CA
Held:
Thus, in applying the said test, based on the foregoing factors, an entity
engaged in the carrying of petroleum products over its pipelines network for hire
as a public employment is deemed to be a common carrier because it
undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose
to employ its services, and transport the goods by land and for compensation.
The fact that is has limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a
common carrier.
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Whether petitioner cannot be held liable for the obligation of a carrier and that
any negligence committed by it was deemed the negligence of the principal.
Held:
Held:
Brokerage firm is also considered a common carrier and for which, the
delivery of the merchandise in bad condition raises the presumption of
negligence. Article 1732 does not distinguish between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only
as an ancillary activity. The rule is that if the improper packing is known to the
carrier or his employees or is apparent upon ordinary observation, but the
common carrier, nevertheless, accepts the same without protest or exception,
he is not relieved of liability for the resulting damage.
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4. CRISOSTOMO VS. CA
Held:
5. DE GUZMAN VS. CA
Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinction between one whose
principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one
who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity, nor does it make distinctions
between one who offers the service to the general public or a narrow segment
of the general population. Therefore, one who back-hauled goods for other
merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, even when such activity was only
periodical or occasional and was not its principal line of business would be
subject to the responsibilities and obligations of a common carrier. It appears to
the Court that private respondent is properly characterized as a common
carrier even though he merely back-hauled goods for other merchants and
although such back-hauling was done on a periodic or occasional manner, and
even through private respondents principal occupation was not the carriage of
goods for others. As regards the issue of exercise of extraordinary diligence, the
court held that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite
beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a
fortuitous event. The private respondent cannot be held liable for the value of
the undelivered merchandise which was lost because of an event entirely
beyond the private respondents control.
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Whether petitioners operate as common carrier and that they are bound to
exercise extraordinary diligence in case of death of a passenger.
Held:
There is no question that the Pereas did not overturn the presumption of
their negligence by credible evidence. Their defense of having observed the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
driver was not legally sufficient. According to Article 1759 of the Civil Code, their
liability as a common carrier did not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
their employee. This was the reason why the RTC treated this defense of the
Pereas as inappropriate in this action for breach of contract of carriage.
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Held:
Held:
Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinction between one whose
principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one
who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. The law did not also
distinguish between between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Further, the law does not distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the general public, and one who offers
services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
population.
7. DSR-SENATOR LINES AND C.F. SHARP AND CO. INC. VS. FEDERAL PHOENIX
ASSURANCE CO.
Whether fire is a fortuitous event which exempts a carrier from liability for loss or
destruction of the cargo.
Held:
Article 1734 specifically provides that common carriers are responsible for
the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to the
following causes:
Fire is not one of those enumerated under the above provision which
exempts a carrier from liability for loss or destruction of the cargo. Since the
period of fire is not comprehended within the exceptions in Article 1734, then
the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence
required by law.
Held:
The elements of a fortuitous event are: (a) the cause of the unforeseen
and unexpected occurrence, must have been independent of human will; (b)
the event constituted the caso fortuito must have been impossible to foresee or,
if foreseeable, impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must have been such as
to render it impossible for the debtors to fulfil their obligation in a normal manner;
and (d) the obligor must have been free from any participation in the
aggravation of the resulting injury to the creditor.
To fully free a common carrier from any liability, the fortuitous event must
have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. And it should have
exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after
the occurrence of the fortuitous event.
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Whether a common carrier is liable for the death of its passenger arising from
culpa contractual when the death was beyond the control of the common
carrier.
Held:
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common
carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of
negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of
the absolute safety of its passengers.
Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in
no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of
transporting or to the negligent or wilful acts of the common carrier or its
employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to provide
safe and suitable care as well as competent employees, with the injury arising
wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control
or even knowledge or could have not prevented, the presumption is rebutted
and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise would
make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers
which is not the intention of the lawmakers.
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Whether Fortune Sea was converted into a private carrier by virtue of the time
charter party agreement it entered with Northern Transport.
Held:
In determining the nature of a contract, courts are not bond by the title or
name given by the parties. The decisive factor in evaluating an agreement to
the intention of the parties, as shown, not necessarily by the terminology used in
the contract but by their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and
immediately after executing the agreement.
Moreover, although the master and crew of the vessel were those of the
shipowner, records show that at the time of the execution of the charter party,
Fortune Sea had completely relinquished possession, command and navigation
of M/V Ricky Rey to Northern Transport.
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Whether petitioner was liable for the injuries sustained by the respondents
despite the provision in the agreement to sell that shielded it from liability.
Held:
In view of the MMTCs admission in its pleadings that it had remained the
registered owner of the bus at the time of the incident, it could not escape
liability for the personal injuries and property damage suffered by the Cuevases.
This is because of the registered-owner rule, whereby the registered owner of the
motor vehicle involved in a vehicular accident could be held liable for the
consequences. The registered-owner rule has remained good in law in this
jurisdiction considering its impeccable and timeless rationale.
Whether the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is applicable in the instant case.
Held:
It is undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely
transported to the destination agreed upon. In actions for breach of contract,
only the existence of such contract, and the fact that the obligor, in this case
the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination are
the matters that need to be proved. X x x Upon the happening of the accident,
the presumption of negligence at once arises, and it becomes the duty of a
common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care
of his passengers. While evidence may be submitted to overcome such
presumption of negligence, it must be shown that the carrier observed the
required extraordinary diligence, which means that the carrier must show the
utmost diligence of a very cautious persons as far as human care and foresight
can provide, or that the accident was caused by fortuitous event. As correctly
found by the trial court, petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively rebut such
presumption. The negligence of petitioner Laspias as the driver of the passenger
bus is, thus, binding against petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger bus
engaged in a common carrier.
Held:
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the
negligence of Li on the night of the accident. Negligence, as it is commonly
understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the
failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
2. We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not
based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for
acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls
upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of his employees. It is up to this point,
however, that our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing
the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, we
are of the opinion that Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable
for the damage caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
Whether the CA correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad
in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Held:
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.
Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it
not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within
its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of
carriage. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or
injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its
employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or
of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due
diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such
death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent,
and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still
establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the
burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen
event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the
carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the
appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been
at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation
to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its
failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the
discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may
choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or
an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is
not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the
late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court
of Appeals that there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor
(Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not
been duly proven x x x. This finding of the appellate court is not without
substantial justification in our own review of the records of the case.
Whether petitioner should be exempt from liability because the tire blow-out was
not more than a fortuitous even that could not have been forseen.
Held:
Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire may
not be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the
situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free
from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle.
Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand
name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode
within five days use.
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the
grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion
of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show that the
accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by
the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents.
The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air
pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was
overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.
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Whether petitioner is liable for the breach of contract of carriage (vigilance over
goods)9
Held:
A common carrier is bound to transport its cargo and its passengers safely
"as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a
very cautious person, with due regard to all circumstances.[14] The extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the
common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding the
damage to, or destruction of, the goods entrusted to it for safe carriage and
delivery.[15] It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill
and foresight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and
characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the
handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires.
Under Articles 1735[17] and 1752[18] of the Civil Code, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in case the goods
transported by them are lost, destroyed or had deteriorated. To overcome the
presumption of liability for loss, destruction or deterioration of goods under
Article 1735, the common carrier must prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as required in Article 1733[19] of the Civil Code.
APPLICABILITY OF COGSA
Whether the shipment sustained damage while in the possession and custody of
Heung-A and if so, whether Heung-As liability can be limited to US$500 per
package pursuant to the COGSA.
Held:
Here, HEUNG-A failed to rebut this prima facie presumption when it failed
to give adequate explanation as to how the shipment inside the container van
was handled, stored and preserved to forestall or prevent any damage or loss
while the same was in its possession, custody and control.