Consti 1 Digest

Agapito Bitoin De Castro Deyto Francia Gutierrez Libunao Lim Pelino Reinante Sison
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST
ARTICLE II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Kilosbayan v. Morato [246 SCRA 540 (1995)] - Marjolaine

Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Facts:
The case at bar is the assailed Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) between the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC). On a previous case, the Court
ruled that the previous Contract of Lease is contrary to law and invalid on the ground that it had been made in
violation of the charter of the PCSO. Thus, a new Agreement which is subject in this case, was entered into by
the parties.
The parties signed a new ELA whereby the PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories to
the PCSO in consideration of rental equivalent to 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket sales derived by the PCSO
from the operation of the lottery which shall not be less than an annual rent computed at P35,000.00 per
terminal operation. The term of lease is eight (8) years. In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ
its own personnel and is responsible for the loss or damage of the equipment arising from any cause. Upon
the expiration of the lease, the PCSO has the option to purchase the equipment for the sum of P25 million.
Petitioners Kilosbayan, Inc. and its Trustees, namely Sen. Webb, Sen. Tanada and Rep. Arroyo, filed
this suit seeking to declare the Agreement invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the
previously nullified agreement. They argued that:
(1) The amended ELA is null and void for being substantially the same in the previous contract;
(2) Assuming that the amended ELA is materially different from the previous one, it is still null and void
for being inconsistent with the PCSO charter and the previous Court decision;
(3) The amended ELA is null and void for being violative of the law on Public Bidding of Contracts for
furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the government. It has not been approved by the
President, and it is not most advantageous to the government.
Respondents PCSO and PGMC questioned the petitioners standing to bring this suit on the ground
that, not being parties to the contract of lease which they seek to nullify, they have no personal and
substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the contract and maintained:
(1) that the ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges of a joint venture which were found
in the Contract of Lease nullified in the prior case;
(2) that the ELA did not have to be submitted to a public bidding because it fell within the exception
provided in E.O. No. 301, Par. 1;
(3) that the power to determine whether the ELA is advantageous to the government is vested in the
Board of Directors of the PCSO;
(4) that for lack of funds, the PCSO cannot purchase its own on-line lottery equipment and has had to
enter into a lease contract; and
(5) that what petitioners are actually seeking in this suit is to further their moral crusade in political
agenda, using the Court as their forum.
Petitioners on the other hand content that the ruling in the previous case sustaining their standing to
challenge the validity of the first contract for the operation of lottery is now the law of the case and
therefore the question of their standing can no longer be reopened.
Issue/s:
(1) W/N the Petitioners have locus standi to bring this suit (None)
1-C 2021 - Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga

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(2) W/N the ELA is valid (YES)
Ruling:
(1) None.
(a) Stare decisis - DOES NOT APPLY. The concern for stability in decisional law does not call for
adherence to what has recently been laid down as the rule. The previous ruling sustaining
petitioner's intervention may itself be considered a departure from the settled rulings on
real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved.
Five years ago, this Court denied standing to a party who, in questioning the validity
of another form of lottery, claimed the right to sue in the capacity of taxpayer,
citizen, and members of the Bar (Valmonte v. PCSO, 1987).
Further, if the complaint is not grounded on the impairment of the powers of
Congress, legislators do not have standing to question the validity of any law or
official action (PhilConsA v. Enriquez, 1994).
(b) Law of the Case - DOES NOT APPLY. While the case is a sequel to a previous decision, it is not
its continuation. The parties are the same but the cases are not. The doctrine applies only
when a case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court.
Law of the Case - opinion delivered on a former appeal. Whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicted
continue to be the facts of the case before the court (People v. Pinuila, 1958).
Differs from Res Judicata in that the conclusiveness of the first judgment is not
dependent upon its finality.
(c) Doctrine of Conclusiveness of Judgement - DOES NOT APPLY.
Conclusiveness of Judgement - an issue actually and directly passed upon and
determined in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action
between the same parties involving a different cause of action (Penalosa v. Tuason,
196).
Does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims
involved (Montana v. United States).
Further, the ELA, which petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different from the
1993 Contract of Lease entered into by the Respondents. Hence, the determination in the prior case that
petitioners had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does not
preclude determination of their standing in the present suit. Moreover, standing is a concept in constitutional
law and here no constitutional question is actually involved.
The issue must be W/N Petitioners are the real parties in interest within the meaning of Rule 3, Par. 2 of
the Rules of Court:
Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of real party in interest.
Standing - special concern in constitutional law because some cases suits are brought NOT by parties who
have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, by by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Real party in interest - whether he is the party who would be benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit (Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., 1951).
Petitioners invoked specific Principles and State Policies set forth in Art. II of the Constitution:
(a) Sec. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
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democracy.
(b) Sec. 12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
(c) Sec. 13. The state recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public civic affairs.
(d) Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to
foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.
These are not, however, self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in
the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
Petitioners, also do not have such present substantial interest in the ELA. Denying them the right to intervene
will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in the execution of government contracts.
(2) YES. The ELA contains none of the features of the former contract which were considered badges of a
joint venture agreement. They deleted certain features such as:
a. The PCSO had neither funds nor expertise to operate the on-line lottery agreement
b. The PGMC would exclusively bear all costs and expenses for printing tickets, payment of salaries
and wages of personnel, advertising and promotion and other expenses for the operation of the
lottery system. - unusual in a lessor-lessee relationship but inherent in a joint venture
c. Only after the term of the contract that PCSO would be ready to operate the lottery system
themselves - in this view, the PGMC would actually be the operator of the lottery system, and
not simply the lessor of equipment.
d. The rent, although still expressed in the ELA, now guaranteed a minimum rent of P35,000.00 a
year per terminal in commercial operation.
Notes:
Petitioners:
Kilosbayan, Inc. - an organization composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and lay
leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal
Trustees - suing in their individual and collective capacities as taxpayers and concerned citizens.
Members of Congress - suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens.
Dissenting opinions of Justices Feliciano, Regalado, and Davide Jr.
Justices believe that the reversal of the decision in Kilosbayan, Inc. et al. v. Guingona, et al. upsets
salutary doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and stare decisis. They also believe that the petitioners
have locus standi in this case since the petition is to be of transcendental importance to the public. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people
even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counterproductive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise.
Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano further showed substantive grounds or considerations of

importance which strengthened the legal standing of the petitioner to bring and maintain the action, namely:
(a) the public character of the funds or other assets involved in the contract of lease; (b) the presence of a
clear case of disregard of a constitutional or legal provision by the public respondent agency; (c) the lack of
any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions involved therein; and (d) the
wide range of impact of the contract of lease and of its implementation.

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Kilosbayan v. Morato MR [250 SCRA 130 (1995)] - Marjolaine

Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Facts:
Petitioners seek for a motion for reconsideration insisting that the first case has already settled (1)
whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as
amended) the PCSO can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an
on-line lottery. They contend that these questions are already barred by a previous judgment.
Petitioners also assailed the previous ruling when this Court held that the more appropriate issue is
whether they are real party in interest rather than the determination of their locus standi. Two objections
were made against that ruling: (1) that the constitutional policies and principles invoked by petitioners, while
not supplying the basis for affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking
down laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them; and (2) that the Constitution, by guaranteeing
to independent peoples organizations effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political,
and economic decision making, grants them standing to sue on constitutional grounds.
Issue/s:
W/N Petitioners may invoke Art. 2 Sections 5, 12, 13, and 17 of the Constitution.
Ruling:
As previously ruled, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be
enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive actions. By authorizing the
holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with these policies and
principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why this Court said with respect
to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, the morality of gambling is not a justiciable
issue. Gambling is not illegal per se xxx It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the
contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise
issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the agreement,
cannot raise.
Tondo Medical v. CA [527 SCRA 746 (2007)] - Marjolaine

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.
Facts:
The case at bar is about the assailed Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) of the Department of
Health (DOH) and the Executive Order Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health
issued by then President Estrada.
In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA providing for five general areas of reform: (1) to provide fiscal
autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure fundings for priority public health programs; (3) promote
the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance; (4) strengthen the capacities of
health regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP).
Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda on fiscal autonomy of government hospitals,
particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring of government hospitals.
Further, they assailed the issuance of the draft of the AO (Guidelines and Procedures in the Implementation if
the Corporate Restructuring of Selected DOH Hospitals to Achieve Fiscal Autonomy, and Managerial
Flexibility), alleging that the implementation of such reforms had resulted in making free medicine and free
medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos.

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Petitioners also assailed E.O. No. 102 which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. It shall refocus its mandate from being the sole provider of health
services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of
basic service to local government units. It is bear-noting that the E.O. was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of
the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160). Petitioners, who are DOH employees, assailed the validity of the E.O.
on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs, and that some of them were suffering from having to
travel longer distance.
The CA ruled that the HSRA is constitutional, reasoning that the Constitutional provisions raised,
which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people's right to health
and well-being are not self-executing, thus, are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only
provide guidelines for legislations.
Issue/s:
W/N the Constitutional provisions raised by the petitioners in protecting the health of the Filipino
people are not judicially enforceable. (YES)
Ruling:
Yes. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of
the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have
already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
In Tanada v. Angara, the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Art. 2 of the 1987
Constitution as non-self-executing and ruled that such broad concepts need legislative enactments before
they can be implemented.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp., the Court declared Section 11, 12, and 13 of
Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not
self-executing provisions.
In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of
Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not a judicially enforceable rights.
There are two reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad
constitutional principles: (1) basic considerations of due process and; (2) limitations of judicial power.
Notes:
Justice Tinga in his Separate Opinion in Agabon v. NLRC, to wit:
Xxx Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed
rights. Xxx Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss,
formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.
BCDA v. COA [580 SCRA 295 (2009)] - Joanna

Ponente: Carpio, J.
Facts:
Bases Conversion and Development Authority Board of Directors (Board) shall exercise the powers
and functions to determine the organizational structure and to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme for
its officials and employees at least equivalent to that of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). The Board
adopted a new compensation and benefit scheme which included a P10,000 year-end benefit granted to each

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contractual employee, regular permanent employee, and Board member. Subsequently, President Ramos
approved the new compensation and benefit scheme. Years after, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-end benefit
(YEB) to its officials and employees and subsequently increased it to P35,000. Pursuant to Section 10 of RA
No. 7227 which states that the compensation and benefit scheme of the BCDA shall be at least equivalent to
that of the BSP, the Board increased the year-end benefit of BCDA officials and employees from P10,000 to
P30,000. Also, aside from the contractual employees, regular permanent employees, and Board members, the
full-time consultants of the BCDA also received the year-end benefit. However, the Commission on Audit
(COA) issued a notice of disallowance to the Board members and full-time consultants because the grant of
year-end benefit to them was contrary to Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Circular Letter No.
2002-2. Based on the said circular letter, YEB is a personnel benefit granted in addition to salaries. Thus,
non-salaried officials (i.e., Board members, and full-time consultants) are not entitled to the YEB so they
should be made to refund the disallowed benefits.
Issue/s:
1. W/N the Board members and full-time consultants are entitled to the YEB? (NO.)
2. W/N the Board members and full-time consultants should be granted the YEB for it is
consistent with Section 5 and Section 18 of Art. II of the 1987 Constitution? (NO.)
3. W/N the denial of YEB to the Board members and full-time consultants violates the Section 1
of Art. III of the 1987 Constitution? (NO.)
4. W/N the SC is estopped from correcting a public officers (President Ramos) erroneous
application of the Statute? (NO.)
Ruling:
1. Although according to Section 10 of RA No. 7227 (created the BCDA), the functions of the Board
include the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme, that Boards power is not unlimited because the
Section 9 specifies that Board members shall receive a per diem for every board meeting, limits the amount of
per diem to not more than P5,000, and limits the total amount of per diem for one month to not more than
four meetings. Hence, the Board members are not salaried officials for they are only entitled to per
diem authorized by law. With regard to the full-time consultants, they are not part of the BCDA
personnel and are not paid the basic salary, thus, they are not entitled to YEB. The full-time consultants
consultancy contracts expressly state that there is no employer-employee relationship between the BCDA and
the consultants, and that the BCDA shall pay the consultants a contract price.
2. Article II is a statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is not a source of

enforceable rights. Section 5 and 18 are not self-executing.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all people of the blessings of
democracy.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.
3. BCDA claims that there is no substantial distinction between regular officials and
employees on one hand, and Board members and full-time consultants on the other. The BCDA states
that there is here only a distinction, but no difference because both have undeniably one common
goal as humans, that is to keep body and soul together or, differently put, both have mouths to feed
and stomachs to fill. However, the SC ruled that Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the
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constitutionality of RA No. 7227 and the burden of proof is on the BCDA to show that there is a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The BCDA failed to show any clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution.
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
4. The BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants are entitled to the year-end
benefit because President Ramos approved the granting of the benefit to the Board members, and they have
been receiving it since 1997. However, The State is not estopped from correcting a public officer's erroneous
application of a statute, and an unlawful practice, no matter how long, cannot give rise to any vested right.
Courts Decision:
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The COAs decision is AFFIRMED with the modification that
the Board members and full-time consultants of BCDA are not required to refund the year-end benefits they
have already received. The reasons are that the Board members and full-time consultants received the
year-end benefit in good faith for the Board members relied on Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which authorized
the Board to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme, it also does not expressly prohibit Board members
from receiving benefits other than the per diem authorized by law, and that President Ramos approved the
said YEB; while the full-time consultants relied on Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which authorized the Board to
adopt a compensation and benefit scheme. There is also no proof that the Board members and full-time
consultants knew that their receipt of the year-end benefit was unlawful.
Section 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them.
People v. Gozo [53 SCRA 476 (1973)] - Joanna

Ponente: Fernando, J.
Facts:
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located within the US Naval Reservation in Olongapo
City. She demolished the house and built another one in its place, without a building permit from the City
Mayor of Olongapo City because she was told that such permit is not necessary. She was charged with
violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with the City Fiscal's Office.
a. The City Court of Olongapo City found her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14,
Series of 1964 and sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as well as to pay the
costs.
b. The Court of Instance of Zambales, on appeal, found her guilty on the above facts of
violating such municipal ordinance but would sentence her merely to pay a fine of P200.00
and to demolish the house thus erected.
c. She elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, she appealed and countered that the City of
Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval
Base of a foreign country. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the SC.
Issue/s: W/N the municipal ordinance of Olongapo City enforceable within the US Naval Base? (YES.)
Ruling:
1. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine
territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of
the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such

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offenses. Hence, Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its
entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Its laws govern therein, and everyone
to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of
sovereignty (Principle of auto-limitation).
2. Loreta Gozo erred in relying on People v. Fajardo case wherein the respondent of the said case
constructed a building even without the building permit because they needed a place of residence very
badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and they had been living on leased
property. They requested for a building permit twice but both were denied even if the said building did
not destroy the view of the Public Plaza or occupied any public property. Clearly then, the application of
such an ordinance to Fajardo was oppressive. In this case, on the contrary, Gozo never bothered to
comply with the ordinance which is neither oppressive, unfair, or unreasonable.
Courts Decision: She was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No.
14, series of 1964.
Notes:
1. Principle of auto-limitation is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity
of legal self-determination and self-restriction. A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise
of what otherwise is illimitable competence. Thus, a state may, by its consent, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights.
2. Administrative jurisdiction of municipal corporation - Within the limits of its territory, whatever
statutory powers are vested upon it may be validly exercised. Any residual authority and therein
conferred, whether expressly or impliedly, belongs to the national government, not to an alien country.
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh

75 PHIL. 113 | September 17, 1945
Ponente: Justice Feria
Facts:
The case at bar is a petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent Judge Dizon of the
lower court (Court of First Instance) be ordered to continue the proceedings in a civil case, which were
initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese Military occupation
of these islands.
History:
On January 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila and consequently proclaimed the
Military Administration under martial law over the districts occupied by the Army. In their proclamation, it
was stated that all laws of the Commonwealth shall be upheld and effective for the time being and all
government positions shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before.
On October 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas McArthur issued a
proclamation to the ROP:
1. Xxxxxx
2. Xxxxxx
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any
other government in the Philippines than that of
the said Commonwealth are null and void and
without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
of enemy occupation and control.

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The respondent Judge Dizon refused to continue the proceedings on the grounds that the proclamation issued
by General Douglas McArthur of the USA issued on October 1944 had the effect of nullifying all judicial
proceedings and judgment of the courts of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and
the Republic of the Philippines (ROP) established during the military occupation. And furthermore,
respondent judge claimed that the lower courts has no jurisdiction to hear the case unless there is an explicit
law that confers to them that jurisdiction.
Issue/s:
1.) WON the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the Philippine
Executive Commission and the ROP were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the US and Filipino forces;
2.) WON the proclamation made by General Douglas McArthur has invalidated all judgments and judicial
acts and proceedings of the said courts;
3.) WON if the judicial acts have not been proven to be invalidated by said proclamation, the courts can
continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time of reoccupation
Ruling:
1.) YES!
This is because the occupation of the Japanese military were in fact a de facto government which made the
judicial acts and proceedings of that government good and valid even after liberation or reoccupation.
Kinds of de facto governments:

a. Government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority,
the rightful legal government and maintains in itself against the will of the latter
b. Government that is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory
of the enemy in the course of war
c. Government that is established as an independent government by the inhabitants of the country who
rise in insurrection against the parents state
As for the case of the Japanese belligerents, they possess all the powers of a de facto government and can
suspend the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as they see fit. Though the
powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, the municipal law of the conquered territory are
considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things. This is made
true until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent.
The governments by the PEC and the ROP during the Japanese military occupation being de facto
governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those
governments, which are not of a political complexion, were GOOD AND VALID. (This also covers legislative
acts of de facto governments)
2.) NO!
The mere conception or thought of possibility that the current sovereign (which is the USA) who reoccupies a
territory occupied by an enemy, may set aside or annul all the judicial acts or proceedings of the tribunal
which the belligerent occupant had the right and duty to establish, would be sufficient to PARALYZE THE
SOCIAL LIFE OF THE COUNTRY. For it would mean that litigants would not file a case thinking that it would
just be annulled by another sovereign country and that criminals would not be deterred from committing
crimes or offenses in the expectancy that they may escape penalty because of the nullification of judgment of
a previous belligerent sovereign.
It is also an upheld doctrine in international law that a belligerent occupant is prohibited from suspending
the use of Courts of Law to assert and enforce their civil rights. For General McArthur to declare all judicial
decisions null and void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts the rights and actions of the
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nationals of the territory.
The Court holds that the proclamation was void and had not invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings
of the courts of justice in the Philippines. And that said judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid
before and are now good and valid after the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces.
3.) YES
It was argued by the Court using various US jurisprudence that the laws and institutions of the country
occupied, if continued by the conqueror or occupant, becomes the law and the courts, by adoption. If such
laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their forces from him,
in the sense that they may continue or set them aside.
The laws and the courts of the Philippines were not repealed by the Japanese military but was adopted by the
Japanese. It did not become theirs because it was continually used as required by the law of nations. Laws
(together with courts) once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. It is
not merely changed by a change in sovereignty.
It is held by the Court that the Courts are the same courts which had been functioning during the Japanese
regime and therefore, can continue the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the restoration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.
In Re: Letter of Associate Justice Puno

210 SCRA 588 | June 29, 1992
Ponente: Justice Padilla
Facts:
Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a letter dated November
1990 addressed to the Supreme Court, seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
On January 1983, the Court of Appeals and all other judiciary courts were reorganized pursuant to BP 129
entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary. Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes. Associate
Justine Puno was appointed Appellate Justice and on November 1984, petitioner accepted an appointment to
be the Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice; he thus ceased to be a member of the judiciary.
The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a reorganization of the entire
government, including the judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the judiciary, the Screening Committee
was created. The Screening Committee recommended the return of petitioner Puno as Associate Justice of the
new Court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of 11 in the roster of appellate court justices. When the
appointments were signed by then President Cory Aquino, Punos seniority ranking changed from rank 11 to
rank 26.
Puno was now alleging that the change in his seniority ranking could only be attributed to the lack of planning
(inadvertence), otherwise it would run contrary to the provision of Section 2 of EO No. 33, which reads:
Section 2. Organization. Xxxxxx Any Member who is

reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any
other position in the government shall retain the
precedence to which he was entitled under his original
appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all
intents and purposes be considered as continuous
and uninterrupted.

10
Petitioner elaborates that former President Cory is presumed to have intended to comply with her own EO
33. He also pointed out that in the case of Justice Oscar Victoriano, his stint with Ministry of Justice as
Commissioner of Land Registration did not adversely affect his seniority ranking in which EO 33 was
correctly applied.
In a resolution of the Court en banc granted Punos request for reinstatement of seniority ranking from #12
to rank 5. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Associate Justices Jose Campos and Luis Javellana was
filed because they are affected by the ordered correction.
Issue/s:
WON the present CA is a NEW court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority
admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the CA and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to EO 33.
Ruling:
YES! The present CA is a NEW COURT.
It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the
Court of Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to EO 33, for it was created in the wake of
the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Cory Aquino in the aftermath of the
people power revolution in 1986.
It is ruled that the CA created prior to EO No. 33 was phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the
revolution and the consequent CA created under EO No. 33 was an entirely new court with appointment
thereto having NO relation to earlier appointments.
Notes:
Dissenting Opinions of Justices Gutierrez and Cruz
They believed that the appointments of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in 1986 were not a personal act of
a revolutionary President.
First, the revolutionary government ended before the appointments were made pursuant to Proclamation No.
3 that made the Freedom Constitution. Second, one significant provision of the Freedom Constitution is that
all elective and appointed positions under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by a proclamation or executive order.
President Aquino was bound to follow the provision of EO No. 33 because it is a law enacted by her and
pursuant to the constitutional authority of the Freedom Constitution. She could no longer act as a
revolutionary President because there was already an in effect Constitution.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan [GR 104768 (2003)] - Czarina
Ponente: Justice Carpio
Facts:
Antecedent Case: Following the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1
creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates, and close associates.
Accordingly, the Chairman, Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to
investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active
service or retired.
In line with this, the AFP Board investigated Major General Josephus Q. Ramas for reports of unexplained

11
wealth. Findings of his properties included, a house and lot in Quezon City valued at P700,000 and a house
and lot in Cebu City having an area of 3,327 square meters. There was also military equipment/items and
communication facilities and money amounting to P2,870,000 and $50,000 US dollars found in the premises
of Elizabeth Dimaano, Major General Ramas alleged mistress. Sworn statement records disclosed that
Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by Ramas. The same confiscated items
were not found in the Major Generals Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Besides that, however, Ramas also
has an unexplained wealth of P104,134.60 disclosed in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities. After the
investigation, PCGG recommended the prosecution of Major General Ramas for violation of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and RA 1379 (The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired
Property).
Timeline of Events:
- 1 August 1987 PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under RA 1379 against Ramas. Before Ramas could
answer the Petition, Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed an Amended Complaint naming the
Republic of the Philippines as the petitioner , Ramas as the defendant, and Dimaano as the
co-defendant. He alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986
and Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit assigned as a clerk-typist for
Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979.
- Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim
denying his ownership of the mansion in Cebu and all other items confiscated in the house of
Dimaano.
- Dimaano filed her own Answer admitting her employment as clerk-typist and ownership of the
items.
- 9 November 1988, petitioner asked or a deferment of the hearing for lack of preparation for trial and
absence of witnesses.
- 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint saying Dimaano alone
acquired the properties subject to forfeiture.
- 17 April 1989, petitioner proceeded with presenting the case and 3 witnesses, only to ask for a
postponement of the trial again.
- 28 September 1989, petitioner manifested its inability to trial because of absence of witnesses and
further evidence to present. The Sandiganbayan noted that the petitioner has delayed the case for a
over a year because of its postponements.
- 23 March 1990, petitioner admitted its inability to present further evidence
- 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial and the Sandiganbayan
granted petitioner 60 days to file an appropriate pleading. While respondents filed their motions to
dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino stating that the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate military
officers without showing that they are subordinates of Marcos.
- 18 November 1991, The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for lack of merit and ordered the return
of the confiscated items to Elizabeth Dimaano.
- 4 December 1991, petitioner filed for its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied on 25 March
1992.
Issue/s:
1.) WON the PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate Ramas and Dimaano.
2.) WON the Sandiganbayan was wrong in concluding the evidence gathered lack merit and there was no
showing of collusion, conspiracy or relationship by consanguinity or affinity by and between Ramas
and Dimaano.
3.) WON the items confiscated from the house of Dimaano was illegally seized and therefore not
admissible in court.
Ruling:
1.) NO. PCGG has no jurisdiction because they can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel under either of the two categories:
a.) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of Marcos
by being his immediate family member, relative, subordinate or close associate
12
b.) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns
their cases to PCGG.
And the PCGG failed to prove that Ramas was a subordinate of Marcos, his mere position does not
automatically make him a subordinate. PCGGs attempt to differentiate Migrinos case was
unsuccessful because unlike in Migrino, where the AFP Board conducted the investigation pursuant
to EO Nos. 1,2, and 14, PCGG recommended that Ramas be prosecuted for violation of RA 3019 and
1379, instead of EO 1. In fact the Ombudsman actually has the jurisdiction to conduct the primary
investigation, not the PCGG.
2.) NO. Petitioner only has itself to blame for the lack of presentation of the evidence. They were given
ample time (4 years pending) to collect and present their case, but they kept on delaying the process.
3.) YES. The items seized in the search were not described in the warrant and there was no legal basis to
seize these items without showing that these items could be subject of warrantless search and
seizure. The warrant cannot be a basis to seize and withhold the items from the possessor.
Notes:
PCGG was vested with the powers to
1. Conduct investigation
2. To promulgate rules and regulations
*as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of the order
Separate Opinion by Justice Puno:

The Bill of Rights was essentially inoperative during the time of the seize, therefore Dimaano cannot
invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure. While this is true, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure is a natural right which cannot be denied by the government. Also, even if the Bill of Rights
were not operative, individuals were still under the protection of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Separate Opinion by Justice Vitug:

We are still signatories of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and are therefore entitled to the
right against arbitrary deprivation of ones property.
Separate Opinion by Justice Tinga:

That while the Aquino government reorganized the government, it did so to protect and stabilize the
revolutionary government and not for the purpose of trampling upon the fundamental rights of the people.
VFP v. Reyes [483 SCRA 526 (2006)] - Czarina
Ponente: Justice Chico-Nazario

Facts:
Petitioner Veterans Federation of the Philippines was created under RA 2640: An Act To Create A Public
Corporation to be known as Veterans Federation of the Philippines, Defining its Powers, and for Other
Purposes. While the Philippine Veterans Bank was created by RA 3518. Respondent Angelo T. Reyes, the
Secretary of the Department of National Defense issued the DND Department Circular No. 04 regarding the
further implementing the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of RA 2640 and requesting to conduct a Management
Audit of VFP by the DND. Respondent Veterans Federation complained about the alleged broadness of the
scope of the management audit and requested the suspension of the Circular. The Undersecretary for Civil
Relations and Administration denied the request so the petitioner requested for certiorari in the Supreme
Court stating that it bypassed the doctrine of hierarchy of courts due to the urgency and substantive
importance of the question on hand. The SC ruled that they would give this case due course because it
involves war veterans, who have limited time left to enjoy the benefits that can be conferred.
Issue/s:
1.) Is the VFP a Private Corporation?

13
2.) Is the Department Circular No. 04 Unconstitutional?

Ruling:
1.) No. It is a Public Corporation.
a.) The name of the Act creating it explicitly mentions that it is a Public Corporation.
b.) Any action or decision of the Federation or the Supreme Council shall be subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Defense, an attached government agency.
c.) It is required to submit annual reports to its proceedings for the past year to the President of
the Philippines or to the Secretary of National Defense
d.) Under EO No 37, it is listed under the government-owned and controlled corporation
e.) In Ang Bagong Bayani - OFW Labor Party v COMELEC, it ruled that the VFP is an adjunct of
the government
Also to answer the Petitioners claims of why they are a Private Corporation:
1. VFP does not qualify elements that would qualify it as a public office.
In Laurel v Disierto, the definition of public office is the right, authority and
duty, created and conferred by law, by which,for a given period, is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised for the benefit of the public. In this case, the functions of the
petitioner certainly fall under the category of sovereign functions. The
protection of interests of war veterans is not only meant to promote social
justice but also intended to reward patriotism.
2. VFP funds are not public funds
RA 2640 provides that the funds in the hands of the VFP from whatever
source are public funds and can only be used for public purposes.
3. VFP argues that it is a civilian federation where membership is voluntary.
The constitution does not contain any prohibition, express or implied,
against a grant of control and/or supervision to the Secretary of National
Defense over a civilian organization
4. The Administrative Code of 1987 does not provide that the VFP is an attached
agency or under the control and supervision of the DND.
Enumeration is not exclusive
5. VFP has evidence of the opinion of the DBM that it is a non-government organization
because it has not been a direct recipient of any funds released by the DBM
The DBM simply was mistaken in believing that the VFP is a private
corporation but an erroneous application of the law by public officers does
not bar a subsequent correct application of the law.
2.) No. It is valid and consistent with the law. The VFP having been proved as a public corporation may
be placed under the control and supervision of the DND.
Notes:
Javier v. Sandiganbayan [599 SCRA 324 (2009)] - Catherine
Ponente: PERALTA J.
Facts:
Javier is one of the 6 private sector members of the National Book Development Board (NBDB). She
was tasked to represent the government in the Madrid International book fair in Spain. J wasn't able to
attend. She didnt refund the money she was advanced (amounting to 139, 199 pesos) for her traveling
expenses either.
She was charged with graft and corruption (ombudsman) and malversation of funds (Commission on
audit).
Her defenses were that she is not a public officer because she is a representative of the organization
from the private sector and that she is not under sandiganbayan.
Issue/s:

14
1. W/N Javier is considered a public officer? -- YES

Ruling:
She is a public officer. By looking at the powers and functions of her, she partakes a public function.
An individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the governem, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public -- even is she is from the private sector, the law invested her a
part of its sovereign function so the purpose of the govt be achieved.
Appointing members from the private sector was for the purpose of proper representation of the
private book publishing sector. Even is she doesnt receive any salary, being a public officer is not dependent
upon the presence of salary but the appointment of authority to her by the public.
Notes:
No double jeopardy. The charges against her in the 2 suits are different causes of action.
MIAA v. CA [495 SCRA 591 (2006)] - Catherine
Ponente: CARPIO J.
Facts:
EO No. 903 created the Revised charter of Manila International Airport Authority by Manong
(HAHAHAHAH) Marcos.
Local Government Code of 1991 was issued cancelling the issuance of the exemptions for GOCCs and
individuals. Paranaque Municipality sent notice to MIAA saying it is liable to pay estate tax. MIAA was able to
pay a bit of the assessment only. Paranaque issued notice of levy.
Issue/s:
W/N MIAA is exempted from Real Estate Tax --- YES
W/N MIAA is a GOCC -- NO
Ruling:
MIAA is not subject to real estate tax because it is not a GOCC but a government instrumentality with
corporate powers (IMPORTANT YUNG WITH CORPORATE POWERS OK kasi gocc is under govt
instrumentality lang).
One of the requisites of being a GOCC is that it should either be a stock or non-stock corporation.
MIAA has no capital stock (Not a stock corp) and remits 20% of its annual gross operating income to the
national treasury (non stock cannot give dividends to members)
It is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently government
functions. The municipal govt cannot tax the national govt and its instrumentality under
MIAA is also a mere trustee of the government because in order to dispose the land and buildings, the
permit of the pres of the republic is needed. Therefore, it doesnt have a free disposition and control of the
property. (Section 234 of LCC) Real property owned by the Republic of the PH is exempted from real property
tax except when the beneficial use thereof is granted to a taxable person.
Notes:
Article 420 of the Civil Code: the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, devoted for public use, are
properties of public dominion. Therefore, it is owned by the PH.
Funa v. MECO [GR 193462 (2014)] - Alyssa
Ponente: Perez, J.
Facts:
The case at hand is a petition for mandamus to compel the COA to audit and examine the funds of the
Manila Economic and Cultural Authority (MECO).
As a background, China has two governments, The Peoples Republic of China (PROC), which controls
the mainland territories, and the Republic of China (ROC), which controls the island of Taiwan. The
Philippines adheres to the One China Policy of the PROC through the Joint Communique. However, the

15
Philippines, maintained unofficial ties facilitated by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office and the MECO.
From the moment it was incorporated, the MECO became the corporate entity "entrusted" by the Philippine
Government with the responsibility of fostering "friendly" and "unofficial" relations with the people of
Taiwan.
In the case at hand, petitioner sent a letter to the COA requesting for a copy of the latest financial and
audit report of the MECO invoking his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. The
petitioner made a request on the belief that the MECO, being under the "operational supervision" of the DTI,
is a GOCC and thus subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA. Assistant Commissioner Naranjo issued a
memo referring petitioners request to another Assistant Commissioner for further disposition. Petitioner,
believing that the memo was an admission that the COA has never audited the accounts of the MECO filed this
mandamus in his capacities as taxpayer, concerned citizen, member of the Philippine Bar, and law book
author. At present, it is the MECO that oversees the rights and interests of OFWs in Taiwan.
The petitioner assails that the MECO is vested with government functions equivalent to those of an
embassy or consulate of the Philippine government, that it is controlled by the government wherein the
President appoints its directors by means of desire letters, and that the MECO is under the operational and
policy supervision of the DTI.
Issue/s:
1. WON the case is moot and academic given that COA already conceded its jurisdiction over the
accounts of MECO through an Office Order
2. WON the petitioner has locus standi
3. WON petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts
4. WON MECO is a GOCC and is thus a government instrumentality.
5. WON the COA is mandated to audit the accounts of the MECO and if the MECO is subject to the
audit jurisdiction of the COA.
Ruling:
1. NO. Petitioner was able to establish a substantial issue that there has been a grave violation of the
Consitution by the COA in its constitutional or legal duty to audit and examine the accounts of an
auditable entity in the MECO
2. YES. The issue is of transcendental importance . The petitioner as a concerned citizen, has legal
standing.
3. NO. The issue is of transcendental importance.
4. NO. There are three attributes which needs to be fulfilled in order to be considered as a GOCC.
a. The organization must be a stock or non-stock corporation.
b. The public character of its function
c. Government ownership over the same
The third attribute is what MECO lacks. It is not also controlled by the Philippine government
given that the desire letters are merely recommendatory and MECO is not binding to it. The
MECO is governed by the Corporation Code and it follows its by-laws.
The MECO was put under the policy supervision of DTI because at any given time, in fulfilling
the purposes for which it was incorporated, the MECO may find itself engaged in dealings that
can directly contradict the Philippines commitment to the One China Policy of the PROC.
5. The COA, under existing laws, only has jurisdiction to audit MECO insofar as their verification
fees and consular fees are concerned.
Since, the Philippines does not maintain an official post in Taiwan, the dole entered into a
series of MOAs with MECO which made it the collecting agent of DOLE with respect to
verification fees that may be due from Taiwanese employers of OFWs.
Similar to verification fees, there is also no consular office for the collection of such. There is
no doubt that the visas, passports, and other documents that the MECO issues pursuant to its
authorized functions still emanate from the PH government itself.
Notes:
*Please focus on the highlighted issues and rulings. I just put the others here just in case.

16
Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. COA [GR 169752 (2007)] - Alyssa
Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.
Facts:
Before the court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition which emanated from the
respondents audit team informing petitioners that they will be conducting an audit survey for its financial
transactions. Petitioner contends this stating that they are not a government entity therefore the COA has no
jurisdiction over them.
The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity by virtue of Act No. 1285 enacted on January 19,
1905. The purpose of which is promote animal welfare. It was initially imbued with the power to apprehend
violators of animal welfare laws and share one half of the fines collected through its efforts. However, such
powers were amended by Commonwealth Act 148 and E.O. 63 which states that the full amount of fines
collected from violators will accrue to the general fund of the municipality where the offense was committed
and that every municipal president shall organize special members of the police force to prosecute animal
welfare violators, respectively.
Issue/s:
1. WON petitioner qualifies as a government agency that may be subject to audit by COA.
Ruling:
1. NO. The petitioner is a quasi-public corporation, a kind of private domestic corporation.
First, The charter test may not be applied since it had only been introduced by the 1935 Constitution
and not earlier.Settled in this rule is that no laws can have a retroactive effect. Second, it shows that it
is not subject to the control or supervision by any agency of the state. Third, the fact that its
employees is covered by the GSIS and not the SS is another proof of the petitioners nature as a
private entity. Fourth, A quasi-public corporation if a type of private corporation. The only difference
of which is the type of service the former renders to the public. The true test to determine whether a
corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State.
It is clear that the powers of petitioners to arrest offenders of animal welfare laws has already been
revoked. Fifth, its reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations as it is the principal means
by which the state may determine if it is acting within its powers.
Notes:
Charter test- To determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is
simple. It is created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the
general corporation law.
Section 2: The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Taada v. Angara [272 SCRA 18 (1997)] - Vero
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Facts:
In April 1994, Respondent DTI Secretary Navarro, as a representative of the govt, signed the Final
Act embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act). This menat that he
agreed to (1) submit the WTO agreement for the consideration of competent authorities for their approval,
and (2) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions. In August 1994, Senate received a letter from
Pres. stating that the Final Act, the Agreement Establishing WTO, the ministerial Declarations and Decisions,
and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are submitted to them for their concurrence. In
Dec. 1994, Senate adopted resolution 97, concurring the ratification by the Pres. of the Agreement

17
Establishing WTO. The Pres. signed the Instrument of Ratification. The WTO Agreement ratified by Pres is
composed of the integral parts of the Agreement. The Final Act signed by Sec. Navarro embodies not only the
integral parts of the WTO Agreement but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, according to
Solicitor Gen. it includes measure in facor of least developed countries, relationship of WTO to IMF, and
agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement and (2) the Understanding on Financial
Commitments, which accdg. to SG dwells on limitations and qualifications of commitments to market access,
national treatment, and defns of non-resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence and new
financial service. In December 1994, the present petition was filed. The Court resolved in December 1995, to
give due course to the petition, the parties filed their memoranda. The Court also requested Hon. Lilia R.
Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the UN, to submit a paper (Bautista Paper) (1) providing a historical
background and (2) summarizing the agreements. During the Oral Argument in August 1996, the Court
directed (a) the petitioners to submit (1) Senate Committee Report and (2) transcript of Senate hearings; and
(b) the SG to file (1) a list of PH treaties prior to PH adherence to WTO which derogate PH sovereignty (2) and
copies of the Agreement and other documents in Final Act, ASAP.
Issue/s and Rulings:

1. W/N the petition present a justiciable controversy?
YES.
The petitioners seek to nullify an act of Senate on the ground that it contravenes CONST. It is the duty of the
Court to settle the dispute. This Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the
Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy
espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the governments economic policy
of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers.
Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO
Agreement and its three annexes.
2. W/N the Provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene PH CONST Art. 2 Sec. 19, and Art 12 Sec
10 and 12?
BACKGROUND:
The petitioner argues that WTO requires the PH to place nationals and products of the member-countries on
the same footing as Filipinos and local products. The petitioners also argue that WTO limits the constitutional
powers of both Congress and the SC. They assail the WTO agreement for violating the constitution mandating
to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
On the other hand, SG counter (1) that the provisions are not self-executing; (2) the CONST should not be read
in isolation; (3) the WTO clauses do not conflict with the CONST; and (4) WTO Agreement contains provisions
to protect developing countries like PH.
Ideals of Economic nationalism:

1. Expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally-produced goods;
2. by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive
3. by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.
HELD:
NO.
Although CONST mandates bias in favor of Filipino goods, it also recognizes the need for business exchange
with the rest of the world and limits protection only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
18
UNFAIR. CONST does not encourage the unli entry of foreign goods, it also does not prohibit them as long as it
is not UNFAIR. WTO recognizes the need to protect weak economies like PH to share in the growth in intl
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.
CONST does not rule out foreign competition, the purpose of economic self-reliance is to avoid
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. WTO cannot be unconstitutional
because it has rules on equality and reciprocity that apply to all members. CONST also favors consumers, not
industries or enterprises and WTO aims to make available to Filipinos the best goods anywhere in the world
at the most reasonable prices.
3. W/N the provisions of agreement and its annexes limit, restrict, or impair the legislative
power by Congress?
Background:
WTO Agreement provides that each member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations. Petitioners say that this limits exercise of legislative power. It
is an assault in the sovereign powers of the PH because this means that Congress could not pass legislation
that will be good for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the
WTO Agreement. They also say that WTO derogates from power to tax, lodged in the Congress.
HELD:
NO.
Sovereignty is still subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the PH, as a member of the
family of nations. CONST Art 2 Sec 2 adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land. By DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION, the country is bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law which are considered to be automatically part of our laws. PACTA SUNT
SERVANDAinternational agreements must be performed in good faith, meaning a treaty engagement is not
a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted
valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict
the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state
power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also
commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights.
As part of UN, PH consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the concept of sovereignty as
auto-limitation. UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again
the exercise of sovereignty. A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based
on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land.
4. W/N the provisions unduly impair or interfere with Judicial power of this Court in
promulgating rules on evidence?
Background:
Petitioners say that provision on intellectual property rights intrudes on the power of SC to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedures. The provision states that a WTO member is required to
provide a rule of disputable presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with the use of
a patented process shall be deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process.
HELD:
NO.
Patent Law of PH provides a similar presumption. The provision does not contain an unreasonable burden
and is consistent with due process inherent in our judicial system.
19
5. W/N the concurrence of the Senate in WTO agreement and its annexes sufficient or valid,
considering that it did not include the Final Act, Ministerial Dec., and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services?
Background:
Petitioners allege that Senate concurrence is defective and insufficient and thus an abuse of discretion. The
concurrence to WTO agreement is in effect a rejection of the Final Act signed by Sec. Navarro in
representation of the Pres.
HELD:
NO.
A final act is not the treaty itself, it just records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference.
Also, Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring because they minutely dissected what they were
concurring in.
Notes:
Bayan v. Zamora [GR 138579 (2000)] - Vero
Ponente: Buena, J.
Facts:
In March 1947, PH and USA forged a Military Bases Agreement (MBA) which formalized the use of
installations in PH territory by US military personnel. To further strengthen the defense and security
relationship, PH and USA entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) in August 1951. The parties agreed to
respond to any external armed attack on their territory, public vessels, etc.
In 1991, the MBA was going to expire so PH and US negotiated for possible extension. In September 1991, PH
Senate rejected the proposal. The periodic military exercises were postponed but the defense and security
relationship continued pursuant to MDT. In July 1997, US Defense Deputy Assistant Sec for Asia Pacific Kurt
Campbell met with Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr. to exchange notes on the
complementing strategic interests of US and PH in the Asia-Pacific region and the possible elements of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Pres. Fidel V. Ramos approved VFA.
In October 1998, Pres. Estrada, through DFA Secretary, ratified VFA. Instrument of Ratification, the letter of
the Pres., and VFA, was sent to Senate for concurrence. Senate approved by a two-thirds vote of its members.
VFA consists of a preamble and nine articles providing for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances
and conditions under which US armed forces and defense personnel may be presented in the PH.
Issue/s and Ruling:

1. W/N the petitioners have locus standi?
No.
Petitioner failed to show that they have sustained direct injury or in imminent danger of sustaining direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA
involved the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. As taxpayers, the petitioners have no legal
standing to assail the legality of the VFA. As petitioners-legislators, they also do not possess the requisite
locus standi because there is also an absence of a clear direct injury to the institution they belong. Petitioner

20
IBP is also stripped of standing in these cases because it lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the
absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence
the present action.
Although
In view of the paramount importance and constitutional significance of the issues raised, the Court takes
cognizance of the petitions. DOCTRINE OF TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE.
2. W/N the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII
of the CONST?
Background:
Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which case, the
concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject
treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII
further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines only by
virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting
state.
HELD:
YES.
Principle of Lex specialis derogat generali- special provision or law prevails over a general one. The
concurrence of the Senate contemplated under Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all
the members of the Senate favorably vote to concur with the treaty-the VFA in the instant case.
3. W/N the VFA constitute an abdication of PH sovereignty?
HELD:
NO.
With the ratification of VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes between
the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part,
under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. As an integral part of the
community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our government, Constitution and laws will carry out
our international obligation. Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for
non-compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under international law.
4. W/N there was a grave abuse of discretion?
HELD:
NO.
President has the power to enter into and ratify treaties with the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all
the members of the Senate. The ratification of VFA falls within the sphere of the Pres constitutional powers.
Whether or not it is correct to enter the treaty is a matter of wisdom of a legislative act and beyond the
jurisdiction of the courts to inquire.
Notes:
Dissenting Opinion
Puno, J.

21
He states that VFA does not comply with PH CONST Art 18, Sec. 25 because one of the requisites is that such
treaty should be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting party and US classifies VFA as an executive
agreement.
Saguisag v. ES [GR 212426 (January 2016)] and MR (July 2016) - Nica
Ponente: SERENO, C.J.

Facts:
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the constitutionality of
EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive department
with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and
use of portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use
the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities within the Agreed Locations:
security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief
activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated the
constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops and
facilities whose entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate,
through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.
Issue/s and Ruling:
Issue 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing in assailing the
constitutionality of EDCA
No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the
requirement of having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show that the act affects a public
right. But here, aside from general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public right, and
that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, the petitioners failed to make any specific
assertion of a particular public right that would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to
do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens suits that would justify a disregard
of the aforementioned requirements.
Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers
No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure, nor is it directed
at the disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Here, those challenging the act must specifically show
that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle to this case,
they must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A reading
of the EDCA, however, would show that there has been neither an appropriation nor an authorization of
disbursement.
Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as legislators suit
No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional prerogative granted by
the Constitution to the Senate. In a legislators suit, the injured party would be the Senate as an institution or
22
any of its incumbent members, as it is the Senates constitutional function that is allegedly being violated.
Here, none of the petitioners, who are former senators, have the legal standing to maintain the suit.
Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case
Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental importance which justify
setting aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The challenge raised here is rooted in the very
Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides for a stricter mechanism required
before any foreign military bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is of paramount
public interest that the Court is behooved to determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Executive Department.
Brion Dissent
Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners satisfied the requirement of legal standing in
asserting that a public right has been violated through the commission of an act with grave abuse of
discretion. The court may exercise its power of judicial review over the act of the Executive Department in not
submitting the EDCA agreement for Senate concurrence not because of the transcendental importance of the
issue, but because the petitioners satisfy the requirements in invoking the courts expanded jurisdiction. Read
more
Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for concurrence by the Senate violates the
Constitution
No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is in the form of a mere
executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into
executive agreements on foreign military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the
instrument that allows the entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves adjustments in detail in the
implementation of the MTD and the VFA. These are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that
have already been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the
Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not be
transmitted to the Senate.
De Castro Dissent
No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the MDT. Whether the stay of
the foreign troops in the country is permanent or temporary is immaterial because the Constitution does not
distinguish. The EDCA clearly involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the country.
Hence, the absence of Senate concurrence to the agreement makes it an invalid treaty.
Bayan v. Romulo [GR 159618 (2011)] - Nica
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.

Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors
of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period
material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) withthe power to exercise its jurisdiction over

23
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national
criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law,
such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. On December 28, 2000, the
RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms,is subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out
of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process.
The Philippines is not among the 92.
Issue:
Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for contracting obligations that are
either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations
and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral
aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from
responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our
country from delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x. The above argument is a kind of recycling of
petitioners earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the
Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the
Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this
regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the
Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x . The agreement is a recognition
of the primacy and competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and
dispense justice fairly and judiciously.Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the
Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape
criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized
under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of
the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both
countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is
the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the
other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things,
there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming
criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both
Philippine laws and the Rome Statute
Deutsche Bank v. CIR [GR 188550 (2013)] - Dreya

Ponente: CJ Sereno
Facts:
The immediate case is a petition for review filed with the Supreme Court, by Deutsche Bank AG Manila
Branch, assailing the decision rendered by the Commission on Tax Appeals denying them refund for
petitioners excess payment of BRPT.
Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch remitted 67,688,553.51php to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on
October 21, 2003 as their payment for the 15% branch profit remittance tax (BRPT), pursuant to the National
Internal Revenue Code.
The petitioner realized that they made an overpayment of a total amount of 22,562,851.17php, and filed with
the BIR Large Taxpayers Assessment and Investigations Division on October 4, 2005, an administrative claim
for refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate. On the same day, petitioner requested from the Internal Tax

24
Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential 10% tax rate under the
RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
Due to BIRs inaction of the petitioners request, the former opted to file a petition for review with the CTA on
October 14, 2005. CTA Second Division denied the petitioners request on the ground that the application for
a tax relief was not filed with ITAD prior to the payment of BPRT and prior to its availment of the preferential
tax rate of 10% in accordance to the provision of the tax treaty. The court asserted that the petitioner violated
the fifteen-day period mandated under Section III, paragraph 2 of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No.
1-2000. The CTAs decision was based on Mirant Operations Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
wherein the court held before the benefits of a foreign treaty may be extended to a corporation, they first
have to invoke the provision of the tax treaty and prove that they are legible for that benefit.
The CTA En Banc affirmed the ruling of the CTA Second Division, saying that following the doctrine of stare
decisis, the court took into consideration the Mirant case where Mirant failed to sufficiently show the
reversible error in the assailed judgment. The court also asserted that the 15-day rule for tax treaty relief
under the RMO 1-2000 cannot be relaxed to the petitioner.
Issue/s:
WON noncompliance to with RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive persons or corporations of the benefit of a Tax
Treaty
Ruling:
No.
The petition is meritorious. By virtue of the Constitution, we shall adhere to the general principles of
international law and adopt it as part of the law of the land. The RP-Germany Tax Treaty, being an
international agreement between the PH and Germany, bounds us to extend to a branch in the Philippines,
remitting to its head office in Germany, the benefit of preferential tax rate of 10% BPRT. Compliance to
treaties we are part of increases the chances of preserving good relationship with foreign countries.
Also, the Mirant case is not a binding precedent because it was only a minute resolution and even if the court
affirmed the Mirant case, it still wont be a binding precedent for it involves a different taxes, treaty, and
taxable periods.
Furthermore, RMO 1-2000 doesnt provide a provision which would deprive the corporation of availment of
benefits mandated by a Tax Treaty for non-compliance of the 15-day period. The obligation to comply with a
tax treaty must take precedent over the objective of the RMO. Even so, the fact that the petitioner invoked the
provision of the treaty when it requested for a confirmation from ITAD before filing an administrative claim
for refund, it should already be considered a substantial compliance with the RMO.
Notes:
-67,688,553.51php represents the 15% Branch Profit Remittance Tax on its Regular Banking Unit (RBU)
amounting to 451,257,023.29 php for 2002.
-Paragraph 6, Article 10 of RP-Germany Tax Treaty provides that where a resident of the Federal Republic
of Germany has a branch in the Republic of the Philippines, this branch may be subjected to the branch profits
remittance tax withheld source in accordance with the Philippine law but shall not exceed 10% of the gross
amount of the profits remitted by that branch to the head office.
-Tax treaties are formed to do away from double taxation, in order to encourage free flow of goods and
services between and among countries, conditions deemed vital for a robust economy.

25
CBK Power Company v. CIR [746 SCRA 93 (2015)] - Dreya

Ponente: Justice Perlas-Bernabe
Facts:
This case is a consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court, seeking to reverse
the decision and resolution of Court of Tax Appeals En Banc amending the decision of granting CBK Power
Company Limited (CBK Power) a refund of its excess payment for withholding tax for taxable years
2001-2003.
CBK Power is a limited partnership that is primarily engaged in the development and operation of the
Caliraya, Botocan, and Kalayaan hydroelectric power-generating plants in Laguna (CBK Project). To fund the
CBK Project, CBK Power obtained loans from several foreign banks.
In February 2001, CBK Power borrowed money from Industrial Bank of Japan, Fortis-Belgium, Raifessen
Bank, and Mizuho Bank for which it remitted payments from May 2001-May 2003. It allegedly withheld final
taxes from said payments by rates of 15% for Fortis-Belgium, Fortis-Netherlands, and Raifessen Bank, and
20% for Industrial Bank of Japan and Mizuho Bank, and paid the same to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
CBK Power invoked the relevant tax treaties between the Philippines and the respective countries in which
the banks is a resident, the interest income derived by the said banks are subject only to a tax rate of 10%.
Accordingly, CBK Power filed a claim for refund on April 14, 2003 of its excess taxes allegedly erroneously
withheld and collected for the years 2001 and 2002. Another claim for refund was filed on March 4, 2005 for
the year 2003. But these claims were allegedly ignored by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue which
pushed the petitioner to take the case to the Court of Tax Appeals.
A total of 6,393,267.20 was withheld for the taxable year of 2001; 8,136,174.32 for the year 2002; and
1,143,517.21 for 2003. All three cases were consolidated in a Resolution on August 3, 2005.
CTA First Division granted the petitions and ordered a refund of a total a total amount of 15,672,958.42php
and categorically declared that a ruling from the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) is not a
prerequisite for the entitlement of the tax relief sought by the CBK Power. It cited the DA-ITAD Ruling No.
099-03, issued by the BIR confirming the petitioners claim that the interest payment made to Industrial Bank
of Japan and Raifessen Bank were subject to a final withholding tax rate of only 10%. Another DA-ITAD Ruling
No. 126-03 confirmed that interest payment to Fortis-Belgium are also subject to the same tax rate as
mandated by the amended RP-Belgium Tax Treaty. The same tax rate will also apply to the payments made to
Fortis-Netherlands.
The Commissioner filed a motion for reconsideration and the CTA First Division amended its decision and
reduced the amount of refund fto 14,835,720.39php, on the ground that CBK Power failed to obtain a ruling
from ITAD with respect to its transactions with Fortis-Netherlands. The CTA First Division then cited Mirant
Operations Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, where the court declared the need to obtain ITAD
ruling before availing the preferential tax rate.
CBK filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied due to lack of merit. CBK Power elevated their case to
the CTA En Banc and filed for petition for review. The Commissioner likewise filed his own motion for review.
The respondent argues that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative reliefs before turning to a court
and that the claims for refund were filed beyond the 2-year filing period prescribed by RMO 1-2000.
CTA En Banc denied the petition and affirmed the decision of CTA First Division that a prior application is
indeed a prerequisite to avail a preferential tax rate, under the Revenue Memorandum Order 1-2000. CTA En
Banc also held that the Mirant case has no binding effect as it was only a minute resolution and that the

26
petitions of CBK Power were within the 2-year period. Also, they affirmed that it was proper for CBK Power to
have filed the said petitions without awaiting the resolutions of its administrative claims for refund before the
BIR or else the 2-year filing period would have lapsed.
CBK Powers motion for partial reconsideration and the Commissioners motion for reconsideration of the
decision of CTA First Division were denied for lack of merit and hence, the petition.
Issue/s: WON a ruling from ITAD is a prerequisite to the entitlement of a preferential tax rate
Ruling:
No.
The Philippine Constitution explicitly provides the adherence to the general principles of international law.
The international principle of pacta sunt servanda or agreements must be kept demands the performance of
good faith on the part of states that enter into an agreement.
The issue of whether the failure to comply with RMO 1-2000 will result to the forfeiture of the availment of
preferential tax rate, was addressed in the case of Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, where the court held that the obligation to comply with tax treaty must take precedence
over the objective of RMO 1-2000. It should be noted that there is not a specific provision in ant tax treaty
that deprives a corporation from availing the tax rate relief if they fail to follow RMO 1-2000.
The court agrees with CTA En Bancs ruling in debunking the claim of the respondent that the petitioner failed
to exhaust all the administrative remedies; had the CBK Power awaited the Commissioners action, the
petitioners would have lost their right to file for the refund because the 2-year period would have come to an
end. There was no violation of Section 229 of National Internal Revenue Code as it only requires that an
administrative be priorly filed, which is exactly what the petitioners did.
Notes:
Lim v. ES [GR 151445 (2002)] - Rostum

Ponente: De Leon, JR.,
Facts:
In line with President Gloria Macapagal Arroyos pledge to render help to the US in its campaign
against global terrorism, an arrangement for a joint military exercise known as RP-US Balikatan 02-1
Exercises (Balikatan 02-1) was entered between the two countries under the Visiting Force Agreement(VFA)
and pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty(MDT). The VFA was a formal agreement in relation to the
treatment of US personnel vising the Philippines. The US government identified the Abu Sayyaf Group(ASG)
as a terrorist group link with Al Qaeda who are responsible for the 911 attack.
Arthur D. Lim(Lim) and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the
constitutionality of Balikatan-02-1 since it allows the US military to participate in areas of armed conflict in
Mindanao.. Lim alleged that Balikatan-02-1 is not covered by the MDT because it only provides for mutual
military assistance in case of armed attack by an external aggressor against the Philippines or the US. They
alleged that the ASG is not an external armed force. Lim also claim that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
does not authorize American Soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine Territory.
Issue/s:
1. WON Balikatan 02-1 is covered by the VFA. (Yes)
2. WON the Balikatan 02-1 is constitutional. (Yes)
Ruling:
1. Yes. The VFA permits US personnel to sojourn in the Philippines to conduct Activities, which was
left undefined to give leeway in negotiation. The activities are subject to the approval of the Philippine
government and US personnel are prohibited from doing anything inconsistent with the spirit of VFA and

27
from any particular political activity. In this case, the Balikatan 02-1, which provides mutual anti-terrorism
advising, assisting and training exercise, falls under the sanctioned activities under the VFA. These activities
under the Balitakan 02-1 are considered combat-related activities not combat itself.
2. Yes, 2. Yes. It is constitutional given the fact that only combat-related activities are being done. The
1987 Constitution contains key provisions that determines the extent of foreign presence in the Philippines.
Thus in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it provides that:
SEC. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
SEC. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount
consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to
self-determination.
These provisions set a dislike towards foreign military presence or foreign influence in general. Thus, foreign
troops are allowed only by way of direct exception.
Given this, a conflict arises between our fundamental law and our treaty obligations. From the
perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of
pacta sunt servanda. Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty. However, this is contrary to the 1987 Constitution which
provides that:
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
Notes: On the issue on WON the American troops are engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the
guise of an alleged training and assistance exercise, the SC cannot take judicial notice because it is a question
of fact, thus it is not fit for a special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, As a rule, we do not take
cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per se for the simple reason that facts must be established in
accordance with the rules of evidence.
Shangri-La International Hotel Management(SLIHM) v. Developers Group of Companies(DGCI) [GR

159938 (2006)] - Rostum
Ponente: Garcia, J:
Facts:
Shangri-La International Hotel Management(SLIHM) owned by the Kuok Family, were the owner and
operator of a chain of hotels. They have been using the name Shangri-La since 1962 and internationally
well-known but is not doing business in the Philippines until 1987. The S was made in 1975.
Respondent Developers Group of Companies (DGCI) claims ownership of the Shangri-La mark and
S logo. They applied for the said mark and logo in October 18, 1982 and was granted registration for its
restaurant business. SLIHM, in 1988, moved to cancel the registration of the mark on the ground that it was
illegally and fraudulently obtained and appropriated by respondents before the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks, and Technology(BPTTT). SLIHM also moved to register the mark and logo in its own name.
While the case is pending, respondent DGCI filed before the trial court a complaint for infringement

28
against petitioner alleging that DGCI had been the prior exclusive user and the registered owner in the
Philippines of said mark and logo. SLIHM argued that DGCI had no right to apply for the registration because
DGCI appropriated and illegally used them. Additionally, SLIHM further argued that they are the ones who
have actual prior used of the mark and logo internationally. Thus, citing the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, their mark and logo have afforded security and protection under the said
treaty. RTC trial ruled in favor of DGCI. CA affirmed RTCs decision.
Issue/s:
1. WON SLIHM can claim protection under the Paris Convention. (No)
2. WON SLIHMs has a better right to the Shangri-La mark and S logo. (Yes)
Ruling:
1. NO. The Intellectual Property Code(IPC), undoubtedly shows the firm resolve of the Philippines to
observe and follow the Paris Convention. The IPC has already dispensed with the requirement of prior actual
use at the time of registration. However, the law in force at the time of registration must be applied, which is
R.A 166. The Paris Convention mandates the protection of internationally known marks without regard as to
whether the foreign corporation is registered, licensed, or doing business in the Philippines. However, this
mandate is contrary to R.A. 166, which required the actual use in commerce in the Philippines. The SC settled
this dispute, saying that, under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law are given a standing
equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments. Making international law part of the law of the land
does not by any mean imply that international law is superior to our municipal law.
2. YES. The CA is right in holding that the law requires the actual use in commerce of the Shangri La and
S logo in the Philippines. However, the CA failed to recognize the difference of Sec. 2 and Sec. 2-A of R.A. No.
166. Sec. 2 provides what are registrable. The provision requires that you should have ownership of the
trademark and before the trademark can registered and it must have been actually used in commerce and
service for not less than two months in the Philippines prior to the filing of an application.
Sec. 2-A, on the other hand, provides how ownership is acquired. First, actual use in commerce is
required. Second, the mark must not have been appropriated by another. While SLIHM may not have
qualified under Section 2 of R.A. No. 166 as a registrant, neither did respondent DGCI, since the latter also
failed to fulfill the 2-month actual use requirement. What is worse, DGCI was not even the owner of the mark.
For it to have been the owner, the mark must not have been already appropriated (i.e., used) by someone else.
At the time of respondent DGCIs registration of the mark, the same was already being used by the SLIHM
internationally, of which DGCIs president was fully aware. Hence, SLIHM as better right since registration
requires ownership, which DGCI failed to have.
Notes:
R.A. No. 166, as amended, provides:
Section 2. What are registrable. - Trademarks, trade names and service marks owned by persons,
corporations, partnerships or associations domiciled in the Philippines and by persons, corporations,
partnerships or associations domiciled in any foreign country may be registered in accordance with the
provisions of this Act: Provided, That said trademarks trade names, or service marks are actually in use in
commerce and services not less than two months in the Philippines before the time the applications for
registration are filed: And provided, further, That the country of which the applicant for registration is a
citizen grants by law substantially similar privileges to citizens of the Philippines, and such fact is officially
certified, with a certified true copy of the foreign law translated into the English language, by the government
of the foreign country to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2-A. Ownership of trademarks, trade names and service marks; how acquired. - Anyone who lawfully
produces or deals in merchandise of any kind or who engages in any lawful business, or who renders any
lawful service in commerce, by actual use thereof in manufacture or trade, in business, and in the service
29
rendered, may appropriate to his exclusive use a trademark, a trade name, or a servicemark not so
appropriated by another, to distinguish his merchandise, business or service from the merchandise,
business or services of others. The ownership or possession of a trademark, trade name, service mark,
heretofore or hereafter appropriated, as in this section provided, shall be recognized and protected in the
same manner and to the same extent as are other property rights known to this law. [Emphasis supplied]
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association v. DOH [GR 173034 (2007)] - Patricia
Ponente: Justice Austria-Martinez
Facts:
Executive Order No. 51, also known as the Milk Code, was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the President under the Freedom Constitution. One of the
preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the International
Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA)
in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention of the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take inappropriate measures to diminish infant and child
mortality and ensure that all segments of society, especially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the Department of Health (DOH) issued herein assailed Administrative Order No.
2006-0012 entitled Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51 (RIRR), which
was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
On June 28, 2006, petitioner, Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines, representing its
members that are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the international instruments ICMBS and WHA Resolution adopted by the respondent,
Department of Health, are considered part of law of the land.
Ruling:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation,
pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution, which provides that no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate. Thus, treaties or conventional international laws must go through a process prescribed by the
Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been transformed by the Senate, as
required by the Constitution.

30
However, the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the
World Health Assembly (WHA), form part of the law of the land. The ICMBS was transformed into domestic
law, through local legislation (concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate), entitled
the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction, and not
the ICMBS per se.
On the other hand, subsequent WHA Resolutions are considered recommendations and do not come into
force for members. They are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. It is propounded that WHA
Resolutions constitute soft law, or non-binding norms, principles and practices that only influence state
behaviors. Thus, provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that
can be implemented by executive agencies, e.g., DOH, without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.
Notes:
1. Doctrine of Incorporation and Doctrine of Transformation Under the 1987 Constitution,
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation.
Transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation concurrence of at least two-thirds of
all the members of the Senate.
Incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed
to have the force of domestic law.
2. What gave rise to the issue above:
The ICMBS did not have any provision as to the prohibition of advertisements and promotions of
breastmilk substitutes. Thus, the Milk Code, almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, also did not
have the said prohibitive provision. Such prohibition was only included in the WHA Resolution, and was
subsequently included and adopted by the DOH in its RIRR. The petitioners claim that the RIRR contains
provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to implement, including the
prohibitive provision mentioned. The respondent, DOH, claims that it implements not only the Milk
Code, but also various international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition.

31

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Agapito Bitoin De Castro Deyto Francia Gutierrez Libunao Lim Pelino Reinante Sison

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

ARTICLE II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Kilosbayan v. Morato [246 SCRA 540 (1995)] - Marjolaine

1-C 2021 - Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

(2) W/N the ELA is valid (YES)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

Members of Congress - suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens.

Dissenting opinions of Justices Feliciano, Regalado, and Davide Jr.

Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano further showed substantive grounds or considerations of

1-C 2021 - Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

Kilosbayan v. Morato MR [250 SCRA 130 (1995)] - Marjolaine

Tondo Medical v. CA [527 SCRA 746 (2007)] - Marjolaine

1-C 2021 - Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

BCDA v. COA [580 SCRA 295 (2009)] - Joanna

1-C 2021 - Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

2. Article II is a statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is not a source of

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

People v. Gozo [53 SCRA 476 (1973)] - Joanna

1-C 2021 - Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh

1-C 2021 - Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

Kinds of de facto governments:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

nationals of the territory.

In Re: Letter of Associate Justice Puno

Section 2. Organization. Xxxxxx Any Member who is

1-C 2021 - Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

Republic v. Sandiganbayan [GR 104768 (2003)] - Czarina

Ponente: Justice Carpio

1-C 2021 - Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

Separate Opinion by Justice Puno:

Separate Opinion by Justice Vitug:

Separate Opinion by Justice Tinga:

VFP v. Reyes [483 SCRA 526 (2006)] - Czarina

Ponente: Justice Chico-Nazario

1-C 2021 - Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

2.) Is the Department Circular No. 04 Unconstitutional?

Javier v. Sandiganbayan [599 SCRA 324 (2009)] - Catherine

1-C 2021 - Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

1. W/N Javier is considered a public officer? -- YES

MIAA v. CA [495 SCRA 591 (2006)] - Catherine

Funa v. MECO [GR 193462 (2014)] - Alyssa

1-C 2021 - Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

1-C 2021 - Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

Taada v. Angara [272 SCRA 18 (1997)] - Vero

1-C 2021 - Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

Issue/s and Rulings:

Ideals of Economic nationalism: