OFELIA S.

CLAUDIO
2014-0031
Atty. J. Parungo
Saturday 8:00-12:00

Analysis on the provisions of Sec. 22 and Sec. 24 (a) of Rule 130 on Evidence:

Both sections of Rule 130 cover spousal privileges namely: testimonial privilege and spousal
communication privilege, respectively. Both are similar in that the spouse affected cannot invoke this privilege
under the following circumstances:
1) In a civil case by one against the other,
2) In a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants
or ascendants.
The testimonial privilege is found in Section 22 of Rule 130, which provides that during their marriage,
neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse.
The spousal communication privilege is found in Section 24 (a) of Rule 130, which provides that the husband
or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage civil case by one against
the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants
or ascendants. (Sections 20 and 24, Rule 130). By the express language of the rules, the exceptions are
limited to these instances. No more, no less.
Although both sections may be similar, The big difference is that testimonial privilege can be invoked
only during the marriage. This cannot be said for the marital communication privilege where the privilege
survives the marriage.

Section 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband
nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except
in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)

CASES:

CASE # 1: Alvarez vs. Ramirez

FACTS:

Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA for allowing the testimony of petitioners
wife in a criminal proceeding where petitioner was accused for ransom. Private prosecutor in the said
criminal case called the petitioners wife without objection from petitioners counsel. Wife testified that it was
her estranged husband who poured and set the house of her sister on fire. A motion to disqualify the
testimony of his wife was filed pursuant to rules on martial disqualification.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the wife can testify against her husband in a criminal case.

RULING:

The reason for the rule on martial disqualification are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidence of private life, even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness;
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.

The offense of arson attributed to the husband impairs the conjugal relation between him and his
wife. His act eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by
which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes the evidence and facts presented reveal
that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and his wife is no longer an interest the State aims
to protect.

CASE # 2: People vs Castaneda

FACTS:

Victoria filed a complaint for Falsification of Public Document against her husband, Benjamin. Victoria
alleged that Benjamin falsified her signature in a deed of sale of a house belonging to the conjugal
partnership, making it appear that she gave her marital consent to said sale. At the trial, the prosecution
called to the witness stand Victoria, but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking the rule
that a spouse cannot be examined without the consent of the other spouse, except in a civil case by one
against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against another. The prosecution
opposed the motion on the ground that the case falls under the exception, contending that it is a criminal
case committed by one against the other. The trial court granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria from
testifying against Benjamin. Their motion for reconsideration denied, the prosecution elevated the case to
the Supreme Court on pure question of law

ISSUE:

Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document may be considered as a criminal case
for a crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital
disqualification.

RULING:

Yes. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a crime committed
by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.

The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the
accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife consented
to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not.
It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her
husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged
against said husband Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise
to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case. To
rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is
to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.

It is undeniable that the act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation.
This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set
aside the order disqualified her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of
the witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-
husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, the "identity of interests disappears and the consequent
danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which, through their
absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Thus, there is no reason to apply the martial
disqualification rule. (People vs. Castaneda, G.R. No. L-46306, February 27, 1979)
\
CASE 3: PEOPLE VS. ORDONO

FACTS:

Avelino Ordoo was charged in the municipal court of San Gabriel, La Union with having raped his daughter,
Leonora, on October 11, 1970. The verified complaint dated November 7, 1973 was signed by the twenty
four year old victim (Criminal Case No. 104).

In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoo, the mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement
wherein she disclosed that on that same date, October 11th, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but
no denunciation was filed because Avelino Ordoo threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina (his daughter
and wife, respectively) if they reported the crime to the police.

Catalina Ordoo in her sworn statement further revealed that her husband had also raped their other
daughter, Rosa, on March 25 and April 7, 1973. He was charged in court with that offense.

Catalina Ordoo said that the rape committed by Avelino Ordoo against Leonora was mentioned during
the investigation and trial of Avelino Ordoo for the rape committed against Rosa Ordoo. Catalina's
statement on this point is as follows:

Q Why did you not file the complaint against your husband concerning the incident
involving Leonora Ordoo?

A We Also narrated the incident during the investigation in the Fiscal's Office and also
when I testified in court in the case of my daughter Rosa Ordoo but then my daughter
Leonora Ordoo was still in Manila, sir.

During the preliminary investigation of the rape committed against Leonora, Catalina manifested that she
was no longer afraid to denounce Avelino Ordoo because he was already in jail for having raped Rosa
Ordoo.

The case against Avelino Ordoo, where Leonora Ordoo was the complainant, was elevated to the
Court of First Instance of La Union, San Fernando, Branch (Criminal Case No. 356). On May 29, 1974 the
Fiscal presented Catalina Ordoo as the second prosecution witness. After she had stated her personal
circumstances, the defense counsel objected to her competency. He invoked the marital disqualification
rule found in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
 Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. The following persons
cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein
enumerated:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife
for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the
other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other;

xxx xxx xxx

Counsel claimed that Avelino Ordoo had not consented expressly or impliedly to his wife's testifying
against him.

The trial court overruled the objection. After the denial of Avelino Ordoo's motion for the reconsideration

ISSUE: of the adverse ruling, he filed the instant action for certiorari and prohibition. He was allowed to sue
in forma pauperis.

The issue is whether the rape committed by the husband against his daughter is a crime committed by him
against his wife within the meaning of the exception found in the marital disqualification rule.

Should the phrase "in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other" be restricted to crimes
committed by one spouse against the other, such as physical injuries, bigamy, adultery or concubinage, or
should it be given a latitudinarian interpretation as referring to any offense causing marital discord?

RULING:

There is a dictum that "where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such
harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of
private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home" (People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, 704).

In the Francisco case, the wife, as a rebuttal witness, was allowed to testify against the husband who was
charged with having killed his son and who testified that it was the wife who killed their son.

We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill vs.
State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow;
and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes
within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attack or
directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute
that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed (by) one against the other.

Using the criterion thus judiciously enunciated in the Cargill case, it can be concluded that in the law of
evidence the rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his
wife (the victim's mother). *
Thus, in this case, when Avelino Ordoo, after having raped his daughter Leonora in the early morning of
October 11, 1970, tried to repeat the beastly act in the evening of that date, Leonora shouted "Mother" and,
on hearing that word, Avelino desisted.

That the rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and revolting crime with incestuous
implications, positively undermines the connubial relationship, is a proposition too obvious to require much
elucidation.

The trial court did not err in holding that Catalina Ordoo could testify against her husband, Avelino Ordoo,
in the case where he is being tried for having raped their daughter, Leonora.

Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following

persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants
or ascendants;

CASES:

CASE #1: Chan vs. Chan

FACTS:

Petitioner Wife filed against Respondent Husband a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, with
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her,
claiming that Respondent Husband failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist
diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
Respondent Husband claims that it was the Wife who failed in her duties. And that he initially agreed to
marriage counseling to save their marriage, but upon arriving at the hospital, two men forcibly held him by
both arms while another gave him an injection. He attached a Philhealth Claim Form to his answer as proof
that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. However, that same form carried a
physicians handwritten note that the Husband suffered from methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.
Based on the physicians handwritten statement, Petitioner Wife requested for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum addressed to Medical City, for the production of the Husbands medical records. The Husband
opposed, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. The request of
Petitioner Wife was denied and her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration on the matter was also denied.
She then filed a Petitioner for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals but this was also dismissed. Her
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration with the CA was also denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not, CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum covering Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character
of the physician-patient communication.

RULING:
Issuance of a subpoena ducestecum is premature. Petitioner Wife made the request before trial started.
She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering her husbands hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial,
that the husband may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.
Petitioner Wifes motion for the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum also cannot be treated as a motion
for production of documents as a mode of discovery because Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is
only limited to disclosure of documents which are not priviledged. Petitioner Wife claims that the
documents are not privileged because it is the testimony of the physician that is supposed to be privileged.
This contention is wrong. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined regarding their (physician-patient) professional conversation. To
allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records (including the results of tests that
the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patients illness, and the advice or treatment given) would, in
effect, be tantamount to allowing access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patients consent.
Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he
gained while dealing with the patient, without the latters prior consent. Lastly, Petitioner Wife argues that
her Husband already admitted in his answer that he had been confined in a hospital. However, as already
mentioned above, trial in the case had not yet begun. Since trial had not yet begun, it cannot be said the
Husband had already presented said Philhealth claim form as evidence. The Husband was not yet bound
to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records
would again be premature. For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying
Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnnys hospital records. Court denies the petition and
affirms the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

CASE # 2: Zulueta vs. CA

FACTS:

Petitioner Wife filed against Respondent Husband a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, with
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her,
claiming that Respondent Husband failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist
diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
Respondent Husband claims that it was the Wife who failed in her duties. And that he initially agreed to
marriage counseling to save their marriage, but upon arriving at the hospital, two men forcibly held him by
both arms while another gave him an injection. He attached a Philhealth Claim Form to his answer as proof
that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. However, that same form carried a
physicians handwritten note that the Husband suffered from methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.
Based on the physicians handwritten statement, Petitioner Wife requested for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum addressed to Medical City, for the production of the Husbands medical records. The Husband
opposed, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. The request of
Petitioner Wife was denied and her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration on the matter was also denied.
She then filed a Petitioner for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals but this was also dismissed. Her
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration with the CA was also denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not, CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum covering Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character
of the physician-patient communication.

RULING:

Issuance of a subpoena ducestecum is premature. Petitioner Wife made the request before trial started.
She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering her husbands hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial,
that the husband may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.
Petitioner Wifes motion for the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum also cannot be treated as a motion
for production of documents as a mode of discovery because Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is
only limited to disclosure of documents which are not priviledged. Petitioner Wife claims that the
documents are not privileged because it is the testimony of the physician that is supposed to be privileged.
This contention is wrong. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined regarding their (physician-patient) professional conversation. To
allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records (including the results of tests that
the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patients illness, and the advice or treatment given) would, in
effect, be tantamount to allowing access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patients consent.
Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he
gained while dealing with the patient, without the latters prior consent. Lastly, Petitioner Wife argues that
her Husband already admitted in his answer that he had been confined in a hospital. However, as already
mentioned above, trial in the case had not yet begun. Since trial had not yet begun, it cannot be said the
Husband had already presented said Philhealth claim form as evidence. The Husband was not yet bound
to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records
would again be premature. For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying
Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnnys hospital records. Court denies the petition and
affirms the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

CASE # 3: LEZAMA VS. CFI

FACTS: \

Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co. in Iloilo, together with 2 others filed
an action in the CFI Iloilo for the annulment of a judgment rendered against the ice plant by CFI Manila in
a civil case. The defendants included spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama and Marciano C. Roque
(judgment was rendered in his favor in the earlier civil case).

It was alleged that because of the mismanagement by the Lezamas, the ice plant was placed under the
receivership of Dineros; that Roque brought an action in CFI Manila against the ice plant for the collection
of P150,000 which Roque supposedly lent to the ice plant; that instead of serving the summons against
Dineros, it was served on the spouses; and that through the collusion of the spouses and roque, the latter
was able to obtain a judgment against the ice plant.

The spouses answered by admitting that the ice plant was placed in receivership, but Mr. Lezama remained
as president and had authority to receive in behalf of the company. They denied collusion with Roque

At the Hearing, Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as a witness
summoned by the plaintiffs. This was granted over the objection of the petitioners who invoked Rule 130
sec. 20(b). said provision deals with 2 different matters which rest on different grounds of policy:

a. Disqualification of husband and wife to testify on each other's behalf & their privilege not
to testify against each other. Common law theory: relationship of spouses, not their
pecuniary interest is the basis of the disqualification. disqualification by relationship
b. it is repugnant in every fair-minded person to compel a wife or husband to be the subject
of the other's condemnation and to subjecting the culprit to the humiliation of being
condemned by the words of his intimate life partner

the request for subpoena indicated that Paquita was to do no more than testify as an adverse party in the
case, and indeed, in the light of the allegations both in the complaint and in the answer, the request was
apparently one that could reasonably be expected to be made.

Dineros alleged that in obtaining a judgement against the ice plant, the spouses in gross and evident bad
faith, and in fraudulent conspiracy made it appear that the ice plant obtained a P150k loan from Roque and
allegedly upon an authority vested by the board of directors. Also, that the spouses manipulated the books
o fthe ice plant to make it appear that the loan was obtained

the spouses answered by denying the allegations above, that they did not contest the complaint for
collection since they believed that the action was legitimate and the allegations were true.

The spouses did not deny the allegation that it was Paquita, who as secretary signed the minutes of the
meeting where Jose Manuel was allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan.

Dineros wanted Paquita not as a witness for or against her husband but as an adverse party in the case as
provided for in Rule 132 sec. 6.

c. Judge Jesus Rodriguez, affirmed the petition to bring in Paquita as a witness and required
her to appear. The spouses filed an action for certiorari but the CA dismissed the petition.
MR denied hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

In a case where the wife is a co-defendant in a suit charging fraud against the spouses, can the wife be
compelled to testify as an adverse party witness concerning her participation in the alleged fraud without
violating Sec. 20B of Rule 130? NO

RULING:

It was argued that she may be compelled to testify but her testimony would be receivable only against her.
On the other hand, it was argued that it will violate Rule 130 sec. 20(b).

What was alleged was fraudulent conspiracy, the wife is called upon to testify as an adverse party witness
on the bases of her participation in the alleged fraudulent scheme (as secretary).

She will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the meeting. Whether her testimony will turn
out to be adverse or beneficial to her own interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her against her
husband. The interests of the 2 are necessarily interrelated. A testimony against her own interest would
show the existence of collusive fraud and she may unwittingly testify against the interests of her husband.

It was argued that as an exception to the rule (based on the wording of the rule) was that there was no
reason why either of them may not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone. Even
if this was acceptable, it would be inapplicable in this case where the main charge is collusive fraud between
the spouses and a hird person, and the evident purpose of examination was to prove the charge.

Finally it was alleged that to prevent the wife from testifying would encourage alliance of husband and wife
as an instrument of fraud (best way of preventing discovery since co-conspirator is made immune to the
most convenient mode of discovery available to the opposite party). SC: sec. 6 of rule 132 is a mere
concession, that rule of discovery should not be expanded in meaning or scopes to allow examination of
one's spouse in a situation where this natural repugnance obtains. Besides it wasnt shown that no other
evidence that Dineros could use to prove the charge.

The resolution appealed from REVERSED. Case remanded for further proceedings.