G.R. No.

L-18407 June 26, 1963 While the purpose which may have animated petitioner is plausible and may run
ELAINE A. MOORE, petitioner-appellant, along the feeling of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among the
vs. members of the Moore family, our hand is deferred by a legal barrier which we
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee. cannot at present overlook or brush aside.1wph1.t
Fidel A. Sandoval for petitioner-appellant. Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child concerned is still a
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee. minor who for the present cannot fathom what would be his feeling when he
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: comes to mature age. Any way, if the time comes, he may decide the matter for
Elaine A. Moore filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying himself and take such action as our law may permit. For the present we deem the
that her child by a former marriage, William Michael Velarde, be permitted to action taken by petitioner premature.
change his name so as to read William Michael Velarde Moore. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
After publishing the petition as required by law, trial was held during which the
parties submitted a stipulation of facts. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order
denying the petition whereupon petitioner interposed the present appeal.
Petitioner is an American citizen formerly married to Joseph P. Velarde, also an
American citizen, out of whose wedlock a child by the name of William Michael
Velarde was born. This child, now 14 years old, was born on January 19, 1947 at
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
The marriage of petitioner to Velarde was subsequently dissolved by a decree of
divorce issued by the Superior Court of the State of California on May 31, 1949.
After said decree became final, petitioner contracted a second marriage with Don
C. Moore on September 29, 1956 at Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and thereafter
the minor lived continuously with the spouses up to the present time. He was
supported by Moore who has always treated him with love and affection as if he
were his true father. In view of this harmonious relation it is petitioner's desire
that the minor be able to use the name Moore after his family name Velarde.
The government opposes the petition and now poses the following issues: (1)
whether under our laws a minor may be permitted to adopt and use the surname
of the second husband of his mother; (2) whether justifiable reasons exist to allow
such change of name; and whether petitioner, as mother of the minor, has the
authority or personality to ask for such a change.
Anent the first issue, the government sustains a negative stand for the reason that
our laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is
not his father, for, as a matter of fact, Article 364 of Civil Code specifically
provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father.
Mention is also made of Article 369 of the same Code which provides that in case
of annulment of avoidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment
she principally use the surname of the father, and considering by analogy the
effect of a decree of divorce, it concluded that the children who are conceived
before such a decree should also be understood as carrying the surname of the
real father, which, in this case, is Velarde.
We find tenable this observation of government's counsel. Indeed, if a child born
out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of
the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce,
there may result a confusion to his real paternity. In the long run the change may
redound to the prejudice of the child in the community.
G.R. No. L-55538 March 15, 1982
In the Matter of the Change of Names of DIONESIO DIVINAGRACIA, JR., and
BOMBI ROBERTO DIVINAGRACIA to DIONESIO NALDOZA and BOMBI ROBERTO
NALDOZA, respectively. ZOSIMA NALDOZA, as natural guardian and guardian ad
litem of said minors, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUDGE FERNANDO S. RUIZ of the Court of
First Instance of Bohol, Branch IV, respondents-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
The issue in this case is whether two minors should be allowed to discontinue
using their father's surname and should use only their mother's surname.
Zosima Naldoza was married to Dionesio Divinagracia on May 30, 1970. They
begot two children named Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto who were born on
October 23, 1970 and July 22, 1973, respectively.
Zosima's husband left her after she confronted him with his previous marriage
with another woman. He never returned to the conjugal abode. He allegedly
swindled Congressman Maglana in the sum of P50,000.00, one Galagar in the sum
of P10,000.00 also Eloy Gallentes and other persons.
The classmates of Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto allegedly teased them about
their father being a swindler. Two criminal cases for estafa were filed in court
against the father.
Desirous of obliterating any connection between her two minor children and their
scapegrace father, Zosima, on August 10, 1978, filed in the Court of First Instance
of Bohol a petition wherein she prayed that the surname of her two children be
changed from Divinagracia to Naldoza, her surname (Special Proceeding No. 768).
After due publication and hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition.
The trial court did not consider as sufficient grounds for change of surname the
circumstances that the children's father was a swindler, that he had abandoned
them and that his marriage to Zosima was a second marriage which, however, had
not been annulled nor declared bigamous. It reasoned that the children's
adoption of their mother's surname would give a false impression of family
relationship.
From that decision, Zosima Naldoza appealed to this Court under Republic Act No.
5440. Appellant's seven assignments of error may be reduced to the question of
whether there is a justification for the two children to drop their father's surname
and use their mother's surname only.
The minors Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto, who are presumably legitimate, are
supposed to bear principally the surname Divinagracia, their father's surname
(Art. 364, Civil Code).
To allow them, at their mother's behest, to bear only their mother's surname
(which they are entitled to use together with their father's surname) and to
discard altogether their father's surname thus removing the prima-facie evidence
of their paternal provenance or ancestry, is a serious matter in which, ordinarily,
the minors and their father should be consulted. The mother's desire should not
be the sole consideration.
The change of name is allowed only when there are proper and reasonable causes
for such change (Sec. 5, Rule 103, Rules of Court). Where, as in this case, the
petitioners are minors, the courts should take into account whether the change of
name would redound their welfare or would prejudice them.
Where the petitioner, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother and a Japanese,
elected Philippine citizenship, and her older brother and sister were using their
mother's surname, and the petitioner felt embarrassed in using her Japanese
father's surname (Oshita) because of the ill-feeling harbored by some Filipinos
against the Japanese, and there was no showing that her desire to use the
maternal surname (Bartolome) was motivated by any fraudulent purpose or that
the change of surname would prejudice public interest, her petition to change her
surname from Oshita to Bartolome was granted (Oshita vs. Republic, L-21180,
March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 700).
Where the petitioner's name in the civil registry is Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte, Duterte being the surname of her father Filomeno, who was
married to her mother, Estrella Alfon, but the petitioner since infancy has used
the name Estrella S. Alfon, particularly in the school and voting records, there is
reasonable ground for allowing her to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon.
Such a change would avoid confusion (Alfon vs. Republic, G.R. No. 51201, May 29,
1980,97 SCRA 858).
The instant case is easily distinguishable from the Oshita and AIfon cases where
the petitioners were already of age.
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for change of
name. The reasons adduced for eliminating the father's surname are not
substantial enough to justify the petition. To allow the change of surname would
cause confusion as to the minors' parentage and might create the impression that
the minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only.
That would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as indicated in their birth
records (Exh. C and D).
As was said in that In re Epstein 200 N.Y.S. 897, "the child should, and in the
course of time must, know of his parentage. " If, when he fully appreciates the
circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for himself, he wants to use his
mother's surname only and to avoid using his father's surname, then he should be
the one to apply for a change of surname. See Anno., 53 ALR2d 914.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro, Ericta and Escolin JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
At the worst, Dionesio Jr. and Bombito should be considered as natural children
by legal fiction having the same status, rights and obligations of acknowledged
natural children, (Art. 29, Civil Code). among which is the right to bear the
surname of their father. (Art. 28 (1), Civil Code).
G.R. No. 118387 October 11, 2001
MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE,
CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU CHUAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T.
HAMOY, in their capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court
of Manila and Branch 130, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, respectively
and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG in their personal capacities and ROSA
K. LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K.
LEE, HENRY K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-
MIGUEL, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeks the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP NO.
317862 . The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals upheld the Orders issued by
respondents Judges Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion3 and Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy4 taking
cognizance of two (2) separate petitions filed by private respondents before their
respective salas for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of
birth of petitioners pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but
begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the private respondents herein,
are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other
set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his
concubine, Tiu Chuan.
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin,
Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano
K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee (hereinafter referred to as
private respondents) filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young,
Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee
(hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition against
all petitioners, with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. 92-636925 and later
assigned to Branch 47 presided over by respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion.
On February 3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC
of Kalookan and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. C-16746 and assigned to the sala of
respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in
all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein
the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by substituting the same
with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the petitioners' true birth mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they
are the legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who
were legally married in China sometime in 1931. Except for Rita K. Lee who was
born and raised in China, private respondents herein were all born and raised in
the Philippines.
Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the
Philippines from China of a young girl named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by
Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but far from becoming their
housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee Tek Sheng's mistress. As a result
of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave
birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the
entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners'
mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and
guidance to the petitioners. They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng
and private respondents were residing in. All was well, therefore, before private
respondents' discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father,
Lee Tek Sheng.
The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng's demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng
insisted that the names of all his children, including those of petitioners', be
included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng's death that was to be
published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued
private respondents' curiosity, if not suspicion.7
Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation into the matter. After
investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI prepared a report
that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of
petitioners, specifically the following.
1. As per Birth Certificate MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1), their father, LEE TEK
SHENG made it appear that he is the 12th child of Mrs. KEH SHIOK
CHENG, but upon investigation, it was found out that her Hospital
Records, the mother who gave birth to MARCELO LEE had given birth for
the 1st time, as per diagnosis of the attending physician, Dr. R. LIM, it
was "GRAVIDA I, PARA I" which means "first pregnancy, first live birth
delivery" (refer to: MASTER PATIENT'S RECORDS SUMMARY Annex I).
Also, the age of the mother when she gave birth to MARCELO LEE as per
record was only 17 years old, when in fact and in truth, KEH SHIOK
CHENG's age was then already 38 years old. The address used by their
father in the Master Patient record was also the same as the Birth
Certificate of MARCELO LEE (2425 Rizal Avenue, Manila). The name of
MARCELO LEE was recorded under Hospital No. 221768, page 73.
2. As per Birth Certificate of ALBINA LEE (Annex F-2), it was made to
appear that ALBINA LEE was the third child which is without any
rationality, because the 3rd child of KEH SHIOK CHENG is MELODY LEE
TEK SHENG (Annex E-2). Note also, that the age of the mother as per
Hospital Records jump (sic) from 17 to 22 years old, but the only age gap
of MARCELO LEE and ALBINA LEE is only 2 years.
 3. As per Birth Certificate of MARIANO LEE (Annex F-3), it was made to
appear that MARIANO LEE was the 5th child, but the truth is, KEH SHIOK
CHENG's 5th child is LUCIA LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-4). As per Hospital
Record, the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was only 23 years old, while the
actual age of KEH SHIOK CHENG, was then already 40 years old.
4. As per Birth Certificate of PABLO LEE (Annex F-4), it was made to
appear that PABLO LEE was the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG which is
impossible to be true, considering the fact that KEH SHIOK CHENG have
stopped conceiving after her 11th child. Also as per Hospital Record, the
age of the mother was omitted in the records. If PABLO LEE is the 16th
child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, it would only mean that she have (sic) given
birth to her first born child at the age of 8 to 9 years, which is impossible
to be true.
Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the recorded age of
KEH SHIOK CHENG was 23 years old. Two years after PABLO LEE was born
in 1955, the difference is only 2 years, so it is impossible for PABLO LEE to
be the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, as it will only mean that she have
(sic) given birth at that impossible age.
5. As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it was made to
appear that she is the 6th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, but as per Birth
Certificate of JULIAN LEE (Annex E-5), he is the true 6th child of KEH
SHIOK CHENG. Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is only 28 years
old, while KEH SHIOK CHENG'S true age at that time was 45 years old.
6. EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as per complainant's
allegation, she was born at their house, and was later admitted at
Chinese General Hospital.
7. As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7), it was made to
appear that he is the 14th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, and that the age of
KEH SHIOK CHENG a.k.a. Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, jumped from 28 years old
at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August 1957 to 38 years old at the birth
of CATALINO LEE on 22 April 1959.
8. As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged last son of KEH
SHIOK CHENG, the age of the mother is 48 years old. However, as per
Hospital Record, the age of Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, then was only 39 years
old. Considering the fact, that at the time of MARCELO's birth on 11 May
1950. KEH SHIOK CHENG's age is 38 years old and at the time of
EUSEBIO's birth, she is already 48 years old, it is already impossible that
she could have given birth to 8 children in a span of only 10 years at her
age. As per diagnosis, the alleged mother registered on EUSEBIO's birth
indicate that she had undergone CEASARIAN SECTION, which Dr. RITA K.
LEE said is not true.
In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:
10. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients
Records, it is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is
certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman,
most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis
by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is in a quandary in fixing the
age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand
design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children,
consequently elevating the status of his 2nd family and secure
their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not
have been necessary had not the father and his 2nd family kept
on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH
SHIOK CHENG.8
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for
cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners' records of birth with the
lower courts.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions SP. PROC. NO. 92-
63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is
improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of
petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy
was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed. 9
On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss
SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 for failure of the herein petitioners (defendants in the
lower court) to appear at the hearing of the said motion. 10 Then on February 17,
1993, Judge Veneracion issued an Order, the pertinent portion of which, reads as
follows:
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is
hereby given due course. Let this petition be set for hearing on March 29,
1993 at 8:30 in the morning before this Court located at the 5th Floor of
the City Hall of Manila.
Notice is hereby given that anyone who has any objection to the petition
should file on or before the date of hearing his opposition thereto with a
statement of the grounds therefor.
Let a copy of this Order be published, at the expense of the petitioners,
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines.
Let copies of the verified petition with its annexes and of this Order be
served upon the Office of the Solicitor General, and the respondents, and
be posted on the Bulletin Board of this Court, also at the expense of the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.11
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated April 15, 1993
taking cognizance of SP. PROC. No. C-1674, to wit:
It appearing from the documentary evidence presented and marked by
the petitioners that the Order of the Court setting the case for hearing
was published in "Media Update" once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks, that is on February 20, 27, and March 6, 1993 as evidenced by the
Affidavit of Publication and the clippings attached to the affidavit, and by
the copies of the "Media Update" published on the aforementioned
dates; further, copy of the order setting the case for hearing together
with copy of the petition had been served upon the Solicitor General,
 City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, Civil Registrar of Kalookan City and the
private respondents, the Court holds that the petitioners have complied
with the jurisdictional requirements for the Court to take cognizance of
this case.
xxx xxx xxx
12
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners' attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned orders
of Judge Veneracion and Judge Hamoy failed, hence their recourse to the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners averred that respondents judges had acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders
allowing the petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in
petitioners' records of birth to prosper in the lower courts.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the following
arguments: (1) Rule 108 is inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and filiation
of children; (2) Respondents judges are sanctioning a collateral attack against the
filiation and legitimacy of children; (3) Respondents judges are allowing private
respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of their siblings despite the
fact that their undisputed common father is still alive; (4) Respondents judges are
entertaining petitions which are already time-barred; and (5) The petitions below
are part of a forum-shopping spree.13
Finding no merit in petitioners' arguments, the Court of Appeals dismissed their
petition in a Decision dated October 28, 1994.14 Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the said decision was also denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated December 19, 1994.15
Hence, this petition.
1. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is
improper since private respondents seek to have the entry for the name of
petitioners' mother changed from "Keh Shiok Cheng" to "Tiu Chuan" who is a
completely different person. What private respondents therefore seek is not
merely a correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of
Lee Tek Sheng's legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan,
in effect a "bastardization of petitioners."16 Petitioners thus label private
respondents' suits before the lower courts as a collateral attack against their
legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.
Debunking petitioners' above contention, the Court of Appeals observed:
xxx xxx xxx
As correctly pointed out by the private respondents in their comment . . .
, the proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status
and/or right. Stated differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to
establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events
which created or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise
deprived said persons of rights.17
xxx xxx xxx
It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or
a particular fact.18 The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of
entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for
physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records.
Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts
were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare
that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that
the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no
blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners. 19
Further sanctioning private respondents' resort to Rule 108, the Court of Appeals
adverted to our ruling in the leading case of Republic vs. Valencia20 where we
affirmed the decision of Branch XI of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu
City ordering the correction in the nationality and civil status of petitioner's minor
children as stated in their records of birth from "Chinese" to "Filipino", and
"legitimate" to "illegitimate", respectively. Although recognizing that the changes
or corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or
innocuous nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial
errors in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established provided
the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.21 In the said case, we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases
to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate
adversary proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are
complied with. Thus we held:
"Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant
facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the
suit or proceeding is 'appropriate.'
The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:
'SECTION 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.'
'SECTION 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for
the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to
be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.'
'SECTION 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
 from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication
of such notice, file his opposition thereto.'
"Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding
concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
are (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition,
it becomes the duty of the court to (1) issue an order fixing the time
and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for
hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are
likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2)
any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought.
"If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed
and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer
be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an
opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any
person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be
cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the
proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings."22 (Emphasis
supplied.)
To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both petitions for
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in
the lower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings.
We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of
entries of birth was filed by private respondents and pursuant to the
order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order
setting the case for hearing was ordered published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. In the RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication of the
order setting the case for hearing in "Media Update" once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks. In both cases notices of the orders were
ordered served upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila
and Kalookan and upon the petitioners herein. Both orders set the case
for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars and the other respondents in
the case below to file their oppositions to the said petitions. A motion to
dismiss was consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano,
Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-
Young in the RTC-Manila, and an opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the
RTC-Kalookan.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private
respondents in the courts below by way of a special proceeding
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the
requisite parties, notices and publications could very well be regarded as
that proper suit or appropriate action.23 (Emphasis supplied.)
The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial does not
give trial courts the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to
those corrections contemplated by Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere
clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature.24 The petitioners point to the
case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,25 which is of a later date than Republic vs.
Valencia,26 where this Court reverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier
cases,27 starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic,28 prohibiting the extension of the
application of Rule 108 beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections.
Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil Registrar,29 allowing
substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule unconstitutional as
the same would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs.
Republic,30 the reason we declared null and void the portion of the lower court's
order directing the change of Labayo-Rowe's civil status and the filiation of one of
her children as appearing in the latter's record of birth, is not because Rule 108
was inappropriate to effect such changes, but because Labayo-Rowe's petition
before the lower court failed to implead all indispensable parties to the case.
We explained in this wise:
"x x x An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the
indispensable parties should be made parties to the case as required
under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
"In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was
notified through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the
Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken,
which is summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where
substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor
General, all other indispensable parties should have been made
respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but
the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their
hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons
who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented x x
x.
xxx xxx xxx
"The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be
substantially impaired if her status would be changed from 'legitimate' to
'illegitimate'. Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that
she will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the
petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of
Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-
making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution,
which directs that such rules 'shall not diminish, increase or modify
 substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or
harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or
obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and
controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity
or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper
proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an
unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify
substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of
the Civil Code."31 (italics supplied).
Far from petitioners' theory, this Court's ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic32 does
not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect
substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil register. The only requisite
is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as
contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding. Thus:
"If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of
entries in the civil register] is merely to correct the clerical errors which
are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may,
under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a
mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect
the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are
substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed
after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of
the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of
a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a
proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy,
and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are
notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the
allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x
x."33(Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere application or motion. But
this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly provides. 34 Hence, a
special proceeding is not always summary. One only has to take a look at the
procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a
summary proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires publication of the petition three
(3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec.4). The Rule also
requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be
affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar and any
person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss
the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).
Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia,35 that
Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is
the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and
changes in entries of the civil register.
It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs. Valencia36 there
continues to be a seesawing of opinion on the issue of whether or not substantial
corrections in entries of the civil register may be effected by means of Rule 108 in
relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The more recent cases of Leonor vs.
Court of Appeals37and Republic vs. Labrador38 do seem to signal a reversion to the
Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the scope of application of Article 412 to
clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register.
In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to modify,
alter or increase substantive rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:
"This issue has been resolved in Leonor vs. Court of Appeals. In that case,
Respondent Mauricio Leonor filed a petition before the trial court
seeking the cancellation of the registration of his marriage to Petitioner
Virginia Leonor. He alleged, among others, the nullity of their legal vows
arising from the "non-observance of the legal requirements for a valid
marriage." In debunking the trial court's ruling granting such petition, the
Court held as follows:
'On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation
of any entry regarding "marriages" in the civil registry for any
reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose.
However, it is not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only
errors that can be canceled or corrected under this Rule are
typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial ones
like the validity or nullity of a marriage. A clerical error is one
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding;
error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some
harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of name
that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation
of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).'
'Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the
civil status of petitioner and her children from legitimate to
illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an
adversarial x x x .'
'Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule
108, and for that matter under Article 412 of the Civil Code
cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia's civil
status from married to single and of their three children from
legitimate to illegitimate x x x '
"Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will
change the status of a person from "legitimate to "illegitimate," as in
Sarah Zita's case, the same cannot be granted in summary
proceedings."39
It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by
pronouncements seemingly in conflict with each other, and perhaps, in the
process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same substantial issue.
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to
substantial corrections is unconstitutional is embodied in the early case of Ty
Kong Tin vs. Republic40 that first delineated the extent or scope of the matters
that may be changed or corrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.
The Supreme Court ruled in this case that:
"x x x After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what
was contemplated therein are mere corrections of mistakes that are
clerical in nature and not those that may affect the civil status or the
nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of the
petition is merely a clerical error then the court may issue an order in
order that the error or mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a
substantial change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party, the
matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the
nature of the issue involved. Such action can be found at random in our
substantive and remedial laws the implementation of which will naturally
depend upon the factors and circumstances that might arise affecting the
interested parties. This opinion is predicated upon the theory that the
procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary in nature which
cannot cover cases involving controversial issues."41
This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al. vs.
Republic42 where the Court said that:
"From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until
the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there
was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial
authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations
in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure
which should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the
substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in the civil
register. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority
under Section 13 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which directs that such
rules of court 'shall not diminish or increase or modify substantive rights.'
If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes
or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial
alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become
unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive
rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New
Civil Code."43 (Italics supplied).
We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong
premise, that is, the interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical errors
of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively excluding from its domain, and the
scope of its implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect nationality,
status, filiation and the like. Why the limited scope of Article 412?
Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin does not satisfactorily answer this question except to
opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and
cannot, therefore, cover cases involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases
have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without, however, shedding light on
the matter.
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary
procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:
"No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a
judicial order."
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say
that the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial order. As such, it
cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining such
judicial order is summary in nature.
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms "corrected"
and "changed". In its ordinary sense, to correct means to make or set right"; "to
remove the faults or errors from"44 while to change means "to replace something
with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute".45 The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed
or corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction
or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil
register may be changed or corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in
the civil register? We need not go further than Articles 407 and 408 of the same
title to find the answer.
"Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register."
"Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments
of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;
(7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children;
(10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name."
It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions
include not only status but also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin
pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may affect
civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous. This interpretation has the
effect of isolating Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the
New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction that a
statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to
be attached to any word or phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature
of the subject treated.46
Thirdly, Republic Act No. 904847 which was passed by Congress on February 8,
2001 substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations."
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil
register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and
by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to
remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in
entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule
108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. This is
precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said,
perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress' response to the
confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-
called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous
nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes
or corrections of a substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have
constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to
categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now
embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary
proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of
Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective application. Hence, the necessity for
the preceding treatise.
II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action
to bring the cases below as Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the
father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his children only after his
death.48
Article 171 provides:
"The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the
period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
"(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed
for bringing this action;
"(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having
desisted therefrom; or
"(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband."
Petitioner's contention is without merit.
In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal,49 we upheld the decision of the Court of
Appeals that affirmed the judgment of the RTC of Lanao del Norte declaring the
birth certificate of one Teofista Guinto as null and void ab initio, and ordering the
Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City to cancel the same from the Registry of Live
Births. We ruled therein that private respondent Presentacion Catotal, child of
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, had the requisite standing to
initiate an action to cancel the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera, another alleged
child of the same spouses because she is the one who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.50
We likewise held therein that:
"x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case.
A close reading of the provision shows that it applies to instances in
which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision,
however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the
mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give
birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer therein is not to declare
that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that
the former is not the latter's child at all x x x. ''51
Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals52 that:
"Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and
171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged
not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather,
these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as
his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who
can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the
first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of
the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or
undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they
speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his
heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child.
Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply
these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one
where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not
his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was
not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned
decision is apropos, viz:
'Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now
Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their
childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner
 Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but
that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by
legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of
the deceased. "'53
III. Petitioners claim that private respondents' cause of action had already
prescribed as more than five (5) years had lapsed between the registration of the
latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the filing of the actions in
December of 1992 and February of 1993.54
We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no
law or rule specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding
under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following
provision of the New Civil Code that applies:
"Art. 1149. other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in
other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of
action accrues."
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of
three (3) elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of the
defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element
occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. 55
It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element
of their cause of action, that is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in
petitioners' birth records, occurred more than thirty (30) years ago. Strictly
speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private respondents' right of action or
right to sue accrued. However, we must take into account the fact that it was only
sometime in 1989 that private respondents discovered that they in fact had a
cause of action against petitioners who continue to use said falsified birth records.
Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private
respondents of their right to establish the truth about a fact, in this case,
petitioners' true mother, and their real status, simply because they had
discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a
much later date. This is especially true in the case of private respondents who, as
their father's legitimate children, did not have any reason to suspect that he
would commit such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right
to inherit from their mother's (Keh Shiok Cheng's) estate. It was only sometime in
1989 that private respondents' suspicions were aroused and confirmed. From that
time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.
Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date
of the registration of the last birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not
from the date private respondents had discovered the false entries in petitioners'
birth records in 1989. Petitioners base their position on the fact that birth records
are public documents, hence, the period of prescription for the right of action
available to the private respondents started to run from the time of the
registration of their birth certificates in the Civil Registry.
We cannot agree with petitioners' thinking on that point.
It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating
thereto are public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained.56 Petitioners liken their birth records to land titles, public
documents that serve as notice to the whole world. Unfortunately for the
petitioners, this analogy does not hold water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a
person's parentage cannot be acquired by prescription. One is either born of a
particular mother or not. It is that simple.
IV. Finally, petitioners accuse private respondents of forum shopping. They
enumerate the other actions filed by private respondents against them prior to
the filing of their Rule 108 petitions in the lower courts, as follows:
(1) A criminal complaint for falsification of entries in the birth certificates
filed against their father as principal and against defendants as alleged
accessories;
(2) A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate of their
father, Lee Tek Sheng; and
(3) A petition for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate. 57
According to the petitioners, all the three (3) actions above-mentioned, as well as
the Rule 108 petitions, subject of the case before us, raise the common issue of
whether petitioners are the natural children of Keh Shiok Cheng or Tiu Chuan.
They contend that in all these cases, the judge or hearing officer would have to
resolve this issue in order to determine whether or not to grant the relief prayed
for.58
Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is
identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought.59 Even a cursory
examination of the pleadings filed by private respondents in their various cases
against petitioners would reveal that at the very least there is no identity of rights
or causes of action and reliefs prayed for. The present case has its roots in two (2)
petitions filed under Rule 108, the purpose of which is to correct and/or cancel
certain entries in petitioners' birth records. Suffice it to state, the cause of action
in these Rule 108 petitions and the relief sought therefrom are very different from
those in the criminal complaint against petitioners and their father which has for
its cause of action, the commission of a crime as defined and penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment of the accused; or the
action for the cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng naturalization certificate which has
for its cause of action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an immoral act, and his
ultimate deportation for its object; or for that matter, the action for partition of
Keh Shiok Cheng's estate which has for its cause of action the private
respondents' right under the New Civil Code to inherit from their mother's estate.
We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum
shopping to speak of in the concept that this is described and contemplated in
Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court. HCISED
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951
MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueas as guardian ad litem, and
MARIA DUEAS, plaintiffs,
vs.
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant.
Reyes and Dy-Liaco for appellants.
Tible, Tena and Borja for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as guardian ad
litem, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the
recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in the barrio
of Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur.
The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal
and Maria Dueas; that Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942; that
Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it
from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter
nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former; that Emiliano Andal had
been in possession of the land from 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig,
taking advantage of the abnormal situation then prevailing, entered the land in
question.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano
Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in
question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the
defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the
plea that only question of law are involved.
It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to
her son Emiliano Andal by virtue of a donation propter nuptias she has executed
in his favor on the occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueas. If the son born to the
couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If
otherwise, then the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of
kin entitled to succeed him under the law. The main issue, therefore, to be
determined hinges on the legitimacy of Mariano Andal in so far as his relation to
Emiliano Andal is concerned. The determination of this issue much depends upon
the relationship that had existed between Emiliano Andal and his wife during the
period of conception of the child up to the date of his birth in connection with the
death of the alleged father Emiliano Andal.
The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal became sick of
tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live
in his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness
became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he
could hardly move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria
Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's
father, until the middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual
intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943,
Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his
funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueas gave birth to a boy, who was given the
name of Mariano Andal. Under these facts, can the child be considered as the
legitimate son of Emiliano?
Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:
Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that
of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first
one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred next preceding the
birth of the child.
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1,
1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he
having been born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the
marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days
of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to prove
that it was physically impossible for Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that
Emiliano was sick of tuberculosis and was so weak that he could hardly move and
get up from his bed sufficient to overcome this presumption?
Manresa on this point says:
Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence
during the initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent,
continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown
that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison
regulations. Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his
book "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p.90)."
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the
initial period of conception, specially during the period comprised between
August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the
300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is
enough evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his
wife were still living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in
the same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since
May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife.
We admit that Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition
then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from bed, his feet were
swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience shows that this does not prevent
carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can
do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to
sexual intercourse. As an author has said, "the reputation of the tuberculosis
towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more upon
confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease." (An Integrated
Practice of Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202). There is neither evidence to show
that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable,
nor was there evidence that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy
under the Civil Code in favor of the child has not, therefore, been overcome.
We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68, par. (c) of Rule
123, of the Rules of Court, which is practically based upon the same rai'son
d'etre underlying the Civil Code. Said section provides:
The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is
indisputably presumed to be legitimate, if not born within one hundred
eighty days immediately succeeding the marriage, or after the expiration
of three hundred days following its dissolution.
We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least
had access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was
born within three (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under
these facts no other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate.
We have also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that
it was physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse.
And here there is no such proof. The fact that Maria Dueas has committed
adultery can not also overcome this presumption (Tolentino's Commentaries on
the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 92).
In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the lower court did
not err in declaring Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the spouses Emiliano
Andal and Maria Dueas.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
G.R. No. L-49542 September 12, 1980
ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH MEJIAS, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 54618-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Branch IX dismissing the action for recognition and support filed by
respondent Elizabeth Mejias against petitioner Antonio Macadangdang, and
which found minor Rolando to be the illegitimate son of petitioner who was
ordered to give a monthly support of P350.00 until his alleged son reaches the age
of majority (p. 47, rec.; p. 10, ROA).
The records show that respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her
husband being Crispin Anahaw (pp. 61-62, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972; pp. 10-11, Brief
for Respondent [P. 198, rec.]) She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner
Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967 (p. 38, t.s.n., June 7, 1972 in CC
No. 109). She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in
1967 (p. 63, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days
following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy who was named
Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24,1967 (Annex "A",
List of Exhibits).
The records also disclose that on April 25, 1972, respondent (then plaintiff) filed a
complaint for recognition and support against petitioner (then defendant) with
the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX. This case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 263 (p. 1, ROA).
Defendant (now petitioner) Macadangdang filed his answer on June 30, 1972,
opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal (p. 3, ROA).
On August 9, 1972, the lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial
Order formalizing certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which
both parties agreed (pp. 4, 5, and 6, ROA). Correspondingly, upon agreement of
the parties, an amended complaint was filed by plaintiff on October 17, 1972 (pp.
7,8 and 9, ROA).
In its decision rendered on February 27, 1973, the lower court dismissed the
complaint,. The decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of
Court and authorities (pp. 10-18, ROA).
On April 18, 1973, plaintiff appealed the CFI decision to the Court of Appeals (p.
59, In her appeal, appellant assigned these errors:
1. The Honorable Trial Court erred in applying in the instant case
the provisions of Arts. 255 and 256 of the Civil Code and Secs.
4[a], 4[b] and 4[c], Rule 131, of the Revised Rules of Court (p. 18,
rec.);
2. The Honorable Trial Court erred in holding that plaintiff-
appellant cannot validly question the legitimacy of her son,
Rolando Macadangdang, by a collateral attack without joining
her legal husband as a party in the instant case (p. 18, rec.).
In its decision handed down on June 2, 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court's decision (p. 47, and thus declared minor Rolando to be an
illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang (p. 52, rec.).
On November 6, 1978, the Court of Appeals denied appellant's motions for
reconsideration for lack of merit. (p. 56, rec.).
Hence, petitioner filed this petition on January 12, 1979.
The issues boil down to:
1. Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed
the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin
Anahaw; and
2. Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would
bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally
presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.
The crucial point that should be emphasized and should be straightened out from
the very beginning is the fact that respondent's initial illicit affair with petitioner
occurred sometime in March, 1967 and that by reason thereof, she and her
husband separated. This fact surfaced from the testimony of respondent herself
in the hearing of September 21, 1972 when this case was still in the lower court.
The pertinent portions of her testimony are thus quoted:
By Atty. Fernandez:
Q What did you feel as a result of the incident where
Antonio Macadangdang used pill and took advantage of
your womanhood?
A I felt worried, mentally shocked and
humiliated.
Q If these feelings: worries, mental shock and
humiliation, if estimated in monetary figures, how
much win be the amount?
A Ten thousand pesos, sir.
Q And because of the incidental what
happened to your with Crispin Anahaw.
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A We separate, sir. (pp. 61-63, T.s.n., Civil Case No.
263, Sept. 21, 1972; emphasis supplied).
From the foregoing line of questions and answers, it can be gleaned that
respondent's answers were given with spontaneity and with a clear understanding
of the questions posed. There cannot be any other meaning or interpretation of
the word "incident" other than that of the initial contact between petitioner and
respondent. Even a layman would understand the clear sense of the question
posed before respondent and her categorical and spontaneous answer which
does not leave any room for interpretation. It must be noted that the very
question of her counsel conveys the assumption of an existing between
respondent and her husband.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that respondent and her husband were
separated in 1965 cannot therefore be considered conclusive and binding on this
Court. It is based solely on the testimony of respondent which is self-serving.
Nothing in the records shows that her statement was confirmed or corroborated
by another witness and the same cannot be treated as borne out by the record or
that which is based on substantial evidence. It is not even confirmed by her own
husband, who was not impleaded.
In the case of Tolentino vs. De Jesus (L-32797, 56 SCRA 167 [1974], this Court
restated that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the
parties and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant
and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (9) when the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised
on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record [Pioneer
Insurance and Surety Corporation vs. Yap, L-36232, December 19, 1974; Roque vs.
Buan, L-22459, 21 SCRA 642 (1967); Ramos vs. Pepsi-cola Bottling Company of the
Philippines, L-225533, 19 SCRA 289 (1967); emphasis supplied].
Again, in Roque vs. Buan, supra, this Court reiterated the aforestated doctrine
adding four more exceptions to the general rule. This case invoked the same
ruling in the previous case of Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company, etc., supra.
In the recent case of Francisca Alsua-Betts, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (L-
46430-31, July 30, 1979), which petitioner aptly invokes, this Court thus
emphasized:
... But what should not be ignored by lawyers and litigants alike
is the more basic principle that the "findings of fact" described
as "final" or "conclusive" are those borne out by the record or
those which are based upon substantial evidence. The general
rule laid down by the Supreme Court does not declare the
absolute correctness of all the findings of fact made by the
Court of Appeals. There are exceptions to the general rule,
where we have reviewed the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals ... (emphasis supplied).
The following provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court should be borne
in mind:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other
than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days
of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were separately, in
such a way that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.
Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time
of the conception of the child, but there was no physical
impossibility of access between her and her husband as set
forth in article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be
illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons,
that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this
article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy
(a) Children born after one hundred eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall
be presumed legitimate.
Against presumption no evidence be admitted other than that
of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to
his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the
three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
[1] By the impotence of the husband
[2] By the fact that the husband and the wife were living
separately, in such a way that access was not possible;
[3] By the serious illness of the husband;
(b) The child shall be presumed legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.
(c) Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the
conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility
of access between her and her husband as set forth above, the
child is presumed legitimate, unless it appears highly
improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the
husband. For the purpose of the rule, the wife's adultery need
not be proved in a criminal case. ... (Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated would be
immaterial to the resolution of the status of the child Rolando. What should really
matter is the fact that during the initial one hundred twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the renamed child, no concrete or even
substantial proof was presented to establish physical impossibility of access
between respondent and her spouse. From her very revealing testimony,
respondent declared that she was bringing two sacks of rice to Samal for her
children; that her four children by her husband in her mother's house in the said
town; that her alleged estranged husband also lived in her mother's place (p. 73,
pp. 21 & 22, 64 & 65, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). It should also be noted that even
during her affair with petitioner and right after her delivery, respondent went to
her mother's house in Samal for treatment. Thus, in the direct examination of
Patrocinia Avila (the boy's yaya), the following came out:
Q Why were you taking care of the child
Rolando, where was Elizabeth Mejias?
A Because Elizabeth went to her parents in Same
Davao del Norte for treatment because she had a
relapse (p. 13, t.s.n., of Sept. 21, 1972).
From the foregoing and since respondent and her husband continued to live in
the same province, the fact remains that there was always the possibility of
access to each other. As has already been pointed out, respondent's self-serving
statements were never corroborated nor confirmed by any other evidence, more
particularly that of her husband.
The baby boy subject of this controversy was born on October 30, 1967, only
seven (7) months after March, 1967 when the "incident" or first illicit intercourse
between respondent and petitioner took place, and also, seven months from their
separation (if there really was a separation). It must be noted that as of March,
1967, respondent and Crispin Anahaw had already four children; hence, they had
been married years before such date (t.s.n., pp. 21-22, Sept. 21, 1972). The birth
of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the
celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged
separation between aforenamed spouses.
Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband.
The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after the initial sexual
contact between petitioner and respondent is another proof that the said child
was not of petitioner since, from indications, he came out as a normal full-term
baby.
It must be stressed that the child under question has no birth certificate of
Baptism (attached in the List of Exhibits) which was prepared in the absence of
the alleged father [petitioner]. Note again that he was born on October 30, 1967.
Between March, 1967 and October 30, 1967, the time difference is clearly 7
months. The baby Rolando could have been born prematurely. But such is not the
case. Respondent underwent a normal nine-month pregnancy. Respondent
herself and the yaya, Patrocinia Avila, declared that the baby was born in the
rented house at Carpenter Street, which birth was obvisouly normal; that he was
such a healthy baby that barely 5 days after his birth, he was already cared for by
said yaya when respondent became sick (pp. 28, 29 & 43, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972);
and that when he was between 15 days and 2 months of age, respondent left him
to the care of the yaya when the former left for Samal for treatment and returned
only in February, 1968 (pp. 30-32, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). From the aforestated
facts, it can be indubitably said that the child was a full-term baby at birth,
normally delivered, and raised normally by the yaya. If it were otherwise or if he
were born prematurely, he would have needed special care like being placed in an
incubator in a clinic or hospital and attended to by a physician, not just a
mere yaya. These all point to the fact that the baby who was born on October 30,
1967 or 7 months from the first sexual encounter between petitioner and
respondent was conceived as early as January, 1967. How then could he be the
child of petitioner?
In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on
the value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage
certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove
the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified but not the
veracity of the states or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk
and/or citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case
of Fortus vs. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a
baptismal administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the
priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the
declarations and statements contained in the certificate that concern the
relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order
that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof
recognized by law.
The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her
spouse. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there
was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of
the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is actually quasi-
conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence the physical
impossibility of access between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the
300 which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility of access
may be caused by any of these:
1. Impotence of the husband;
2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible
and
3. Serious illness of the husband.
This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual
union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. Hence, proof of
the physical impossibility of such sexual union prevents the application of the
presumption (Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1,
p. 513 citing Bevilaqua, Familia p. 311).
The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have
enabled the husband to be the father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be
presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is
rebutted by evidence to the contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or
proved, the husband must be taken to be the father of the child (Tolentino, citing
Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations, pp. 340-341).
To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore, there must be physical
impossibility of access by the husband to the wife during the period of
conception. The law expressly refers to physical impossibility. Hence, a
circumstance which makes sexual relations improbable, cannot defeat the
presumption of legitimacy; but it may be proved as a circumstance to corroborate
proof of physical impossibility of access (Tolentino, citing Bonet 352; 4 Valverde
408).
Impotence refers to the inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its
proper function (Bouvier's Law Dictionary 514). As defined in the celebrated case
of Menciano vs. San Jose (89 Phil. 63), impotency is the physical inability to have
sexual intercourse. It is not synonymous with sterility. Sterility refers to the
inability to procreate, whereas, impotence refers to the physical inability to
perform the act of sexual intercourse. In respect of the impotency of the husband
of the mother of a child, to overcome the presumption of legitimacy on
conception or birth in wedlock or to show illegitimacy, it has been held or
recognized that the evidence or proof must be clear or satisfactory: clear,
satisfactory and convincing, irresistible or positive (S.C. Tarleton vs. Thompson,
118 S.E. 421, 125 SC 182, cited in 10 C.J.S. 50).
The separation between the spouses must be such as to make sexual access
impossible. This may take place when they reside in different countries or
provinces, and they have never been together during the period of conception
(Estate of Benito Marcelo, 60 Phil. 442). Or, the husband may be in prison during
the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through
corrupt violation of or allowed by prison regulations (1 Manresa 492-500).
The illness of the husband must be of such a nature as to exclude the possibility of
his having sexual intercourse with his wife; such as, when because of a injury, he
was placed in a plaster cast, and it was inconceivable to have sexual intercourse
without the most severe pain (Tolentino, citing Commissioner vs. Hotel 256 App.
Div. 352, 9 N.Y. Supp. p. 515); or the illness produced temporary or permanent
impotence, making copulation impossible (Tolentino, citing Q. Bonet 352).
Thus, in the case of Andal vs. Macaraig (89 Phil. 165), this Court ruled that just
because tuberculosis is advanced in a man does not necessarily mean that he is
incapable of sexual intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from
tuberculosis can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage of health because
then they seemed to be more inclined to sexual intercourse. The fact that the wife
had illicit intercourse with a man other than her husband during the initial period,
does not preclude cohabitation between said husband and wife.
Significantly American courts have made definite pronouncements or rulings on
the issues under consideration. The policy of the law is to confer legitimacy upon
children born in wedlock when access of the husband at the time of conception
was not impossible (N.Y. Milone vs. Milone, 290 N.Y. S. 863, 160 Misc. 830) and
there is the presumption that a child so born is the child of the husband and is
legitimate even though the wife was guilty of infidelity during the possible period
of conception (N.Y. Dieterich vs. Dieterich, 278 N.Y. S. 645, Misc. 714; both cited
in 10 C.J.S., pp. 18,19 & 20).
So firm was this presumption originally that it cannot be rebutted unless the
husband was incapable of procreation or was absent beyond the four seas, that is,
absent from the realm, during the whole period of the wife's pregnancy (10 C.J.S.
p. 20).
The presumption of legitimacy of children born during wedlock obtains,
notwithstanding the husband and wife voluntarily separate and live apart, unless
the contrary is shown (Ala. Franks vs. State, 161 So. 549, 26 . App. 430) and this
includes children born after the separation [10 C.J.S. pp. 23 & 24; emphasis
supplied].
It must be stressed that Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child
is presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress has been adopted for
two solid reasons. First, in a fit of anger, or to arouse jealousy in the husband, the
wife may have made this declaration (Power vs. State, 95 N.E., 660). Second, the
article is established as a guaranty in favor of the children whose condition should
not be under the mercy of the passions of their parents. The husband whose
honor if offended, that is, being aware of his wife's adultery, may obtain from the
guilty spouse by means of coercion, a confession against the legitimacy of the
child which may really be only a confession of her guilt. Or the wife, out of
vengeance and spite, may declare the as not her husband's although the
statement be false. But there is another reason which is more powerful,
demanding the exclusion of proof of confession or adultery, and it is, that at the
moment of conception, it cannot be determined when a woman cohabits during
the same period with two men, by whom the child was begotten, it being possible
that it be the husband himself (Manresa, Vol. I, pp. 503-504).
Hence, in general, good morals and public policy require that a mother should not
be permitted to assert the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock in order to
obtain some benefit for herself (N.Y. Flint vs. Pierce, 136 N.Y. S. 1056, cited in
10 C.J.S. 77).
The law is not willing that the child be declared illegitimate to suit the whims and
purposes of either parent, nor Merely upon evidence that no actual act of sexual
intercourse occurred between husband and wife at or about the time the wife
became pregnant. Thus, where the husband denies having any intercourse with
his wife, the child was still presumed legitimate (Lynn vs. State, 47 Ohio App.
158,191 N.E. 100).
With respect to Article 257 aforequoted, it must be emphasized that adultery on
the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her
child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband (Tolentino,
citing 1 Vera 170; 4 Borja 23-24).
It has, therefore, been held that the admission of the wife's testimony on the
point would be unseemly and scandalous, not only because it reveals immoral
conduct on her part, but also because of the effect it may have on the child, who
is in no fault, but who nevertheless must be the chief sufferer thereby (7 Am. Jur.
Sec. 21, pp. 641-642).
In the case of a child born or conceived in wedlock, evidence of the infidelity or
adultery of the wife and mother is not admissible to show illegitimacy, if there is
no proof of the husband's impotency or non-access to his wife (Iowa Craven vs.
Selway, 246 N.W. 821, cited in 10 C.J.S. 36).
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or
economic interest involved (Tolentino, citing Bevilaqua, Familia, p. 314).
The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock belongs
only to the alleged father, who is the husband of the mother and can be exercised
only by him or his heirs, within a fixed time, and in certain cases, and only in a
direct suit brought for the purpose (La Ducasse vs. Ducasse, 45 So. 565, 120 La.
731; Saloy's Succ. 10 So. 872, 44 La. Ann., cited in 10 C.J.S. 77; emphasis supplied).
Thus the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never
uncertain; she can only contest the Identity of the child (La Eloi vs. Mader, 1
Rollo. 581, 38 Am. D. 192).
Formerly, declarations of a wife that her husband was not the father of a child in
wedlock were held to be admissible in evidence; but the general rule now is that
they are inadmissible to bastardize the child, regardless of statutory provisions
obviating incompetency on the ground of interest, or the fact that the conception
was antenuptial. The rule is said to be founded in decency, morality and public
policy (Wallace vs. Wallace 137 Iowa 37,114 N.W. 527,14 L.R.A. [N.S.] 544,126
Am. St. Rep. 253,15 Ann. Cas. 761, Am. Jur. 26).
From the foregoing, particularly the testimony of respondent and her witnesses,
this Court has every reason to believe that Crispin Anahaw was not actually
separated from Elizabeth Mejias; that he was a very potent man, having had four
children with his wife; that even if he and were even separately (which the latter
failed to prove anyway) and assuming, for argument's sake, that they were really
separated, there was the possibility of physical access to each other considering
their proximity to each other and considering further that respondent still visited
and recuperated in her mother's house in Samal where her spouse resided with
her children. Moreover, Crispin Anahaw did not have any serious illness or any
illness whatsoever which would have rendered him incapable of having sexual act
with his wife. No substantial evidence whatsoever was brought out to negate the
aforestated facts.
Crispin Anahaw served as a refuge after respondent's reckless and immoral
pursuits or a "buffer" after her flings. And she deliberately did not include nor
present her husband in this case because she could not risk her scheme. She had
to be certain that such scheme to bastardize her own son for her selfish motives
would not be thwarted.
This Court finds no other recourse except to deny respondent's claim to declare
her son Rolando the illegitimate child of petitioner. From all indications,
respondent has paraded herself as a woman of highly questionable character. A
married woman who, on first meeting, rides with a total stranger who is married
towards nightfall, sleeps in his house in the presence of his children, then lives
with him after their initial sexual contact the atmosphere for which she herself
provided is patently immoral and hedonistic. Although her husband was a very
potent man, she readily indulged in an instant illicit relationship with a married
man she had never known before.
Respondent had shown total lack of or genuine concern for her child (Rolando)
for, even after birth, she left him in the care of a yaya for several months. This is
not the normal instinct and behavior of a mother who has the safety and welfare
of her child foremost in her mind. The filing of this case itself shows how she is
capable of sacrificing the psycho-social future (reputation) of the child in
exchange for some monetary consideration. This is blatant shamelessness.
It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade
the responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her
husband, her illicit lover and above all her own son. For this Court to allow,
much less consent to, the bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to
serious and far-reaching consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate
scheming married women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men
and then exploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them to
collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wrecking the
stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.
And as between the paternity by the husband and the paternity by the paramour,
all the circumstances being equal, the law is inclined to follow the former; hence,
the child is thus given the benefit of legitimacy.
Finally, Article 220 of the Civil Code reinforces the aforesaid principle when it
provides thus:
Art. 220. In case of doubt, an presumptions favor the solidarity
of the family. Thus, every of law or facts leans toward the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds,
the legitimacy of children the community of property during
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of
unlawful aggression.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED JUNE 2, 1978,
AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 6, 1978 ARE HEREBY REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987
JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem, ARLENE
S. SALGADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision* of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
51078-R, dated 29 August 1978, which dismissed petitioner"s action for
recognition and support against private respondent, and from the respondent
Court"s resolution, dated 11 October 1978, denying petitioner"s motion for
reconsideration of said decision.
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by
her mother and guardian-ad-litemArlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and
support with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against private
respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a
blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping
test, held 21 January 1969, indicated that Janice could not have been the possible
offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado.1
The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon
plaintiff"s (herein petitioner"s) second motion for reconsideration, it ordered a
trial on the merits, after which, Janice was declared the child of Jao, thus entitling
her to his monthly support.
Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court"s failure to
appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As there was no showing
whatsoever that there was any irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests,
Jao argued that the result of the tests should have been conclusive and
indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.
The Court of Appeals upheld Jao"s contentions and reversed the trial court"s
decision. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:
From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears undisputed that
JAO was introduced to ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bay Side Club,
by Melvin Yabut. After this meeting, JAO dated and courted ARLENE. Not
long thereafter, they had their first sexual intercourse and subsequently,
they lived together as husband and wife. ...
It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO accompanied
ARLENE to the Marian General Hospital for medical check-up and her
confinement was with JAO"s consent. JAO paid the rentals where they
lived, the salaries of the maids, and other household expenses. ...
The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on August 16,
1968, after completing 36 weeks of pregnancy, which indicates that
ARLENE must have conceived JANICE on or about the first week of
December, 1967. "Thus, one issue to be resolved in this appeal is
whether on or about that time, JAO and ARLENE had sexual intercourse
and were already living with one another as husband and wife.
In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO sometime in
the third or fourth week of November, 1967 at the Saddle and Sirloin,
Bayside Club; that after several dates, she had carnal knowledge with
him at her house at 30 Long beach, Merville, Paranaque. Rizal in the
evening of November 30, 1967, and that he started to live with her at her
dwelling after December 16, 1967, the date they finished their cruise to
Mindoro Island.
On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE at the
Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club, however, maintains that this was on
December 14, 1967 because the day following, he and his guests:
ARLENE, Melvin Yabut, Didi Crescini and Charlie Litonjua went to
Mindoro by boat. He dated ARLENE four times in January, 1968. He
remembered he had carnal knowledge of her for the first time on
January 18, 1968, because that was a week after his birthday and it was
only in May, 1968 that he started cohabiting with her at the Excelsior
Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.
These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in resolving the
paternity of JANICE, the role of the blood grouping tests conducted by
the NBI and which resulted in the negative finding that in a union with
ARLENE, JAO could not be the father of JANICE.
We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is not in a
position to determine with mathematical precision the issue of
parentage by blood grouping test, considering the rulings of this Court ...
where the blood grouping tests of the NBI were admitted; especially
where, in the latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo Sunico who conducted the
test and it appears that in the present case, the same Dr. Sunico
approved the findings and report. ... In Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, 101
Phil. 188, the Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI
in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the
competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been
recognized as early as the 1950"s.
The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be stated as follows:
Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of
blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it
can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of
the child. But group blood testing cannot show that a man is the
father of a particular child, but at least can show only a
possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in
others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such
tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive
presumption of non-paternity where the results of the test,
made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the
alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the
judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely accurate,
and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where
 the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with
the results of the test.
The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the
fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged
father or any one of many others with the same blood type may
have been the father of the child. But the Uniform Act
recognizes that the tests may have some probative value to
establish paternity where the blood type and the combination in
the child is shown to be rare, in which case the judge is given
discretion to let it in (I Jones on Evidence, 5th Ed., pp. 193-194).
In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups, scientific
opinion is now in accord in accepting the fact that there is a
causative relation between the trait of the progenitor and the
trait of the progeny. In other words, the blood composition of a
child may be some evidence as to the child"s paternity. But thus
far this trait (in the present state of scientific discovery as
generally accepted) can be used only negativelyi.e. to evidence
that a particular man F is not the father of a particular child C. (I
Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Ed., pp. 610-611).
In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and competency of the blood
test, JANICE claims that probative value was given to blood tests only in
cases where they tended to establish paternity; and that there has been
no case where the blood test was invoked to establish non-paternity,
thereby implying that blood tests have probative value only when the
result is a possible affirmative and not when in the negative. This
contention is fallacious and must be rejected. To sustain her contention,
in effect, would be recognizing only the possible affirmative finding but
not the blood grouping test itself for if the result were negative, the test
is regarded worthless. Indeed, this is illogical. .... As an admitted test, it is
admissible in subsequent similar proceedings whether the result be in
the negative or in the affirmative. ...
The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to petitioner"s
contention that JAO"s actions before and after JANICE was born were tantamount
to recognition. Said the respondent appellate court:
On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not recognize her as his
own. In fact, he filed a petition that his name as father of JANICE in the
latter"s certificate of live birth be deleted, evidencing his repudiation,
rather than recognition. The mere acts of JAO in cohabiting with ARLENE,
the attention given to her during her pregnancy and the financial
assistance extended to her cannot overcome the result of the blood
grouping test. These acts of JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing the
unborn JANICE as his own as the possession of such status cannot be
founded on conjectures and presumptions, especially so that, We have
earlier said, JAO refused to acknowledge JANICE after the latter"s birth.
JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on paragraph 2 of
Article 283 in relation to Article 289 of the New Civil Code which
provides: "When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child
of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter.
Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs 3 or 4 of said
article which states:
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that
the defendant is his father.
As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could have been
conceived from November 20, 1967 to December 4, 1967. Indeed,
ARLENE claims that her first sexual intercourse with JAO was on
November 30, 1967 while the latter avers it was one week after January
18, 1968. However, to satisfy paragraph 3 as above-quoted, JANICE must
have been conceived when ARLENE and JAO started to cohabit with one
another. Since ARLENE herself testified that their cohabitation started
only after December 16, 1967, then it cannot be gainsaid that JANICE was
not conceived during this cohabitation. Hence, no recognition will lie.
Necessarily, recognition cannot be had under paragraph 4 as JANICE has
no other evidence or proof of her alleged paternity.
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time of
conception, ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two other men: "Oying"
Fernandez and Melvin Yabut, which was not even rebutted; and
considering that it was Melvin Yabut, who introduced ARLENE to JAO at
the Bayside Club. Moreover, the testimony of ARLENE is not wholly
reliable. When the trial court said that "the Court is further convinced of
plaintiff"s cause by ARLENE"s manner of testifying in a most straight-
forward and candid manner," the fact that ARLENE was admittedly a
movie actress may have been overlooked so that not even the trial court
could detect, by her acts, whether she was lying or not.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and a new
one entered dismissing plaintiff-appellee"s complaint. Without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility and
conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests to prove non-paternity.
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm
paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,2 an action for declaration of
filiation, support and damages. In said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood
tests stated that "from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a
possible father of the child." From this statement the defendant contended that
the child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious
reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of
the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This
possibility, coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out during the
trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant Co Tao is the father of the child
Manuel."3
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests in the
to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. instant case by impugning the qualifications of the NBI personnel who performed
For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage the tests and the conduct of the tests themselves. Her allegations, in this regard,
has already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal appear to be without merit. The NBI"s forensic chemist who conducted the tests
scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, is also a serologist, and has had extensive practice in this area for several years.
although inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact that the blood type of the The blood tests were conducted six (6) times using two (2) scientifically
child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively recognized blood grouping systems, the MN Test and the ABO System, 14 under
prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is witness and supervision.15
not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a
father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged proper subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the
father.4 first blood test, she, represented by her mother, declined to undergo the same
In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests results to blood test to prove or disprove their allegations, even as Jao was willing to
prove non-paternity has already been passed upon in several cases. In Gilpin v. undergo such a test again.16 1avvphi1
Gilpin5 the positive results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a case in which it Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that
was shown that proper safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible
were recognized as final on the question of paternity. In Cuneo v. Cuneo6 evidence and conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice.
of non-paternity consisting of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted No evidence has been presented showing any defect in the testing methods
despite a finding that the alleged father had cohabited with the mother within the employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of the
period of gestation. The Court said that the competent medical testimony was tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a
overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such testimony would be scientific fact.
tantamount to rejecting scientific fact. Courts, it was stated, should apply the In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as heretofore
results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since quoted, which are binding on this Court, we do not find it necessary to further
to reject said result was to deny progress. 7 This ruling was also echoed in Clark v. pass upon the issue of recognition raised by petitioner.
Rysedorph,8 a filiation proceeding where an uncontradicted blood grouping test WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied. Without
evidence, excluding paternity, was held conclusive.9 Legislation expressly pronouncement as to costs.
recognizing the use of blood tests is also in force in several SO ORDERED.
states.10 Tolentino,11 affirms this rule on blood tests as proof of non-paternity,
thus
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man
which can be transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the
same type of blood in two persons does not indicate that one was
begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will
indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when
the supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same blood
group, they cannot be father and child by consanguinity. The Courts of
Europe today regard a blood test exclusion as an unanswerable and
indisputable proof of non-paternity. 12
Moreover,
The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father cannot
be a ground for compulsory recognition if such cohabitation could not
have produced the conception of the child. This would be the case, for
instance, if the cohabitation took place outside of the period of
conception of the child. Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests that
the child and the supposed father belong to different blood groups, the
cohabitation by itself cannot be a ground for recognition. 13
G.R. No. L-83942 December 29, 1988
ROMEO S. AMURAO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMUEL JEROME BUENAVENTURA, represented
by her natural mother and guardian ad litem FE ROSARIO
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
The petitioner was sued for support by the offspring of his illicit relations with a
19-year old college student. The petitioner denied paternity and refused to give
support.
At the commencement of the trial on July 25, 1977, the trial court made a
last-minute effort to simplify the issues by calling the parties and their counsel to
a conference in her chambers. The result was an agreement of the parties, a gist
of which was written down in the minutes of the hearing, duly signed by the
parties and their counsel, attested by the Deputy Clerk of Court, and embodied in
the court's order of September 26, 1977 as follows:
When this case was called for trial this morning, parties jointly
moved for a conference in chambers. The same was granted.
After said conference, parties agreed to submit themselves to a
blood-grouping test to determine the paternity of plaintiff
before the National Bureau of Investigation; and to be bound by
the results of the said government agency in the following
manner: a) if the finding is to the effect that herein plaintiff may
be the offspring of defendant, paternity shall be admitted and
this case will proceed for trial only on the issue of amount of
support; and b) if the finding is negative, then this case shall be
dismissed without further trial. The Court finds the same well
taken.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff-minor. his natural mother and defendant
are hereby ordered to submit themselves to a blood-grouping
test before the National Bureau of Investigation on or before
October 17, 1977 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning for a
determination of plaintiffs paternity. (Emphasis supplied.) (pp.
29-30, Original Records; p. 20, Rollo.)
On the basis of the blood grouping tests performed by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the NBI submitted to the Court Report No. 77-100 dated
October 17, 1977, finding that:
The said child (Romuel Jerome Buenaventura) is a possible
offspring of the alleged father Romeo Amurao with Fe Rosario
Buenaventura as the natural mother. (p. 20, Rollo.)
Exactly one year later, on September 26, 1978, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order dated September 26, 1977, impugning its
validity. The motion was denied by the trial court. The petitioner sought a review
of the order by the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari (G.R. No.
51407). The petition was denied by this Court on May 4, 1980.
A motion to declare the petitioner in contempt of court for failure to pay
support pendente lite was filed by the private respondent minor. At the hearing of
the contempt motion the parties presented evidence on the petitioner's capability
to give support. After the hearing on the contempt motion, the case was set for
trial on July 8, 1983, with due notice to both parties, for the presentation of
further evidence by the petitioner (defendant) on the main case. However,
neither the petitioner, nor his counsel, appeared at the hearing. The court
declared the case submitted for decision. On August 8, 1985, it rendered
judgment for the private respondent ordering the petitioner to pay the former
support of P500 per month plus attorney's fees of P3,000, and costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV 07645) which
rendered judgment on March 7, 1988, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
the modification that the support fixed in the judgment
appealed from is increased to One Thousand Five Hundred
(P1,500.00) Pesos, payable within the first five days of each
month at the plaintiffs residence. Defendant-appellant is hereby
ordered to pay support pendente lite of P200.00 in arrears since
October 1978 up to the termination of this appeal. Costs against
defendant-appellant. (p. 24, Rollo.)
Once more, the case is before Us for review upon a petition alleging that the
Court of Appeals erred:
1. in finding that the petitioner had admitted his paternity in
relation to the minor Romuel Jerome Buenaventura and that
hence said minor is entitled to receive support from him;
2. in upholding the trial court's decision based on the evidence
(consisting among others of the petitioner's balance sheets,
audit reports and admissions regarding his income) presented
by the parties at the hearing of the plaintiffs contempt motion;
3. in increasing the amount of support granted by the trial court;
and
4. in applying Article 290 of the Civil Code instead of Articles 296
and 297 of the same Code.
The petition for review is devoid of merit.
The first, second, third, and fourth issues raised by the petition are factual issues
which this Court may not review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Whether or not the petitioner made an admission of paternity under the terms of
the trial court's order dated September 26, 1977, thereby binding himself to give
support to his child, the private respondent herein, is a finding of fact.
So is the Court's determination of the amount of support payable to the private
respondent. It was perfectly proper for the Court to consider the evidence
presented by the parties at the hearing of the plaintiff s contempt motion against
the defendant, as evidence also on the merits of the main case. The parties did
not have to repeat the ritual of presenting the same evidence all over again to the
court. The defendant (herein petitioner), by failing to appear at the hearing of the
main case on July 8, 1983 (p. 17, Rollo), waived his right to adduce additional
evidence. Hence, he may not be heard to complain that he was denied due
process.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the minor, who
filed his action for support in 1977 when he was only an infant five (5) months old,
is now (as an 11-year old student) entitled to an increase in the amount of
support awarded to him by the trial court, is also a factual issue which We may
not re-examine and review.
In any event, We find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The increase in the child's support is proper and is sanctioned by the provisions of
Articles 290, 296 and 297 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-75377 February 17, 1988
CHUA KENG GIAP, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and CHUA LIAN KING respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
We are faced once again with still another bid by petitioner for the status of a
legitimate heir. He has failed before, and he will fail again.
In this case, the petitioner insists that he is the son of the deceased Sy Kao and
that it was error for the respondent court to reject his claim. He also says his
motion for reconsideration should not have been denied for tardiness because it
was in fact filed on time under the Habaluyas ruling. 1
This case arose when Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the regional trial court of Quezon
City. The private respondent moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of
the petitioner's capacity to file the petition. The latter, it was claimed, had been
declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in S.P. No. Q-
12592, for the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. The decision in
that case had long become final and executory.2
The motion was denied by Judge Jose P. Castro, who held that the case invoked
decided the paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner. 3 Holding that this
was mere quibbling, the respondent court reversed the trial judge in a petition for
certiorari filed by the private respondent.4 The motion for reconsideration was
denied for late filing.5 The petitioner then came to this Court to challenge these
rulings.
The petitioner argues at length that the question to be settled in a motion to
dismiss based on lack of a cause of action is the sufficiency of the allegation itself
and not whether these allegations are true or not, for their truth is hypothetically
admitted. 6 That is correct. He also submits that an order denying a motion to
dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore reversible not in a petition
for certiorari but on appeal.7 That is also correct Even so, the petition must be and
is hereby denied.
The petitioner is beating a dead horse. The issue of his claimed filiation has long
been settled, and with finality, by no less than this Court. That issue cannot be
resurrected now because it has been laid to rest in Sy Kao v. Court of
Appeals, 8 decided on September 28, 1984. In that case, Sy Kao flatly and
unequivocally declared that she was not the petitioner's mother.
The Court observed through Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
Petitioner Sy Kao denies that respondent Chua Keng Giap is her
son by the deceased Chua Bing Guan. Thus, petitioner's
opposition filed on December 19, 1968, is based principally on
the ground that the respondent was not the son of Sy Kao and
the deceased but of a certain Chua Eng Kun and his wife Tan
Kuy.
After hearing on the merits which lasted for ten years, the court
dismissed the respondent's petition on March 2, 1979 on a
finding that he is not a son of petitioner Sy Kao and the
deceased, and therefore, had no lawful interest in the estate of
the latter and no right to institute the intestacy proceedings.
The respondent tried to appeal the court's resolution but his
appeal was denied by the lower court for having been filed out
of time. He then filed a mandamus case with the Court of
appeals but the same was dismissed. Respondent, therefore,
sought relief by filing a petition for certiorari, G.R. No. 54992,
before this Court but his petition was likewise dismissed on
January 30, 1982, for lack of merit. His subsequent motions for
reconsideration met a similar fate.
xxx xxx xxx
To allow the parties to go on with the trial on the merits would
not only subject the petitioners to the expense and ordeal of
obligation which might take them another ten years, only to
prove a point already decided in Special Proceeding No. Q-
12592, but more importantly, such would violate the doctrine
of res judicata which is expressly provided for in Section 49, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.
There is no point in prolonging these proceedings with an examination of the
procedural objections to the grant of the motion to dismiss. In the end, assuming
denial of the motion, the resolution of the merits would have to be the same
anyway as in the aforesaid case. The petitioner's claim of filiation would still have
to be rejected.
Discussion of the seasonableness of the motion for reconsideration is also
unnecessary as the motion would have been validly denied just the same even if
filed on time.
Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was really her son?
More than any one else, it was Sy Kao who could say as indeed she has said
these many years--that Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. L-69679 October 18, 1988
VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM, LIM BIAK CHIAO and CALASIAO BIJON
FACTORY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CONSORCIA FRIANEZA GOLEA, MARIA
FRIANEZA VERGARA, BENEDICTA FRIANEZA MAYUGBA BONIFACIA FRIANEZA
HEIRS OF DOMINGO FRIANEZA namely, DECIDERIA Q. VDA. DE FRIANEZA
FRANCISCO, DONA, VILMA and DECIDERIA, all surnamed FRIANEZA HEIRS OF
DANIEL FRIANEZA namely, ADELA V. VDA. DE FRIANEZA in her behalf and as
Guardian ad litem of Minors, DARLENE, DANIEL JR., DUSSEL and DAISY GLEN, all
surnamed FRIANEZA respondents.
Ethelwoldo R. de Guzman for petitioners.
Tomas B. Tadeo, Sr. for private respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This case involves a contest over the estate of the late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat
wherein the protagonists are her sisters and the children of her deceased
brothers on one hand, and the petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be
her only child.
Petitioners Violeta Cabatbat Lim, her husband Liam Biak Chiao, and the Calasiao
Bijon Factory assail the decision dated October 25, 1984 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals (AC-G.R. No. CV 67055), which affirmed
the trial court's decision finding that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not the off-
spring, hence, not a legal heir of the late Esperanza Cabatbat.
The private respondents, sisters of the late Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No. D-3841),
praying for the partition of the estate of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat, who died
without issue on April 23, 1977. Part of her estate was her interest in the business
partnership known as Calasiao Bijon Factory, now in the possession of Violeta
Cabatbat Lim who claims to be the child of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso
Cabatbat.
Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat was survived by her husband, Proceso Cabatbat, her
sisters, Consorcia Maria, Benedicta, Bonifacia, all surnamed Frianeza and the
children of her deceased brothers Daniel and Domingo. In their complaint, the
private respondents alleged that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza,
but was only a ward (ampon) of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who
sheltered and supported her from childhood, without benefit of formal adoption
proceedings.
Private respondents' evidence on the non-filiation of Violeta to Esperanza
Cabatbat were: 1) the absence of any record that Esperanza Cabatbat was
admitted in the hospital where Violeta was born and that she gave birth to Violeta
on the day the latter was born; 2) the absence of the birth certificate of Violeta
Cabatbat in the files of certificates of live births of the Pangasinan Provincial
Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948, when Violeta was supposedly born; 3)
certification dated March 9, 1977, of the Civil Registry coordinator Eugenio Venal
of the Office of the Civil Registrar General, that his office has no birth record of
Violeta Cabatbat alleged to have been born on May 26, 1948 or 1949 in Calasiao,
Pangasinan; 4) certification dated June 16, 1977 of Romeo Gabriana, Principal II,
that when Violeta studied in the Calasiao Pilot Central School, Proceso Cabatbat
and Esperanza Cabatbat were listed as her guardians only, not as her parents; 5)
testimony of Amparo Reside that she was in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital on
May 21,1948 to watch a cousin who delivered a child there and that she became
acquianted with a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth on May 26,
1948 to a baby girl who grew up to be known as Violeta Cabatbat.
Pitted against the evidence of the plaintiffs are the evidence of herein petitioners
consisting of. 1) Violeta Cabatbat's birth record which was filed on June 15,1948
showing that she was born on May 26, 1948 at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital
and that she is a legitimate child of the spouses Proceso and Esperanza Cabatbat;
2) testimony of Proceso Cabatbat that Violeta is his child with the deceased
Esperanza Frianeza; 3) testimony of Benita Lastimosa denying that she delivered a
child in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is that
child; 4) the marriage contract of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao where Esperanza
appeared as the mother of the bride; 5) Deed of Sale dated May 14, 1960,
wherein the vendee Violeta Cabatbat, then a minor, was represented and assisted
by her "mother," Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat; and 6) another Deed of Absolute Sale
dated April 21, 1961, wherein Violeta Cabatbat was assisted and represented by
her "father," Proceso Cabatbat.
Upon the evidence, the trial court held on August 10, 1979 that Violeta Cabatbat
is not a child by nature of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat and that
hence, she is not a legal heir of the deceased Esperanza Cabatbat. The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Finding that defendant VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM is not a child
by nature of the spouses, decedent Esperanza Frianeza and
defendant Proceso Cabatbat, and not a compulsory heir of the
said decedent;
(2) Declaring that the heirs of the decedent are her surviving
husband, defendant Proceso Cabatbat and her sisters, plaintiffs
Consorcia MARIA, BENEDICTA alias JOVITA, and BONIFACIA alias
ANASTACIA, all surnamed FRIANEZA her brothers deceased
DANIEL FRIANEZA represented by his surviving spouse, Adela
Vda. de Frianeza, and their children, Darlene, Daniel, Jr., Dussel
and Daisy Glen, all surnamed FRIANEZA and deceased
DOMINGO FRIANEZA represented by his surviving spouse
Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza and their children, Francisco,
Dona, Vilma and Decideria, all surnamed FRIANEZA
(3) Finding that the estate left by the decedent are the thirty
properties enumerated and described at pages 13 to
19 supra and an equity in the Calasiao Bijon Factory in the sum
of P37,961.69 of which P13,221.69 remains after advances
obtained by the deceased during her lifetime and lawful
deductions made after her death;
 (4) That of the real properties adverted to above, three-fourth
(3/4) pro- indiviso is the share of defendant Proceso Cabatbat,
as the surviving spouse, one-half () as his share of the conjugal
estate and one-half () of the remaining one-half as share as
heir from his wife (decedent's) estate, while the remaining one-
half () of the other half is the group share of the heirs of the
brothers and sisters of his wife and of the children of the latter if
deceased, whose names are already enumerated hereinbefore
in the following proportions: one-sixth (1/6) each pro-indiviso to
Consorcia Maria, Benedicta alias Jovita, and Bonifacia alias
Anastacia; one-sixth (1/6) to Adela B. Vda. de Fraineza Darlene,
Daniel, Jr., Dussel and Daisy Glen, as a group in representation
of deceased brother DANIEL FRIANEZA and one. sixth (1/6) to
Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza, Francisco, Dona, Vilma and
Decideria as a group in representation of deceased brother
DOMINGO FRIANEZA
(5) That of the balance of the equity of the deceased in the
CALASIAO BIJON FACTORY in the sum of P13,221.69, three-
fourths (3/4) or P9,916.29 is the share of Proceso Cabatbat as
surviving spouse and as heir of his deceased wife, and the
remaining one-fourth (1/4) to the plaintiffs under the sharing
already stated in the preceding paragraph; (a) but because
defendant Proceso Cabatbat has overdrawn his share he is
ordered to return to the estate the sum of P796.34 by
depositing the same with the Clark of Court; and (b) defendant
Violeta Cabatbat Lim, not being an heir, is ordered to return to
the estate the sum of P2,931.13 half of what she and her
codefendant Proceso Cabatbat withdrew from the equity of the
deceased under Exhibit 29, receipt dated April 30, 1977;
(6) Ordering jointly defendant a Proceso Cabatbat and Violeta
Cabatbat Lim to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00, the
sum of P4,000.00 from defendant Proceso Cabatbat and
Pl,000.00 from defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, and litigation
expenses in the sum of Pl,000.00 from defendant Proceso
Cabatbat and P200.00 from defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, to
the plaintiffs, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 236-239, Record on Appeal.)
Petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the
decision of the trial court on October 25, 1984.
A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the
Intermediate Appellate Court.
Petitioners have elevated the decision to Us for review on certiorari, alleging that
the Intermediate Appellate Court erred:
1. In finding that petitioner is not the child of Prospers and
Esperanza Cabatbat;
2. In ignoring the provisions of Section 22 of Rule 132, Rules of
Court;
3. In not considering the provision of Article 263 of the New Civil
Code;
4. In disregarding Exhibits 8, 9, 10, and 11 of petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim
Petitioners' first and fourth assignments of error raise factual issues. The finding
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that Violeta Cabatbat was not born of
Esperanza Cabatbat is a factual finding based on the evidence presented at the
trial, hence, it is conclusive upon Us. Well entrenched is the rule that "factual
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect"
(Vda. de Roxas vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 77; Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 705). Section 22,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides that: "Where a private writing is
more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally
be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of
suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given" does
not apply to petitioners' Exhibit "5," the supposed birth registry record of
defendant Violeta Cabatbat showing that she was born on May 26,1948, at the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, and that her father and mother
are Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Frianeza, respectively. In rejecting that
document, the trial court pointedly observed:
This is very strange and odd because the Registry Book of
admission of the hospital does not show that Esperanza Frianeza
was ever a patient on May 26, 1948. Indeed, Esperanza Frianeza
was never admitted in the hospital as an obstetrics case before
or after May 26, 1948, that is from December 1, 1947 to June
15, 1948 (Stipulation of Facts, Pre-Trial Order of May 23, 1977,
Record on Appeal, p. 117).
On May 26, 1948, the day defendant Violeta Cabatbat was
alleged to have been delivered by Esperanza Frianeza in the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, the records of the hospital show
that only one woman by the same of the Benita Lastimosa of
Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, not Esperanza Frianeza, gave birth to an
illegitimate child who was named by her mother Benita
Lastimosa as Baby Girl Lastimosa (Exhibit S. Plaintiffs' Folder of
Exhibits, p. 39, Record on Appeal, pp. 117-118). Furthermore,
the record of birth certificates of Pangasinan Provincial Hospital
for the years 1947 and 1948 does not carry the birth certificate
of defendant Violeta Cabatbat and the only birth certificate in
the file of birth certificates of the hospital for May 26, 1948 is
that of Baby Girl Lastimosa whose mother's name is Benita
Lastimosa. (pp. 3-4, CA Decision, pp. 13-14, Record on Appeal.)
Furthermore, the absence of a record of the birth of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat in
the Office of the Civil Registrar General, puts a cloud on the genuineness of her
Exhibit 5.
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not well-taken. This
legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this
case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an
action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their
childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is
an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all.
Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a
child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the
deceased.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The appealed decision is
affirmed, but with modification of paragraphs 2 and 4 of the dispositive portion
thereof, by excluding the widows Adela B. Vda. de Frianeza and Decideria Q. Vda.
de Frianeza, who are not legal heirs of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat from
participating with their children and the surviving sisters of the deceased in the
one-fourth share of the estate pertaining to the latter under Article 1001 of the
Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132305 December 4, 2001
IDA C. LABAGALA, petitioner,
vs.
NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO, AMANDA T. SANTIAGO and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision dated March 4,
1997,1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817, which reversed and set
aside the judgment dated October 17, 1990,2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 54, in Civil Case No.87-41515, finding herein petitioner to be the
owner of 1/3 pro indiviso share in a parcel of land. 1wphi1.nt
The pertinent facts of the case, as borne by the records, are as follows:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729, located in Rizal
Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered
it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein)
sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property.3 On April 20, 1981, the trial
court in that case decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of
ownership over portions of the property covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register
of Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in
the certificate of title to said property.4
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987, respondents filed a
complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against herein
petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to, recover
from her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into
petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them by
operation of law, because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died
intestate and without issue. They claimed that the purported sale of the property
made by their brother to petitioner sometime in March 19795 was executed
through petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to
secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 172334 6) in
petitioner's name alone.7
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery .The deed showed that
Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon but respondents averred that, having been
able to graduate from college, Jose never put his thumb mark on documents he
executed but always signed his name in full. They claimed that Jose could not
have sold the property belonging to his "poor and unschooled sisters who.
..sacrificed for his studies and personal welfare."8 Respondents also pointed out
that it is highly improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed consideration
of P150,000 for the sale of the subject property because petitioner was
unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood at the time of the alleged
sale. They also stressed that it was quite unusual and questionable that petitioner
registered the deed of sale only on January 26, 1987, or almost eight years after
the execution of the sale.9
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as
claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to know any person
by the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus
entitled to his share in the subject property. She maintained that she had always
stayed on the property, ever since she was a child. She argued that the purported
sale of the property was in fact a donation to her, and that nothing could have
precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his
signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged
respondents' claim over the property such that respondents had to sue to claim
portions thereof. She lamented that respondents had to disclaim her in their
desire to obtain ownership of the whole property.
Petitioner revealed that respondents had in 1985 filed two ejectment cases
against her and other occupants of the property. The first was decided in her and
the other defendants' favor, while the second was dismissed. Yet respondents
persisted and resorted to the present action.
Petitioner recognized respondents' ownership of 2/3 of the property as decreed
by the RTC. But she averred that she caused the issuance of a title in her name
alone, allegedly after respondents refused to take steps that would prevent the
property from being sold by public auction for their failure to pay realty taxes
thereon. She added that with a title issued in her name she could avail of a realty
tax amnesty.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the plaintiffs
[herein respondents] as being entitled to the ownership and possession
each of one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the property originally
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 64729, in the name of Jose T.
Santiago and presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
172334, in the name of herein defendant [herein petitioner] and which is
located at No. 3075-A Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila, as per
complaint, and the adjudication to plaintiffs per decision in Civil Case No.
56226 of this Court, Branch VI, and the remaining one-third
(1/3) pro indiviso share adjudicated in said decision to defendant Jose T.
Santiago in said case, is hereby adjudged and adjudicated to herein
defendant as owner and entitled to possession of said share. The Court
does not see fit to adjudge damages, attorney's fees and costs. Upon
finality of this judgment, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334 is
ordered cancelled and a new title issued in the names of the two (2)
plaintiffs and the defendant as owners in equal shares, and the Register
of Deeds of Manila is so directed to effect the same upon payment of the
proper fees by the parties herein.
SO ORDERED.10
According to the trial court, while there was indeed no consideration for the deed
of sale executed by Jose in favor of petitioner, said deed constitutes a valid
donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose's 1/3
portion of the property as Jose's daughter. The trial court ruled that the following
evidence shows petitioner to be the daughter of Jose: (1) the decisions in the two
ejectment cases filed by respondents which stated that petitioner is Jose's
daughter, and (2) Jose's income tax return which listed petitioner as his daughter.
It further said that respondents knew of petitioner's existence and her being the
daughter of Jose, per records of the earlier ejectment cases they filed against
petitioner. According to the court, respondents were not candid with the court in
refusing to recognize petitioner as Ida C. Santiago and insisting that she was Ida C.
Labagala, thus affecting their credibility.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and one is entered
declaring the appellants Nicolasa and Amanda Santiago the co-owners in
equal shares of the one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the late Jose
Santiago in the land and building covered by TCT No. 172334.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Manila is directed to cancel said
title and issue in its place a new one reflecting this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Apart from respondents' testimonies, the appellate court noted that the birth
certificate of Ida Labagala presented by respondents showed that Ida was born of
different parents, not Jose and his wife. It also took into account the statement
made by Jose in Civil Case No. 56226 that he did not have any child.
Hence, the present petition wherein the following issues are raised for
consideration:
1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to prove that
she is the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago, and
2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the filiation of the petitioner as
the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in ruling that she had adduced
sufficient evidence to prove her filiation by Jose Santiago, making her his sole heir
and thus entitled to inherit his 1/3 portion. She points out that respondents had,
before the filing of the instant case, previously "considered" 11 her as the daughter
of Jose who, during his lifetime, openly regarded her as his legitimate daughter.
She asserts that her identification as Jose's daughter in his ITR outweighs the
"strange" answers he gave when he testified in Civil Case No. 56226.
Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot impugn her filiation
collaterally, citing the case of Sayson v. Court of Appeals12 in which we held that
"(t)he legitimacy of (a) child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for
that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by
law."13 Petitioner also cites Article 263 of the Civil Code in support of this
contention.14
For their part, respondents contend that petitioner is not the daughter of Jose,
per her birth certificate that indicates her parents as Leo Labagala and Cornelia
Cabrigas, instead of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas.15 They argue that the
provisions of Article 263 of the Civil Code do not apply to the present case since
this is not an action impugning a child's legitimacy but one for recovery of title,
ownership, and possession of property .
The issues for resolution in this case, to our mind, are (1) whether or not
respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery of title
and possession; and (2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion
of the property he co-owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or
donation.
On the first issue, we find petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code to
be misplaced. Said article provides:
.Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be
brought within one year from the recording of the birth in the Civil
Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case,
any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they
should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of
the child has been concealed, the term shall be counted from the
discovery of the fraud.
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same
chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said
chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a
child is indeed a man's child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his
heirs) denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is
alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple.16
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and
prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present case is
not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely
that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at
all.17 Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and
thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.
Petitioner's reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual milieu present
in Sayson does not obtain in the instant case. What was being challenged by
petitioners in Sayson was (1) the validity of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo by
the deceased Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and (2) the legitimate status of Doribel
Sayson. While asserting that Delia and Edmundo could not have been validly
adopted since Doribel had already been born to the Sayson couple at the time,
petitioners at the same time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was not the
child of the couple. The Court ruled in that case that it was too late to question
the decree of adoption that became final years before. Besides, such a challenge
to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally but in a direct
proceeding.18
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner's legitimate status but are,
instead, asserting that she is not at all their brother's child. The birth certificate
presented by respondents support this allegation.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that:
The Certificate. of Record of Birth (Exhibit H)19 plainly states that... Ida
was the child of the spouses Leon Labagala and [Cornelia] Cabrigas. This
document states that it was Leon Labagala who made the report to the
Local Civil Registrar and therefore the supplier of the entries in said
Certificate. Therefore, this certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida.
Appellee however denies that Exhibit H is her Birth Certificate. She insists
that she is not Ida Labagala but Ida Santiago. If Exhibit H is not her birth
 certificate, then where is hers? She did not present any though it would
have been the easiest thing to do considering that according to her
baptismal certificate she was born in Manila in 1969. This court rejects
such denials and holds that Exhibit H is the certificate of the record of
birth of appellee Ida...
Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only present her testimony
and a baptismal certificate (Exhibit 12) stating that appellee's parents
were Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. But then, a decisional rule in
evidence states that a baptismal certificate is not a proof of the
parentage of the baptized person. This document can only prove the
identity of the baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the identities
of the baptismal sponsors and the priest who administered the
sacrament -- nothing more.20 (Citations omitted.)
At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988, petitioner's counsel admitted that
petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating that she is Ida Santiago,
though she had been using this name all her life. 21
Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her relationship with
Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal certificate.22 However, as we
held in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals :
...a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the administration of
the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
declarations therein stated with respect to [a person's] kinsfolk. The
same is conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the
rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but
it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person
baptized.23
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of
filiation.24 More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only
shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof. 25
We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy of her birth
certificate but petitioner, without advancing any reason therefor, failed to do so.
Neither did petitioner obtain a certification that no record of her birth could be
found in the civil registry, if such were the case. We find petitioner's silence
concerning the absence of her birth certificate telling. It raises doubt as to the
existence of a birth certificate that would show petitioner to be the daughter of
Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth certificate
would raise the presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be
adverse to her claim. Petitioner's counsel argued that petitioner had been using
Santiago all her life. However, use of a family name certainly does not establish
pedigree.
Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the same
birthdate as Ida Labagala.26 The similarity is too uncanny to be a mere
coincidence.
During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied knowing Cornelia
Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the birth certificate of Ida Labagala. In
her petition before this Court, however, she stated that Cornelia is the sister of
her mother, Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made conflicting statements
that affect her credibility and could cast along shadow of doubt on her claims of
filiation.
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court of Appeals
that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and
contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being
a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit from him through
intestate succession. It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute
was validly transferred to petitioner through sale or donation.
On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we agree with the Court
of Appeals that:
...This deed is shot through and through with so many intrinsic defects
that a reasonable mind is inevitably led to the conclusion that it is fake.
The intrinsic defects are extractable from the following questions: a) If
Jose Santiago intended to donate the properties in question to Ida, what
was the big idea of hiding the nature of the contract in the facade of the
sale? b) If the deed is a genuine document, how could it have happened
that Jose Santiago who was of course fully aware that he owned only
1/3 pro indiviso of the properties covered by his title sold or donated the
whole properties to Ida? c) Why in heaven's name did Jose Santiago, a
college graduate, who always signed his name in documents requiring his
signature (citation omitted) [affix] his thumbmark on this deed of sale? d)
If Ida was [the] child of Jose Santiago, what was the sense of the latter
donating his properties to her when she would inherit them anyway
upon his death? e) Why did Jose Santiago affix his thumbmark to a deed
which falsely stated that: he was single (for he was earlier married to
Esperanza Cabrigas ); Ida was of legal age (for [ s ]he was then just 15
years old); and the subject properties were free from liens and
encumbrances (for Entry No. 27261, Notice of Adverse Claim and Entry
No. 6388, Notice of Lis Pendens were already annotated in the title of
said properties). If the deed was executed in 1979, how come it surfaced
only in 1984 after the death of Jose Santiago and of all people, the one in
possession was the baptismal sponsor of Ida? 27
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer
ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his
sisters.28 Petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract, being a
minor at the time.29 Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential
requisites of a contract,30including one of sale, absent which there can be no valid
contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any centavo for the
property,31 which makes the sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be
shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Again, as
explained by the Court of Appeals:
 ...Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation.
It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art. 725 of the Civil
Code. Being a minor in 1979, the acceptance of the donation should have
been made by her father, Leon Labagala or [her] mother Cornelia
Cabrigas or her legal representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same
Code. No one of those mentioned in the law - in fact no one at all -
accepted the "donation" for Ida.32
In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals, hence it must be upheld. 1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CY No. 32817 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors, represented
by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS
DIZON, FELIFE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper
parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER
SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES,
INC. respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The petitioner involves the case of the illegitimate children who, having been born
in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to
enforce their respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules of succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It
was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de
Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter
on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina
Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind
considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some
real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that
petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and
Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of
Quezon City.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder,
sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while
denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the
status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de
Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de
Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the
motion to dismiss and subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13
September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said
motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and
ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It
ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be threshed out at the
trial considering that the birth certificates presented by respondents appeared to
have effectively contradicted petitioners' allegation of illegitimacy.1wphi1.nt
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several
other motions, respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in fact,
made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of
decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief
once petitioners would have been able the establish their status as such heirs. It
was contended, in fine that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum
to likewise ascertain the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could
only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately,
dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being
improper.1 It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a
special proceeding in asmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a
status or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for
review on certiorari. Basically, petitioners maintain that their recognition as being
illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself
sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action
for judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs.
Bellosillo.2
In the comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by
petitioners is inapplicable to the case because there has been no attempt to
impugn legitimate filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of
dismissal of the complaint, respondents count on the case of Sayson vs. Court of
Appeals,3 which has ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in a
complaint for partition and accounting but must be seasonably brought up in
direct action frontally addressing the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it
is time that this matter draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1)
the record of birth appearing the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be
proved by (1) the open and continuos possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 4 The
due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court or record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. 5 In
fact, any writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval.6 Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicted on other evidence
merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court or record or an authentic writing, judicial action within
the applicable statue of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's
acknowledgement.7
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the
marriage of their parents. The certificates of live would also identify Danilo de
Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded
on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate.8 this presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of
the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and
wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse.9 Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in
Article 170,10 and in proper cases Article 171,11 of the Family Code (which took
effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no
longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes
fixed and unassailable,12
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G.
Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being
children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly
done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a
civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, 13 or in exceptional
instances the latter's heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has
been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor
in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings the action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who had
claimed to be an acknowledgement spurious child by virtue of a private
document. Signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It
was not a case of legitimate children asserting to be somebody else's illegitimate
children. Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the
attendant circumstances particularly, to declare that they could not have been
the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their respective birth
certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be
validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether
petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent,
cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to
impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, 15 one
that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for
that purpose.16 Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.17
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is
DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner,
vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND
LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO,respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 453941 which reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in
declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased
William Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose
L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as
a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all successional
rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit.
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G.
Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an
action for compulsory recognition as "the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late
William Liyao" against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret
L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao.2 The complaint was later
amended to include the allegation that petitioner "was in continuous possession
and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao," petitioner having
been "recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his
lifetime."3
The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo
for more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case.
Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of
Williams untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the
company of Corazons two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in
Quezon City and Manila. This was with the knowledge of William Liyaos
legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his
subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both
employed at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William
were then vice president and president, respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the
signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale.
She failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite
the necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel
of land located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of
Far East Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao
visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the
medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of
William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia
Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise instructed
Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company4 and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein.5 William Liyao
would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their
pictures taken together.6
During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among
others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billys godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz,
William Liyaos legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio. 7 Corazon
also presented pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied
William Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other important
meetings.8 During the occasion of William Liyaos last birthday on November 22,
1975 held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged
Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and
said, "Hey, look I am still young, I can still make a good looking son."9 Since birth,
Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a
recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latters direct and
overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other
material needs. However, after William Liyaos death, it was Corazon who
provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle,
Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old
newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where he
shared his last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon
G. Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to her children. She used to
visit Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon
from her marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together
with some housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On
some occasions like birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in
the couples residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would
usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part
of 1974, was pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to
four (4) times a week in Greenhills and later on in White Plains where she would
often see William Liyao. Being a close friend of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal
Santos Memorial Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited them
at White Plains and knew that William Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon,
gave support by way of grocery supplies, money for household expenses and
matriculation fees for the two (2) older children, Bernadette and Enrique. During
William Liyaos birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket
Office, he was carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his two (2)
daughters from his legal marriage, "Look, this is my son, very guapo and
healthy."10 He then talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy before Christmas.
He intended to make it "engrande" and "make the bells of San Sebastian Church
ring."11 Unfortunately, this did not happen since William Liyao passed away on
December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyaos funeral and helped Corazon pack
his clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue and gray 12 which Mr.
Liyao wore in a photograph13 as well as another shirt of lime green14 as belonging
to the deceased. A note was also presented with the following inscriptions: "To
Cora, Love From William."15 Maurita remembered having invited the couple
during her mothers birthday where the couple had their pictures taken while
exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still
married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon
legally separated from her said husband. However, during the entire cohabitation
of William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any
other man in the house when she usually visited Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she
knew that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the
latter being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazons house in
Scout Delgado, Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous
occasions to see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple
transferred to White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon
was conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another
miscarriage so he insisted that she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not be
bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to play mahjong and together with Atty.
Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong sessions among themselves. Gloria
knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary of the
maids and food for Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that
Corazon is married but is separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had
any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and
Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo,
from the time that the latter abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique
was about six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live with them up to the
time of the latters death on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive
and fond of Enriques half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing
Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enriques testimony
was corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various
pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and
that the negatives were in the possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married.16Linda grew up and lived with her parents at
San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got married; that her parents
were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her
parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at
their house in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even during out of
town business trips or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father
would change his clothes at home because of his personal hygiene and habits. Her
father reportedly had trouble sleeping in other peoples homes. Linda described
him as very conservative and a strict disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of
success would compensate for failure of a home. As a businessman, he was very
tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily. He
suffered two strokes before the fatal attack which led to his death on December
2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May 1974 and was
attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in the house for two (2) to three (3)
months for his therapy and acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move,
walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose
Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the collection of rents while her sister
referred legal matters to their lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had
personally changed. He was not active in business and had dietary restrictions.
Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke during the latter part of September to
October 1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3) days and went back to
work. He felt depressed, however, and was easily bored. He did not put in long
hours in the office unlike before and tried to spend more time with his family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo.
Corazon was not legally separated from her husband and the records from the
Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any annulment 17of
their marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon
Garcia at the company garage. Immediately after the death of Lindas father,
Corazon went to Lindas office for the return of the formers alleged investments
with the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas
and Company. Linda added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the
company, was able to take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures
of William Liyao from the office. There was one instance when she was told by the
guards, "Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out things again."18 Linda then instructed
the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose,
decided to let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not recognize any article of clothing
which belonged to her father after having been shown three (3) large suit cases
full of mens clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never
been separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village,
Makati up to the time of her fathers death on December 2, 1975. 19Her father
suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the
first heart attack sometime between April and May 1974, his speech and hands
were affected and he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under
strict medication, taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by
Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol level control. 20 Tita Rose
testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (100,000.00) representing her investment in the
Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family never
received any formal demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an
illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. After assuming the position of
President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any check signed by her
late father representing payment to lessors as rentals for the house occupied by
Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the laminated photographs presented by
Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which were displayed
at the latters office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and
bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported
for work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 oclock in the
morning. At past 7:00 oclock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin
Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974,
Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was able to report to the
office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly.
Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr.
Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the
latter among which was buying medicine for him like capasid and aldomet. On
December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr.
Pineda saw his employer leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyaos
breast and decided later to carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died
upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the
first to arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees
of the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her
husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr.
Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo
who was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of
Corazon. He freely relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of
Republic Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when
he went to the latters law office. Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of
years, Pineda said that he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty.
Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation
together with the lawyers wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao,
he does not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for
activities like shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad
litem of the minor William Liyao, Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son
of the deceased William Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan,
Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the
minor William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William
Liyao, entitled to all succesional rights as such; and
(d) Costs of suit.21
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by
preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao,
Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with
the deceased. The trial court observed that herein petitioner had been in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by
direct and overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of
petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and
publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and even
introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that
the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child and "the
presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that
marital intimacy between husband and wife was physically impossible at the
period cited in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code." The
appellate court gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for the
respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still legally married
and have not secured legal separation, were seen in each others company during
the supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased William Liyao. The
appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and the baptismal
certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are not
sufficient to establish proof of paternity in the absence of any evidence that the
deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said certificates and
considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals
stated that neither do family pictures constitute competent proof of filiation.
With regard to the passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the
appellate court observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was
opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William
Liyaos signature and name do not appear thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present
petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a
number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by
petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao.
Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this
litigation: May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the
estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate.22 The presumption of legitimacy of children does not
only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.23
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255
of the New Civil Code24 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon
physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the of the legitimacy of the latter?
child. We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the
This physical impossibility may be caused: husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on
1) By the impotence of the husband; the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings.
that access was not possible; Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother,
3) By the serious illness of the husband. Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.1wphi1
the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the
relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his evidence presented by both parties on the petitioners claim of alleged filiation
claim, petitioner presented a document entitled, "Contract of with the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive
Separation,"25 executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or
any and all claims on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the recognized his paternity.
future.26 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While SO ORDERED.
physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is
one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis
that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article
255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his
heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil
Code.27 Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the
husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one
directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.28 It is only in
exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of
these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o
an insult to his memory.29
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as
guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by
respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late
William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage
is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. 30 We cannot allow
petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the
law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could
impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child
himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father
does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed,
and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour. On
the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot
elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. 31
G.R. No. 148220 June 15, 2005
ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON.
NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court,
Manila, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 to set aside the Decision2 dated 29 November 2000 of
the Court of Appeals ("appellate court") in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. The appellate
court affirmed two Orders3 issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila ("trial court") in SP No. 98-88759. The Order dated 3 February 2000
directed Rosendo Herrera ("petitioner") to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid
("DNA") paternity testing, while the Order dated 8 June 2000 denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"),
represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for
compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On 7 August
1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the
biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with
respondents mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to
abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the
testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an
Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She
was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research
Institute ("UP-NSRI"), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at
the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the
Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr.
Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test
had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.4
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained
acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his
right against self-incrimination.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondents motion to
conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Thus:
In view of the foregoing, the motion of the petitioner is GRANTED and the
relevant individuals, namely: the petitioner, the minor child, and respondent are
directed to undergo DNA paternity testing in a laboratory of their common choice
within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the Order, and to submit the
results thereof within a period of ninety (90) days from completion. The parties
are further reminded of the hearing set on 24 February 2000 for the reception of
other evidence in support of the petition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 February 2000 Order. He
asserted that "under the present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is compelled to
take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the
requisite specimen, unconstitutional."
In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.6
On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He asserted that
the trial court rendered the Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June 2000 "in
excess of, or without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Petitioner further contended that there is "no
appeal nor any [other] plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course
of law." Petitioner maintained his previous objections to the taking of DNA
paternity testing. He submitted the following grounds to support his objection:
1. Public respondent misread and misapplied the ruling in Lim vs. Court
of Appeals (270 SCRA 2).
2. Public respondent ruled to accept DNA test without considering the
limitations on, and conditions precedent for the admissibility of DNA
testing and ignoring the serious constraints affecting the reliability of the
test as admitted by private respondents "expert" witness.
3. Subject Orders lack legal and factual support, with public respondent
relying on scientific findings and conclusions unfit for judicial notice and
unsupported by experts in the field and scientific treatises.
4. Under the present circumstances the DNA testing petitioner [is]
compelled to take will be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive
process to obtain the requisite specimen from the petitioner,
unconstitutional.7
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition
and affirming the questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated
that petitioner merely desires to correct the trial courts evaluation of evidence.
Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an error of judgment that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that the
proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against self-
incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally,
the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible adverse
result of the DNA paternity testing. The dispositive portion of the appellate
courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and ordered dismissed, and the challenged orders
of the Trial Court AFFIRMED, with costs to Petitioner.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its
Resolution dated 23 May 2001.9
Issues
Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this
jurisdiction to determine filiation. Petitioner asks for the conditions under which
DNA technology may be integrated into our judicial system and the prerequisites
for the admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity suit.10
Petitioner further submits that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion
when it authorized the trial court "to embark in [sic] a new procedure xxx to
determine filiation despite the absence of legislation to ensure its reliability and
integrity, want of official recognition as made clear in Lim vs. Court of Appeals and
the presence of technical and legal constraints in respect of [sic] its
implementation."11 Petitioner maintains that the proposed DNA paternity testing
violates his right against self-incrimination.12
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it appropriate to
give an overview of a paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall
consider the requirements of the Family Code and of the Rules of Evidence to
establish paternity and filiation.
An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,13 support (as in
the present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person
who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are
four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties
have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy,
and physical resemblance between the putative father and child. 14
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with
the putative father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the
burden forward and shift it to the putative father.15
There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative
father may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of
either physical absence or impotency.16 The putative father may also show that
the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate.17 The childs legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict
standards provided by law.18
Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be
offered as part of evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique
to a paternity proceeding. However, although likeness is a function of heredity,
there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how much a child must or
must not look like his biological father.19 This kind of evidence appeals to the
emotions of the trier of fact.
In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi
Alba, respondents mother, put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that
petitioner is respondents biological father. Aware that her assertion is not
enough to convince the trial court, she offered corroborative proof in the form of
letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Albas assertion.
He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent
is Armi Albas child with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioners denial by
submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how much
they resemble each other.
Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests. We now
look to the law, rules, and governing jurisprudence to help us determine what
evidence of incriminating acts on paternity and filiation are allowed in this
jurisdiction.
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of
Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree"
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Courts rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as
evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA,20 a case petitioner often cites, we
stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional
evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative
father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent
shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record,
or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by
the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative
father.21 A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative father was considered acceptable evidence. 22 Letters to the mother
vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father
cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth,
proved filiation.23 However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a
fathers operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent,
cannot be taken as authentic writing.24 Standing alone, neither a certificate of
baptism25 nor family pictures26 are sufficient to establish filiation.
So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of paternity
and filiation to incriminating acts alone. However, advances in science show that
sources of evidence of paternity and filiation need not be limited to incriminating
acts. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests
are conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on paternity.27
In Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,28 the result of the blood grouping test showed that
the putative father was a "possible father" of the child. Paternity was imputed to
the putative father after the possibility of paternity was proven on presentation
during trial of facts and circumstances other than the results of the blood
grouping test.
In Jao v. Court of Appeals,29 the child, the mother, and the putative father agreed
to submit themselves to a blood grouping test. The National Bureau of
Investigation ("NBI") conducted the test, which indicated that the child could not
have been the possible offspring of the mother and the putative father. We held
that the result of the blood grouping test was conclusive on the non-paternity of
the putative father.
The present case asks us to go one step further. We are now asked whether DNA
analysis may be admitted as evidence to prove paternity.
DNA Analysis as Evidence
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up. DNA
is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person.
Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile can determine his
identity.30
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample
obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a
pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This
DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins. 31 We quote
relevant portions of the trial courts 3 February 2000 Order with approval:
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic
acid). It is exclusive to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical
twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life.
Being a component of every cell in the human body, the DNA of an individuals
blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen,
samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known
as A (adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T(thymine). The order in which the
four bases appear in an individuals DNA determines his or her physical makeup.
And since DNA is a double-stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific
paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a
particular sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in
the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known
as "polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests,
fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA fingerprinting/genetic tests or fingerprinting). In
other words, DNA typing simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a
molecular biologist may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5)
techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length
polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287
cases that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November
1994; mtDNA process; VNTR (variable number tandem repeats); and the most
recent which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short
tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of by most forensic
laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an
evidence sample a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving
the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes
measurements in 13 separate places and can match two (2) samples with a
reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To
illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a
criminal case, the evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with
the "known" print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the
same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one
feature of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come from
the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people.
In each of these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called "allele", one
inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a
number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other
half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged fathers
profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile,
which match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match
that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then
he is not excluded as the father.32 (Emphasis in the original)
Although the term "DNA testing" was mentioned in the 1995 case of People v.
Teehankee, Jr.,33 it was only in the 2001 case of Tijing v. Court of Appeals34 that
more than a passing mention was given to DNA analysis. In Tijing,we issued a writ
of habeas corpus against respondent who abducted petitioners youngest son.
Testimonial and documentary evidence and physical resemblance were used to
establish parentage. However, we observed that:
Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University
of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem
repeat (STR) analysis. xxx For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when completely obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject
said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to
DNA testing, in [the] future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.
Admissibility of DNA Analysis as Evidence
The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo35 discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may
be considered a 180 degree turn from the Courts wary attitude towards DNA
testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case,36 where we stated that "DNA, being a relatively
new science, xxx has not yet been accorded official recognition by our courts."
In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim
matched the accuseds DNA profile. We affirmed the accuseds conviction of rape
with homicide and sentenced him to death. We declared:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should
consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. 37
Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By
2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis
as evidence. The Court moved from the issue of according "official recognition" to
DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting
DNA analysis.
In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact on
jurisprudence on DNA testing: People v. Yatar38 and In re: The Writ of Habeas
Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa.39 In Yatar, a match existed between the DNA profile
of the semen found in the victim and the DNA profile of the blood sample given
by appellant in open court. The Court, following Vallejos footsteps, affirmed the
conviction of appellant because the physical evidence, corroborated by
circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of rape with homicide. In De
Villa, the convict-petitioner presented DNA test results to prove that he is not the
father of the child conceived at the time of commission of the rape. The Court
ruled that a difference between the DNA profile of the convict-petitioner and the
DNA profile of the victims child does not preclude the convict-petitioners
commission of rape.
In the present case, the various pleadings filed by petitioner and respondent refer
to two United States cases to support their respective positions on the
admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence: Frye v. U.S.40 and Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals.41 In Frye v. U.S., the trial court convicted Frye of murder.
Frye appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
During trial, Fryes counsel offered an expert witness to testify on the result of a
systolic blood pressure deception test42 made on defendant. The state Supreme
Court affirmed Fryes conviction and ruled that "the systolic blood pressure
deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among
physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting
expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments
thus far made." The Fryestandard of general acceptance states as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.
In 1989, State v. Schwartz43 modified the Frye standard. Schwartz was charged
with stabbing and murder. Bloodstained articles and blood samples of the
accused and the victim were submitted for DNA testing to a government facility
and a private facility. The prosecution introduced the private testing facilitys
results over Schwartzs objection. One of the issues brought before the state
Supreme Court included the admissibility of DNA test results in a criminal
proceeding. The state Supreme Court concluded that:
While we agree with the trial court that forensic DNA typing has gained general
acceptance in the scientific community, we hold that admissibility of specific test
results in a particular case hinges on the laboratorys compliance with appropriate
standards and controls, and the availability of their testing data and results. 44
In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.45 further modified
the Frye-Schwartz standard. Daubertwas a product liability case where both the
trial and appellate courts denied the admissibility of an experts testimony
because it failed to meet the Frye standard of "general acceptance." The United
States Supreme Court ruled that in federal trials, the Federal Rules of Evidence
have superseded the Frye standard. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence, while
Rule 402 provides the foundation for admissibility of evidence. Thus:
Rule 401. "Relevant evidence" is defined as that which has any "tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Daubert cautions that departure from the Frye standard of general acceptance
does not mean that the Federal Rules do not place limits on the admissibility of
scientific evidence. Rather, the judge must ensure that the testimonys reasoning
or method is scientifically valid and is relevant to the issue. Admissibility would
depend on factors such as (1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been
tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review
and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the techniques operation; and (5) whether
the theory or technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.
Another product liability case, Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael,46 further modified
the Daubert standard. This led to the amendment of Rule 702 in 2000 and which
now reads as follows:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.
We now determine the applicability in this jurisdiction of these American cases.
Obviously, neither the Frye-Schwartz standard nor the Daubert-Kumho standard
is controlling in the Philippines.47 At best, American jurisprudence merely has a
persuasive effect on our decisions. Here, evidence is admissible when it is relevant
to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of
Court.48 Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence.49 Section 49 of Rule 130, which
governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as follows:
The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience
or training which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence.
This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as
evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed "when it tends in
any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in
issue."50
Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions
in Tijing, Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as
evidence. In our jurisdiction, the restrictive tests for admissibility established
by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go into the weight of the evidence.
Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence
Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious
in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement
in Vallejo:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should
consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.51]
We also repeat the trial courts explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity
cases:
In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA
profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the
childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been
inherited from the biological father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined
to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the
paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the child,
the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he
is not excluded as the father.52
It is not enough to state that the childs DNA profile matches that of the putative
father. A complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA
profile of the putative father does not necessarily establish paternity. For this
reason, following the highest standard adopted in an American jurisdiction, 53 trial
courts should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of
Paternity ("W") prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the
likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the probability of a
random match of two unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference population
database, such as the Philippine population database, is required to compute for
W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal to
100%. However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the putative father,
mother and child are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those conducted
between the putative father and child alone.54
DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be
conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results
of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value
of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity.55 This
refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself." Petitioner asserts that obtaining
samples from him for DNA testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only
to testimonial evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial courts 3
February 2000 Order with approval:
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the
respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action,
will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to
evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under duress (People vs. Olvis,
154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-
incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion
of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a defendant
can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body (as cited in
People vs. Olvis, Supra); the substance emitting from the body of the accused was
received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145);
morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36
Phil. 735); an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size
was allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a
woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs. Summers,
41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on "testimonial
compulsion."56
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without
prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own
defenses.57 Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the
facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered
subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the
Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June 2000 issued by Branch 48 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. SP-98-88759.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-39537 March 19, 1985
IRENE REYES (alias IRENE RAMERO, alias IRENE DELGADO), MOISES VILLANUEVA
and GENOVEVA RAMERO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PLACIDA DELGADO, DOMINGO DELGADO, PAULA DELGADO
and MAXIMINA DELGADO, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the of the Court of Appeals Special
Division of Five dated October 7, 1974 in CA-G.R. No. L-44964-R, reversing the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas Branch I, dated December 26,
1969 in Civil Case No. 1144 dismissing the action for reconveyance.
On January 29, 1967, private respondents as plaintiffs a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Batangas praying that the defendant Irene Reyes, alias Irene
Ramero or Irene Delgado, be ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor
of plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado, and Paula Delgado over four
parcels of land located in Tayabas, Quezon, and one parcel of land located in
Pagbilao, Quezon, and another deed of reconveyance in favor of plaintiff
Maximina Delgado over three parcels of land located in Alitagtag, Batangas.
It was alleged in the complaint that the defendants thru abuse of confidence,
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and other falsifications succeed in registering in
the offices of the Register of Deeds of Quezon and Batangas a document of self-
adjudication (Exhibit "24"), wherein defendant Irene Delgado alleged that she was
the sole child of the deceased Francisco Delgado and entitled to inherit the
parcels of lands described in the complaint; that as a result thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489 were cancelled
and new Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in the name of Irene Delgado;
that defendant Irene Delgado is not the illegitimate daughter of Francisco
Delgado, who died without issue, but is the legitimate daughter of Genoveva
Ramero and Justino Reyes; that plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado and
Paula Delgado, sisters and brother of the deceased Francisco Delgado are the
heirs entitled to inherit from Francisco Delgado; and that Paula, Placido and
Domingo Delgado defrayed the expenses of the last illness and the funeral
expenses of Francisco Delgado and for the purpose they borrowed the sum of P
7,000.00 from their niece, plaintiff Maximina Delgado, and to pay Maximina
Delgado they conveyed to her the three parcels of land described in
subparagraphs (f) to (g) of paragraph 9 of the complaint. They also alleged that
the defendant spouses Irene and Moises Villanueva borrowed from plaintiffs
common fund the sum of P23,000.00 which they used in the purchase of a parcel
of land (pp. 1-14, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On or about March 2, 1967, defendant Irene Delgado, one of the petitioners
herein, filed an answer to the complaint and set up the affirmative defense that
she is the illegitimate daughter of the defendant Genoveva Ramero and the
deceased Francisco Delgado; that for several years preceding the birth of Irene
Delgado, her mother Genoveva Ramero had separated from her lawful husband
Justino Reyes and never reconciled since then; and that Irene was born during the
cohabitation of Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero as common law
husband and wife, and since her birth, lived with Francisco Delgado and Genoveva
Ramero, who reared and treated her as their child, maintaining her and sending
her through college. Defendants also denied having contracted a debt of P
23,000.00 from plaintiffs, or that plaintiffs spent for the last illness and funeral of
Francisco Delgado. Irene Delgado likewise set up a counterclaim, alleging that, as
the illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado, she has the right to represent her
father to the inheritance left by her grandmother (pp. 15-43, Record on Appeal; p.
63, rec.).
On March 16, 1967, the plaintiffs thru counsel filed an answer to the counterclaim
denying that the defendant Irene Delgado was the illegitimate child of Francisco
Delgado, and hence has no right to claim from the estate of Francisco's mother,
Benigna Castillo, and that the properties claimed by the defendant Irene Delgado
no longer formed part of the estate of Benigna Castillo as she had previously
disposed of them during her lifetime (pp. 43-46, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On August 15, 1967, a pre-trial in Civil Case No. 1144 was conducted.
On March 25, 1969, the plaintiffs filed a motion to admit an amended answer to
the counterclaim posed by defendant, wherein the plaintiffs alleged that the
counterclaim of the defendant, in so far as it would have the effect of being an
indirect action for acknowledgment, has already prescribed (pp. 50-55, Record on
Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On April 14, 1969, the lower court admitted the amended answer to the
counterclaim over the objections of the defendant (pp. 56-61, Record on Appeal;
p. 63, rec.).
After trial on the merits, the Court rendered its decision on December 26, 1969
dismissing the action for reconveyance and declaring defendant Irene Delgado the
lawful owner of the eight parcels of land. The counterclaim of Irene Delgado was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (now IAC), the plaintiffs with
respect to their complaint and the defendants with respect to their counterclaim.
The then Court of Appeals sitting as a Special Division of Five rendered its decision
on October 7, 1974, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed.
The deed of self-adjudication executed by Irene Delgado is
hereby declared null and void and set aside. The transfer
certificates of title issued in the name of Irene Delgado in lieu of
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747
and 13489 are hereby cancelled, and T.C.T. 9913, 10348, 14937,
T-11747 and 13489 are reinstated in the name of Francisco
Delgado. Likewise, the extrajudicial declaration executed by
Irene Delgado adjudicating to herself the 3 parcels of land
located in Alitagtag, Batangas, with Tax Declaration Nos. 8625,
8626 and 8627 are declared null and void. No costs (pp. 58-59,
rec.).
The then Court of Appeals in arriving at this decision found that, although Irene
Delgado was the spurious daughter of Francisco Delgado, she nevertheless cannot
inherit from the estate of the deceased Francisco Delgado because she was not
recognized either voluntarily or by court action (pp. 52-53, rec.).
The titles to the questioned lot however cannot be executed in favor of the
plaintiffs; because in so doing it will be in effect a recognition by the court that
the plaintiffs are the only heirs of Francisco Delgado to the prejudice of other
possible heirs or creditors of the deceased.
As to alleged loan contracted by Irene from the plaintiffs, the then Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that it was without merit, because if it
were true, the plaintiffs could have demanded a receipt for such a big amount.
The counterclaim of Irene that she has the share to the inheritance of Benigna
Castillo, Francisco Delgado's mother, and her alleged share in the expenses for the
sickness and funeral of Francisco Delgado which was advanced by the plaintiffs,
need not be ruled upon because of the findings that Irene is not an heir of
Francisco Delgado (pp. 57-58, rec.).
On December 2, 1974, defendants, petitioners herein, filed a petition to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals (pp. 2237, rec.).
On January 2, 1975, the plaintiffs, respondents herein, submitted their comment
on the petition for review filed by the petitioner (pp. 67-71, rec.).
On January 15, 1975, the petition for review filed by petitioners was denied in a
resolution by the First Division of the Supreme Court for lack of merit (p. 75, rec.).
On February 18, 1975, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 86-113,
rec.).
On April 5, 1975, respondents filed their comments on the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners (pp. 130-134, rec.).
On April 23, 1975, petitioners filed their reply to respondents' comment (pp. 118-
125, rec.).
On May 23, 1975, the Supreme Court reconsidered its resolution denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration (p. 142, rec.).
In their petition, petitioners sought to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
raising the following arguments:
1. There are strong and cogent reasons why this Honorable
Court must return to and even enhance the doctrine
in Zuzuarregui vs. Zuzuarregui, considering serious flaws in the
reasoning of the currently prevailing doctrine, so that
as arguendo and pro hac vice that Irene was not duly recognized
or acknowledged as illegitimate child, she is nevertheless
entitled to successional rights as sole heir of the late Francisco
Delgado, considering that her filiation as illegitimate daughter of
Francisco Delgado is undisputed and beyond question (p. 12,
Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.).
2. Upon the other hand, this time assuming arguendo and pro
hac vice that under the Civil Code recognition of an 'other
illegitimate' is a pre-requisite to enjoyment of rights, Irene
Delgado was legally acknowledged by her father Francisco
Delgado, specially by his consent or advice to her marriage with
Moises Villanueva contrary to the erroneous conclusions of the
Court of Appeals (P. 39, Petitioner's Brief, p. 164, rec.).
The petition is without merit.
The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit must be
first recognized voluntarily or by court action is well settled in Our jurisprudence.
(Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Divinagracia vs. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307
[1976]; Clemea vs. Clemea, 24 SCRA 720 [1968]; Noble vs. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104
[1966]; Republic vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 13 SCRA 272 [1969];
Paulino vs. Paulino, 3 SCRA 730 [1961]; Barles vs. Ponce Enrile, 109 Phil. 522
[1960]).
There is no reason to overturn this doctrine and revert to what was enunciated in
the case of Zuzuarregui vs. Zuzuarregui (103 Phil. 346 [1958]); as suggested by
herein petitioners in their first assignment of errors.
It is the contention of the petitioners that the silence of the Civil Code as to the
recognition of illegitimate children other than natural, in contrast to natural
children who are expressly required to be recognized in order to inherit, only
meant that illegitimate children need not be recognized in order to inherit from
his or her alleged parent (p. 13, Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.). Petitioners also
raised the argument that under Article 287 of the New Civil Code which reads:
"Illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other
than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional
rights as are granted in this, code." The term "other illegitimate children" refers
not only to those who are not natural or merely adulterous or incestuous but also
includes natural children who were not acknowledged or recognized (p. 18,
Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.). In other words, unrecognized natural children can
inherit not the share of a natural child but the share of a spurious child so long as
his filiation shall be duly proved. So, in effect, illegitimate children need only to
prove his filiation to inherit and such does not place him in a more advantageous
position than natural children, as they are placed in the same situation.
WE do not find these arguments persuasive.
Though the Civil Code is silent with respect to spurious children as to their
recognition, this Court, in applying the rules of recognition, applicable to natural
children, to said spurious children, declared in Clemea vs. Clemea, supra, that:
The considerations of fairness and justice that underlie the time
limit fixed in Article 285 of the Civil Code for actions seeking
compulsory acknowledgment of natural children are fully
applicable, if not more, to actions to investigate and declare the
paternity of illegitimate children that are not natural. The
motive that led the codifiers to restrict the period for bringing
action for compulsory recognition of natural children were
stated by this Court in Serrano vs. Aragon, 22 Phil. 18, to be as
follows:
... the writers of the code no doubt had in mind that there
would arise instances where certain illegitimate children, on
account of the strong temptation due to the large estates left by
deceased persons, would attempt to establish that they were
 natural children of such persons in order to get part of the
property, and furthermore, they considered that it is nothing
but just and right that alleged parents should have a personal
opportunity to be heard. It was for these reasons and others
equally as well founded that Article 137 was enacted (p. 724).
There are two (2) general classifications of illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock. They may be either natural (actually or by
fiction) or spurious (the incestuous, adulterous or illicit). Natural children are
defined as those born outside of wedlock of parents, who at the time of
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other (Article 269, New Civil Code). On the other hand, spurious children are
those born of parents, who at the time of their conception, are disqualified to
marry each other on account of certain impediment. Because of this basic
distinction between these children, it is not legally possible to classify
unrecognized natural children under the class of spurious children. Besides,
commentators construe the phrase "illegitimate children other than natural" as
excluding from the grants of rights under Article 287 of the New Civil Code those
children who are natural child proper by birth and who have not secured
voluntary or compulsory recognition (p. 276, An Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes
and R.C. Puno, Vol. 1). They fag within the scope of the definition of natural
children enumerated in Article 269, New Civil Code (p. 142, Civil Law Reviewer, D.
Jurado, 1982 ed.). Lastly, to follow petitioners' contention win not be in
accordance with the consistent pronouncements of this Court. It is an elementary
and basic principle under the old and new Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural
child has no rights whatsoever against his parent or his estate. His rights spring
not from the filiation itself, but from the child's acknowledgment by the natural
parent (Alabat vs. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 [1967]; Mise vs. Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396
[1954]; Magallanes vs. CA, 95 Phil. 797 [1954]; Candles vs. Ugarte, 91 Phil. 6
[1952]; Malonda vs. Malonda, 81 Phil. 149 [1948]; Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5
Phil. 1 [1905]).
As to the second assignment of error raised by petitioners, We find that there was
no sufficient legal recognition of petitioner Irene Delgado by Francisco Delgado.
It can be seen from the record of birth (Exhibit "L-2") that the name of the
petitioner was Irene Ramero, and signed by Genoveva Ramero and of an
unknown father. This was certified to by the treasurer of the municipality of
Alitagtag Batangas (Exhibits "L" and "L-1 "). Another certified copy of another
birth certificate issued by the municipal treasurer and local civil registrar of the
municipality of Alitagtag (Exhibit "20") stated therein that the name of the child is
Irene Ramero, and the name of the father is "Francisco" and the mother
"Genoveva Ramero." Any of these records of birth cannot be sufficient
recognition under the law. The birth certificate, to be sufficient recognition, must
be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father
refuses, otherwise she may be penalized (Sec. 5, Act 3753; Madredejo vs. De
Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]); and if the alleged father did not sign in the birth
certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, or doctor or registrar, is
incompetent evidence of paternity of said child (Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53
[1984]; Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 102 Phil. 1050 [1958]). Since any
of the certificates of birth presented were not signed by Francisco Delgado, it
cannot be taken as record of birth to prove recognition of Irene Delgado; nor can
this birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument. (Pareja vs.
Pareja, 95 Phil. 167[1954]).
Irene's certificate of baptism (Exhibit "1") cannot be taken as proof of recognition
(Bercilles vs. GSIS, supra; People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid vs.
Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [1968]; Vudaurrazaga vs. CA, 91 Phil. 492 [1952];
Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 [1907]). In the case of Macadangdang vs. CA
[100 SCRA 73 [1980]), this Court said that while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration
of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk.
Irene's secondary student permanent record (Exhibits "12", "13", "15" and "16")
nor the written consent given by Irene to the operation of her alleged father
(Exhibit "4") cannot be taken as an authentic writing. An authentic writing does
not have to be a public instrument; it is sufficient that it is genuine and not a
forgery. It must generally be signed by the alleged parent (Madredejo vs. De
Leon, supra) unless the whole instrument is in the handwriting of the alleged
parent and the facts mentioned therein correspond to actual and real facts
(Varela vs. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248 [1954]). Thus, Irene's secondary student
permanent record and her written consent to the operation of her father, not
being signed nor written in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado, cannot be taken
as an authentic writing to prove her recognition by her alleged father.
The marriage contract (Exhibit "17") of Irene Delgado and Moises Villanueva,
wherein it was stated that Francisco Delgado gave his consent or advice for Irene
Delgado to marry, and that he was her father cannot be also taken as recognition
in an authentic document because it was not signed nor in the handwriting of
Francisco Delgado It cannot also be taken as recognition in a public instrument as
held in the case of Lim vs. CA, (65 SCRA 161, 164 [1975]) wherein the Court said.
According to Article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, Public
documents 'are those authenticated by a notary or by a
competent public official, with the formalities required by law.'
Thus, 'there are two classes of public documents, those
executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by
reason of their office.' "The public document pointed out in
Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be
made belongs to the first class.
The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy
the requirements of solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the
Civil Code of 1889. Such contract is not a written act with the
intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument executed in due
form before a notary and certified by him. The marriage
contract is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two
 witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and
wife, signed by signature or mark by said contracting parties and
the said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the
marriage. The marriage contract does not possess the requisites
of a public document of recognition...
The family pictures (Exhibits "11" to "11-E") presented by Irene, showing Irene
posing with Francisco Delgado, cannot be a sufficient proof of recognition. In the
case of Bercilles vs. GSIS, supra, it was held that pictures do not constitute proof
of filiation.
What Irene may have proved is that she had been in continuous possession of a
status of an illegitimate child who is not natural. But such fact alone without a
valid recognition in a record of birth, will statement before a court of record, or
authentic writing does not make Irene a recognized illegitimate child who is not
natural. She nevertheless possesses the right to compel judicial recognition and
the action for this must be brought within the proper prescriptive period
(Clemea vs. Clemea, supra). Article 285 of the New Civil Code provides "that the
action for the. recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except when the father or mother dies during
the minority of the child, the action shall be brought within four years from the
age of majority, or if after the death of the father or of the mother a document
should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both
parents recognize the child, the action shag be brought within four years from the
finding of the document." Since Irene was already of age (35 years old) when her
alleged father died, and she had not presented any discovered document wherein
her presumed father recognized her, the action to compel recognition is already
barred (Canales vs. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]).
WE affirm the findings of the then Court of Appeals that Irene Reyes alias Irene
Delgado is not an heir of the late Francisco Delgado.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE THEN COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY
AFFIRMED IN TOTO, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONERS.
G.R. No. L-50974-75 May 31, 1989
JUAN CASTRO and FELICIANA CASTRO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CIPRIANO NAVAL and BENITA C. NAVAL, respondents.
Luis R. Reyes for petitioners.
Marcelino U. Aganon for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 47262 and 47263-R, which affirmed the decision
of the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac in Civil Case Nos. 3762-3763. The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
defendants and against plaintiffs in the above-entitled cases:
1) Declaring defendant Benita Castro Naval a duly acknowledged
and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro;
2) Awarding the sum of P2,000.00 to defendants by way of
attorney's fee and expenses of litigation (one-half to be paid by
plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in Civil Case No. 3762 and one-
half by plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3763); and
3) Pending the partition or distribution of the properties
involved herein in appropriate proceedings or by mutual
agreement, and so as to preserve the status quo, the writ of
preliminary injunction of February 10, 1967 shall continue to
remain in full force and effect.
With costs against plaintiffs, one-half chargeable to plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3762 and the other half to plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 3763. (Record on Appeal, pp. 137-138)
Petitioners Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro are the brother and sister of the late
Eustaquio Castro while respondent Benita Castro Naval is the only child of
Eustaquio. Respondent Cipriano Naval is the husband of Benita Castro.
The Court of Appeals correctly summarized the facts of the case as follows:
In Civil Case No. 3762 entitled Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro
v. Benita Castro, the plaintiffs filed an action for partition of
properties against the defendant alleging, among other things
that they are the forced heirs of Pedro Castro who died in
Mayantoc, Tarlac on May 27, 1923 (p. 6, Record on Appeal).
In Civil Case No. 3763 plaintiff Marcelina Bautista also filed an
action for partition of properties against defendant Benita
Castro Naval alleging, among other things, that they are also
compulsory heirs of Eustaquio Castro who died in Mayantoc,
Tarlac on August 24, 1961 and that they are entitled to the
partition of the properties of said deceased (p. 32, Record on
Appeal).
The defendants in their amended answer in both cases allege
that Benita Castro Naval is the only child of the deceased
Eustaquio and that said Eustaquio Castro is the son of Pedro
Castro, therefore, the complaint for partition has no cause of
action (p. 25, Record on Appeal).
With leave of Court, plaintiffs filed their amended complaints
whereby they converted the original action for partition into an
action for quieting of title. Defendant's husband Cipriano Naval
was forthwith impleaded as party-defendant (p. 32, Record on
Appeal).
In the meantime, defendant Benita Naval filed a petition for
appointment as receiver and for preliminary injunction in Civil
Case No. 3762. The trial court, however, denied said petition for
appointment of receiver, but granted the petition for writ of
preliminary injunction and also adjudged Marcelina Bautista
who is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3762 guilty of contempt and
ordering her to pay a fine of P100. 00 (p. 97, Record on Appeal).
Considering that evidence in these incidents of appointing a
receiver and preliminary injunction as well as the motion for
contempt were related to the merits of the case, the parties
stipulated that evidence therein be considered as evidence in
the trial on the merits.
During the pre-trial the parties agreed that the main issue to be
resolved in this case is as to whether or not defendant Benita
Castro Naval is the acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio
Castro. In view of this stipulation, defendant Benita Naval was
allowed to introduce evidence to show that she was indeed the
acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio Castro.
The evidence on record shows that Juan Castro and Feliciana
Castro, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3762 and Eustaquio Castro
who was already dead were the children of the deceased
spouses Pedro Castro and Cornelia Santiago. Marcelina Bautista,
one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3763, is the surviving
spouse of the deceased Eustaquio Castro. Eustaquio Castro died
on August 23, 1961 and Pricola Maregmen died on September
11, 1924.
It appears that defendant Benita Castro Naval, a child of
Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen, was born on March 27,
1919 in San Bartolome, Tarlac (Exhibit A). Eustaquio Castro, who
caused the registration of said birth gave the date indicated in
the civil registry that he was the father. Benita Castro was later
baptized in the Roman Catholic Church of Camiling, Tarlac,
wherein the baptismal certificate appeared that her parents are
deceased Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen (Exhibit C).
When Eustaquio Castro died, pictures were taken wherein the
immediate members of the family in mourning were present,
among whom was Benita Castro Naval (Exhibits D and D-1). On
this score, the plaintiffs in their complaint in Civil Case No. 3762
 admitted that defendant Benita C. Naval is the forced heir of
Eustaquio Castro and a compulsory heir of Eustaquio Castro in
Civil Case No. 3763.
The evidence further shows that Pricola Maregmen, the natural
mother of Benita C. Naval who was a resident of Mayantoc,
Tarlac, was wedded to Felix de Maya of Anoling Canaling, Tarlac
against her wishes on May 23, 1913. While the celebration of
the wedding in Anong, Camiling, Tarlac was going on, the guests
soon found out that Pricola Maregmen surreptitiously left the
party and went to the house of her first cousin Bernarda
Pagarigan at Barrio Malacampa, also in Anoling Camiling, Tarlac,
and there she cried that she did not want to get married to Felix
de Maya. That evening Pricola proceeded to Barrio San
Bartolome, Mayantoc, Tarlac, where she united with her real
sweetheart, Eustaquio Castro, the father of Benita Castro Naval.
Antonio Maregmen, the brother'. of Pricola Maregmen who was
then in the wedding party learned of the disappearance of his
sister. He finally found her living with Eustaquio Castro. A few
days later Eustaquio Castro accompanied by two persons went
to the parents of Pricola Maregmen at Mayantoc, Tarlac and
informed them that Pricola was already living with him as
husband and wife. Pricola's parents merely submitted to their
daughter's wishes, so Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen
lived as husband and wife until the death of Pricola on
September 11, 1924.
There is no dispute that Eustaquio Castro at the time he lived
with Pricola Maregmen, was a widower, and was, therefore,
free to marry Pricola. As a result of their cohabitation Benita
Castro Naval, herein defendant, was born on March 27, 1919.
After the death of her mother, when she was only five years old,
she continued to live with her father Eustaquio Castro until his
death on August 22, 1961 (Exhibit 11). Moreover, when Benita
Castro Naval got married to Cipriano Naval, it was Eustaquio
Castro who gave her away in marriage. Even after Benita's
marriage, she was taken care of by her father. (Rollo, pp. 11-13).
The trial court ruled that respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and
recognized child of Eustaquio Castro and is, therefore, entitled to participate in
the partition of the properties left by him. These properties are the subject of the
civil cases. As stated earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision.
The main issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Benita Castro
Naval is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.
The Court of Appeals justified its pronouncement that the private respondent is
an acknowledged and recognized child of Eustaquio Castro in the following
manner:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The recognition of Benita Castro as a natural child of
Eustaquio Castro appears in the records of birth and partition.
Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or any authentic writing
(Art. 278, Civil Code). It was a voluntary recognition already
established which did not need any judicial pronouncement
(Gut, 68 Phil. 385; Root v. Root, (CA), 71 O.G. 3061). In Javelona
v. Onteclaro, 74 Phil. 393, the Supreme Court clarified the
distinction between voluntary recognition and compulsory
recognition. In the first place, a voluntary recognition is made in
a public document, whereas in the indubitable writing under
Article 135 is a private document. (Manresa, Vol. 1, p. 579). The
father would ordinarily be more careful about what he said in a
public document than in a private writing, so that even an
incidental mention of the child as his in a public document
deserves full faith and credit. In the second place, in an action
on Article 131 (voluntary recognition) the natural child merely
asks for a share in the inheritance in virtue of his having been
acknowledged as such, and is not trying to compel the father or
his heirs to make the acknowledgment, whereas the action
based on Article 135 is to compel the father or his heirs to
recognize the child. In the former case, acknowledgment has
been formally and legally accomplished because the public
character of the document makes judicial pronouncement
unnecessary, while in the latter case, recognition is yet to be
ordered by the courts because a private writing, lacking the
stronger guaranty and higher authenticity of a public document
is not self- executory. A judgment in favor of the status of a
natural child according to Art. 135 must therefore be based on
an express recognition so found and declared by the court after
hearing. At this juncture, it is to be noted that an action based
on voluntary acknowledgment may be brought after the death
of the father, but. not an action to compel acknowledgment, as
a general rule, (Art. 137, Civil Code) which shows the liberality of
the law as to voluntary recognition, and its strictness toward
compulsory acknowledgment.
While it is true that Pricola Maregmen, Benita's mother was
married to Naval (sic), it is the rule, however, that in case the
recognition is made by only one of the parents, it will be
presumed that the child is natural if the parents recognizing it
had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of the
conception (Art. 277, Civil Code; Borres and Barza v.
Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil. 643; Capistrano v. Gabino, 8 Phil.
135). The presumption arises from the act of recognition.
What is more is that plaintiffs in their amended complaint
admitted that Benita Castro was the compulsory heir of
 Eustaquio Castro. They cannot now contradict their own
allegations (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 232). (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The Court of Appeals has correctly stated the principles but the petitioners
contend that it erred in applying these principles to the facts of this case.
The law which now governs paternity and filiation is Title VI of the Family Code of
the Philippines, Executive Order No. 209, July 6,1987 as amended by Executive
Order No. 227, July 17, 1987. We have to examine the earlier provisions, however,
because the Family Code provides in its Article 256 that:
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no question that the private respondent is an illegitimate child of
Eustaquio Castro. Her father Eustaquio was a widower when Pricola Maregmen,
her mother, went to live with him. The two could not validly enter into a marriage
because when Pricola fled from her own wedding party on May 23, 1913, the
wedding rites to Felix de Maya had already been solemnized. In other words, the
marriage was celebrated although it could not be consummated because the
bride hurriedly ran away to join the man she really loved.
Under the Civil Code, whether "new" or "old", illegitimate children or those who
are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups:
(1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful
wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other. (Article 119, old Civil Code;
Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or
illicit, were those born of parents who, at the time of conception, were
disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments.
Since Eustaquio Castro was a widower when Benita was conceived, Benita is Ms
natural child. (See Borres and Barza v. Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil. 643,647
[1922]). However, from the viewpoint of the mother who had a subsisting
marriage to Felix de Maya, Benita was her spurious child.
Under the Civil Code, for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit, she
must first be recognized voluntarily or by court action. (Berciles v. Government
Service Insurance System, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Divinagracia v. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307
[1976]; Vda. de Clemena v. Clemena 24 SCRA 720 [1968]; Noble v. Noble, 18 SCRA
1104 [1966]; Republic v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 13 SCRA 272
[1965]; Paulino v. Paulino 3 SCRA 730 [1961]; Barles, et al. v. Ponce Enrile, 109
Phil. 522 [1960]; and Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]). This arises
from the legal principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has
no rights from her parents or to their estate because her rights spring not from
the filiation or blood relationship but from the child's acknowledgment by the
parent. (Alabat v. Vda. de Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 [1967]; Mise v. Rodriguez, 95 Phil.
396 [1954]; Magallanes, et al.v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795 [1954];
Canales v. Arrogante, et al., 91 Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda v. Malonda, 61 Phil. 149
[1948]; Buenaventura v. Urbano, et al., 5 Phil. 1 [1905]; and Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, supra). In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not
because she was the true or real child of her parents but because under the law,
she had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child.
This brings us to the question whether or not the private respondent is an
acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.
Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of acknowledgment voluntary and
compulsory. The provisions on acknowledgement are applied to natural as well as
spurious children (Clemena v. Clemena supra; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra).
Article 131 of the old Civil Code provides for voluntary acknowledgment by the
father or mother, while Article 135 and Article 136 of the same Code provide for
the compulsory acknowledgment by the father and mother respectively. Article
131 of the old Civil Code states that "The acknowledgment of a natural child must
be made in the record of birth, in a will or in some other public document."
In these cases, the appellate court ruled that the private respondent was
voluntarily recognized by her father, Eustaquio Castro through the record of birth,
hence there was no need for any judicial pronouncement.
The record of birth referred to by the appellate court is actually the birth
certificate of the private respondent. It appears in the certificate that Eustaquio
Castro is the respondent's father.
The petitioners take exception to the respondent court's ruling on voluntary
recognition.
Strictly speaking, a birth certificate to be sufficient for purposes of recognizing a
child must be signed by the father and mother jointly and if the father refuses, by
the mother alone otherwise she may be penalized. (Section 5, Article 3753;
Madridejo v. de Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]). What is signed is a loose form whose
contents are later transferred by a municipal employee to the local registry book
of births which is preserved. An examination of Exhibition F, Birth Certificate of
Benita Castro, Folder of Exhibits, p. 112, shows that this "birth certificate" was in
turn copied on October 17, 1961 from Book page No. 28, and Registry No. 47 of
the book bound records where "Eustaquio Castro" appears under the column
"Remarks." This is no question that Eustaquio himself reported the birth of his
daughter but this record is not determinative of whether or not he also signed the
easily lost looseleaf form of the certificate from where the entry in book bound or
logbook record was taken in March, 1919.
The ruling in Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila (102 Phil. 1050 [1958])
and Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System (128 SCRA 53 [1984]) that if
the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity
does not apply to this case because it was Eustaquio himself who went to the
municipal building and gave all the data about his daughter's birth. In Berciles we
find no participation whatsoever in the registration by Judge Pascual Berciles, the
alleged father.
We likewise see no application of the statement in Madridejo v. de Leon (supra),
that the father, apart from furnishing the necessary data must also sign the
certificate itself In that case, Pedro Madridejo, the father was still alive when the
1930 case was brought to court. Pedro himself testified that Melecio Madridejo
was conceived and born to him, a bachelor, and Flaviana Perez, a widow. The two
were validly maried when Flaviana was about to die. If the situation of Benita (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
Castro Naval were similar, there would be no need to even discuss whether or not judgment; or
the father signed the birth certificate. Under the present law, the subsequent (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
wedding of a man and woman whose child was conceived when there were no private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
legal impediments to a valid marriage gives that child the lights of a legitimate off- concerned.
spring. The situation is different in the present case. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
We apply the more liberal provisions of the new Family Code considering the facts shall be proved by:
and equities of this case. (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
First, Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of the late Eustaquio legitimate child; or
Castro who was qualified to legally marry when she was conceived and born. (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
From her birth on March 27, 1919 until the father's death on August 22, 1961 or laws. (265a, 266a; 267a)
for 42 years, Benita lived with her father and enjoyed the love and care that a Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the
parent bestows on an only child. The private respondents, themselves, admitted child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the
in their complaint in Civil Case No. 3762 that Benita is a forced heir of Eustaquio heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
Castro. insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
Second, the rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family is of no years within which to institute the action.
special relevance here because Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were The action already commenced by the child shall survive
the only immediate family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate children born of a notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
legitimate wife contesting the inheritance of Benita. (268a)
Third, it was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open and continuous
registered. There is no indication in the records that Eustaquio should have known possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro and that the
in 1919 that apart from reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed action of Benita in defending her status in this case is similar to an "action to claim
the certificate and seen to it that it was preserved for 60 years. Or that he should legitimacy" brought during her lifetime.
have taken all legal steps including judicial action to establish her status as his WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned
recognized natural child during the reglementary period to do so. decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Fourth, it was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano SO ORDERED.
Naval. The couple continued to live with the father even after the wedding and
until the latter's death.
Fifth, the certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the
wake for Eustaquio may not be sufficient proof of recognition under the Civil Code
(Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra; People v. Villeza. 127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid v.
Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [1968]; Capistrano, et al. v. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 [1907])
but they add to the equities of this case favoring the petitioner.
To remove any possible doubts about the correctness of the findings and
conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we, therefore, apply the
provision of the Family Code which states that it shall have retroactive effect since
the respondents have no clear vested rights in their favor.
Under the Code's Title VI on Paternity and Filiation there are only two classes of
children legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types
of illegitimate children have been eliminated.
Article 175 provides that "Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children."
(Emphasis supplied).
Articles 172 and 173 on establishing the filiation of legitimate children provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
G.R. No. L-63132 July 30, 1987
ELIAS S. MENDOZA and EUSTIQUIA S. MENDOZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, BUENAVENTURA GABUYA and SEVERA
FERNANDEZ,respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
Petitioners-spouses Elias and Eustiquia Mendoza seek a review of the decision
dated September 8, 1982 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 58815-58816-
17-R entitled Elias Mendoza, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus Buenaventura
Gabuya, et al., Defendants-Appellees" as well as the resolution of January 3, 1983,
denying their motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
Sometime in November and December of 1969, three [3] complaints were filed
before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu; viz: 11 Civil Case No. R-11485
instituted by herein petitioners-spouses Mendoza against private respondents-
spouses Buenaventura Gabuya and Severa Fernandez for partition of Lot No. 3597
of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu, located at Pardo, Cebu City, with an area of 2,992
square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
43910 issued in the names of "Buenaventura Gabuya, married to Severa
Fernandez ... and Elias S. Mendoza, married to Eustiquia S. Mendoza ... with one-
half [1/2] share each"1 and damages; 2) Civil Case No. R-11486 commenced by
spouses Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima, likewise against private
respondents-spouses Buenaventura Gabuya and Severa Fernandez for partition of
Lot No. 3506 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu, located at Pardo, Cebu, with an area
of 2,799 square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 43909 issued in the names of Buenaventura Gabuya, married to Severa
Fernandez and Modesta Gabuya, married to Dominador Delima, and damages;
and, 3] Civil Case No. R-1152 filed by private respondents-spouses Buenaventura
Gabuya and Severa Fernandez against the spouses Modesta Gabuya and
Dominador Delima and petitioners-spouses Mendoza for the annulment of: a) the
extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the late Evaristo Gabuya, dated March
12, 1969 covering Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597, Cebu Cadastre; b) the sale of one-half
[1/2] portion of Lot No. 3597 dated December 31, 1968 in favor of spouses
Mendoza; and, c) Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 43909 and 43910, covering Lot
Nos. 3506 and 3597, respectively; and damages.
Because they involved the same parties and properties, the cases were heard and
tried jointly.
Thereafter, on September 12, 1972, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, based on all the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Buenaventura Gabuya in the
third case and against defendant-spouses Modesta Gabuya and
Dominador Delima and Atty. Elias S. Mendoza and Eustiquia S. Mendoza:
1] Declaring null and void and without force and effect:
a) The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Evaristo
Gabuya insofar as the shares of defendant Modesta Gabuya in
Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597 are concerned;
b) The Deed of Absolute Sale Modesta Gabuya executed on
December 31, 1968 in favor of her co-defendants-spouses Atty.
Elias S. Mendoza and Eustiquia S. Mendoza, covering Lot No.
3597 without prejudice to the rights of the latter spouses-
vendors to demand from Modesta Gabuya reimbursement of
any amounts they have paid on account of the sale;
c) Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 43909 and 43910 insofar as
the respective recorded one-half [1/2] undivided shares of the
spouses Modesta Gabuya married to Dominador Delima and
Atty. Elias S. Mendoza married to Eustiquia S. Mendoza in each
of Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597 with plaintiff Buenaventura Gabuya
married to Severa Fernandez are concerned;
2] Condemning the two defendants-spouses to pay jointly and severally
to the plaintiff the amount of P500.00 as moral damages, P750.00 as
attorney's fees; and,
3] To pay the costs.
The Register of Deeds of Cebu is hereby directed to cancel the recorded
one-half [1/2] share each of the defendants-spouses Modesta Gabuya
married to Dominador Delima and Atty. Elias S. Mendoza married to
Eustiquia S. Mendoza in Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597 covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 43909 and 43910, respectively. 2
Dissatisfied with said decision, the spouses Mendoza and the spouses Delima
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court. Their motion for reconsideration likewise proved
unavailing.1awphil
Thus, on February 14, 1983, within the extended period granted, the spouses
Mendoza filed the petition at bar. After private respondents had filed their
comment thereon, and petitioners, their Reply to said comment, the Court, on
September 19, 1983, gave due course to the petition. 3 In due time, the parties
submitted their respective memoranda.
On July 10, 1985, Atty. Paterno S. Compra entered his appearance as counsel for
spouses Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima, and on July 19, 1985, filed a
Notice of Death, informing this Court that respondent Buenaventura Gabuya died
on October 21, 1981 and that Severa Fernandez likewise died on October 14,
1983, allegedly leaving no legal heirs except Modesta Gabuya.4
Acting on said Notice of Death, the Court resolved on September 18, 1985, "to
Direct [1] the legal representatives of the deceased respondents Buenaventura
Gabuya and Severa Fernandez to appear and to be substituted for the latter,
within a period of thirty [30] days from notice; and [2] the petitioners to amend
their petition within ten [10] days from receipt of the notice of appearance and
substitution by the legal representatives of the aforesaid respondents, so as to
conform with the latest development in the case."5
It appears that sometime between September 18, 1985 and November 27, 1985,
Venerando Gabuya, a sixth degree collateral relative of Buenaventura Gabuya,
filed a motion dated October 31, 1985 to substitute the latter in the case at bar.
While the motion itself does not appear in the rollo, the same was granted by the
Court in its resolution of November 27, 1985.
Meanwhile, on November 20, 1985, the petitioners filed an Amended Petition,
naming the spouses Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima as co-petitioners
therein. Said "petitioners" Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima prayed in the
Amended Petition that Modesta Gabuya be declared the sole legal heir of
Buenaventura Gabuya. Said spouses Delima likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of November 27, 1985, which granted
Venerando Gabuya's motion for substitution. However, since the resolution of the
motion for reconsideration would entail going into the merits of the case, its
resolution was held in abeyance.
The sole issue presented by the petition is couched by petitioners, thus:
Whether or not under the Civil Code of Spain, a natural child without any
judicial decree or deed of acknowledgment in his favor by his natural
parent may succeed said natural parent under certain circumstances. 6
The factual backdrop of this legal query, as found by the trial court and sustained
by the appellate court, is as follows:
That Buenaventura, Nicolasa and Teresa, all surnamed Gabuya, are the
legitimate children of the spouses Evaristo Gabuya and Susana Sabandija,
who died intestate many years ago, the first in 1926 and the second in
1912; that both Nicolasa and Teresa died single, the first in 1943 and the
second in 1964; that Modesta Gabuya is the illegitimate daughter of
Nicolasa [Exhs. G & 7-B-Gabuya]; that Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597 of the
Cebu Cadastre were some of the original properties left by the late
Evaristo Gabuya both located at Pardo, Cebu City, formerly covered by
Original Certificate [sic] of Title Nos. 6353 and 6597 in the name of
Evaristo Gabuya and containing 2,799 square meters and 2,992 square
meters, respectively; that sometime in February, 1969, Modesta Gabuya
accompanied by Atty. Elias S. Mendoza went to the house of
Buenaventura Gabuya who wanted to see the titles of these two parcels
of land and Buenaventura was instructed by Modesto to look for them so
that they be reconstituted; that some days later the two, Modesta
Gabuya and Elias S. Mendoza visited him again at his house and Mode
took the titles but this time Buenaventura went with them to the Cebu
Capitol Building; that Buenaventura and Modesto signed a document and
acknowledged before Atty. Salvador B. Mendoza but the latter did not
read to the signatories the contents of the document; that this document
dated March 12, 1969 turned out to be an Extrajudicial settlement of the
Estate of Evaristo Gabuya [Exhs. A and 1-B-Gabuya] whereby
Buenaventura and Modesto appear to have divided and partitioned
between themselves pro visio and share and share alike [1/2 each] Lot
Nos. 3506 and 3597; that this Extrajudicial settlement of the Estate of
Evaristo Gabuya was duly published [Exh. B] in the Morning Times and
registered with the Register of Deeds [Exhs. B-1 & B-2] and the document
itself was also similarly registered [Exhs. A-1 and A-2]; that on December
31, 1968, prior to the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement
document, a Deed of Absolute Sale [Exhs. 2-B-Gabuya] was executed by
Modesta Gabuya in favor of the spouses Atty. and Mrs. Elias S. Mendoza
covering her alleged one-half [1/2] undivided share in Lot No. 3597 for a
consideration of P10,000.00; that pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement [Exhs. A & 1-B-Gabuya], and the Deed of Absolute Sale [Exh.
2-B-Gabuya], Original Certificates of Title Nos. 6353 and 6597 in the
name of the late Evaristo Gabuya, father of Buenaventura Gabuya, were
cancelled and in liue thereof were issued Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 43909 and 43910 [Exh. C] The first in the names of spouses
Buenaventura Gabuya married to Severa Fernandez, and Modesta
Gabuya married to Dominador Delima and the second, in the names of
Buenaventura Gabuya married to Severa Fernandez and Atty. Elias S.
Mendoza married to Eustiquia S. Mendoza; that Atty. Elias S. Mendoza
and Modesta Gabuya have respectively asked from Buenaventura
Gabuya the partition of the lots which they are co-owners of the
undivided one-half [1/2] portions; and that Buenaventura refused to do
so claiming that ModestaGabuya is not entitled to inherit from the estate
of his late father Evaristo Gabuya. 7
Under the Civil Code of Spain, the law in force at the time of the death in 1943 of
Nicolasa Gabuya, the mother of Modesta, full successional rights were granted
only to legitimate and legitimated children [Arts. 114 and 122, respectively].
Acknowledged natural children were given limited successional rights in that they
were entitled to inherit only from the acknowledging parent [Art. 134], while
illegitimate children who did not possess the status of natural children had no
successional rights whatsoever [Art. 139]. The latter were only entitled to
support. Adopted children become heirs of the adopting parents only if the
adopting parents had agreed to confer the adopted children such rights in the
deed of adoption, or had instituted them as heirs in a will. 8
Recognition or acknowledgment of a natural child under said Code must be made
in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in some other
public document.9 In the case at bar, the only document presented by Modesta
Gabuya to prove that she was recognized by her mother was the certificate of
birth and baptism signed by Rev. Fr. Filomeno Singson, Assistant Parish Priest of
Pardo, Cebu City, stating therein that Modesta Gabuya is an illegitimate daughter
of Nicolasa Gabuya.10 However, Philippine jurisprudence is consistent and uniform
in ruling that the canonical certificate of baptism is not sufficient to prove
recognition.11 The rationale for this ruling, enunciated in the case of Civ v.
Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434, is that while the baptismal certificate in the parish
records was a public document before the effectivity of General Order No. 68 and
Act 190, this certificate did not constitute a sufficient act of acknowledgment,
since the latter must be executed by the child's father or mother, and the parish
priest can not acknowledge in their stead.
Neither could the alleged continuous possession by Modesta Gabuya of the status
of a natural child improve her condition. In Alabat v. vda. de Alabat, 21 SCRA
1479, 1481, it was stressed that:
It is an elementary and basic principle in our law of succession that the
rights of a natural child spring not from the filiation itself but from the
child's acknowledgment by the natural parent, made voluntarily or by
court decree. Equally basic and elementary . . . is the fact that possession
or enjoyment of the status of natural child is per se not a sufficient
operative acknowledgment but only a ground to compel the parent to
acknowledge the child.
The case of Ramos, et al. v. Ramos, et al., 61 SCRA 284, heavily relied upon by
petitioners, does not apply to the case at bar. Unlike in said case, Modesta
Gabuya failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she was in
continuous possession of the status of a natural child.
That this petition must fail is a foregone conclusion. Modesta Gabuya, not having
been acknowledged in the manner provided by law by her mother, Nicolasa, was
not entitled to succeed the latter. The extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Evaristo Gabuya is, therefore, null and void insofar as Modesta Gabuya is
concerned per Article 1105 of the New Civil Code which states:
A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is
not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
Since the ownership of the one-half [1/2] pro indiviso portion of Lot No. 3597
never passed on to Modesta Gabuya, it follows that the sale thereof to
petitioners-spouses Elias and Eustiquia Mendoza is likewise null and void.12
One last point. During the pendency of this case, the spouses Modesta Gabuya
and Dominador Delima joined the spouses Mendoza as petitioners in this case by
submitting an amended petition, ostensibly in compliance with Our resolution of
September 18, 1985. In said Amended Petition, aforementioned spouses Delima
prayed that Modesta Gabuya Delima be declared the sole heir of the deceased
private respondent Buenaventura Gabuya, to the exclusion of substitute
Venerando Gabuya. It must be remembered, however, that the Delima spouses
not having joined petitioners-spouses Mendoza in the instant petition for review.
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 58815-58816-17-R has
become final and executory as to said spouses Delima. With the pronouncement
of the appellate court that Modesta Gabuya-Delima was not entitled to inherit
from her mother, in conjunction with our affirmance thereof, it is clear that her
prayer in the amended petition cannot be granted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied. The decision of the appellate
court in CA-G.R. Nos. 58815-5881617-R, is affirmed in toto. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19872 December 3, 1974
EMILIANO B. RAMOS, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
GREGORIA T. RAMOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Humberto V. Quisumbing and Maximino M. San Diego for plaintiffs-appellants.
Hilado and Hilado for defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:p
The parties appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and holding that the intestate estate of
Martin Ramos was settled in Civil Case No. 217, which was terminated on March
4,1914, and that the judgment therein is res judicata and bars any litigation
regarding the same estate (Civil Case no. 4522).
The documentary evidence reveals the following facts:
The spouses Martin Ramos and Candida Tanate died on October 4, 1906 and
October 26, 1888, respectively. They were survived by their three legitimate
children named Jose, Agustin and Granada. Martin Ramos was also survived by his
seven natural children named Atanacia, Timoteo, Modesto, Manuel, Emiliano,
Maria and Federico.
On December 10, 1906 a special proceeding was instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
said spouses. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 217 (its expediente is still
existing). Rafael O. Ramos, a brother of Martin, was appointed administrator. The
estate was administered for more than six years (Exh. F, G, H, I and J).
A project of partition dated April 25, 1913 was submitted. It was signed by the
three legitimate children, Jose, Agustin and Granada; by the two natural children,
Atanacia and Timoteo, and by Timoteo Zayco in representation of the other five
natural children who were minors. It was sworn to before the justice of the peace
(Exh. 3).
In the project of partition the conjugal hereditary estate was appraised at
P74,984.93. It consisted of eighteen parcels of land, some head of cattle and the
advances to the legitimate children(Exh. 3).
Under that project of partition, the following adjudications were made to the
heirs:
Legitimate children: Value
1. To Jose Ramos: (a) Hacienda Calaza
with an area of 328 hectares,
(b) a one-hectare town lot, (c) a
23-hectare lot in Sitio Bingig, and
(d) some head of cattle P25,291.66
2. To Granada Ramos: (a) a
parcel of riceland with a capacity
of 16 cavans of seedlings, located
in Barrio Binicuel, Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental and (b) some
head of cattle 1,891.66
3. To Agustin Ramos: (a) the
remaining fourteen (14) lots out of
the eighteen lots described in the
inventory, which included the Hacienda
Ylaya with an area of 185 hectares and
(b) some head of cattle 36,291.68
Natural children:
4. To each of the seven (7) natural
children named Atanacia, Modesto,
Timoteo, Federico, Manuel, Emiliano
and Maria, were adjudicated personal
properties valued at P1,785.35 consisting
of (a) cash amounting to P1,760.35 and
(b) P25, representing a one-seventh (1/7)
of a one-sixth (1/6) portion in certain head
of cattle allegedly representing one-third
of the free portion of the estate of Martin
Ramos, with an aggregate value of 12,497.51
Total adjudications P75,972.51
It was agreed in the project of partition that Jose Ramos would pay the cash
adjudications to Atanacia, Timoteo and Manuel, while Agustin Ramos would pay
the cash adjudications to Modesto, Federico, Emiliano and Maria. It was further
agreed that Jose Ramos and Agustin Ramos would pay their sister, Granada, the
sums of P3,302.36 and P14,273.78, respectively (Exh. 3).
The record does not show whether assessed or market values were used in
appraising the eighteen parcels of land. By way of explanation, it may be stated
that, inasmuch as the ganancial estate had an appraised value of P74,984.93, one-
half thereof or the sum of P37,492.46 represented the estate of Martin Ramos.
One-third thereof was the free portion or P12,497.48. The shares of the seven
natural children were to be taken from that one-third free portion. Dividing
P12,497.48 by seven gives a result of P1,783.35 which represented the one-
seventh share of each natural child in the free portion of the estate of their
putative father, Martin Ramos. The partition was made in accordance with the old
Civil Code which provides:
ART. 840. When the testator leaves legitimate children or
descendants, and also natural children, legally acknowledged,
each of the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the portion
pertaining to each of the legitimate children not bettered,
provided that it can be included within the third for free
disposal, from which it must betaken, after deducting the burial
and funeral expenses.
The legitimate children may satisfy the portion pertaining to the
natural children in cash, or in other property of the estate, at a
fair valuation.
The sum of P1,785.35, as the legal share of each natural child, was the amount
which was indicated in the project of partition(Exh. 3) and which was to be
satisfied in cash. The second paragraph of article 840 gives the legitimate children
the right to satisfy in cash the hereditary portions of the natural children. (Article
840 was applied in the project of partition when it stated that each natural child
had "una septima partede un sexto de semovientes" but the statement in the
project of partition that each legitimate child was entitled to "un tercio delos
cinco quintos de los semovientes" is erroneous. It should be "un tercii de los
cinco sextos de los semovientes").
Judge Richard Campbell, in his "decision" dated April 28,1913, approved the
project of partition as well as the intervention of Timoteo Zayco as guardian of the
five heirs, who were minors. The court declared that the proceeding would be
considered closed and the record should be archived as soon as proof was
submitted that each heir had received the portion adjudicated to him (Exh. 4).
In an order dated February 3, 1914 Judge V. Nepomuceno asked the administrator
to submit a report, complete with the supporting evidence, showing that the
shared of the heirs had been delivered to them as required in the decision of April
28,1913 (Exh. 5). In a manifestation dated February 24, 1914, which was signed by
Jose, Agustin, Granada, Atanacia and Timoteo all surnamed Ramos, and by
Timoteo Zayco, the guardian, and which was sworn to before the justice of the
peace on March 2 (not 4), 1914 and filed in court on March 5,1914, they
acknowledged:
... hemos recibido del Administrador Judicial Rafael O.
Ramostodas y cada una de las participaciones a que
respectivamente tenemos derecho en los bienes relictor de los
finados esposos Martin Ramos y Candida Tanate, completo
acuerto y conformidad con elproyecto de reparticion que
nosotros mismo sometemos al Juzgado en 25 de Abril de 1913
... . (Exh. 6).
Note that Granada Ramos and the natural children were assumed to have
received their shares from the administrator although according to the object of
partition, Jose Ramos and Agustin Ramos (not the administrator) were supposed
to pay the cash adjudications to each of them. No receipts were attached to the
manifestation, Exhibit 6. Apparently, the manifestation was not in strict
conformity with the terms of judge Nepomuceno's order and with the project of
partition itself.
Lots Nos. 1370, 1371, 1372, 1375, 2158, 2159, 2161 and 2163(eight lots) of the
Himamaylan cadastre (page 8 of the Record on Appeal does not mention Lot
1370), which are involved in this case were registered (as of 1958) in equal shares
in the names of Gregoria Ramos and her daughter, Granada Ramos, as shown
below (Exh. 8):
Original
Lot No Registration Present title Date
1370 Aug. 29, 1923 TCT No. RT-2238 Dec. 1,
1933
1371 do TCT No. RT-2235 do
1372 do TCT No. RT-2237 do
1375 do TCT No. RT-2236 do
2158 Sept. 10, 1923 TCT No. RT-2230 do
2159 do TCT No. RT-2233 do
2161 do TCT No. RT-2232 do
2163 do TCT No. RT-2231 do
Plaintiffs' version of the case. A summary of plaintiffs' oral evidence is found in
pages 4 to 13 of their well-written brief. It is reproduced below (omitting the
citations of the transcript):
Martin Ramos, who died in 1906 in the municipality of Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental, left considerable real estate, the most valuable of which were the
Hacienda Calaza and Hacienda Ylaya, both located in Himamaylay, Negros
Occidental. Hacienda Calaza consists of sugar land, palay land and nipa groves
with an area of 400 hectares and with a sugar quota allotment of 10,000 piculs,
more or less, and having as its present actual value P500,000 more or less.
"All the children of martin Ramos, whether legitimate or acknowledged natural,
lived together in Hacienda Ylaya during his lifetime and were under his care. Even
defendant Gregoria Ramos, widow of Jose Ramos, admitted that she dealt with
plaintiffs as family relations, especially seeing them during Sundays in church as
they lived with their father, and maintained close and harmonious relations with
them even after the death of their father. All said children continued to live in said
house of their father for years even after his death.
"Upon their father's death, his properties were left under the administration of
Rafael Ramos, the younger brother of their father and their uncle, Rafael Ramos
continued to administer those properties of their father, giving plaintiffs money as
their shares of the produce of said properties but plaintiffs not receiving any
property or piece of land however, until 1913 when Rafael Ramos gathered all the
heirs, including plaintiffs, in the house of their father, saying he would return the
administration of the properties. He turned over Hacienda Ylaya to Agustin Ramos
and Hacienda Calaza to Jose Ramos.
"All said children, defendants and plaintiffs alike, continued to live in the same
house of their father in Hacienda Ylaya, now under the support of Agustin Ramos.
Plaintiff Modesto Ramos who 'could understand Spanish a little', only left said
house in 1911; plaintiff Manuel stayed there for one year and lived later with Jose
Ramos for four years. Plaintiff Maria Ramos, who herself testified that she has 'a
very low educational attainment', lived there until 1916 when she got married.
Plaintiff Emiliano lived there with Agustin, helping him supervise the work in
Hacienda Ylaya, until he transferred to Hacienda Calaza where he helped Jose
Ramos supervise the work in said hacienda.
"Agustin Ramos supported plaintiffs, getting the money from the produce of
Hacienda Ylaya, the only source of income of Agustin coming from said hacienda.
Plaintiffs asked money from Agustin pertaining to their share in the produce of
Hacienda Ylaya and received varied amounts, sometimes around P50 at a time,
getting more when needed, and receiving P90 or P100 more or less a year.
"Jose Ramos gave plaintiffs also money as their shares from the products of
Hacienda Calaza. Even Maria Ramos who upon her marriage in 1916 lived in La
Cartota with her husband was given money whenever she went to Himamaylan.
Plaintiffs received varied amounts or sums of money from Jose as their shares in
the produce of Hacienda Ylaya more or less about P100 a year, mostly during the
milling season every year while he was alive up to his death in 1930. Emiliano
Ramos, now deceased and substituted by his widow, Rosario Tragico, moreover,
received P300 from Jose Ramos in 1918 taken from the products of Hacienda
Calaza when he went to the United States to study.
"Upon Jose Ramos death his widow Gregoria Ramos, herself, his first cousin, their
father and mother, respectively being brother and sister, continued to give
plaintiffs money pertaining to their shares in the products of Hacienda Calaza. She
however stopped doing so in 1951, telling them that the lessee Estanislao Lacson
was not able to pay the lease rental.
"There was never any accounting made to plaintiffs by Jose Ramos, plaintiffs
reposing confidence in their elder brother, Nor was any accounting made by his
widow, defendant Gregoria Ramos, upon his death, plaintiff Manuel Ramos
moreover having confidence in her.
"Before the survey of these properties by the Cadastral Court, plaintiff Modesto
Ramos was informed by the Surveying Department that they were going to survey
these properties. Plaintiffs then went to see their elder brother Jose to inform him
that there was a card issued to them regarding the survey and gave him 'a free
hand to do something as an administrator'. They therefore did not intervene in
the said cadastral proceedings because they were promised that they(defendants
Jose and Agustin) would 'be the ones responsible to have it registered in the
names of the heirs'. Plaintiffs did not file and cadastral answer because
defendants Jose and Agustin told them 'not to worry about it as they have to
answer for all the heirs'. Plaintiffs were 'assured' by defendants brothers.
"Plaintiffs did not know that intestate proceedings were instituted for the
distribution of the estate of their father. Neither did plaintiffs Modesto, Manuel,
Emiliano and Maria know (that) Timoteo Zayco, their uncle and brother-in-law of
defendant widow Gregoria was appointed their guardian. There was an express
admission by defendant Gregoria Ramos that Timoteo Zayco was her brother-in-
law.
"Plaintiffs did not know of any proceedings of Civil Case No. 217. They never
received any sum of money in cash the alleged insignificant sum of P1,785.35
each from said alleged guardian as their supposed share in the estate of their
father under any alleged project of partition.
"Neither did Atanacia Ramos nor her husband, Nestor Olmedo, sign any project of
partition or any receipt of share in(the) inheritance of Martin Ramos in cash.
Nestor Olmedo did not sign any receipt allegedly containing the signatures of
Atanacia assisted by himself as husband, Timoteo Ramos, and Timoteo Zayco as
guardian ad-litem of the minors Modesto, Manual, Federico, Emiliano and Maria.
As a matter of fact, plaintiffs Modesto and Manuel were in 1913 no longer minors
at the time of the alleged project of partition of the estate being approved, both
being of age at that time. No guardian could in law act on their behalf.
"Plaintiffs only discovered later on that the property administered by their elder
brother Jose had a Torrens Title in the name of his widow, Gregoria, and
daughter, Candida, when plaintiff Modesto's children insisted and inquired from
the Register of Deeds sometime in 1956 or 1957. Plaintiffs did not intervene in the
intestate proceedings for (the) settlement of the estate of their brother Jose as
they did not know of it.
"Plaintiffs were thus constrained to bring the present suit before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental on September 5, 1957 seeking for the
reconveyance in their favor by defendants Gregoria and daughter Candida and
husband Jose Bayot of their corresponding participations in said parcels of land in
accordance with article 840 of the old Civil Code and attorney's fees in the sum of
P10,000 plus costs and expenses of this litigation". (4-13 Brief).
Proceedings in the lower court. The instant action was filed on September 5,
1957 against defendants Agustin Ramos, Granada Ramos and the heirs of Jose
Ramos for the purpose of securing a reconveyance of the supposed participations
of plaintiffs Atanacia, Emiliano, Manuel, Maria and Modesto, all surnamed Ramos,
in the aforementioned eight (8) lots which apparently form part of Hacienda
Calaza. (The plaintiffs did not specify that the said shares would amount to one-
sixth of the said eight cadastral lots. One-sixth represented the one-third free
portion of Martin Ramos' one-half shares in the said lots. And the said one-sixth
portion was the share of his seven legally acknowledged natural children under
article 840 of the old Civil Code).
The action is really directed against the heirs of Jose Ramos, namely, his wife
Gregoria and his daughter Candida in whose names the said eight lots are now
registered as shown in Exhibit 8 and in page 4 hereof. It is predicated on the
theory that plaintiffs' shares were held in trust by the defendants. No deed of
trust was alleged and proven.
The defendants denied the existence of a trust. They pleaded the defenses of (a)
release of claim as shown in the project of partition, the decision and the receipt
of shares forming part of the expediente of Civil Case No. 217 (Exh. 3, 4 and 6), (b)
lack of cause of action, (c) res judicata and (d) prescription.
Timoteo Ramos, who was joined as a co-plaintiff, manifested that he had already
received his own share of the inheritance, that he did not authorized anyone to
include him as a plaintiff and that he did not want to be a party in this case. He
moved that his name be stricken out of the complaint (44-45 Rec. or Appeal; Exh.
7).
Emiliano Ramos, who died in 1958, was substituted by his widow and their ten
children (Exh. E, 61-64 Rec. on Appeal).The complaint is silent as to the fate of
Federico Ramos, the seventh natural child of Martin Ramos.
As already noted, after trial, the lower court dismissed the complaint on the
ground of res judicata. The plaintiffs as well as the defendants appealed.
Plaintiffs' appeal. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred (1) in
dismissing their complaint, (2) in denying their right to share in their father's
estate and (3) in holding that the action was barred by res judicata or the prior
judgment in the special proceeding for the settlement of Martin Ramos' intestate
estate, Civil Case No. 217 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Abintesdado de los finados esposos Martin Ramos y Candida
Tanate(Exh. F to J and 1 to 6).
The plaintiffs vigorously press on this Court their theory that the plaintiffs, as
acknowledged natural children, were grievously prejudiced by the partition and
that the doctrine of res judicata should not bar their action.
A preliminary issue, which should first be resolved, is the correctness of the trial
court's "inexorable conclusion" that the plaintiffs were the legally acknowledged
natural children of Martin Ramos. Plaintiffs' action is anchored on that premise.
The defendants failed to impugn that conclusion in their appellants' brief. Not
having done so, it may be regarded as conclusive against them. That is the
proposition advanced by the plaintiffs in their reply-brief.
The defendants in their appellees' brief assail that conclusion. It is true that an
appellee may make an assignment of error in his brief but that rule refers to an
appellee who is not an appellant (Saenz vs. Mitchell, 60 Phil. 69, 80). However,
since an appellee is allowed to point out the errors committed by the trial court
against him (Relativo vs. Castro, 76 Phil. 563; Lucero vs. De Guzman, 45 Phil. 852),
defendants' contention that the plaintiffs were not legally acknowledged natural
children may just as well be passed upon.
The defendants, in contesting the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs were
legally acknowledged children, assume that the legitimate children committed a
mistake in conferring successional rights on the plaintiffs.
We hold that the trial court's conclusion is correct. It is true that the
acknowledgment of the plaintiffs is not evidenced by a record of birth, will or
other public document (Art. 131, Old Civil Code). But the record of Civil Case No.
217, which is relied upon by the defendants to support their defense of res
judicata, indubitably shows that the plaintiffs were treated as acknowledged
natural children of Martin Ramos. The reasonable inference is that they were in
the continuous possession of the status of natural children of Martin Ramos, as
evidenced by his direct acts and the acts of his family (Art. 135, Old Civil Code).
Unacknowledged natural children have no rights whatsoever(Buenaventura vs.
Urbano, 5 Phil. 1; Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil. 5, 11; Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil.
738; Crisolo vs. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862). The fact that the plaintiffs, as natural
children of Martin Ramos, received shares in his estate implies that they were
acknowledged. Obviously, defendants Agustin Ramos and Granada Ramos and the
late Jose Ramos accorded successional rights to the plaintiffs because martin
Ramos and members of his family had treated them as his children. Presumably,
that fact was well-known in the community. Under the circumstances, Agustin
Ramos and Granada Ramos and the heirs of Jose Ramos are estopped from
attacking plaintiffs' status as acknowledged natural children (See Arts. 283[4] and
2266[3], New Civil Code).
Even the lower court, after treating the plaintiffs in 1913 in the intestate
proceeding as acknowledged natural children, had no choice but to reaffirm that
same holding in its 1961 decision in this case.
The crucial issue is prescription. With it the question of res judicata and the
existence of a trust are inextricably interwoven. Inasmuch as trust is the main
thrust of plaintiffs' action, it will be useful to make a brief disgression of the
nature of trusts (fideicomisos) and on the availability of prescription and laches to
bar the action for reconveyance of property allegedly held in trust.
"In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in
equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another, but the words 'trust' is frequently employed to indicate duties, relations,
and responsibilities which are not strictly technical trusts." (89 C.J.S. 712).
"A person who establishes a trust is called the trust or; one in whom confidence is
reposed is known as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust has
been created is referred to as the beneficiary" (Art. 1440, Civil Code). There is a
fiduciary relation between the trustee and the cestui que trust as regards certain
property, real, personal, money or choses inaction (Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil.
505).
"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention
of the trust or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law."
(Art. 1144, Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any
interest therein may be proven by oral evidence. An implied trust may be proven
by oral evidence" (Ibid, Arts. 1443 and 1457).
"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid, Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs.
Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543,
546). "Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of
the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or
impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J.S. 722).
"Implied trust are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the
nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are super induced on the
transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the
particular intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided
into resulting and constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).
"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act
or construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised
by implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the
parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction,
but not expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725).
Examples of resulting trusts are found in article 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code.
See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168,179).
On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction of law, or
arising by operation of law". In a more restricted sense and as contra
distinguished from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by
any words, either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a
trust, but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It
does not arise by agreement or intention but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S.
7260727). "If a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment,
courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor
of the defrauded party." A constructive trust is not a trust in the technical
sense(Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P.I., 49 Phil. 244; See Art. 1456, Civil Code).
There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership of
property entrusted to him (Palma vs. Cristobal, 77 Phil. 712), or that an action to
compel a trustee to convey property registered in his name in trust for the benefit
of the cestui qui trust does not prescribed (Manalang vs. Canlas, 94 Phil. 776;
Cristobal vs. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810), or that the defense of prescription cannot be
set up in an action to recover property held by a person in trust for the benefit of
another(Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or that property held in trust can
be recovered by the beneficiary regardless of the lapse of time (Marabilles vs.
Quito, 100 Phil. 64; Bancairen vs. Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126 Juan vs. Zuniga, 62 O.g.
1351; 4 SCRA 1221; Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962. See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147
Phil. 31, 37).
That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the
possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire by
prescription the property held in trust. Thus, section 38 of Act 190 provides that
the law of prescription does not apply "in the case of a continuing and subsisting
trust" (Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261,266; Laguna vs. Levantino, 71
Phil. 566; Sumira vs. Vistan, 74 Phil. 138; Golfeo vs. Court of Appeals, 63 O.G.
4895, 12 SCRA 199; Caladiao vs. Santos, 63 O.G. 1956, 10 SCRA 691).
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in trust may
possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as the trustee has not repudiated the
trust (Heirs of Candelaria vs. Romero, 109 Phil. 500, 502-3; Martinez vs. Grano, 42
Phil. 35; Buencamino vs. Matias, 63 O. G. 11033, 16 SCRA 849).
The rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to constructive trusts (Geronimo and
Isidoro vs. Nava and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145, 153. Compare with Cuison vs.
Fernandez and Bengzon, 105 Phil. 135, 139; De Pasion vs. De Pasion, 112 Phil. 403,
407).
Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee
in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the
trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of
the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known
to the cestui qui trustand(c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive (Laguna
vs. Levantino, supra; Salinas vs. Tuason, 55 Phil. 729. Compare with the rule
regarding co-owners found in the last paragraph of article 494, Civil Code; Casanas
vs. Rosello, 50 Phil. 97; Gerona vs. De Guzman, L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA
153,157).
With respect to constructive trusts, the rule is different. The prescriptibility of an
action for reconveyance based on constructive trust is now settled (Alzona vs.
Capunitan, L-10228, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 450; Gerona vs. De
Guzman, supra; Claridad vs. Henares, 97 Phil. 973; Gonzales vs. Jimenez, L-19073,
January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80; Bonaga vs. Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason & Co.,
vs. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 84). Prescription may
supervene in an implied trust (Bueno vs. Reyes, L-22587, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA
1179; Fabian vs. Fabian, L-20449, January 29, 1968; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957,
May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 371).
And whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be barred
by laches (90 C.J.S. 887-889; 54 Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado,
supra. Compare with Mejia vs. Gampona, 100 Phil. 277).
The plaintiffs did not prove any express trust in this case. The expediente of the
intestate proceeding, Civil Case No. 217, particularly the project of partition, the
decision and the manifestation as to the receipt of shares (Exh. 3, 4 and
6)negatives the existence of an express trust. Those public documents prove that
the estate of Martin Ramos was settled in that proceeding and that adjudications
were made to his seven natural children. A trust must be proven by clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain
evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations (De Leon vs. Peckson, 62
O. G. 994). As already noted, an express trust cannot be proven by parol
evidence(Pascual vs. Meneses, L-18838, May 25, 1967, 20 SCRA 219, 228;
Cuaycong vs. Cuaycong, L-21616, December 11, 1967, 21 SCRA 1192).
Neither have the plaintiffs specified the kind of implied trust contemplated in
their action. We have stated that whether it is a resulting or constructive trust, its
enforcement may be barred by laches.
In the cadastral proceedings, which supervened after the closure of the intestate
proceeding, the eight lots involved herein were claimed by the spouses Jose
Ramos and Gregoria T. Ramos to the exclusion of the plaintiffs (Exh. 8 to 19). After
the death of Jose Ramos, the said lots were adjudicated to his widow and
daughter (Exh. 8). In 1932 Gregoria T. Ramos and Candida Ramos leased the said
lots to Felix Yulo (Exh. 20).Yulo in 1934 transferred his lease rights over Hacienda
Calazato Juan S. Bonin and Nestor Olmedo, the husband of plaintiff Atanacia
Ramos (Exh. 22). Bonin and Olmedo in 1935 sold their lease rights over Hacienda
Calaza to Jesus S. Consing (Exh. 23).
Those transactions prove that the heirs of Jose Ramos had repudiated any trust
which was supposedly constituted over Hacienda Calaza in favor of the plaintiffs.
Under Act 190, whose statute of limitations applies to this case (Art. 116, Civil
Code), the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten years Diaz vs.
Gorricho and Aguado, supra.).
Atanacia, Modesto and Manuel, all surnamed Ramos, were already of age in 1914
(Exh. A to D). From that year, they could have brought the action to annul the
partition. Maria Ramos and Emiliano Ramos were both born in 1896. They
reached the age of twenty-one years in 1917. They could have brought the action
from that year.
The instant action was filed only in 1957. As to Atanacia, Modesto and Manuel,
the action was filed forty-three years after it accrued and, as to Maria and
Emiliano, the action was filed forty years after it accrued. The delay was
inexcusable. The instant action is unquestionably barred by prescription and res
judicata.
This case is similar to Go Chi Gun vs. Co, 96 Phil. 622, where a partition judicially
approved in 1916 was sought to be annulled in 1948 on the ground of fraud. it
was contended that there was fraud because the real properties of the decedent
were all adjudicated to the eldest son, while the two daughters, who were
minors, were given only cash and shares of stocks. This Court, in upholding the
petition, said:
"In any case, the partition was given the stamp of judicial approval, and as a
matter of principle and policy we should sustain its regularity, in the absence of
such cause or reason that the law itself fixes as a ground for invalidity" (on page
634). "As the administration proceedings ended in the year 1916, the
guardianship proceedings in 1931, and the action was brought only in the year
1948, more than 32 years from the time of the distribution and 27 years from the
termination of guardianship proceedings", the action was barred by laches (on
page 637). See Lopez vs. Gonzaga, L-18788, January 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 167;
Cuaycong vs. Cuaycong, supra).
The leading case of Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343, repeatedly cited by the
plaintiffs, does not involve any issue of prescription or laches. In that case, the
action for reconveyance was seasonably brought. The alleged trustee was an
overseer who secured title in his name for the land of his brother which was
under his administration. He could not have acquired it by prescription because
his possession was not adverse. On certain occasions, he had admitted that he
was merely the administrator of the land and not its true owner.
More in point is the Cuaycong case, supra, where the action for the reconveyance
of property held in trust accrued in 1936 and it was filed only in 1961 or after the
lapse of twenty-five years. That action was barred.
On its face, the partition agreement was theoretically correct since the seven
natural children were given their full legitime, which under article 942 of the old
Civil Code was their share as legal heirs. But is was possible that the lands were
undervalued or were not properly appraised at their fair market value and,
therefore, the natural children were short-changed in the computation of the
value of their shares which the legitimate children could pay in case as allowed in
article 840 of the old Civil Code. It is of common knowledge that anyone who
received lands in the partition of a decedent's estate would ultimately have an
advantage over the one who received cash because lands increase in value as
time goes by while money is easily spent.
As pointed out in the statement if facts, it was anomalous that the manifestation,
evidencing the alleged receipt by the natural children of their shares, should
recite that they received their shares from the administrator, when in the project
of partition itself, as approved by the probate court (Exh. 3 to 6),it was stipulated
that Jose Ramos and Agustin Ramos would be the ones to pay the cash settlement
for their shares. No receipts were submitted to the court to prove that Jose
Ramos and Agustin Ramos paid to the plaintiffs the cash adjudicated to them in
the project of partition.
The plaintiffs pinpoint certain alleged irregularities in the intestate proceeding.
The aver that Modesto Ramos and Manuel Ramos were already of age in 1913
and could not therefore have been represented by Timoteo Zayco as guardian ad
litem and that, consequently, the two were denied due process. The plaintiffs
accused Zayco of not having competently protected the interests of the minors,
Maria Ramos and Emiliano Ramos. The allege that Atanacia Ramos signed the
project of partition and the "receipt" of share (Exh. 3 and 6)without
understanding those documents which were in Spanish. They assert that the
lopsided and defective partition was not implemented.
In short, the plaintiffs contend that the partition was not binding on them (Note
that their brother, Timoteo, considered himself bound by that partition). They ask
that the case be remanded to the lower court for the determination and
adjudication of their rightful shares.
All those contentions would have a semblance of cogency and would deserve
serious consideration if the plaintiffs had not slept on their rights. They allowed
more than forty years to elapse before they woke up and complained that they
were much aggrieved by the partition. Under the circumstances, their claims can
hardly evoke judicial compassion. Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura
subveniunt. "If eternal vigilance is the price of safety, one cannot sleep on one's
right for more than a tenth of a century and except it to be preserved in its
pristine purity" (Ozaeta, J. in Association Cooperativa de Credito Agricola de
Miagao vs. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 281, 283).
The plaintiffs have only themselves to blame if the courts at this late hour can no
longer afford them relief against the inequities allegedly vitiating the partition of
their father's estate.
In connection with the res judicata aspect of the case, it maybe clarified that in
the settlement of a decedent's estate it is not de rigueur for the heirs to sign a
partition agreement. "It is the judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests
title in the distributees" (Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu, L-17818, January 25,1967, 19
SCRA 85, 91) which in this case was Judge Campbell's decision (Exh. 4).
A judgment in an intestate proceeding may be considered asa judgment in
rem (Varela vs. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248, 267. See Sec. 49[a], Rule 39, Rules of
Court). There is a ruling that "if that decree of distribution was erroneous or not in
conformity with law or the testament, the same should have been corrected by
opportune appeal; but once it had become final; its binding effect is like that of
any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or
fraud". A partition approved by the court in 1939 could no longer be contested in
1956 on the ground of fraud. The action had already prescribed. "The fact that
one of the distributees was a minor at the time the court issued the decree of
distribution does not imply that the court had no jurisdiction to enter the decree
of distribution." (Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu, supra, citing Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil.
742). "A final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the
title to the land of the estate in the distributes" (Syllabus, Santos vs. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895, 900).
Parenthetically, it may be noted that the filing of the instant case long after the
death of Jose Ramos and other persons involved in the intestate proceeding
renders it difficult to determine with certitude whether the plaintiffs had really
been defrauded. What Justice Street said in Sinco vs. Longa, 51 Phil. 507, 518-9 is
relevant to this case.
In passing upon controversies of this character experience
teaches the danger of accepting lightly charged of fraud made
many years after the transaction in question was accomplished,
when death may have sealed the lips of the principal actors and
changes effected by time may have given a totally different
color to the cause of controversy. In the case before us the
guardia, Emilio Tevez, is dead. The same is true of Trinidad
Diago, mother of the defendant Agueda Longa; while Agapito
Longa is now living in Spain. It will be borne in mind also that,
insofar as oral proof is concerned, the charge of fraud rests
 principally on the testimony of a single witness who, if fraud was
committed, was a participant therein and who naturally would
now be anxious, so far as practicable, to put the blame on
others. In this connection it is well to bear in mind the following
impressive language of Mr. Justice Story:
... But length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence;
and as it thus removed from the parties all the immediate
means to verify the nature of the original transactions, it
operates by way of presumption, in favor of innocence, and
against imputation of fraud. It would be unreasonable, after a
great length of time, to require exact proof of all the minute
circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a satisfactory
explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent with which it
may be incumbered. The most that can fairly be expected, in
such cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty of memory,
and human infirmity, is, that the material facts can be given with
certainty to a common intent; and, if the parties are dead, and
the cases rest in confidence, and in parol agreements, the most
that we can hope is to arrive at probable conjectures, and to
substitute general presumption of law, for exact knowledge.
Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the
living, for, the legal presumption is the other way; as to the
dead, are not here to answer for themselves, it would be the
height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate
the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear,
beyond a reasonable doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat.
[U.S.],481, 498).
Defendants' appeal. Defendants Granada Ramos, Gregoria T. Ramos, Candida
Ramos, Jose Bayor and Agustin Ramos appealed from the lower court's decision
insofar as it ignored their counterclaim for P50,000 as moral damages and
P10,000 as attorney's fees. In their brief the claim for attorney's fees was
increased to P20,000. They prayed for exemplary damages.
The defendants argue that plaintiffs' action was baseless and was filed in gross
and evident bad faith. It is alleged that the action caused defendants mental
anguish, wounded feelings, moral shock and serious anxiety and compelled them
to hire the service of counsel and incur litigation expenses.
Articles 2219 and 2220 (also 1764 and 2206) of the Civil Code indicate the cases
where morel damages may be recovered. The instant litigation does not fall
within any of the enumerated cases. Nor can it be regarded as analogous to any of
the cases mentioned in those articles. Hence, defendants' claim for moral
damages cannot be sustained (Ventanilla vs. Centeno, 110 Phil. 811, 814). The
worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously
instituted are not the moral damages contemplated in the law (Solis & Yarisantos
vs. Salvador, L-17022, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 887).
"The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and
subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that
moral damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously."
(Barretto vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771, 779).
On the other hand, the award of reasonable attorney's fees is governed by article
2208 of the Civil Code which lays down the general rule that, in the absence of
stipulation, attorney's fees and litigation expenses cannot be recovered. Article
2208 specifies eleven instances where attorney's fees may be recovered. The
defendants did not point out the specific provision of article 2208 on which their
counterclaim may be predicated.
What may possibly apply to defendants' counterclaim are paragraphs four and
eleven which respectively provide that attorney's fees may be recovered "in case
of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff"(defendant is
a plaintiff in his counterclaim) or "in any other cases where the court deems it just
and equitable" that attorney's fees should be awarded.
We hold that, notwithstanding the dismissal of the action, no attorney's fees
should be granted to the defendants. Under the facts of the case, it cannot be
asseverated with dogmatic finality that plaintiffs' action was manifestly
unfounded or was maliciously filed to harass and embarrass the defendants. All
indications point to the fact that the plaintiffs honestly thought that they had a
good cause of action. They acted in evident good faith. (See Herrera vs. Luy Kim
Guan, 110 Phil. 1020, 1028; Rizal Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
L-23729, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 61).
Inasmuch as some of the plaintiffs were minors when the partition of their
father's landed estate was made, and considering that they were not allotted
even a few square meters out of the hundreds of hectares of lands, which
belonged to him, they had reason to feel aggrieved and to seek redress for their
grievances. Those circumstances as well as the marked contrast between their
indigence and the affluence of the heirs of their half-brother, Jose Ramos, might
have impelled them to ask the courts to reexamine the partition of their father's
estate.
It is not sound public policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. An adverse
decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning
party (Herrera vs. Luy Kim, supra; Heirs of Justiva vs. Gustilo, 61 O. G. 6959. Cf.
Lazatin vs. Twano and Castro, 112 Phil. 733, 741).
Since no compensatory and moral damages have been awarded in this case,
defendants' claim for exemplary damages, which was ventilated for the first time
in their appellants' brief, may be as an afterthought, cannot be granted(Art. 2229,
Civil Code).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the clarification that
defendants' counterclaim is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-39381 July 18, 1975
FELISA LIM, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GUADALUPE ENRIQUEZ UY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-39033 July 18, 1975
GUADALUPE ENRIQUEZ UY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA LIM, respondents.
Juanito R. Sagun for Felisa Lim.
Pedro G. Uy and Francisco D. Bacabac for Guadalupe Enriquez Uy.
CASTRO, J.:
These two petitions for certiorari were separately filed by Felisa Lim and
Guadalupe Enriquez Uy to review the decision dated June 6, 1974 of the Court of
Appeals, and the resolutions dated September 12, 1974 and July 18, 1974 of the
same court denying their respective motions for reconsideration. We affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
In 1962 Felisa Lim brought suit against Francisco Miguel Romualdez Uy Chen Hong
in the Court of First Instance of Manila for (1) declaration of nullity of the affidavit
Uy executed in which he adjudicated to himself, as the only son and heir of
Susana Lim, a lot (120 square meters) with the house thereon located at Tayabas
St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; (2) cancellation of the certificate of title issued in the name
of Uy; and (3) issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in her favor.
Both Uy and Felisa Lim claimed they inherited, to the exclusion of each other, the
property in question from Susana Lim. Felisa Lim claims to be the natural
daughter of Susana Lim. To support her claim, she presented (1) her certificate of
baptism, which certificate states that Felisa Lim is the natural daughter of Susana
Lim; and (2) her marriage contract, which contract states that Susana Lim gave
consent to Felisa Lim's mother. Felisa Lim also alleges continuous possession of
the status of a natural child.
On the other hand, Uy claimed to be the only son and heir of Susana Lim. To
support his claim, he presented, among others, (1) his application for alien
registration in the Bureau of Immigration, which application names Susana Lim as
Uy's mother; (2) the order of the Bureau of Immigration cancelling his alien
registration, which order describes Uy as a Filipino citizen by derivation from his
mother Susana Lim; and (3) his identification certificate issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, which certificate likewise describes Uy as a citizen of the Philippines
by derivation from his mother Susana Lim.
On November 22, 1967 the court a quo, after finding Felisa Lim as "the daughter
and only heir" of Susana Lim, rendered judgment declaring the affidavit executed
by Uy null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila (1) to cancel the
registration of the said affidavit, (2) to cancel the certificate of title in the name of
Uy, and (3) to issue a new transfer certificate of title in favor of Felisa Lim.
Uy then moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision and asked for new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. This motion for reconsideration
and new trial the court a quo denied.
Uy appealed to the Court of Appeals.1 On June 6, 1974 the appellate court
reversed the judgment dated November 22, 1967 of the court a quo and
dismissed the complaint. The appellate court ruled that neither Felisa Lim nor Uy
"is entitled to the inheritance because neither of them had been recognized by
Susana Lim as her child by any of the means provided for by law; and neither had
either of them been declared in a judicial proceeding to be a child of Susana Lim."
Both parties' subsequent respective motions for reconsideration were denied.
Hence the present recourse by both parties against the judgement dated June 6,
1974 of the appellate court as well its resolutions dated September 12,1974 and
July 18, 1974 denying their respective motions for reconsideration.
In L-39381, Felisa Lim assails the finding of the appellate court that she "has no
right to inherit from Susana Lim, even on the assumption that she is her natural
daughter, as she had not been recognized by any of the means provided for by
the New Civil Code." Felisa Lim alleges that Susana Lim's consent to her marriage,
given pursuant to Act 3613 (The Marriage Law), amounted to an admission and
recognition on the part of Susana Lim that she (Felisa) is her natural daughter.
Felisa Lim adds that the records in the office of the Local Civil Registrar pertaining
to her marriage license, "together with the supporting papers which included the
consent given by Susana Lim, were destroyed during the liberation of the City of
Manila." However, that Susana Lim gave consent to her marriage, Felisa Lim
asserts, the marriage contract evinces. Felisa Lim states that the marriage
contract partakes of a public document and thus fulfills the provisions of the old
Civil Code (re recognition "in some other public document") and the new Civil
Code (re recognition "in any authentic writing").
In L-39033, Guadalupe Enriquez Uy takes exception to the appellate court's non-
adjudication of the property in question in favor of her husband. The finding of
the appellate court that her husband "is not likewise entitled to inherit from
Susana Lim" makes no difference, she states, for her husband purchased the
property in question "with his own money prior to his mother's death and took
conveyance and title thereof" in his mother's name in deference to her since "she
gave him a little amount to complete the purchase price."
L-39381
At the outset, it should be noted that Felisa Lim claims that her recognition by
Susana Lim as her (the latter's) natural child took place in 1943. Since the
recognition allegedly took place during the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1889,
such recognition should be reckoned in accordance with the requisites established
by the said Civil Code. For, the law in force at the time of the recognition governs
the act of recognition.
Section 131 of the Civil Code of 1889 requires that the recognition of a natural
child "be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document."
Felisa Lim argues that her marriage contract partakes of a public document.
According to article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, public documents "are those
authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities
required by law." Thus, "there are two classes of public documents, those
executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and
those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office."2 "The public
document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition
may be made belongs to the first class."3
The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy the requirements
of solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889. Such contract is
not a written act with the intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument
executed in due form before a notary and certified by him. The marriage contract
is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each
other as husband and wife, signed by signature or mark by the said contracting
parties and the said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the
marriage. The marriage contract does not possess the requisites of a public
document of recognition. Be it remembered that recognition, under the Civil Code
of 1889, "must be precise, express and solemn."4
L-39033
Uy claims that her husband purchased the property in question with his own
money prior to Susana Lim's death but took conveyance thereof in her name. In
the circumstances, she alleges, an implied trust exists in favor of her husband. She
questions the statement made by the appellate court in its resolution dated July
18, 1974 denying her motion for reconsideration, which statement reads: "The
title is in the name of Susana Lim, and oral testimony cannot overcome the fact
that the sale was made to Susana Lim and title issued in her favor."
An implied trust arises "where a person purchases land with his own money and
takes conveyance thereof in the name of another. In such a case, the property is
held on a resulting trust in favor of the one furnishing the consideration for the
transfer, unless a different intention or understanding appears. The trust which
results under such circumstances does not arise from contract or agreement of
the parties, but from the facts and circumstances, that is to say, it results because
of equity and arises by implication or operation of law."5
To support her allegation regarding the existence of an implied trust, Uy
presented excerpts from the respective testimonies of her deceased husband, her
husband's half-brother, and the former owner of the property in question. These
testimonies, as excerpted, tend to prove (1) that the deceased Uy received a
P10,000 legacy from his father; (2) that he purchased the property in question;
and (3) that the name of Susana Lim appeared on the deed of sale.
It is thus asserted that the deceased Uy furnished the consideration, although he
asked Susana Lim for a little amount to complete the purchases price of the
property in question, and that having supplied the greater portion of the purchase
money, he intended the purchase for his own benefit.
It is our view that two countervailing circumstances militate against Uy's theory of
an implied trust in favor of her husband. (1) Uy raised the theory of implied trust
for the first time in her motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court;
(2) the evidence regarding the alleged purchase by her late husband is altogether
unconvincing.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
RS OF RAYMUNDO C. BAAS, namely, TRINIDAD VECINO VDA. DE BAAS, LUIS
V. BAAS JOSE V. BAAS, CONRADO V. BAAS ESTER V. BAAS CELIA V. BAAS,
and ANTONIO DE GUZMAN, plaintiffs-appellants
vs.
HEIRS OF BIBIANO BARAS, namely, FAUSTINA VECINO VDA. DE BAAS ANTONIO
V. BAAS BIBIANO V. BAAS JR., ROSITA V. BAAS, ANGEL V. BAAS, MIGUEL
DIVINO JACINTO DE DIOS and BAAS & SONS, INC., defendants-appellees.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision dated January 5, 1966 of the then Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 59859, which dismiss plaintiffs-
appellants' complaint for partition or recovery of hereditary share, fruits and
damages.
Plaintiffs-appellants, in their complaint filed no February 12, 1965, alleged that
the late Raymundo Baas their predecess-or-in-interest, was the acknowledged
natural son of the late Bibiano Baas defendants-appellees' predecessor- in-
interest; that therefore, they are, by descent, entitled to a share in the estate of
the late Bibiano Baas.
Defendants-appellees, in answer to the complaint, denied that Raymundo Baas
was the natural son of the late Bibiano Baas nor was he ever acknowledged by
the latter and his family as such; and by way of special and/or affirmative
defenses alleged that the use of the surname Baas by Raymundo was justified on
an alleged kinship of Raymundo Baas with Pedro Baas brother of Bibiano Baas.
The following antecedent facts culled from the records are not disputed, to wit:
The late Raymundo Baas was a natural child being born out of wedlock on March
15, 1894, in Sampaloc, Manila, of Dolores Castillo and of an unknown father (p.
103, CFI rec.). During this time, Bibiano Baas was still single (pp. 38-39, CFI rec.).
When Raymundo was of school age, he studied at the Colegio de San Beda It was
Bibiano Baas who shouldered Raymundo's school expenses. Raymundo pursued
his studies until he became a public school teacher (pp. 70-88, CFI rec.). At this
juncture, the records are completely bereft of any evidence to show whether or
not Bibiano Baas lived with Raymundo and his mother. At any rate, the records
show that by the year 1922, Raymundo Baas used to go to the place of Bibiano
Baas once or twice a week, and it was in one of his visits, sometime between
1922 and 1923, that he met Trinidad Vecino, a niece of Faustina Vecino Baas the
wife of Bibiano Baas (pp. 379-381, CFI rec.). Trinidad Vecino lived with the family
of Bibiano Baas and took care of his children ever since she was a young girl,
sometime in 1909 (p. 391, CFI rec.).
On October 9,1926, Raymundo married Trinidad Vecino. In their marriage
certificate (Exh. "H"), the name of the father of Raymundo was stated to be
Bibiano Baas Pedro Baas' name appeared in the marriage certificate as one of
the sponsors (p. 66, CFI rec.).
After their marriage, Raymundo and Trinidad resided at Gastambide St.,
Sampaloc, Manila. Dolores Castillo, mother of Raymundo, lived with the couple
until she died no December 27, 1940 (p. 363, CFI rec.). From Gastambide St., they
transferred to Sigay St., Quiapo, Manila, where they were sometimes visited by
Bibiano Baas and his wife Faustina (pp. 373 & 358, CFI rec.).
On December 1, 1928, Raymundo Baas and Pedro Baas executed sworn
statements before Atty. Andres Faustino wherein Raymundo Baas declared that
he was the natural son of Dolores Castillo and of an unknown father as it
appeared in his baptismal certificate; that in due time, he came to know that his
natural father was Pedro Baas that he had realized that in his marriage
certificate, dated October 9, 1926, an error had been committed in that the name
of his father stated therein was Bibiano Baas brother of his said father Pedro
Baas and that he is executing that sworn statement to put things in their proper
place. This was recorded in the notarial book of Notary Public Andres R. Faustino
as Document No. 153, series of 1928 (p. 103, CFI rec.).
Pedro Baas in his sworn statement, declared that he has a natural son named
Raymundo Baas whom he had with Dolores Castillo, and whom he recognized as
such; that he came to know that in the marriage certificate of his aforesaid son an
error had been committed in that the name of the father of Raymundo Baas
appeared therein to be Bibiano Baas instead of Pedro Baas that he was
executing that document to put things in the right place, and also to ask for the
correction from the Justice of the Peace of the Municipality of Pasay, Rizal, of the
aforesaid error committed in the marriage certificate of his son Raymundo Baas
and Trinidad Vecino. This was recorded in the notarial book of Notary Public
Andres R. Faustino as Document No. 154, series of 1928 (p. 113, CFI rec.).
These sworn statements of Raymundo Baas and Pedro Baas were filed with the
Office of Justice of the Peace Ed. Aenlle of Pasay, Rizal before whom the marriage
of Raymundo Baas and Trinidad Vecino was solemnized. Accordingly, justice of
the Peace Ed. Aenlle issued the following constancia:
En esta fecha se han presentado en esta Oficina una declaracion
suscrita y jurada ante el Notario Publico de Manila, Andres R.
Faustino, el dia 1.0 del actual, por Raymundo Baas que
contrajo matrimonio con Trinidad Vecino, segun el presente
certificado de matrimonio haciendo constar que el verdadero
nombre de su padre es PEDRO BARAS, y no BIBIANO Baas
como erroneamente se puso en dicho certificado; y otra
declaracion suscrita y jurada en dicha fecha y ante el mismo
Notario Publico, por Pedro Baas haciendo constar que el es el
padre de dicho contrayente Raymundo Baas y no Bibiano
Baas como equivocadamente se consigno en dicho certificado;
uedando archivadas y unidas dichas declaracion juradas al
referido certificado para los efectos consiguientes las cuales se
han transferido al Secretario Municipal de este Municipio
juntamente con esta constancia. Y para que conste extiendo la
presente corstancia en Pasay, Rizal hoy a 7 de Diciembre de
1928,
 A
At the bottom of this constancia ethere appears a handwritten notation marked
Exhibit " 2-a ", which reads as follows:
n
El original de esta
l timbre del juzgado se llevo Trinidad Vecino.
Consequently, in the certified copy l of the marriage contract of Raymundo Baas
and Trinidad Vecino, Exhibit "H", ethe following remark appears:
Segun declaracion
, adjunta en el certificado de matrimonio de
Raymundo Baas J el padre de este es Pedro Baas y no Bibiano
Baas (Exh. "4",up. 66, CFI rec.).
On June 30, 1930, Pedro Baas wrote e to M.R.P. Juez del Arzobispado de Manila"
wherein he reiterated that he hadz recognized his natural son born of Dolores
Castillo and baptized on March 25, 1984 as Raymundo Castillo; that according to
the medical certificate issued by Dr.d M. Mallare Dolores
Castillo suffers from mental deficiency;
e that he was submitting therewith copies
of the declaraciones juradas executed by him and his aforesaid son no December
1, 1928 before Notary Public Andres P R. Faustino; and that he was requesting that
the necessary correction in the certificate
a of baptism of Raymundo Baas as well
as those of the latter's children, Luis
z and Jose, be made by indicating that the
father of said Raymundo,
( and the paternal grandfather of said Luis and Jose, is
Pedro Baas and E not Bibiano Baas (p. 116, CFI rec.; Exh. "9").
On July 1, 1930,x Bibiano Baas executed a sworn statement stating therein that
Pedro Baas had h a child, Raymundo Baas with Dolores Castillo. This was
recorded in the. notarial book of Notary Public Vicente Larna as Document No.
1078, series of 1930 (p. 115, CFI rec.).
Sometime in January,
" 1931, Raymundo and his family moved to 1444 Kalimbas St.,
Santa Cruz, Manila.
2 The property in Kalimbas St. belonged to Bibiano Baas and
was transferred" to Raymundo's name on August 4, 1936 by virtue of a Deed of
Sale executed by , Bibiano Baas in favor of Raymundo Baas for the sum of one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) [Exhs. "11" & "l 1-a"; p. 120; CFI rec.].
On April 25, 1954,
P Bibiano Baas died survived by his wife and children, the
defendants-appellees
. herein (p. 105, CFI rec.).
In May, 1955, Raymundo Baas wrote two letters (Exhs. "J" & "J-1") to Atty.
Andres Faustino1 in which he complained bitterly about the alleged injustices done
to him by Faustina
0 Vecino vda. de Baas at the same time stating that he would
know what to do 4 at the proper time. Pertinent portions of said letters read as
follows: ,
Upang makapanloko, ginawa ni Gg. Baas ang lahat ng kanyang
C abilidad o paraan [metodo o sistema] upang sa huling panahon
F ako isang maliit na inapi at dinayaay mawalan ng lakas o
I katibayan na makapaghabol [sa mana] Subali't ang Diyos po ay
marunong. Tinutulungan Niya ang isang taong inaapi. Ako po ay
r mayroong KATIBAYAN [BUHAY] (pp. 68- 69, CFI rec.).
On June 24, 1955,e more than a year after the death of Bibiano Baas his heirs, the
defendants-appellees
c herein, extra-judicially settled his estate by means of a deed
of extra-judicial. settlement among themselves. The deed of extra-judicial
settlement was notarized by Atty. Angel Vecino, brother of Trinidad Vecino (pp.
105-111, CFI rec.).
On November 7, 1955, the spouses Raymundo Baas and Trinidad Vecino
executed a mortgage over their house and lot in 1444 Kalimbas St., Sta. Cruz,
Manila, in favor of herein defendant-appellee Angel V. Baas for the sum of
seventeen thousand pesos (P17,000.00). The mortgage contract was also (2) Exhibit "B"a directory and homecoming souvenir program
prepared by Atty. Angel Vecino (p. 423, CFI rec.). After the spouses had paid more of the San Beda Alumni Association dated 1956 wherein
or less, twelve thousand pesos (Pl2,000.00), the mortgage was cancelled by Angel thisentry is found: Baas R.CS'06" (p. 202, CFI rec.).
V. Baas (pp. 425,432, CFI rec.). (3) Exhibits "C" & "C1" two original copies of receipts of
On February 25, 1962, Raymundo C. Baas died survived his wife and children, the payments for matriculation, dated June 13, and November I of
plaintiffs-appellants herein (p. 93, CFI rec.; Exh. "N"). the year 1905 (p. 64, CFI Rec.).
On February 12, 1965, almost three years after the death of Raymundo Baas his (4) Exhibits "D" & "E"the 1904 and 1905 matriculation
heirs, the plaintiffs-appellants herein, filed the instant complaint for partition or certificates of Raymundo Baas in San Beda College wherein it is
recovery of hereditary share, fruits and damages against the heirs of the late stated that Raymundo Baas is "hijo de Bibiano Baas (p. 63, CFI
Bibiano Baas Sr., herein defendants-appellees. rec.).
In support of their claim, plaintiffs-appellants presented Trinidad Vecino vda. de (5) Exhibits "F", "F-1", "G" and "G-1"the 1910 and 1911 report
Baas who testified that after the death of her husband in 1962, she discovered cards of Raymundo Baas for the fifth and sixth grades of the
certain documents in his aparador which established his filiation. Plaintiffs- Sampaloc Intermediate School. Exhibit "F-1" is the space at the
appellants presented these documents as evidence of their contention that the back of the report card for the signatures of the parent or
late Raymundo Baas was the acknowledged natural son of the late Bibiano Baas guardian. The signatures in this space had been erased,
to wit: although not thoroughly, so that it can still be seen at close
(1) Exhibit "A"a handwritten note preserved in a glass frame examination that the signatures appear to be that of Bibiano
which reads: Baas Plaintiff-appellants have not offered any explanation for
Mundo hoy a las 10 y 45. Tu no estas en casa. No requieres tu these erasures. Exhibit "G-1" contains the following entries:
obedecer lo que te dije que en estas horas estudiar, descansar y B. of E. Form No, 137
ayudar con su madre. Que no veo mas otraves asi. PUPIL'S RECORD CARD
23/5/7 Name Baas Raymundo
S Age 17 on March 15, 1911.
u Home Address 62 Progreso
Province Manila Int. Quiapo
P Parentor-
a Guardian BibianoBaas Occupation Reg.
d Practitioner (p. 65, CFI rec.).
r (6) Exhibit "I"a type-written statement of Raymundo Baas
e dated Oct. 6, 1958 setting forth his alleged personal
( circumstances (p. 67, CFI rec.).
S (7) Exhibits "J", "J-1" and "J-2"the carbon copies of the
g typewritten letters sent by Raymundo Baas to Atty. Andres
d Faustino (pp. 68-69, CFI rec.).
. (8) Exhibits "K" & "L"the autobiographies of Raymundo Baas
) Exhibit "L" is typewritten and contains intercalations, alterations
and spoliations (pp. 70 & 123, CFI rec.).
Plaintiffs-appellants
B also presented the marriage certificate of Raymundo Baas
and Trinidad Vecino
. as evidence and was marked as Exhibit "H".

B
Defendants-appellees, no the other hand, presented defendant-appellee Bibiano
Baas Jr., who testified that after the death of Bibiano Baas Sr. in 1954, the
following documents were found in the latter's safe:
(1) Duplicate original copies of the "Declaracion Jurada of
Raymundo Baas and Pedro Baas executed no December 1,
1928, before Notary Public Andres R. Faustino (pp. 103 & 114,
CFI rec.; Exhs. " I " & " 7 ").
(2) Duplicate original copy of the "Declaracion Jurada of Bibiano
Baas dated July 1, 1930, executed before Notary Public Vicente
Larna (p. 115, CFI rec.; Exh. "8").
(3) Duplicate original copy of the letter of Pedro Baas dated
June 30, 1930, to the M.R.P. Juez Provisor del Arzobispado de
Manila (pp. 116-118, CFI rec.; Exh. "9").
(4) The envelope wherein the aforesaid
documents were contained when found in the
safe of Bibiano Baas Sr., no which there
appears a typewritten annotation no its face
which reads:
Asunto Civil de Raymundo No. 10953 en
Diciembre de 1913, en contra mia Sobresaido
2 Copias para el Sr. Arsobispo de Manila
reconosiendo que Pedro Baas es padre de
Raymundo a Dolores Castillo 30 de Junio de
1930. Aprobado.
Afidavit de D. Pedro Baas Bibiano y
Reymundo a 1 de Julio de 1930.
UN APUNTED DE Resumen de Raymundo que
hasindio un total de TRESMIL SEIS CIENTOS
UNO PESOS toniados a mi estudio con mis
firmas las fechas de tomas 8 de Enero de
1922" (p. 119, CFI rec.; Exhs. "10" & "10-a").
It is not disputed that Raymundo Baas had the status of a natural child. What is
being disputed is whether or not he was an acknowledged natural son of Bibiano
Baas.
The case was tried and no January 5, 1966, the trial court rendered a decision
dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint mainly no the following grounds:
(1) that the evidence presented by the plaintiffs-appellants were
not sufficient to prove their claim that Raymundo Baas was the
acknowledged natural child of the late Bibiano Baas
(2) that "considering the lack of express recognition, the sworn
declaration of Pedro Baas Exhibit 7, that Raymundo Baas was
his son, together with the express acknowledgment made by
Raymundo Baas in the sworn statement, Exhibit 1, that his
father was Pedro Baiffas and not Bibiano Baas entirely negates
the Idea that Raymundo was the son of Bibiano Baas;
(3) that since the note (Exh. "a") addressed to Mundo with the
complimentary ending "Su Padre, B. Baas invoked by the
plaintiffs-appellants as their principal evidence was executed in
1907, under the regime of the Spanish Civil Code, therefore the
question of whether or not Exhibit "A" is a valid form of
voluntary recognition should be decided according to the old
Civil Code; and in accordance with Art. 131 thereof such
document does not constitute a valid voluntary recognition;
(4) that "Raymundo Baas was the son of Pedro Baas Bibiano
Baas brother but since the evidence shows that Pedro Baas
was unable to support himself and his wife, it could very well be
that Bibiano Baas had sort of adopted or considered
Raymundo, the son of his brother, to be his own son and had
taken paternal solicitude for him",
(5) that "(T)he failure of Raymundo Baas to take any legal
action to enforce his alleged rights, or to make any written
demand upon the defendants herein, are all confirmatory of the
sworn statement, Exhibit 1, in which he declared that his father
was Pedro Baas",
(6) that "his failure to enforce his rights for a period of over
eight years is indicative of the lack of merit of plaintiffs' claim"
(pp45-54, CFI rec.).
Plaintiffs-appellants now come before this Court with the following assignment of
errors:
I. The trial court erred in not holding that the fifty-nine (59) year
old note of Doctor Bibiano Baas to his natural child, Raymundo
C. Baas (Exh. "A", page 25, Record no Appeal), being an
authentic writing, is a sufficient form of voluntary recognition
under articles 278 and 2260 of the New Civil Code, which entitle
the plaintiffs, as heirs of Raymundo C. Baas to claim
successional rights in the estate of Doctor Baas who died in
1954.
II. The trial court erred in not finding that Raymundo C. Baas
was the voluntarily acknowledged natural child of Doctor
Bibiano Baas as proven not only by Exhibit "A", but also by the
records of San Beda College (Exh. B to E) and by the records of
the Sampaloc Intermediate School (Exh. F and G) and the
marriage certificate (Exh. H).
III. The trial court erred (a) in giving probative value to the
affidavits, Exhibits 1 and 7 both dated December 1, 1928,
executed by Raymundo C. Baas and Pedro Baas and stating
that Raymundo was the natural son of Pedro Baas (b) in not
holding that said affidavits were nullified by the subsequent
documents, namely, the 1930 "Genealo"gy in the handwriting of
Raymundo C. Baas (Exh. K), and his typewritten autobiography
(Exh. L), wherein Raymundo clarified that his father was Bibiano
 Baas and (c) in not holding that said affidavits could not revoke
nor affect the status of Raymundo as a voluntarily
acknowledged natural child of Bibiano Baas by virtue of Exhibit
"A".
IV. That trial court erred in not holding that the entry in 1926
marriage certificate of Raymundo C. Baas and Trinidad Vecino
(EXIL H), that Bibiano Baas was the father of Raymundo, cannot
be corrected nor nullified by the 1928 affidavits, Exhibits 1 and
7, which state that Pedro Baas was Raymundo's father, nor can
such entry be the subject matter of the constancia of Justice of
the Peace Ed. Aenlle of Pasay (Exh. 2), a document which was
erroneously admitted as evidence by the trial court.
V. The trial court erred in not holding that the affidavits, Exhibits
1 and 7, stating that Raymundo C. Baas was the natural son of
Pedro Baas were part and parcel of an illegal and fraudulent
compromise no the civil status of Raymundo C. Baas whose
principal objective was to induce him to make a void
renunciation of his hereditary rights in the estate of Ms natural
father, Bibiano Baas.
VI. The trial court erred in assuming that Raymundo C. Baas
consulted his insane mother with respect to the execution of
Exhibits 1 and 7.
VII. The trial court erred in surmising that Bibiano Baas had sort
of adopted or considered Raymundo, the son of his brother, to
be his own and had taken paternal solicitude in him.
VIII. The trial court erred in holding that the failure of Raymundo
C. Baas to enforce his claim within the eight-year period from
1954, when Bibiano Baas died, to 1962, when Raymundo died,
shows that his claim had no merit.
IX. The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint and in not
ordering the defendants, as successors-in-interest of Doctor
Baas to deliver to the plaintiffs the hereditary share in the
properties in litigation of Raymundo C. Baas as a voluntarily
acknowledged natural child of Doctor Baas plus his share of the
fruits thereof and damages" (pp. a-d, Brief for the Plaintiffs-
Appellants, p. 19; rec.).
I Voluntary recognition of a natural child to be effective under the
The decisive issue to be resolved herein is whether or not Bibiano Baas had
voluntarily acknowledged Raymundo Baas as his natural son.
WE hold that there was no voluntary recognition in the instant case.
Plaintiffs-appellants rest their claim no Article 278 of the New Civil Code which
provides:
(7) Art. 278Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a
wilt a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing.
WE have ruled that Article 278 should be given retroactive effect (Moscoso vs. CA,
et all L-46439, April 24, 1984).
Plaintiffs-appellants admit that the main basis of their action is Exhibit "A" (Brief
for the Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 2; p. 19, rec.). Exhibit "A" is again quoted
hereunder:
Mundo hoy a las 10 y 45. Tu no estas en casa no requieres tu
obedecer loque te dije, que en estas horas estudiar, descansar y
ayudar con su madre. Que no veo mas otraves asi.
23/5/7
23/5/7 B. Baas
(p. 170, CFI rec.).
Trinidad Vecino vda. de Baas widow of the late Raymundo Baas and plaintiff-
appellant herein, testified that this note is in the handwriting of Bibiano Baas In
its regard, the observation of the trial court should be noted, and WE quote:
She said that she is familiar with the handwriting of Bibiano
Baas since she had often seen him write. This testimony,
however, must be considered as very much strained for Exhibit
"A" is dated "23/5/7"or 23 May 1907. While according to
Trinidad Vecino, she saw Bibiano Baas write only as early as
1917. Considering the long lapse of time, which was around 10
years, any testimony that the writing is the handwriting of a
person no the ground that the witness is familiar with the
handwriting must be considered unreliable (p. 49, CFI rec.).
Nevertheless, Exhibit "A" was admitted by the trial court no the ground that it is
an ancient document, the authenticity of which need not be proven.
Assuming that plaintiffs-appellants' Exhibit "A" is authentic document as
contemplated by Article 278 of the New Civil Code, We find that the same does
not constitute a sufficient proof of a valid voluntary recognition.
law (Art. 278), must be made expressly by the recognizing
parent, either in the record of birth, in a will in a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing" (Vol. 1-A
Padilla, Civil Law, 1975 ed., p. 83).
The formalities of voluntary recognition under Article 278 of the New Civil Code is
that recognition shall be express and made either in the record of birth, in a will,
in a statement in a court of record, or in any authentic writing (Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
Civil Law, Vol. 1, p. 262).
In the case of Intestate Estate of Pareja vs. Pareja (95 Phil. 171, 172), Justice
Labrador quoted Sanchez Roman who said that recognition of natural children
must be precise, express, and solemn, thus:
54. En cuanto a los elementos formales del reconocimiento de
hijos naturales, o sean las formas legales de llevarlo a cabo, las
establecidas por el Codigo son de caracter taxativo, expreso y
solemne.
Lo primero, porque, segun el art. 131 y sus complementarios,
132, 133, solo puede las tener lugar dicho reconocimiento en el
acta de nacimiento, en testamento o en otro documento
publico, y en este ultimo caso, cuando el reconocimiento, sea de
un menor, con la aprobacion judicial y audiencia del Ministerio
fiscal, asi como cuando es de un mayor, siempre con su
consentimiemto, segun ya se ha dicho (1).
Lo segundo, porque de este mismo criterio legal taxativo y de
los medios unicos que establece el articulo 131, se deduce una
vez mas, que el Codigo, apartandose del sentido declarado por
la jurisprudencia del Derecho anterior, no acepta la doctrina del
reconocimiento tacito, ni siquira la de la libertad para acreditario
por cualquiera de los medios de prueba establecidos en
Derecho, cuando del reconocimiento voluntario propiamente tal
se trate, siendo, a lo sumo, aquellos medios, elementos para
fundar la demanda del llmado reconocimiento forzoso, a que se
refieren los articulos 135 y 136 (2), siempre que concurran las
circunstancias especificas, en cuanto a la prueba de la filiacion
natural, que los mismos enumeran.
Lo tercerro, porque todas las formas de llevar a cabo el
reconocimiento, taxativamente expresadas en el articulo 131 y
complementadas para algun caso en el segundo parrafo del 133,
son de caracter solemne, segun lo revelan sus distintas especies,
y hasta la mas generica que expresa de documento publico, curo
valor legal se establece por el articulo 1.216 (3) del Codigo; y
para este efecto, como tal, debe considerarse el acta de
conciliacion, calificada de documento publico y solemne por la
ley de Enjuiciamiento civil (4). Tampoco cabe nagar tal caracter
a la forma especial del testamento olografo, no obstante la
condicion privada de su otorgamiento, puesto que la cualidad
de documento publico la adquiere desde el momento en que es
protocolado (5) [Tomo 5, Vol. 2, Sanchez Roman, p. 1043]
(Emphasis supplied).
The same concept still holds under the new law since Article 278 of the New Civil
Code was taken from Article 131 of the Old Civil Code, except that the present
Code adds "statement before a court of record" as a new means of recognition
and changes "public document" in the old Code to "authentic writing. "
Consequently, the trial court was correct when it said:
The question to determine is whether Exbibit "A" is a document
sufficient to constitute a recognition of Raymundo Baas by
Bibiano Baas The note is addressed to Mundo and ends with
the complimentary with the endingSu padre, B. BaasAre the
words Su padre, B. Baasa sufficient recognition of Raymundo
by Bibiano? This question must be decided no the strength of
Exhibit "A" alone and not by the other evidence submitted by
the plaintiff. If the Court had allowed the submission of
evidence to show that Raymundo Baas was the son of Bibiano
Baas it was only for the purpose of showing that Mundo, the
person addressed to in Exhibit "A", was Raymundo Baas. The
words Su Padre considering the evidence for the defendants are
in the opinion of the Court not sufficient to constitute an intent
to recognize.
xxx xxx xxx
There is nothing in Exhibit "A", outside of the complimentary
ending, that Raymundo Baas is the son of Bibiano Baas (p. 50,
CFI rec.; emphasis supplied).
The complimentary ending, Su padre," taking into consideration the context of
the entire letter (EXIL "A"), is not an indubitable acknowledgment of paternity. It
is a mere indication of paternal solicitude.
The Filipinos are known for having very close family ties. Extended families are a
common set-up among them, sometimes to the extent that strangers are also
considered as part of the family. In addition, Filipinos are generally fond of
children, so that children of relatives or even of strangers are supported if their
parents are not capable to do so. This is a manifestation of the fact that Filipinos
are stin living in a patriarchal society (see opinion of then C.A. Justice Castro
quoted by Chief Justice Bengzon in Gustilo vs. Gustilo, 14 SCRA 154).
Thus, in the case of Gustilo vs. Gustilo, supra, penned by Chief Justice Bengzon,
analogous to the case at bar, wherein the evidence submitted as proof of
voluntary recognition does not only include a letter written by the alleged father
to the natural child which also ends with the complimentary ending" ... tu padre,"
but other stronger evidence tending to show voluntary recognition, this Court
held that such evidence does not prove express recognition. Pertinent portions of
the decision reads as follows:
The pertinent facts of the case were accurately described in the
decision of Mr. Justice Castro of the Court of Appeals:
At the trial she (Rosa) was allowed, over the objection of the
defendants to introduce evidence tending to show that she was
begotten in 1898, out of wedlock by Calixto Gustilo and Teodora
Soqueo (both deceased) who, at the time of her conception,
could marry each other without legal impediment; that from her
birth until the age of 7, she was under the custody of her
mother who was supported by Calixto Gustilo; that in 1902,
Calixto Gustilo married Martina Poblador; and that at the age of
seven she was taken into the custody of the said spouses with
whom she lived for almost fifteen years. The evidence for the
plaintiff further shows that in the year 1902, she studied at the
Zarraga public school while she was staying with the mother of
Martina at the poblacion of Zarraga; that she later enrolled at
the Colegio de San Jose and at the Colegio de Santa Ana
together with her sister Josefa, and all her expenses were borne
by Calixto; that all along she was considered as a member of the
family and addressed by her father as "Inday" and at nines
"Rosa," and was introduced in pubic gatherings by Calixto as his
daughter; and that she received the same treatment from her
brothers and sisters and her foster mother Martina Poblador.
xxx xxx xxx
The items of documentary evidence introduced by the plaintiff
are the following
(1) Exh. Aa marriage certificate which states that no the 8th
day of October, 1922, Juan Sumagaysay, 26 years of age, the son
of Rufino Sumagaysay and Gregoria Sebusa resident of Leganes
Iloilo, was married to Rosa Gustilo, 23 years of age, the daughter
of Calixto Gustilo and Teodora Soqueo.
(2) Exh. Ba letter of Calixto Gustilo addressed to Rosa, and
dated February 12, 1917, pertinent part of which reads:
'Seorita Rosa Gustilo y su hermana Josefa, Queridas hija: ...
Conservamas buenas que es siempre el desee de tu padre (Fdo.)
CALIXTO GUSTILO.
(3) Exh. Ca letter of Augusta Gustilo to Rosa Gustilo dated
September 5, 1918 which in part says: "Senorita Rosa Gustilo,
Colegio Santa Ana, Molo, Iloilo Islas Filipinos, Mis muy queridas
Hermanas: ...Vuestro hermano que es requiere (Fdo.) AUGUSTO
GUSTILO.
(4) Exh. Da letter of August Gustilo to Rosa dated February 1,
1920, which in part says: 'Senorita Rosa Gustilo, Zarraga, Iloilo,
Islas Filipinos, Mis querida hermana: ... Tu hermano que te
requiere. (Fdo.) AUGUSTO GUSTILO.
(5) Exh. Ea motion filed by Augusta Gustilo with the Court in
behalf of Rosa dated December 10, 1945, which in part reads:
'Rosa Gustilo, my sister, is the registered owner of Lot 9500 of
the Cadastral Survey of Santa Barbara, now Zarraga. ... (fdo.)
AUGUSTO GUSTILO.
(6) Exh. Fa deed of donation executed by Calixto Gustilo
himself in favor of Rosa in a public document, duly accepted by
the latter in the same document, which states in substance that
in consideration of the donation the donee will renounce her
participation in his estate after his death.
Under the facts set out in the first paragraph above quoted,
Rosa Gustilo could conceivably have filed an action for
compulsory recognition under Art. 283 of the New Civil Code
alleging continuous possession of the status of a natural child of
Calixto Gustilo by direct acts of the latter or of his family; but as
she did not file such action before his death, she is now
precluded from bringing it, inasmuch as she was already mature
(64) when Calixto died; and as she did not claim (nor prove) to
have discovered after his death some document actually
recognizing her.
Therefore, this action may not be entertained as an action to
compel recognition It must be regarded as an action by a
recognized natural child to enforce her rights as such. As the
Court of Ap has stated, the only provision of law upon which
Rosa may now rest her claim is Art. 278 of the New Civil Code,
which reads as follows:
Art. ...
Admittedly, plaintiff has not been recognized in a record of
birth, nor in a will but she rests her claim to filiation no the
strength of either a statement before a court of record or
statements in an authentic writing. It must be obvious that such
statement, to be effective, must be one made by Calixto
himself; and that the writing must be the writing of Calixto.
Let us now examine the documents presented.
Exh. Athe certificate of marriage of Rosa Gustilo with Juan
Sumagaysay, stating she was the daughter of Calixto Gustilo and
Teodora Soqueo.
As it does not appear that this has been signed by Calixtoit is
enough.
On the same ground, the other papers, Exhs. C, D and E all
signed by Augusto Gustilo must be discarded.
Exh. Bis a letter signed by Calixto addressed to "Rosa Gustilo y
su hermana Josefa." It says: "Queridas hijas: ... Conservanmas
buenas que es siempre el desee de tu padre."
The Court of Appeals deemed this letter to be insufficient for it
contends no unequivocal avowal that Rosa was Calixto's child.
Indeed, it was addressed also to Josefa who was admittedly his
own child. It should specially be noted that the letter spoke of tu
padre' referring to his wife Martina who was the mother of
Josefa not of Rosa. At any rate there is much sense in Justice
Castro's observation that 'it is not uncommon in many Filipino
homes that a child who is a perfect stranger to the family but
who was taken under similar circumstances, is regarded as a
member of the family and called "hija" or "hijo " by the head
thereof.' This view follows and coincides with the line of thought
expressed by Manresa in that portion of his commentaries,
quoted with approval in Joaquin v. Joaquin, 60 PhiL 399 wherein
adverting to written acknowledgments of paternity of a natural
child, he explained:
 En cuanto al otro requisito de ser expreso el reconocimiento ...
el excrito, aunque contenga otros particulares, como sucede en
los testamentos, ha de tener por objeto el reconocimiento
deliverado y expreso del hijo natural. No ulna, pues, ese objeto
la manifestation que incidentalmente haga el padre de ser hijo
natural suyo la persona a quien se refiera, y mucho mas el dar a
una persona el titulo y tratemiento de hijo en certas familiares
(Manresa, Commentarios al Codigo Civil, Tomo 1, pag. 580, 3a
ed.)
Needless to add, Manresa's above opinion was written as a
comment to Art. 131 of the Spanish Civil Code which is exactly
the same as Art. 278 of the New Civil Code, except that 'in some
other public document' has been substituted with 'in any
authentic writing.
This letterto recall our previous indicationscould probably
be material evidence in a suit to compel recognition. However, it
is not by itself a voluntary act of recognition, such as is
contemplated in Art. 278, which act must be precise and express
(Pareja v. Pareja, L-6823, May 31, 1954). For as Gitt v.
Gitt exemplifies, there may be direct acts of the father which
though not constituting voluntary acknowledgment of a natural
child, may be used to "compel" recognition as such (emphasis
supplied).
A FORTIORI plaintiffs-appellants' argument that Exhibit As
complimentary clause "su padre," is a categorical admission by
Bibiano Baas that he was the father of "Mundo" or Raymundo
Baas must necessarily fail.
II
Plaintiffs-appellants argued that under the rule of incidental acknowledgment,
Exhibit "A" is a sufficient form of recognition (p. 19, rec., Brief for the Plaintiffs-
appellants, p. 40). To support their contention, plaintiffs-appellants cited the case
of Donado vs. Menendez Donado (55 Phil. 861, 872), and quoted therefrom the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
The terms in which the acknowledgment is made are immaterial
and Goyena's opinion is admissible that, with reference to
article 124 of the bill of 1851, the law inclines favorably to an
acknowledgment made incidentally or in any terms, so long as
the intention to acknowledge sufficiently appears. "It is
enough," he adds, "that the testator mention the legatee as his
natural child," who may thenceforth demand his rights as a
natural child, even if the will is revoked.
According to the cases cited above and Manresa's opinion,
acknowledgment made in a public or private document need not
be direct, but may even incidentally admit that the person
whose name appears in the document in question is the
subscriber's child (p. 19, rec., p. 41, Brief for the Plaintiffs-
appellants, emphasis supplied).
Plaintiffs-appellants went no further to cite the cases of Javelona vs.
Monteclaro (74 Phil. 393), Apacible vs. Castillo(74 PhiL 589), and Cosio vs. Pili (10
PhiL 72). They alleged that based no the above-mentioned quotation and cited
cases, the rule of incidental acknowledgment applies to Exhibit "A" which,
therefore, constitutes a sufficient and valid voluntary recognition of Raymundo
Baas by Bibiano Baas.
WE do not agree. Plaintiffs-appellants have erroneously applied the rule of
incidental acknowledgment. They have completely failed to note that all of the
authorities they cited endorse incidental acknowledgment, in cases of voluntary
recognition, if the alleged voluntary recognition were made in a public document.
The reason for this is quite simple. Nowhere in these cited cases can be found any
statement that incidental voluntary acknowledgment may be made in a private
writing, simply because all of these cited cases were decided long before the
adoption of the New Civil Code. Under the regime of the Old Civil Code, a
voluntary recognition can only be made in a record of birth, will or other public
document (Art. 131). A private writing or document, under the Old Civil Code,
may be considered as an "indubitable writing" which is a ground for compulsory
recognition according to Art. 135 thereof.
Justice Villa-Real in the case of Donado vs. Menendez Donado (55 Phil. 861), cited
by the plaintiffs-appellants, was referring to both Articles 131 and 135 of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889, or the Old Civil Code, when he said that, an
"acknowledgment made in a public or private document need not be direct, but
may even incidentally admit that the person whose name appears in the
document in question is the subscriber's child." This statement of Justice Villa-
Real was clarified by Justice Bocobo in the case of Javelona, et all vs. Monteclaro,
et al. (74 Phil. 393, 398; 400)-also cited by the plaintiffs-appellants when he
clearly laid down the ratio legis of the doctrine of incidental acknowledgment
under Article 131 of the Old Civil Code, thus:
Upon the second point, whether a voluntary acknowledgment
may be done incidentally in a public document, a distinction
must be made between the two kinds of acknowledgment: (1)
voluntary, and (2) compulsory. In the former, recognition may
be incidental but in the latter, it must be direct and express.
xxx xxx xxx
We adopted the same rule as to article 131 in the case
of Donado vs. Menendez Donado, 55 PhiL 861, 872, when we
held that an acknowledgment in a document need not be direct,
but may even incidentally admit that the person whose name
appears in the document is the subscriber's child.
The reasons for the above distinction between express
recognition in article 135 and incidental acknowledgment
according to article 131 are not far to seek. In the first place, a
voluntary recognition is made in a public document (Art. 131)
whereas the indubitable writing under article 135 is a private
 document (Manresa, vol 1, p. 579). The father would ordinarily
be more careful about what he says in a public document than in
a private writing, so that even an incidental mention of the child
as his in a public document deserves full faith and credit ...
In the second place, in an action no Article 131 (voluntary
recognition) the natural child merely asks for a share in the
inheritance in virtue of his having been acknowledged as such,
and is not trying to compel the father or his heirs to make the
acknowledgment whereas the action based no Article 135 is to
compel the father or his heirs to recognize the child. In the
former case, acknowledgment has been formally and legally
accomplished because the public character of the
document makes judicial pronouncement unnecessary, while in
the latter case, recognition is yet to be ordered by the courts
because a private writing, lacking the stronger guaranty and
higher authenticity of a public document, is not self-executory...
(lbid, pp. 398, 400, emphasis supplied).
It is therefore clear that the rule of incidental acknowledgment does not apply to
plaintiffs-appellants' Exhibit "A" since it is not a public document where a father
would ordinarily be more careful about what he says. In fact, Exhibit "A" is merely
a short note whereby a 13-year old boy is being admonished for staying out late
and not staying at home studying his school lessons or helping his mother.
Moreover, in Manresa's opinion invoked by the plaintiffs-appellants, it is
emphasized therein that while the terminology in which the acknowledgment is
made is immaterial, the sine qua non is that the act of recognition must be "con
tal que de ellos aparezra suficientemente la intencion de hacerlo". In other words,
the intent to recognize must be sufficiently apparent in the document. And, as WE
have earlier indicated, the complimentary ending Su padre," taking into
consideration the context of the entire letter (Exh. "A"), is not an indubitable
acknowledgment of paternity, but merely an indication of the paternal concern of
one for the well-being of the natural son of his brother who could not support or
rear the boy. The intent to recognize, therefore, is not apparent in Exhibit "A".
III
Plaintiffs-appellants also presented the school records (Exhs. "B" to "F") of
Raymundo Baas and a certified copy of his marriage certificate (Exh. "H"), to
further support their claim. However, these school records could not be said to be
confirmative of any intention no the part of Bibiano Baas to recognize Raymundo
as his natural son since school records are prepared, not by Bibiano, but by the
school authorities concerned. The same can also be said of the marriage
certificate of Raymundo Baas and Trinidad Vecino which was prepared by the
church authorities concerned. In addition to this, the records in the case at bar are
completely bereft of any evidence to show that Bibiano Baas furnished the
statements therein or that he had any participation in securing the enrollment
and the marriage certificate of Raymundo nor made representations in
connection therewith.
This Court held that the authentic writing upon which the claim to filiation rests
must, to be effective, be one made by the putative father himself and that the
writing must be the writing of the said alleged father (Gustilo vs. Gustilo, 14 SCRA
149; Malonda vs. Malonda, 81 PhiL 149; Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 350).
Likewise, in the case of Cid vs. Brunaman (24 SCRA 439), this Court held that a
birth certificate does "not constitute a sufficient act of acknowledgment, since the
latter must be executed by the child's father or mother, and the parish priest can
not acknowledge in their stead (Canales vs. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 6)."
In the case of Exhibit "F", although Bibiano Baas signatures appeared at the back
of the report card of Raymundo Baas no the space provided for the signatures of
the parent or guardian, still it does not constitute a sufficient act of recognition
for it could very well be that Bibiano Baas affixed his signatures no the report
card of Raymundo as a guardian and not as parent of the latter. As pointed out by
the trial court: The evidence shows that Pedro Baas even during his marriage,
had always lived with the spouses Bibiano Baas and Faustina Vecino. It would
appear, therefore, that Pedro Baas was unable to support himself and his wife,
and it could very well be that Bibiano Baas had sort of adopted de factonot
legally or considered Raymundo, the son of his brother, to be his own "ampon" in
Tagalog or Filipino, and had taken paternal solicitude for him (p. 50, CFI rec.).
Furthermore, since the signatures of Bibiano Baas appearing in Raymundo's
report MM may be construed as the signature of a mere guardian, the
recognition, if there is any, cannot be said to be precise and express as required
by Article 278. WE must not also fail to mention the fact that Exhibit "F" contains
erasures for which plaintiffs-appellants have not offered any explanation. The
signatures of Bibiano Baas appearing therein can hardly be read except no close
examination.
IV
Plaintiffs-appellants' claim of voluntary recognition no the part of Bibiano Baas
runs counter to the established facts of the case. The sworn statementa public
document(Exh "8", p. 115, CFI rec.), executed by Bibiano Baas no July 1, 1930,
before Notary Public Vicente Larna wherein Bibiano declared that Raymundo was
the son of his brother, Pedro Baas clearly shows that he had no intention
whatsoever to recognize Raymundo as his natural son, nor had he ever treated
Raymundo as such.
Consequently, even if the evidence presented by the plaintiffs- appellants
constitute a sufficient proof of a voluntary recognition, still their complaint will
not prosper since it is evident that if there was acknowledgment no the part of
Bibiano, he had rectified or repudiated the same by his sworn statement (Exh.
"8").
Accordingly, "(T)he recognition of a child as a natural child by any means required
by law may be subsequently corrected by the person who made the
acknowledgment. There is no provision in any of the laws now in force which
prohibits the father or the mother who recognized a person as their natural or
their legitimate child, to make, by any of the means prescribed or recognized by
law, such a rectification that is, to deny to said person the previously
acknowledged status of the child. Neither is it necessary in order that a
rectification of this nature be made, that there be a legal provision to authorize it,
for the reason that the law cannot foresee the cases where, by reason of the
ineluctable dictates of conscience of the necessity of safeguarding some right,
such a rectification may be necessary and just. Nevertheless, such rectification
must not be arbitrary and its purpose must be to show that the acknowledged
child does not have the conditions that the law requires in order that he may be so
acknowledged, or that he has not the absolute condition of being the child of the
person who acknowledged him, or that such person could not have begotten him,
or that the child is the child of a third person (Francisco, Civil Law, Bk. I, pp. 734,
735, citing the case of Remigio v. Ortiga 33 Phil. 614, emphasis supplied).
Corollary to this, Raymundo and Pedro Baas had acknowledged the paternal
relationship between them when they executed sworn statements (Exhs. 1 and 7,
pp. 103, 113, CFI rec.) no December 1, 1928, before Atty. Andres Faustino,
whereby Raymundo declared that he was the natural son of Dolores Castillo and
of an unknown father as it appeared in his baptismal certificate; that Id due time,
he came to know that his natural father was Pedro Baas. Pedro Baas in his
sworn statement, declared that he has a natural son named Raymundo Baas
whom he begot with Dolores Castillo, and whom he recognized as such.
The reason given by the affiants Raymundo and Pedro Baas why they were
executing their sworn statements, is to put no record the true state of things;
because they had realized that in the marriage certificate of Raymundo and
Trinidad Vecino, dated October 9,1926, an error had been committed in that the
name of Raymundo's father stated therein was Bibiano Baas brother of his
father, Pedro Baas And that, therefore, they are asking for the correction of the
aforesaid error in the marriage certificate from the Justice of the Peace Ed Aenlle
of Pasay, Rizal before whom the marriage of Raymundo and Trinidad was
solemnized. To OUR mind, this is a valid and sufficient reason for Raymundo and
Pedro Baas to execute their sworn statements.
Plaintiff-appellant Trinidad Vecino Vda. de Baas claims that the sworn statement
of Raymundo was allegedly executed by the latter in consideration of Bibiano
Baas promise to give them an additional lot. But, as the trial court correctly
observed, "(T)rue, Trinidad Vecino vaguely declared that the sworn statement was
executed by Raymundo Baas because of the promise to give them another lot in
addition to the Kalimbas lot. But this testimony must fail in the face of her
insistent testimony that she came to know of the sworn statement, Exhibit 1, only
after the death of Raymundo Baas in 1962" (p. 49, CFI rec.). In other words, how
can Trinidad Vecino Vda. de Baas be believed in her testimony that Exhibit I was
executed in consideration of said promise, since Exhibit 1 was executed without
her knowledge way back in 1928.
Moreover, the sworn statement of Raymundo Baas was executed no December
1, 1928, or almost two years before Raymundo and his family moved to the
Kalimbas lot, and more than six years before the said property was transferred to
Raymundo's name. Under these premises, how can plaintiff-appellant Trinidad
Vecino Vda. de Baas now validly claim that Raymundo executed that sworn
statement in consideration of Bibiano Baas 'promise of an additional lot when in
fact Raymundo had not received any lot from Bibiano Baas when he executed
such sworn statement. On the other hand, as it appears in the records, the
Kalimbas property was sold and not given or donated by Bibiano Baas to
Raymundo Baas Obviously, plaintiffs-appellants' arguments no this point are
completely unfounded.
It is evident from the records that Raymundo Baas had recognized the truth of
his declaration in Exhibit "1". As correctly pointed out by the counsel for the
defendants- appellees, "Raymundo had all the opportunity to nullify or to formally
declare as untrue his aforesaid sworn statement. The fact that he never did, is
cogent proof of his own acknowledgment of the truth of the contents of the
same" (p. 22, rec., Brief for the defendants-appellees, p. 50).
Raymundo's recognition of the truth of his statement in Exhibit " 1 " is reflected in
the alleged copies of his letter (Exhs. till and "J-2"), to Atty. Andres Faustino.
Nowhere in the said letters bristling with unconcealed bitterness, did he say that
he had a claim against the estate of Bibiano Baas as the latter's acknowledged
natural son. Not only did Raymundo fail to categorically state that he is Bibiano's
acknowledged natural son, he also did not make any reference to Exhibit "1"
which he executed before Atty. Andres Faustino.
Thus:
... Where a party has the means in his power of rebutting and
explaining the evidence adduced against him, f it does not tend
to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong inference
against him (Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th Ed. by R. H. Kersley p.
638).
V
The records show that Raymundo Baas obviously bitter and discontended
because he was not given a share in the estate of Bibiano Baas failed to file a
formal claim or demand during the eight-year period between the death of
Bibiano Baas in 1954 and his own in 1962.
Human nature normally dictates that Raymundo should establish his filiation to
Bibiano, especially if such action can benefit him and his family. The urgency of
such action is heightened in the case of Raymundo since it can be deduced that
they were having financial difficulties from the mortgage executed by the spouses
Raymundo and Trinidad over their own house and lot in favor of Angel V. Baas a
legitimate son of Bibiano Baas and defendant-appellee herein, no November 7,
1955, a few months after the settlement of Bibiano's estate. As correctly observed
by the trial court, "his (Raymundo's) failure to enforce Ws rights for a period of
over eight years is indicative of the lack of merit of plaintiffs' claim (p. 52, CFI rec.).
VI
Finally, that Raymundo Baas was not an acknowledged natural son of Bibiano
Baas is further shown by the fact that plaintiffs-appellants' allegation that the
documents tending to prove Raymundo's filiation were only discovered after the
latter's death defies belief.
Included in those documents allegedly discovered were the letters of Raymundo
to Atty. Andres Faustino wherein he complained bitterly about the alleged
injustices done to him by Faustina Vecino vda. de Baas He even adverted in the
said letters that he had in his possession proofs of his claim and that he would
know what to do when the proper time comes. These letters, to Our mind, could
not have been written without the knowledge of Trinidad since it is only natural
for Raymundo, as a husband, to share his sentiments with Trinidad, his wife.
Raymundo was naturally expected to share with his wife Trinidad his bitterness,
more especially since Trinidad is definitely not a stranger to the family of Bibiano
Baas It must be noted that Trinidad once stayed with and served the family of
Bibiano Baas aside from being the niece of Faustina, Bibiano's wife. Thus, it is
highly improbable that Raymundo will hide from his wife whatever proofs he has
in his possession to support his claim to a share in the estate of Bibiano Baas
Furthermore, anything of sentimental value, such as old school records,
autobiographies, letters, etc., is normally shared between husband and wife.
Hence, it is likewise not normal for Trinidad not to have seen before Raymundo's
death mementos which tend to establish his filiation to Bibiano.
The conflicting testimonies of Trinidad Vecino vda. de Baas no this point lend
credence to Our view that the documents presented as evidence by the plaintiffs-
appellants to support their claim, were already known to the plaintiffs-appellants
long before Raymundo's death.
When asked, no cross-examination, whether she and her husband, Raymundo,
discussed matters pertaining to Raymundo's claim in the estate of Bibiano Baas
after the latter's death in 1954, she answered in the negative (p. 426, CFI rec.).
However, upon re-cross-examination, she answered in the following manner:
ATTY. REGALADO
Q. Testifying no Exhibit "J", do you happen to
know, Mrs. Baas whether the original of this
letter allegedly prepared by Raymundo Baas
address to Atty. Andres Faustino was ever sent
to Atty. Faustino?
A. I do not know, sir.
Q. And after you read this paragraph here
which had been marked Exhibit 'J-l,' you state
that what you understood therefrom was the
fact that he was not given the additional lot
allegedly promised by Dr. Bibiano Baas How
did you come to that conclusion? Was it
because during the period of his lifetime or
after the death of Bibiano Baas you discussed
with your husband the matter of your claim
against his estate?
A. Yes sir.
Q. In other words, after the death of Dr.
Bibiano Baas and before the death of
Raymundo Baas you were already discussing
the death of your claim against the estate and
that he had a feeling that he was going to be
defrauded. Is that not correct?
A. We were waiting for their willingness or
voluntariness in giving whatever share we
would be given.
Q. But my question, Mrs. Baas was during
that period8-year period, after the death of
your husband from the years from 1954 to
1962, you were actually discussing with your
husband the matter of making a claim against
the estate of Dr. Baas and you were fearing
that you might be defrauded from your due
participation Is that not true?
A. Yes, sir. One time I visited my aunt, Mrs.
Faustina Baas and I asked her how she was
and I reminded her about the promise to give
us one more lot and she said, 'I am not greedy;
I win take care of you.
Q. And no that occasion did you tell her that
you were asking for the share of Raymundo
specifically as the son of Dr. Baas or as a
matter of gratification by reason of the
services that you tendered to the children of
Dr. Baas by rearing them in their childhood?
A. What pertains to Raymundo Baas would
pertain to hint What is mine is different.
COURT.
Q. So in this occasion when you were asking
the widow about that one lot were you asking
her as gratification or compensation for your
services?
A. As far as I am concerned, what they would
give me.
Q. But did you ask for the share they would
give you.
A. Yes, sir. That was what I told themwhat
they were giving to Raymundo.
ATTY. REGALADO
Q. You told Mrs. Faustina Baas that you are
there claiming in behalf of Raymundo Baas as
the son of Bibiano Baas and, therefore, you
wanted the share of Raymundo Baas is that
what you told your aunt?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why did you go there by yourself? Why did
you not ask Raymundo Baas himself to go
there and claim since he was the son?
 A. Before that, both of us went to see my
aunt but later no I went by myself because my
husband was in class.
Q. When did you go there together with your
husband to demand the matter of his
participation as the alleged son of Dr. Bibiano
Baas ?
A. More or less in 1955.
Q. After the death of Bibiano Baas?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said so to your aunt, Faustina. And you
made it plain to them that you were claiming
the property of Raymundo as the son of Dr.
Bibiano Baas ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said so to your aunt, Faustina vda. de
Baas ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what did she say, if she said anything?
A. She said, 'Yes, you just wait later on.
Q. On that occasion you did not hesitate nor
were you embarrassed to make that demand
even if you believed that in Cavite you are not
supposed to "mangamangalawa" in the matter
of claims to inheritance?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was long before you even
discovered these alleged documents, Exhibits
"A" to "L"?
A. Yes, sir, because these documents were
discovered in 1962 (pp. 439-441, CFI rec.;
emphasis supplied).
It is patent from the above that the testimony given by Trinidad Vecino vda. de
Baas cannot be considered reliable. Inasmuch as she is the plaintiffs-appellants'
principal witness, their claim is rendered groundless.
Moreover, this casts doubt no the other evidence presented by the plaintiffs-
appellants, such as Exhibit "I", the alleged typewritten statement of Raymundo
Baas dated October 6, 1958, setting forth his personal circumstances. This
statement was made at a time when Raymundo had already made known through
his letters to Atty. Andres Faustino of his discontent over the settlement of the
estate of the late Bibiano Baas Therefore, the possibility that Raymundo might
have some hidden motives, aside from merely establishing his filiation, cannot be
ignored. The same can also be said of Exhibits "K" and "L", the alleged
autobiographies of Raymundo Baas This is especially true of Exhibit "L", which
not only is typewritten, but also contains intercalation's and spoliation's.
VII
Raymundo should and could have filed an action for compulsory recognition
during Bibiano's lifetime, alleging continuous possession of the status of a natural
child by direct acts of Bibiano or of his family, and that he has in his favor proof
that Bibiano is his father.
Considering that Raymundo was born in 1894, and was already of majority age in
1915, long before Bibiano's death in 1954, he should and could have filed such
action either under Article 135 of the Old Civil Code, or Article 283 of the New
Civil Code. Article 135 of the Old Civil Code and Article 283 of the New Civil Code
read as follows:
Art. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his
natural child in the following cases:
1. When an indubitable writing of his exists in which he
expressly acknowledges his paternity;
2. When the child is in the uninterrupted possession of the
status of a natural child of the defendant father, justified by the
conduct of the father himself or that of his family; ... (emphasis
supplied).
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to
recognize the child as his natural child:
xxx xxx xxx
2. When the child is in continuous possession of the status of a
child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of
his family;
3. When the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father;
4. When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father (emphasis supplied).
Raymundo's failure to institute an action for compulsory recognition during
Bibiano's lifetime under either of the above cited law, militates against plaintiffs-
appellants' complaint for partition or recovery of hereditary share, fruits and
damages.
Article 137 of the Old Civil Code and Article 285 of the New Civil Code provide that
the action of the natural child for compulsory recognition prescribes, if not taken
during the lifetime of the alleged parents, unless the case falls within the
exceptions which allow the filing of such action even after the death of the
alleged parents, thus:
Art. 137. Actions for the acknowledgment of natural children
may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative
parents except in the following cases:
1. If the father or mother dies during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may commence the action within the four
years next following the attainment of its majority;
2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some document,
before unknown should be discovered in which the child is
expressly acknowledged;
 In this case the action must be commenced within six months nor can an argument of presumption be based no the lesser
next following the discovery of such document (Old Civil Code). claim when there is no basis for the greater one, and when it is
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may only given as an exception in well-defined cases. It is placing the
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, heirs of the natural child no a better footing than the heirs of
except in the following cases: the legitimate one, when, as a matter of fact, the position of
1. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, natural child is not better than, nor even equal to, that of a
in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration legitimate child (p. 256).
of four years from the attainment of his majority; As earlier indicated, the evidence presented by the plaintiffs-appellants does not
2. If after the death of the father or of the mother a document constitute a sufficient act of voluntary recognition, but, may be a ground for
should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which compulsory recognition under Article 135 of the Old Civil Code, or Article 283 of
either or both parents recognize the child. the New Civil Code. And since, as discussed above, the right to compel
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years acknowledgment solely belongs to the natural child and cannot be inherited and
from the finding of the document" (New Civil Code; emphasis exercised by his heirs, plaintiffs-appellants have no personality to file such action,
supplied). it follows that their complaint is totally baseless.
It is obvious that under the above-cited law, after the death of WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM BEING IN CONFORMITY WITH THE
Bibiano Baas Raymundo was precluded from filing an action for FACTS AND THE LAW, THE SAME IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. COSTS AGAINST
compulsory recognition against Bibiano's heirs, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS.
Raymundo was already 60 years old when Bibiano died in 1954. This rules out the SO ORDERED.
first exception. The alleged documents which established Raymundo's filiation to
Bibiano were not unknown to Raymundo during tile latter's lifetime. And, as We
have pointed out, these documents could not even have been unknown to his
wife, Trinidad Vecino.
Furthermore, in the second exception, the document discovered after the death
of the alleged parents, should be one in which the natural child is expressly
acknowledged by either or both parents. In the documents presented and relied
no by the plaintiffs-appellants, there is no express acknowledgment by Bibiano
Baas of Raymundo as his natural child.
Granting that, after the death of Bibiano Baas Raymundo could file an action for
compulsory recognition against Bibiano's heirs, still plaintiffs-appellants cannot
invoke Raymundo's right to file such action, because it is not transmissible to the
natural child's heirs; the right is purely a personal one to the natural child (Paras,
Civil Code Annotated, 1971 ed., p. 654). As held by this Court in the case of Conde
vs. Abaya (13 Phil. 249), 14 such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child
can only be exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or to
his ascendants." The reason advanced by this Court, through Chief Justice
Arellano, is as follows:
It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct
interpretation that the right of action to secure
acknowledgment by the natural child should be presumed to be
transmitted, independently, as a rule, to his heirs, while the
right to claim legitimacy from his predecessor is not, as a rule,
conceded to the heirs of the legitimate child, but only relatively
and as an exception. Consequently, the pretention that the right
of action no the part of the child to obtain the acknowledgment
of his natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants is
altogether No legal provision exists to sustain such pretention,
G.R. Nos. L-11483-11484 February 14, 1958
In the matter of the Testate Estate of the deceased Edward E. Christensen,
ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR,petitioner.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY and ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA and BERNARDA
CAMPOREDONDO, oppositors-appellees.
BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, as Executor of the Deceased EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, defendant-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for appellants.
Leopoldo M. abellera and Amado A. Munda for appellee Maria Heliuen
Christensen Garcia.
Pedro P. Suarez and Oscar Breva for appellee Bernarda Camporedondo.
FELIX, J.:
From the records of the above-entitled cases, it appears that as of 1913,Edward E.
Christensen, an American citizen, was already residing in Davao and on the
following year became the manager of Mindanao Estates located in the
municipality of Padada of the same province. At a certain time, which the lower
court placed at 1917, a group of laborers recruited from Argao, Cebu, arrived to
work in the said plantation. Among the group was a young girl,Bernarda
Camporendondo, who became an assistant to the cook. Thereafter, thegirl and
Edward E. Christensen, who was also unmarried staring living together as husband
and wife and although the records failed to establishthe exact date when such
relationship commenced, the lower court found the same to have been continous
for over 30 years until the death of Christensen occurecd on April 30, 1953. Out of
said relations, 2 children, Lucy and Helen Christensen, were allegedly born.
G. R. NO. L-11484.
Upon the demise of the American, who had left a considerable amount of
properties his will naming Adolfo Cruz Aznar as executor was duly presented for
probate in court and became the subject of Special Proceedings No. 622 of the
Court of First Instance of Davao. Said will contains, among others, the following
provisions:
xxx xxx xxx.
3. I declare . . . that I have but one (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No.
665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I have no living ascendants, andno
descendantsexcept my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx.
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN, now
married toEduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the factthat she was baptized Christensen, is not in any
way related to me, nor hasshe been at any time adopted to me, and
who, from all information I have now resides in Egipt, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREEE THOUSAND SIXHUNDRED PESOS (P3,600)
Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in trustfor said Maria Lucy
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the PhilippineNational Bank, and
paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100), Philippine Currency
per month until the the principal thereof as well as any interest which
may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.
8. I give devise and bequeath unto BERNARDA CAMPORENDONDO, now
residing inPadada, Davao, Philippines, the sum of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000), Philippine Currency.
xxx xxx xxx.
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter,
the said MARIA Lucy CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of
my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind
or character, andwheresover situated; of which I may be possessed at
any death and which mayhave come to me from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime,Provided, honvever, that should the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY at any time prior to her decease having living issue,
then, and in that event, the life interest herein given shall terminate, and
if so terminated, then I give, devise, and bequeath to my said daughter,
the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY, the rest remainder and
residue of my property, with the same force and effectas if I had
originally so given, devised and bequeathedit to her; and provided,
further, that should be said Maria Lucy ChristensenDaney die without
living issue then, and in that event, I give, devise and bequeath all the
rest, remainder and residue of my property, one-half (1/2) to my well-
beloved sister, Mrs. CARRIE LOIUSE C. BORTON, now residing at No. 2124
Twentieth Street, Bakersfield, California, U.S.A. and one-half (1/2) to the
children of my deceased brother, JOSEPH C. CRISTENSEN, . . .
13. I hereby nominate and appoint Mr Adolfo Cruz Aznar, of Davao City,
Philippines, my executor, and the executor of this, my last will and
testament.
. . . (Exh. A).
Oppositions to the probate of this will were separately filed by Maria Helen
Christensen Garcia and Bernarda Camporendondo, the first contending that
thewill lacked the formalities required by law; that granting that he had,
thedispositions made therein were illegal because although she and Lucy
Christensen were both children had by the deceased with Bernarda
Camporendondo, yet she was given only a meager sum of P3,600 out of an estate
valued at $485,000 while Lucy would get the rest of the properties;and that the
petitioner Adolfo Cruz Aznar was not qualified to be appointed as administrator of
the estate because he had an interest adverse to thatof the estate. It was
therefore prayed by his oppositor that the application for probate be denied and
the will disallowed; that the proceeding be declared intestate and that another
disinterested person be appointed as administrator.
Bernarda Camporedondo, on the other hand, claimed ownership over one-halfof
the entire estate in virtue of her relationship with the deceased, it being alleged
that she and the testator having lived together as husband andwife continuously
for a period of over 30 years, the properties acquired during such cohabitation
should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. This opposition was dismissed
by the probate court on the ground that shehad no right to intervene in said
proceeding, for as such common-law wife she had no successional right that
might be affected by the probate of thewill, and likewise, she could not be
allowed to establish her title and co-ownership over the properties therein for
such questions must be ventilated in a court of general jurisdiction. In view of this
ruling of the Court and in order to attain the purpose sought by her overruled
opposition Bernarda Camporedondo had to institute, as she did institute Civil
Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of Davao (G.R. No. L-11483) which we
will consider and discuss hereinafter.
In the meantime, Adolfo Cruz Aznar was appointed special adminsitrator of the
estate after filing a bond for P5,000 pending the appointment of a regular one,
and letters of special administrition were correspondingly issued to him on May
21, 1953.
The records further show that subsequent to her original opposition. Helen
Christensen Garcia filed a supplemental opposition and motion to declare her an
acknowledged natural child of Edward E. Christensen, alleging that shewas
conceived during the time when her mother Bernarda Camporendondo was living
with the deceased as his common-law wife; that she had been in continous
possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased; thatahe had in her
favor evidence and/or proof that Edward Christensen was her father; and that she
and Lucy had the same civil status as children of the decedent and Bernarda
Camporedondo. This motion was opposed jointly by the executor and Maria Lucy
Christensen Daney asserting that before, during and after the conception and
birth of Helen Christensen Garcia, her mother was generally known to be carrying
relations with 3 different men; that during the lifetime of the decedent and even
years before his death, Edward Christensen verbally as well as in writing
disavowed relationship with said oppositor; that oppositor appropriated and used
the surname Christensen illegally and without permission from the deceased.
Thus they prayed the Court that the will be allowed; that Maria Helen Christensen
Garcia be declared not in any way related to the deceased; and that the motion of
said oppositor be denied.
After due hearing, the lower court in a decision dated February 28, 1953, found
that oppositor Maria Helen Cristensen had been in continous possession of the
status of a natural child of the deceased Edward Christensen notwithstanding the
fact that she was disowned by him in his will, for such action must have been
brought about by the latter's disaproval of said oppositor's marriage to a man he
did not like. But taking into considerationthat such possession of the status of a
natural child did not itself constitute acknowledgment but may only be availed of
to compel acknowledgment, the lower Court directed Maria Lucy Christensen
Daney toacknowledge the oppositor as a natural child of Edward E. Christensen.
Thewill was, however, allowed the letters testamentary consequently issued
toAdolfo Cruz Aznar, the executor named therein. From the portion of the
decision requiring Lucy Christensen to acknowledge Helen as a natural child of the
testator, the former and the executor interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 13421-R), but the appellate tribunal elevatedthe same to Us
on the ground that the case involves an estate the value of which far exceeds
P50,000.00 and thus falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court
pursuant to Section 17 (5), Republic Act No. 296.
The principal issue in this litigation is whether the lower court erred in finding that
the oppositor Maria Helen Christensen Garcia had been in continous possession
of the status of a natural child of the deceased EdwardE. Christensen and in
directing Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, recognizeddaughter and instituted heirs
of the decedent, to acknowledge the former assuch natural child.
Maria Lucy Christensen was born on April 25, 1922, and Maria Helen Christensen
on July 2, 1934, of the same mother, Bernarda Camporedondo, during the period
when the latter was publicly known to have been living as common-law wife of
Edward E. Chrisiensen. From the facts of the case there can be no question as to
Lucy's parentage, but controversy arose when Edward Christensen, in making his
last will and testament, disavowed such paternity to Helen and gave her only a
legacy of P3,600. ln the course of the proceeding for the probate of the will (Exh,
A), Helen introduced documentary and testimonial evidence to support her claim
that she, Lucy,was a natural child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to the
hereditaryshare corresponding to such descendant. Several witness testified in
herfavor, including the mother Bernarda Camporendondo, her former teachers
andother residents of the community, tending to prove that she was known in the
locality as a child of the testator and was introduced by the latter to the circle of
his friends and acquaintances as his daughter. Family portraits, greeting cards and
letters were likewise presented to bolster herassertion that she had always been
treated by the deceased and by Lucy herself as a member of the family.
Lucy Christensen and Adolfo Cruz Aznar, as executor, tried to repudiate herclaim
by introducing evidence to prove that on or about the period when shewas
conceived and born, her mother was carrying an affair with another man,Zosimo
Silva, a former laborer in her Paligue plantation. Silva executed an affidavit and
even took the witness stand to testify to this effect. Appellants also strived to
show that the defendant's solicitations for Helen's welfare and the help extended
to her merely sprang out generosity and hammered on the fact that on several
occasions, the deceased disclaimed any relationship with her (Exh. O-Daney, Exh.
Q-Daney, Exh. Z-Daney, Exh. 8-Helen).
Going over the evidence adduced during the trial, it appears indubitable that on
or about the period when Helen was born, Bernarda Camporendondo had
established residence at her plantation at Paligue, Davao, and that although
Edward Christensen stayed in Davao City to manage his merchandising business,
he spent the weekends with the former and their child Lucy in the
Christensenplantation. Even granting that Zosimo Silva at his stage fitted himself
intothe picture, it cannot be denied that Helen's mother and the deceased
weregenerally and publicly known to be living together as husband and wife.
Thismust have been the reason why Christensen from Helen's birth in 1934
providedfor her maintenance; shouldered the expenses for her education to the
extentthat she was even enrolled as an intern in an exclusive college for girls
inManila; tolerated or allowed her carrying the surname "Christensen", and
ineffect gaver her the attention and care that a father would only do to this
offspring. We should take note that nothing appears on record to show
thatChristensen ever entertained any doubt or disputed Helen's paternity.
Hisrepudations of her relationship with him came about only after he
andBernarda Comperodondo parted ways in March, 1950, and apparently after
Helentook sides with her mother. Furthermore, it seems that despite that
decedent's desire that she continue her studies, Helen ignored the same andgot
married to a man for Christensen held no high esteem. We may state at
hisjuncture that while it is true that herein appellants introduced witnesses
todisprove oppositor'r claim, the lower Court that had the opportunity to observe
the conduct of the witnesses while testifying and could better gaugetheir
credibility and impartiality in the case, arrived at the conclusion that Maria Helen
Christensen had established that she had been in continouspossessions of the
status of a natural child of the deceased. Considering the preponderant evidence
on record, We see no reason to reverse said ruling.The testator' lastacts cannot
be made the criterion in determining whether oppositor was his child or not, for
human frailty and parental arrogance maydraw a person to adopt unnatural or
harsh measures against an erring child orone who displeases just so the weight of
his authority could be felt. In theconsideration of a claim that one is a natural
child, the attitude or directacts of the person against whom such action is directed
or that of his family before the controversy arose or during his lifetime if he
predeceases the claimant, and not a single opportunity or an isolated occasions
but as a whole, must be taken into account. The possession of such status is one
of the cases that gives rise to the right, in favor of the child, of
coumpulsaryrecognition. (Art. 283, Civil Code).
The lower Court, however, after making its finding directed Maria Lucy
Christensen Daney, an heir of the decedent, to recognize oppositor as a natural
child of the deceased. This seems improper. The Civil Code for 2 kinds of
acknowledgement of a natural child: voluntary and compulsory. In the first
instance, which may be effected in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or in an authentic writing (Art. 278,Civil Code), court intervention
is very nil and not altogether wanting, whereas in the second, judicial
pronouncement is essential, and while it is true that the effect of a voluntary and
a compulsory acknowledgment onthe right of the child so recognized is the same,
to maintain the view of thelower Court would eliminate the distinction between
voluntary acts and those brought about by judicial dicta. And if We consider that
in the case, where, the presumed parent dies ahead of the child and action for
compulsory recogniton is brought against the heirs of the deceased, as in the
instant case, the situation would take absurd turn, for the heirs would be
compelled to recognize such child as a natural child of the deceased without a
properprovision of the law, for as it now stands, the Civil Code only requires a
declaration by the court of the child's status as a natural child of the parent who,
if living, would be compelled to recognize his offspring as such.Therefore, We hold
that in cases of compulsory recognition, as in the case at bar, it would be
sufficient that a competent court, after taking into account all the evidence on
record, would declare that under any of the circumstances specified by Article 283
of the Civil Code, a child has acquired the status of a natural child of the
presumptive parent and as such is entitled to all rights granted it by law, for such
declaration is by itself already a judicial recognition of the paternity of the parent
concerned which is her against whom the action is directed, are bound to respect.
G.R. No. L-11483
Coming now to Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Bernarda Camporendondo claimed in her complaint 1/2 of the properties of
thedeceased as co-owner thereof in virtue of her relations with the deceased. She
alleged as basis for action that she and the deceased Edward E. Christensen had
lived and cohabitated as husband and wife, continously and openly for a period
for more than 30 years; that within said period, plaintiff and the deceased
acquired real and personal properties through their common effort and industry;
and that in virtue of such relationship, she was a co-owner of said properties. As
the executor refused to account forand deliver the share allegedly belonging to
her despite her repeated demands, she prayed the court that said executor be
ordered to submit an inventory and render an accounting of the entire estate of
the deceased;to divide the same into 2 equal parts and declare that one of them
lawfully belonged to plaintiff; and for such other reliefs as may be deemed just
and equitable in the premises. In his answer, the executor denied the
avermentsof the complaint, contending that the decedent was the sole owner of
the properties left by him as they were acquired through his own efforts;
thatplaintiff had never been a co-owner of any property acquired or possessed by
the late Edward christensen during his lifetime; that the personal relationship
between plaintiff and the deceased was purely clandestinebecause the former
habitually lived in her plantation at Paligue, Davao, from the time she acquired
the same in 1928; that she also maintained relations with 2 other men; and that
the claim of plaintiff would violate the provisions of Article 2253 of the Civil Code
as the vested rights of the compulsory heirs of the deceased would be impaired.
Defendant thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and as counterclaim
demanded the sum ofP70.000.00 representing actual, moral and exemplary
damages.
Due hearing was conducted thereon and after the parties ad submitted
theirrespective memoranda, the lower Court on August 25, 1954, rendered
judgmentfinding that the deceased Edward Christensen and Bernarda
Camporendondo,not otherwise suffering from any impediment to contract
marriage, lived together as husband and wife without marital ties continously for
over 30years until the former's death in 1953; that out of such relations 2
childrenwere born; and that the properties in controversy were acquired by either
orboth of them through their work or industry. Relying on Section 144 of theCivil
Code which said court considered to have created another mode ofacquiring
ownership, plaintiff was held to be entitled to one-half of saidproperties as co-
owner thereof in view of her relationship with the deceasedand ordered the
executor to account for and deliver the same by her. Fromthis decision, defendant
Aznar, as Executor of the will, perfected an appealto the Court of Appeals, but as
the property involved in the litigation exceeds P50,000.00 said tribunal elevated
the case to Us for consideration.
It is not controverted that at the time of his death, Edward Christensen was the
owner of certain properties, including shares of stock in the plantation bearing his
name and a general merchandising store in Davao City. It is also undeniable that
the deceased and appellee, both capacitated to enter into the married state,
maintained relations as husband and wife, continuously and publicly for a
considerable number of years which the lower Court declared to be until the
death of Christensen in 1953. While as a general rule appellate courts do not
usually disturb the lower court's findings of fact, unless said finding is not
supported by or totally devoid of or inconsistent with the evidence on record,
such finding must ofnecessity be modified to confrom with the evidence if the
reviewing tribunalwere to arrive at the proper and just solution of the
controversy. In theinstant case, the court a quo overlooked or failed to consider
the testimonies of both Lucy and Helen Christensen to the effect that the
deceased and their mother Bernarda Camporendondo had some sort of quarrel or
misunderstanding and parted ways as of March, 1950, a fact which appelleewas
not able to overcome. Taking into account the circumstances of this caseas found
by the trial court, with the modification that the cohabitation should appear as
continuous from the early 20's until March, 1950, the question left for our
determination is whether Bernarda Camporedondo, byreason of such
relationship, may be considered as a co-owner of the properties acquired by the
deceased during said period and thus entitledto one-half thereof after the latter's
death.
Presumably taking judicial notice of the existence in our society of a certain kind
of relationship brought about by couples living together as husbands and wives
without the benefit of marriage, acquiring and bringingproperties unto said union,
and probably realizing that while same may not beacceptable from the moral
point of view they are as much entitled to theprotection of the laws as any other
property owners, the lawmakersincorporated Article 144 in Republic Act No. 386
(Civil Code of the Philippines) to govern their property relations. Said article read
as follows:
ART. 114. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning,
the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules of co-
ownership.
It must be noted that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and the
woman thus living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage and that the properties realized during their cohabitation be acquired
through the work, industry, employment or occupation of both or either of them.
And the same thing may be said of whose marriages are by provision of law
declared void ab intio. While it is true that these requisites are fully met and
satisfied in the case at bar, We must remember that the deceased and herein
appellee were already estranged as of March, 1950. There being no provision of
law governing the cessation of such informal civil partnership, if ever existed,
same may be considered terminated upon their separation or desistance to
continue said relations.The Spanish Civil Code which was then enforce contains to
counterpart of Article 144 and as the records in the instant case failed to show
show thata subsequent reconciliation ever took place and considering that
Republic ActNo. 386 which recognizeed such form of co-ownership went into
operation onlyon August 30, 1950, evidently, this later enactment cannot be
invoked as basis for appellee's claim.
In determining the question poised by this action We may look upon the
jurisprudence then obtaining on the matter. As early as 1925, this Court already
declared that where a man and a woman, not suffering from any impediment to
contract marriage, live together as husband and wife, an informal civil partnership
exists and made the pronouncement that each of them has an intereat in the
properties acquired during said union and is entitled to participate therein if said
properties were the product oftheir JOINT efforts (Marata vs. Dionio G.R. No.
24449, Dec. 31, 1925). In another case, this Court similarly held that although
there is no technical marital partnership between person living maritally without
being lawfully married, nevertheless there is between them an informalcivil
partnership, and the parties would be entitled to an equal interest where the
property is acquired through their JOINT efforts (Lesaca vs. FelixVda. de Lesaca, 91
Phil., 135).
Appellee, claiming that the properties in controversy were the product of their
joint industry apparently in her desire to tread on the doctrine laiddown in the
aforementioned cases, would lead Us to believe that her help wassolicited or she
took a hand in the management of and/or acquisition of thesame. But such
assertion appears incredible if We consider that she wasobserved by the trial
Court as an illiterate woman who cannot even remembersimple things as the date
when she arrived at the Mindanao Estate, when shecommenced relationship with
the deceased, not even her approximate age orthat of her children. And
considering that aside from her own declaration, which We find to be highly
improbable, there appears no evidence to proveher alleged contribution or
participation in the acquisition of the properties involved therein, and that in view
of the holding of this Courtthat for a claim to one-half of such property to be
allowed it must be provedthat the same was acquired through their joint efforts
and labor (Flores vs.Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, * 50 Off. Gaz. 1029), We
have no recoursebut reverse the holding of the lower Court and deny the claim of
BernardaCampredondo. We may further state that even granting, for the sake
ofargument, that this case falls under the provisions of Article 144 of theCivil
Code, same would be applicable only as far as properties acquiredafter the
effectivity of Republic Act 386 are concerned and to no other, forsuch law cannot
be given retroactive effect to govern those already possessedbefore August 30,
1950. It may be argued, however, that being a newly created right, the provisions
of Section 144 should be made to retroact if only toenforce such right. Article
2252 of the same Code is explicit in thisrespect when it states:
SEC. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this
Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the old legislation, shall have ro retroactive effect.
xxx xxx xxx.
As it cannot be denied that the rights and legitimes of the compulsory heirsof the
deceased Edward Christensen would be impaired or diminished if the claim of
herein appellee would succeed, the answer to such argument wouldbe simply
obvious.
With regard to appellant Aznar's contention that the lower Court erred in
admitting the testimony of appellee Bernarda Camporedondo dealing with facts
that transpired before the death of Edward Christensen on the ground that it is
prohibited by Section 26-(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. We deem it
unnecessary to delve on the same because even admitting that the court a
quo committed the error assigned, yet it will not affect anymore the outcome of
the case in view of the conclusion We have already arrived at on the main issue.
On the strength of the foregoing considerations, We affirm the decision of the
lower Court in case G.R. No. L-11484, with the modification that MariaLucy
Christensen Daney need not be compelled to acknowledge her sister Maria Helen
Christensen Garcia as a natural child of her father Edward E. Christensen, the
declaration of the Court in this respect being sufficient to enable her to all the
rights inherent to such status.
The decision appealed from in case G.R. No. L-11483 is hereby reversed and
another one rendered, dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
Costs are taxed against appellants in G.R. No. L-11484 and against appellee
Bernarda Camporedondo in G.R. No. L-11483. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 86302 September 24, 1991
CASIMIRO MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA TORING TUACAO, respondents.
Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr. for petitioner.
Domingo Antigua & Associates for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day. The trial
court believed him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The
appellate court did not and reversed the judgment of the court below. Now the
issue is before us on certiorari.
The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu
City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she was
born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant
Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that
Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and
according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiffs
allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees.
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her mother who told
her that her father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her
mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house.
When she married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and
engaged him to drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck
but gave the proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro
allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he gave her
money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. On February 14,
1977, Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor at the
Mandaue City branch of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. Two years
later, Margarita Bate, Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the passbook from her,
but Casimiro ordered it returned to her after admonishing Margarita. 1
Lolito Tufiacao corroborated his mother and said he considered Casimiro his
grandfather because Teopista said so. He would kiss his hand whenever they saw
each other and Casimiro would give him money. Casimiro used to invite him to his
house and give him jackfruits. when his grandfather learned that he was living on
a rented lot, the old man allowed him to build a house on the former's land. 2
Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac
Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro.
Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring because she
used to work with him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro himself told him she was his
sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which
eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to
Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at Teopista's
baptism. Casimiro also gave him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida. 3
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his
father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so
informed him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his
salary, he would also give him various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00 to be
delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give certain
properties to Teopista.4
Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age, but Vicente Toring
took the stand to resist Teopista's claim.
Vicente, who professed to be Casimiro's only illegitimate child by Brigida Toring,
declared that Teopista's father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy,
who later abandoned her. Vicente said that it was he who sold a lot to Teopista,
and for a low price because she was his half sister. It was also he who permitted
Lolito to build a house on Casimiro's lot. This witness stressed that when Casimiro
was hospitalized, Teopista never once visited her alleged father. 5
The last statement was shared by the other defense witness, Julieta Ouano,
Casimiro's niece, who also affirmed that Vicente Toring used to work as a cook in
Casimiro's boat. She flatly declared she had never met Teopista but she knew her
husband, who was a mechanic.6
The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in Article 283 of the Civil Code,
which has been held to be applicable not only to natural children but also to
spurious children.7 The said article provides:
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize
the child as his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the
offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the
alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father.
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father.
This article has been substantially reproduced in the Family Code as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
 Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
In his remarkably well-written decision, Judge Leoncio P. Abarquez rejected the
plaintiff' s claim that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child of
the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family. His Honor
declared:
In this particular case the established evidence is that plaintiff
continuously lived with her mother, together with her sister Paulina.
Neither the plaintiff nor her husband had come to live with the
defendant. At most, only their son, Lolito Tufiacao was allowed to
construct a small house in the land of the defendant, either by the
defendant himself, as claimed by the plaintiff, or by Vicente Toring, as
claimed by the witnesses of the defendant. The defendant never spent
for the support and education of the plaintiff. He did not allow the
plaintiff to carry his surname. The instances when the defendant gave
money to the plaintiff were, more or less, off-and-on or rather isolatedly
periodic. They were made at considerable intervals and were not given
directly to the plaintiff but through a third person. Thus, while it may be
conceded that: a) the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff himself
told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza that Teopista is the
daughter of the defendant; b) that Teopista calls the defendant as "Papa
Miroy"; c) that Teopista would kiss defendant's hand when she met him;
d) that the defendant gave to her and her husband the income of the
passenger truck as well as the proceeds of the sale thereof, all these acts,
taken altogether, are not sufficient to show that the plaintiff had
possessed continuously the status of a recognized illegitimate child.
On appeal, however, the respondent courts8 disagreed and arrived at its own
conclusion as follows:
Contrary to the conclusion of the court a quo, We find that appellant has
sufficiently proven her continuous possession of such status. Although
the court a quo did not pass on the credibility of the various witnesses
presented, We consider the witnesses for the plaintiff as credible and
unbiased. No proof was shown to render them otherwise. There is no
showing that Isaac and Gaudencio testified falsely. They were
disinterested parties with no axe to grind against the appellee or the
people actively acting in his behalf. In fact even the court a quo conceded
to the truthfulness of some of their testimonies.
By contrast, it continued, Vicente Toring was an interested party who was
claiming to be the sole recognized natural child of Casimiro and stood to lose
much inheritance if Teopista's claim were recognized. He had earlier filed theft
charges against his own sister and libel charges against her husband. As for Julieta
Ouano, the respondent court found it difficult to believe that she had never met
Teopista although both of them have been living in the same barangay since birth.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on August 11, 1988. A
motion for reconsideration was filed, and it was only from the opposition thereto
of the private respondent that Casimiro's counsel learned that his client had died
on May 1986. He immediately informed the respondent court build the motion
for reconsideration was denied without any substitution of parties having been
effected. The said counsel, now acting for Vicente Toring, then asked this Court to
substitute the latter for the deceased Casimiro Mendoza in the present petition.
The applicable provisions of the Rules of Court are Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3,
reading as follows:
Sec. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or incompetency of
party. Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes
incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to
inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency,
and to give the name and residence of his executor, guardian or other
legal representative.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may
be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time the
court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a
legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the
court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf
of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring
such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered
as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for
the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
In the early case of Masecampo vs. Masecampo,9 it was settled that:
The subsequent death of the father is not a bar to the action commenced
during Ms lifetime by one who pretended to be his natural son. It may
survive against the executor, administrator, or any other legal
representative of the testate or intestate succession.
Pursuant to the above rules and jurisprudence, we hereby allow the substitution
of Casimiro Mendoza pro haec viceand nunc pro tunc by Vicente Toring, who
appears to be the former's illegitimate son. This disposes of the private
respondent's contention that the lawyer-client relationship terminated with
Casimiro's death and that Vicente has no personality now to substitute him.
Now to the merits.
We note that both the trial court and the respondent court, in arriving at their
respective conclusions, focused on the question of whether or not Teopista was in
continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro
Mendoza. This was understandable because Teopista herself had apparently
based her claim on this particular ground as proof of filiation allowed under
Article 283 of the Civil Code.
To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
"Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever
but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. 10 The
possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own,
directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though
without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate).11 There must be a showing of
the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own,
by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. 12
With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not
been in continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of
Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
Family Code.
The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they
were both residents of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent court
observed, that this could have been because defendant had a legitimate wife.
However, it is not unusual for a father to take his illegitimate child into his house
to live with him and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in
this case. In fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of
Casimiro, lived with the latter and his wife, apparently without objection from the
latter. We also note that Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although
this is, of course, not decisive of one's status. No less significantly, the regularity
of defendant's act of giving money to the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza
and Isaac Mendoza has not been sufficiently established. The trial court correctly
concluded that such instances were "off-and-on," not continuous and
intermittent. Indeed, the plaintiff s testimony on this point is tenuous as in one
breath she said that her mother solely spent for her education and in another that
Casimiro helped in supporting her.13
But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has
nevertheless established that status by another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is
that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil
Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,"
according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.14
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff
himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the
daughter of the defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light of
Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 39. Act or declarations about pedigree. The act or declaration
of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
The statement of the trial court regarding Teopista's parentage is not entirely
accurate. To set the record straight, we will stress that it was only Isaac Mendoza
who testified on this question of pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father.
His testimony was that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was
Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista
was Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.15
Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule because "it is the best the nature of the case admits and because
greater evils are apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its
admission.16 Nevertheless, precisely because of its nature as hearsay evidence,
there are certain safeguards against its abuse. Commenting on this provision,
Francisco enumerates the following requisites that have to be complied with
before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in
issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such
declaration.17
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the
declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro,
Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's
testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity
of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory
recognition. The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by
Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the
relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by
evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of
the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his
heirs.18
The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by
deposition if he was too old and weak to testify at the trial of the case.
If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private
respondent and her witnesses, such as the financial doles made by Casimiro to
Brigida Toring, the hiring of Teopista's husband to drive the passenger truck of
Casimiro, who later sold the vehicle and gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista
and her husband, the permission he gave Lolito Tufiacao to build a house on his
land after he found that the latter was living on a rented lot, and, no less
remarkably, the joint savings account Casimiro opened with Teopista, we can
reasonably conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
Mendoza.
We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the
other circumstances of this case, 'reopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is
the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as
such. In so holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family
Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate
children, without prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed
status with his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the
facilities of modern medicine and technology
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING
Teopista Toring Tuacao to be the illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza
and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.