G.R. No. 95536 March 23, 1992
The shipment was immediately loaded on PAL
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., MARIA SALVACION SALUDO, LEOPOLDO
G. SALUDO and SATURNINO G. SALUDO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., and
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Shipper - Pomierski and Son Funeral Home
Consignee Maria Saludo
Carrier - Transworld Airlines (TWA) Chicago San Francisco, and
Philippine Airlines (PAL)- San Francisco Manila
After the death of petitioner's mother, Crispina Galdo Saludo, in
Chicago Illinois, Pomierski and Son Funeral Home of Chicago,
made the necessary preparations and arrangements for the
shipment, of the remains from Chicago to the Philippines.
Philippine Vice Consul in Chicago, Illinois, Bienvenido M. Llaneta,
at the Pomierski & Son Funeral Home, sealed the shipping case
containing a hermetically sealed casket that is airtight and
waterproof wherein was contained the remains of Crispina Saludo
Galdo). On the same date, October 26, 1976, Pomierski brought
the remains to C.M.A.S. (Continental Mortuary Air Services) at the
airport (Chicago) which made the necessary arrangements such
as flights, transfers, etc.; C.M.A.S. is a national service used by
undertakers to throughout the nation (U.S.A.). C.M.A.S. booked
the shipment with PAL thru the carrier's agent Air Care
International, with Pomierski F.H. as the shipper and Mario (Maria)
Saludo as the consignee. The requested routing was from
Chicago to San Francisco on board TWA Flight 131 of October 27,
1976 and from San Francisco to Manila on board PAL Flight No.
107 of the same date, and from Manila to Cebu on board PAL
Flight 149 of October 29, 1976. Maria Saludo upon arriving at San
Francisco Airport, she then called Pomierski that her mother's
remains were not at the West Coast terminal, and Pomierski
immediately called C.M.A.S., which in a matter of 10 minutes
informed him that the remains were on a plane to Mexico City, that
there were two bodies at the terminal, and somehow they were
switched. The following day October 28, 1976, the shipment or
remains of Crispina Saludo arrived (in) San Francisco from Mexico
on board American Airlines. This shipment was transferred to or
received by PAL at 1945H or 7:45 p.m. (Exh. 2-PAL, Exh. 2-a-
PAL). This casket bearing the remains of Crispina Saludo, which
was mistakenly sent to Mexico and was opened (there), was
resealed by Crispin F. Patagas for shipment to the Philippines
(See Exh. B-1).
flight for Manila that same evening and arrived (in) Manila on
October 30, 1976, a day after its expected arrival on October 29,
1976. Aggrieved by the incident, the petitioners instituted an action
against respondents and were asked to pay for damages.
Petitioner allege that private respondents received the casketed
remains of petitioners' mother on October 26, 1976, as evidenced
18
by the issuance of PAL Air Waybill No. 079-01180454 by Air
Care International as carrier's agent; and from said date, private
respondents were charged with the responsibility to exercise
extraordinary diligence so much so that for the alleged switching
of the caskets on October 27, 1976, or one day after private
respondents received the cargo, the latter must necessarily be
liable.
RTC - absolved the two respondent airlines companies of liability.
CA - affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto, and in a
7
subsequent resolution, denied herein petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUE
W/N the delay in the delivery of the casketed remains of petitioners'
mother was due to the fault of respondent airline companies,
HELD:
NO. A bill of lading is a written acknowledgment of the receipt of
the goods and an agreement to transport and deliver them at a
specified place to a person named or on his order. According to foreign
and local jurisprudence, "the issuance of a bill of lading carries the
presumption that the goods were delivered to the carrier issuing the bill, for
immediate shipment, and it is nowhere questioned that a bill of lading
is prima facie evidence of the receipt of the goods by the carrier. . . . In the
absence of convincing testimony establishing mistake, recitals in the bill of
lading showing that the carrier received the goods for shipment on a
specified date controls.
However, except as may be prohibited by law, there is nothing to
prevent an inverse order of events, that is, the execution of the bill of lading
even prior to actual possession and control by the carrier of the cargo to be
transported. There is no law which requires that the delivery of the goods for
carriage and the issuance of the covering bill of lading must coincide in point
of time or, for that matter, that the former should precede the latter.
As between the shipper and the carrier, when no goods have been
delivered for shipment no recitals in the bill can estop the carrier from
showing the true facts . . . Between the consignor of goods and receiving
carrier, recitals in a bill of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a
rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment. As
between the consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the
recital."
In the case at bar, it was on October 26, 1976 the cargo containing
the casketed remains of Crispina Saludo was booked for PAL Flight Number
PR-107 leaving San Francisco for Manila on October 27, 1976, PAL Airway
Bill No. 079-01180454 was issued, not as evidence of receipt of delivery of
the cargo on October 26, 1976, but merely as a confirmation of the booking
thus made for the San Francisco-Manila flight scheduled on October 27,
1976. Actually, it was not until October 28, 1976 that PAL received physical
delivery of the body at San Francisco.
Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the
extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins from the time the
goods are delivered to the carrier. This responsibility remains in full force
and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit,
29
unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppagein transitu, and
terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time for the acceptance, of
the goods by the consignee or such other person entitled to receive
30
them. And, there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are ready for
and have been placed in the exclusive possession, custody and control of
the carrier for the purpose of their immediate transportation and the carrier
31
has accepted them. Where such a delivery has thus been accepted by the
carrier, the liability of the common carrier commences eo instanti.
As already demonstrated, the facts in the case at bar belie the
averment that there was delivery of the cargo to the carrier on October 26,
1976. Rather, as earlier explained, the body intended to be shipped as
agreed upon was really placed in the possession and control of PAL on
October 28, 1976 and it was from that date that private respondents became
responsible for the agreed cargo under their undertakings in PAL Airway Bill
No. 079-01180454. Consequently, for the switching of caskets prior thereto
which was not caused by them, and subsequent events caused thereby,
private respondents cannot be held liable.
PARMANAND SHEWARAM V. PAL of the negligence of the appellant as a common carrier, the liability of the
G.R. No. L-20099, July 7, 1966 appellant is clear- it must pay the appellee the value of those articles.

FACTS:
Shewaram was a paying passenger on defendants aircraft from
Zamboanga City bound for Manila.
He checked in 3 pieces of baggages- a suitcase and 2 other
pieces. The suitcase was mistagged by defendants personnel in
Zamboanga as IGN (Iligan) instead of MNL (Manila).
Plaintiff made a claim with defendants personnel in Manila airport
and another suitcase similar to his own which was the only
baggage left for that flight was given to the plaintiff for him to take
delivery but he refused to take the delivery of the same because it
was not his, alleging that all his clothes were white and the
National transistor 7 and a Rollflex camera were not found inside
the suitcase, and moreover, it contained a pistol which he did not
have nor placed it inside the suitcase.
It was found out that the suitcase shown to and given to the
plaintiff belonged to a certain Del Rosario who was bound for Iligan
in the same flight with Shewaram.
Shewaram made demand for these 2 items or for the value thereof
but the same was not complied with by defendant.
The municipal trial court rendered decision in favor of plaintiff. The
said court had found that the suitcase of the appellee was
tampered and the transistor radio and the camera contained
therein were lost, and that the loss of those articles was due to the
negligence of the employees of the appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the limited liability rule applies.

HELD: No. Article 1750 of the NCC provides that the pecuniary liability of a
common carrier may, by contract, be limited to a fixed amount. It is required,
however, that the contract must be reasonable and just under the
circumstances and has been fairly agreed upon. In the case at bar, the
requirements have not been met. It cannot be said that the appellee had
actually entered into a contract with the appellant, embodying the conditions
as printed at the back of the ticket stub that was issued by the appellant to
the appellee. The fact that those conditions are printed at the back of the
tickets stub in letters so small that they are hard to read would not warrant
the presumption that the appellee was aware of those conditions such that
he had fairly and freely agreed to those conditions.
The liability of the appellant should be governed by the provisions of Article
1734 and 1735 of the NCC. It having been clearly found by the trial court
that the transistor radio and the camera of the appellee were lost as a result
ONG YIU V. CA AND PAL
G.R. No. L-40597, June 29, 1979
FACTS:
On August 26, 1967, petitioner, a practicing lawyer and
businessman, was a fare paying passenger of respondent PAL on
board a flight from Cebu bound for Butuan City. He was scheduled
to attend a trial in CFI Butuan on August 28-31, 1967.He checked
in a blue maleta.Upon arrival in Butuan, petitioner claimed his
luggage but it could not be found.
PAL Butuan sent a message to PAL Cebu inquiring about the
missing luggage. It was later on relayed to PAL Manila.PAL Manila
wired PAL Cebu advising that the luggage had been over carried to
Manila and it would be forwarded to Cebu. Instructions were also
given that the luggage be immediately forwarded to Butuan on the
first available flight. At 5 PM, PAL Cebu sent a message to PAL
Butuan that the luggage would be forwarded the following day,
August 27, 1967. However, this message was not received by PAL
Butuan as all personnel had already left since there were no more
incoming flights that afternoon.
Petitioner was worried about the missing luggage because it
contained vital documents needed for trial. Petitioner wired PAL
Cebu demanding the delivery of his baggage before noon the next
day otherwise he would hold PAL liable for damages. This telegram
was received by the PAL Cebu supervisor but the latter felt no need
to wire the petitioner that his luggage had already been forwarded
on the assumption that by the time the message reached Butuan
City, the luggage would have arrived.
On August 27, 1967, petitioner went to Bancasi Airport. He did not
wait for the morning flight which arrived at 10 AM. The porter paged
petitioner but the latter had already left. A certain Emilio Dagorro, a
driver who used to drive the petitioner, volunteered to take the
luggage to petitioner. As Maximo Gomez knew Dagorro to be the
same driver used by petitioner whenever the latter was in Butuan
City, Gomez took that luggage and placed it on the counter.
Dagorro examined the lock, pressed it, and it opened. After calling
the attention of Gomez, Gomez took a look at its contents, but did
not touch them.
Dagorro delivered the maleta to petitioner, informing him that the
lock was open. Upon inspection, petitioner found that the folder
containing documents in civil case were missing, aside from 2 gift
items for his parents-in-law. Petitioner refused to accept the
luggage. Dagorro returned it to the porter clerk who sealed it and
forwarded the same to PAL Cebu.
Petitioner asked for postponement of the hearing due to the loss of
his documents, which was granted by the court. He returned to
Cebu. In a letter to PAL Cebu, he demanded that his luggage be
produced intact, and that he be compensated for damages.
Petitioner sent a letter to PAL Cebu inquiring the results of the
investigation to pinpoint responsibility for the unauthorized opening
of the maleta. PAL Cebu failed to found the lost folder and failed to
pinpoint the personnel who allegedly pilfered the baggage.
Petitioner filed a complaint against PAL for damages for breach of
contract of transportation. The trial court found PAL to have acted
in bad faith and with malice and declared petitioner entitled to
damages. CA found that PAL was guilty only of simple negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not PAL acted in bad faith.
HELD:No. Bad faith means a breach of a known duty though some motive of
interest or ill will. It was the duty of PAL to look for petitioners luggage which
had been miscarried. PAL exerted due diligence in complying with such
duty. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or fraud or bad faith,
petitioner is not entitled to moral damages. Petitioner is neither entitled to
exemplary damages. It can be granted if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner, which has not been
proven in this case.
Petitioner further contends that respondent court committed grave error
when it limited PALs carriage liability to the amount of P100 as stipulated at
the back of the ticket; and that there is nothing in the evidence to show that
he actually entered into a contract with PAL limiting the latters liability for the
loss or delay of the baggage of its passengers.
While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket, he is
nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. Such provisions have been
held to be part of the contract of carriage and valid and binding upon the
passenger regardless of the latters lack of knowledge or assent to the
regulation. It is what is known as contract of adhesion wherein one party
imposes a readymade form of contract on the other. The one who adheres
to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his
consent.
PanAm v IAC

FACTS:
Jose Rapaldas is on board a flight for Pan Am Flight 841 from Guam to
Manila. While standingin line to board the flight at the Guam airport,
Rapadas was ordered by Pan Am's handcarrycontrol agent to check-in his
Samsonite attache case. Rapadas protested pointed to the fact thatother co-
passengers were permitted to handcarry bulkier baggages. But for fear that
he wouldmiss the flight, he agreed to check it in. He gave his attache case to
his brother who happened tobe around without declaring its contents or the
value of its contents.Upon his arrival in Manila, he was given all his check-in
baggages except the attache case.Because Rapadas felt ill, he sent his son
to request for search of the missing luggage. Eventually,Rapadas received a
letter from Pan Am's counsel offering to settle the claim for the sum
of $160.00 representing Pan Am's alleged limit of liability for loss or damage
to a passenger'spersonal property under the contract of carriage between
Rapadas and Pan Am.

ISSUE:
Is Pan American Airways liable for the lost check-in baggage?

COURT RULING:

Notice of limited liability in airline tickets

On page 2 of the airline ticket, it states that the Warsaw Convention

governsin case of death orinjury to the passenger or of loss, damage or
destruction to a passenger's luggage. It says:"If the passenger's journey
involves an ultimate destination or stop in a country, the WarsawConvention
may be applicable and the conversation governs and in most cases, limits
theliability of carriers for death or personal injury and in respect of loss or
damage to baggage."

Passenger is expected to be vigilant with respect to his baggages

In this case, Rapadas actually manifested a disregard with the airline rules
insofar as hisbaggagesareconcerned. He failed to state the value
of the said check-in baggage and failed toremove whatever check-in
valuables he had in which should have been placed in his allowablehand-
carry baggage instead.
Cathay Pacific v. CA limitations. However, it must not be construed to preclude the operation of
the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less
FACTS: Respondent Alcantara was a first class passenger of a Cathay exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its
Pacific flight to Jakarta to attend a business conference with the Director passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if wilfull misconduct on
General of Trade of Indonesia. Upon his arrival in Jakarta, he discovered the part of the carrier's employees is found or established, as in this case.
that his luggage was missing. He was informed that his luggage was left
behind in Hongkong and was offered $20.00 as "inconvenience money" to
buy his immediate personal needs. He had to seek postponement of his pre-
arranged conference. And when his luggage finally reached Jakarta after a
day, it was required to be picked up by an official of the Philippine Embassy.
The trial court ordered Cathay to pay. The CA affirmed but increased the
award of damages. SC affirmed but modified the award of damages. Cathay
argues that the one-day delay was not made in bad faith because it had a
mechanical trouble wherein all pieces of luggage on board the first aircraft
bound for Jakarta were unloaded and transferred to the second aircraft
which departed an hour and a half later. Cathay also argues that he was not
treated rudely and arrogantly by its employees. Also, that the CA erred in
failing to apply the Warsaw Convention on the liability of a carrier to its
passengers.

ISSUE: W/N Cathay breached its contract of carriage with Alcantara and
acted in bad faith?

HELD: YES. Cathay failed to deliver his luggage at the designated place and
time, it being the obligation of a common carrier to carry its passengers and
their luggage safely to their destination, which includes the duty not to delay
their transportation. It was not even aware that the luggage was left behind
until its attention was called by the Hongkong Customs authorities. It also
refused to deliver the luggage at his hotel and required him to pick it up with
an official of the Philippine Embassy The Cathay employees were also
discourteous, rude, and insulting. He was simply advised to buy anything he
wanted with only $20.00 which was certainly not enough to purchase
comfortable clothing appropriate for an executive conference. Cathays
agents only replied, "What can we do, the baggage is missing. I cannot do
anything . . . Anyhow, you can buy anything you need, charged to Cathay
Pacific." Moral and exemplary damages are proper where in breaching the
contract of carriage bad faith or fraud is shown. In the absence of fraud or
bad faith, liability is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the
breach of obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen. Further, Cathay contends that the extent of its liability
should be limited absolutely to that set forth in the Warsaw Convention. The
said treaty does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances
for declaring a carrier liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an
absolute limit of the extent of that liability. The Warsaw Convention declares
the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated cases and under certain
Natl Development Co. v. CA and Development Insurance & Surety
Corp.
G.R. No. L-49407 August 19, 1988
Maritime Co. of the Philippines v. CA and Development Insurance &
Surety Corp.
G.R. No. L-49469 August 19, 1988
Paras, J.
FACTS:
In accordance with a memorandum agreement entered into between
defendants NDC andMCP, NDC appointed MCP as its agent to manage and
operate Dona Nati vessel for and inits behalf and account
E. Philipp Corporation loaded on board the vessel 1200 bales of American
raw cottonconsigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation, Manila and
the Peoples Bank and Trust Company acting for and in behalf of the Pan
Asiatic Commercial Company, Inc., whorepresents Riverside Mills
Corporatio; also loaded on the same vessel were the cargo of Kyokuto
Boekui, Kaisa, Ltd., consigned to the order of Manila Banking
Corporationconsisting of 200 cartons of sodium lauryl sulfate and 10 cases
of aluminum foil
En route to Manila the vessel figured in a collision with a Japanese vessel as
a result of which 550 bales of aforesaid cargo of American raw cotton as well
as the cargo of KyokutoBoekui, Kaisa, Ltd were lost and/or destroyed
Development Insurance & Surety Corp. paid the insurance and filed an
action for recoveryof money against NDC and MCP
ISSUES:
1. which laws govern loss or destruction of goods due to collision of vessels
outsidePhilippine waters; 2. what is the extent of liability as well as the rules
of prescriptionprovided thereunder
HELD:
1. [T]he law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
theliability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration (Art. 1753).Since the goods in question are transported from
San Francisco, California and Tokyo, Japanto the Philippines and that they
were lost or due to a collision which was found to have beencaused by the
negligence or fault of both captains of the colliding vessels the laws of
thePhilippines will apply.
Art 1735: in all other than those mentioned is Article 1734 thereof, the
common carriershall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless it proves thatit has observed the extraordinary diligence
required by law
collision not one of those enumerated under Art. 1734; hence, carrier is
presumed to beat fault or to have acted negligently
2. Art. 826 of the Code of Commerce: where collision is imputable to the
personnel of avessel, the owner of the vessel at fault, shall indemnify the
losses and damages incurredafter an expert appraisal. But more in point
Art. 827, ditto: if the collision is imputable to both vessels, each one shall
suffer its owndamages and both shall be
solidarily
responsible for the losses and damages suffered bytheir cargoes
Art 826 to 839, ditto: the shipowner or carrier is not exempt from liability for
damagesarising from collision due to the fault or negligence of the captain;
primary liability isimposed on the shipowner or carrier in because of the
accepted doctrine that theshipmaster or captain is merely the representative
of the owner who has the actual orconstructive control over the conduct of
the voyage
both the owner (NDC) and agent (MPC) of the offending vessel are liable for
the damagedone where both are impleaded; that in case of collision, both
the owner and the agent arecivillyjointly and severally responsible for
the acts of the captain since the obligation
which is the subject of the action had its origin in a tortious act and did not
arise from contract
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. IAC and Development Insurance &
Surety Corp.
G.R. No. L-69044 May 29, 1987
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. The Nisshin Fire and Marine Insurance
Co., andDowa Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd.
G.R. No. 71478 May 29, 1987
Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS:
(G.R. No. L-69044): a vessel operated by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc., loaded atKobe, Japan for transportation to Manila, 5000 pieces of
calorized lance pipes in 28packages consigned to Philippine Blooming Mills
Co., Inc., and 7 cases of spare partsconsigned to Central Textile Mills, Inc.;
both sets of goods were insured with DevelopmentInsurance and Surety
Corp.
(G.R. No. 71478): the same vessel took on board 128 cartons of garment
fabrics andaccessories, in 2 containers, consigned to Mariveles Apparel
Corporation, and two cases of surveying instruments consigned to Aman
Enterprises and General Merchandise
the vessel caught fire and sank, resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo
ISSUES:
1. which law should govern the Civil Code provisions on Common carriers
or theCarriage of Goods by Sea Act?; 2. who has the burden of proof to
show negligence of thecarrier? 3. what is the extent of the carriers liability?
HELD:
1. The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
theliability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration. As thecargoes were transported from Japan to the Philippines,
the liability of Petitioner Carrier isgoverned primarily by the Civil Code.
However, in all matters not regulated by said Code,the rights and obligations
of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerceand by
special laws. Thus, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is
suppletory tothe provisions of the Civil Code.
2. Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that all cases than those mention
in Article 1734,the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently,unless it proves that it has observed the
extraordinary diligence required by law. Theburden is upon Eastern Shipping
Lines to prove that it has exercised the extraordinarydiligence required by
law.
Note: fire not considered a natural disaster or calamity within the
contemplation of Art.1734 for it arises almost invariably from some act of
man or by human means; it does notfall within the category of an act of God
unless caused by lightning or by other naturaldisaster or calamity
having failed to discharge the burden of proving that it had exercised the
extraordinarydiligence required by law, Eastern Shipping Lines cannot
escape liability for the loss of thecargo
As it was at fault, it cannot seek the protective mantle of Sec. 4(2) of
Carriage of Goods bySea Act which provides: Neither the carrier nor the
ship shall be responsible for loss ordamage arising or resulting from x x x (b)
Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier.
there was actual fault of the carrier shown by lack of diligence in that when
the smoke wasnoticed, the fire was already big; that the fire must have
started 24 hours before the samewas noticed; and that after the cargoes
were stored in the hatches, no regular inspectionwas made as to their
condition during the voyage.
3. See Art. 1749.G.R. No. 69044: no stipulation in the Bills of Lading limiting
the carriers liability for the lossor destruction of the goods; no declaration of
a higher value of the goods; Hence, Eastern
Shipping Lines liability should not exceed US $500 per package (as
provided in 4(5) of theCOGSA), or its peso equivalent, at the time of
payment of the value of the goods lost, but inno case more than the amount
of damage actually sustained.
Lufthansa vs. IAC

Facts: Henry Alcantara shipped 13 pieces of luggages through Lufthansa

from Teheran to Manila, to which he did not disclose the contents or the
value of the luggages when he delivered to Lufthansa. Of the 13 luggages,
Teresita Alcantara was able to claim 12 pieces of luggages. Spouses
Alcantara informed Lufthansa of the loss of one of the luggages and the
contents thereof. Lufthansa traced the missing luggage but to no avail, thus
informed spouses Alcantara to file a claim of invoice. Spouses Alcantara
wrote a letter demanding for the production of the luggage within 10 days
after receipt of the letter. When Lufthansa did not comply, spouses Alcantara
filed a complaint for BREACH OF CONTRACT with damages against
Lufthansa, to which it filed its answer alleging that the Warsaw Convention
limits the liability of the carrier, if any, with respect to the cargo. It further
alleged that it never acted fraudulently or in bad faith to entitle the spouses
to its claim for moral damages.

The RTC ruled in favor of spouses Alcantara. Lufthansa appealed to CA,

which affirmed the trail courts decision with modification, by deleting the
award of attorneys fees. Its MR having been denied, Lufthansa filed the
petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether spouses Alcantara are entitled to an award of damages

beyond the liability set forth in the Warsaw Convention.

Held: Yes.

The SC found no congent reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial
court and the appellate court. Hence, even if the RP is a party to the Warsaw
Convention, Lufthansa waived the applicability of the Warsaw Convention to
the case when it offered spouses Alcantara a higher amount than that which
is provided in the said law and failed to raise timely objections during the trial
when questions and answers were brought out regarding the actual claims
and damages sustained by the spouses Alcantara which were even
subjected to a lengthy cross examination by Lufthansas counsel.