
court may do so. Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the powers of the
Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. The Ombudsman is
clothed with authority to directly remove an erring public official other
than members of Congress and the Judiciary who may be removed only
by impeachment.
DISPOSITION: Petition granted. Ombudsman decision upheld.
Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan, and having been charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, is subject
to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
FACTS: The Municipality of San Nicolas, represented by Mayor Conrado
Rodrigo, entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction, represented by
Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Caboloan, San Nicolas, for the sum
of P486,386.18. On September 2, 1992, Reynaldo Mejica, the Planning and
Development Coordinator of San Nicolas, prepared an Accomplishment Report
stating that the Caboloan Power Generation project was 97.5% accomplished.
Said report was supposedly approved by Mayor Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry
Lu. On the basis of said report, payment of P452, 825.53 was effected by the
Municipal Treasurer, petitioner Alejandro Facundo, to Philwood Construction.

On 14 August 1993, petitioners received a Notice of Disallowance dated

21 June 1993 from the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan, Atty. Agustin Chan, Jr.,
who found that as per COA (Commission on Audit) evaluation of the
electrification project, only 60.0171% of the project (equivalent to P291,915.07)
was actually accomplished. The Ombudsman approved the filing of an
information against Rodrigo et. al. for v i o l a t i o n o f A n t i - G r a f t L a w
b e f o r e t h e S a n d i g a n b a y a n . Petitioners question the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. They contend that Mayor Rodrigo occupies a position of
Grade 24 and is, therefore, beyond the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Rodrigo et. al.

HELD: Yes. Although RA 7975 limits the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to

those government officials having Salary Grade 27 or higher, municipal mayors
were re-classified from Salary Grade24 to Salary Grade 27 by virtue of RA 6758
which took effect on July 1, 1989. Rodrigo however, claim that at the time of
the commission of the alleged crime on or about 2 September 1992,
Mayor Rodrigo, the highest public ranking public official impleaded in this case,
was receiving a monthly salary of P10,441.00. Such amount 6758 is
supposedly equivalent to a fourth step increment in Grade 24 under the
Salary Schedule prescribed in Section 7 of R.A. No. 6758. Congress adopted
the scheme employed in P.D. No. 985 for c lass if ying pos itions with
c om par able res pon s ibilities and qua lif ic atio ns f or the purpos e
of according such positions similar salaries. This scheme is known as the
"Grade," defined in P.D. No. 985 as including all classes of positions which,
although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are
sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of
qualif ic atio n requir ements of the work to wa rrant the inc lus ion of
s uc h c lass es of positions within one range of basic compensation. Rodrigos
position having been classified as Grade 27 in accordance with R.A. No. 6758,
Llorente Jr. v Sandiganbayan v People - To determine whether the official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, reference should be made to RA 6758 and and the
2000 | Pardo, J. Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades;
- An officials Salary Grade is not a matter of proof but of law which the
2 criminal cases were filed against petitioner for violation of Section 3
Court must take judicial notice;
of RA 3019.
- Also, under Section 444(d) of the LGC, the municipal mayor shall
-
st receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary
1 is for seizing 930 sawn knockdown wooden boxes without search
and seizure warrant and without issuing any receipt of seizure causing Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758
damage to one Diamante; and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
-
nd
2 is for refusing to issue mayors permit to ice plant and resawmill/box - Additionally, both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of
factory of Diamantes without sufficient justification; Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades list the
- They were filed before he became a Congressman in May 8, 1995 when municipal mayor under Salary Grade 27.
he was still a municipal mayor;
- He pleaded not guilty to both;
DENIED
- Note that trial in Sandiganbayan has not yet begun;

Later, in May 16, 1995, Congress enacted RA 7975, amending Section 4 of PD

1606 which defined jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan;

- Under section 4 (jurisdiction) municipal mayors were not mentioned;

- At the bottom it says, where none of principal accused are occupying
position corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, exclusive
jurisdiction is with RTC or MTCs as the case may be.

st
Llorente filed an motion to dismiss or refer to the RTC in 1 case;

-
nd
As to the 2 case, he motioned for it to be referred to the RTC;
- Both motion denied so to SC.

W/N RA 7975 divested Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over violations of RA

3019 against municipal mayors. No.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 against municipal

mayors

- Petitioner says: the salary received by a public official determines his

Salary Grade;
- SC says: on the contrary, it is the officials grade that determines his or
her salary;
Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996
Ponente: Justice Francisco
Facts:
Petitioner is the incumbent barangay captain of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won
during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall was
filed by the registered voters of the barangay. A recall election was set, against
which petitioner filed a petition. Petitioner cites Section 74 (b) of LGC, which
states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
local election, petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall
election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by
Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years
thereafter. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election,
hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK
election from the recall election. We do not agree.
Issue:
Whether or not an SK election is a regular election.
Held:
No. A statutes provisions must be considered with the other parts and must be
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Paragraph (b)
with (a) of LGC74 merely designates such a period, i.e. 2nd year of term.
Considering the SK election as regular will unduly circumscribe the LGC
provision on recall. No recall election can be conducted if that is the case (May
1996, every three years). It is assumed that legislature intended to enact an
effective law, and interpretation should give effec to the intent, with the whole
statute. It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute
[7]
should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation
of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof,
should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X
of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum x x x. An interpretation too literal that the spirit is denied will fall in
former of the latter.
Claudio v. COMELEC
FACTS:
LGU concerned: Pasay City
Position of person/s involved: Mayor of Pasay City
Contested Law/Ordinance:
Jovito O. Claudio (Claudio) was duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11,
1998 elections. Sometime in May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in
Pasay City gathered for the purpose of convening the Preparatory Recall
Assembly (PRA) and to file a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of
confidence.
On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs,
kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution
No. 01, S-1999 recalling Claudio as mayor for loss of confidence. The petition
for recall was filed on July 2, 1999 and copies of the petition were in public areas
throughout the City.
Claudio filed an opposition against the petition alleging, among others, that the
petition for recall was filed within one year from his assumption into office and
therefore prohibited. He argued that the PRA was convened within the 1 year
prohibited period as provided by Section 74 of the Local Government Code. The
COMELEC, however, granted the petition for recall ruling that recall is a process
which starts with the filing of the petition for recall and since the petition was filed
exactly one year and a day after Claudio's assumption of office, the petition was
filed on time. Thereafter, COMELEC set the date of the recall elections on April
15, 2000. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WoN the petition for recall was filed within the proper period provided for
by Section 74 of the Local Government Code
HELD: Yes. SC Affirmed COMELEC
The limitations in Section 74 apply to the exercise of the power of recall (i.e. the
recall election itself) which is vested with the registered voters of the LGU. It
does not apply to the preparatory processes to such exercise of recall such as
the proceedings of the PRA.
RATIO:
Recall as used in Section 74 refers to the election itself
We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the
preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of
the registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing
of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such
resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding
of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of
74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide
whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement.
Section 69 of the Local Government Code provides that "the power of recall
...shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which
the local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is
not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into
office, the limitations in 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall
proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the
recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for
recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of
the voters for a petition for recall.
Anything steps prior to recall election itself are merely preliminary steps for the
purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in 74 apply only to the exercise of
the power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and not
merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which
paragraph (b) of 74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place
within one year from the date of assumption of office of an elective local official.
The proceedings of the PRA do not constitute the exercise of recall
It is the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that the Constitution
gave to the people. A recall resolution "merely sets the stage for the official
concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be
allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their sovereign
judgment, the official concerned remains in office. Thus, the preliminary
proceedings of the PRA do not produce a decision by the electorate on whether
the local official concerned continues to enjoy the confidence of the people,
then, the prohibition in paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall, except one
year after the official's assumption of office, cannot apply to such proceedings.
Purpose of the one year prohibitory period against the exercise of recall
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the
performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the
election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to
initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a
local official.
Including the convening of the PRA as part of recall restricts right of speech and
assembly
Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening
of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective
local officials would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of
assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the
election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and
formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the
first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the holding of assemblies for the
exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the
most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such
assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may
result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent.
The phrase regular local election does not include the campaign period
Claudio contends that the date April 15, 2000 also falls within the second
prohibition under Section 74 of the Local Government Code arguing that the
phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does not only mean "the day of
the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election
period as well. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall
election may be held.
The contention is untenable. First there is nothing in the law that shows the
campaign period is included for purposes of computing the prohibitory period.
Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which
a recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held
until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official,
presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period
from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding
year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To
construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period
would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation must be
rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to
make local government units" more responsive and accountable."

ANGOBUNG versus COMELEC
G. R. No. 126576 (March 5, 1997)This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set
aside Resolution No. 96-2951
(15 October 1996) issued by theCommission on Elections (COMELEC), which
approved the Petition for Recall filed and signed by only oneregistered voter,
private respondent Ma. Aurora S. de Alban, against petitioner incumbent Mayor
Ricardo M.Angobung; set the further signing of said petition by the rest of the
registered voters of Tumauini, Isabela on 09 November 1996; and in case the said
petition is signed by at least 25% of the total number of registered votes
inTumauini, Isabela, scheduled the recall election on 02 December 1996. The
Supreme Court issued a TemporaryRestraining Order
enjoining COMELEC from implementing and enforcing the assailed Resolution.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ricardo M. Angobung was the elected Mayor of the Municipality of
Tumauini, Isabela in the localelections of 1995. Private respondent de Alban was
also a candidate in said elections. In September 1996, deAlban filed with the Local
Election Registrar of Tumauini, Isabela, a Petition for Recall against Angubong.
Said petition was forwarded to the Regional Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan and
then to the main office of COMELEC in Manila, for approval. Deputy Executive
Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson then submitted tothe COMELEC en banc,
a Memorandum (08 October 1996) which recommends the approval of the petition
for recall filed by de Alban and its signing by other qualified voters in order to
garner at least 25% of the totalnumber of registered voters as required by Section
69[d] of the Local Government Code of 1991. TheCOMELEC en banc, acting on
said Memorandum, issued the herein assailed Resolution No. 96-2951.Petitioner
now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being unconstitutional and therefore
invalid.
ISSUES
1)
Whether the Resolution violated the one-year bar on recall elections;Whether the
Resolution violated the statutory minimum requirement of 25% as to the number
of signatures supporting any petition for recall.
HELD, RATIO
1.
NO. The recall election scheduled on 02 December 1996 is not barred by the May
1997 BarangayElections. The one-year bar finds no application in the case;
Resolution No. 96-2951 is therefore validon this ground.
Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that "no recall shall
take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election." For the
time bar to apply, the approaching regular localelection must be one where the
position of the official to be recalled is to be actually contested and filled by
theelectorate.
2.
YES. Private respondent de Alban filed the petition for recall with only herself as
the filer andinitiator. She claims in her petition that she has, together with many
others in Tumauini, Isabela, lostconfidence in the leadership of petitioner. The
petition, however, does not bear the names of all theseother citizens of Tumauini
who have reportedly also become anxious to oust petitioner from the postof
mayor.
Section 69 [d] of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that
"recall of any elective municipal official may also be validly initiated upon petition
of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in thelocal government unit
concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was
elected"
. The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates recall proceedings: only a
petition of at least25% of the total number of registered voters may validly initiate
recall proceedings. The law does not state thatthe petition must be signed by at
least 25% of the registered voters but rather it must be "of" or by, at least 25%of
the registered voters, i.e., the petition must be filed, not by one person only, but by
at least 25% of the totalnumber of registered voters.
Recall
is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of
office.The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their
sovereign power and in theabsence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied
in all governmental operations. Such powerhas been held to be indispensable for
the proper administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly,it is frequently
described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative
democracy(Garcia v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 100, 1993).
Recall was intended to be an effective and speedy remedy to remove an official
who is not givingsatisfaction to the electorate regardless of whether or not he is
discharging his full duty to the best of hisability and as his conscience dictates. It is
a power granted to the people who, in concert, desire tochange their leaders for
reasons only they, as a collective, can justify. It must be pursued by the people,not
just by one disgruntled loser in the elections or a small percentage of
disenchanted electors.Otherwise, its purpose as a direct remedy of the people
shall be defeated by the ill motives of a fewamong them whose selfish resort to
recall would destabilize the community and seriously disrupt therunning of
government.While the people are vested with the power to recall their elected
officials, the same power isaccompanied by the concomitant responsibility to see
through all the consequences of the exercise of such power, including rising
above anonymity, confronting the official sought to be recalled, his family,his
friends, and his supporters, and seeing the recall election to its ultimate end. The
procedure of allowing just one person to file the initiatory recall petition and then
setting a date for the signing of the petition, which amounts to inviting and courting
the public which may have not, in the first place, evenentertained any displeasure
in the performance of the official sought to be recalled, is not only violativeof
statutory law but also tainted with an attempt to go around the law.The Supreme
Court (1) granted the Petition for Certiorari; (2) declared COMELEC Resolution
No. 96-2951 null and void; (3) set aside the same; made permanent the
restraining order it issued
CATU VS ATTY RELLOSA
FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio
Pastor who were occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was
owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong
th
Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5 District of Manila where
respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned
for conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement,
were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate
action in court. Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth
and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered
his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed
the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that
he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he
stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the
conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In his
defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task
without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeths request to handle the case for
free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found
sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them, respondent
violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective
official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the
violation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1.
Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent was then
recommended suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern
warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of
respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the
respondent were proper.
HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03
the Code of Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has
left government service and in connection to former government lawyers who
are prohibited from accepting employment in connection with any matter in
which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar, respondent
was an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the
purview of the said provision.
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which
governs the practice of profession of elective local government officials. While
RA 6713 generally applies to all public officials and employees, RA 7160, being
a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while under RA
7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board
members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the
sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to
practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his
profession.
Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior
permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil
service regulations. The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing
the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law but also violated a civil service rules which is a
breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act
and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oathand/or for breach
of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of
professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7
and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months
effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
word delicadeza.
MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS
REGALADO, J.:
Facts: Atty. Felix E. Mendiola served as counsel for the Municipality of Pililia in a
collection suit for unpaid business taxes, storage permit fee, mayors permit fee,
sanitary inspection fee, and the cost of the suit against private respondent
Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC). The municipality won in the trial court,
and when PPC elevated the case to the Supreme Court, the SC affirmed the
aforesaid judgment. The judgment became final and executory and the records
were remanded to the trial court for execution.
In connection with the execution of said judgment, Atty. Felix E. Mendiola filed a
motion in behalf of the municipality for the examination of defendant
corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and 1984 to 1991 for the
purpose of computing business tax. Defendant corporation filed a manifestation
that Pililla Mayor Nicomedes Patenia received from it the sum of
P11,457,907.00 as full satisfaction of the above-mentioned judgment of the
Supreme Court, as evidence by the release and quitclaim documents executed
by said mayor. The RTC denied the municipality's motion for examination and
execution of judgment on the ground that the judgment had already been
satisfied.
It was when the case was only when the case was brought before to the CA that
respondent PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola's authority to
represent petitioner municipality. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence,
but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla
through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Mendiola can represent the Municipality of Pilila
Held: No. The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no
authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the Municipality of
Pililla. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial
subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal shall represent the
province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court,
except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme
Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question
is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other
municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the
interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof
are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or
other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be
employed by its council.
Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or
municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's
authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where
the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.
The fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's
case must appear on record. In the case, there is nothing in the records to show
that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of
Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of herein private counsel is without
authority of law.
The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to apply to
situations where the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case cannot be
sustained. The fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal
justification. A fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not
provided for by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the
services of a special attorney, the municipal council should request the
Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the
provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court.
It should also be noted that the lack of authority of Atty. Mendiola, was even
raised by the municipality itself in its comment and opposition to said counsel's
motion for execution of his lien, which was filed by the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of said municipality.
The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise for the first
time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the municipality is untenable.
The legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of the
proceedings.
Also, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty.
Mendiola was duly authorized, said authority is deemed to have been revoked
by the municipality when the latter, through the municipal mayor and without
said counsel's participation, entered into a compromise agreement with PPC.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment
of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 99425 March 3, 1997
FACTS:
On April 18, 1990, petitioners Antonio C. Ramos, Rosalinda M. Perez, Norma C.
Castillo, and the Baliuag Market Vendors Association, Inc. filed a petition for the
Declaration of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances No. 91 (1976) and No. 7 (1990)
and the contract of lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed in the
municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan, Preliminary injunction, was issued by the court
a quo on May 9, 1990.
The provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney, Oliviano D. Regalado, filed an
Answer in behalf of respondent municipality. At the pre-trial conference
scheduled on May 28, 1990, Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos appeared, manifesting
that he was counsel for respondent municipality.
On June 18, 1990, Provincial Attorney Oliviano D. Regalado appeared as
collaborating counsel of Atty. Romanillos. The Provincial Fiscal did not appear. It
was Atty. Romanillos who submitted the Reply to petitioners' Opposition to
respondents' motion to dissolve injunction and a written formal offer of evidence
for respondent municipality.
Petitioners opposed the personality of Atty. Romanillos to appear as counsel of
the respondent municipality, and motioned to disqualify Atty. Romanillos from
appearing as counsel for respondent municipality and to declare null and void
the proceedings participated in and undertaken by Atty. Romanillos. Atty.
Romanillos withdrew as counsel for respondent municipality and that Atty.
Regalado, as his collaborating counsel for respondent municipality, is adopting
the entire proceedings participated in/undertaken by Atty. Romanillos.
Respondent Judge issued the Order denied petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty.
Romanillos as counsel for respondent municipality and to declare null and void
the proceeding participated in by Atty. Romanillos; and on the other hand,
granted Atty. Regalado's motion "to formally adopt the entire proceedings
including the formal offer of evidence. It is noted that Atty. Romanillos initially
entered his appearance as collaborating counsel of the Provincial Prosecutor
and the Provincial Attorney when he filed a motion to dissolve injunction under
motion dated May 30, 1990 and since then despite his active participation in the
proceedings, the opposing counsel has never questioned his appearance until
after he made a formal offer of evidence for the respondents. The acquiescence
of petitioners' counsel of his appearance is tantamount to a waiver and
petitioners are, therefore, estopped to question the same.
ISSUES:
1. Who has the legal authority to represent a municipality in law-suits?
2. If an unauthorized lawyer represents a municipality what is the effect of his
participation in the proceedings?
3. Parenthetically, does a motion to withdraw the appearance of the
unauthorized counsel have to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
regarding notice and hearing of motions?
HELD: We affirm the Decision and Resolution of public respondent.
1. Only provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a
province or municipality in their lawsuits. In the recent case of Municipality
of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals, set in clear-cut terms the answer to the
question of who may legally represent a municipality in a suit for or against it,
thus: we ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality
in lawsuits.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions
in litigation. The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any
municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof
(sic) original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the
municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same
province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political
division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the
province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other
political subdivision of a province a special attorney may be employed by its
council.
Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, Republic Act No. 2264,
the Local Autonomy Law, only provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can
represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is
mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly
limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.
For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was
disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record. In the
instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial
fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on
appeal, hence the appearance of herein private counsel is without
authority of law. The provincial fiscal's functions as legal officer and adviser for
the civil cases of a province and corollarily, of the municipalities thereof, were
subsequently transferred to the provincial attorney.
The foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudence show that only the provincial
fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal attorney should represent a municipality
in its lawsuits. Only in exceptional instances may a private attorney be hired
by a municipality to represent it in lawsuits. It may be said that Atty.
Romanillos appeared for respondent municipality inasmuch as he was already
counsel of Kristi Corporation which was sued with respondent municipality in this
same case. The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed to WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
collaborate with a private law firm does not legalize the latter's representation of Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. No costs.
the municipality of Hagonoy. While a private prosecutor is allowed in criminal
cases, an analogous arrangement is not allowed in civil cases wherein a
municipality is the plaintiff.

Private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own. Neither

may they do so even in collaboration with authorized government lawyers.
This is anchored on the principle that only accountable public officers may act
for and in behalf of public entities and that public funds should not be expanded
to hire private lawyers.

2. YES, We agree with public respondent that such adoption produces validity. It
does not appear that the adoption of proceedings participated in or undertaken
by Atty. Romanillos when he was private counsel for the respondent municipality
of Baliuag such as the proceedings on the motion to dissolve the injunction,
wherein petitioners had even cross-examined the witnesses presented by Atty.
Romanillos in support of said motion and had even started to present their
witnesses to sustain their objection to the motion would have resulted in any
substantial prejudice to petitioners' interest. To declare the said proceedings null
and void notwithstanding the formal adoption thereof by Atty. Regalado as
Provincial Attorney of Bulacan in court and to require trial anew to cover the
same subject matter, to hear the same witnesses and to admit the same
evidence adduced by the same parties cannot enhance the promotion of justice.

This Court believes that conferring legitimacy to the appearance of Atty.

Romanillos would not cause substantial prejudice on petitioners. Requiring
new trial on the mere legal technicality that the municipality was not represented
by a legally authorized counsel would not serve the interest of justice. In sum,
although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in litigations,
in the interest of substantial justice however, we hold that a municipality may
adopt the work already performed in good faith by such private lawyer, which
work is beneficial to it (1) provided that no injustice it thereby heaped on the
adverse party and (2) provided further that no compensation in any guise is paid
therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer. Unless so expressly adopted,
the private lawyers work cannot bind the municipality.

3. NO, a motion to withdraw the appearance of an unauthorized lawyer is a

non-adversarial motion that need not comply with Section 4 Rule 15 as to
notice to the adverse party. The disqualification of Atty. Romanillos was what
petitioners were really praying for when they questioned his authority to appear
for the municipality. The disqualification was granted, thereby serving the relief
prayed for by petitioners. such being the case, no "notice directed to the parties
concerned and served at least 3 days before the hearing thereof" need be given
petitioners, the questioned motion not being contentious. Besides, what
petitioners were questioning as to lack of authority was remedied by the
adoption of proceedings by an authorized counsel, Atty. Regalado.
Enrique T. Garcia v. Commission on Elections and Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan
RATIO:
GR No. 111230, Sept. 30, 1994
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as
Ponente: Puno appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in
luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the
people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law
FACTS:
or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act
includes a resolution. It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with
and not in violation of the constitution.
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which
includes the Municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone
Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely:
in accord with the RA No. 7227. Nonetheless, the municipality did not take any
action on the petition within 30 days after its submission; so, the petitioners 1. Initiative on the Constitution petition to amend the Constitution
resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991.
They solicited the required number of signatures to repeal the said resolution. 2. Initiative on statutes petition proposing to enact a national legislation

However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding 3. Initiative on local legislation petition proposing to enact a regional,
Office of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance
to deny the petition for local initiative and/or referendum. On July 6, 1993, the
COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative because its subject is merely a
resolution and not an ordinance. They contend that under the Local
Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative.
They rely on section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government
Code of 1991 which provides: "Local Initiative Defined. Local initiative is the
legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may
directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance."

ISSUES:

1. WON the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper
subject of an initiative.
2. WON the decision of the COMELEC to deny the petition be set aside.

HELD:

YES. The petition is granted and the decision of the COMELEC on July
6, 1993 is annulled and set aside.