People vs.

Tamani possibility of the presence of the accused at the

Appeal; Perfection of appeal; Statutory
construction; Appeal lies 15 days from
promulgation of judgment in criminal cases.
The assumption that the fifteen-day period
should be counted from February 25, 1963,
when a copy of the decision was allegedly served
en appellants counsel by registered mail, is not
well-taken. The word promulgation in section
6 should be construed as referring to
judgment, while the word notice should be
construed as referring to order. That
construction is sanctioned by the rule of
reddendo singula singulis: referring each to
each; referring each phrase or expression to its
appropriate object, or let each be put in its
proper place, that is, the words should be taken
distributively.
scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission. The accused must show
that he was at some other place for such a period
of time that it was impossible for him to have
been at the place where the crime was
committed at the time of its commission.
Same; Confessions; Details unknown to
investigators indicate voluntariness of
confession.NBI agents Almeda and Mendoza
testified that Tamanis sworn statements were
freely executed. Tamanis testimony on the
alleged maltreatment was not corroborated. As
correctly noted by the Solicitor General, certain
details in the confession, which only Tamani
could have supplied, are indications of its
voluntariness and give it spontaneity and
coherence.

Same; Same; Case at bar, appeal made out of
time given due course.Considering that
appellants right to seek a review of his case was
lost by reason of his counsels inadvertence and
considering further that the briefs have been
submitted, the Court has resolved to review the
record to obviate any possible miscarriage of
justice (Cf. Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 135, 2
L. ed. 60, where Chief Justice Marshall discussed
the merits of a mandamus action although the
Court held that it had no power to issue that
writ.).
Criminal Law; Alibi: Two-kilometer distance from
the scene of the crime is a weak alibi.Appellant
Tamanis defense of alibi, which can be
fabricated with facility, cannot be given serious
consideration. Assuming that he was in Barrio
Aniog in the afternoon and night of June 11th, it
was physically possible for him to be at the scene
of the shooting at the time that it was
perpetrated and return to the house of Vice-
Mayor Tamani in Barrio Aniog. That place was
only two kilometers from the store of Pedro Pua.
The victims were shot in front of the store.
Same; Same; Alibi when acceptable as a
defense.The settled rule is that an alibi, to be
tenable, must be such as to preclude the
Same; Treachery; Shot from a distance indicates
treachery. The act of shooting Siyang at a
distance, without the least expectation on his
part that he would be assaulted, is murder
because of the attendance of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. Appellant Tamani
deliberately employed a mode of execution
which tended directly and specially to insure the
consummation of the killing without any risk to
himself arising from the defense which the
victim could have made.
Same; Complex Crime; Results of two volleys of
shots constitute separate offenses.The
infliction of the four fatal gunshot wounds on
Siyang and of the wound in the palm of the
mayors right hand was not the result of a single
act. The injuries were the consequences of two
volleys of gunshots. Hence, the assaults on
Siyang and the mayor cannot be categorized as a
complex crime. People vs. Tamani, 55 SCRA 153,
Nos. L-22160 & L-22161 January 21, 1974
FACTS: Tamani was convicted of murder and
attempted murder by the lower court on
February 14, 1963. Upon receipt of a copy of this
order, his counsel subsequently filed a motion
for reconsideration on March 1, 1963, which was
denied. The lower court sent a copy of the order

1
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
of denial to the counsel by registered mail on July
13, 1963 through the counsels wife. Counsel
filed his appeal only on September 10, 1963,
forty-eight days from July 24th, which is the
reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal.
Appellees contend that the case should be
dismissed on the ground that the appeal was
forty-eight days late. They invoked Sec. 6, Rule
122 of the Rules of Court which states that an
appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from the promulgation or notice of the judgment
or order appealed from.
ISSUE: Whether the fifteen-day period should
commence from the date of promulgation of the
decision.
RULING: Yes. Using the rule of reddendo singula
singulis, the word promulgation should be
construed as referring to judgment, while
notice should be construed as referring to
order. Tamanis appeal is therefore 58 days
late, not 47, as Appellees contend; he only had a
day left from the receipt of his wife of the notice
on July 13. Nonetheless, the court decided to act
upon the appeal at hand to obviate any possible
miscarriage of justice.
Amadora vs. Court of Appeals
Civil Law; Torts; Article 2180 of the Civil Code
should apply to all schools, academic as well as
non-academic.After an exhaustive
examination of the problem, the Court has come
to the conclusion that the provision in question
should apply to all schools, academic as well as
non-academic. Where the school is academic
rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of
such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head
thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as
an exception to the general rule. In other words,
teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of
their students except where the school is
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be anBwerable. Following the
canon of reddendo singula singulis, teachers
should apply to the words pupHs and students
and heads of establishments of arts and trades
to the word apprentices.
Same; Same; Same; No substantial distinction
between the academic and the non-academic
schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned.There is really no
substantial distinction between the academic
and the non-academic schools insofar as torts
committed by their students are concerned. The
same vigilance is expected from the teacher over
the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is
teaching, The suggestion in the Sxconde and
Mercado Cases is that the provision would make
the teacher or even the head of the school of arts
and trades liable for an injury caused by any
student in its custody but if that same tort were
committed in an academic school, no liability
would attach to the teacher or the school head.
All other circumstances being the same, the
teacher or the head of the academic school
would be absolved whereas the teacher and the
head of the nonacademic school would be held
liable, and simply because the latter is a school
of arts and trades.
ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, an academic school, is liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous act
of its students.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-
examination of the provision on the last
paragraph of Article 2180 which provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain in their
custody.
The Supreme Court said that it is time to update
the interpretation of the above law due to the
2
changing times where there is hardly a
distinction between schools of arts and trade
and academic schools. That being said, the
Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools, academic
or not, may be held liable under the said
provision of Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the
school, whether academic or not, should not be
held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.
For non-academic schools, it would be the
principal or head of school who should be
directly liable for the tortuous act of its students.
This is because historically, in non-academic
schools, the head of school exercised a closer
administration over their students than heads of
academic schools. In short, they are more hands
on to their students.
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-
charge who would be directly liable for the
tortuous act of the students and not the dean or
the head of school.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability
does not cease when the school year ends or
when the semester ends. Liability applies
whenever the student is in the custody of the
school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within its
premises, whether the semester has not yet
begun or has already ended at the time of the
happening of the incident. As long as it can be
shown that the student is in the school premises
in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in
the exercise of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student privilege, the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student continues. Indeed,
even if the student should be doing nothing
more than relaxing in the campus in the
company of his classmates and friends and
enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the
school, he is still within the custody and subject
to the discipline of the school authorities under
the provisions of Article 2180.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid
direct liability, and for the school, to avoid
subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the
teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to
prevent the injury complained of, and the school
exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in
charge was not properly named, and there was
no sufficient evidence presented to make the
said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct
liability of the teachers because of the foregoing
reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily
liable too.
National Association of Trade Unions-Republic
Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter vs. Torres
G.R. No. 93468. December 29, 1994.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS
(NATU)-REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK
SUPERVISORS CHAPTER, petitioner, vs. HON.
RUBEN D. TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT and REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK,
respondents.
Labor Law; Certification Election; An employer
has no standing to question the process since
this is the sole concern of the workers.
Respondent Bank has no legal personality to
move for the dismissal of the petition for
certification election on the ground that its
supervisory employees are in reality managerial
employees. An employer has no standing to
question the process since this is the sole
concern of the workers. The only exception is
where the employer itself has to file the petition
pursuant to Art. 258 of the Labor Code because
of a request to bargain collectively.
Same; Employees; Definition of Managerial
Employee and Supervisory Employee.A
managerial employee is (a) one who is vested
with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies, or to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees; or (b) one who is
3
vested with both powers or prerogatives. A
supervisory employee is different from a
managerial employee in the sense that the
supervisory employee, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommends such
managerial actions, if the exercise of such
managerial authority is not routinary in nature
but requires the use of independent judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Branch Managers, Cashiers
and Controllers of respondent Bank are not
managerial employees but supervisory
employees.Ranged against these definitions
and after a thorough examination of the
evidence submitted by both parties, we arrive at
a contrary conclusion. Branch Managers,
Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are
not managerial employees but supervisory
employees. The finding of public respondent
that bank policies are laid down and/or executed
through the collective action of these employees
is simply erroneous. His discussion on the
division of their duties and responsibilities does
not logically lead to the conclusion that they are
managerial employees, as the term is defined in
Art. 212, par.(m).
National Association of Trade Unions-Republic
Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter vs. Torres
Same; Same; Same; It is the nature of the
employees functions, and not the nomenclature
or title given to his job, which determines
whether he has rank-and-file, supervisory or
managerial status.The job description of a
Cashier does not mention any authority on his
part to lay down policies, either. On the basis of
the foregoing evidence, it is clear that subject
employees do not participate in policy-making
but are given approved and established policies
to execute and standard practices to observe,
leaving little or no discretion at all whether to
implement said policies or not. It is the nature of
the employees functions, and not the
nomenclature or title given to his job, which
determines whether he has rank-and-file,
supervisory or managerial status.
PADILLA, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
Labor Law; Certification Election; Respondent
Banks Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers, being confidential employees of the
Bank are disqualified from joining or assisting
petitioner labor union or joining, assisting or
forming any other labor organization, including a
supervisors union .I concur in the majority
opinions conclusion that respondent Banks
Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers, being confidential employees of the
Bank, are disqualified from joining or assisting
petitioner labor union or joining, assisting or
forming any other labor organization, including a
supervisors union.
Same; Same; Public respondent is correct in
disqualifying from membership in a labor union
of supervisors, those who are Department
Managers and Assistant Managers.It would be
incongruous for a Department Manager who, as
already stated, is usually a Vice-President, to be
a member of the same labor organization as his
messenger or supervisory account executives. It
would be even more untenable and dangerous
for a Department Manager who usually is a Vice-
President, being a member of a labor union, to
be designated a union representative for
purposes of collective bargaining with the
management of which he is a part. I think the
public respondent is correct in disqualifying from
membership in a labor union of supervisors,
those who are Department Managers and
Assistant Managers. National Association of
Trade Unions-Republic Planters Bank
Supervisors Chapter vs. Torres, 239 SCRA 546,
G.R. No. 93468 December 29, 1994
G.R. No. 96663. August 10, 1999.
PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
LABOR, MED-ARBITER NAPOLEON V.
FERNANDO & PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY
EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION-UOEF,
respondents.
4
Labor Law; Remedial Law; Action; Moot and
Academic; It is unnecessary to indulge in
academic discussion of a moot question. The
issue in G.R. No. 96663, whether or not the
supervisors union can be affiliated with a
Federation with two (2) rank and file unions
directly under the supervision of the former, has
thus become moot and academic in view of the
Unions withdrawal from the federation. In a
long line of cases (Narciso Nakpil, et al. vs. Hon.
Crisanto Aragon, et al., G.R. No. L-24087, January
22, 1980, 95 SCRA 85; Toribio v. Bidin, et al., G.R.
No. L-37960, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 361;
Gumaua v. Espino, G.R. No. L-36188-37586,
February 29, 1980, 96 SCRA 402), the Court
dismissed the petition for being moot and
academic. In the case of F.C. Fisher v. Yangco
Steamship Co., March 31, 1915, the Court held:
It is unnecessary, however to indulge in
academic discussion of a moot question. The
action would have been dismissed at any time on
a showing of the facts as they were. The question
left for the court was a moot one. Its Resolution
would have been useless. Its judgment would
have been impossible of execution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if a case were
moot and academic, a statement of the
governing principle is appropriate in the
resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only
of the parties but of others similarly situated.In
the case of University of San Agustin, Inc., et al.
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the court resolved the
case, ruling that even if a case were moot and
academic, a statement of the governing principle
is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for
the guidance not only of the parties but of others
similarly situated. x x x
Same; Labor Unions; Certification Election; An
order to hold a certification election is proper
despite the pendency of the petition for
cancellation of the registration certificate of the
respondent union. Anent the issue of whether
or not the Petition to cancel/revoke registration
is a prejudicial question to the petition for
certification election, the following ruling in the
case of Association of the Court of Appeals
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
Employees (ACAE) vs. Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, in
her capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor
Relations, et al., 203 SCRA 597, 598, [1991], is in
point, to wit: x x x It is a well-settled rule that a
certification proceedings is not a litigation in the
sense that the term is ordinarily understood, but
an investigation of a nonadversarial and fact
finding character. (Associated Labor Unions
[ALU] v. Ferrer-Calleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989];
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 451 [1990]). Thus, the
technical rules of evidence do not apply if the
decision to grant it proceeds from an
examination of the sufficiency of the petition as
well as a careful look into the arguments
contained in the position papers and other
documents. At any rate, the Court applies the
established rule correctly followed by the public
respondent that an order to hold a certification
election is proper despite the pendency of the
petition for cancellation of the registration
certificate of the respondent union. The
rationale for this is that at the time the
respondent union filed its petition, it still had the
legal personality to perform such act absent an
order directing the cancellation.
Same; Same; Court considers the position of
confidential employees as included in the
disqualification found in Article 245 as if the
disqualification of confidential employees were
written in the provision.In applying the doctrine
of necessary implication, we took into
consideration the rationale behind the
disqualification of managerial employees
expressed in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v.
Sanchez, thus x x x if these managerial
employees would belong to or be affiliated with
a Union, the latter might not be assured of their
loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of
interests. The Union can also become company
dominated with the presence of managerial
employees in Union membership. Stated
differently, in the collective bargaining process,
managerial employees are supposed to be on
the side of the employer, to act as its
representatives, and to see to it that its interest
are well protected. The employer is not assured
5
of such protection if these employees
themselves are union members. Collective
bargaining in such a situation can become one-
sided. It is the same reason that impelled this
Court to consider the position of confidential
employees as included in the disqualification
found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of
confidential employees were written in the
provision. If confidential employees could
unionize in order to bargain for advantages for
themselves, then they could be governed by
their own motives rather than the interest of the
employers. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc.
vs. Secretary of Labor, 312 SCRA 104, G.R. No.
96663, G.R. No. 103300 August 10, 1999
Facts: Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF
(PCEU) filed a petition for certification election
with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive
bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola
Philippines (Pepsi). The petition was granted, but
with the explicit statement that PCEU was
affiliated with Union de Obreros Estivadores de
Filipinas (UOEF) and 2 other rank-and-file unions,
the PCLU and the PEUP.
Pepsi then filed a petition for cancellation with
the BLR against PCEU, on the grounds that: (a)
the members of PCEU were managers and (b) a
supervisors' union cannot affiliate with a
federation whose members include the rank and
file union of the same company. It also filed an
urgent ex-parte motion to suspend the
certification election.
PCEU argued that Art. 245 of the Labor Code, as
amended by RA 6715, did not prohibit a local
union composed of supervisory employees from
being affiliated to a federation which has local
unions with rank-and-file members as affiliates.
Furthermore, Book V, Rule II, Section 7 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
provides the grounds for cancellation of the
registration certificate of a labor organization,
and the inclusion of managerial employees is not
one of the grounds.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
However, on 1992, or before the SC decision, the
PCEU issued a resolution withdrawing from the
UOEF.
Issue: Whether or not PCEU may be affiliated
with the rank-and-file unions.
Held: PCEU's withdrawal from the affiliation
made the case moot and academic. But for the
guidance of others similarly situated, the Court
ruled No.
If the intent of the law is to avoid a situation
where supervisors would merge with the rank
and file or where the supervisors' labor
organization would represent conflicting
interests, then a local supervisors' union should
not be allowed to affiliate with the national
federation of union of rank-and-file employees
where that federation actively participates in
union activity in the company.
The limitation is not confined to a case of
supervisors' wanting to join a rank-and-file
union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors'
local union applying for membership in a
national federation the members of which
include local unions of rank and file employees.
The intent of the law is clear especially where, as
in this case at bar, the supervisors will be co-
mingling with those employees whom they
directly supervise in their own bargaining unit.
In the collective bargaining process, managerial
employees are supposed to be on the side of the
employer, to act as its representatives, and to
see to it that its interests are well protected. The
employer is not assured of such protection if
these employees themselves are union
members. It is the same reason that impelled
this Court to consider the position of confidential
employees as included in the disqualification
found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of
confidential employees were written in the
provision. Said employees may act as spies of
either party to a collective bargaining
agreement.
6
G.R. No. 109902. August 2, 1994.*
ALU-TUCP, Representing Members: ALAN
BARINQUE, with 13 others, namely: ENGR.
ALAN G. BARINQUE, ENGR. DARRELL LEE
ELTAGONDE, EDUARD H. FOOKSON, JR.,
ROMEO R. SARONA, RUSSELL GACUS, JERRY
BONTILAO, EUSEBIO MARIN, JR., LEONIDO
ECHAVEZ, BONIFACIO MEJOS, EDGAR S.
BONTUYAN, JOSE G. GARGUENA, JR., OSIAS B.
DANDASAN, and GERRY I. FETALVERO, petition-
ers,vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and NATIONAL STEEL
CORPORATION (NSC), respondents.
Labor Law; Project Employees; The services of
project employees are co-terminus with the
project and may be terminated upon the end or
completion of the project for which they were
hired.The basic issue is thus whether or not
petitioners are properly characterized as
project employees rather than regular
employees of NSC. This issue relates, of course,
to an important consequence: the services of
project employees are co-terminous with the
project and may be terminated upon the end or
completion of the project for which they were
hired. Regular employees, in contrast, are legally
entitled to remain in the service of their
employer until that service is terminated by one
or another of the recognized modes of
termination of service under the Labor Code.
Same; Same; Principal test for determining
whether particular employees are properly
characterized as project employees as
distinguished from regular employees, is
whether or not the project employees were
assigned to carry out specific project or
undertaking, the duration (and scope) of which
were specified at the time the employees were
engaged for that project.It is evidently
important to become clear about the meaning
and scope of the term project in the present
context. The project for the carrying out of
which project employees are hired would
ordinarily have some relationship to the usual
business of the employer. Exceptionally, the
project undertaking might not have an
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
ordinary or normal relationship to the usual
business of the employer. In this latter case, the
determination of the scope and parameters of
the project becomes fairly easy. It is unusual
(but still conceivable) for a company to
undertake a project which has absolutely no
relationship to the usual business of the
company; thus, for instance, it would be an
unusual steel-making company which would
undertake the breeding and production of fish or
the cultivation of vegetables. From the
viewpoint, however, of the legal characterization
problem here presented to the Court, there
should be no difficulty in designating the
employees who are retained or hired for the
purpose of undertaking fish culture or the
production of vegetables as project
employees, as distinguished from ordinary or
regular employees, so long as the duration and
scope of the project were determined or
specified at the time of engagement of the
project employees. For, as is evident from the
provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code,
quoted earlier, the principal test for determining
whether particular employees are properly
characterized as project employees as
distinguished from regular employees, is
whether or not the project employees were
assigned to carry out a specific project or
undertaking, the duration (and scope) of which
were specified at the time the employees were
engaged for that project.
Same; Same; Project in the realm of business
and industry refer to particular job or
undertaking that is within the regular or usual
business of employer, but which is distinct and
separate, and identifiable as such, from the
undertakings of the company. Such job or
undertaking begins and ends at determined or
determinable times.In the realm of business
and industry, we note that project could refer
to one or the other of at least two (2)
distinguishable types of activities. Firstly, a
project could refer to a particular job or
undertaking that is within the regular or usual
business of the employer company, but which is
distinct and separate, and identifiable as such,
7
from the other under-takings of the company. means of evading otherwise applicable
Such job or undertaking begins and ends at requirements of labor laws.
determined or determinable times. The typical
Same; Same.The employment of each project
example of this first type of project is a particular
worker is dependent and co-terminous with the
construction job or project of a construction
completion or termination of the specific activity
company. A construction company ordinarily
or undertaking [for which] he was hired which
carries out two or more discrete identifiable
has been predetermined at the time of
construction projects: e.g., a twenty-five-storey
engagement. Since, there is no showing that
hotel in Makati; a residential condominium
they (13 complainants) were engaged to
building in Baguio City; and a domestic air
perform work-related activities to the business
terminal in Iloilo City. Employees who are hired
of respondent which is steel-making, there is no
for the carrying out of one of these separate
logical and legal sense of applying to them the
projects, the scope and duration of which has
proviso under the second paragraph of Article
been determined and made known to the
280 of the Labor Code, as amended.
employees at the time of employment, are
properly treated as project employees, and Same; Same; It has been held that the length of
their services may be lawfully terminated at service of a project employee is not the
completion of the project. controlling test of employment tenure but
whether or not the employment has been fixed
Same; Same; It could also refer to a particular job
for a specific project or undertaking the
or undertaking that is not within the regular
completion of which has been determined at the
business of the corporation but such job or
time of the engagement of the employee.The
undertaking must also be identifiably separate
present case therefore strictly falls under the
and distinct from the ordinary or regular
definition of project employees on paragraph
business operations of the employer. It also
one of Article 280 of the Labor Code, as
begins and ends at determined or determinable
amended. Moreover, it has been held that the
times.he term project could also refer to,
length of service of a project employee is not the
secondly, a particular job or undertaking that is
controlling test of employment tenure but
not within the regular business of the
whether or not the employment has been fixed
corporation. Such a job or undertaking must also
for a specific project or undertaking the
be identifiably separate and distinct from the
completion or termination of which has been
ordinary or regular business operations of the
determined at the time of the engagement of
employer. The job or undertaking also begins
the employee. (See Hilario Rada v. NLRC, G.R.
and ends at determined or determinable times.
No. 96078, January 9, 1992; and Sandoval
The case at bar presents what appears to our
Shipping, Inc. v. NLRC, 136 SCRA 674 (1985).
mind as a typical example of this kind of
project. Same; Same; Casual Employees; Second
paragraph of Article 282 of the Labor Code,
Same; Same; The basic requisite is that the
providing that an employee who served for at
designation of named employees as project
least one (1) year, shall be considered a regular
employees and their assignment to a specific
employee, relates to casual employees, not to
project, are effected and implemented in good
project employees.Petitioners next claim that
faith.Whichever type of project employment is
their service to NSC of more than six (6) years
found in a particular case, a common basic
should qualify them as regular employees. We
requisite is that the designation of named
believe this claim is without legal basis. The
employees as project employees and their
simple fact that the employment of petitioners
assignment to a specific project, are effected and
as project employees had gone beyond one (1)
implemented in good faith, and not merely as a
year, does not detract from, or legally dissolve,
8
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
their status as project employees. The second
paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code,
quoted above, providing that an employee who
has served for at least one (1) year, shall be
considered a regular employee, relates to casual
employees, not to project employees.
Statutory Construction; The familiar
grammatical rule is that a proviso is to be
construed with reference to the immediately
preceding part of the provision to which it is
attached, and not to other sections thereof.In
the case of Mercado, Sr. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, this Court ruled that the
proviso in the second paragraph of Article 280
relates only to casual employees and is not
applicable to those who fall within the definition
of said Articles first paragraph, i.e., project
employees. The familiar grammatical rule is that
a proviso is to be construed with reference to the
immediately preceding part of the provision to
which it is attached, and not to other sections
thereof, unless the clear legislative intent is to
restrict or qualify not only the phrase
immediately preceding the proviso but also
earlier provisions of the statute or even the
statute itself as a whole. No such intent is
observable in Article 280 of the Labor Code,
which has been quoted earlier. ALU-TUCP vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 234 SCRA
678, G.R. No. 109902 August 2, 1994
FACTS:
[P]etitioners, as employees of private
respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC),
filed separate complaints for unfair labor
practice, regularization and monetary benefits
with the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch
XII, Iligan City. The complaints were consolidated
and after hearing, the Labor Arbiter declared
petitioners regular project employees who shall
continue their employment as such for as long as
such [project] activity exists, but entitled to the
salary of a regular employee pursuant to the
provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement. It also ordered payment of salary
differentials.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified
the Labor Arbiters decision. It affirmed the
Labor Arbiters holding that petitioners were
project employees since they were hired to
perform work in a specific undertaking the
Five Years Expansion Program, the completion of
which had been determined at the time of their
engagement and which operation was not
directly related to the business of steel
manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside
the award to petitioners of the same benefits
enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal
and factual basis.
The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor
Code, where the petitioners argue that they are
regular employees of NSC because: (i) their
jobs are necessary, desirable and work-related
to private respondents main business, steel-
making; and (ii) they have rendered service for
six (6) or more years to private respondent NSC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are considered
permanent employees as opposed to being
only project employees of NSC.
HELD:
NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of
merit. NLRC Resolutions affirmed.
Function of the proviso. Petitioners are not
considered permanent employees. However,
contrary to petitioners apprehensions, the
designation of named employees as project
employees and their assignment to a specific
project are effected and implemented in good
faith, and not merely as a means of evading
otherwise applicable requirements of labor laws.
On the claim that petitioners service to NSC of
more than six (6) years should qualify them as
regular employees, the Supreme Court
believed this claim is without legal basis. The
simple fact that the employment of petitioners
as project employees had gone beyond one (1)
year, does not detract from, or legally dissolve,
9
their status as project employees. The second
paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code,
quoted above, providing that an employee who
has served for at least one (1) year, shall be
considered a regular employee, relates to casual
employees, not to project employees.
No. L-34024. April 5, 1978.*
ISIDRO G. ARENAS, petitioner, vs. CITY OF SAN
CARLOS (PANGASINAN), CITY COUNCIL OF SAN
CARLOS CITY, JUAN C. LOMIBAO, BENJAMIN
POSADAS, DOUGLAS D. SORIANO. BASILIO
BULATAO, CATALINA B. CAGAMPAN, EUGENIO
RAMOS, FRANCISCO CANCINO, ALFREDO
VINLUAN, MARCELO LAPEA, LEOPOLDO C.
TULAGAN and TORIBIO PAULINO, in their
official capacities as City Mayor, City Vice
Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer,
respectively, and Honorable Presiding Judge,
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SAN CARLOS CITY
(PANGASINAN), BRANCH X, respondents.
Judges; Local Governments; Statutory
Construction; Under RA. 5967 the salary of a city
judge cannot be higher than that of the City
Mayor.It is clear from the deliberation of the
Senate that the intention of Congress in enacting
Republic Act No. 5967 was that the salary of a
city judge should not be higher than the salary of
the city mayor. The saving clause Provided,
however, That the salary of a city judge shall be
at least P100.00 per month less than that of the
city mayor. Qualifies the earlier provision which
fixes the salary of city judges for second and,
third class cities at P18,000.00 per annum.
Same; Same; Same; Where there is irreconcilable
repugnancy between a proviso and the body of
the statute, the former prevails as latest
expression of legislative intent.The primary
purpose of a proviso is to limit the general
language of a statute. When there is
irreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso
and the body of the statute, the former is given
precedence over the latter on the ground that it
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
is the latest expression of the intent of the
legislature. Inasmuch as the city mayor of San
Carlos City (Pangasinan) was receiving an annual
salary of P13,200.00, the respondents cannot be
compelled to provide for an annual salary of
P18,000.00 for the petitioner as city judge of the
said city. Arenas vs. City of San Carlos
(Pangasinan), 82 SCRA 318, No. L-34024 April 5,
1978
FACTS:
RA 5967 provides that second and third class
judges would receive an annual salary of
P18,000. Arenas was receiving a monthly salary
of P1000.00, P350 of which was from the
national government and the remaining P650
comes from the city government. Petitioner had
repeatedly requested the city to enact the said
RA but the Respondent City refused.
ISSUE:
W/N Judge Arenas should be granted the
increase in his salary from P12,000 to P18,000.
HELD:
Looking at the Senate deliberations, the
intention in enacting the RA was that the salary
of a city judge should not be higher than the
salary of the city mayor. Moreover, exceptions,
as a general rule, should be strictly but
reasonably construed; they extend only so far as
their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. In case
there is repugnancy between the proviso and the
main provision, the latter provision, whether a
proviso or not, is given preference because it is
the latest expression of the intent of the
legislation, but more so because provisos are
negatively written and gives off a more
mandatory tone.
Samson vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-43182. November 25,1986.*
10
MARCIAL F. SAMSON, City Mayor of Caloocan Stated differently, it is not the powers and duties
City, THE CITY TREASURER, THE CITY AUDITOR, exercised and discharged by the Assistant
both of Caloocan City, and HERMOGENES Secretary to the Mayor as may be delegated and
LIWAG, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE assigned by the Mayor that makes the position
COURT OF APPEALS, CFI-RIZAL and FELICIANO C. of Assistant Secretary primarily confidential.
TALENS, respondents. While duties possibly involving confidential
matters are sometimes handled by the Assistant
Civil Service; Statutes; Purpose of Civil Service
Secretary to the Mayor, this does not necessarily
Law.We are not persuaded and find
transform the nature of the position itself as one
unacceptable such submission of the herein
that is primarily and highly confidential.
petitioners. As may be noted, the general
purpose of the Civil Service Law (Republic Act Same; Same; If the law intended assistant
No. 2260) is to insure and promote the secretaries to belong to the non-competitive
constitutional mandate regarding appointments service, it should have been worded:
only aecording to merit anjl fitness, and to Secretaries and their assistance."It should be
provide within the public service a progressive stressed that the position of Secretary to the
system of personal administration to insure the Mayor and that of Assistant Secretary to the
maintenance of an honest and efficient Mayor are two separate and distinct positions.
progressive and courteous civii service in the While both individuals may be called
Philippines. (Section2, R.A. 2260). secretary, nevertheless, one is certainly of al
higher category and rank than the other with the
Same; Same; Statutory exceptions are to be
added distinction that a Secretary must enjoy
strictly but reasonably construedUnder the
the confidence of the Mayor. However, the
rules of statutory construction. exceptions, as a
position of Assistant Secretary being of a lower
general rule, should be strictly, but reasonably
rank, need not carry the requisites attaching to
construed; they extend only so far as their
the primarily confidential position of the actual
language fairly warrants, and all doubts skould
Secretary to the Mayor. Moreover, if it was the
be resolved in favor of the general provisions
intention of Congress to include the Assistant
ratker than the exception. Where a general rule
Secretaries within the purview of Section 5(f) of
is established by statute with exceptions, the
R.A. No. 2260, as amended, so that Assistant
court will not curtaO the former nor add to the
Secretaries are also embraced in the non-
latter by implication x x x (Francisco, Statutory
competitive service, the law could have been
Construction, p. 304, citing 69 C.J., Section 643,
easily worded secretaries and their assistance.
pp. 10921093, italics supplied).
Same; Same; An assistant secretary although
Same; Same; Under a strict construction of R.A.
termed a secretaryv and may incidenially
2260, or who belong to the non-competitive
perform work tkat is confidential is technically
service, the position of Assistant Secretary to the
different from a secretary to the mayor.We
Mayor is deemed to belong to the competitive
are not disposed to agree with petitioners. What
service inasmuch only secretaries to governors
petitioners fail to consider is that an assistant
and mayors are expressly enumerated as non-
secretary, although described as secretary,
competitive.The parties are agreed that the
technically differs in function from the
nature of the functions attaching to office or
Secretaries. An assistant merely helps, aids
position ultimately determines whether such
or serves in a subordinate capacity to the person
position is policy-determining, primarily
who is actuaUy clothed with all the duties and
confidential or highly technicaL It is the nature of
responsibillties of secretary. Needless to say,
the position which finaiiy determines a position
the functions strictly attributable to a
to be primarily confidential (Leon A. Pinero, et al.
secretary and which would repose on such
vs. Rufino Hechanova, et al., 18 SCRA 421).
11
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
person the trust and confidence of the employer,
is not automaticaUy vested or transferred to an
assistant secretary, because the latter simply
assists or aids the former in the accomplishment
of his duties. Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 145
SCRA 654, No. L-43182 November 25, 1986
FACTS:
Petitioner Samson, the mayor of Caloocan,
terminated the services of Respondent, Mr.
Talens, as Assistant Secretary, through
Administrative Order No. 3, because of lack and
loss of confidence, and appointed Mr. Liwag, co-
Petitioner, to said position. RA 2260 (Civil Service
Act of 1959) Sec 5(f) declares that the position of
secretaries to city mayors as non-competitive.
Talens asserts his position was not covered by
the said act and, being permanently appointed,
he can only be removed for a cause and after due
process. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor
of Talens, declaring the order null and void. The
Court of Appeals also affirmed said decision.
ISSUE:
WoN the termination of Talens illegal.
HELD:
Yes, Talens termination was illegal; his position
is not among those expressly declared by law as
highly confidential. The nature of functions
attached to a position determines whether such
position is highly confidential. Where the law
provides that positions in the government
belong to the competitive service, except those
declared by law to be in the noncompetitive
service and those which are policy determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical in
nature, the legislature is presumed to have
intended to exclude those not enumerated, for
otherwise, it would have included them in the
enumeration.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
ROBERTO OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. FERNANDO
BUENAVENTURA, JOSE VASQUEZ, ADOLFO
BELDEROL, POTENCIANO ADOBAS, JR., and
JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, respondents.
Action; Cause of; Prejudicial question; No
prejudicial question where me case is
administrative and the other civil. In
accordance with Article 36 of the Civil Code, a
prejudicial question must be decided before any
criminal prosecution based on the same facts
may proceed. There is no prejudicial question
here since there is no criminal prosecution
involved, the petitioners case before the
POLCOM being administrative in nature and the
respondents case before the Court of First
Instance of Cebu is a simple civil suit for damages
not based on a crime but on alleged harassment
by the petitioner in charging them
administratively before the City Mayor and
before the POLCOM.
Same; Same; Action for damages bused on
alleged malicious filing of administrative
complaint is premature while said complaint is
pending determination.The respondents
complaint for damages is based on their claim
that the administrative case filed against them
before the POLCOM is malicious, unfounded and
aimed to harass them. The veracity of this
allegation is not for us to determine, for if We
rule and allow the civil case for damages to
proceed on that ground, there is the possibility
that the court a quo in deciding said case might
declare the respondents victims of harassment
and thereby indirectly interfere with the
proceedings before the POLCOM. The
respondents case for damages before the lower
court is, therefore, premature as it was filed
during the pendency of the administrative case
against the respondents before the POLCOM.
Res judicata; Police Act; Mayors exoneration of
policemen is not a bar to investigation by the
POLCOM.Respondents likewise plead res
judicata to defeat this action, contending that
the administrative case before the POLCOM
should have been dismissed as it is barred by a
12
prior judgment that embodied in the City
Mayors Administrative Order No. 157
exonerating herein respondents policemen. The
argument is devoid of merit. On the first
requisite alone, that of jurisdiction, respondents
miserably failed to meet the requirements of the
rule invoked. The City Mayor of Cebu was
without jurisdiction to try, hear and decide
administrative cases either under Republic Act
No. 557 or under Republic Act 4864.
Police Act; Statutory Construction; Effectivity of
Police Act of 1966.Section 26 of the Police Act
is, as expressly stated therein, a mere saving
clause, and refers solely to the administrative
cases involving police service and personnel
which are pending at the time of the effectivity
of the Act. The Police Commission was required
to absorb the said pending cases within 100 days
after it shall have published a Police Manual. The
said Section 26 may not be interpreted to mean
that the Board of Investigators of each city or
municipality and the Police Commission could
not legally function to carry into effect the
purposes of the Act until after the lapse of the
said 100 days, because section 28 provides that
this Act shall take effect upon its approval. Since
the Act was approved on September 8, 1966, it
became effective immediately on that date.
Motion to dismiss; Motion to dismiss for lack of
cause of action may be filed any time.As a
general rule a motion to dismiss is interposed
before the defendant pleads (section 1, Rule 16,
Rules of Court). However, there is no rule or law
prohibiting the defendant from filing a motion to
dismiss after an answer had been filed. On the
contrary, section 2 of Rule 9, expressly
authorizes the filing of such motion at any stage
of the proceedings when it is based upon failure
to state a cause of action, as in the case at bar
where the complaint failed to state a cause of
action as alleged by petitioner in his very motion
to dismiss and/or suspension of the trial.
Ocampo vs. Buenaventura, 55 SCRA 267, No. L-
32293 January 24, 1974
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
Petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to
annul the order dated June 1, 1970, of
respondent Judge Hon. Mateo Canonoy, then of
Branch III, Court of First Instance of Cebu,
denying petitioners motion to dismiss and/or
suspend the trial of its Civil Case No. R-11320,
entitled Fernando Buenaventura, et al. v.
Roberto Ocampo, including the order denying
his motion for reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner further prays this Court to make
permanent the preliminary injunction issued on
October 9, 1970, restraining respondent Judge
from further proceeding with Civil Case No. R-
11320.
The records of this case establish the following
facts: On September 11, 1966, respondents
Fernando Buenaventura, Jose Vasquez, Adolfo
Belderol and Potenciano Adobes, Jr., all
members of the Cebu Police Department,
arrested and detained in the City Jail of Cebu,
Edgar Ocampo (petitioners son) and Paul, Jade,
Cesar and Julius, all surnamed Ocampo (his
nephews), together with one George Namok (a
friend of the Ocampo boys), all minors, for an
alleged violation of Section 1 of Ordinance No.
345 which amended Ordinance No. 228 fixing
curfew hours. This Ordinance penalizes the
wandering, sauntering or loitering of minors in
any street, wood or alley. Pursuant to said
arrest, the City Fiscal of Cebu filed an
information in the city court and the minors
were convicted for violation of the said
ordinance. On appeal to the Court of First
Instance, however, Judge Tantuico, on March 3,
1969, noting the exception under Section 3 of
Ordinance 228 which provides:
The provisions of Section 1 hereof shall not be
applicable to minors attending or participating
in, or going home from, purely scholastic
functions, commencement exercises,
convocations, educational and religious
programs or in wholesome and decent
assemblage, and during yuletide masses, New
Years eve and Holy Week cults, during the hours
mentioned therein. acquitted the accused
minors, ruling that since they came from a
13
birthday party considered as a wholesome and
decent assemblage, the minors fell within the
exception and committed no violation of the
ordinance in question.
Meanwhile, petitioner Roberto Ocampo on
September 19, 1966, filed a complaint with the
City Mayors office charging the respondents
policemen with serious misconduct, grave abuse
of authority and commission of a felony. On
August 8, 1967, the Mayor issued Administrative
Order No. 157 exonerating the policemen. On
March 17, 1969, a complaint was lodged with the
Police Commission (POLCOM) for serious
misconduct, abuse of authority and commission
of an act constituting a felony, which
administrative case is still pending up to the
present.
On June 4, 1969, respondents herein filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner. On
May 22, 1970, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss and/or suspension of the trial of the case
on the merits on the following grounds: (1)
existence of a prejudicial question and (2) that
the action is premature. This motion was denied
by respondent Judge in an order dated June 1,
1970. The petitioners motion for
reconsideration thereof having been also
denied, the instant petition was filed.
In the meantime respondent Fernando
Buenaventura died and he was substituted
herein by his widow, Guillerma Cosca
Buenaventura, and his heirs, Carlos, Cora, Eva
Araceli,
The main question to be resolved is whether or
not the court a quo abused its discretion in
denying petitioners motion to dismiss and/or
suspend the trial of the case on the merits. The
first ground thereof (prejudicial question) is
entirely inapplicable. In accordance with Article
36 of the Civil Code, a prejudicial question must
be decided before any criminal prosecution
based on the same facts may proceed. There is
no prejudicial question here since there is no
criminal prosecution involved, the petitioners
case before the POLCOM being administrative in
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
nature and the respondents case before the
Court of First Instance of Cebu is a simple civil
suit for damages not based on a crime but on
alleged harassment by the petitioner in charging
them administratively before the City Mayor and
before the POLCOM. A careful consideration of
the record discloses that the principal issue in
the complaint for damages is the alleged
malicious filing of the administrative cases by the
petitioner against the policemen respondents.
The determination of this question is primarily
dependent on the outcome of the administrative
case before the POLCOM. The respondents
complaint for damages is based on their claim
that the administrative case filed against them
before the POLCOM is malicious, unfounded and
aimed to harass them. The veracity of this
allegation is not for us to determine, for if We
rule and allow the civil case for damages to
proceed on that ground, there is the possibility
that the court a quo in deciding said case might
declare the respondents victims of harassment
and thereby indirectly interfere with the
proceedings before the POLCOM. The
respondents case for damages before the lower
court is, therefore, premature as it was filed
during the pendency of the administrative case
against the respondents before the POLCOM.
The possibility cannot be overlooked that the
POLCOM may hand down a decision adverse to
the respondents, in which case the damage suit
will become unfounded and baseless for wanting
in cause of action. Of persuasive force is the
ruling in William H. Brown vs. Bank of the
Philippine Islands and Santiago Freixas, 101 Phil.
309, 312, where this Court said:
x x x. In effect, plaintiff herein seeks to recover
damages upon the ground that the detainer case
has been filed, and is being maintained,
maliciously and without justification; but this
pretense affects the merits of said detainer case.
Should final judgment be eventually rendered in
that case in favor of the plaintiffs therein, such
the one rendered in the municipal court, the
validity of the cause of action said lessors against
Brown, would thereby be conclusively
established, and, necessarily, his contention in
14
the present case would have to be rejected.
Similarly, we cannot sustain the theory of Brown
in the case at bar, without prejudging the issue
in the detainer case, which is still pending. Until
final determination of said case, plaintiff herein
cannot, and does not, have, therefore, a cause of
action if any, on which we do not express our
opinion against the herein defendants. In
short, the lower court has correctly held that the
present action is premature, and, that,
consequently, the complaint herein does not set
forth a cause of action against the defendants.
Ocampo vs. Buenaventura, 55 SCRA 267, No. L-
32293 January 24, 1974
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC.,
petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS,
respondents.
Labor Law; Appeal Bond; POEA; Appeal bond is
required to perfect an appeal from a decision of
the POEA.The POEA Rules are clear. A reading
thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash
and surety bonds and the escrow money, an
appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award is required to perfect an appeal
from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the
appeal bond is intended to further insure the
payment of the monetary award in favor of the
employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to
the NLRC.
Same; Same; Same; E.O. 247; Bonds are
supposed to guarantee payments of valid and
legal claims against employer. POEA can also go
against these bonds for violations by the
recruiter of the conditions of its license.It is
true that the cash and surety bonds and the
money placed in escrow are supposed to
guarantee the payment of all valid and legal
claims against the employer, but these claims
are not limited to monetary awards to
employees whose contracts of employment
have been violated. The POEA can go against
these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of
the conditions of its license, the provisions of the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247
(reorganizing the POEA) and the POEA Rules, as
well as the settlement of other liabilities the
recruiter may incur.
Same; Same; Same; Overseas recruiter is
solidarily liable with foreign employer. The
bonds and escrow money are intended to insure
more care on the part of local agent in its choice
of foreign principal to whom overseas workers
are to be sent.It is true that these standby
guarantees are not imposed on local employers,
as the petitioner observes, but there is a simple
explanation for this distinction. Overseas
recruiters are subject to more stringent
requirements because of the special risks to
which our workers abroad are subjected by their
foreign employers, against whom there is usually
no direct or effective recourse. The overseas
recruiter is solidarily liable with the foreign
employer. The bonds and the escrow money are
intended to insure more care on the part of the
local agent in its choice of the foreign principal
to whom our overseas workers are to be sent.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; In
interpreting a statute, care should be taken that
every part be given effect. Construction that
would render a provision inoperative should be
avoided and inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of
harmonious whole.It is a principle of legal
hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a
set of rules as in this case), care should be taken
that every part thereof be given effect, on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated
measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
Under the petitioners interpretation, the appeal
bond required by Section 6 of the
aforementioned POEA Rule should be
disregarded because of the earlier bonds and
escrow money it has posted. The petitioner
would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity
but we do not see any such redundancy; on the
contrary, we find that Section 6 complements
Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a
construction that would render a provision
15
inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
coordinated and harmonious whole.
Same; Same; In addition to monetary obligations
of the overseas recruiter appeal bond is required
to perfect an appeal from a decision of the
POEA.Accordingly, we hold that in addition to
the monetary obligations of the overseas
recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II
of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement
under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary
to post the appeal bond required under Section
6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a
condition for perfecting an appeal from a
decision of the POEA.
Same; Same; Every intendment of the law must
be interpreted in favor of the working class.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted
in favor of the working class, conformably to the
mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining
rather than annulling the appeal bond as a
further protection to the claimant employee,
this Court affirms once again its commitment to
the interests of labor. JMM Promotions &
Management, Inc. vs. NLRC, 228 SCRA 129, G.R.
No. 109835 November 22, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners appeal was dismissed by the
respondent National Labor Relations
Commission citing the second paragraph of
Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended and
Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure
of the NLRC, as amended. The petitioner
contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion in applying these rules to decisions
rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal
bond is not necessary in the case of licensed
recruiters for overseas employment because
they are already required under Section 4, Rule
II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a
license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash
bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000.
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in
escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
National Bank in compliance with Section 17,
Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, to primarily
answer for valid and legal claims of recruited
workers as a result of recruitment violations or
money claims. The Solicitor General sustained
the appeal bond and commented that appeals
from decisions of the POEA were governed by
Section 5 and 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA
Rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is still required to
post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a
decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
HELD:
YES. Petitioners contention has no merit.
Statutes should be read as a whole. Ut res magis
valeat quam pereat that the thing may rather
have effect than be destroyed.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in
interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this
case), care should be taken that every part
thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was
enacted as an integrated measure and not as a
hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Under the
petitioners interpretation, the appeal bond
required by Section 6 of the POEA Rule should be
disregarded because of the earlier bonds and
escrow money it has posted. The petitioner
would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity
but there is no such redundancy. On the
contrary, Section 6 complements Section 4 and
Section 17. The rule is that a construction that
would render a provision inoperative should be
avoided. Instead, apparently inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole.
ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA SAJONAS,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
DOMINGO A. PILARES, SHERIFF ROBERTO
16
GARCIA OF QUEZON CITY and REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents.
Land Titles; Adverse Claims; Annotation of an
adverse claim is a measure designed to protect
the interest of a person over a piece of real
property where the registration of such interest
or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land
Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529) and
serves a warning to third parties dealing with
said property that someone is claiming an
interest on the same or a better right than that
of the registered owner thereof.Concededly,
annotation of an adverse claim is a measure
designed to protect the interest of a person over
a piece of real property where the registration of
such interest or right is not otherwise provided
for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now
P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree),
and serves a warning to third parties dealing with
said property that someone is claiming an
interest on the same or a better right than that
of the registered owner thereof. Such notice is
registered by filing a sworn statement with the
Register of Deeds of the province where the
property is located, setting forth the basis of the
claimed right together with other datas
pertinent thereto. The registration of an adverse
claim is expressly recognized under Section 70 of
P.D. No. 1529.
Same; Land Registration; Torrens System; Under
the Torrens system, registration is the operative
act which gives validity to the transfer or creates
a lien upon the land.Under the Torrens
system, registration is the operative act which
gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien
upon the land. A person dealing with registered
land is not required to go behind the register to
determine the condition of the property. He is
only charged with notice of the burdens on the
property which are noted on the face of the
register or certificate of title.
Same; Same; Same; One who buys without
checking the vendors title takes all the risks and
losses consequent to such failure.While it is
true that under the provisions of the Property
Registration Decree, deeds of conveyance of
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
property registered under the system, or any
interest therein only take effect as a conveyance
to bind the land upon its registration, and that a
purchaser is not required to explore further than
what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates in
quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right
that may subsequently defeat his right thereto,
nonetheless, this rule is not absolute. Thus, one
who buys from the registered owner need not
have to look behind the certificate of title, he is,
nevertheless, bound by the liens and
encumbrances annotated thereon. One who
buys without checking the vendors title takes all
the risks and losses consequent to such failure.
Statutory Construction; Taken in solitude, a word
or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite
different from the one actually intended and
evident when a word or phrase is considered
with those with which it is associated.In
construing the law aforesaid, care should be
taken that every part thereof be given effect and
a construction that could render a provision
inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a harmonious whole. For
taken in solitude, a word or phrase might easily
convey a meaning quite different from the one
actually intended and evident when a word or
phrase is considered with those with which it is
associated. In ascertaining the period of
effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we
must read the law in its entirety.
Same; Each statute must be construed as to
harmonize it with the pre-existing body of
laws.A statutes clauses and phrases must not
be taken separately, but in its relation to the
statutes totality. Each statute must, in fact, be
construed as to harmonize it with the pre-
existing body of laws. Unless clearly repugnant,
provisions of statutes must be reconciled. The
printed pages of the published Act, its history,
origin, and its purposes may be examined by the
courts in their construction.
Same; P.D. 1529; Land Titles; Adverse Claims;
P.D. 1529, taken together, simply means that the
cancellation of the adverse claim is still
17
necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise the annotated the notice of levy on execution
inscription will remain annotated and shall thereto. Consequently, he is charged with
continue as a lien upon the property. knowledge that the property sought to be levied
Construing the provision as a whole would upon on execution was encumbered by an
reconcile the apparent inconsistency between interest the same as or better than that of the
the portions of the law such that the provision registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy
on cancellation of adverse claim by verified cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim
petition would serve to qualify the provision on inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the
the effectivity period. The law, taken together, petitioners.
simply means that the cancellation of the
Same; Same; Sales; Words and Phrases;
adverse claim is still necessary to render it
Purchaser in Good Faith, Defined.A
ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will
purchaser in good faith and for value is one who
remain annotated and shall continue as a lien
buys property of another without notice that
upon the property. For if the adverse claim has
some other person has a right to or interest in
already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of
such property and pays a full and fair price for
said period, its cancellation is no longer
the same, at the time of such purchase, or before
necessary and the process of cancellation would
he has notice of the claims or interest of some
be a useless ceremony.
other person in the property. Good faith consists
Same; Same; Same; Same; To interpret the in an honest intention to abstain from taking any
effectivity period of the adverse claim as unconscientious advantage of another.
absolute and without qualification limited to
Same; The Land Registration Act (Property
thirty days defeats the very purpose for which
Registration Decree) guarantees to every
the statute provides for the remedy of an
purchaser of registered land in good faith that
inscription of adverse claim.To interpret the
they can take and hold the same free from any
effectivity period of the adverse claim as
and all prior claims, liens and encumbrances
absolute and without qualification limited to
except those set forth on the Certificate of Title
thirty days defeats the very purpose for which
and those expressly mentioned in the ACT as
the statute provides for the remedy of an
having been preserved against it.At any rate,
inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of
the Land Registration Act (Property Registration
an adverse claim is a measure designed to
Decree) guarantees to every purchaser of
protect the interest of a person over a piece of
registered land in good faith that they can take
real property where the registration of such
and hold the same free from any and all prior
interest or right is not otherwise provided for by
claims, liens and encumbrances except those set
the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D.
forth on the Certificate of Title and those
1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and
expressly mentioned in the ACT as having been
serves as a warning to third parties dealing with
preserved against it. Otherwise, the efficacy of
said property that someone is claiming an
the conclusiveness of the Certificate of Title
interest on the same or a better right than the
which the Torrens system seeks to insure would
registered owner thereof.
be futile and nugatory. Sajonas vs. Court of
Land Titles; Adverse Claims; Writs of Execution; Appeals, 258 SCRA 79, G.R. No. 102377 July 5,
A notice of levy cannot prevail over an existing 1996
adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of
title.In sum, the disputed inscription of
adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of Title
No. N-79073 was still in effect on February 12,
1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia

18
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
Facts:
The case is for cancellation of the inscription of a
Notice of Levy on Execution from a certificate of
Title covering a parcel of real property. The
inscription was caused to be made by the private
respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-
79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina,
issued in the name of the spouses Uychocde, and
was later carried over to and annotated on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the
same registry, issued in the name of the spouses
Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land from
the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in
this case.
The subject property was bought by Sajonas
spouses on September 1983 and caused the
annotation of their adverse claim on August
1984. The Deed of Sale was executed upon the
full payment of the purchase price and the same
was registered only on August 1985.
Meanwhile, without the petitioners' knowledge,
there has been a compromise agreement
between the spouses Uychocde and Pilares
(Uychocde's judgment creditor), and a notice of
levy on execution was issued on February 12,
1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff
Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said
notice of levy on execution before the Register
of Deeds of Marikina and the same was
annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry
No. 123283.
Issue:
Which should be preferred between the notice
of levy on execution and the deed of absolute
sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on
September 4, 1984, but was registered only on
August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on
execution was annotated six (6) months prior to
the registration of the sale on February 12, 1985.
Decision:
The annotation of the adverse claim is
equivalent to notice to third persons of the
interest of the claimant. The provision of the law
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
(PD 1529) that the adverse claim is only valid for
30 days cannot be upheld. Clearly, the intention
of the law is otherwise as may be gleaned on the
following discussion:
Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part
or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date
of the original registration, may, if no other
provision is made in this decree for registering
the same, make a statement in writing setting
forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how
or under whom acquired, a reference to the
number of certificate of title of the registered
owner, the name of the registered owner, and a
description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and
shall state the adverse claimants residence, and
a place at which all notices may be served upon
him. This statement shall be entitled to
registration as an adverse claim on the
certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be
effective for a period of thirty days from the date
of registration. After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled
upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the
party in interest: Provided, however, that after
cancellation, no second adverse claim based on
the same ground shall be registered by the same
claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any
party in interest may file a petition in the Court
of First Instance where the land is situated for
the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the
court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the
question of the validity of such adverse claim,
and shall render judgment as may be just and
equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be
invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered
cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice
and hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus
registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant
in an amount not less than one thousand pesos,
nor more than five thousand pesos, in its
discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the
claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by
19
filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition
to that effect.
Construing the provision as a whole would
reconcile the apparent inconsistency between
the portions of the law such that the provision
on cancellation of adverse claim by verified
petition would serve to qualify the provision on
the effectivity period. The law, taken together,
simply means that the cancellation of the
adverse claim is still necessary to render it
ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will
remain annotated and shall continue as a lien
upon the property. For if the adverse claim has
already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of
said period, its cancellation is no longer
necessary and the process of cancellation would
be a useless ceremony.
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse
claim as absolute and without qualification
limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose
for which the statute provides for the remedy of
an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation
of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of
real property where the registration of such
interest or right is not otherwise provided for by
the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D.
1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and
serves as a warning to third parties dealing with
said property that someone is claiming an
interest or the same or a better right than the
registered owner thereof.
G.R No. 147066, March 26, 2001.*
AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL
II-Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI, PATRICIA O. PICAR,
MYLA GAIL Z. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E.
OMBAO, JOHNNY ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN
TALAUE, RYAN DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER
OARDE, JOSE MARI MODESTO, RICHARD M.
VALENCIA, EDBEN TABUCOL, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Election Law; Suffrage; In a representative
democracy, the right of suffrage, although
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy of rights
embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be
exercised within the proper bounds and
framework of the Constitution and must
properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted
by the Legislature.In a representative
democracy such as ours, the right of suffrage,
although accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy
of rights embodied in the fundamental law,
ought to be exercised within the proper bounds
and framework of the Constitution and must
properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted
by the Legislature, which statutes for all intents
and purposes, are crafted to effectively insulate
such so cherished right from ravishment and
preserve the democratic institutions our people
have, for so long, guarded against the spoils of
opportunism, debauchery and abuse. To be sure,
the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein
petitioners, is not at all absolute. Needless to
say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the
enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to
existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution,
statute books and other repositories of law.
Same; Same; Voters Registration; The act of
registration is an indispensable precondition to
the right of suffrage; The State undoubtedly, in
the exercise of its inherent police power, may
then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the
act of voters registration for the ultimate
purpose of conducting honest, orderly and
peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally
important end, that even pre-election activities
could be performed by the duly constituted
authorities in a realistic and orderly manner, one
which is not indifferent and so far removed from
the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times.As to the
procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to
vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain
procedural requirements he must undergo:
among others, the process of registration.
Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to
exercise his right to vote, in addition to the
minimum requirements set by the fundamental
charter, is obliged by law to register, at present,
20
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189,
otherwise known as the Voters Registration
Act of 1996. Stated differently, the act of
registration is an indispensable precondition to
the right of suffrage. For registration is part and
parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable
element in the election process. Thus, contrary
to petitioners argument, registration cannot
and should not be denigrated to the lowly
stature of a mere statutory requirement.
Proceeding from the significance of registration
as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the
State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent
police power, may then enact laws to safeguard
and regulate the act of voters registration for
the ultimate purpose of conducting honest,
orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental
yet generally important end, that even pre-
election activities could be performed by the
duly constituted authorities in a realistic and
orderly mannerone which is not indifferent
and so far removed from the pressing order of
the day and the prevalent circumstances of the
times. Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on
Elections, 355 SCRA 318, G.R No. 147066, G.R
No. 147179 March 26, 2001
FACTS: On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth,
together with other youth movements sought
the extension of the registration of voters for the
May 2001 elections. The voters registration has
already ended on December 27, 2000.
AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be
allowed a special 2-day registration. The
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the
petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for
alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the
petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are
about 4 million youth who were not able to
register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC
invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which
provides that no registration shall be conducted
120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-
Youth however counters that under Section 28
of Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the
exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can
reset the periods of pre-election acts including
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
voters registration if the original period is not
observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised
grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
extension of the voters registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right
to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of
Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters
registration shall be conducted within 120 days
before the regular election. The right of suffrage
is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like
voters registration which is not a mere statutory
requirement. The State, in the exercise of its
inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voters
registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally
important end, that even pre-election activities
could be performed by the duly constituted
authorities in a realistic and orderly manner
one which is not indifferent and so far removed
from the pressing order of the day and the
prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189
prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision
is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say
that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day
special registration, COMELEC has shown in its
pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially
create a setback in the other pre-election
matters because the additional voters from the
special two day registration will have to be
screened, entered into the book of voters, have
to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then
entered into the computerized voters list; and
then they will have to reprint the voters
information sheet for the update and distribute
it by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections
would have been overshot because of the
lengthy processes after the special registration.
In short, it will cost more inconvenience than
good. Further still, the allegation that youth
voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient.
Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youths pleading was
attached any actual complaint from an individual
21
youth voter about any inconvenience arising of the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory
from the fact that the voters registration has order but a final disposition of the complaint.
ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-
Same; Same; Same; Same; After the lapse of the
Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they
fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and
are asking an extension because they failed to
executory and is beyond the power or
register on time for some reasons, which is not
jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to
appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant
further amend or revoke.The law grants an
and not those who slumber on their rights.
aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days
from his receipt of the courts decision or order
disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal
FIDEL M. BAARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO,
or move to reconsider the same. After the lapse
EDGAR M. BAARES, EMILIA GATCHALIAN and
of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final
FIDEL BESARINO, petitioners, vs. ELIZABETH
and executory and is beyond the power or
BALISING, ROGER ALGER, MERLINDA CAPARIC,
jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to
EUSTAQUIO R. TEJONES, ANDREA SAYAM,
further amend or revoke. A final judgment or
JENNY ISLA, WILMA ROGATERO, PABLITO
order cannot be modified in any respect, even if
ALEGRIA, ROLANDO CANON, EDITHA ESTORES,
the modification sought is for the purpose of
EDMUNDO DOROYA, TERESITA GUION, DANNY
correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court
ANDARAYAN, LOURDES CADAY, ROGELIO
which rendered the same. After the order of
MANO, EVANGELINE CABILTES AND PUBLIC
dismissal of a case without prejudice has become
PROSECUTOR OF RIZAL, Antipolo, Rizal,
finals and therefore becomes outside the courts
respondents.
power to amend and modify, a party who wishes
Remedial Law; Actions; Dismissals; Definition of to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to
Final Order and Interlocutory Order.A file a new complaint.
final order issued by a court has been defined
Same; Same; Same; Same; The foregoing rule
as one which disposes of the subject matter in its
applies not only to civil cases but to criminal
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
cases as well.Contrary to private respondents
action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
claim, the foregoing rule applies not only to civil
enforce by execution what has been determined
cases but to criminal cases as well. In Jaca vs.
by the court. As distinguished therefrom, an
Blanco, the Court defined a provisional dismissal
interlocutory order is one which does not
of a criminal case as a dismissal without
dispose of a case completely, but leaves
prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before
something more to be adjudicated upon.
the order of dismissal becomes final or to the
Same; Same; Same; Same; An order dismissing a subsequent filing of a new information for the
case without prejudice is a final order if no offense.
motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rules regarding
is timely filed.This Court has previously held
finality of judgments also apply to cases covered
that an order dismissing a case without prejudice
by the rules on summary procedure.A careful
is a final order if no motion for reconsideration
examination of Section 18 in relation to Section
or appeal therefrom is timely filed. In Olympia
22 of the 1991 Revised Rule of Summary
International vs. Court of Appeals, we stated,
Procedure and Rule 40, Section 2 in relation to
thus: The dismissal without prejudice of a
Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10, and Rule 36, Section
complaint does not however mean that said
2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
dismissal order was any less final. Such Order of
amended, leads to no other conclusion than that
dismissal is complete in all details, and though
the rules regarding finality of judgments also
without prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed
apply to cases covered by the rules on summary
22
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
procedure. Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure conflicts
with the prevailing rule that a judgment or order
which is not appealed or made subject of a
motion for reconsideration within the prescribed
fifteen-day period attains finality.
Same; Presidential Decree No. 1508; It is well-
settled that the non-referral of a case for
barangay conciliation when so required under
the law is not jurisdictional in nature and may
therefore be deemed waived if not raised
seasonably in a motion to dismiss.The Court
also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken
impression of petitioners and the municipal trial
court that the non-referral of a case for barangay
conciliation as required under the Local
Government Code of 1991 may be raised in a
motion to dismiss even after the accused has
been arraigned. It is well-settled that the non-
referral of a case for barangay conciliation when
so required under the law is not jurisdictional in
nature and may therefore be deemed waived if
not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. The
Court notes that although petitioners could have
invoked the ground of prematurity of the causes
of action against them due to the failure to
submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of
the cases as soon as they received the
complaints against them, petitioners raised the
said ground only after their arraignment.
However, while the trial court committed an
error in dismissing the criminal cases against
petitioners on the ground that the same were
not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing
thereof in court although said ground was raised
by them belatedly, the said order may no longer
be revoked at present considering that the same
had already become final and executory, and as
earlier stated, may no longer be annulled by the
Municipal Trial Court, nor by the Regional Trial
Court or this Court. Baares II vs. Balising, 328
SCRA 36, G.R. No. 132624 March 13, 2000
Facts: Fidel M. Banares II, Lilia C. Valeriano,
Edgar M. Banares, Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel
Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal
cases for estafa. They filed a motion to dismiss.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
The trial court dismissed the criminal case
without prejudice. After more than 2 months,
private complainants sought the revival of the
criminal case. When the trial court allowed
revival of the case, the accused questioned the
order, claiming that the prior dismissal had
already become final and executory.
Issue: Whether the said order became final and
executory
Held: Yes. An order dismissing a case without
prejudice is a final order if no motion for
reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely
filed. The law grants an aggrieved party a period
of 15 days from his receipt of the decision or
order to appeal or move to reconsider the same.
After the order of dismissal of a case without
prejudice has become final, and therefore
becomes outside the courts power to amend
and modify, a party who wishes to reinstate the
case has no other remedy but to file a new
complaint.
PURIFICACION M. VDA. DE URBANO, PEDRO DE
CASTRO, AURELIO I. ARRIENDA, ARNEL U.
ARRIENDA, ALBERT U. ARRIENDA, ALICE A.
PEDRON and MARILYN C. BILOG, petitioners, vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(GSIS), FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., ZACARIAS
BELTRAN, JR., MARCIAL SECOQUIAN and
CRISPINA DELA CRUZ, respondents.
Government Service Insurance System; There is
no restriction or qualification that the GSIS
should dispose of its real properties in favor only
of GSIS members.The above laws grant the
GSIS Board of Trustees (the Board) the power,
nay, the responsibility, to exercise discretion in
determining the terms and conditions of
financial accommodations to its members with
the dual purpose of making the GSIS more
responsive to the needs of the members of the
GSIS and assuring the actuarial solvency of the
Fund administered by the GSIS. As mandated by
P.D. 1146, this discretion may be exercised in
acquiring, utilizing or disposing of, in any manner
23
recognized by law, real or personal properties the GSIS. As a financial institution extending
in the Philippines or elsewhere necessary to housing loans, the disposition of foreclosed
carry out the purposes of this Act. Contrary to propertiessuch as the subject propertyat a
petitioners position, there is no restriction or price beneficial to the GSIS helps maintain the
qualification that the GSIS should dispose of its actuarial solvency of the GSIS fund. It cannot,
real properties in favor only of GSIS members. therefore, be said that the subject property is
Based on these laws, the Board could exercise its no longer needed by the GSIS. Vda. de Urbano
discretion on whether to accept or reject vs. Government Service Insurance System, 367
petitioners offer to repurchase the subject SCRA 672, G.R. No. 137904 October 19, 2001
property taking into account the dual purpose
Topic: Statutes in Pari MateriaStatutes in pari
enunciated in the whereas clause of P.D. 1981,
materia should be read and construed together
i.e., making the GSIS more responsive to the
because enactments of the same legislature on
needs of the members of the GSIS and assuring
the same subject are supposed to form part of
the actuarial solvency of the Fund administered
one uniform system.
by the GSIS.
FACTS: Petitioners mortgaged their property to
Same; Redemption; Repurchase; Words and
respondent GSIS to secure a housing loan. As
Phrases; Redemption and Repurchase,
petitioners failed to pay their load when it fell
Distinguished; The right to redeem becomes
due, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage. Petitioner
functus oficio on the date of its expiry, and its
Vda. De Urbano wrote The GSIS Board of
exercise after the period is not really one of
trustees to inform them of her desire to
redemption but a repurchase.Jurisprudence
redeem the subject property and for advice on
also supports the Boards exercise of discretion
the procedure for redemption. GSIS responded
in case of repurchase, viz.: The right to redeem
advising her to pay The Total redemption price
becomes functus oficio on the date of its expiry,
of P154, 896.00 on or before the expiry date of
and its exercise after the period is not really one
redemption. Unable to Find Financing to
of redemption but a repurchase. Distinction
repurchase the subject property, petitioners
must be made because redemption is by force of
requested for re-mortgage through repurchase
law; the purchaser at public auction is bound to
of the subject property. Respondent Crsipina
accept redemption. Repurchase, however, of
DelaCruz commenced negotiations with
foreclosed property, after redemption period,
respondent GSIS for her purchase of The
imposes no such obligation. After expiry, the
petitioners' foreclosed property. A Deed of
purchaser may or may not re-sell the property
Absolute Sale over The subject property was
but no law will compel him to do so. And, he is
executed between GSIS and private respondent
not bound by the bid price; it is entirely within
Dela Cruz. Having learned about The sale of The
his discretion to set a higher price, for after all,
subject property To DelaCruz, petitioner Aurelio
the property already belongs to him as owner.
Arrienda wrote To The GSIS protesting The said
Same; Same; As a financial institution extending sale and requesting its reconsideration and
housing loans, the disposition of foreclosed recall. Petitioners fled the instant case before
properties at a price beneficial to the GSIS helps The RTC of Quezon City. The lower court
maintain the actuarial solvency of the GSIS dismissed the complaint. This was armed by The
fund.That the subject property is not Court of Appeals.
unserviceable or useless is rather obvious.
ISSUES: WoN The petitioners have a right To
Petitioners are precisely fighting tooth and nail
repurchase The subject property.
to claim the subject property as they are still
using it as their family home. It still serves its Ratio:
purpose well. Neither is it no longer needed by

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
No
Charter of the GSIS was PD 1146 which
stipulated the power of the GSIS to acquire,
utilize, and dispose of real or personal properties
in the Philippines or elsewhere. It was amended
by PD 1981 which gave the GSIS the power to
compromise or release any claim or settled
liability to the system.
SC- The laws granted the GSIS Board the power
to exercise discretion in determining the terms
and condition of financial accommodations to its
members with the dual purpose of making the
GSIS more responsive to the needs of GSIS
members. The laws also stipulated that the
Board could exercise discretion on whether to
accept or reject petitioners offer to repurchase
the subject property taking into account the dual
purpose enunciated in the whereas clause of PD
1981 which made the GSIS more responsive to
the needs of its members.
With regard to the Boards exercise of discretion,
in Natino v IAC, the Court also held that
repurchase of foreclosed property after
redemption period imposes no such obligation
on the purchaser (the board in this case) to re-
sell the property since the property belongs to
him (the board as well)
The boards denial of petitioners request to
purchase the subject property was not based on
whim but on a factual assessment of the financial
capacity of the petitioners to make good their
repeated offers to purchase the subject
property. Based on the circumstances, the
petitioners were repeatedly unable to fulfill their
obligations to pay. In the comments of the AAD
manager, the observation was that the
petitioners lacked the capacity to pay up.
The petitioners are not entitled to a request for
repurchase as a matter of right. The Board
exercised its discretion in accordance with law in
denying their requests and the GSIS cant be
faulted for their failure to repurchase as it acted
under the petitioners application under
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)
Operation Pabahay. The sale to respondent cant
be annulled on such invoked right.
GOV. ANTONIO CALINGIN, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Special 17th Division,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RENATO S. DE VILLA,
DEPT. OF INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECRETARY JOEY LINA,** UNDERSECRETARY
EDUARDO R. SOLIMAN, JR., DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 10, DIRECTOR RODOLFO
Z. RAZUL, respondents.
Statutory Construction; Statutes; Special Laws;
Where there are two statutes that apply to a
particular case, that which was specially
intended for the said case must prevail.In
Lapid v. Court of Appeals, we held that it is a
principle of statutory construction that where
there are two statutes that apply to a particular
case, that which was specially intended for the
said case must prevail. The case on hand involves
a disciplinary action against an elective local
official. Thus, the Local Government Code is the
applicable law and must prevail over the
Administrative Code which is of general
application. Further, the Local Government Code
of 1991 was enacted much later than the
Administrative Code of 1987. In statutory
construction, all laws or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with the later law are repealed or
modified accordingly.
Constitutional Law; Local Government; Local
Government Code; Execution; The decisions of
the Office of the President under the Local
Government Code are immediately executory
even pending appeal.Under the same case of
Lapid v. Court of Appeals, we enunciated that the
decisions of the Office of the President under the
Local Government Code are immediately
executory even pending appeal because the
pertinent laws under which the decisions were
rendered mandated them to be so. In sum, the
decisions of the Office of the President are final
and executory. No motion for reconsideration is
allowed by law but the parties may appeal the
25
decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal,
however, does not stay the execution of the
decision. Thus, the DILG Secretary may validly
move for its immediate execution. Calingin vs.
Court of Appeals, 434 SCRA 173, G.R. No. 154616
July 12, 2004
Facts: The Office of the President issued a
resolution, dated March 22 2001 (during the
election period) suspending Gov. Calingin for 90
days. 12 days after, he filed before the Office a
motion for recon.
later than the Administrative Code of 1987. In
statutory construction, all laws or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with the later law are
repealed or modified accordingly.
Since no motion for recon is allowed by law but
parties may appeal to the CA and that the LGC
says that the decisions of the Office of the
President are executory even pending appeal,
then the decision is final and executory
Petition denied

On April 30, 2001, Undersecretary Soliman of the

DILG issued a memorandum implementing said
resolution. The DILG Memorandum was with the
authority of the COMELEC which gave an
exemption to suspend elective officials during
the election period from January 2, 2001 to July
13, 2001. Calingin filed a petitioner for
prohibition before the CA, but the petition was
dismissed. Hence the appeal. Petitioner
contends that the decisions of the Office of the
President on cases where it has original
jurisdiction such as those involving a Provincial
Governor will become final and executory only
after the lapse of 15 days from the receipt and
that filing a motion for recon would suspend the
running of that period. He further contends that
the provision in the LGC saying that decisions of
the Office of the President, will not apply to his
case.

Issues/Held:

WON the decision is final and executory

Ratio:

Court said that where there are two statutes that

apply to a particular case, that which was
specially intended for the case must prevail.

The case involves a disciplinary action against an

elective local official. Thus, the Local
Government Code is the applicable law and must
prevail over the Administrative Code which is of
general application further, the Local
Government Code of 1991 was enacted much
26
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER (ESCRA)