#187 INS v.

CHADHA AUTHOR: Kylie Dado

462 U.S. 919 (1983) Notes:
TOPIC: Interdependence, Blending of Powers and Checks and Balances
PONENTE:

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

Built-in legislative vetoes applicable to administrative agency decisions have been upheld as constitutional in the past. In this case, the act is
unconstitutional because it allows Congress to interpret and determine the legal status of an individual based on statutory criteria, the exclusive
province of a judiciary. Although administrative agencies exercise judicial authority in some cases, that authority is checked by such provisions as
the Administrative Procedure Act.
Emergency Recit:
Chadha overstayed his student visa and was asked to show cause why he should not be deported. After a hearing, the immigration judge ordered
that Chadhas deportation be suspended. However pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), which authorized either House of Congress
to invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the United States Attorney General (Attorney General), the House of Representatives (the House)
suspended an immigration judges deportation ruling regarding Chadha. The Court ruled that the said congressional veto provision is
unconstitutional because it circumvents the legislative procedures framed by the constitution when Congress resolves to act outside its boundaries.
FACTS:
Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) authorizes either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the
Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General, to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the
United States.

Appellee-respondent Chadha, an alien who had been lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa, remained in the
United States after his visa had expired and was ordered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to show cause why he should not be
deported. He then applied for suspension of the deportation, and, after a hearing, an Immigration Judge, acting pursuant to 244(a)(1) of the Act,
which authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to suspend deportation, ordered the suspension, and reported the suspension to Congress
as required by 244(c)(1). Thereafter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution pursuant to 244(c)(2) vetoing the suspension, and the
Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings.

Chadha moved to terminate the proceedings on the ground that 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional, but the judge held that he had no authority to rule
on its constitutionality, and ordered Chadha deported pursuant to the House Resolution. Chadha's appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was
dismissed, the Board also holding that it had no power to declare 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. Chadha then filed a petition for review of the
deportation order in the Court of Appeals, and the INS joined him in arguing that 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals held that
244(c)(2) violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, and accordingly directed the Attorney General to cease taking any steps to
deport Chadha based upon the House Resolution.

ISSUE: W/N the said congressional veto provision in 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional

HELD: YES

RATIO:
The section granting the House of Rep. a one-House veto to overturn the decision of the A.G. to suspend deportation proceedings is an
unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority by Congress since it circumvents the legislative procedures framed by the constitution when
Congress resolves to act outside its boundaries.

The prescription for legislative action in Art. I, 1 -- requiring all legislative powers to be vested in a Congress consisting of a Senate and a House of
Representatives -- and 7 -- requiring every bill passed by the House and Senate, before becoming law, to be presented to the President, and, if he
disapproves, to be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House -- represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal
Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure. This procedure is an integral part of the
constitutional design for the separation of powers.

Here, the action taken by the House pursuant to 244(c)(2) was essentially legislative in purpose and effect, and thus was subject to the procedural
requirements of Art. I, 7, for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentation to the President.

Although the act itself was passed under Congress Art. I, 8, cl. 4 power to establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization the action that the House
took under the provision of the Act had the purpose and effect of changing the legal rights, duties and relations of persons, including the A.G. and
Chadha, all of whom were outside the Legislative Branch, i.e. the act was legislative. The fact that the House could overturn an executive decision
made pursuant to a legislative grant of authority meant that it could not be justified as an attempt at amending the standards set out in the
preceding provisions, or as a repeal since such actions would have to conform to the legislative requirements of Art. I. Any action taken by Congress
that wished to express disagreement in policy with the A.G. is necessarily subject to the bicameral legislative procedure outlined in Art. I.

The Court finds that there are 4 instances authorized by the Constitution where either House of Congress may act alone:
1. House of Rep. can initiate impeachments Art. I, 2, cl. 5
2. Senate given power to conduct trials for impeachment and convict. Art I. 3, cl.6
3. Senate alone given final and unreviewable power to approve Presidential appointments. Art. II, 2, cl. 2
4. Senate alone given unreviewable power to ratify treaties negotiated by the President. Art. III, 2. cl.2
To act in any legally binding way other than those above, either House could only resolve to internally bind itself to matters concerning its own
affairs. Art. I, 5 cl.2.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):