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  • Article-Construction Failures From Pile Buck Jul Aug 2016 Volume 32, Issue 4

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    Construction Failures

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    Construction Failures

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    6 tayangan16 halaman

    Article-Construction Failures From Pile Buck Jul Aug 2016 Volume 32, Issue 4

    Diunggah oleh

    sam
    Construction Failures

    Hak Cipta:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Unduh sebagai PDF atau baca online dari Scribd
    Tandai sebagai konten tidak pantas
    dari 16
    a aa AND WHAT WE CAN taal Engineered structure: have failed for a multitude of reasons. This article i will look at some of i the notable failures lt caused by foundations, design, and human miscommunication. The failures are presented in i chronological order. The Leaning Tower of Pisa repre- sents a structure whose failure equated toglobal recognition. Construction of the tower began in 173 and began +o lean following completion of the tower's third floor in 178, Construction was halted for roughly 100 years. In 1272, four additional floors were added. The builder tried to compensate forthe original lean by tmakingone sie ofthe atonal fou flors taller than the others. The tower began to lean further. Once again construction was halted until seventh floor was finished in 139, The st | pleted when abel tower was added i nround 1369 4 ‘As time lapsed, the tower ened j snore, resulting ina 5-fotvertieal jcture was com i discrepancy. | FAILURE CAUSE thought to be unstable ground benesth the foundation. The weight of he tower was sai to compress the ground below the foundation beginning with a7 meter layer of silt and 30 meters of clay, One a side of the structure is softer than its counterparts, maki the tower upright. a of elay under the south tunable to hold 78 Pile Buck Magazine | Yol.32 No.4 2016 | pilebuck.com 1n 1993, engineers loaded 600 tons of ead ingots on the north side of the tower to counteract the lean, a method that successfully brought the tower back almost an inch, However, these lead piles were viewed as extremely unattractive, hin. dering the splendor of the tower. In 2003, John Burland, an English geotechnical engineer, discovered that the primary cause ofthe tit was a fluctuating water table, which perched higher on the tower's north side, caus ing the southward slanting. Burland introduced a new drainage system beneath the tower's north side that addressed this condition. Another effort removed sol from the tower's north side, with the final goal of reducing the lean by 10 percent. So far this excavation along with the new a inage system has proved successful From 2003 to 2008, the tower did not move ~ the first time in its history that ‘movement had completely ceased. Atthe time of construction, the Quebec City Bridge was to be a wonder and the longest bridge in the world. Instead the bridge took ofengineeri the lives oF 86 workers when the main antlever collapsed, falling more than 150 feet into the StL. FAILURE CAUSE Ina cost-cutting move, the b piers were placed farther out in the river, lengthening the main span from 490 meters to ‘The longer span required high tress that negatively impacted the ‘chords on the arms ofthe cantilever causing them to bend. This bending and collapse could have been prevented when the bridge's southern half was taking shape in 1904, During final design, the preliminary calculations which had been mad daring the planning stages were not property checked, as the actual weight of the bridge was far in excess ofthe srrying capacity ‘When the bridge neared completion during the summer of1907 the onsite gineering team noticed increasing distor- tions of key structural members already in place. The head ofthe tear, Norman MeL, wrote to the bridge’ consulting engineer Theodore Cooper, who first replied that the problems were minor Te took MeLure until late August toconvinee Cooper that the issue (ern ip rey St france Dm staning scion wit agnor ro esse of ‘When Cooper finaly telegraphed the bridge's contractor, Phoenix Bridge ‘Company, alerting them thet no more load tothe bridge be placed, it was too late, Late that same afternoon, the south arm and part ofthe bridge's cen- tral section collapsed, ‘The bridge's collapse was the direct result of errors in design and the mis- calculation of loads. ‘The bridge was rebuilt and opened in August 1919, During the construction of he Southwest Land and Lake Tunnel Sys- temunder Lake Michigan, « temporary dormitory “crib” constructed of wood and brick caught fire Located roughly 1.5 miles off shore, the crib housed a number of mostly Irish iremigrants that were building a brick-lined tunnel under the lake. The workers lived on the erib because it was deemed impractical to carry them back and forth each day due to the large ‘quantity of ce in the lake, Atthe time ofthe fire, 95 men were oon the structure. Of those workers, ‘53 perished. Those who lost their lives were either burned to death or drowned when trying to escape. Those that survived took refuge on floating, chunks ofice and were eventually res ccued by tugs, which had a difficult time getting through the icy water. FAILURE CAUSE ‘The origin of the Fire is still up for debate, as some historians believe itwas caused when a janitor used gasoline to ward off bed bugs. Others think the fire had its origin in a small boiler house aboue 100 yards from the main crib structure where the tunnel ctor, George W. Jackson Com pany, stored just enough powder and dynamite for urgent use. ‘Somehow these explosives were put {nto action and the erib quickly became Pile Buck Magazine | Vol32 No. 20% | pilebuck.com ablaze essen ly trapping the workers. ‘The fire is acautionary tale © ‘workers and contractors operating in ‘golated locations that outside help dur- ing an emergency may not be available ina timely fashion. Because of the high volume of ce in the water, rescue tugs were prevented from aiding the rib workers ina timely fshi California's history occurred when acurved, concrete gra collapsed, Located roughly 40 miles north of Los Angeles, the storage reservoir failure resulted in more than 450 deaths and is considered one of the worst American civil engineering disasters ofthe 20th century. Known as the t. Francis Dam, itwas partofthe Los Angeles Aqueduct Designed and built between 1924 ‘and 1926 by the Los Angeles Depart- ment of Water and Power, the dam ae had begun to show signs of stress in 1928, with a number of temperature and contraction eracks appearing and a small amount of seeping occurring under the abutments ‘The department's chief engineer, William Mulholland, checked the leaks Jess than a day before the collapse, deeming the cracks to be of average level for adam of ts size Twelve hours later only a middle Portion ofthe dam remained FAILURE CAUSE Defective foundations, not the dam design, were to blame for the collapse. ‘Reports found the west end of the dam was founded upon a reddish con- sslomerate that even when dry was of inferior strength. When wet, the con- lomerate became so soft that it nearly lost all rock characteristics, undermin- ing the west end The failure ofthe west end released rush of water that caused a heavy ‘cour against the eastern canyon wall ‘This scour led to the ultimate collapse of the dam. More recent findings have shown the ‘dam was built on an ancient landslide, ‘which would have been undetectable to engineers inthe 1920s. Reports suggested the utilization of inspection galleries, pressure grout- ing, drainage wells and deep cut-off walls could have postponed the final re; but also, acknowledged that due tothe defective foundation it was unlikely any ofthese devices would have been effective ‘TACOMA NARROWS BRIDGE (NOVEMBER 1940) Dubbed ‘Galloping Gertie, the T coma Narrowrs Bridge opened in July 1940. Four months later, the suspension bridge main span collapsed amid high conditions, the resul of aeroelas- flutter. No human lives were lot ‘One dog in acar died. FAILURE CAUSE ‘The solid sides ofthe bridge restriet- ‘ed wind from passing through the deck. Instead the bridge caught the wind, ‘coms ron rae Ue AUR URED aL (Racy U Las es ey EO UPB EVA) ky PU nO ROIs Bt BA BCU RRB) by te eves BESTA BU BV eZee V3) PVR ADR eNO aE RIUM pha OSPR aes Se UN BAe ise cl Oe cet ee tise ‘which reached 42 mph on the day of the collapse, causing the deck to sway and bend from side to side. ‘This violent bending caused the deck to break, falling into Puget ‘mantlingof the remaining towers and side spans that survived the collapse of, the main span continued until May 1943, ‘The collapse remains a prime example of aeroclastc futter and the impact itcan have on a structure. The ‘Tacoma experience taught engincers that wind eauses not only static loads fon the bridge, but also significant dy- namic actions. The bridge was rebuilt and opened {in 1950. Nearly 60 years later, twin suspension bridge was built next to it and carries the eastbound Highway 16 traffic. The 1950 span carries the west bound traffic ound. Dis (84 Pile Buck Magazine | Vol32.No.4 2016 | pilebuck.com BANQIAO RESERVOIR DAM (AUGUST 1975) Completed along the Ru River in 1952 with the help of Soviet consultants, Ban- giao Dam stood 24.5 meters high, eom- prised ofelay and featured a maximum reservoir discharge of 1,742 eubie meters per second. Soon after completion, cracks inthe dam and sluice gates appeared. ‘These cracks were repaired, with the new design dubbed the iron dam. The iron dam failed 23 years later, ‘The failure of Bangiao Dam and the subsequent collapse of 61 other dams in China's Henan Province are respon- sible for claiming the most casuaites, an estimated 171,000. The flooding that resulted from the mass dam failures ‘wiped out entire towns, displacing an estimated 11 million people, FAILURE CAUSE Failure ofthe dam's sluice gates fl- lowed a period of record rainfall that oceurred when Typhoon Nini ninto cooler northern ai. Storms dropped meter G feet 3.37 inches) of water in three days. The dam was designed tohandlea maximum of roughly 0.5 meters over a three-day period, Immediately following the three-day storm, water in the reservoir erested 0.3 meters higher than the dan’s wave protection wall. The sluice gates were able to handle the overflow of wate! and failed, Sedimentation blockage contributed to the gate failures. In the six hours afte the failure, an estimated 701 million water was released from the reservoir, Upriver at Shimantan Dem, 1.67 bil lion cubic meters of water was released in a5.5-hour window. Several other dams were deliberately destroyed by air strikes, with water released into flood diversion areas. In total 15.738 billion je meters of ‘cubic meters of water was release. Following the failure, the Chinese Officially, lame for Bangiao Da wwas placed on natute, ams gow nment put a larger focus on the surveillance, repair and consolidation However, there were problems with of reservoir dams, Most ofthe coun: the dam's safety features. Renowned _try’s dams were constructed between Chinese hydrologist Chen Xing, who the 1980s and 1970s using low con- was involved in the design of the struction standards, dam, recommended the dam feature In the last 20 years, the government W2sluice gates. Instead, the dam was _has invested more than $10 billion buile with only five. ‘toward the repair and consolidation of ‘he Bangiao Dam was rebuiltand these degraded reservoirs, completed in 1992, standing two ties taller (50.5 meters) than its predecessor. The reservoirnow features acatch- During the initial filling, workers on ‘ment ares of 768 square kilometersand the earthen Teton Dam in Idaho noticed amaximum reserve capacity of 675 mil- _asmallle near the top of the 405-foot lion cubic meters, which is 34 percent high wall, Later that day the dam larger than that of the failed dam. The maximum discharge ofthe breached, emptying more than 250,000 acre-feet of sedimentfilled water into reservoir is 15,000 cubic meters, with the six-mile Teton River Canyon, killing effective storage at 256 million cubic 11 people and 13,000 cattle. meters. The normal high water level for tthe time ofthe failure, the dam the reservoiris 11.5 meters shove sea was nearly at maximum-depth eapacity level, with the erest level 2120 meters. of 240 fee a3 cng DAMPER Sete Raat eel tascy i cranes E a Cea Pesta Retort NEE eT) Peace Seema ery Prone Rae) Rohregee eee eet Te gee eae Aer -— FAILURE CAUSE The dam had two sets of internal ‘open cracks, each ata different loca- tion. The set of eracks where the breach initiated extended to a depth of 2 feet from the top of the dam. ‘When the reservoir water level rose tothe bottom of the crack, water flowed through the open vertical crack, Which eroded into a large tunnel, ‘This formation led to the eventual breach of the dara, Of note, the filling of the reservoir had been accelerated several times to accommodate the ad- ditional spring run-off Initially, one foot of water was emp- tied into the reservoir a day. ‘With heavy winter snows, the project construction engineer requested to double the fill rate, a way ta deal with the additional run-off, After increasing the rate, monitoring showed that groundwater was flowing a thousand times faster than antic. pated. These findings had little impact, asthe filling rate was doubled a month Tater to four feet a day, Following the collapse, studies placed blame on the permeable loess soil used in the dam's core and the cracked rhyolite ints abutments. These cracks allowed water to seep around and through the dam, causing internal ero- sion, or piping, that led to the breach, The US. government paid out more than $300 million in claims related to ‘the collapse, more than three times the cost to construct the dam, which was never rebuilt, ‘The dam's collapse stresses the importance of proper soil testing when designing and construeting an earthen dam. Significantly inreasing the rate at which a reservoirs filled can prove disastrous, Considered one of the worst con: struction accidents in USS. history was the collapse of a cooling tower under construction ata power station on Wil: low Island, West Virginia. The accident Pile Buck Magazine | Vol32 No“ 2016 | pilebuek.com ‘00k the lives of 1 workers. TThose that perished were situated on scaffolding bolted to the interior ofthe structure. The scaffolding col- lapsed when a crane hoisting a bueket ‘of concrete fell toward the inside of the rower. The falling concrete and scaffolding sent construction workers falling to their death into the hollow center ofthe tower, At the time of the accident construction had reached 166 feet high. The structure was part of a new power plant being constructed by the Allegheny Power System, FAILURE CAUSE A liftof concrete was being raised when the eable hoisting that bucket went slack. This caused the crane that was raising the bucket to fall toward the inside of che tower. When striking the tower, the crane caused the previ ous day's concrete lift, which had not had sufficient time to eure, tounwrap from the top down, first peeling eaun- ter-clockwise then in both directions, SAVE| Direct Buyer-to-Selle! 80! 1% - ZERO Lead Time List Your i Nin | 80%.)

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