Country Information Report Myanmar

DFAT COUNTRY INFORMATION REPORT
MYANMAR
10 January 2017
CONTENTS
ACRONYMS 2
1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 3
2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 4
Recent history 4
Demography 5
Economic overview 5
Political System 7
Human Rights Framework 8
Security situation 8
3. REFUGEE CONVENTION CLAIMS 11

Race/Nationality 11
Religion 16
Political Opinion (Actual or imputed) 18
Groups of Interest 19
4. COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION CLAIMS 24

Arbitrary Deprivation of Life 24
Death Penalty 24
Torture & Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 25
5. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 26
State Protection 26
Internal Relocation 29
Treatment of Returnees 30
Documentation 31
Prevalence of Fraud 32
DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 1

ACRONYMS
ACSC Associate Citizenship Scrutiny Card

BGP Border Guard Police
BSPP Burma Socialist Programme Party
CMC Camp Management Committee
CSC Citizenship Scrutiny Card
FRC Foreign Registration Certificate
HDI Human Development Index
ICNV Identity Card for National Verification
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP Internally Displaced People
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOM International Organisation for Migration
KIA Kachin Independence Army
LGBTI Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex
MNHRC Myanmar National Human Rights Commission
MP Member of Parliament
MSM Men who have sex with men
NCA Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
NCSC Naturalised Citizenship Scrutiny Card
NGO Non-Government Organisation
NLD National League for Democracy
NRC National Registration Card
PEC Presidential Electoral College
RSF Reporters Sans Frontiers (Reporters Without Borders)
SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council
SPDC State Peace and Development Council
USDP Union Solidarity and Development Party
UWSA United Wa State Army

1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
This Country Information Report has been prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT) for protection status determination purposes only. It provides DFATs best judgment and assessment
at time of writing and is distinct from Australian Government policy with respect to Myanmar.
The report provides a general, rather than an exhaustive country overview. It has been prepared
with regard to the current caseload for decision-makers in Australia without reference to individual
applications for protection visas. The report does not contain policy guidance for decision-makers.
Ministerial Direction Number 56 of 21 June 2013 under s 499 of the Migration Act 1958 states that:
Where the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has prepared a country information assessment
expressly for protection status determination processes, and that assessment is available to the
decision-maker, the decision-maker must take into account that assessment, where relevant, in
making their decision. The decision-maker is not precluded from considering other relevant
information about the country.
This report is based on DFATs on-the-ground knowledge and discussions with a range of sources in
Myanmar, including in Yangon and Rakhine State. It takes into account relevant and credible open source
reports, including reports from the US State Department, Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
(Burma), Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, International Crisis Group, the
International Monetary Fund, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the UN Office of the
High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the World
Bank. Where DFAT does not refer to a specific source of a report or allegation, this may be to protect the
source.
This updated Country Information Report replaces the previous DFAT report released on Burma
(Myanmar) published on 9 June 2015.

2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
RECENT HISTORY
Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, is a south-east Asian parliamentary republic, situated on the
Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. The second-largest country in south-east Asia by area, it shares borders
with Bangladesh and India to the north-west, China to the north-east and Laos and Thailand to the east.
Myanmar is characterised by a central plain, ringed with rugged mountains which form the tail-end of the
Himalayas. Much of the country is covered by forests of teak, rubber, acacia, bamboo, ironwood, mangrove
and rhododendron. The capital city is Nay Pyi Taw, a planned city founded in the mid-2000s. The old capital,
Yangon (formerly known as Rangoon), is Myanmars largest city and its economic centre. Myanmar is subject
to natural disasters, including cyclones and flooding. For example, in May 2008 Cyclone Nargis caused severe
damage across the Ayeyarwady Delta region, reportedly killing around 140,000 people. In July and August
2015, more than 100 people died in widespread monsoon flooding across Myanmar, which also destroyed
an estimated 1.2 million acres of rice fields.
The Union of Burma achieved independence from Britain in 1948, initially as a parliamentary
democracy under the leadership of General Aung San (Aung San Suu Kyis father). A military coup in 1962
brought General Ne Win to power, and he ruled through the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) for
26 years. Under the BSPPs Burmese Way to Socialism, Myanmar became one of the most isolated
countries in the world. Many ethnic groups sought greater independence during this time, often through
protracted armed insurgencies.
General Ne Win stood down in 1988 following widespread demonstrationswhich were in part
linked to rice shortagesand demands that the BSPP regime be replaced by an elected civilian government.
The military (known as the Tatmadaw) responded by announcing a military-backed State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC, renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997).
The SLORC restored order through violent military and police crackdowns from August 1988. Some sources
indicate that at least 3,000 people were killed in Yangon and Mandalay, though the exact number of
casualties is unknown.
Elections in 1990 were undermined by violence and the arrest of many opposition figures, including
Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite this, opposition groups and ethnic parties opposed to the government won 475
out of the 485 non-military seats available. The SLORC did not recognise the results of the election and
senior opposition figures, including Aung San Suu Kyi, were imprisoned. Senior General Than Shwe continued
military rule until 30 March 2011, establishing Myanmars current constitution in 2008.
Parliamentary elections were held in November 2010; these were boycotted by the opposition
National League for Democracy (NLD) and considered flawed by international observers. The military-backed
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won over 75 per cent of the non-military seats available (see
Political System for details of the constitutional arrangements for allocating seats in the parliament). The
new parliament convened in January 2011 and appointed Thein Sein president; Thein Sein was a general in
the Tatmadaw and Prime Minister under Than Shwe.

Thein Seins government initiated a series of political and economic reforms that set in motion a
period of rapid and transformational change for Myanmar. They released hundreds of political prisoners,
including Aung San Suu Kyi, who was released from house arrest six days after the 2010 elections. Aung San
Suu Kyi and other members of the NLD party were allowed to contest parliamentary by-elections held on
1 April 2012 for 45 seats in the union, state and regional parliaments. These by-elections were deemed to be
credible by international observers. The NLD won 43 of the 44 seats it contested; Aung San Suu Kyi was one
of those elected.
In November 2015, Myanmar held credible nation-wide elections for the first time since 1960; more
than 23 million people voted for more than 6,000 candidates from 91 political parties for the bicameral
national parliament (the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw). The election result, in which Aung San Suu Kyis NLD won
almost 80 per cent of the 75 per cent of seats not reserved for the military under the Constitution, was
generally accepted by the public and by the other parties and candidates and international observers. A
transition of power to the new government was completed in March 2016. For more information on the
political situation in Myanmar, see Political System, below.
DEMOGRAPHY
The first national census in more than 30 years was completed in April 2014. The census showed
Myanmars population to be 51.4 million people. This number includes estimates of the population sizes of
various communities in Rakhine, Kachin and Kayin (also known as Karen) states that were not directly
surveyed due to conflict (Kachin and Kayin states) or sensitivities regarding ethnicity (Rakhine State; see
Race/Nationality, below).
Around 70 per cent of Myanmars population live in rural areas. Of the 15 states and regions, Yangon
region has the highest population with around 7.4 million people, followed by Ayeyarwady and Mandalay
with around 6.2 million people each. The states of Chin and Kayah (also known as Karenni) are the least-
populated, with fewer than half-a-million people residing in each.
The Constitution officially recognises 135 ethnic groups in Myanmar. Some ethnic minorities present
in the country are not included as part of this list. Information on the relative size of these ethnic populations
was collected during the 2014 Census, but has not yet been released by the government. According to
estimates in the CIA World Factbook, the Bamar ethnic group is the largest in Myanmar, making up around
68 per cent of the population, followed by Shan (9 per cent), Kayin/Karen (7 per cent), and Rakhine
(4 per cent). Other significant ethnic groups in Myanmar include the Mon, Chin, Kayah/Karenni, and ethnic
Chinese and Indian populations, as well as a group of Muslim people who identify as Rohingya. DFAT
acknowledges that use of the term Rohingya is highly sensitive in Myanmar (see Race/Nationality below).
The majority of people in Myanmar are Buddhists, although there are also significant minority
populations of Christians and Muslims. According to the 2014 census, around 88 per cent of Myanmars
population is Buddhist, 6 per cent is Christian, 4 per cent is Muslim, and 2 per cent belong to animist or other
religious groups.
ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Myanmar is experiencing a significant political, economic and social change. Its recent move away
from authoritarian government, embrace of market-oriented economic policies and efforts to address
internal conflict are having a positive effect on stability and development. The economic potential of
Myanmar is significant: the countries with which it shares its borders (Bangladesh, India, China, Lao PDR and

Thailand) are home to approximately 40 per cent of the worlds population; it is located near key maritime
trade routes; and has significant natural resources.
Gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaged around 7.4 per cent between 2011 and 2015.
According to the IMF, growth in the 2015-16 financial year (which ended on 31 March 2016) was around
7 per cent, about 1.5 percentage points lower than the preceding two years. This moderation in the growth
rate followed widespread flooding in 2015, uncertainty regarding the election process and deteriorating
terms of trade as commodity prices fell. Growth, while slightly weaker than in previous years, remains strong
in absolute terms, and there are some signs of capacity constraints, with inflation rising to around
10.5 per cent in 2015.
Despite strong growth in recent years, Myanmar remains one of Asias poorest countries. It was
ranked 148 out of 188 countries in the United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP) 2015 Human
Development Report, the latest data available. Around a quarter of the population is estimated to live below
the national poverty line; while many more sit just above and are susceptible to economic shocks. Economic
activity is centralised in major urban centres; Yangon and Mandalay together accounted for around
40 per cent of the growth in the entire Myanmar economy in 2014-15, despite having only 26 per cent of the
population. Economic growth and public service provision is weaker in rural and remote areas, particularly in
areas affected by conflict.
Myanmars services sector accounts for around 42 per cent of the total economy, followed by the
agriculture sector (36 per cent) and the industrial sector (22 per cent). The World Banks Myanmar
Economic Monitor, released on 1 May 2016, projects medium-term annual GDP growth of 8.2 per cent,
driven by expansion in services, infrastructure, construction and manufacturing. The agriculture sector,
which has long suffered from low productivity, has been slow to recover from floods in August 2015. The
lack of opportunities in rural areas has driven increased rates of rural-urban migration.
The state still exerts significant influence over the economy, but reforms implemented since 2011
have exposed military-owned businesses to greater competition. The abolition of the Tatmadaw-controlled
Trade Council, which approved all export and import licences, and the removal of the tax-exempt status of
Tatmadaw businesses, has opened up these enterprises to greater competition, particularly in the
manufacturing and processing sectors.
Health
Health outcomes are generally poor in Myanmar, and poorer in rural areas. Around one-third of
children are stunted, and stunting rates among the Muslim community in Rakhine State are reportedly
increasing. Maternal mortality rates are around 200 deaths per 100,000 live births, compared with around
72 deaths per 100,000 live births for East Asia and the Pacific as a whole. According to UNICEF, the neonatal
mortality rate in Myanmar is around 26.4 deaths per 1,000 live births, compared with around 8.9 deaths per
1,000 live births for the East Asia and Pacific region. The standard of healthcare is generally poor, even in
major urban centres. Poor infrastructure, rugged and remote terrain and ongoing conflict are key constraints
to the effective delivery of health services in some parts of the country, particularly during the monsoon
season. Communicable diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria, dengue fever, Hepatitis B, typhoid and HIV are
common among the Myanmar population.

Education
Myanmars literacy rate is estimated to be around 93 per cent. Enrolment rates at primary school
level are reasonably high, estimated at around 95 per cent of the relevant age group in 2014, but drop
rapidly at higher levels of education, with enrolment rates of 48 per cent and 14 per cent at secondary and
tertiary levels respectively. This drop-off in enrolments at higher levels of education is reflected in the
expected years of schooling (i.e. the number of years a child of school entrance age can expect to spend at
school), which is around 8.6 years in Myanmar compared with 10.6 in Lao PDR, 10.9 in Cambodia, 11.9 in
Vietnam and 13.5 in Thailand. Children in rural and remote areas, and in areas affected by conflict, face
additional challenges in obtaining an education.
POLITICAL SYSTEM
Myanmars 2008 Constitution divides power between the executive, legislature and judiciary. The
Tatmadaw reserves 25 per cent of seats in the parliament (Hluttaw), giving it the ability to block any
constitutional reforms, and appoints the Ministers for Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw also has the right to invoke extraordinary powers, including the ability
to suspend civil liberties and abrogate parliamentary authority.
Myanmar is divided administratively into seven regions, seven states, six self-administered zones or
divisions, and one union territory (containing the capital, Nay Pyi Taw). Despite the difference in
terminology, states and regions are constitutionally equivalent.
The six self-administrated zones/divisions in Myanmar are recognised under the Constitution. These
are governed by ethnic minority groups; five are located within Shan State and one within Sagaing Region.
The largest is the Wa self-administered division, bordering China in the eastern part of Shan State.
Under the Constitution, the legislative power of the Union is shared among the central and the state
and regional parliaments, although in practice power is heavily centralised in the national executive and the
national parliament. The President has the power to appoint the chief ministers of states and regions, and
chief ministers are directly responsible to the President rather than to their respective state or regional
parliament. National legislation overrides state or regional law under the Constitution.
Each state and region has its own legislature comprising elected officials and appointed
administrators. While taxation is formally centralised, state governments typically collect informal revenues
through land repossessions and sales, local contracts and administrative levies. Myanmars judicial, law
enforcement and administrative structures do not have complete or uniform reach across the country.
Representatives from government revenue and service delivery agencies rarely travel to the more
inaccessible areas of Myanmar due to poor transportation and telecommunications infrastructure and
instability and conflict.
The bicameral national parliament is made up of the Peoples Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw, the lower
house) and the House of Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw, the upper house); the two houses combine to form
the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw to discuss certain issues, such as national budgets, and to resolve deadlocks. The
Peoples Assembly consists of 440 representatives, of which 330 are directly elected from single-member
electorates and 110 are military personnel appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The
House of Nationalities consists of 224 representatives, of which 168 are directly elected (12 from each of the
states and regions) and 56 are military personnel appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces.

The President is elected by the Presidential Electoral College (PEC), which comprises lower house
members of parliament (MPs), upper house MPs and military MPs. Each of these three groups elects one
Vice President. The combined PEC (comprising all representatives in the national parliament) then elects one
of the three Vice Presidents to be President. The President and the remaining two Vice Presidents serve in
those roles for a term of five years. The Constitution includes several eligibility criteria for presidential and
vice-presidential nominees, including that neither of each nominees parents nor any of their children can be
foreignerson these grounds, Aung San Suu Kyi is ineligible for the presidency because her two sons have
British citizenship.
The parliamentary elections held in November 2015 resulted in a landslide victory by Aung San Suu
Kyis NLD. The NLD won almost 80 per cent of the popularly elected seats in the national parliament (and a
similar proportion in state and regional parliaments), despite receiving just 57 per cent of the popular vote,
due to the first-past-the-post electoral system. The incumbent military-aligned USDP won just eight per cent
of elected seats, and parties representing ethnic minorities won 11 per cent of elected seats, well below
expectations. The Buddhist nationalist National Development Party, which had the fourth-most candidates of
all parties contesting the election, failed to win a seat. The results gave the NLD enough seats to freely
choose a president and to pass legislation on its own.
In March 2016 the parliament elected NLD nominee Htin Kyaw as President, with retired Lieutenant
General Myint Swe (nominated by the military representatives) and Henry Van Thio (also nominated by the
NLD) appointed as Vice Presidents. Aung San Suu Kyi was appointed to the new and constitutionally-
undefined position of State Counsellor, and also holds the key portfolios of Foreign Minister and Minister of
the Presidents Office. As provided by the Constitution, the Ministers for Defence, Home Affairs and Border
Affairs are members of the defence services nominated by the Commander-in-Chief. Home Affairs is
responsible for the Myanmar Police Force, court system, and the General Administration Department.
HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
National Human Rights Institution

Myanmar established the government-funded Myanmar National Human Rights Commission
(MNHRC) in 2011. The International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights currently classifies the MNHRC as a B status institution, meaning that the
MNHRC is not fully in compliance with the Paris Principles, which set out the minimum international
standards required by human rights institutions to be considered credible and to operate effectively.
At present, the MNHRC receives complaints and has some investigative powers. Following its
investigations, the MNHRC refers its recommendations to the relevant government department for action,
but has no power to ensure its recommendations are implemented. Its administrative and financial
independence from the government is limited.
SECURITY SITUATION
Sporadic conflict between ethnic groups and the state has been ongoing since independence in
1948. In recent decades conflict has largely been restricted to contested areas in the border states and
regions (the ethnic Bamar heartland has been largely unaffected by conflict). Of the 21 active ethnic armed
organisations (EAOs), 15 were included, or chose to participate, in negotiations for a Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement (NCA). Of these, only eight signed the agreement in October 2015, despite all 15 subsequently

agreeing to draft text in March 2016. Several other EAOs remained outside the NCA negotiation process.
While some groups chose not to participate, three groups were excluded by the military because of their
involvement in recent clashes with the Tatmadaw: the Kokang (MNDAA); the Arakan Army (AA); and the
Taang National Liberation Army (TNLA). All NCA signatories continue to encourage non-signatories to sign
the NCA so they can take part in the political dialogue process once it commences formally. While not all
EAOs have signed the agreement, the partial signing of the NCA was a significant step towards advancing the
peace process in Myanmar. The NCA sets out the architecture for progressing political dialogue.
Continuing the momentum around the peace process is a key priority for the NLD in government. On
31 August 2016, the government held a Union Peace Conference or the 21st Century Panglong Conference,
a reference to the Panglong Conference held in 1947 and led by General Aung San, which led to the
formation of the Union of Burma. The 2016 conference served as a symbolic restart of the peace process
under the NCA, and focused on inclusion rather than substance. Attendees included the government, the
Tatmadaw, signatory and non-signatory EAOs (but not the MNDAA, AA or TNLA, despite genuine
negotiations on their inclusion) and civil society representatives.
Despite the NCA, parts of the country remain affected by ongoing conflict, and there are some areas
where the government does not exercise control. EAOs continue to clash with government forces. These
clashesincluding renewed fighting in late 2016occur predominantly in border areas in southern Kachin
State and northern Shan state and have displaced significant numbers of the local population. Sporadic
clashes have also occurred in other parts of the country including Kayin and Rakhine states. In late 2015 the
Arakan Armya small group of ethnic Rakhine separatists that historically trained and fought alongside the
KIA in Kachin Statebegan carrying out guerrilla-style attacks on military personnel in the northern parts of
Rakhine State (although not in the northern townships of Maungdaw and Buthidaung, where the majority of
the population is Muslim).
The security situation in Rakhine State deteriorated rapidly after an outbreak of inter-communal
violence in 2012 between ethnic Rakhine (Buddhists) and a minority Muslim population that identify as
Rohingya. Between 2012 and late 2016, intercommunal violence decreased, although the situation was
extremely fragile with significant impact on the realisation of rights for both communities. See detail on this
specific situation in Those who identify as Rohingya below.
On 9 October 2016, groups of armed men carried out attacks on three Border Guard Police (BGP)
facilities in Maungdaw Township. According to the authorities, nine members of the police force were killed,
along with eight of the attackers. Around 50 firearms and over ten thousand rounds of ammunition were
stolen. Further clashes occurred during October and November 2016. A new armed group calling itself
Harakah al-Yakin (Faith Movement in Arabic) has claimed responsibility for the attacks and released a
series of videos calling for an end to the persecution of the Rohingya. The Myanmar Government and
international analysts claim the group has some links to international jihadist groups. The military and BGP
launched a major operation in response to the attacks, sealing off a large area of northern Maungdaw for
clearance operations. While international access to the area has been limited, satellite imagery shows that
several villages have been burned, there have been a number of confirmed deaths in custody and it is
estimated that tens of thousands of people have been displaced. The government has confirmed that a
number of people have been killed in security operations following the attacks. See detail on the human
rights impact of this situation in Those who identify as Rohingya below.
Conflict across the country, including inter-communal violence in Rakhine State, has resulted in large
numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees (predominantly those displaced across the
Thailand border). According to a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar, as at March 2016 there were more than 470,000 people displaced including 140,000 IDPs in
Rakhine State, more than 96,000 IDPs in Kachin and northern Shan State, and around 230,000 in a situation

of protracted displacement in south-eastern parts of Myanmarincluding those displaced across the border
in Thailand. Whilst fighting in the south-east has substantially reduced since the signing of the NCA the rate
of return from refugee camps in Thailand is still unpredictable. Over 30,000 people have fled to Bangladesh
as a result of the latest conflict in Rakhine State.

3. REFUGEE CONVENTION CLAIMS
RACE/NATIONALITY
The Myanmar Government recognises eight major ethnic groups (the Kachin, Kayah/Karenni,
Kayin/Karen, Chin, Bamar, Mon, Rakhine and Shan) as part of 135 national races. The law grants full
citizenship to members of the 135 officially-recognised national races. Under the Burma Citizenship Law
1982, an ethnic group must have been present in any of the territories included within the State
continuously since 1823 for its members to be entitled to full citizenship. The law restricts members of other
groups from full citizenship. Proof of citizenship is usually required to access government services. The
Constitution recognises those national races with greater than 0.1 per cent of the national population
(National races with suitable population) by allocating seats in state and regional parliaments to members
of these groups. Aside from this formal positive discrimination, instances of official discrimination on the
basis of ethnicity against people recognised as citizens are rare.
The Muslim population who identify as Rohingya are not among the 135 recognised ethnic groups;
nor are people of Indian, Chinese, Anglo-Burmese or Nepali descent. The formal restrictions on people who
do not hold full citizenship are broad. Officially, they are unable to access state-funded healthcare and
education services, although in practice, those with the ability to pay can often secure access to these
services. They typically cannot work for state, regional or central governments.
The Bamar are the majority ethnic group in Myanmar, comprising approximately 68 per cent of the
population. Bamar people dominate the bureaucracy and the political system, and are often appointed to
leadership positions in states or regions even where other ethnic groups form the majority. The central
plains of Myanmar have a higher concentration of Bamar than remote areas, including major cities. The vast
majority of ethnic Bamar people are Buddhist.
Identity in Myanmar is complex, involving elements of race/nationality/ethnicity, religion, language
and geographic location. Different members of the same family may identify as belonging to different races,
and peoples officially-recognised race or religion may be different to how they self-identify. Marriages
between different ethnic groups are common, particularly between people who are of different ethnicity but
share a religion.
In general, DFAT assesses that people in Myanmar, other than those who identify as Rohingya,
typically face a low level of official and societal discrimination on the basis of their race or ethnicity.
For the purposes of this report, the Rohingya ethnicity is treated as a standalone issue under
Race/Nationality, while other ethno-religious groups including Christian and Muslim groups are covered
below under Religion.
Those who identify as Rohingya

DFAT acknowledges that there is debate in Myanmar around the origins and historical validity of the
term Rohingya. This section describes the situation of people who identify as Rohingya. This term is

contested by a part of the ethnic Rakhine population, and some others in Myanmar, who claim that the
Rohingya are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and should be recognised and known as Bengali.
The vast majority of Rohingya are Sunni Muslim, and almost all live in Rakhine State (formerly known
as Arakan State). Some also live in Bangladesh (see DFATs Country Information Report on Bangladesh,
published on 5 July 2016). Official estimates of the size of the Rohingya population are not available as this
group is not recognised as citizens and was excluded from the 2014 census. However, the census used
mapping data to estimate the size of the population not counted in Rakhine state. This mapping process
indicated that approximately 1.1 million people were not counted because they were not allowed to
self-identify using a name that is not recognised by the government. This estimate is broadly in line with
most credible estimates of the Rohingya population in Rakhine state, which has a total population of around
3.2 million.
Rakhine is the second-poorest state in Myanmar, with a universal poverty rate of 78 per cent. The
majority of those that identify as Rohingya reside in the northern part of Rakhine State in the area that
encompasses the townships of Maungdaw and Buthidaung. These are two of only three townships in
Myanmar with a Muslim majority (the other being Mingalar Taung Nyunt in Yangon). Credible sources told
DFAT that those that identify as Rohingya make up around 85-95 per cent of the population in these
townships. There are smaller communities of Rohingya in many other townships in Rakhine State, including
Sittwe, Pauktaw and Myebon. Ethnic Rakhine (also known as Arakanese), who are mostly Buddhist, form the
majority in all parts of Rakhine except northern Rakhine State.
DFAT assesses that official and societal discrimination against Rohingya in Rakhine State, on the basis
of their ethnicity, is endemic. They lack citizenship, face severe restrictions on their freedom of movement
and are the subject of systemic extortion and harassment. These issues combine to restrict this communitys
access to livelihoods and to essential services such as education and healthcare. While movement
restrictions imposed on Rohingya have reduced the opportunities for societal violence between Muslims and
Buddhists, DFAT assesses that high levels of religious and ethnic tensions remain, and there is a high risk of
further violence. This is exacerbated by the recent emergence of an armed Muslim group in Rakhine, with
alleged links to international jihadist groups. Violence in Rakhine State has potential to inflame existing
religious tensions between Muslim and Buddhist communities in other parts of the country.
Citizenship
Until the effective implementation of the 1982 citizenship law in the late 1980s, Rohingya typically
held formal identity cards known as National Registration Cards (or NRCs). NRCs were formal identification
documents which, while explicitly not considered conclusive proof of citizenship, were issued to all
Myanmar citizens. Non-citizens were issued Foreign Registration Certificates. In 1989 the government
carried out a citizenship scrutiny exercise as part of the implementation of the 1982 law. During this
process, NRCs were replaced with full, naturalised or associate citizenship scrutiny cards (CSCs). However,
while Rohingya previously held NRCs, very few were issued with CSCs of any type following the citizenship
scrutiny exercise.
In 1995 the government began to issue Temporary Registration Cards (known as white cards) to
those that identified as Rohingya. According to the UNHCR, as many as 90 per cent of Rohingya in Rakhine
State were white card-holders in 2014. However, in 2015 then-President Thein Sein declared white cards
invalid, thus removing the only formal documentation available to this population. Receipts were given out in
exchange for white cards as part of a plan to reinstate identification documents at a later date. Without
valid documentation, former white card-holders were unable to vote in the 2015 elections, to stand as
candidates, or to form political parties.

From June 2015 the government began issuing a new identity card for national verification (ICNV,
also known as a turquoise card). DFAT understands that as few as 1,000 people were issued with this card
in 2015. The rights conferred by the ICNV are unclear. DFAT understands that a small number of Rohingya
(who were required to identify as Bengali to take part in the process) were issued with the card as part of
the 2015 process, but have not seen any change to their access to services or freedom of movement. The
ICNVs issued in 2015 were valid for just two years, and no information is available around what happens
once they expire.
In June 2016 the NLD government restarted the process to determine who is a citizen under the
1982 law. While the process applies across the whole country, Rohingya are the single largest group
affected. DFAT understands that people applying for ICNVs under the new process are not required to
include their ethnicity or religion in their application, a significant change from the 2015 process which
required Rohingya applicants instead to identify as Bengali. This change is in line with public statements
from Aung San Suu Kyi that using sensitive nomenclature should be avoided regardless of the side of the
citizenship debate (i.e. the word Rohingya should not be used, but neither should the word Bengali). DFAT
understands that the ICNVs issued under this process also no longer have expiry dates.
Despite significant changes in the process, at the time of publication application rates for ICNVs
remained low. DFAT understands that authorities received approximately 1,300 applications across Rakhine
State in the first month of the revised process (June 2016). Some community leaders have reportedly urged
their communities not to participate because of uncertainty around the rights conferred by an ICNV, ongoing
issues with nomenclature and issues with slow decision-makingaround one-third of applications made in
2015 had not been processed by mid-2016. As a result, the vast majority of Rohingya remain
undocumentedor holding a receiptand effectively stateless. This is having significant implications in
particular for lack of registration of new births in this community.
Freedom of movement
Following the widespread communal violence in Rakhine State in 2012, local authorities and the
Ministry of Home Affairs moved some communities into camps and implemented severe movement
restrictions on the population. This disproportionately affected Rohingya, and restrictions remained in place
at the time of publication. In northern Rakhine State, where Rohingya make up a large majority of the
population, the BGP maintain checkpoints that restrict movement, in some cases within village tracts within
a township. In other parts of the state such as Sittwe and Myebon, where they make up a minority of the
population, those that identify as Rohingya tend to still be confined to camps for internally displaced people
(IDPs) or in separate Muslim enclaves such as Aung Mingalar in Sittwe (the capital of Rakhine State). The
security response to the 9 October 2016 attacks against the BGP has included the establishment of a sealed
security zone in northern Rakhine State. Movement in and out of the security zone has been extremely
limited. Movement restrictions have also reportedly tightened in the rest of northern Rakhine. The
restrictions on movement for Rohingya prevent access to livelihoods and essential services. Rohingya are
required to obtain travel approval to move even short distances; credible sources told DFAT that obtaining
travel approval documents and then using these documents to pass through checkpoints requires them to
pay informal fees at every stage. The size of these informal payments can vary and can be linked to the
perception of an individuals capacity to pay.
Access to healthcare is severely impacted by imposed restrictions on movement for Rohingya. This
includes those living in IDP camps as well as those in northern Rakhine State. Poor access to healthcare is
partly driven by the generally poor healthcare services in Rakhine State and underdeveloped transport
infrastructure, and exacerbated by the movement restrictions for Rohingya and discrimination in the delivery
of services. For example, Rohingya living in IDP camps near Myebon are not permitted to attend the local

hospital in the Myebon town centre, a short drive away. Instead, these people must travel by boat to Sittwe,
a journey that takes between five and seven hours.
Very basic levels of healthcare are provided in the IDP camps. For example, in a camp visited by
DFAT, a mobile clinic provides services four days per week for three hours per day, with limited facilities.
Sittwe hospital does not allow Rohingya access to the general medical services provided to the rest of the
population. Access to the hospital for Rohingya is limited to emergency cases, and this group are treated in a
separate ward at the hospital, which has a limited number of beds and lower-standard facilities compared to
the rest of the hospital. People in IDP camps are often reluctant to go to hospital (a process which requires a
police escort and transportation costs), meaning treatment is often delayed, leading to higher death rates.
This in turn makes people even more reluctant to seek hospital care. Those Rohingya who have sufficient
funds will occasionally travel to Bangladesh or, less often, Yangon to seek medical treatment.
While travel within Rakhine Stateand Myanmar in generalis severely restricted for Rohingya,
several credible sources told DFAT that this group in northern Rakhine State are more easily able to travel to
and from Bangladesh, despite neither country recognising the Rohingya as citizens. Prior to the security
operations following the October 2016 attacks against BGP outposts, people from northern Rakhine State
were able to take these trips for trading purposes or to access healthcare services. Myanmar immigration
and customs officials issue an official documentknown as a blue bookthat allowed regularised
movements of people, including Rohingya, between Myanmar and Bangladesh. Information on the card
includes the holders name and address and a record of their trips. The cards allowed for multiple entries
across a certain period of time. Since the commencement of security operations, one way, irregular people
movement from Myanmar to Bangladesh has dramatically increased, but regular movement between the
two countries has been restricted.
The restrictions on freedom of movement and access to quality healthcare for Rohingya lead to
poorer health outcomes. Access to safe water and sanitation facilities is poor, including in the IDP camps.
While official data on the health outcomes for this group are not collected, a wide range of credible sources
active in Rakhine State told DFAT that malnutrition rates among the Rohingya population are very high,
leading to high stunting rates. Maternal health outcomes are also reportedly much poorer for Rohingya
compared with the ethnic Rakhine population.
Extortion and harassment

Movement restrictions provide opportunities for authorities to extract informal payments,
particularly in northern Rakhine State. Checkpoints, usually manned by Border Guard Police (BGP) officials,
are set up to check whether Rohingya have travel approval. Passing through these checkpoints requires
Rohingya to pay bribes, even if they have the appropriate travel documentation (which also requires
informal payments to obtain). It is estimated that there are nearly 200 checkpoints in northern Rakhine State
alone. Credible sources told DFAT that Rohingya faced systematic levels of extortion in central and northern
Rakhine State.
There are reports of BGP officials carrying out night-time raids on Rohingya households, under the
pretext of searching for weapons or other contraband. These raids are used to further extract payment from
the Rohingya population. There are also accusations of BGP officials planting Bangladeshi mobile phone SIM
cards on the persons of Rohingya; while it is not illegal to possess a Bangladeshi SIM card under Myanmar
law, there are local orders in northern Rakhine State against holding these cards. Credible sources confirmed
to DFAT reports of a woman being strip-searched and sexually harassed after being accused of hiding a
Bangladeshi SIM card in her undergarments.
Rohingya living in IDP camps face similar restrictions on movements, and are often unable to travel
to access markets or other income-generating opportunities. People in camps also face a risk of extortion or

other forms of corruption from members of their camp management committee (CMC). CMCs are typically
managed by camp members chosen by local authorities. This results in representatives who are generally not
reflective of the broader camp community, which is often made up of people from different villages across
Rakhine State. There have been credible allegations of corruption, with CMC members seeking payment or
sexual favours in return for allocations of resources such as food and accommodation.
Since the 9 October 2016 attacks and subsequent security operations in northern Rakhine State,
there have been consistent but largely unconfirmed allegations of systematic human rights abuses against
Rohingya by security forces. Allegations include torture, indiscriminate killings, burning of houses and mass
rapes. In December 2016 a video was published online that showed police beating villagers. The officers
involved in the incident have been identified and the government has said it will take necessary action
against them.
Other issues affecting those who identify as Rohingya in Rakhine State

Rohingya living in Rakhine State, particularly northern Rakhine State, are subject to a number of
other discriminatory official practices, which are typically enforced through local orders (i.e. orders that do
not apply outside of local townships). They are also restricted from holding gatherings of more than four
people, which limits their freedom to worship and can impinge on their ability to work. Credible sources told
DFAT that, while there are fewer cases of marriage orders than in the past, these orders can still be used as a
means of extortion. Marriage orders may include a requirement to shave ones beard, to prove you are not
pregnant, and to commit to having no more than two children, before approval to marry is granted. Children
born in contravention of the two-child rule may not be registeredofficials often refuse to list these
children on their official household list. Being non-citizens, the household list is often the only formal
documentation accessible to Rohingya.
The authorities restrictions on movement for Rohingya have reduced the opportunity for communal
violence between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims. Nonetheless, tensions remain and further
outbreaks of violence are possible. In January 2014 credible but unverified reports suggested that up to
48 Rohingya were killed in mob violence in Maungdaw, northern Rakhine State. Later that year, communal
tensions in Sittwe led to Rakhine Buddhists targeting UN offices and international NGOs, causing property
damage and affecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Rakhine State. In 2016, the use of the word
Rohingya in a US Embassy Facebook post resulted in large protests outside the US Embassy in Yangon,
reflecting the extent of societal sensitivity in Myanmar over issues related to this group.
Those who identify as Rohingya outside Rakhine State

There are a number of Rohingya people living outside of Rakhine State, particularly in Yangon. The
size of the Rohingya population in Myanmar outside Rakhine State is unclear, as these people generally do
not publicise their ethnicity. Rohingya outside Rakhine State typically have higher incomes and better access
to resources than those in Rakhine State, and are typically able to obtain identity documentation that allows
them to live and work without facing the high levels of discrimination otherwise experienced by Rohingya in
their day-to-day life. Typically, Rohingya in Yangon are registered as Burmese Muslims. Burmese Muslims
hold national ID cards and residency documents, which gives them a legal right to a passport. Rohingya who
maintain a low profile outside of Rakhine State face a similar level of discrimination to that faced by other
Muslims or people of South Asian appearance in Myanmar (see Muslims, below), although they are not
subject to local orders as other Rohingya in northern Rakhine State. DFAT assesses that those Rohingya
outside Rakhine State experience moderate levels of societal discrimination on a day-to-day basis.

RELIGION
Section 34 of Myanmars Constitution entitles all Myanmar citizens to freedom of conscience and
the right to freely profess and practice religion subject to public order, morality or health. Section 361 of the
Constitution recognises the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the majority of citizens.
This applies only to Theravada Buddhism. According to the US State Departments 2015 Report on Religious
Freedom, Myanmar bans any organisation of Buddhist monks from outside the nine monastic orders
recognised under the 1990 Law Concerning Sangha Organisations. Section 362 of the Constitution further
recognises Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Animism as the religions existing in the Union at the day of the
coming into operation of this Constitution. There are several other provisions in the Constitution that
prohibit discrimination against citizens on the basis of religion, including section 352 which bans
discrimination in the employment of public officials. These anti-discrimination provisions do not apply to
those groups not recognised as full citizens, such as the Rohingya.
In 2015 the parliament passed four laws known as the Preservation of Race and Religion Laws.
These laws include a Religious Conversion Law, requiring people who want to convert to a different religion
to register with authorities proving they are over 18 years of age and that no third party is forcing the
conversion. This law also provides for penalties including fines and imprisonment for anyone found guilty of
coercing someone to convert their religion. The Interfaith Marriage Law places requirements on Buddhist
women marrying non-Buddhist men, including a requirement that notice of the interfaith marriage must be
publicly displayed and can only proceed in the absence of objections from the community. The law also
requires that the woman be allowed to continue to practice her Buddhist faith, and creates special
circumstances around divorce procedures that overwhelmingly favour the Buddhist woman over the
non-Buddhist man. The law is retrospective, and applies to interfaith couples who were married prior to the
law taking effect, although it does not invalidate existing marriages. The Monogamy Law makes it an offence
to have more than one spouse, or for a married person to live with a partner other than their spouse, though
the law is vague on the nature of the relationship. Some members of the Muslim community practice
polygamy. Finally, the Population Control Law requires that women must space out the birth of their children
by at least 36 months in regions where authorities have identified issues relating to population density,
population growth, child or maternal mortality rates, imbalances within the population or strains on
available resources.
Nationalist Buddhist groups in Myanmar, particularly the Committee for the Protection of Nationality
and Religion (an organisation led by radical Buddhist monks, commonly referred to by its acronym of Ma Ba
Tha) supported the Preservation of Race and Religion Laws. The laws are seen by many human rights groups
as targeting the Muslim population. For example, the Population Control Law forcing women to space births
by at least three years is seen as a response to claims by groups such as Ma Ba Tha that Muslimswhose
birth rates are reportedly higher than those of the rest the populationwere trying to take over the country.
Womens groups also maintain that the law discriminates against women.
In practice, the laws require bylaws to be enforced, and only the Monogamy Law has been used. No
bylaws have yet been put in place. According to Wirathu, the leading Ma Ba Tha monk, the Monogamy Law
was intended to preserve the sanctity of marriage, to safeguard from the danger of Jihadi Muslims who are
marrying many women in an effort to establish a Muslim nation. Media sources indicate the overwhelming
majority of men charged under the Monogamy Law have been Buddhist men allegedly being unfaithful to
their wives.
There are currently no legal barriers to government employment for non-Buddhist citizens in
Myanmar. In the absence of full citizenship, those that identify as Rohingya are banned from standing for
election. Neither the NLD nor the USDP fielded any Muslim candidates in the 2015 elections, reportedly due
to pressure from nationalist Buddhist organisations. For example, the NLD reportedly prevented Win Mya

Mya, the vice-president of the NLD in Mandalay, from standing for election on the basis of her Muslim faith.
According to Human Rights Watch, of the 6,074 candidates in the 2015 election, 5,130 were Buddhist, 903
were Christian and just 28 were Muslim. No Muslim candidates were elected. While Muslims and Christians
are rarely promoted to senior levels in government, the military or the police, discrimination is less severe in
professional services; Muslims and Christians occupy senior positions in professional fields such as medicine,
finance and legal services.
There is a high level of anti-Muslim sentiment, particularly outside the major cities. Buddhist
nationalist groups such as Ma Ba Tha and the 969 Movement are vocal and influential advocates of
discrimination against Muslims, and have advocated boycotts on Muslim-run businesses. Anti-Muslim
sentiment applies not just to Rohingyas, but also to Muslims of other ethnicities, including the ethnic Kaman
(one of the constitutionally-recognised national races of Myanmarsee Muslims, below). Some of these
groups also occasionally espouse anti-Christian views. The government has resisted these calls from hardline
nationalists and has publicly stated that Ma Ba Tha is unnecessary and redundant. The NLD has consistently
rejected their calls and emphasises that the Constitution separates religion from politics.
Christians
Three major ethnic groups in Myanmar have significant Christian populations; the Chin, Kachin, and
Kayin (also known as Karen). Each of these groups is comprised of numerous smaller ethnic sub-groups. Each
also has a home state in which a substantial proportion of its population live, but large numbers of each
group live elsewhere in the country, particularly in major cities or in states or regions bordering their own
state. In general, Christians are tolerated in Myanmar. Major Christian festivals, including Christmas and
Easter, are national holidays and are observed in most parts of the country.
Christians can face low levels of official and societal discrimination in Myanmar. For example,
Christians are rarely promoted to senior levels in the government, military or police. Human rights groups in
Myanmar told DFAT that Christians find it difficult to obtain land on which to build new churches (although
building new churches on existing land is generally possible), and there are reports of isolated attacks on
new or repaired church buildings. Credible sources also told DFAT that hard-line Buddhist groups
occasionally build pagodas on church property.
Muslims
Muslims live throughout Myanmar. In addition to the Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine State (see Those
who identify as Rohingya, above), there are a much smaller number of non-Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine
State and across the rest of the country. Anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar is widespread and entrenched,
especially outside of major cities.
Non-Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State

There are populations of non-Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State, including the Muslim Kaman
community. The government officially recognises many non-Rohingya Muslims as citizens, and these
Muslims can theoretically access the basic services unavailable to the Rohingya population.
Despite their distinct identity, non-Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State are subject to some official
and societal discrimination on the basis of their perceived association with the Rohingya, or as a result of
broader anti-Muslim discrimination. Key areas of discrimination include access to public services,
employment opportunities and official identification documents.

DFAT assesses that non-Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State face moderate levels of official
discrimination and a moderate risk of societal violence on the basis of their religion and perceived
association with the Rohingya population.
Muslims outside Rakhine State

Muslim groups form minority populations in many Myanmar states. Some Muslims outside of
Rakhine State belong to ethnic groups that are among those recognised under the Constitution. These
groups do not face significant restrictions on access to citizenship, and therefore enjoy a greater level of
formal legal protection from discrimination. However, there are a large number of non-citizen Muslims
outside of Rakhine State, including many Indian Muslims.
Muslims outside of Rakhine State can generally access a similar level of government services to other
ethnic groups. There are credible reports of authorities discriminating against people from Muslim groups,
but DFAT assesses that these incidents represent informal, societal discrimination by mostly Bamar public
officials and do not represent official government policy.
In March 2016 a small number of villages in the Ayeyarwady region reportedly erected signs saying
that Muslims were banned from staying overnight, conducting business, renting houses or marrying in the
village. In June 2016, following an argument over a building wrongly thought to be a mosque, approximately
200 Buddhists destroyed a separate mosque in a village in Bago region, central Myanmar. In early July 2016,
a group of Buddhist migrant workers attacked and burned down a mosque in Kachin state, reportedly after
mosque authorities had failed to heed demands to demolish the structure. Buddhist groups have reportedly
shut down Muslim-owned slaughterhouse and meat processing businesses (by buying the licences) in the
Ayeyarwady region.
In early 2013, a dispute between a female Muslim shopkeeper and a female Buddhist customer in
Meiktila (a key trading town in central Myanmar) escalated into mob violence when rumours spread that the
customer had been beaten to death. Community sentiments were further inflamed following the
subsequent, possibly unrelated, murder of a Buddhist monk by a Muslim man, which led to two further days
of rioting involving more than 1,000 people. Forty-four people reportedly died in the violence, both Muslims
and Buddhists.
Despite these examples, societal violence between Muslims and Buddhists has not occurred in every
town with a Muslim population in Myanmar, nor does it occur on a daily basis. Credible sources have told
DFAT of Muslim and Buddhist communities that are mutually dependent for trade and other livelihood
purposes and that generally live together without violence. Muslim communities in major cities generally live
peacefully.
DFAT assesses that Muslims outside of Rakhine state experience moderate levels of societal
discrimination and low levels of official discrimination. DFAT further assesses that Muslims outside of
Rakhine state face a low risk of societal violence on a day-to-day basis.
POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED)

The establishment of civilian government in Myanmar in 2011 led to the removal of several
restrictions around political commentary and freedom of speech. Many former political prisoners and exiled
activists are now politically active; around 115 NLD members of parliament elected in 2015 are former
political prisoners. The NLD government has a policy to release all political prisoners, and has pardoned
scores of political prisoners since taking power in March 2016.

The NLD government generally accepts peaceful political dissent. Many media restrictions have been
relaxed since 2011. Nonetheless, some laws restricting political activism remain, and protesters have
continued to be arrested, including since the NLD came to power. For example, in May 2016 a group of
workers protesting for labour rights attempted to march on parliament. More than 70 protesters were
detained and 51 were charged by police under the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law (which
requires permission from authorities to conduct a peaceful assembly or procession) and Sections 143, 145
and 147 of the Penal Code (which prohibit unlawful assembly and rioting). The parliament is currently
considering amendments to the Peaceful Assembly Law. If passed, the amended law, inter alia, would only
require protesters to advise authorities of their protest, rather than obtain official permission.
As at May 2016, around 64 convicted political prisoners were being held in Myanmar. These
prisoners included people associated with armed ethnic groups such as the KIA and the Arakan Army. A
further 125 people were being held pending trial for charges related to political activity.
A low level of societal intolerance towards differing political opinions continues. For example, laws
allowing for greater freedom of speech have led to an increase in hate-speech, which has incited violence,
particularly against those that identify as Rohingya and other minority groups.
DFAT assesses that in the course of normal events, Myanmar citizens face a low risk of official or
societal harassment, discrimination, violence or imprisonment on the basis of their actual or imputed
political opinion. People who actively participate in public protests against the government or the military
face a moderate risk of being arrested and detained. Given the NLD government only assumed power in
March 2016, it is unclear at this stage whether those detained in these circumstances will typically be
released more quickly than under the previous government.
GROUPS OF INTEREST
Media
Myanmars Constitution provides for freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Media
freedoms have improved significantly since the transition to civilian government in 2011. There are now no
front-end restrictions on publishing in Myanmar; the government does not actively censor news
organisations or require permissions to publish material in advance, beyond an initial permit to operate.
Since licensing of media outlets was opened up in 2013, the number of news outlets in Myanmar has
increased significantly. Those news outlets that have failed have generally done so due to a lack of
profitability in a highly competitive market, rather than any government-imposed restrictions. Multiple
credible media sources told DFAT that the operating environment is generally benign, with almost no official
barriers to running a media enterprise in Myanmar beyond financial viability. However, newspapers
published by the government and the Tatmadaw are reportedly sold below cost, making it more difficult for
privately-owned media to compete.
According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Myanmars media sector has improved in recent
years, but remains closely monitored. Myanmar is ranked 143rd out of 180 countries in the RSF 2016 World
Press Freedom Index. Similarly, Freedom House assesses Myanmars media sector as Not Free, with a score
of 73 (on a scale where 0 is the most free and 100 is the least free). DFAT assesses that these rankings do not
adequately reflect the improvements to media regulation that Myanmar has implemented since 2011.
Media representatives in Yangon told DFAT that, while some issues remain (see below), in general the
situation has improved significantly over this period and Myanmar now has one of the freest media sectors
in South East Asia.

According to media representatives DFAT spoke to in-country during preparation for this report, the
biggest constraints facing journalists in Myanmar are access to information and self-censorship when
reporting on the military. Access to official information is tightly controlled in Myanmar. The government has
appointed a specific spokesperson for each ministry, but these spokespeople are reportedly often not fully
informed and are unable to provide all the necessary information when requested.
There is reportedly self-censorship by the media when reporting on the military; this includes
reporting on military-controlled government portfolios such as the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of
Border Affairs and Ministry of Defence. In March 2015 the Myanmar Times issued a prominent apology for
publishing a cartoon that was perceived as making fun of the military by referencing accusations of
land-grabs by the armed forces. According to Amnesty International, the CEO of the Unity Journal was
arrested along with four of the journals reporters in February 2014 for publishing an article about an alleged
secret chemical weapons factory in Magwe Region in central Myanmar. Although the report appears not to
have been accurate, the government accused the Unity Journal of disclosing state secrets, trespassing and
taking photos in a restricted area, and all those arrested were sentenced to seven-year jail terms, though
they were released in early 2016 as part of an amnesty. The Unity Journal has since closed. DFAT is not
aware of any cases of journalists or publishers being detained or charged for criticising the government or
the military since the NLD government assumed power in March 2016.
While poor telecommunications infrastructure, low internet penetration and slow internet speeds
have previously limited the uptake of social media, people are now rapidly increasing their use of social
media in Myanmar, especially Facebook. In conjunction with a rapid increase in access to mobile
technologies and significant uptake of social media the digital literacy of the general population remains low.
A limited understanding has often translated to misuse; hate-speech on Facebook is a growing occurrence
and has been used by Ma Ba Tha to stir anti-Muslim sentiment.
The legislation governing the use of social media is considered stricter than that governing other
forms of media. According to Freedom House, a number of people have been arrested and charged under
the 2013 Telecommunications Law (which allows the government to intercept any information that
threatens national security or the rule of law) and the 2004 Electronic Transactions Law (which bans the
electronic transfer of information capable of undermining national security, including information about
cultural or economic affairs).
Overall, DFAT assesses that journalists in Myanmar who report critically on the military face a
moderate risk of being prosecuted through the judicial system and receiving sentences that could be
considered high by international standards. DFAT assesses that, in general, journalists face a low risk of
physical violence as a result of their reporting.
Women
Article 348 of the Constitution prohibits state discrimination against any Myanmar citizen based on
their sex. In practice, women participate in public life, including in government, business and civil society,
most notably Aung San Suu Kyi. However, DFAT assesses that women are under-represented in senior public
and private sector positions. Cultural and societal norms portray business as the province of men, and
women as mothers who are not active in the formal sector of the economy. Wage disparities favour men by
around 30 per cent, and there are barriers to women accessing finance and land use rights. Only around
9 per cent of the executive committee members of the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of
Commerce and Industry are women. The 2015 elections saw an unprecedented number of women elected
to Myanmars parliament; 64 women were elected out of a total of 491 elected representatives, or around
13 per cent of the total.

The laws prohibiting rape and violence against women in Myanmar are outdated; for example, the
Penal Code 1861 has language prohibiting assault of a woman with intent to outrage her modesty. There is
no specific legislation outlawing spousal abuse or domestic violence. Under the current legislation women
need to provide medical records to pursue a rape case, but the lack of doctors in rural areas and the
requirement to go to the police before undergoing the medical examination make successful prosecution
difficult. The delays can also prevent the woman receiving timely medical attention, including preventing
pregnancy or HIV. All abortion is illegal, including for a rape-induced pregnancy. While rape is illegal in
Myanmar, marital rape is not, unless the wife is under 14 years of age.
The parliament has been developing new laws around gender-based violence since 2012, but there
is reportedly some resistance to the new laws from within the civil service and the judiciary. The new draft
legislation reportedly would allow women to abort rape-induced pregnancies, albeit subject to the
agreement of a (currently all-male) health committee. DFAT understands that the draft law also proposes
making marital rape illegal.
While reliable data on the prevalence of rape and violence against women are unavailable, DFAT
understands that these incidents are highly prevalent, particularly in communities that have been affected
by conflict and/or disaster. Media outlets often contain stories of physical and sexual abuse of women, often
involving underage victims who can be as young as six years old. The perpetrators of violence are reportedly
often members of the victims family or local village. According to the US State Departments Report on
Human Rights Practices for 2015, there are also reports of military and security officials committing rapes in
Kachin, Shan and Rakhine States.
Credible sources in Myanmar told DFAT that women rarely seek justice for violence or rape through
formal legal mechanisms, and more often resolve issues through customary laws. Under these customary
processes, community harmony can often be seen as more important than the individual womans
wellbeing. These processes typically involve the victim discussing the incident with other women and, if it is
deemed sufficiently serious, with the men in the family. If the male family members agree that the incident
was unacceptable, they then take it up with local leaders. The solution often takes the form of an apology
rather than a punishment; for example, a pig or cow may be killed and used to feed the whole village.
In Kachin State, village-based committees typically deal with disputes, which are usually resolved
through mediation or compensation. In the case of a rape, the victim and her family are typically required to
cleanse the village, by holding a ceremony and feeding the whole village.
Women that identify as Rohingya in Rakhine state face multiple levels of discrimination. In addition
to the official and societal discrimination faced by Rohingya people in general (see Those who identify as
Rohingya, above), Rohingya society is generally conservative and women often face familial or community-
based restrictions on their movements and activities. Rohingya girls over the age of 13 are often prevented
from leaving their homes until they are married; women in northern Rakhine State typically wear full facial
coverings and gloves when in public. Violence against women is reportedly highly prevalent, particularly
intimate partner violence. According to the US State Department, there are consistent and credible reports
of rapes of Muslim women, including by security forces, and authorities often do not investigate these
crimes.
Health services in both rural and urban areas lack expertise in sexual and reproductive health. Access
to contraception remains limited. While abortion is illegal, it reportedly is highly prevalent, and contributes
to Myanmars high maternal mortality rates.
While education enrolment rates for girls are relatively high, retention rates are poor across the
country. Credible reports suggest that only a minority of girls receive a secondary-level education. However,

some universities have more female students than males. Educational texts reportedly often reinforce
traditional gender roles.
Overall, DFAT assesses that women in Myanmar face a moderate risk of domestic violence, and in
general face moderate levels of societal discrimination. DFAT further assesses that women from the Muslim
community, particularly in northern Rakhine State and in IDP camps in Rakhine state, face high levels of
societal discrimination on the basis of their gender.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

Article 377 of the Penal Code 1861 prohibits carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any
man, woman or animal, with a punishment of a fine or up to ten years imprisonment. This is interpreted,
inter alia, as criminalising sex between men; sex between two women is not considered to be covered under
Article 377. Credible civil society representatives told DFAT that this provision is rarely used to prosecute
men for same-sex activity, but can be used by authorities to extort money.
There have been two prominent cases where authorities have used Article 377 in an attempt to
prosecute members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex (LGBTI) community: a transgender
person who was jailed for five years in 2011 (released after three) for using a public toilet; and an
unsuccessful attempt to prosecute a gay couple who held a civil ceremony in 2014 to celebrate being
together for 10 years. Authorities also use Article 377 to prosecute perpetrators of child sexual offences and
same-sex rape. (Provisions in the 1861 Myanmar Penal Code only discuss rape of a female victim by a male
perpetrator.) The law thus conflates homosexuality and paedophilia. There are credible reports of police
targeting LGBTI people with harassment and degrading treatment.
The LGBTI community has become increasingly visible in Myanmar in recent years, but societal
discrimination persists. Culturally, many people in Myanmar view homosexuality as sinful, and link it to
mental illness. Credible sources told DFAT of an individual who, having revealed her sexuality, was sent to a
mental institution by her family and involuntarily medicated. Credible sources also told DFAT that parents
often use corporal punishment to correct behaviour in young children that does not align with traditional
gender roles or heterosexual norms. Parents can also support teachers to discriminate against their LGBTI
children at school.
Media coverage of LGBTI issues is often negative, but visibility of LGBTI issues is increasing,
particularly in urban centres. For example, in January 2016 the &PROUD Yangon LGBTI film festival attracted
around 3,500 people over four days in its second edition, after it was first held in 2014. LGBTI people can
cohabit in major cities, with significant numbers of LGBTI people living in Yangon and Mandalay. Some
restaurants and other venues in these major cities openly identify as LGBTI friendly; however, these venues
can face some resistance from more conservative parts of the community, including religious organisations.
Credible sources in Yangon told DFAT that LGBTI people face discrimination in the workplace and in
the delivery of services. For example, LGBTI people reportedly face discrimination from healthcare providers.
This is particularly problematic for those infected with HIV; according to a report from the Myanmar Ministry
of Health released in June 2015, around 6.6 per cent of men who have sex with men (MSM) in Myanmar
have HIV, compared with 0.54 per cent of the general population.
There is an active LGBTI civil society in Myanmar; the Myanmar LGBTI Rights Network is a group of
around 20 civil society organisations advocating for LGBTI rights. These groups have permission to operate
from the government, but can be subject to threats and intimidation. One group told DFAT that they had
received about 100 death threats related to their advocacy against the Preservation of Race and Religion Bills

(see Religion, above). There are no openly LGBTI members of parliament or other public figures in
Myanmar.
Sexual reassignment surgery is prohibited in Myanmar. Two sections of Myanmars penal code,
relating to grievous hurt (section 320), and grievous hurt by cutting (section 326) are interpreted to
prohibit male-to-female reassignment surgery.
While sex between men is illegal and there is some official discrimination against LGBTI people in the
delivery of services, DFAT assesses that, in practice, LGBTI people in Myanmar face a low level of official
discrimination in their day-to-day life. DFAT further assesses that LGBTI people in Myanmar face high levels
of societal discrimination due to their sexual orientation or gender identity.

4. COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION CLAIMS
ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIFE

The Tatmadaw considers that all its actions against ethnic armed groups, militia and their support
bases are military operations and not extra-judicial regardless of their location or context. There are no
reliable figures available on the numbers of people killed by the Tatmadaw or police in conflicts with ethnic
groups or during law enforcement operations.
According to the US State Department, in 2015 there were reports of extrajudicial killings and other
abuses by authorities in Rakhine State, with only one report of officials being investigated or held to account.
In this example, on 7 December 2015 a 25-year-old Rohingya man was shot and killed after the vehicle in
which he was travelling failed to stop at a checkpoint. The US State Department cites credible reports as
saying that an officer shot the man in the head after he failed to pay a bribe. News reports also suggested
that BGP officers tortured the man before he was killed. The BGP officer was reportedly charged with
murder.
There are also some credible reports of killings and disappearances in conflict-affected areas of
Myanmar. According to Amnesty International, in January 2015 two ethnic Kachin women were found dead
in their church compound residence in northern Shan State. The women reportedly appeared to have been
raped and beaten prior to their death. A Tatmadaw unit was reportedly staying in the same village at the
time. The military conducted an investigation that cleared military members of any involvement, and
government officials stated that no rape was committed. The investigation has otherwise failed to identify
any suspects. According to a joint letter by several UN Special Rapporteurs involved in human rights to the
Myanmar authorities, the lack of an independent investigation contributes to an ongoing climate of
impunity for rape and other crimes of sexual violence, in particular in conflict-affected and ethnic minority
areas.
DFAT assesses historical allegations of the Tatmadaw assassinating ethnic armed group leaders as
credible. However, DFAT is unaware of any credible reports of such assassinations in recent years,
particularly since the signing of the NCA and in the context of other ongoing attempts to negotiate a broader
peace agreement.
DEATH PENALTY
The judiciary can theoretically apply the death penalty for a range of crimes including murder, drug
trafficking, drug possession and treason. Pregnant women and people who have been determined to be
mentally ill are exempt from receiving a death sentence.
In practice, there is no evidence of the government carrying out an execution under the Penal Code
since the 1980s. On 2 January 2014 the then-President ordered that all death sentences be commuted to life
imprisonment. According to Amnesty International, at least 17 people have been given death sentences

since this announcement. None of these sentences have been carried out. The United Wa State Army, a
non-state armed group, is reported to have executed two people in early 2016.
TORTURE & OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING

TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
The Myanmar Penal Code 1861 outlaws the use of torture. However, according to the US State
Department and some international civil society organisations, authorities from the military and the police
forces have reportedly used torture in order to elicit confessions and other information. Credible reports
suggest that the military continues to use torture against people suspected to be associated with armed
ethnic groups in Kachin and Shan States. The most common methods of torture used were reportedly
beatings and deprivation of food, water and sleep. In general, torture and other abuses by authorities tend
to occur most frequently in conflict-affected areas. These recurrences do not appear to be systemic and in
some cases the military have referred the cases to civil courts. There are also credible reports of torture and
rape by authorities against Rohingya people in Rakhine State, particularly during recent security operations
in northern Rakhine.
Authorities are rarely brought to account for their actions. According to Amnesty International,
authorities rarely carry out investigations into incidents involving torture and other abuses. The US State
Department has also noted that authorities rarely take action to investigate allegations of torture by the
military or police forces or to punish the alleged perpetrators.
Myanmar has taken significant steps to eliminate forced labour, including by establishing a
complaints mechanism and joint action plan with the International Labour Organization. However, there are
credible reports that the Tatmadaw and other ethnic armed organisations continue to force civilians,
including children, to work as porters, guides, messengers and domestic servants particularly in conflict
zones.
Recruitment of child soldiers by the military is no longer tolerated and, if discovered, disciplinary
action is brought against the responsible officer. Military rules prohibit the enlistment of people under the
age of 18 years. In 2012 the military signed a Joint Action Plan with the United Nations, and is on track to be
de-listed from the UN Secretary-Generals list of persistent perpetrators regarding the recruitment and use
of children in armed conflict. Seven (non-state) ethnic armed groups appear on the UN Secretary-Generals
list of persistent perpetrators regarding the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict such as the
Kachin Independence Army.
Arbitrary Arrest and Detention

According to the US State Departments Report on Human Rights Practices for 2015, there are
credible reports of police forces frequently carrying out arbitrary arrests and detaining people for periods of
time without charge, despite the law requiring permission from a court to detain a person for more than 24
hours. The law allows authorities to detain without charge or trial anyone they believe endangering the
sovereignty and security of the state or public peace and tranquillity. Reports suggest that arbitrary
detention occurs most frequently in relation to people protesting against the government or the military, or
people with (real or perceived) links to EAOs.

5. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
STATE PROTECTION
Myanmars Constitution guarantees for citizens freedom from discrimination on the basis of race,
birth, religion, official position, status, culture, sex and wealth. However, the law offers few specific
protections to citizens to shield them from discrimination, and there are few avenues through which citizens
can pursue redress against discrimination.
Weak rule of law is a key challenge to effective state protection in Myanmar. Successive
governments have publicly committed to improving the rule of law and reforming law and order institutions.
However, avenues for a victim of violence to seek protection or redress in Myanmar remain unreliable.
Police and the security services in particular continue to enjoy impunity. Charges against members of
the police forces or the Tatmadaw need to have the support of the police or military leadership or a high
profile public figure to have a realistic chance of success.
The availability of state protection depends on a range of circumstances and is not necessarily
determined on the basis of religion or ethnicity. Nonetheless, given that Myanmars Bamar Buddhist majority
dominates the public service and the security services, and given the widespread anti-Muslim sentiment
across Myanmar, access to effective state protection can be more difficult for Muslims and for some
Christians, particularly those with a (real or perceived) link to ethnic armed groups. Effective state protection
mechanisms are rarely available for those that identify as Rohingya.
Military
Myanmars armed forces comprise an army, navy and air force, collectively known as the Tatmadaw.
The Tatmadaw is led by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, who has the power to appoint people
to key positions including one of the Vice Presidents, the Ministers for Defence, Home Affairs and Border
Affairs, and the military representatives in the parliament. While official figures are not available, credible
sources estimate the Tatmadaws size at just under 400,000 personnel.
Officially, there is no military conscription and all service personnel are considered volunteers.
However, credible sources indicate that some personnel are pressed into service to avoid possible criminal
convictions or to escape poverty. Myanmar has acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and has
taken steps in recent years to release from military service any children under the age of 18 at the time of
recruitment (from 2012) it has found within Tatmadaw ranks; according to UNICEF, more than 700 children
have been released from service since the signing of a joint action plan with the UN on the prevention of
child recruitment in 2012. However, there are reports that occasional recruitment of children by the military
has occurred and that the military occasionally use forced labour of adults and children, particularly in
conflict-affected areas, though the numbers have considerably decreased.
Given the historical role of the military in Myanmars government, military personnel have tended to
be immune from prosecution for alleged human rights abuses, and trials of members of the armed forces

remain uncommon. Several credible sources in Myanmar told DFAT that military personnel are able to act
with impunity, particularly in conflict-affected areas and in northern and central parts of Rakhine State.
The military, rather than the police forces, have been the primary source of community protection
for people in Rakhine State during periods of communal violence under the declaration by the government
of a special state of emergency. However, in conflict-affected parts of the country such as northern Shan
State and Kachin State, this is not the case, and there are credible reports that the military has failed to act
to protect civilians in conflict zones.
Police
The Myanmar Police Force was established in 1964 and is responsible to the Minister of Home
Affairs (a position held by a military appointee). There are 14 state and divisional police forces and three
mobile or ready reaction forces under separate sub-commands, responsible to a central commander. The
Border Guard Police (BGP) has a significant role in policing in northern Rakhine State.
Police forces have often been slow to respond to crises and ineffective in dealing with larger
demonstrations. For example, in 2012 and 2013 police were ineffective in protecting those that identify as
Rohingya during communal violence in Rakhine State. A lack of police effectiveness in responding to
significant incidents may also reflect inadequate personnel, training and resourcing.
Corruption is reportedly a significant issue within the police forces, causing inconsistencies in police
responses to requests for protection and in criminal investigations. According to the US State Department,
police often require victims of crime to pay substantial bribes to undertake criminal investigations, and
regularly extort money from the civilian population. Corruption and extortion are particularly prevalent
against those that identify as Rohingya living in Rakhine State (see Those who identify as Rohingya, above).
There are credible allegations of police harassing, arbitrarily detaining and mistreating civilian populations in
conflict-affected areas.
Overall, DFAT assesses that police have a limited ability to provide state protection to the civilian
population, particularly during large protests or significant incidents of communal violence. Police typically
act with impunity.
Judiciary
Corruption and a lack of independence are ongoing and significant challenges for Myanmars
judiciary. The government appoints senior members of the federal judiciary. Judges typically do not see
themselves as independent, and political bias continues to affect the judicial system. At the state and
regional level, civil matters are often managed by the bureaucracy rather than the judiciary. According to the
US State Department, corruption in the judiciary is rampant.
Criminal cases can be tried by village magistrates or escalated to state or federal courts. The highest
level of the judiciary, usually reserved for legislative matters, is the Constitutional Tribunal. While the
Constitution protects the decisions of the Tribunal, its members are appointed by the government. Individual
decisions by the Tribunal can be revisited after the resignation or removal of its members. In 2012, all
members of the Tribunal were forced to resign, reflecting the lack of independence of the Tribunal and of
the judiciary as a whole. In consultations during the preparation of this report, credible sources told DFAT
that the judiciary remains very weak, hampered by low capacity and a lack of independence. There are some
efforts by both the government and the legal profession to reform the judicial system; these efforts are

ongoing and will likely take a long time to have a significant impact on outcomes. Public confidence in the
judiciary is very low.
Overall, DFAT assesses that the Myanmar legal system remains weak and has limited capacity to
provide state protection. In cases that are politically sensitive, engage vested interests or involve the security
services, the judicial system cannot be relied upon to provide an independent outcome. In lower-profile
cases, corruption within the judicial system may impinge on the prospects for a fair trial.
Detention and Prison

Myanmars Corrections Department operates more than 40 conventional prisons. Women are
detained in separate prisons in major cities, and the government provides education to the children of
inmates, including in some cases up to high-school level. Under the 1993 Child Law the minimum age of
criminal responsibility is seven, which means children can be tried for crimes in adult courts. At time of
writing the government is undergoing significant revisions to the Child Law. Credible sources told DFAT that,
in addition to these conventional prisons, the government also runs around 50 labour camps, some of which
are temporary. The conditions in these labour camps are reportedly poor, with inadequate safety practices
leading to injuries and some deaths.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been allowed to visit the countrys prisons
and labour camps (its reports are shared with prison authorities on a confidential basis), but there is no
access for international observers to any police detention facilities in northern and central Rakhine State.
The government is working with the ICRC and other civil society groups to improve prison conditions.
Overcrowding remains a problem in the prison system; for example, credible sources told DFAT that
Insein Prison in Yangon has a capacity of around 5,000 prisoners but currently holds around 8,000 prisoners.
Prisoners within the system reportedly have poor access to medicine and healthcare services. Corruption is
highly prevalent, with inmates bribing guards to receive more food, water and living space. Nonetheless,
while conditions remain below international standards, they are showing some signs of improvement. Legal
representatives are typically able to gain access to their clients. Families of inmates are able to visit them in
prison, provided they can prove their relationship by showing authorities their household list.
State Protection for Rohingya

Police complaint processes require official identity documents to lodge complaints. As non-citizens,
those that identify as Rohingya are often unable to make police complaints. Local administrators and police
in Rakhine State are almost exclusively drawn from the Rakhine Buddhist community. Credible sources
suggest that the police in Rakhine State carry societal prejudices against Rohingya people. Reports of police
standing by when faced with anti-Muslim communal violence are widespread and credible. DFAT assesses
that the police cannot be relied upon to give effective state protection to Rohingya from communal violence.
Access to legal representation and to the court system in Rakhine State is limited. Civil disputes are
typically managed by (Rakhine Buddhist) local administrators. Criminal matters must be supported by local
police if they are to proceed.
Overall, DFAT assesses that Rohingya are unlikely to have access to effective state protection.

INTERNAL RELOCATION
Article 355 of Myanmars Constitution protects the right of citizens to settle and reside in any place
within the Union of Myanmar according to law. Non-citizens, (such as Rohingya) are typically required to
register their movements. At the time of writing, people in Myanmar staying at a place other than their usual
place of residence are still required to inform local authorities. Myanmars Parliament is currently
considering amendments to law that would remove this requirement for people staying at a place other than
their usual place of residence for a period of less than 30 days.
Household registration is required to obtain identification documentation and to gain access to
services such as electricity and water. Household lists are also used by townships for population estimates.
Township Administration Offices administer household lists. If a member of a household wishes to change
their registration, the formal process is for the head of the household to go to the township and have them
removed. The household member would then be issued with a relocation notice. This notice, together with
money and other identification documents, are then taken to the Township Administration office in the
persons new location where they are then added to the list for their new household. The types of
documentation and the amounts of money required for this process vary across different jurisdictions.
When a baby is born, their birth certificate is required to add them to their household list. Each
household must have an officially nominated head. While this is largely now just a tradition, at times the
household head can be called upon to represent the household.
It is rare for a citizen of Myanmar who is resident in the country to not be registered on a household
list. If a person is found to be unregistered, the penalty is a maximum of seven days detention at the police
station, during which time the person must prove they belong to a household and have the head of the
household come to register them on their household list. It is unclear what would happen if a person were
not claimed by a household head, and DFAT does not have any information on how often or how
consistently penalties for incorrect registration are applied. While spot checks to monitor peoples
movements still take place, in recent years these have occurred less frequently than in the past.
The residents of states where ethnic minorities form the dominant group typically face greater
restrictions on their freedom of movement than those in the Bamar-majority regions. Freedom of movement
in these places can be restricted by state and local orders.
Some members of minority ethnic groups do not speak Burmese. In the absence of a social welfare
system, a lack of Burmese language skills means that relocation would be practically difficult. Relocation to
another area with a common language would, however, be possible.
Despite the above-mentioned difficulties, urbanisation in recent years shows that many Myanmar
people do relocate within the country, for a variety of reasons including accessing better economic, lifestyle
and education opportunities. Complex migration patterns exist domestically; seasonal migration routes are
common and well established as populations move for livelihood opportunities. Cross border migration,
particularly into Thailand and Malaysia, is common and also closely linked to livelihood opportunities.
Overall, DFAT assesses that, with the exception of those that identify as Rohingya and other stateless
people, most people in Myanmar can typically relocate within Myanmar to reduce the risk of violence or the
risk of low level discrimination, subject to their individual financial circumstances. IDP camps represent a
short- to medium-term option for many people attempting to escape ethnic armed violence.

Internal Relocation for Rohingya
Freedom of movement is a significant problem for Rohingya in northern Rakhine State, where
people require permission from local authorities to move around,in some instances even within a single
village tract. Rohingya in IDP camps and in ethnic enclaves within towns also face movement restrictions
imposed by local police. Rohingya people cannot legally travel interstate without a valid identity document;
most Rohingya are undocumented. While many Rohingya travel regularly between northern Rakhine State
and Bangladesh with official travel documentation, this travel is only permitted for short-term travel.
Bangladeshi authorities do not recognise Rohingya as being Bangladeshi citizens, and Rohingya have no
rights to residency in Bangladesh.
Some Rohingya have successfully relocated to other parts of Myanmar and procured identity
documentation, typically by manipulating official processes (i.e. either purchasing fraudulent documentation
or by obtaining genuine documents supported by fraudulent information). Rohingya with sufficient
resources are typically able to bribe officials to travel and to access identity documentation. The vast
majority of Rohingya in Rakhine State do not have sufficient resources to pursue these options.
DFAT assesses that there are significant official, societal and socioeconomic barriers to Rohingya in
Rakhine State relocating to other parts of Myanmar, but there are occasional examples of people having
done so as evidenced by the Rohingya communities in Yangon, Mandalay and other parts of the country.
Overall, DFAT assesses that Rohingya in Rakhine State are rarely able to relocate to other parts of Myanmar
to avoid violence or discrimination.
TREATMENT OF RETURNEES
Myanmars Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population is responsible for conducting interviews
of returnees. DFAT is not aware of how often these interviews are conducted and what, if any, information is
passed to government security agencies.
In the past, the government has sought to exercise control over the travel and residence of
high-profile opposition figures. This has abated following the extensive democratic reforms carried out since
2011. On 17 August 2011 then-President Thein Sein announced that Myanmar would welcome the return of
exiles that had fled the country during military rule. Former political prisoners and exiled activists are now
typically able to return safely to Myanmar. In preparation for this report, DFAT spoke with a number of
political and human rights activists who had been imprisoned or exiled from Myanmar during the period of
military rule; these people had been able to freely return to Myanmar in recent years, and have remained
politically active. People who are known to have actively and openly criticised the military may face a higher
level of scrutiny than other political activists such as LGBTI or democracy activists.
No reliable data are available regarding the numbers of voluntary and involuntary returnees to
Myanmar. Voluntary returnees that receive assistance from the International Organisation for Migration
(IOM) receive short- and medium-term reintegration assistance, including (where possible) vocational
training assistance and medical care.
Returnees to Myanmar who departed the country illegally are technically subject to up to five years
imprisonment for having illegally crossed a border. DFAT understands that this provision has not been
enforced in recent years. For example, in March 2015 a large number of migrant workers were returned to
Myanmar from Malaysia, some of whom had departed Myanmar illegally. The Myanmar Government
reached an agreement with the Malaysian Government to allow their return, and the workers gave their
consent. The workers were processed in Yangon, and the government provided them with 10,000 Myanmar
Kyat (approximately USD 8) to cover transportation costs back to their homes.

In May 2015 a group of failed Rohingya Muslim migrantspredominantly from Bangladesh, but
some originating from Myanmarwere rescued at sea. Myanmar authorities agreed to allow those Rohingya
who had originated from Myanmar to be returned to Rakhine State, after verifying their place of origin using
household registration lists and by contacting relatives. DFAT is not aware of any mistreatment of these
people beyond that faced more generally by Rohingya people in Rakhine State and outlined in this report.
DFAT is not aware of any credible reports of mistreatment of failed Rohingya asylum seekers
stemming specifically from their having sought asylum overseas.
Exit and Entry Procedures

Check-in and immigration procedures for Myanmar passport-holders are functionally similar to
standard international practices. Airport staff review booking details and check the name in the passport
against the name on the reservation. Customs and immigration staff vet baggage and conduct a cursory
check that the photograph in the passport matches the bearer of the document. Immigration staff scan the
passport document. There is no integration of police and immigration identity systems. Immigration cards
record standard information about the person entering the country. Inbound Myanmar nationals are
required to provide their fathers name on the form; outbound Myanmar nationals are required to list their
fathers name, their address and their identity card number.
DOCUMENTATION
Myanmars 1982 Citizenship Law provides for full, associate and naturalised categories of citizenship.
A range of rights apply to holders of associate and naturalised citizenship.
Foreigners who marry Myanmar citizens are not necessarily conveyed the full rights enjoyed by their
spouse; nor are their children. They are, however, able to access passports and other travel documents to
allow movement across state and national borders. All citizens above the age of 18 in Myanmar are eligible
to vote, but only full citizens (whose parents were both also full citizens) are eligible to stand for election.
The government can revoke in the interests of the State the citizenship, naturalised citizenship or associate
citizenship of any person except those who are citizens by birth, making these citizenship categories less
secure than full citizenship. The naturalised and associate citizenship categories also have implications for
access to services such as education; for example, enrolment in education courses for some professions such
as medicine, law and engineering is restricted to full citizens.
In 1989 the government began a process to implement the 1982 Citizenship Law which involved
replacing the previous National Registration Cards (NRCs) with a new series of identification documents.
Under the 1982 law, the government issues full Myanmar citizens with Citizenship Scrutiny Cards (CSCs, also
known as pink cards), naturalised citizens with Naturalised Citizenship Scrutiny Cards (NCSCs or green
cards), and associate citizens with Associate Citizenship Scrutiny Cards (ACSCs or blue cards). Non-citizens
are typically issued with Foreign Registration Certificates.
The CSCs issued to full citizens contain information including the bearers photo, name, fathers
name, nationality, religion and occupation. The identity cards take the form of a pink credit card-sized
document, made of stiff card and sometimes laminated. Forgeries are reportedly difficult to distinguish from
genuine documents. The identity card grants relative freedom of domestic travel within Myanmar and can
be used to access some services, including voting and government schooling.

Documentation for Rohingya
While most of the population of Rakhine State, including Rohingya, had held NRCs prior to 1989,
very few Rohingya had their NRCs replaced with identification documents of any kind. In 1995, authorities
began issuing Rohingya with Temporary Registration Cards (or white cards), which had previously been
issued temporarily to people who had lost their NRCs. In 2015, then President Thein Sein declared white
cards invalid, thus removing the only formal documentation available to Rohingya.
As it currently stands, the majority of Rohingya are undocumented and, in effect, stateless. The
government does not recognise Rohingya as one of the 135 official ethnic groups in Myanmar. Rohingya are
not recognised as citizens of Myanmar and are also not recognised as citizens of neighbouring countries such
as Bangladesh. While, under the 1982 Citizenship Law, many Rohingya are formally eligible for associate or
naturalised citizenship, in practice government officials are sometimes unwilling to provide citizenship to
Rohingya. Many Rohingya also reject the categories of naturalised or associate citizenship. These categories
of citizenship implicitly deny the existence of Rohingya in Myanmar/Burma before 1823, and legally reinforce
what Rohingya see as the inaccurate view that Rohingya are immigrants from Bangladesh. Furthermore, the
naturalised and associate citizenship categories confer fewer rights than full citizenship, as noted above. For
more information on citizenship issues faced by Rohingya, see Those who identify as Rohingya above.
Household Registration Lists

Household registration is required to obtain a CSC, and to gain access to some services such as
electricity and water. Household registration is often the only formal documentation accessible to Rohingya
in northern Rakhine State. For more information on household registration, see Internal Relocation, above.
Passports
Myanmar introduced machine-readable passports in 2010. The government is currently working to
introduce an e-passport system, which would include biometric information to help verify the identity of the
traveller.
Until 2014, there were two passport issuing centres, located in Yangon and Mandalay. In January
2014 the government opened a further 15 passport issuing centres across the country, so that there are now
passport offices in every state and region.
In order to obtain a passport, Myanmar citizens need to present their CSC and household
registration, and fill out an additional application at the issuing centre. The applicant needs to be at the
office in person, where they have an official photo taken. One week turnaround is reported, though offices
usually specify 10-15 working days for collection.
PREVALENCE OF FRAUD
Document fraud is highly prevalent in Myanmar. Fraud can take the form of fake documentation, or
genuine documentation provided on the basis of fraudulent information. The prevalence of corruption in
Myanmar means that fake documentation can be purchased with relative ease. As noted above, the
unsophisticated nature of CSCs, ACSCs and NCSCs means that fake documents are relatively easy to produce.
While passports have more sophisticated security features, it is possible to obtain a genuine passport using a
fake CSC. As noted above, immigration systems are not linked with police databases.

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DFAT COUNTRY INFORMATION REPORT

1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 3

3. REFUGEE CONVENTION CLAIMS 11

4. COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION CLAIMS 24

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 1

ACSC Associate Citizenship Scrutiny Card

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 2

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 3

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 4

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 5

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 6

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 7

HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK

National Human Rights Institution

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 8

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 9

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 10

Those who identify as Rohingya

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 11

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 12

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 13

Extortion and harassment

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 14

Other issues affecting those who identify as Rohingya in Rakhine State

Those who identify as Rohingya outside Rakhine State

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 15

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 16

Non-Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 17

Muslims outside Rakhine State

POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED)

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 18

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 19

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 20

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 21

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 22

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 23

ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIFE

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 24

TORTURE & OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING

Arbitrary Arrest and Detention

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 25

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 26

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 27

Detention and Prison

State Protection for Rohingya

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 28

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 29

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 30

Exit and Entry Procedures

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 31

Household Registration Lists

DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 32

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