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CHAPTER 1
Sren Brier
http://www.brier.dk/SoerenBrier/index.htm
The introduction of this book states its purpose and paradigmatic view point as follows:
The book focuses on relations between information and computation. Information is a
basic structure of the world, while computation is a process of the dynamic change of
information. In order for anything to exist for an individual, the individual must get
information on it, either by means of perception or by re-organization of the existing
information into new patterns and networks in the brain.
Though I am supportive of this transdisciplinary endeavor, I will argue that it is only
possible if the informational and computational view of what Dodig-Crnkovic (2006)
calls the pancomputational/pan- informational view is integrated with a Peircean semiotic
insight. This needs to be done in order to relate an evolutionary theory of information
more realistically to the actual phenomenologically experienced knowing processes and
functions in the human social world. It is my view that in order to make such an
integration, one needs to include a theory of first person awareness, qualia, signification
and the communication of meaning integrated with cybernetic informational and
computational theories. I will argue that there is no way to bypass the crucial role of
naturally developed and culture-born self-conscious embodied awareness if one wants to
arrive at a transdisciplinary theory of information, cognition and communication
including language. In short, this is the ambition of making a scientific theory of knowing
and knowledge in the form of a cybersemiotics. The question is, if science as we know it
can encompass self-consciousness and meaning as causal agents in nature or, rather,
encompass the reality that the synergy between nature, living systems, consciousness and
intersubjective communication produces.
1
2 S. Brier
on. Thus the task has become that of describing a knowing systems
operation within its own domain of description (Brier 2009), and
accounting for the constitution of its identity and the conditions of its
persistence in its own terms.1 Cantwell Smith writes:
In order to abstract anything as an object, that is in order to
construct material ontology we have to be committed to that out of
which, and that in which, we objectify. It follows that, in order to say
anything at all in order to refer, in order to stabilise an object as an
object an agent must literally be committed to that which cannot be
said. For the world, in this sense, is not the post-intentional world
of thereby-arrayed materiality. It is something prior and more profound.
Something like the ground of being that, in our faulty, partial,
perspectival, self-interested way, we take to host the rock. The
transcendental grounds for the possibility of objects if one likes
Kantian language. Or the world of no-thing-ness, if ones preferences
run Buddhist (remember: the gauntlet is to develop a global perspective).
Perhaps it is a noumenal world, except that to cleave phenomenal
appearance from noumenal reality sounds suspiciously like one of those
formal distinctions we have been at such pains to eschew. Whatever: it is
a world of norms as much as of objects, a world of mattering as well as
of matter.
(Cantwell Smith 1998 p. 18)
Actually both Peirce and Spencer-Brown in their philosophies of
semiosis and making a distinction end up with a foundation of no-
thing-ness or emptiness (Brier 2007b, 2008c, 2009). Put it in another
way, the purpose of the intentional sciences is to find a theoretical
explanatory way of putting the knower into a known the world that
is constructed so as to keep the knower viable in practice. This is not
1
This is for instance what Maturana and Varela (1980 and 1988 as well as Maturana
1988 a & b) attempt to do for biological systems with their theory of autopoiesis, but not
managing to encompass a theory of conscious meaning. Niklas Luhmann (1990, 1992,
1995 and 1999) has attempted to generalize this theory and use for human socio-
communicative systems by introducing to more types of autopoiesis system, namely a
psychic one and a socio-communicative. He writes that they operate in the medium of
meaning and the biological system in the medium of life. But only communication
communicates. I have criticized his theory of meaning and his claim to have based it on
Husserls phenomenology in Brier (2007b)
Cybersemiotics and the Question of Knowledge 9
what the sciences have done so far, and the computational and
informational sciences are no exception to this. But maybe they are
developing such a role. However, this is limited insofar as their view
does not deal with life, consciousness, feeling and qualia. Therefore
Cantwell Smith points out that we are leaving the age of (purely
mechanistic or physicalistic) science, and entering an age of signification
(p.16). I could not agree more!
I have agreed with this analysis for the last 25 years although I only
found it expressed in this way during the last six months and have been
searching for such a new foundation that can contain both the sciences
and the intentional sciences. Autopoiesis theory, Luhmanns system
theory and second order cybernetics lack a foundation in first person
awareness such as the one Merleau-Ponty described (Brier 2008a), but
which I found in C. S. Peirces pragmaticist semiotic philosophy.
Furthermore, from the start Peirce actually attempted new ways of
classifying sciences in order to be able to give a name to the new work
he was doing. We cannot go through how he developed those
classifications here, but will concentrate on what he called the Sciences
of Discovery. Peirce divided the Sciences of Discovery into:
(I) mathematics (which draws necessary conclusions about hypothetical
objects);
(II) cenoscopy or philosophy (about positive phenomena in general, such
as confront a person at every waking moment, rather than special classes,
and not settling theoretical issues by special experiences or experiments),
and
(III) idioscopy, or the special sciences (about special classes of positive
phenomena, and settling theoretical issues by special experiences or
experiments).
Peirce writes:
Class II is philosophy, which deals with positive truth, indeed, yet
contents itself with observations such as come within the range of every
mans normal experience, and for the most part in every waking hour of
his life. Hence Bentham calls this class, coenoscopic. These observations
escape the untrained eye precisely because they permeate our whole
lives, just as a man who never takes off his blue spectacles soon ceases to
see the blue tinge. Evidently, therefore, no microscope or sensitive film
10 S. Brier
Historical Perspective
Descartes especially stands for, and the dualism that was a result of his
philosophy. These are important ways of thinking about mind,
knowledge and computer technology permeating our culture. (See for
instance the arguments in Hayles 1999). It is now time to unite the two
opposites of mechanicism and organicism into a new synthesis and at the
same time unite Snows two cultures into a third culture (Brier 2005).
The idea of intelligence and knowledge based on the Turing machine
has carried us a long way. It is now called the information processing
paradigm of cognitive science. The research project presented here is
based on the hypothesis that the usefulness of the paradigm has run out
for the modern complicated problems and systems we have to deal with
(Brier 1996) unless it is updated with semiotic knowledge. Therefore a
new cognitive semiotics is under development, marked by its own
journal, as well as the burgeoning of biosemiotics. I have attempted to
unite the two disciplinary fields in Brier (2009b). A crucial problem is, of
course, human interaction with computers and how to integrate the
computer, Internet and robots in our culture in ways that support human
development, social as well as existential production of meaning, and
will not destroy the centre of democratic culture with its respect for the
uniqueness and rights of the individual human being.
Information in Etymology
The cybernetic theory was derived from the new findings in the 1930s
and 1940s regarding the role of bioelectric signals in biological systems,
including the human being. The full title of Wieners book was:
Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the
Machine. Cybernetics was thus from the beginning attached to biology as
well as to feedback and control. Wiener (1948) connects information and
entropy with organization and therefore evolution. He writes on p. 18:
The notion of the amount of information attaches itself very naturally
to a classical notion in statistical mechanics: that of entropy. Just as the
amount of information in a system is a measure of its degree of
organisation, so the entropy of a system is a measure of its degree of
disorganisation.
How is information then measured? Wiener defines it as a
probability: here he describes the amount of information mathematically
as an integral, i.e. an area of probability measurements, where he defines
information as negentropy inspired by Schrdinger, on p. 76:
The quantity that we here define as amount of information is the
negative of the quantity usually defined as entropy in similar situations.
Wieners view of information is thus that it contains a structure.
Many researchers attempt to build up a concept of meaning on this
foundation. The structure in itself has meaning, some researchers
suggest. But such a concept of meaning may be used on computer
systems does not have much to do with that upon which living systems
and human beings operate in cognition and communication.
System theorists build further on this concept and see information as
something that is used by a mechanism or organism, a system which is
seen as a black box, for steering the system towards a predefined goal.
The goal is compared with the actual performance, and signals are sent
back to the sender if the performance deviates from the norm. This
concept of negative feedback has proven to be a powerful tool in most
control mechanisms, relays etc.
do not communicate with electric signals from the brain (yet?). They
communicate with meaningful signs between embodied minds.
Human communication involves a very complex interpretation by the
receiver. The meaning of a text or a sign does not exist independently
of the receiver as a fixed state. It enters as a percept through our senses
and clashes with our mind. A percept is the result of our interaction with
what is exterior. Peirce writes:
Our logically initial data are percepts. Those percepts are undoubtedly
purely psychical, altogether of the nature of thought. They involve three
kinds of psychical elements, their qualities of feeling, their reaction
against my will, and their generalizing or associating element
(Peirce CP 8.144, 1900).
According to Peirces ways of using his three categories the process
of the percept is a pure Second: a clash between two different
phenomena. Thus, it does include Firstness but not Thirdness as there is
no interpretation of any kind of regularity or meaning yet. Peirce writes.
The direct percept [...] has no generality; [...] it appears under a physical
guise [...] it does not appear as psychical. The psychical, then, is not
contained in the percept
(Peirce CP 1.253, 1902).
Thirdness in perception emerges with the construction of perceptual
fact or a cognition, which is the intellects fallible account of making
meaning of precepts through a generalization operated upon a series of
percepts. The perceptual judgment gives propositional form to the
perceptual coalescence. It constitutes an irresistible hypothesis with
regards to percepts.
Percepts are not, strictly speaking, objects of experience. Though the
percept makes knowledge possible, it offers no information as it does not
contains any Thirdness. Experience, understood as the knowing process
imposed upon us in or by the course of living, is perfused with
Thirdness in the form of generality and continuity as fallible account of
percepts. Meaning must somehow be constructed by the receiver,
within certain frames. There is a theoretical lack of agreement in finding
a basis for determining meaning. Along with this, there is no theory of
the existence of first person experience and qualia in most informational
and computational approaches. There is thus a lack of theoretical
Cybersemiotics and the Question of Knowledge 21
To sum up the problems we have encountered above and which are still
prevalent in the three paradigms, I cannot see how there can be any direct
connection between negentropy and meaning per se. I argue that it is
only living system that can attach meaning to information patterns
because they can experience emotions. This is done because living
systems are individuals with an interest in surviving, procreation and
pleasure. This is the first level of meaning. Peirce talks about
signification when an organism gets meaning out of non-intentional
signals and turns them into signs by giving them meaning in relation to
its form of life.
In the making of a transdisciplinary theory of signification and
communication for living, human, social and technological systems I
argue that C. S. Peirces semiotics is the only sign theory that deals
systematically with non-conscious intentional signs of the body as well
as with language in an evolutionary perspective. Thus, contrary to the
information processing paradigm of cognitive science and any form of
computational theory, Peirce starts which the experienced world, which
he calls the phaneron. Peirce writes, in the Adirondack Lectures,
Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I
mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present
to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing
or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave
these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those
features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all
times and to all minds. So far as I have developed this science of
phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron.
(CP 1.284, 1905)
Peirce even puts logic into his evolutionary semiotic framework and
claims that logic is semiotic. Thus he includes logic in a non-mechanistic
framework basis that includes signification. Therefore the basis of the
pragmaticistic view he developed is semiotic. The fact is that our present
conceptions of science have raised consistency problems for developing
a natural evolutionary theory of awareness and signification involving
levels of semiosis up to full language capacity. A crucial question for
24 S. Brier
concepts presuppose the human mind and its social, embodied and
existential concept of meaning. Thus they are not able to deliver a
reflective theory of meaning.
The great question here is whether we can represent meaning in bits
at all. Do all human brains have their own common universal language
based on bits before it is translated into the various natural human
languages developed by the various cultures that exist on earth, since all
children have the capability to learn any language? If so, symbols would
get their meaning from (subconscious?) thought, which would then have
to have its own universal language, in which we think before translating
it to a natural language? If this is so, a neuro-cognitive computational
information science has a real chance of establishing a universal theory
of information, cognition and communicative meaning. Jerry Fodor
(1987) postulates such a universal language of thought, which he calls
Mentalese. Fodor imagines that Mentalese might be a form of
interaction between three-dimensional forms. Pinker (1995) expresses the
same kind of theories. But, as far as I know, we have not invented an
artificial meaning processing system close to natural language as yet. I am
aware that Lotfi Zadeh (inventor of Fuzzy Logic) is trying to make an
approximation, by extending his basic idea of fuzzyness. He calls it
computing with words. Still, that very complicated system is very limited
in its representation of meaning (see http://www-bisc.cs.berkeley.edu). It is
an abstract model that has very little to do with Mentalese as far as I can see
and does not claim to attempt to be anything like that.
If we stay with Wieners definition of information, then we can have
information without meaning, but not meaning without information.
Shannons information is based on the identification of a set of possible
states the system can be in given a specific context, such as
communication with the alphabet. So it is dependent on a system too.
Shannons focus was on making technology for human communication.
Meaningful human communication was always the context for his
engineering work; hence the ambiguity I mentioned earlier.
I doubt that we can formalize meaning. It is a human social concept
involving linguistic, embodied, self-conscious beings with emotions, will
and qualia. Meaning is what makes the difference make a difference. By
this action of signification we include the difference as a significant thing
28 S. Brier
A reason has its being in bringing other things into connexion with
each other; its essence is to compose: it is triadic, and it alone has a real
power.
Signs, the only things with which a human being can, without
derogation, consent to have any transaction, being a sign himself, are
triadic; since a sign denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact, which
latter it brings into connexion with the former [. . .]
(Peirce CP 6.341 - 344)
Every sign process comes about by combining Firstness with
Secondness and Thirdness created through the tendency to take habits.
The assumption is that this is a common foundation for mind and nature,
not matter, energy and physical information alone. I see no way that we
can explain or give a good model for signification and communication
from a mechanistic view of nature that sees nature as a basic independent
reality which, through self-organization, develops forms that interact as
information, and then life emerges and meaning.
Conclusion
systems on the surface of the earth, we are shunting some of the Suns
energy rather than letting it be serenely reflected off into space as heat
radiation. Living systems are built out of neg-entropy, as Schrdinger
saw it, as a sort of dissipative structure, which Prigogine described in
mathematic terms. The expanding universe absorbs all the entropy-
energy which the Earth radiates and creates irreversibility, physical time
and thereby also drive evolution.
But in such a view there is a lack of a basis for determining meaning.
This is because it is an ideoscopic view only and lacks its cenoscopic
foundation in a theory of the existence of first person experience and
qualia and how the knowledge that is the basis of the ideoscopic science
is produced. Humans the necessary prerequisites for producing
science are interpreting and meaning-making social communicative
creatures who find themselves, as products of a universe they are bound
to, trying to understand, by the very essence of their nature as Gadamer
describes it in Truth and Method Gadamer is not against scientific
knowledge, as he is sometimes interpreted to be: he just holds a view
compatible to Cantwell Smith and Peirces.
The Peircean view presented here of course makes me shy away from
the idea that we should be able to define meaning on any pure
mathematical or algorithmic level, as I see meaning as embodied
pragmaticist signification attached to the evolutionary fight for existence,
good experiences among other things in the form of sensual gratification
and a meaningful life. This leads to discussions of values, the good life,
the meaning of life, religion and philosophy in the social conscious
human. Functionalist meaning can probably be described for certain
primitive uses as an operator. But, I do not think it is fruitful to claim that
meaning is an operator in itself. It is my point of view that all meaning
and value comes from our existential awareness of being embodied
living beings in an ecological web of signs.
Then there is the problem of levels of meaning. A male seagull, that
has as part of its mating ritual bringing a morsel of food to the female as
it would if she were a young or nesting, makes a coded message.
Actually ethologists interpret it as a sign of non-hostile intentions
because those other situations, which the feeding symbolizes, are
caring and non-threatening situations. Ethologists call it ritualization.
Cybersemiotics and the Question of Knowledge 31
Acknowledgements
I want to thank Paul Cobley and Wolfgang Hoffkirschner for their useful
critical comments on the draft versions of the text and Cobley for
suggesting so many good improvement of the language.
Bibliography