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The ESBWR Plant

General Description

g imagination at work
ESBWR
Plant General Description

April 2007

g imagination at work
DISCLAIMER OF RESPONSIBILITY

This document was prepared by the General Electric Company (GE)


only for the purpose of providing general information about its next-
generation nuclear reactor, commonly referred to as the ESBWR.
No other use, direct or indirect, of the document or the information
it contains is authorized; and with respect to any unauthorized use,
neither GE nor any of the contributors to this document makes any
representation or warranty (express or implied) as to the completeness,
accuracy, or usefulness of the information contained in this document
or that such use of such information may not infringe privately owned
rights; nor do they assume any responsibility for liability or damage of
any kind which may result from such use of such information. Furnishing
this document does not convey any license, express or implied, to use
any patented information or any information of GE disclosed herein,
or any rights to publish or make copies of the document without prior
written permission of GE.
Contents

Table of Contents

Table of Contentsi
Acronyms v

Introduction1-1
Chapter 1 Introduction1-1
Nuclear Energy for the New Millennium................................................................ 1-1
Fifty Years in the Making....................................................................................... 1-1
ESBWR Development and Design Approach........................................................ 1-4
Related Projects Worldwide................................................................................... 1-5
ESBWR in the U.S................................................................................................. 1-5
Nuclear Plant Projects in the New Millennium....................................................... 1-6

Chapter 2 Plant Overview2-1


ESBWR Program Goals........................................................................................ 2-1
Summary of the ESBWR Key Features................................................................. 2-1

Nuclear Island3-1
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems3-1
Overview................................................................................................................ 3-1
Reactor Vessel and Internals . .............................................................................. 3-1
Control Rod Drive System..................................................................................... 3-6
Nuclear Boiler System......................................................................................... 3-10
Isolation Condenser System ...................................................................................3-15

Chapter 4 Safety Systems4-1


Overview................................................................................................................ 4-1
Emergency Core Cooling Systems . ..................................................................... 4-1
Gravity Driven Core Cooling System............................................................... 4-1
Automatic Depressurization System................................................................ 4-5
Passive Containment Cooling System............................................................. 4-6
Standby Liquid Control System............................................................................. 4-8
Emergency Control Room Habitability . ........................................................................ 4-9


Contents

Chapter 5 Auxiliary Systems5-1


Overview................................................................................................................ 5-1
Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System.............................................. 5-1
Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System.............................................................. 5-5
Reactor Component Cooling Water System.......................................................... 5-8
Plant Service Water System.................................................................................. 5-9
Drywell Cooling System........................................................................................5-11
Containment Inerting System.............................................................................. 5-12

Chapter 6 Fuel Design6-1


Introduction and Summary.................................................................................... 6-1
Core Configuration................................................................................................ 6-2
Fuel Assembly Description.................................................................................... 6-2
Control Rod Description........................................................................................ 6-6
Core Orificing......................................................................................................... 6-6
Other Reactor Core Components.......................................................................... 6-7
Core Nuclear Design............................................................................................. 6-9
Neutron Monitoring System................................................................................. 6-10

Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control7-1


Overview................................................................................................................ 7-1
Digital Protection System Applications.................................................................. 7-3
Reactor Protection System.............................................................................. 7-4
Leak Detection and Isolation System............................................................... 7-4
Diverse Instrumentation and Control..................................................................... 7-5
Diversity Overview............................................................................................ 7-5
System Description.......................................................................................... 7-5
ATWS Mitigation............................................................................................... 7-6
Diverse Protection System (DPS).................................................................... 7-7
Fault-Tolerant Process Control Systems............................................................... 7-8
Plant Automation System................................................................................. 7-9
Feedwater Control System............................................................................... 7-9
Steam Bypass and Pressure Control System.................................................. 7-9
Turbine Control System.................................................................................. 7-10
Rod Control and Information System............................................................. 7-10
Process Radiation Monitoring System............................................................7-11
Area Radiation Monitoring System..................................................................7-11
Containment Monitoring System.....................................................................7-11
Plant Computer...............................................................................................7-11
Remote Shutdown System (RSS).................................................................. 7-12
Main Control Room.............................................................................................. 7-12
Plant Automation................................................................................................. 7-15
Operation............................................................................................................. 7-16

Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement8-1


Plant Layout........................................................................................................... 8-1

ii
Contents

Safety Buildings..................................................................................................... 8-4


Inclined Fuel Transfer System........................................................................ 8-12
Primary Containment System.............................................................................. 8-13
Vacuum Breakers........................................................................................... 8-16
Severe Accident Mitigation............................................................................. 8-16
Turbine Building................................................................................................... 8-18
Electrical Building................................................................................................ 8-18
Radwaste Building............................................................................................... 8-22
Other Principal Buildings..................................................................................... 8-22
Fire Protection..................................................................................................... 8-22
Flood Protection.................................................................................................. 8-22

Balance of Plant9-1
Chapter 9 Major Balance of Plant Features9-1
Steam and Power Conversion System.................................................................. 9-1
Main Turbine/Generator................................................................................... 9-3
Main Condenser............................................................................................... 9-3
Turbine Bypass System................................................................................... 9-4
Condensate and Feedwater System................................................................ 9-5
Circulating Water System................................................................................. 9-6
Other Turbine Auxiliary Systems .......................................................................... 9-7
Station Electrical Power......................................................................................... 9-7
Offsite Power System....................................................................................... 9-7
Onsite AC Power Distribution........................................................................... 9-8
DC Power Distribution.................................................................................... 9-12

Chapter 10 Radioactive Waste Systems10-1


Overview.............................................................................................................. 10-1
Liquid Radwaste Management System............................................................... 10-1
Offgas System .................................................................................................... 10-5
Solid Radwaste Management System . .............................................................. 10-7

Evaluations11-1
Chapter 11 Safety Evaluations11-1
Overview...............................................................................................................11-1
Transient Performance.........................................................................................11-1
Accident Performance..........................................................................................11-2
Special Event Performance..................................................................................11-2
Severe Accident Performance..............................................................................11-3
ESBWR Features to Mitigate Severe Accidents...................................................11-5
Protection of the Public.........................................................................................11-6

iii
AppendicesA-1
Appendix A Key Design CharacteristicsA-1
Appendix B Frequently Asked QuestionsB-1
What proof is there that natural circulation works in such a large reactor?........... B-1
What has ESBWR done to improve worker radiation exposure?.......................... B-7
Turbine Radiation Exposure............................................................................. B-9

IndexI-1
Acronyms

Acronyms CRHAVS
CRT
CRHA HVAC Subsystem
Cathode Ray Tube
CST Condensate Storage Tank
ABWR Advanced Boiling Water Reactor CWS Chilled Water System
ACRS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
ADS Automatic Depressurization System DAW Dry Active Waste
AFIP Automated Fixed In-Core Probe DBA Design Basis Accident
AHS Auxiliary Heat Sink DC Direct Current
AHU Air Handling Unit DCIS Distributed Control & Information System
ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable DCPS DC Power Supply
ALWR Advanced Light Water Reactor DCS Drywell Cooling System
APR Automatic Power Regulator System DCV Drywell Connecting Vent
APRM Average Power Range Monitor DG Diesel Generator
ARM Area Radiation Monitoring DMC Digital Measurement Controller
ARI Alternate Rod Insertion DoE Department of Energy
ASD Adjustable Speed Drive DPS Diverse Protection System
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers DPV Depressurization Valve
AST Alternate Source Term DW Drywell
ATIP Automatic Traversing In-Core Probe
ATLM Automatic Thermal Limit Monitor EAB Exclusion Area Boundary
ATP Authorization to Proceed EB Electrical Building
ATWS Anticipated Transients Without Scram ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System
ECP Electrochemical Potential
BAF Bottom of Active Fuel ECW Emergency Chilled Water
BiMAC Basemat-internal Melt Arrest Coolability EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
BOP Balance of Plant EHC Electro-hydraulic Control (Turbine Control
BWR Boiling Water Reactor System)
EFU Emergency Fan Unit
C&FS Condensate and Feedwater System EMI Electro-Magnetic Interference
CB Control Building EMS Essential Multiplexing System
CCC Control Cell Core EOF Emergency Operations Facility
CCFP Contingent Containment Failure Probability EPD Electrical Power Distribution
CDF Core Damage Frequency EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
CIRC Circulating Water System ESF Essential Safeguards Feature
CIV Combined Intermediate Valves
CLAVS Clean Air Ventilation Subsystem FAPCS Fuel and Auxiliary Pool Cooling System
CMS Containment Monitoring System FB Fuel Building
COE Cost of Electricity FCU Fan Cooling Unit
COL Combined Operating License FDA Final Design Approval
CONAVS Controlled Area Ventilation Subsystem FFTR Final Feedwater Temperature Reduction
CP Construction Permit/Control Processor FIV Flow-Induced Vibration
CPR Critical Power Ratio FMCRD Fine Motion Control Rod Drive
CPS Condensate Purification System FOAKE First-of-a-Kind Engineering
CRD Control Rod Drive FPS Fire Protection System
CRDHS Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
CRHA Control Room Habitability Area FSC First Structural Concrete


Acronyms

FTDC Fault Tolerant Digital Controller LOPP Loss of Preferred Power


FW Feedwater LPCI Low-Pressure Coolant Injection
FWC Feedwater Control System LPCP Low-Pressure Condensate Pump
FWP Feedwater Pump LPCRD Locking Piston Control Rod Drive
LPRM Local Power Range Monitor
GDCS Gravity Driven Cooling System LPZ Low Population Zone
GE General Electric Company LTP Lower Tie Plate
GETAB General Electric Thermal Analysis Basis LU Logic Unit
GPM Gallons per minute LWMS Liquid Radwaste Management System
GT Gamma Thermometer
MCC Main Control Console/Motor Control
HCU Hydraulic Control Unit Center
HCW High-Conductivity Waste MCES Main Condenser Evacuation System
HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air MCOPS Manual Containment Overpressure
HFF Hollow Fiber Filter Protection System
HIC High Integrity Container MCPR Minimum Critical Power Ratio
HPCP High Pressure Condensate Pump MCR Main Control Room
HPNSS High Pressure Nitrogen Supply System M-G Motor-Generator
HSI Human System Interface MITI Ministry of International Trade and
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning Industry (Japan)
HWC Hydrogen Water Chemistry MLHGR Maximum Linear Heat Generation Rate
MMI Man-Machine Interface
I&C Instrumentation and Control MO Motor-Operated Valve
IASCC Irradiation-Assisted Stress Corrosion MRBM Multi-Channel Rod Block Monitoring
Cracking System
ICS Isolation Condenser System MS Main Steam Subystem
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve
Engineers MSR Moisture Separator Reheater
IFTS Inclined Fuel Transfer MUX Multiplexer
IGSCC Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking MWS Makeup Water System
ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test
IMC Induction Motor Controller NBS Nuclear Boiler System
IMS Information Management System NDT Nil Ductility Temperature
IRM Intermediate Range Monitor N-DCIS Nonsafety-Related DCIS
ISI In-Service Inspection NEMS Non-Essential Multiplexing System
NMO Nitrogen Motor Operated Valve
KRB Kernkraftwerke Gundremmingen NMS Neutron Monitoring System
Betriebsgesellschaft, unit A NO Nitrogen (piston) Operated Valve
NPHS Normal Power Heat Sink
LA Low Activity NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
LCW Low Conductivity Waste NRHX Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger
LD Laundry Drain NSS Nuclear Steam Supply
LDW Lower Drywell
LD&IS Leak Detection and Isolation System O&M Operation and Maintenance
LFCV Low Flow Control Valve OGS Offgas System
LHGR Linear Heat Generation Rate OPRM Oscillation Power Range Monitor
LLRT Local Leak Rate Test
LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident PAS Plant Automation System
LOFW Loss of Feedwater PCCS Passive Containment Cooling System
LOOP Loss of Offsite Power PCI Pellet Clad Interaction

vi
Acronyms

PCS Plant Computer System SDV Scram Discharge Volume


PCT Peak Fuel Clad Temperature SIM Simulator
PCV Primary Containment Volume SJAE Steam Jet Air Ejector
PG Power Generation (loads) SLCS Standby Liquid Control System
PGCS Power Generation Control System SOE Sequence of Events
PIP Plant Investment Protection (loads) SP Suppression Pool
PIP Position Indicator Probe SPC Suppression Pool Cooling
PLR Part Length Fuel Rod SPDS Safety Parameter Display System
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment SRM Source Range Monitor
PRMS Process Radiation Monitoring System SRNM Startup Range Neutron Monitor
PRNM Power Range Neutron Monitor System SRV Safety/Relief Valve
PSWS Plant Service Water System SSAR Standard Safety Analysis Report
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake
SSLC Safety System Logic and Control
Q-DCIS Safety-related DCIS SSPV Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve
SWMS Solid Waste Management System
RAT Reserve Auxiliary Transformer
RB Reactor Building TAF Top of Active Fuel
RBC Rod Brake Controller TB Turbine Building
RC&IS Rod Control and Information System TBCE Turbine Building Component Exhaust
RCCV Reinforced Concrete Containment TBS Turbine Bypass System
Vessel TBV Turbine Bypass Valve
RCCWS Reactor Component Cooling Water TCCWS Turbine Component Cooling Water
System System
RCIC Reactor Core Isolation System TCS Turbine Control System
RCPB Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary TCV Turbine Control Valve
RDT Resistance Temperature Detector TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company
RHR Residual Heat Removal TGSS Turbine Gland Steam System
RHX Regenerative Heat Exchanger TIP Traversing In-Core Probe
RMS Radiation Monitoring Subsystem TIU Technician Interface Unit
RMU Remote Multiplexer Unit TMSS Turbine Main Steam System
RO Reverse Osmosis TPC Taiwan Power Company
RPS Reactor Protection System TRA Transient Recording and Analysis
RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel TSC Technical Support Center
RSS Remote Shutdown System
RTNDT Reference Nil Ductility Temperature UAT Unit Auxiliary Transformer
RW Radwaste Building UDW Upper Drywell
RWCU/SDC Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown UHS Ultimate Heat Sink
Cooling System UPS Uninterruptable Power Supply
RWM Rod Worth Minimizer URD Utility Requirements Document
UTP Upper Tie Plate
S&PC Steam and Power Conversion System
SA Severe Accident V&V Verification and Validation
SAR Safety Analysis Report VAC Volts-Alternating Current
SB Service Building VB Vacuum Breaker
SB&PC Steam Bypass and Pressure Control VDC Volts-Direct Current
System VDU Video Display Unit
SBO Station Blackout
SBWR Simplified Boiling Water Reactor WDP Wide Display Panel
SCRI Select Control Rod Insert WW Wetwell

vii
Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter
Introduction 1
Nuclear Energy for the technologies first applied in the Advanced Boiling
Water Reactor (ABWR) with simplifications in
New Millennium the recirculation system and ECCS. Four ABWRs
have been constructed in Japan and are reliably
generating large amounts of low cost electricity.
Nuclear energy plays a major role in meeting the Taiwan is constructing two more ABWRs which
worlds energy needs. At the end of 2005, there were will enter commercial operation in 2009 and 2010.
443 nuclear power plants operating in 32 countries, Other countries have similar strategies to deploy
with 25 more units under construction. These plants advanced nuclear plants, and the successful deploy-
account for 17% of the worlds electricity. The indus- ment of ABWRs in Japan and Taiwan, coupled with
try remains dynamic, as evidenced by the fact that international agreements to limit CO2 emissions, will
several new plants enter commercial operation every only reinforce these plans.
year and there are typically 30 or more in various
stages of construction at any given time. The ESBWR represents an entirely new ap-
proach to the way nuclear plant projects are under-
Generating electricity with nuclear energy taken, modeled after the successful process used
permits economic and social development to be for ABWR. The ABWR was licensed and designed
sustainable; that is, not limited by encroaching envi- in detail before construction ever began. Once con-
ronmental concerns. A non-nuclear, baseload power struction did begin, it proceeded smoothly from start
plant generates electricity by burning fossil fuels to finish in just four years.
day in and day out and releasing the by-products to
the environment. A nuclear plant, on the other hand, The successful design, licensing, construc-
generates large amounts of electricity with virtually tion and operation of the ESBWR nuclear power
no impact on the environment. In quantitative terms, plant will usher in a new era of safe, economic and
if the worlds nuclear plants were replaced with coal- environmentally friendly nuclear electricity. The
fired plants, global CO2 emissions would increase by ESBWR is the first of a new generation of nuclear
8% every year. This would amount to 1,600 million plants equipped with advanced technologies and
tons per year at a time when the world is trying to features that raise plant safety to new levels that
reduce emissions by 4,200 million tons per year. significantly improve the economic competitiveness
Similarly, if the worlds growing appetite for new of this form of generation.
electricity is met without nuclear energy playing a
key role, CO2 emissions would quickly rise to levels
that curtail economic growth.

The ESBWR advanced nuclear plant will play Fifty Years in the Making
an important role in meeting the conflicting needs
of developed and developing economies for massive The Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) nuclear
amounts of new electricity and the need worldwide plant, like the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), has
to limit CO2 emissions. It continues to use advanced its origins in the technology developed in the 1950s

1-1
Chapter 1 Introduction

for the U.S. Navys nuclear submarine program. The Steam was generated in the reactor but then flowed
first BWR nuclear plant to be built was the 5 MWe to an elevated steam drum and a secondary steam
Vallecitos plant (1957) located near San Jose, Cali- generator before making its way to the turbine.
fornia. The Vallecitos plant confirmed the ability of The first step down the path of simplicity that led
the BWR concept to successfully and safely produce ultimately to the ABWR was the elimination of the
electricity for a grid. The first large-scale BWR, external steam drum by introducing two technical
Dresden 1 (1960), then followed. The BWR design innovationsthe internal steam separator and dryer
has subsequently undergone a series of evolutionary (KRB, 1962). This practice of simplifying the design
changes with one purpose in mindsimplify. with technical innovations was to be repeated over
and over.
The BWR design has been simplified in two
key areasthe reactor systems and the contain- The first large direct cycle BWRs (Oyster Creek)
ment design. Table 1-1 chronicles the development appeared in the mid-1960s and were characterized
of the BWR. by the elimination of the steam generators and the
use of five external recirculation loops. Later, reactor
Dresden 1 was, interestingly enough, not a true systems were further simplified by the introduction
BWR. The design was based upon dual steam cycle, of internal jet pumps. These pumps sufficiently
not the direct steam cycle that characterizes BWRs. boosted recirculation flow so that only two external

Product First Commercial Representative Plant/


Line Operation Date Characteristics
BWR/1 1960 Dresden 1
Initial commercial-size BWR
BWR/2 1969 Oyster Creek
Plants purchased solely on economics
Large direct cycle
BWR/3 1971 Dresden 2
First jet pump application
Improved ECCS: spray and flood capability
BWR/4 1972 Vermont Yankee
Increased power density (20%)
BWR/5 1977 Tokai 2
Improved ECCS
Valve flow control
BWR/6 1978 Cofrentes
Compact control room
Solid-state nuclear system protection system
ABWR 1996 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6
Reactor internal pumps
Fine-motion control rod drives
Advanced control room, digital and fiber optic
technology
Improved ECCS: high/low pressure flooders

ESBWR under review Natural circulation
Passive ECCS

Table 1-1. Evolution of the GE BWR

1-2
Chapter 1 Introduction

recirculation loops were needed. This change first that houses a large water pressure suppression pool.
appeared in the Dresden-2 BWR/3 plant. The conical Mark II design has a less-complicated
arrangement. A key feature is the large containment
The use of reactor internal pumps in the ABWR drywell that provides more room for the steam and
design took this process of simplification another ECCS piping. The Mark III containment design,
step. By using pumps attached directly to the vessel used worldwide with BWR/6s and some BWR/5s,
itself, the jet pumps and the external recirculation represented a major improvement in simplicity. Its
systems, with all their pumps, valves, piping, and containment structure is a right-circular cylinder
snubbers, have been eliminated altogether. that is easy to construct, and provides ready access
to equipment and ample space for maintenance
The ESBWR, and its smaller predecessor, the activities. Other features of the Mark III include
SBWR, took the process of simplification to its horizontal vents to reduce overall loss-of-coolant
logical conclusion with the use of a taller vessel accident (LOCA) dynamic loads and a freestanding
and a shorter core to achieve natural recirculation all-steel structure to ensure leak-tightness.
without the use of any pumps. Figure 1-1 illustrates
the evolution of the reactor system design. The ABWR containment is significantly
smaller than the Mark III containment because the
The first BWR contain- elimination of the recircula-
ments were spherical dry tion loops translates into a
structures. Dry containments significantly more compact
in spherical and cylindrical containment and reactor
shape are still used today in Dresden 1 KRB building. The structure it-
PWR designs. The BWR, self is made of reinforced
however, quickly moved to concrete with a steel liner
the pressure suppression Oyster Creek from which it derives its
containment design with a Dresden 2
nameRCCV, or reinforced
suppression pool for its many concrete containment vessel.
advantages. Among these The ESBWR containment is
are: ABWR similar in construction to the
SBWR
ESBWR ABWR, but slightly larger
High heat capacity Figure 1-1. Evolution of the Reactor System Design to accommodate the passive
Lower design pressure ECCS systems.
Superior ability to accommodate rapid depres-
surization Figure 1-2 illustrates the evolution of the BWR
Unique ability to filter and retain fission prod- containment from the earliest versions to todays
ucts ESBWR RCCV design.
Provision of a large source of readily available
makeup water in the case of accidents There are 93 BWRs, including four ABWRs,
Simplified, compact design currently operating worldwide. Many are among
the best operating plants in the world, performing
It is the reduction in containment design pres- in the best of class category. Numerous countries
sures, together with the elimination of the external rely heavily upon BWR plants to meet their needs
recirculation loops, that allows the containment for electricity. Japan, for example, has 32 BWR
(and, by extension, the reactor building) to be more plants, representing nearly two-thirds of its installed
compact. nuclear capacity. The Tokyo Electric Power Com-
pany (TEPCO) owns 17 nuclear plants, all of which
The Mark I containment was the first of the are BWRs. TEPCOs Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear
new containment designs. The Mark I design has a station, which consists of seven (7) large BWRs, is
characteristic light bulb configuration for the rein- the largest power generation facility in the world,
forced concrete drywell, surrounded by a steel torus licensed for 8,200 MWe. Similarly, BWR plants pre-

1-3
Chapter 1 Introduction

ment Cooling System (PCCS), were run in Europe


and Japan.

A Design Certification Program was started


DRY MARK I
MARK II in the late 1980s with the objective of obtaining a
standardized license, similar to that obtained for the
ABWR. However, as more of the design details
became known, it became clear that, at 670 MWe,
MARK III the SBWR was too small to be economically com-
ABWR petitive with other utility options for electrical gen-
eration. The certification program was stopped, but
GE continued to look for ways to make an SBWR
attractive for power generation. With European
SBWR Utility support, the SBWR was uprated gradually
ESBWR
to its current power level of approximately 1550
MWe. This was made possible by staying within
Figure 1-2. Evolution of the Containment Design the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) size limit estab-
lished by the ABWR, and by taking advantage of
dominate in Taiwan and several European countries. the modular approach to passive safety afforded by
In the United States, there are 35 operating BWRs. Isolation Condensers (IC) and PCCS.
To date, the ABWR plant is the only advanced
The ESBWR has achieved its basic plant simpli-
nuclear plant in operation or under construction.
fication by using innovative adaptations of operating
plant systems, e.g., combining shutdown cooling and
reactor water cleanup systems, and combining the

ESBWR Development
various pool cooling and cleanup systems. In addi-
tion, several systems were eliminated, e.g., standby

and Design Approach


gas treatment and flammability control. There is a
high confidence that the design is proven because of
the following basic approach to the design:
Following the Three Mile Island accident in
1979, there was a lot of interest in developing a Utilize BWR features that have been success-
reactor with passive safety features and less depen- fully used before in operating BWRs, e.g.,
dence on operator actions. Utilities also took this natural circulation, isolation condensers.
opportunity to request a reactor which was simpler to Utilize standard systems where practical, e.g.
operate, had fewer components and no dependence utilize features common to ABWR - vessel
on diesel-generators for safety actions. GE began size, fine motion control rod drives, pressure
an internal study of a new BWR concept based on suppression containment, fuel designs, materials
these principles and the Simplified Boiling Water and chemistry.
Reactor (SBWR) was born in the early 1980s. This Extend the range of data to ESBWR parameters,
concept attracted development support from the e.g. separators, large channel two phase flow,
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), EPRI and a isolation condensers (IC).
number of US Utilities. Key new features, such as Perform extensive separate effects, component
the Gravity Driven Core Cooling System (GDCS), and integral tests at different scales for the
Depressurization Valves (DPV), and leak-tight PCCS.
wetwell/drywell vacuum breakers were tested. As Test any new components, e.g. squib actuated
interest grew, an International Team was formed to DPVs, IC heat exchangers, wetwell/drywell
complete the design, and additional separate effects, vacuum breakers.
component and integrated system tests, particularly
of the innovative new feature, the Passive Contain- The ESBWR program, as a result, inherited a

1-4
Chapter 1 Introduction

technologically rich legacy of design, development


and analysis work passed along from the SBWR and
ABWR programs. Some systems required duty or
rating up-sizing to adjust to a higher power level.
Other systems needed an addition of yet another
duplicate equipment train. Instrumentation and
Control (I&C) were little changed from ABWR.
Plant electrical (even though significantly simpli-
fied), cooling water, and heat cycle systems benefited
tremendously from the on-going systems work un-
derway on all of GEs ABWR design activities.

Related Projects
Worldwide Figure 1-3. Kashiwasaki Units 6 & 7

previous designs. See Figure 1-3 for a photo of the


Operating ABWRs in Japan Kashiwazaki Units 6 & 7.
Four ABWR units in Japan are now constructed
and fully operational. Two of these units are located
The ABWR in the United States
at TEPCOs Kashiwazaki-Kariwa site, 100 miles
The ABWR was the first plant to use the
north of Tokyo on the Sea of Japan. The worlds first
new standard plant licensing process in the U.S.
advanced nuclear plant, Unit 6, began commercial
(10CFR50.52). The efforts of the NRC and GE
operation in 1996. Unit 7, the second ABWR, fol-
came to fruition in 1997 when the ABWR Design
lowed shortly thereafter with commercial operation
Certification was signed into law. This was rightly
commencing in 1997.
hailed by the U.S. industry as a significant ac-
complishment, one that has been envisioned for a
Both TEPCO ABWR units were constructed
long timepre-approval of a standard design of an
in world record times. From first concrete to fuel
advanced nuclear plant.
load, it took just 36.5 months to construct Unit 6
and 38.3 months for Unit 7, the former being 10
months less than the best time achieved for any of The ABWR in Taiwan
the previous BWRs constructed in Japan. In addi- Two more ABWRs are being constructed for the
tion, both units were built on budget, which is an Taiwan Power Company (TPC) at TPCs Lungmen
impressive record of performance, since these were site, located on the Pacific Ocean about 40 miles
first-of-a-kind units. northeast of Taipei.

Two more ABWRs are now operational in Japan Commercial operation of Lungmen Unit 1 is
- Hamaoka-5, which began commercial operation in expected to begin in July 2009. The schedule for
January, 2005; and Shika-2, which was connected Unit 2, including the start of commercial operation,
to the grid in July, 2005, and achieved commercial is one year later.
operation in March, 2006.

ESBWR in the U.S.


Both TEPCO units have completed many cycles
of operation. By all measures, these ABWRs have
lived up to their promise. Other than regulatory
mandated outages, both plants have operated essen- The Design Certification application for the ES-
tially at full power for each fuel cycle. The thermal BWR was submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
efficiency of the plant is 35%, slightly higher than Commission (NRC) in August 2005 and with one

1-5
Chapter 1 Introduction

of the most thorough acceptance review processes (and in some cases mind-numbing) capital costs.
conducted, was formally accepted for docketing in
just 3 months. The new plant review and licensing The ESBWR concept has been designed to
process has been improved, including allowance for higher levels of safety, including being designed to
parallel review of Design Certification and COL, prevent and mitigate the consequences of a Severe
with a focus on standardization, and reducing and Accident.
eliminating re-reviews of the same open items.
The ESBWR design will be captured elec-
GE is working with a number of customers who tronically using the latest state-of-the-art information
have selected ESBWR technology, and is participat- management technology. The benefits appear not
ing in the Department of Energys (DOE) Nuclear only in construction, where it has been shown over
Power 2010 program, which was established by the and over with fossil plants that use of this engineer-
DOE to act as a catalyst for new build nuclear energy ing tool reduces construction time and cost, but also
in the U.S., and therefore help the U.S. meet long- during the operation and maintenance of the plant.
term demand for electrical power generation. The approach described above is being fully utilized
for the Lungmen ABWR project.

Construction of Nuclear Plants in the 2000s

Nuclear Plant Projects


Nuclear plants today are constructed much dif-
ferently than in the past. The most notable difference

in the New Millennium is the schedule. The ESBWR is planned to be built


in only three years, from first concrete to the start
of commercial operation. Design simplifications
The way in which nuclear plants are designed, and the use of new construction technologies and
licensed and constructed is vastly different than was techniques make this possible.
the case 10 or 20 years ago.
Of course, there is no substitute for experience.
Design and Licensing The Lungmen ABWRs are being supplied by a team
The ESBWR nuclear plant will be licensed and of U.S. and Japanese suppliers, led by GE, that were
designed in its entirety prior to the start of construc- also involved in the supply of the Japanese ABWRs.
tion. Long before first concrete is poured, all safety This team, and the supporting network of equipment
and engineering issues are identified and resolved. sub-suppliers, is accustomed to working on an inter-
This precludes construction delays due to re-engi- national stage and can readily transplant its experi-
neering, a problem which plagued so many projects ence and know-how to a new host country. This is the
in the past and contributed significantly to the high basis for the learning curve effect, which reduces
capital costs with each new unit.

1-6
Chapter 2 Plant Overview

Chapter
Plant Overview 2
ESBWR Program Goals Cost advantage over competing baseload elec-
trical generating technologies.
Plant availability factor of 95%.
The ESBWR builds on the very successful Ad-
vanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) technology
and construction programs, as well as the Simpli-
fied Boiling Water Reactor (SBWR) development
program. The key design objectives for the ABWR Summary of the ESBWR
Key Features
were established during its development program.
The key goals, all of which were achieved, are as
follows:
A cutaway rendering of the ESBWR plant (Fig-
Design life of 60 years. ure 2-1) illustrates the general configuration of the
Plant availability factor of 87% or greater. plant for a single unit site in the U.S. Shown in the
foreground are the Reactor and Fuel Buildings, and
Less than one unplanned scram per year. in the background is the Turbine Building. In front
18 to 24-month refueling interval. of the Reactor Building is the Control Building. A
Operating personnel radiation exposure limit comparison of key features of the ESBWR to previ-
<1 Sv/year. ous models is shown in Table 2-1.
Reduced calculated core damage frequency
An artists rendering of the major systems and
by at least a factor of 10 over previous BWRs
how they are interconnected is shown in Figure
(goal <10-6/yr).
2-2. This shows the reactor, ECCS, containment,
Radwaste generation less than that of the 10% turbine equipment and the key auxiliary mechani-
best operating BWRs. cal systems.
48-month construction schedule.
20% reduction in capital cost ($/kWh) vs. pre- Design Philosophy
vious 1100 MWe class BWRs. Recognizing the desire for simplification of the
typically complex safety systems with attendant
To these objectives, the following additional cost, quality assurance requirements and technical
goals were established for ESBWR: specifications, the ESBWR has adopted passive
safety systems, together with a natural circulation
primary system.
All Essential Safeguards Features (ESF) shall
be passive, eliminating the need for safety
By shortening the active fuel length, adding an
grade diesel generators.
approximately 9 m tall chimney above the core and
Following design basis events, no operator ac- lengthening the reactor vessel, the ESBWR elimi-
tion shall be required for 72 hours. nated the recirculation system, relying completely
36-month construction schedule. on natural circulation for core flow (see Figure 2-3).

2-1
Chapter 2 Plant Overview

33
34

36

21 32
18

35

20
16 30
19 17
3

6
28 4 31
11
29 15
23 1
22
5
9 26

ESBWR
24 10

2
27
7
14 1. Reactor Pressure Vessel 19. Buffer Fuel Storage Pool
8
2. Fine Motion Control Rod Drives 20. Refueling Machine
12 3. Main Steam Isolation Valves 21. Reactor Building
4. Safety/Relief Valves (SRV) 22. Inclined Fuel Transfer Machine
25 13 5. SRV Quenchers 23. Fuel Building
6. Depressurization Valves 24. Fuel Transfer Machine
7. Lower Drywell Equipment Platform 25. Spent Fuel Storage Pool
8. BiMAC Core Catcher 26. Control Building
9. Horizontal Vents 27. Main Control Room
10. Suppression Pool 28. Main Steam Lines
11. Gravity Driven Cooling System 29. Feedwater Lines
12. Hydraulic Control Units 30. Steam Tunnel
13. Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown 31. Standby Liquid Control
Cooling (RWCU/SDC) Pumps System Accumulator
14. RWCU/SDC Heat Exchangers 32. Turbine Building
15 Containment Vessel 33. Turbine-Generator
16. Isolation Condensers 34. Moisture Separator Reheater
17. Passive Containment 35. Feedwater Heaters
Cooling System 36. Open Feedwater Heater
18. Moisture Separators and Tank

Figure 2-1. Cutaway Rendering of the ESBWR

High pressure inventory control and heat removal by more than a factor of fifty relative to the BWR/6
is accomplished with the use of isolation condens- design and five relative to the ABWR. Further-
ers if the reactor becomes isolated from the normal more, the ESBWR also improved the capability to
heat sink. mitigate severe accidents, even though such events
are extremely unlikely. Through nitrogen inerting,
The reactor can also be depressurized rapidly containment integrity threats from hydrogen deto-
to allow multiple sources of non-safety systems nation were eliminated. Sufficient spreading area in
to provide makeup. However, the ultimate safety the lower drywell, together with a drywell flooding
features are passive, both for core flooding as well system and a core catcher located under the Reactor
as for containment heat removal. Pressure Vessel (RPV) provide further assurance
against containment basemat attack. Manual connec-
Response to anticipated transients without tions make it possible to use onsite or offsite water
scram (ATWS) is improved by the adoption of fine- systems to maintain core cooling. The result of this
motion control rod drives (FMCRDs), which allow design effort is that in the event of a severe accident,
reactor shutdown either by hydraulic or electric the whole body dose consequence at the calculated
insertion. In addition, the need for rapid operator ac- site boundary is very low. More information on this
tion to mitigate an ATWS is avoided by automation subject can be found in Chapter 11.
of emergency procedures such as feedwater runback
and passive Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) Improvements to Operation and
injection from borated water stored in pressurized Maintenance
accumulators. With the goal of simplifying the utilitys burden
of operation and maintenance (O&M) tasks, the
Calculated core damage frequency is reduced design of every ESBWR electrical and mechanical

2-2
Chapter 2 Plant Overview

Vent to stack Vent to stack


Isolation
Condenser
Tank Post LOCA
PCCS Fill Connection
N2 Standby Liquid
Control System
Backup
RPV
DPV Spray Moisture
Separator
SRV Reheater

Hx Fuel and Auxiliary


Pool Cooling System GDCS Low
Pressure
Turbine Generator
Backup Makeup
F/D
from FAPCS

Backup Makeup
from CRDS High Pressure Turbine Main
Con- Circulating
denser Water
Hx
High Pressure
FW Heaters Stack
Suppression Suppression 5, 6 & 7
Pool Pool Offgas System
F/D
Condensate
Pump
Open FW
Heater #4 Steam Jet
FMCRD Air Ejector
Hydraulic
Control Unit
Feedwater
Feedwater
Boost
Pump Low Pressure
Pump
Feedwater Heaters Condensate
1, 2 & 3 Demineralizer

Condensate
Main
Condensers Condensate Storage Tank
Condenser
Filter
Filter / Demineralizer
RHx NRHx
Reactor Water Cleanup /
Shutdown Cooling System CRD Pump

Figure 2-2. ESBWR Major Systems

2-3
Chapter 2 Plant Overview

2-4
Chapter 2 Plant Overview


Feature BWR/6 ABWR ESBWR
Recirculation Two external loop Recirc Vessel-mounted reactor Natural circulation
System system with jet pumps internal pumps
inside RPV
Control Rod Drives Locking piston CRDs Fine-motion CRDs Fine-motion CRDs
ECCS 2-division ECCS 3-division ECCS 4-division, passive,
plus HPCS gravity-driven

Reactor Vessel Welded plate Extensive use of Extensive use of


forged rings forged rings

Primary Containment Mark III - large, low Compact, inerted Compact, inerted
pressure, not inerted

Isolation Makeup RCIC RCIC Isolation condensers,


Water passive

Shutdown Heat 2-division RHR 3-division RHR Non-safety system


Removal combined with RWCU

Containment Heat 2-division RHR 3-division RHR Passive


Removal
Emergency AC 3 safety-grade D/G 3 safety-grade D/G 2 non-safety D/G

Alternate shutdown 2 SLC pumps 2 SLC pumps 2 SLC accumulators

Control & Analog, hardwired, Digital, multiplexed, Digital, multiplexed,


Instrumentation single channel fiber optics, fiber optics,
multiple channel multiple channel

In-core Monitor TIP system A-TIP system Gamma thermometers


Calibration

Control Room System-based Operator task-based Operator task-based

Severe Accident Not specifically addressed Inerting, drywell flooding, Inerting, drywell flooding,
Mitigation containment venting core catcher

Table 2-1. Comparison of Key ESBWR Features to previous BWRs

system, as well as the layout of equipment in the tions. First, scram discharge piping and scram dis-
plant, is focused on improved O&M. charge volumes (SDVs) were eliminated, since the
hydraulic scram water is discharged into the reactor
The reactor vessel lower sections are made vessel. By supporting the drives directly from the
of forged rings rather than welded plates. This core plate, shootout steel located below the reac-
eliminates 30% of the welds from the core beltline tor vessel to mitigate the rod ejection accident was
region, for which periodic in-service inspection is eliminated. The number of hydraulic control units
required. (HCUs) was reduced by connecting two drives to
each HCU, as was done on the ABWR. The number
The FMCRDs permit a number of simplifica- of rods per gang was increased up to 26 rods, greatly

2-5
Chapter 2 Plant Overview

containment boundary.

By combining the reactor water cleanup func-


tion with shutdown heat removal, simplification
was achieved in the reduction of equipment. A side
benefit is that decay heat removal after shutdown
can be accomplished at high pressure.

Lessons learned from operating experience


were applied to the selection of ESBWR materials.
Stainless steel materials that are qualified as resistant
to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC)
were used. In areas of high neutron flux, materials
were also specially selected for resistance to irra-
diation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC).
Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) is recommended
for normal operation to further mitigate any potential
for stress corrosion cracking.

The use of material producing radioactive cobalt


was minimized. The main condenser uses titanium
tubing at sea water sites and stainless steel tubing for
cooling tower or cooling lake sites. The use of stain-
less steel in applications that currently use carbon
steel was expanded. Depleted Zinc Oxide injection
to the feedwater system is recommended to further
control radiation buildup. These materials choices
reduce plant-wide radiation levels and radwaste and
will accommodate more stringent water chemistry
Figure 2-3. ESBWR Reactor Pressure Vessel and requirements.
Internals
Also contributing to good reactor water chem-
improving reactor startup times. Finally, since there istry is the increase of the Reactor Water Cleanup/
are no organic seals, only two or three drives will be Shutdown Cooling System (RWCU/SDC) capacity
inspected per outage, rather than the 30 specified in to approximately two percent of feedwater flow.
most current plants.
The ESBWR Reactor Building (including con-
Responses to transients and accidents are first tainment) was configured to simplify and reduce
attempted by non-safety makeup systems, together the O&M burden. Figure 2-4 illustrates some of the
with the isolation condensers. At high pressure, the key design features of the ESBWR containment.
CRD pumps of the Control Rod Drive system can In-containment elevated water tanks (GDCS) plus
add water directly to the RPV via a feedwater line. a raised suppression pool provide the means to pas-
Postulated loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) are sively provide ECCS, if necessary, and assure core
mitigated by automated reactor pressure blowdown coverage for all design basis events. Natural convec-
followed by passive gravity-driven ECCS (GDCS) tion heat exchangers located outside and just above
,which has sufficient water stored in the containment the containment provide passive heat removal. The
to completely flood the lower drywell and the reactor containment itself is a reinforced concrete contain-
to 1 meter above the top of fuel. Residual decay heat ment vessel (RCCV).
is removed from the containment passively via heat
exchangers located directly above and outside the Within the containment itself, no equipment

2-6
Chapter 2 Plant Overview

about 30% less than that of the BWR/6 and requires


REACTOR BUILDING substantially lower construction quantities. Its lay-
out is integrated with the containment, providing
PASSIVE CONTAINMENT PRIMARY
360 access with servicing areas located as close as
COOLING SYSTEM
HEAT EXCHANGERS
CONTAINMENT practical to the equipment requiring regular service.
Clean and contaminated zones are well defined and
kept separate by limited controlled access. The fuel
pool is sized to store at least ten years of spent fuel
plus a full core.

GDCS
UPPER
DRYWELL GDCS
Controls and instrumentation were enhanced
POOL POOL through incorporation of digital technologies with
automated, self-diagnostic features. The use of
WETWELL VACUUM
BREAKER
multiplexing and fiber optic cable has eliminated 1.3
million feet of cabling. Within the safety systems,
SUPPRESSION
POOL
SUPPRESSION
POOL
the adoption of a two-out-of-four trip logic and the
fiber optic data links have significantly reduced the
number of required nuclear boiler safety system
related transmitters. In addition, a three-channel
controller architecture was adopted for the primary
LOWER
DRYWELL process control systems to provide system failure
tolerance and on-line repair capability. These new
I&C features were first added in ABWR.
BiMAC

A number of improvements were made to the


Figure 2-4. ESBWR Reactor Building and Containment Neutron Monitoring System (NMS). Fixed wide-
range neutron detectors have replaced retractable
requires servicing during plant operation and the source and intermediate range monitors. In addi-
amount of equipment that requires maintenance tion, an automatic, period-based protection system
during outages is significantly reduced. The contain- replaced the manual range switches used during
ment is significantly smaller than that of the preced- startup. The Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) calibra-
ing BWR/6, but about the same size as ABWR. tion system has been replaced by fixed Gamma
However, primarily due to the elimination of the Thermometers (GT).
recirculation system, there is actually more room
to conduct maintenance operations. To simplify The man-machine interface was significantly
maintenance and surveillance during scheduled improved and simplified for the ESBWR using
outages, permanently installed monorails and plat- advanced technologies such as large, flat-panel
forms permit 360 access, and both the upper and displays, touch-screen CRTs and function-oriented
lower drywells have separate personnel and equip- keyboards. The number of alarm tiles was reduced
ment hatches. To simplify FMCRD maintenance, by almost a factor of ten. Many operating processes
a rotating platform is permanently installed in the and procedures are automated, with the control room
lower drywell, and semi-automated equipment was operator performing a confirmatory function. Figure
specially designed to remove and install that equip- 2-5 illustrates a main control room for the ABWR,
ment. The wetwell area is compact and isolated which uses similar technology.
from the rest of the containment, thus minimizing
the chance for suppression pool contamination with The plant features discussed above, while
foreign material. simplifying the operators burden, have an ancil-
lary benefit of increased failure tolerance and/or
A new Reactor Building design surrounds the reduced error rates. Studies show that less than one
containment. Its volume (including containment) is unplanned scram per year will be experienced with

2-7
Chapter 2 Plant Overview

Figure 2-5. ABWR (Lungmen) Main Control Room Panels

the ESBWR. Increased system redundancies will sure was achieved by (1) minimizing the necessity
also permit on-line maintenance. Thus, both forced for and amount of personnel time spent in radiation
outages and planned maintenance outages will be areas and (2) minimizing radiation levels in routinely
significantly reduced. occupied plant areas in the vicinity of plant equip-
ment expected to require personnel attention.
The ESBWR combines advanced facility design
features and administrative procedures designed to Changes in the materials will lead to a signifi-
keep the occupational radiation exposure to person- cant reduction in the quantity of radwaste generated
nel as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Dur- through radioactive corrosion products. In addition,
ing the design phase, layout, shielding, ventilation the condensate treatment system was improved to
and monitoring instrument designs were integrated include both pre-filtration and deep bed demineral-
with traffic, security and access control. Operating izers without regeneration, which reduces liquid
plant results were continuously integrated during and solid radwaste input. Extensive use of mobile
the design phase. Clean and controlled access areas radwaste technology is used in the ESBWR radwaste
are separated. system design. This also contributes to minimizing
radiation exposure to operating personnel.
Reduction in the plant personnel radiation expo-

2-8
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

Chapter
Nuclear Steam Supply Systems 3
Overview Use of forged shell rings at and below core
elevation
A tall partitioned chimney to promote natural
The Nuclear Steam Supply Systems (NSSS)
circulation core flow
produce steam from the nuclear fission process, and
direct this steam to the main turbine. The NSSS is
comprised of (1) the reactor vessel, which serves as The RPV design is based on proven BWR tech-
a housing for the nuclear fuel and associated com- nology. A noteworthy feature is the lack of any large
ponents, (2) the control rod drive system, (3) the nozzles below the elevation of the top of the core.
nuclear boiler system and (4) the isolation condenser This RPV nozzle configuration precludes any large
system. Other supporting systems are described in pipe ruptures at or below the elevation of the core.
Chapter 5, Auxiliary Systems. It is a key factor in the ability of ESBWR safety sys-
tems to keep the core completely and continuously
flooded for the entire spectrum of design basis loss-
of-coolant accidents (LOCAs). Many of the features

Reactor Vessel and listed above were introduced in the ABWR.

Internals The vessel contains the core support structure


that extends to the top of the core. The presence of
a large volume of steam and water results in two
The reactor vessel houses the reactor core, very important and beneficial characteristics. First,
which is the heat source for steam generation. it provides a large reserve of water above the core,
The vessel contains this heat, produces the steam which translates directly into a much longer period
within its boundaries, and serves as one of the fis- of time being available before core uncovery can oc-
sion product barriers during normal operation. The cur as a result of feed flow interruption or a LOCA.
ESBWR reactor assembly is shown in Figure 3-1. Consequently, this gives an extended period of time
The diameter of the ESBWR reactor pressure ves- during which automatic systems or plant operators
sel (RPV) is the same size as for the ABWR. The can reestablish reactor inventory control using any
RPV is approximately 27.6 m in height and 7.1 m normal, non-safety-related system capable of inject-
in diameter. ing water into the reactor. Timely initiation of these
systems is designed to preclude initiation of the
The most important new features of the ESBWR emergency safety equipment. This easily controlled
RPV and internals are as follows: response to loss of normal feedwater is a significant
operational benefit. Second, the larger RPV volume
Steam nozzles with flow restrictors leads to a reduction in the ESBWR pressure rise that
Double feedwater nozzle thermal sleeve would occur after a rapid isolation of the reactor from
Sliding block vessel support the normal heat sink.
Relatively flat bottom head The following sections provide further descrip-
Elimination of large nozzles below the core tions of the unique features of the ESBWR RPV

3-1
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

1 - Vessel flange and closure head

20 - Steam dryer assembly

Steam outlet flow restrictor - 2


21 - DPV/IC outlet

19 - Steam separator assembly Stabilizer - 7

Feedwater nozzle - 3
4 - Feedwater sparger
25 - RWCU/SDC outlet
8 - Forged shell rings
Chimney - 17

22 - IC return
Chimney partitions - 18
23 - GDCS inlet

5 - Vessel support
24 - GDCS equalizing line inlet Top guide - 12
27 - Fuel and control rods Core shroud - 9
13 - Fuel supports
Core plate - 11
15 - Control rod guide tubes
16 - In-core housing Control rod drive housings - 14
10 - Shroud support brackets
Vessel bottom head - 6
Control rod drives - 26

Figure 3-1. ESBWR Reactor Assembly

and internals. ing an outlet for steam from the RPV, the steam
outlet nozzles will provide for: (1) steam line break
RPV Closure Head (1) detection by measuring steam flow to signal a trip
The RPV closure head is elliptical in shape and for the main steam isolation valves; (2) steam flow
is fabricated of low alloy steel, per ASME SA-508, measurement for input to the feedwater control
Grade 3, Class 1. It is secured to the RPV by 80 sets system; and (3) a flow-choking device to limit
of fasteners (studs and nuts). These nuts are tightened blowdown and associated loads on the RPV and
in groups of (typically) four at a time, using an auto- internals in the event of a postulated main steam line
matic or semiautomatic four-stud tensioner device. break. Calculations show that the pressure drop in
The vessel closure seal consists of two concentric the nozzle is within the requirements of the steady-
O-rings which perform without detectable leakage state performance specification.
at all operating conditions, including hydrostatic
testing. Feedwater Nozzle Thermal Sleeve (3)
There are three feedwater nozzles for each of
Steam Nozzle with Flow Restrictor (2) the two feedwater lines which utilize double thermal
The ESBWR RPV has flow restricting venturi sleeves welded to the nozzles. The double thermal
located in the steam outlet nozzles. Besides provid- sleeve protects the vessel nozzle inner blend radius
. Numbers refer to Figure 3-1. from the effects of high frequency thermal cycling.

3-2
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

Reactor Vessel Bottom Head (6)


The bottom head consists of a spherical bot-
tom cap, made from a single forging, extending to
the toroidal knuckle between the head and vessel
cylinder and encompassing the control rod drive
(CRD) penetrations. With a bottom head thickness
of approximately 260 mm, the bottom head meets
the ASME allowables for the specified design loads.
The main advantage of using a single forging for
the bottom head is that it eliminates all RPV welds
within the CRD pattern, thus reducing future (ISI)
requirements.

Stabilizers (7)
Stabilizers are located around the periphery of
the RPV toward its upper end. These provide reac-
Figure 3-2. ESBWR Reactor Pressure Vessel
tion points to resist horizontal loads and suppress
Feedwater Nozzle RPV motion due to earthquakes and postulated pipe
rupture events.
A schematic of the feedwater nozzle is shown in
Figure 3-2. Forged Shell Rings (8)
The ESBWR RPV utilizes low alloy forged
Feedwater Spargers (4) shell rings, adjacent to and below the core belt line
The feedwater spargers are stainless steel head- region. The flanges and large nozzles are also low
ers located in the mixing plenum above the down- alloy steel. The shell rings above the core beltline
comer annulus. A separate sparger in two halves is region and the RPV closure head are made from low
fitted to each feedwater nozzle by a tee and is shaped alloy steel forgings or plate per ASME SA-533, Type
to conform to the curve of the vessel wall. The B, Class 1. The required Reference Nil Ductility
sparger tee inlet is connected to the thermal sleeve Temperature (RTNDT) of the vessel material is -20C.
arrangement. Feedwater flow enters the center of the Figure 3-3 shows one of the RPV forged shell rings
spargers and is discharged radially inward to mix the during fabrication of an ABWR vessel. A similar
cooler feedwater with the downcomer flow from the process will be used on ESBWR.
steam separators and steam dryer.

Vessel Support (5)


The vessel supports are of the sliding block type
geometry and are provided at a number of positions
around the periphery of the vessel. Multiple vessel
supports along with the corresponding pedestal RPV
support brackets provide:

Openings to permit water to pass from the up-


per to lower drywell
Access for in-service inspection (ISI) of the
bottom head weld

More information on the vessel supports can be


found in Chapter 8. Figure 3-3. ABWR RPV Forged Steel Ring

3-3
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

Core Shroud (9) proper coolant flow to the peripheral fuel assembly.
The shroud is a stainless steel cylindrical assem- Each main fuel support sustains four fuel assemblies
bly that provides a partition to separate the upward vertically upward and horizontally and is provided
flow of coolant through the core from the down- with orifices to assure proper coolant flow distribu-
comer annulus flow. The upper shroud is bounded tion to each fuel bundle. The main fuel support sits
at the bottom by the core plate. The lower shroud, on the top of the control rod guide tube, which carries
surrounding part of the lower plenum, is welded the weight of the fuel rods down to the bottom of
to the RPV shroud support brackets. The shroud the RPV. The control rods pass through cruciform
provides lateral support for the core by supporting openings in the center of the main fuel support.
the core plate and top guide.
Control Rod Drive Housing (14)
Shroud Support Brackets (10) The control rod drive housing provides exten-
There are 12 thick vertical support brackets sion of the RPV for installation of the control rod
welded to the vessel wall near the bottom inside drive, and the attachment of the CRD line. It also
region of the RPV cylindrical portion. Besides the supports the weight of a control rod, control rod
weight of the shroud, these brackets support the drive, control rod guide tube, main fuel support and
weights of the core plate, fuel and fuel supports, top four fuel assemblies.
guide, chimney, chimney partitions and the steam
separator assembly.
Control Rod Guide Tubes (15)
The control rod guide tubes extend from the top
Core Plate (11)
of the control rod drive housings up through holes
The core plate consists of a circular plate with
in the core plate. Each guide tube is designed as the
round openings. The core plate provides lateral sup-
guide for the lower end of a control rod and as the
port and guidance for the control rod guide tubes,
support for a main fuel support. This locates the four
in-core flux monitor guide tubes, peripheral fuel sup-
fuel assemblies surrounding the control rod, which,
ports, and startup neutron sources. The last two items
in turn, transmits the weight of the guide tube, fuel
are also supported vertically by the core plate. The
support, and fuel assemblies to the reactor vessel bot-
entire assembly is bolted to a support ledge in the
tom head. The control rod guide tube also contains
shroud. The core plate also forms a partition within
holes, near the top of the control rod guide tube and
the shroud, which causes the recirculation flow to
below the core plate, for coolant flow to the orificed
pass into the orificed fuel supports and through the
fuel supports. In addition, the guide tube provides a
fuel assemblies.
connection to the Fine Motion Control Rod Drive
(FMCRD) to restrain a hypothetical downward
Top Guide (12)
ejection of the FMCRD in case of a postulated RPV
The top guide consists of a grid that gives lateral
weld failure.
support of the top of the fuel assemblies. Each open-
ing provides lateral support and guidance for four
fuel assemblies or, in the case of peripheral fuel, two In-Core Housing (16)
or three fuel assemblies. Holes are provided in the The in-core housings provide extensions of the
bottom of the support intersections to anchor the in- RPV at the bottom head for the installation of various
core flux monitors and startup neutron sources. The in-core flux monitoring sensor assemblies, which are
top guide is bolted to the top of the core shroud. components of the Neutron Monitoring System. It
also supports the weight of an in-core flux monitor-
Fuel Supports (13) ing sensor assembly, in-core guide tube and part of
The fuel supports are of two basic types; namely, the in-core guide tube stabilizer assembly.
peripheral fuel supports and main fuel supports. The
peripheral fuel supports are located at the outer edge Chimney (17)
of the active core and are not adjacent to control The chimney is a long stainless steel cylinder
rods. Each peripheral fuel support sustains one fuel that supports the steam separators and is bolted to the
assembly and contains an orifice designed to assure top guide. It provides the driving head necessary to

3-4
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

create and sustain the natural circulation flow.


DRYER STEAM
Chimney Partitions (18)
Partitions are located inside the chimney that
separate groups of up to 16 fuel bundles. These
partitions act to channel the mixed steam and water
flow exiting the core into smaller chimney sections RETURNING
to limit the cross flow and minimize the potential for WATER

recirculating eddies that could result from a much


larger open chimney.

Steam Separator Assembly (19)


The steam separator assembly consists of a flat
base on top of which is welded an array of standpipes
with a three-stage steam separator located at the top
of each standpipe. The steam separator assembly
rests on the top flange of the chimney and forms
the cover of the core discharge plenum region. The
separator assembly is bolted to the chimney flange
by long hold down bolts which, for ease of removal,
extend above the separators. During installation, the
WATER LEVEL
separator base is aligned on the chimney flange with OPERATING RANGE
guide rods and finally positioned with locating pins.
The objective of the long-bolt design is to provide
direct access to the bolts during reactor refueling
operations with minimum-depth underwater tool
manipulation during the removal and installation of
the assemblies. It is not necessary to engage threads TURNING
in mating up the shroud head. A tee-bolt engages in SKIRT
VANES
the chimney flange and its nut is tightened to only
nominal torque. Final loading is established through
differential expansion of the bolt and compression
sleeve.

The fixed axial flow type steam separators have


no moving parts and are made of stainless steel. WET
In each separator, the steam-water mixture rising STEAM CORE STANDPIPE
DISCHARGE
through the standpipe impinges on vanes which give PLENUM
the mixture a spin to establish a vortex wherein the
centrifugal forces separate the water from the steam Figure 3-4. Schematic of Steam Flow Through Separator
in each of three stages. Steam leaves the separator at
the top and passes into the wet steam plenum below which is removable from the RPV as an integral unit.
the dryer (Figure 3-4). The separated liquid exits The assembly includes the dryer banks, dryer supply
from the lower end of each stage of the separator and discharge ducting, drain collecting trough, drain
and enters the pool that surrounds the standpipes to ducts, and a skirt which forms a water seal extending
join the downcomer annulus flow. below the separator reference zero elevation. Steam
from the steam separators flows upward to the steam
Steam Dryer Assembly (20) dryer and outward through the drying vanes (Figure
The steam dryer assembly consists of multiple 3-5). These vanes are attached to a top and bottom
banks of dryer units mounted on a common structure supporting member forming a rigid, integral unit.

3-5
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

DRYER injection lines. In addition, four 150 mm flow restric-


LIFTING
BAR (4) tors are designed into each nozzle to limit the flow
in the event of a postulated GDCS line break.

GDCS Equalizing Line Inlet (24)


A A
There are four 150 mm nozzles spaced around
the RPV for connection to each of the four divisions
of the GDCS equalizing lines. Flow restrictors are
part of each nozzle design to limit the flow in the
DRAIN CHANNELS STEAM WATER FLOW event of a postulated GDCS equalizing line break.
(AT EACH DRYER FROM SEPARATORS
SECTION)
RWCU/SDC Outlet (25)
There are two 300 mm nozzles provided for
STEAM DRYER ASSEMBLY
connection to each of the trains of the Reactor
DRYER
Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling (RWCU/SDC)
SKIRT system.
VERTICAL GUTTER STRIP
OR "MOISTURE HOOK"

STEAM Control Rod Drive


System
WATER
FLOW

CROSS SECTION A-A The Control Rod Drive (CRD) System controls
changes in core reactivity during power operation by
Figure 3-5. Schematic of Steam Flow Through Dryer movement and positioning of the neutron absorbing
control rods within the core in fine increments in
Moisture is removed and carried by a system of response to control signals from the Rod Control
troughs and drains to the pool surrounding the sepa- and Information System (RC&IS). The CRD System
rators and then into the downcomer annulus between provides rapid control rod insertion in response to
the chimney and reactor vessel wall. Upward and manual or automatic signals from the Reactor Pro-
radial movement of the dryer assembly under the tection System (RPS). Figure 3-6 shows the basic
action of blowdown and seismic loads is limited by system configuration and scope.
support brackets on the vessel shell and hold down
brackets inside the RPV closure head. The assembly When scram is initiated by the RPS, the CRD
is arranged for removal from the vessel as an integral System inserts the negative reactivity necessary to
unit on a routine basis. shut down the reactor. Each control rod is normally
controlled by an electric motor unit. When a scram
DPV/IC Outlet (21) and IC Return (22) signal is received, high-pressure water stored in ni-
There are four 450 mm nozzles spaced around trogen charged accumulators forces the control rods
the RPV for connection to each of the four isolation into the core. Simultaneously, the control rod drives
condenser (IC) subsystems and to four of the depres- are inserted via the electric motor units. Thus, the
surization valves (DPV). The IC return line nozzles hydraulic scram action is backed up by an electri-
are 200 mm diameter. cally energized insertion of the control rods.

GDCS Inlet (23) The CRD System consists of three major ele-
There are eight 150 mm nozzles spaced around ments:
the RPV for connection to each of the four divisions
of the Gravity Driven Cooling System (GDCS) Electrohydraulic fine motion control rod drive

3-6
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

TO OTHER HCUs
SCRAM AIR HEADER
DUMP VALVES ARI VALVES
S S S S
FW- B TO HCU
RPV
S S S S RWCU/SDC- A SSPV
FROM
S S
INSTRUMENT EXHAUST
AIR S
TO OTHER
HCUs A
RPV
EXHAUST SCRAM CRD
A VALVE
FMCRD
F R O M C O ND E N SA T E
AND FEEDWATER
H O
CONDENSATE 2
STORAGE N2
TANK INJECTION
MIN VALVES
FLOW AO
RPV
LINE CRD
TO OTHER
FMCRD
HCUs
PRIMARY
ACCUMULATOR CONTAINMENT
AO

CHARGING PURGE
HEADER HEADER

CRD
PUMPS
RWCU/SDC
PUMPS
BACKUP CORE MAKEUP PURGE WATER
CONTROL VALVES
NBS

Figure 3-6. CRD System Schematic

(FMCRD) mechanisms. in almost all current GE plants) in that the control


Hydraulic control unit (HCU) assemblies blades are moved electrically during normal op-
eration. This feature permits small power changes,
Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System
improved startup time, and improved power maneu-
(CRDHS)
vering. The FMCRD, as with current drives, is in-
serted into the core hydraulically during emergency
The FMCRDs provide electric-motor-driven shutdown. Because the FMCRD has the additional
positioning for normal insertion and withdrawal electrical motor, it drives the control blade into the
of the control rods and hydraulic-powered rapid core even if the primary hydraulic system fails to
control rod insertion for abnormal operating condi- do so, thus providing an additional level of protec-
tions. Simultaneous with scram, the FMCRDs also tion against Anticipated Transient Without Scram
provide electric-motor-driven run-in of control (ATWS) events. The FMCRD design is an improved
rods as a path to rod insertion that is diverse from version of similar drives that have been in operation
the hydraulic-powered scram. The hydraulic power in European BWRs since 1972, and is basically the
required for scram is provided by high pressure water same drive design that is in use in ABWR.
stored in the individual HCUs. An HCU can scram
two FMCRDs. It also provides the flow path for Figure 3-7 shows a cross-section of the FMCRD
purge water to the associated drives during normal as used in the ESBWR. The FMCRD consists of four
operation. The CRDHS supplies pressurized water major subassemblies: the drive, spool piece, brake
for charging the HCU scram accumulators and and motor/synchros. The spool piece and motor may
purging to the FMCRDs. In addition, the CRDHS be removed without disturbing the drive, allowing
supplies high pressure makeup water to the RPV maintenance with low personnel exposure.
during certain transients.
The drive consists of the outer tube, hollow
Fine Motion Control Rod Drives piston, guide tube, buffer, labyrinth seal, ball check
The ESBWR FMCRDs are distinguished from valve, ball nut and ball screw shaft.
the locking piston CRDs (which are in operation

3-7
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

BAYONET COUPLING TYPE BAYONET COUPLING TYPE


crud into the drive. The piston head contains
CRD SPUD INTERNAL CRD BLOWOUT latches that latch into notches in the drive guide
(TO CONTROL ROD SUPPORT (TO CONTROL ROD
SOCKET COUPLING) GUIDE TUBE BASE COUPLING) tube after scram. The scram buffering action is
provided by an assembly of Belleville washers
FMCRD HOUSING in the buffer and is supplemented by hydraulic
LABYRINTH SEAL BUFFER damping as the buffer assembly parts come
together.

FULL-IN MECHANISM The outer tube performs several functions,


one of which is to absorb the scram pressure,
preventing its application to the CRD housing,
which is part of the reactor coolant pressure
OUTER TUBE HOLLOW PISTON boundary (RCPB). The outer tube top end is a
BALL SCREW
bayonet connection similar to that employed
POSITION INDICATOR on the hollow piston which couples with a
PROBE (PIP)
GUIDE TUBE similar bayonet connection on the control
BALL NUT
PISTON HEAD rod guide tube, sandwiching the CRD hous-
SCRAM INLET LINE
SCRAM POSITION
ing end cap between the two. The outer tube
BALL CHECK VALVE
SENSING MAGNET lower end is a middle flange which bolts to
MIDDLE FLANGE the CRD housing flange. The bolts allow the
SEPARATION SENSING drive to remain in place when the motor and
MAGNET BACK SEAT spool piece are removed. The combination of
SEPARATION SENSING
SPRING
the positive coupling of the control rod guide
SPOOL PIECE
tube and the drive and the flange on the lower
MAGNETIC COUPLING end of the outer tube form a positive means
SEPARATION PROBE of preventing ejection of the FMCRD/con-
trol rod for any postulated housing break.
Protection against the postulated failure of
MOTOR UNIT
(WITH BRAKE,
the housing to stub tube weld is provided by
POSITION DETECTOR the same features, with the shootout load be-
AND GEAR UNIT)
ing transferred to the core plate by the flange
at the top end of the control rod guide tube.
Figure 3-7. Fine Motion Control Rod Drive Cross-Section These internal CRD blowout support features
allow the elimination of the external support
The coupling is a bayonet-type configuration structure of beams, hanger rods, grids and support
which, when coupled with the mating coupling on bars used to prevent rod ejection as in previous GE
the control rod blade, precludes separation of the BWR product lines.
blade and the hollow piston.
The latches on the hollow piston are designed
The hollow piston is a long hollow tube with a so that with only one being engaged, it is sufficient
piston head at the lower end. The hollow piston is to hold the control rod in place under all loading,
driven into the reactor during scram by the pressure including the ejection load caused by a scram line
differential that is produced by the high scram flow break.
from the HCU accumulator. The labyrinth seal,
which is contained inside the buffer, at the top end In normal operation, the hollow piston rests on
of the outer tube restricts the flow from the drive to the ball nut and is raised and lowered by translation
the reactor, thereby maximizing the pressure drop of the ball nut resulting from rotation of the ball
which enhances scram performance. Additionally, screw. The latches are held in a retracted position by
it allows the purge flow during normal operation to the ball nut. During scram, the hollow piston is lifted
preclude entrance of reactor water and associated off the ball nut by the hydraulic pressure.

3-8
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

tor, position signal generators and holding brake.


The spline arrangement between the ball screw
lever coupling and the middle flange back seat There are two resolver-type position signal gen-
provides a back seat type anti-withdrawal gear that erators located within the motor unit. The resolvers
automatically engages whenever the spool piece is provide a continuous analog readout signal of control
lowered. This prevents the ball screw from rotating rod position during normal operation and are driven
and withdrawing the rod. by gears from the motor shaft.

The spool piece contains the magnetic coupling The holding brake located in the motor unit
between the motor and the ball screw drive shaft. serves to restrain the rod against withdrawal in the
The magnetic coupling is employed to achieve unlikely event that the scram line breaks. The brake
seal-less leak-free operation of the control rod drive is redundant with the ball check valve in mitigating
mechanism. The magnetic coupling consists of an the scram line break. It should be noted at this point
inner and an outer rotor. The inner rotor is located that the check valve on the FMCRD has no function
inside the spool piece pressure boundary and the other than to mitigate the scram line break and to
outer rotor is located on the outside. Each rotor has limit leakage during drive replacement.
permanent magnets mounted on it. As a result, the
inner and outer rotors are locked together by the The balance of the FMCRD System includes
magnetic forces acting through the pressure bound- the scram position probes which are mounted on
ary and work as a synchronous coupling. The outer the outside of the CRD housing. The scram probe
rotor is coupled with the motor unit and driven by provides a position signal at 10%, 40% and 60%
the motor. The inner rotor is keyed to the drive shaft insertion, as well as continuous full-in. The con-
and follows the rotation of the outer rotor. tinuous full-in signal prevents the loss of position
indication that would otherwise occur while the
The spool piece also contains a weighing de- hollow piston is held by the scram latches at the top
vice, which is a spring-loaded platform with two latched position.
magnets located on it. In normal service, weight
of the hollow piston and control rod is transferred The probes use reed switches similar to the
to the weighing device. If, during withdrawal, the Locking Piston Control Rod Drive (LPCRD), as do
weight of the rod or hollow piston is removed from the separation switch probes that are mounted on the
the device, then the device will move upwards and side of the spool piece. The separation probes and
trigger two external reed switches, called separation associated circuits and equipment are considered
switches. If either is opened, withdrawal motion is important to safety and are therefore categorized
inhibited. There are two separation switch probes as Class 1E.
which are directly opposite each other. Each probe
contains one switch. Thus, the reactivity addition In addition to the FMCRD and probes, other
from a postulated Rod Drop Accident is limited to items in the system include the power supply to
a few cents, and this event is no longer analyzed in motor, the Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU), scram
Safety Analysis Reports. piping, wiring and the CRD pump and its associ-
ated equipment.
The spool piece is bolted to the CRD housing
by bolts which pass through the middle flange. As Induction Motor Control (IMC) equipment in
mentioned above, the middle flange is also bolted to the Rod Control & Information System (RC&IS)
the CRD housing. The double bolting arrangement, provides the control power to the FMCRDs for per-
combined with the back seat type lock feature dis- forming normal control rod movements. The IMC
cussed above, allows spool piece servicing without equipment provides for AC phase direction change
disturbing the drive. of the 3-Phase AC power provided to each AC in-
duction motor so that both insertion and withdrawal
The motor unit bolts to the bottom of the spool movements can be accomplished.
piece. The motor unit consists of the induction mo-

3-9
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

The Rod Brake Controllers (RBCs) within the event of a postulated steam line break. The system
RC&IS provide the control power for operation of incorporates provisions for relief of overpressure
the holding brakes. The holding brake is normally conditions in the RPV. Also included in the NBS
de-energized and engaged by spring force when is the Nuclear Island portion of the Feedwater
the FMCRD is stationary. The RBC provides the System.
power to energize and disengage the brake when
the FMCRD is commanded to move. Main Steam Subsystem (MS)
In the ESBWR design, four 700 mm steam lines
Hydraulic Control Units transport steam from the steam outlet nozzles on the
The HCU consists of a gas bottle and accumula- RPV through Reinforced Concrete Containment
tor which are mounted on a frame. The HCU also Vessel (RCCV) penetrations and then through the
includes the scram and scram pilot valves. In an steam tunnel to the turbine. Main steam isolation
ESBWR, there is one HCU for every two FMCRDs, valves (MSIVs) are installed in each steam line
similar to the ABWR. The use of the paired ar- inboard and outboard of the RCCV penetrations.
rangement allows savings in space and maintenance Eighteen safety/relief valves (SRVs) are installed
without sacrificing reliability or safety. The two FM- vertically on the main steam lines. Of the 18 SRVs,
CRDs on a given HCU are widely separated in the 10 provide the Automatic Depressurization System
core so that there is no additional loss of shutdown (ADS) function during an accident condition, and
margin if an HCU fails. the discharge from each SRV is routed through the
associated SRV discharge line to quenchers located
Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System in the suppression pool. The remaining 8 SRVs are
The ESBWR Control Rod Drive Hydraulic spring-actuated only to provide overpressure protec-
System (CRDHS) supplies clean, demineralized tion in the case of a postulated Anticipated Transient
water, which is regulated and distributed to provide Without Scram (ATWS) event. The discharge from
charging of the HCU scram accumulators and purge these valves is routed into two discharge headers
water flow to the FMCRDs. The CRDHS is also the located in the drywell equipped with rupture disks.
source of pressurized water for purging the Reactor Each discharge header is also routed to the sup-
Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling (RWCU/SDC) pression pool with a discharge line terminating in
System pumps and for providing keep-fill flow to a quencher.
the RPV water level reference leg instrument lines.
In addition, the CRDHS provides high pressure In addition, the MS is equipped with 8 Depres-
makeup water to the reactor vessel following the surization Valves (DPVs). These valves are actuated
loss of the normal feedwater makeup supply (red during postulated LOCAs and discharge directly
pathway in Figure 3-6). into the drywell. Four valves are located on the
main steam lines and four are located on stub lines
The CRD pump is basically the same as that which also supply steam to the Isolation Condens-
used in ABWR (i.e., a multistage centrifugal pump). ers (IC). Figure 3-8 is a simplified piping diagram
The filtration system is basically also the same as of the MS.
that used in ABWR.
The MS is composed of several components
and subsystems in addition to the above, which
are necessary for proper operation of the reactor

Nuclear Boiler System under various operating, shutdown and accident


conditions. Some of these subsystems include: main
steam bypass/drain subsystem, reactor head vent
The purpose of the Nuclear Boiler System subsystem, and system instrumentation.
(NBS) is to direct steam flow from the RPV steam
outlet nozzles to the main turbine. A main steam Main Steam Isolation Valves
line flow restrictor is provided in each steam outlet Two MSIVs are welded in a horizontal run
nozzle. It is designed to limit the flow rate in the of each of the four main steam pipes. The MSIVs

3-10
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

ISOLATION VACUUM
CONDENSER BREAKER CONTAINMENT
(TYPICAL) TURBINE
INBOARD MSIV BUILDING
SRV
(TYPICAL) AV AV

MAIN
TURBINE
MAIN STEAM
RPV LINE A
DPV SEISMIC
DPV FROM
(TYPICAL) OUTBOARD GUIDE
(TYPICAL) STEAMLINES
MSIV B, C & D

FROM
STEAMLINES
B, C & D

DRAIN LINE

FROM
DRAIN LINE
STEAMLINES
B, C & D

AV WETWELL

DRAIN LINE
QUENCHER
RADWASTE MAIN
SUMP SUPPRESSION POOL CONDENSER

Figure 3-8. Main Steam Subsystem

are designed to isolate primary containment upon and outlet passages to be streamlined; this minimizes
receiving an automatic or manual closure signal, pressure drop during normal steam flow and helps
thus limiting the loss of coolant and the release of prevent debris buildup on the valve seat.
radioactive materials from the nuclear system.
Attached to the upper end of the stem is a pneu-
Each MSIV is a Y-pattern, globe valve and matic cylinder that opens and closes the valve and a
is powered by both pneumatic pressure and com- hydraulic dashpot that controls its speed. The speed
pressed spring force (Figure 3-9). The main disk is adjusted by hydraulic control valves in the hydrau-
assembly is attached to the lower end of the stem. lic return lines bypassing the dashpot piston.
Normal steam flow tends to close the valve and
the pressure is over the disk. The bottom end of The valve is designed to close quickly when
the valve stem or a stem disk attached to the stem nitrogen or air is admitted to the upper piston com-
closes a small pressure balancing hole in the main partment to isolate the MS in the event of a LOCA,
disk assembly. When the hole is open, it acts as an or other events requiring containment or system
opening to relieve differential pressure forces on the isolation to limit the release of reactor coolant. The
main disk assembly. Valve stem travel is sufficient MSIVs can be test closed one at a time at a slow
to provide flow areas past the wide open main disk closing speed by admitting nitrogen or air to both
assembly greater than the seat port area. The main the upper and lower piston compartments. This is
disk assembly travels approximately 90% of the to ensure that the slow valve closure does not pro-
valve stem travel to close the main seat port area; duce a transient disturbance large enough to cause
approximately the last 10% of the valve stem travel a reactor scram.
closes the pilot seat. The air cylinder actuator can
open the main disk assembly with a maximum dif- When all the MSIVs are closed, the combined
ferential pressure of 1.38 MPaG (200 psig) across leakage through the MSIVs for all four steam lines
the isolation valve in a direction that tends to hold the is monitored to within the offsite radiation dose
valve closed. The Y-pattern valve permits the inlet release limit.

3-11
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

ACCUMULATOR
LIFTING
MECHANISM
LEVER

PNEUMATIC
YOKE ROD CONTROL
PANEL
SPINDLE

LIMIT SWITCH

PNEUMATIC
CYLINDER
AIR SUPPLY HYDRAULIC SET POINT SPRING
DASHPOT (BELLEVILLE WASHERS)
(COMPRESSION)
STEM EXTERNAL SPRINGS
BONNET
PILOT
POPPET PISTON-TYPE
SPRING PNEUMATIC
ACTUATOR PACKING
DISK AND GLAND
PISTON
ASSEMBLY

COVER VENT
FLOW

ADJUSTING
RING

PILOT POPPET SOLENOID AND PISTON


POPPET VALVE BODY DRAIN AIR CONTROL LINER
VALVE ASSEMBLY DISCHARGE

PISTON
DISC

Figure 3-9. Main Steam Isolation Valve BODY INLET


NOZZLE

Nitrogen is used for the inboard MSIV operation Figure 3-10. Safety Relief Valve With
because of the inerted drywell environment where Pneumatic Actuator
the inboard MSIVs are located. Instrument air is
used for the outboard MSIV operation. is classified as nonsafety-related.

A separate pneumatic accumulator is provided Due to the use of the IC System in ESBWR,
and located close to each MSIV, supplying pressure SRVs are not normally needed to maintain primary
as backup operating gas to assist in valve closure in system pressure below the ASME Code design
the event of a failure of pneumatic supply pressure limits.
to the valve actuator.
The SRVs are located on the main steam lines
Safety/Relief Valves between the RPV and the inboard MSIV. These
A SRV is in principle a dual function, direct- valves provide two main protection functions:
acting valve and is classified as safety-related (Fig-
ure 3-10). In the ESBWR, 10 valves (ADS-SRV) Overpressure Safety Operation: The 18
include the accumulators and pneumatic actuators valves function as spring-loaded safety valves
necessary for automatic or manual actuation in ad- and open to prevent RCPB overpressurization.
dition to opening on spring pressure (dual function). The valves are self-actuated by inlet steam pres-
The other 8 SRVs have the same body, but do not sure. This will occur only during certain ATWS
include the extra actuators and open on spring pres- events.
sure only (direct acting). The SRV is considered part
of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)
because the inlet side of the valve is connected to the Operation: The 10 ADS-SRV valves are
steam line prior to the inboard MSIV. The ADS-SRV opened using a pneumatic actuator upon receipt
logic and two of the solenoids are also classified and of an automatic or manually initiated signal at
qualified as safety-related per the IEEE Standards. the solenoid valve located on the pneumatic
This classification is also applied to the ADS func- actuator assembly. This action pulls the lifting
tion and other associated systems. The third solenoid mechanism of the main disk, thereby open-

3-12
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

ing the valve to allow inlet steam to discharge The ADS-SRVs can be operated individually in
through the SRV. The SRV pneumatic operator the power-actuated mode by remote manual switches
is so arranged that, if it malfunctions, it does not located in the main control room. They are provided
prevent the SRV from opening when steam inlet with position sensors which provide positive indica-
pressure reaches the spring lift setpoint. They are tion of SRV disk/stem position.
opened automatically or manually in the power
actuated mode when required during a LOCA. Each ADS-SRV has its own discharge line with
The ADS designated SRVs open automatically two vacuum breakers. The discharge lines are sized
as part of the Emergency Core Cooling System so that the critical flow conditions occur through the
(ECCS) as required to mitigate a LOCA when valve. This prevents the conditions in the discharge
it becomes necessary to reduce RCPB pressure lines of water hammer and pressure instability. For
to admit low pressure ECCS coolant flow to the the ADS-SRVs, the SRV discharge lines terminate at
reactor. the quenchers located below the surface of the sup-
pression pool (SP). The remaining 8 SRVs discharge
The SRVs are divided into two spring setpoint lines are routed to two headers in the drywell which
groups to relieve the RPV pressure in accordance are equipped with rupture disks. Each header has a
with the RPV overpressure protection evaluations discharge line with two vacuum breakers, sized for
for ATWS. the steam relief of one SRV, which terminates in a
quencher located below the surface of the SP.
A pneumatic accumulator is provided for each
ADS-SRV function and is located close to each Depressurization Valves
SRV to supply pressure for the purpose of valve There are eight DPVs, 4 located on the main
actuation. steam lines and 4 on stub lines (Figure 3-11), whose
sole purpose is to aid the ADS subsystem in rapidly

TENSION BOLT BOOSTER ASSEMBLY TENSION BOLT BOOSTER ASSEMBLY


(EXPLOSIVE) (EXPLOSIVE)

HOUSING HOUSING

NIPPLE PISTON NIPPLE PISTON


ACTUATOR PIN

INLET INLET
OUTLET OUTLET

NIPPLE
SHEAR CAP
NIPPLE
SHEAR SECTION NIPPLE RETAINER NIPPLE RETAINER SHEAR CAP
ELECTROMAGNETIC ELECTROMAGNETIC
SWITCH SWITCH

CLOSED OPEN

Figure 3-11. Depressurization Valve

3-13
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

reducing RCPB pressure during a LOCA in order for MAIN TURBINE


TURBINE
the low pressure ECCS to add water to the RPV. C D A B BUILDING
MAIN
STEAM
LINES
The DPVs are of a non-leak/non-simmer/non-
maintenance design. They are straight-through,
squib-actuated, non-reclosing valves with a metal
diaphragm seal. The valve size provides about twice OUTBOARD MSIV
REACTOR
BUILDING
the depressurization capacity as an SRV. Each DPV
is closed with a cap covering the inlet chamber. The INBOARD MSIV

cap shears off when pushed by a valve plunger that DRYWELL CONTAINMENT
WALL

is actuated by the explosive initiator-booster. This


opens the inlet hole through the plug. The sheared
* SRV SRV SRV
cap is hinged such that it drops out of the flow SRV
SRV *
SRV

path and does not block the valve. The DPVs are SRV
SRV *
DPV DPV
*
SRV
SRV

designed so that there is no leakage across the cap SRV SRV


*
SRV SRV *

throughout the life of the valve. * SRV MSL DPV


REACTOR
DPV MSL SRV *
PRESSURE
* SRV VESSEL SRV *
MSL
Two initiators (squibs), singly or jointly, actuate DPV DPV
MSL
a booster, which actuates the shearing plunger. The DPV DPV RPV STEAM OUTLET

squibs are initiated by either one, or both of, two * ADS DESIGNATED SRV
NOZZLE/RESTRICTOR
(TYPICAL)

battery-powered, independent firing circuits. The


firing of one initiator-booster is adequate to activate Figure 3-13. MSIV, SRV and DPV Configuration
the plunger.

The DPV has undergone engineering develop-


ment testing using a prototype to demonstrate the FROM FW-TI
proper operability, reliability, and flow capabil- TURBINE BUILDING

ity of the design. Figure 3-12 shows the DPV test SEISMIC
facility, located at Wyle Laboratories, Huntsville, GUIDE REACTOR BUILDING

Alabama. FROM FROM


RWCU - B RWCU - A

FROM FROM

STEAM TUNNEL
FAPCS CRD
FW - A

FW - B

CONTAINMENT
WALL

REACTOR
Figure 3-12. DPV Under Test PRESSURE
VESSEL

Figure 3-13 shows the SRV, DPV and MSIV


locations on the main steam lines and stub lines. Figure 3-14. Feedwater Configuration (Nuclear Island)

3-14
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

Feedwater Subsystem (Nuclear Island) Isolation Condenser


System
Two 550 mm feedwater lines transport feed-
water from the feedwater pipes in the steam tunnel
through RCCV penetrations to horizontal headers in
the upper drywell which have three 300 mm riser The primary function of the Isolation Condenser
lines that connect to nozzles on the RPV (Figure System (ICS) is to limit reactor pressure and prevent
3-14). Isolation valves are installed upstream and Safety Relief Valve (SRV) operation following an
downstream of the RCCV penetrations. Two other isolation of the main steam lines. The ICS, together
valves, one upstream and one downstream of the with the water stored in the RPV, conserves sufficient
isolation valves are installed to provide rapid isola- reactor coolant volumes to avoid automatic depres-
tion of a postulated feedwater line break to limit the surization caused by low reactor water level. The
amount of additional water added to containment. ICS removes excess sensible and core decay heat
The valves will be either power- and/or process- from the reactor, in a passive way and with minimal
operated. Also shown in the figure are the intercon- loss of coolant inventory from the reactor, when the
nections from the Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown normal heat removal system is unavailable. The ICS
Cooling System (RWCU/SDC), CRD and Fuel and is designed as a safety-related system to remove
Auxiliary Pool Cooling System (FAPCS). reactor decay heat following reactor shutdown and
isolation. It also prevents unnecessary reactor de-
pressurization and operation of ECCS, which can
also perform this function.

MOISTURE SEPARATOR ATMOSPHERIC


VENT
ISOLATION CONDENSER

IC/PCC POOL

NO
NO

NMO

NMO

MAIN STEAM
REACTOR LINE
DRYWELL DPV VESSEL NO
INLINE
VESSEL
STUB
LINE

NO

CORE
TRAIN A SHOWN
SUPPRESSION
POOL

Figure 3-15. Isolation Condenser System (Standby Mode)

3-15
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

The ICS consists of four totally independent first started. The purge line penetrates the contain-
trains, each containing an isolation condenser (IC) ment roof slab.
that condenses steam on the tube side and transfers
heat to a large IC/PCCS pool positioned immediately Containment isolation valves are provided on
outside the containment, which is vented to the the steam supply piping and the condensate return
atmosphere as shown on the ICS schematic (Figure piping.
3-15). The IC, connected by piping to the reactor
pressure vessel, is placed at an elevation above the Located on the condensate return piping just
source of steam (vessel) and, when the steam is con- upstream of the reactor entry point is a loop seal and
densed, the condensate is returned to the vessel via a parallel-connected pair of valves: (1) a condensate
a condensate return pipe. The steam side connection return valve (nitrogen motor-operated, fail as is) and
between the vessel and the IC is normally open and (2) a condensate return bypass valve (nitrogen piston
the condensate line is normally closed. This allows operated, fail open). These two valves are closed
the IC, drain piping and an in-line water storage during normal station power operations. Because
tank to fill with condensate, which is maintained the steam supply line valves are normally open,
at a subcooled temperature by the pool water dur- condensate forms in the IC and develops a level up
ing normal reactor operation. The IC is started into to the steam distributor, above the upper headers.
operation by opening condensate return valves and To start an IC into operation, the nitrogen motor-
draining the condensate to the reactor, thus causing operated condensate return valve and the condensate
steam from the reactor to fill the tubes which transfer return bypass valve are opened, whereupon the
heat to the cooler pool water. Each IC consists of standing condensate drains into the reactor and the
two identical modules. steam-water interface in the IC tube bundle moves
downward below the lower headers to a point in the
The steam supply line (properly insulated main condensate return line.
and enclosed in a guard pipe which penetrates the
containment roof slab) is vertical and feeds two The loop seal assures that condensate valves
horizontal headers through four branch pipes. Each do not have hot water on one side of the disk and
pipe is provided with a built-in flow limiter, sized to ambient temperature water on the other side during
allow natural circulation operation of the IC at its normal plant operation, thus affecting leakage during
maximum heat transfer capacity while addressing system standby conditions. Furthermore, the loop
the concern of IC breaks downstream of the steam seal assures that steam continues to enter the IC
supply pipe. Steam is condensed inside vertical preferentially through the steam riser, irrespective
tubes and condensate is collected in two lower of water level inside the reactor, and does not move
headers. Two pipes, one from each lower header, countercurrent back up the condensate return line.
take the condensate to the common drain line which
vertically penetrates the containment roof slab. During ICS normal operation, any noncon-
densable gases collected in the IC are vented from
A vent line is provided for both upper and the IC top and bottom headers to the suppression
lower headers to remove the noncondensable gases pool. During ICS standby operation, discharge of
away from the unit, during IC operation. The vent hydrogen excess or air is accomplished by a purge
lines are routed to the containment through a single line that takes a small stream of gas from the top
penetration. of the isolation condenser and vents it downstream
of the RPV on the main steam line upstream of the
A purge line is provided to assure that, during MSIVs.
normal plant operation (IC system standby condi-
tions), the excess of hydrogen (from hydrogen Radiation monitors are provided in the IC/PCC
water chemistry control additions) or air from the pool steam atmospheric exhaust passages for each
feedwater does not accumulate in the IC steam IC loop. The radiation monitors are used to detect IC
supply line, thus assuring that the IC tubes are not loop leakage outside the containment and cause ei-
blanketed with noncondensables when the system is ther alarms or automatic isolation of a leaking IC.

3-16
Chapter 3 Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

The IC has undergone engineering development


testing using a prototype to demonstrate the proper
operability, reliability, and heat removal capability
of the design over a range of pressures and tempera-
tures. Figure 3-16 shows one of the modules (half
of a heat exchanger) under test at the SIET facility
in Italy.

Figure 3-16. IC Test Module

3-17
Chapter 4 Safety Systems

Chapter
Safety Systems 4
Overview In addition to the systems mentioned above,
there are other important safety systems in the
ESBWR, including the Emergency Air Supply
The ESBWR Safety Systems design incorpo- subsystem of the Control Room Habitability HVAC
rates four redundant and independent divisions of Subsystem (CRHAVS).
the passive Gravity Driven Core Cooling System
(GDCS), the Automatic Depressurization System
(ADS) and a Passive Containment Cooling System

Emergency Core
(PCCS). Refer to Figure 4-1. Heat removal and in-
ventory addition are also provided by the Isolation

Cooling Systems
Condenser System (ICS) and the Standby Liquid
Control System (SLCS). The ADS and ICS Systems
were discussed in Chapter 3.
Gravity Driven Core Cooling System
The RPV has no external recirculation loops or
General
large pipe nozzles below the top of the core region.
The GDCS is composed of four divisions. A
This, together with a high capacity ADS, allowed the
single division of the GDCS consists of three inde-
incorporation of an ECCS driven solely by gravity,
pendent subsystems: a short-term cooling (injection)
with no need for pumps. The water source needed
system, a long-term cooling (equalizing) system, and
for the ECCS function is stored in the containment
a deluge line. The short-term and long-term systems
upper drywell, with sufficient water to ensure core
provide cooling water under force of gravity to re-
coverage to 1 meter above the top of active fuel as
place RPV water inventory lost during a postulated
well as flooding the lower drywell.
LOCA and subsequent decay heat boil-off. The
The PCCS heat exchangers are located above deluge line connects the GDCS pool to the lower
and immediately outside of containment. There is drywell. Refer to Figure 4-2.
sufficient water in the external pools to remove decay
heat for at least 72 hours following a postulated de- Each division of the GDCS injection system
sign basis accident, and provisions exist for external consists of one 200 mm pipe exiting from the GDCS
makeup beyond that, if necessary. pool. A 100 mm deluge line branches off and is ter-
minated with three 50 mm squib valves and deluge
As a result of these simplifications in the ES- line tailpipes to flood the lower drywell. The injec-
BWR safety systems, there is an increase in the cal- tion line continues after the deluge line connection
culated safety performance margin of the ESBWR from the upper drywell region through the drywell
over earlier BWRs. This has been confirmed by a annulus where the line branches into two 150 mm
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for the ES- branch lines each containing a biased-open check
BWR, which shows that the ESBWR is a calculated valve and a squib valve.
factor of about 5 lower than ABWR and 50 better
than BWR/6 in avoiding possible core damage from Each division of the long-term system consists
degraded events. of one 150 mm equalizing line with a check valve

4-1
Chapter 4 Safety Systems

Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS) Automatic Depressurization Isolation Condenser System (ICS)
Gravity Driven Cooling System (GDCS) System (ADS) Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS)
Ultimate
Heat Sink

PCC Pool
IC Pool
Containment
NMO NO
Steam Supply
SRV
GDCS DPV NMO NO
GDCS
Pool Condensate Pool
Main Steam Drain
Line
GDCS Injection Line
RPV
NO
PCC Vent IC Vent
Line Line

NO

Suppression Suppression
Pool Equalizing Line Pool

Core

DPV = Depressurization valve Deluge


Line
= Explosive valve = Safety/relief valve
BiMAC
= Motor operated valve = Solenoid valve Containment Boundary

Figure 4-1. ESBWR Key Safety Systems

and a squib valve, routed between the suppression the vessel has depressurized below GDCS pool sur-
pool and the RPV. All piping is stainless steel and face pressure plus its gravity head, the differential
rated for reactor pressure and temperature. The RPV pressure opens the check valve and allows water to
injection line nozzles and the equalizing line nozzles begin flowing into the vessel. Refer to Figure 4-3
all contain integral flow limiters. for a 3D simulation of the GDCS process.

In the injection lines and the equalizing lines The GDCS deluge lines provide a means of
there exists a remotely testable check valve located flooding the lower drywell region with GDCS pool
upstream of the squib-actuated valve. The GDCS water in the event of a postulated core melt sequence,
squib valves are gas propellant type shear valves which causes failure of the lower vessel head and
that are normally closed and which open when a allows the molten fuel to reach the lower drywell
pyrotechnic booster charge is ignited. During nor- floor. A core melt sequence would result from a
mal reactor operation, the squib valve is designed common mode failure of the short-term and long-
to provide zero leakage. Once the squib valve is term systems, which prevents them from performing
actuated it provides a permanent open flow path to their intended function. Deluge line flow is initiated
the vessel. by thermocouples, which sense high lower drywell
region basemat temperature indicative of molten
The check valves mitigate the consequences of fuel on the lower drywell floor. Squib-type valves
spurious GDCS squib valve operation and minimize in the deluge lines are actuated upon detection of
the loss of RPV inventory after the squib valves are high basemat temperatures. The deluge lines do not
actuated and the vessel pressure is still higher than require the actuation of squib-actuated valves on
the GDCS pool pressure plus its gravity head. Once the injection lines of the GDCS piping to perform

4-2
Chapter 4 Safety Systems

SLOSH MESH
GUARD SCREEN

RE = REMOTELY EXERCISED
GDCS CHECK VALVE
POOL

INJECTION
LINE REACTOR
DELUGE VESSEL
LINE

WETWELL RE WETWELL
AIRSPACE AIRSPACE

RE

RE
SUPPRESSION INJECTION CORE SUPPRESSION
EQUALIZING
POOL SQUIB VALVES POOL
LINE
DELUGE
SQUIB VALVES

(TO LOWER DIVISION A SHOWN


DRYWELL - BiMAC)

TYP DIV B, C, D
DRYWELL

Figure 4-2. Gravity Driven Cooling System Schematic

their function. The GDCS equalizing lines perform the RPV


inventory control function in the long term. By clos-
The deluge valves are opened based on very ing the loop between the suppression pool and RPV,
high temperatures in the lower drywell, indicative inventory, which is transferred to the suppression
of a severe accident. Once the deluge valve is actu- pool either by PCCS condensation shortfall, or by
ated it provides a permanent open flow path from steam condensation in the drywell (which eventually
the GDCS pools to the lower drywell region. Flow spills back to the suppression pool), can be added
then drains to the lower drywell via permanently back to the RPV.
open drywell lines. This supports the BiMAC core
catcher function (see Chapter 8). Equipment and Component Description
The following describes the GDCS squib
The GDCS check valves remain fully open valve, and deluge valve, which are unique system
when zero differential pressure exists across the components that were not used in previous BWR
valve. This is to minimize the potential for sticking in designs.
the closed position during long periods of non use.
Squib Valve
Suppression pool equalization lines have an The function of the squib valve is to open upon
intake strainer to prevent the entry of debris mate- an externally applied signal and to remain in its full
rial into the system that might be carried into the open position without any continuing external power
pool during a large break LOCA. The GDCS pool source in order to admit reactor coolant makeup into
airspace opening to DW is covered by a mesh screen the reactor pressure vessel in the event of a LOCA.
or equivalent to prevent debris from entering the pool These valves also function in the closed position
and potentially blocking the coolant flow through to maintain RPV backflow leak-tight and main-
the fuel. A slosh guard is added to the opening to tain the reactor coolant pressure boundary during
minimize any sloshing of GDCS pool water into the normal plant operation. The valve is a horizontally
drywell following dynamic events. mounted, straight through, long duration submers-

4-3
Chapter 4 Safety Systems

Before

After
Figure 4-3. GDCS 3D Layout and Action after a Design Basis Accident

ible, pyrotechnic actuated, non-reclosing valve with it impacts the ram and nipple shear caps. Once the
metal diaphragm seals and flanged ends. The valve piston impacts the ram and nipple shear caps, the
design is such that no leakage is possible across the nipples are sheared. The ram and shear caps are
diaphragm seals throughout the 60-year life of the then driven forward and are locked in place at the
valve. The squib valve is classified as Quality Group end of stroke by an interference fit with the nipple
A, Seismic Category I, and ASME Section III Class retainer. This lock ensures that the nipples cannot
1. The valve diaphragm forms part of the reactor block the flow stream and provides a simple means
pressure boundary and as such is designed for RPV of refurbishment by simply unthreading the plug. A
service level conditions. switch located on the bottom of the valve provides a
method of indication to the control room of an actu-
Illustrated in Figure 4-4 is a typical squib valve ated valve. The shear nipple sections are designed
design that satisfies GDCS system requirements. to produce clean shear planes. The piston is allowed
This valve has similar design features to the ADS to backup after shearing the nipples, but, in any
depressurization valve. Valve actuation initiates case, its forward motion is limited by the housing
upon the actuation of either of two squib valve ini- so that it will not create flow resistance. Standard
tiators, a pyrotechnic booster charge is ignited, and metal seals are installed on the piston to reduce
hot gases are produced. When these gases reach a the potential of ballistic products from entering the
designed pressure, a tension bolt holding a piston flow stream. The squib valve can be completely
breaks allowing the piston to travel downward until refurbished once fired. The squib valve housing,

4-4
Chapter 4 Safety Systems

TENSION BOLT BOOSTER ASSEMBLY TENSION BOLT BOOSTER ASSEMBLY


(EXPLOSIVE) (EXPLOSIVE)

HOUSING HOUSING

NIPPLE PISTON PISTON


NIPPLE

INLET OUTLET INLET OUTLET

NIPPLE NIPPLE
SHEAR CAP SHEAR SECTION SHEAR CAP SHEAR SECTION

NIPPLE
RETAINER

ELECTROMATIC ELECTROMATIC
SWITCH SWITCH

CLOSED OPEN

Figure 4-4. GDCS Squib Valve

nipples, adapter flanges, actuator housing, indicator common mode failure, the deluge valve pyrotechnic
switch body, indicator plunger, head cap, coupling, booster material is different from the booster mate-
collar and adapter are machined. The piston, ram, rial in the other GDCS squib valves.
and tension bolt is made from heat treated material
for necessary strength. Automatic Depressurization System
The ADS logic is automatically initiated after
GDCS Check Valve a short delay if an RPV low water level signal is
The GDCS check valves are designed such that present concurrently with a high drywell pressure
the check valve is fully open when zero differential signal. The ADS logic is also automatically initiated
pressure is applied across the check valve. The full if only the RPV low water level signal is present.
open position is accomplished by valve design and This initiation will occur after a longer delay to al-
installation. The check valve is a long duration low high pressure backup systems (such as the CRD
submersible valve. The valve meets the minimum hydraulic system or parts of the Feedwater System)
flow requirements for a valve stuck in the open a chance to restore the RPV water level and thus
position. avoid the ADS actuation.

Remote check valve position indication is pro- ADS initiation is accomplished by redundant
vided in the main control room by position indication trip channels arranged in two divisionally separated
instrumentation. logics that control two separate solenoid-operated
pneumatic pilots on each ADS-SRV. Either pilot
Deluge Valve can operate the ADS valve. These pilots control the
The deluge valve is a 50 mm squib valve similar pneumatic pressure applied by the accumulators
in design to the SLCS squib valves or ADS depres- and the High Pressure Nitrogen Supply System
surization valves. To minimize the probability of (HPNSS). In addition to the 10 ADS-SRVs, the 8 De-

4-5
Chapter 4 Safety Systems

pressurization Valves (DPVs) are also initiated from lows. A central steam supply pipe is provided which
one of two squibs located on each valve, controlled is open to the containment at its lower end, and it
by the same trip channels. The ADS valve openings feeds two horizontal headers through two branch
are staggered in time to control the blowdown rate pipes at its upper end. Steam is condensed inside
and prevent excessive level swell. vertical tubes and the condensate is collected in two
lower headers. The vent and drain lines from each
The DC power for the logic and squib firing lower header are routed to the DW through a single
power is obtained from two separate divisions within containment penetration per condenser module as
the Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC). This shown on the diagram. The condensate drains into
arrangement makes the ADS initiation logic single- an annular duct around the vent pipe and then flows
failure proof. in a line that connects to a large common drain line,
which also receives flow from the other header, end-
For ATWS mitigation, the ADS has an automatic ing in a GDCS pool.
and manual inhibit of the automatic ADS initiation
to prevent ADS actuation during an ATWS. Auto- The non-condensable vent line is the pathway
matic initiation of the ADS is inhibited unless there
is a coincident low reactor water level signal and an
average power range monitors (APRMs) downscale
signal. There are also main control room switches for
the manual inhibit of automatic initiation of the ADS.
The ADS can also be initiated manually. Description
of the ADS valves can be found in Chapter 3.

Qualification tests of the GDCS were performed


in a full-height, scaled volume test facility at GE.
Figure 4-5 is a picture of the GDCS Integral System
Test (GIST).

Passive Containment Cooling System


The PCCS maintains the containment within its
pressure limits for Design Basis Accidents (DBAs).
The system is designed as a passive system with no
components that must actively function, and it is
also designed for conditions that equal or exceed the
upper limits of containment severe accident capabil-
ity. The PCCS consists of six, low-pressure, totally
independent loops, each containing a steam con-
denser (Passive Containment Cooling Condenser),
as shown in Figure 4-6. Each PCCS condenser loop
is designed for 11 MWt capacity and is made of two
identical modules. Together with the pressure sup-
pression containment, the PCCS condensers limit
containment pressure to less than its design pressure
for at least 72 hours after a LOCA without makeup
to the IC/PCC pool, and beyond 72 hours with pool
makeup. The PCCS condensers are located in a large
pool (IC/PCC pool) positioned above, and outside,
the ESBWR containment (DW).

Each PCCS condenser loop is configured as fol- Figure 4-5. GIST Facility

4-6
Chapter 4 Safety Systems

ATMOSPHERIC
PCC MOISTURE VENT
CONDENSER SEPARATOR

IC/PCC
POOL

CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY
INLET
DRYWELL

NON-CONDENSABLES
CONDENSATE
DRAIN LINE

VENT LINE
GDCS POOL

LOOP A SHOWN SPARGER

SUPPRESSION POOL

TYP LOOP B, C, D, E & F

Figure 4-6. Passive Containment Cooling System Schematic

by which drywell noncondensables are transferred Spectacle flanges are included in the drain line
to the wetwell. This ensures a low noncondens- and in the vent line to conduct post-maintenance
able concentration in the steam in the condenser, leakage tests separately from Type A containment
necessary for good heat transfer. During periods in leakage tests. Located on the drain line and sub-
which PCCS heat removal is less than decay heat, merged in the GDCS pool, just upstream of the
excess steam also flows to the suppression pool via discharge point, is a loop seal. It prevents backflow
this pathway. of steam and gas mixture from the DW to the vent
line, which would otherwise short circuit the flow
The PCCS loops receive a steam-gas mixture through the PCCS condenser to the vent line. It also
supply directly from the DW. The PCCS loops are provides long-term operational assurance that the
initially driven by the pressure difference created PCCS condenser is fed via the steam supply line.
between the containment DW and the suppression
pool during a LOCA and then by gravity drainage Each PCCS condenser is located in a sub-
of steam condensed in the tubes, so they require no compartment of the IC/PCC pool, and all pool
sensing, control, logic or power-actuated devices to subcompartments communicate at their lower ends
function. The PCCS loops are an extension of the to enable full use of the collective water inventory
safety-related containment and do not have isola- independent of the operational status of any given
tion valves. IC/PCCS sub-loop. A valve is provided at the bottom

4-7
Chapter 4 Safety Systems

of each PCC subcompartment that can be closed


so the subcompartment can be emptied of water to
allow PCCS condenser maintenance.

Pool water can heat up to about 101C (214F);


steam formed, being non-radioactive and having
a slight positive pressure relative to station ambi-
ent, vents from the steam space above each PCCS
condenser where it is released to the atmosphere
through large-diameter discharge vents. A moisture
separator is installed at the entrance to the discharge
vent lines to preclude excessive moisture carryover
and loss of IC/PCC pool water. IC/PCC pool makeup
clean water supply for replenishing level is normally
provided from the Makeup Water System.

Level control is accomplished by using an air-


operated valve in the makeup water supply line. Figure 4-7 PCCS Heat Exchanger Testing
The valve opening and closing is controlled by
water level signal sent by a level transmitter sens- ity effect of shutting down from rated power to cold
ing water level in the IC/PCC pool. Cooling and shutdown condition. It also adds additional inventory
cleanup of IC/PCC pool water is performed by the to the RPV after confirmation of a LOCA.
Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System (FAPCS)
(see Chapter 5). The FAPCS provides safety-related The SLCS is automatically initiated in case of
dedicated makeup piping, independent of any other signals indicative of LOCA or ATWS. It can also
piping, which provides an attachment connection at be manually initiated from the main control room
grade elevation in the station yard outside the reactor to inject the neutron absorbing solution into the
building, whereby a post-LOCA water supply can reactor.
be connected.
The SLCS is a two-division passive system us-
There have been extensive qualification tests of ing pressurized accumulators to inject borated water
the PCCS, including full-scale component tests and rapidly and directly into the bypass area of the core.
full height scaled integral tests. Figure 4-7 shows a Each division is 50% capacity. Injection will take
picture of the component testing at the SIET labo- place after either of two squib valves in each division
ratories in Italy. fires upon actuation signal from the SSLC. Figure
4-8 illustrates the SLCS configuration.

In addition to the accumulators and injection


Standby Liquid Control valves, supporting non-safety grade equipment

System
includes a high pressure nitrogen charging system
for pressurization and to make up for losses, and a
mixing and boron solution makeup system.
The Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS)
provides a backup method to bring the nuclear re- The boron absorbs thermal neutrons and thereby
actor to subcriticality and to maintain subcriticality terminates the nuclear fission chain reaction in the
as the reactor cools. The system makes possible fuel. The specified neutron absorber solution is
an orderly and safe shutdown in the event that not sodium pentaborate using 94% of the isotope B10
enough control rods can be inserted into the reactor at a concentration of 12.5%. This combination not
core to accomplish shutdown in the normal manner. only minimizes the quantity of liquid to be injected,
The SLCS is sized to counteract the positive reactiv- but also assures no auxiliary heating is needed to

4-8
Chapter 4 Safety Systems

REACTOR
BUILDING

VENT
VENT

AO AO ELECTRICALLY
HEATED
ACCUMULATOR NITROGEN
ACCUMULATOR
VAPORIZER

PRESSURE
LOOP B LOOP A BUFFER
LEVEL LEVEL
INSTRU- INSTRU-
MENTATION MENTATION

DRYWELL REACTOR
BUILDING
PUMP
AO AO INJECTION INJECTION AO AO
SQUIB VALVE RPV SQUIB VALVE
FROM LIQUID
NITROGEN TANK
MIXING DRUM
W/ ELECTRICAL
HEATING
CORE
PISTON PUMP
CORE MIXING FOR POISON
BYPASS PUMP SOLUTION
SPARGERS MAKEUP

POISON SOLUTION
FILL LINE

Figure 4-8. Standby Liquid Control System Schematic

prevent precipitation of the sodium pentaborate out that collectively provide the habitability functions.
of solution in the accumulator and piping. At all The systems that make up the habitability systems
times, when it is possible to make the reactor criti- are the:
cal, the SLCS will be able to deliver enough sodium
pentaborate solution into the reactor to assure reactor CRHA HVAC Subsystem (CRHAVS)
shutdown. Radiation Monitoring Subsystem (RMS)
Lighting System
Upon completion of injecting the boron solution, Fire Protection System (FPS)
redundant accumulator level measurement instru-
mentation using 2-out-of-4 logic closes at least one ESBWR design features are provided to ensure
of two injection line shut-off valves in each SLCS that the control room operators can remain in the
division. Closure of these valves prevents injection control room and take actions to safely operate the
of nitrogen from the accumulator into the reactor plant under normal conditions and to maintain it in
vessel that could interfere with Isolation Condenser a safe condition under accident conditions. These
System operation or cause additional containment habitability features include missile protection,
pressurization. As a backup, the accumulator vent radiation shielding, radiation monitoring, air filtra-
valves are also opened at the same time. tion and ventilation systems, lighting, personnel and
administrative support, and fire protection.

Emergency Control * The CRHA includes the plant area in which actions

Room Habitability can be taken to operate the plant safely under normal
conditions and to maintain the reactor in a safe condi-
tion during accident situations. It includes the Main
The Control Room Habitability Area* (CRHA) Control Room (MCR) area and areas adjacent to the
is served by a combination of individual systems MCR containing operator facilities.

4-9
Chapter 4 Safety Systems

The RMS provides radiation monitoring of the CRHAVS is not required to operate during normal
CRHA environment and outside air intake. The conditions. The normal operation of the CRHAVS
FPS provides smoke detection and fire damper maintains the air temperature of the CRHA within a
isolation. Emergency lighting is provided by the predetermined temperature range. This maintains the
Lighting System. Storage capacity is provided in CRHA emergency habitability system passive heat
the main control room for personnel support equip- sink at or below a predetermined temperature. The
ment. Manual hose stations outside the CRHA and normal operation portion of the CRHAVS operates
portable fire extinguishers provide fire suppression during all modes of normal power plant operation,
in the CRHA. including startup and shutdown

The CRHA boundary envelope structures are The Emergency Filter Units (EFUs) are redun-
designed with low leakage construction. The CRHA dant safety-related components that supply filtered
is located in an underground portion of the Control air to the CRHA for breathing and pressurization
Building (CB). The boundary walls are adjacent to to minimize inleakage. The EFUs and their related
underground fill or underground internal areas of the components form a safety-related subset of the
CB. The construction consists of cast-in-place rein- CRHAVS.
forced concrete walls and slabs, and is constructed to
minimize leakage through joints and penetrations. The EFU outside air supply portion of the
CRHAVS is safety-related and Seismic Category I.
Only the habitability portion of the CRHAVS Single active failure protection is provided by the use
is discussed here. Figure 4-9 provides a schematic of two trains, which are physically and electrically
diagram of the CRHAVS. redundant and separated. In the event of failure in
one train, the failed train is isolated and the alternate
The CRHA emergency habitability portion of the train is automatically initiated. Both trains are 100%

** HIGH RAD., SMOKE, LOW


FLOW DETECTION TO PLANT CHILLED CONTROL PRESSURE REDUCING
WATER RETURN VALVE VALVE

PRE-FILTER HEPA FILTER


MISSILE PROTECTION
AIR INTAKE (TYP)
(TYP) (TYP) FC CONTROL BLDG FROM PLANT CHILLED
WATER RETURN
M
HVAC ROOM
CHILLED WATER
THERMAL
ADSORBER (TYP)
STORAGE TANK
EMERGENCY
TORNADO PROTECTION FILTER-SA
FC
DAMPER (TYP) M TO PLANT CHILLED
AIR AIR
FC SEPARATOR SEPARATOR FC WATER RETURN
FO FO FO FO
FC
EMERGENCY LOUVER
FILTER-SB OUTSIDE AIR
LOUVER
SMOKE PURGE INTAKE FANS FC

INTAKE FC FC

FC
FC

FC FC

HUNG CEILING SMOKE PURGE


EMERGENCY EXHAUST
AIR SUPPLY

CONTROL ROOM
HABITABILITY AREA CHILLED WATER PIPING

CHILLED WATER PIPING RECIRCULATION


RECIRCULATION AHU
AHU (STANDBY)
EXFILTRATION FC FILTER FILTER FC
COOLING COOLING
M
COIL COIL
FC FC RAISED FLOOR

FLOOR

Figure 4-9. Control Room Habitability Area HVAC Subsystem (CRHAVS) Schematic

4-10
Chapter 4 Safety Systems

capacity and capable of supplying 99% credited ef- can operate indefinitely. In the event that AC power
ficiency filtered air to the CRHA pressure boundary is not available, the safety-related battery power
at the required flowrate. supply is sized to provide the required power to
an EFU fan for 72 hours of operation. The CRHA
The EFU design utilizes a Pre-filter, HEPA filter, isolation dampers fail closed on a loss of AC power
Carbon Filter, and Post-filter to provide radiological or instrument air. Backup power to the safety-related
protection of the CRHA outside air supply. The EFU CR EFU fans (post 72 hours) will be provided by a
design incorporates an upstream fan to maintain the portable dedicated RTNSS* generator.
entire filtration sequence and air delivery duct to the
CRHA under positive pressure. Upon a loss of preferred power or Station
Blackout (SBO), most of the equipment in the MCR
Operation of the emergency habitability portion remains powered by the nonsafety-related battery
of the CRHAVS is automatically initiated by either supply for the first 2 hours. After two hours, the
of the following conditions: nonsafety-related batteries are exhausted, and only
a small amount of safety-related equipment remains
High radioactivity in the main control room powered. During the first two hours the environ-
supply air duct, or mental conditions are maintained within the nor-
Extended loss of AC power mal limits. This is accomplished via the continued
operation of a CRHA AHU and chilled water pump
Operation can also be initiated by manual ac- powered from the same nonsafety-related battery
tuation. If radiation levels in the main control room supply that powers the non-safety MCR equipment.
supply air duct exceed the high setpoint, the normal Chilled water from a chilled water thermal storage
outside air intake and restroom exhaust are isolated tank is utilized as the heat sink. The cooling function
from the CRHA pressure boundary by automatic clo- for this two hour period is not a safety function. If
sure of the isolation devices in the system ductwork. this cooling function is lost, the Nonsafety-related
At the same time, an EFU begins to deliver filtered equipment and their associated heat loads are auto-
air from one of the two unique safety-related outside matically de-energized.
air intake locations. A constant air flow rate is main-
tained and this flow rate is sufficient to pressurize If power remains unavailable beyond two hours,
the CRHA boundary to at least 31 Pa (1/8-inch water the remaining CRHA safety-related equipment heat
gauge) positive differential pressure with respect to loads are dissipated passively to the CRHA heat
the surroundings. The EFU system air flow rate is sink. The CRHA heat sink limits the temperature
also sufficient to supply the ASHRAE Standard 62 rise to 8.3 C (15F). The CRHA is passively cooled
fresh air requirement of 9.5 l/s (20 cfm) per person by conduction into the walls and ceiling. Sufficient
for up to 21 occupants (200 l/s total). thermal mass is provided in the walls and ceiling of
the main control room to absorb the heat generated
With a source of AC power available, an EFU by the equipment, lights, and occupants.

* RTNSS = Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Sys-


tems. Additional regulatory requirements are placed
on this system, but it is not a safety-related system.

4-11
Chapter 5 Auxiliary Systems

Chapter
Auxiliary Systems 5
Overview Induce reactor coolant flow from the reactor
vessel bottom head to reduce thermal stratifi-
cation during startup
The main auxiliary systems in the ESBWR
Nuclear Island are: Reactor Water Cleanup/Shut- Provide shutdown cooling and cooldown to
down Cooling System (RWCU/SDC), Fuel and cold shutdown conditions
Auxiliary Pools Cooling System (FAPCS), Reactor Provide heated primary coolant for RPV hy-
Component Cooling Water System (RCCWS), Plant drostatic testing and reactor startup
Service Water System (PSWS), and Drywell Cool-
ing System (DCS). There are many other Nuclear System Description
Island and non-Nuclear Island auxiliary systems, The RWCU/SDC system is comprised of two
such as instrument and service air, condensate and independent pump-and-purification equipment
demineralized water transfer, chilled water, HVAC, trains (Figure 5-1). These trains together provide
equipment drain, floor drain and other systems which redundant cleanup capacity such that each pump
are basically the same as on past BWR plants and train and demineralizer is designed to achieve and
are not covered here, since the designs are all well maintain the reactor water quality within design
known. specifications. The system processes the water in the
primary system during all modes of operation includ-
ing startup, normal power generation, cooldown and
shutdown operation. The capacity of each train for
Reactor Water Cleanup/ reactor water cleanup is 1% of the rated feedwater
flow rate.
Shutdown Cooling Sys- During normal plant operation, the RWCU/SDC
tem system continuously recirculates water taking suc-
tion from the mid-vessel area of the RPV and from
The Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling the reactor bottom head and returning via the feed-
(RWCU/SDC) System performs two basic functions, water line to the RPV. The reactor water is cooled
reactor water cleanup and shutdown cooling, which by flowing through the tube side of the Regenerative
include the following major activities: Heat Exchanger (RHX) and the Non-Regenera-
tive Heat Exchanger (NRHX) before entering the
RWCU/SDC pump suction. The pump discharges
Purify the reactor coolant during normal op-
the flow to the demineralizer for the removal of
eration and shutdown
impurities and returns and reheats the reactor water
Supplement reactor cooling when the reactor is via the shell side of the RHX.
at high pressure in the hot standby mode
Assist in the control of reactor water level dur- Each train of the RWCU/SDC system performs
ing startup, shutdown, and in the hot standby the two functions of reactor water cleanup and
mode shutdown cooling with a common piping system.

5-1
Chapter 5 Auxiliary Systems

TRAIN A SHOWN
TO MAIN
CONDENSER
TYPICAL TRAIN B TRAIN B
TO
RADWASTE
(TRAIN B ONLY)

REACTOR
WELL

FE
FEEDWATER-B

FEEDWATER-A RPV
NO AO
FE CRD
MAKEUP DEMIN
RWCU/SDC
(TRAIN
TRAIN B
B:FAPCS
-LPCI)
CONTAINMENT

HIGHER LOWER
CORE CAPACITY CAPACITY

FE
PUMP PUMP

ASD

ASD
RWCU/SDC
TRAIN B

TRAIN B

NO AO NON-REGEN HX
FE
NOTES:
1. VALVE ALIGNMENT IS SHOWN IN
RCCW IN
REACTOR WATER CLEANUP MODE REGEN HX
2. RWCU/SDC TRAIN A IS CONNECTED TO
FW LINE B, AND RWCU/SDC TRAIN B IS RCCW OUT
CONNECTED TO FW LINE A
3. CRD MAKEUP IS CONNECTED TO TRAIN
A ONLY, AND FAPCS-LPCI IS CONNECTED
TO TRAIN B ONLY

Figure 5-1. Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System Schematic

The RWCU/SDC system suction line from reac- would be too slow. Feedwater (aided by an auxiliary
tor bottom head up to and including the outboard boiler, if necessary) is used to heat the reactor and
isolation valve, reactor bottom flow sample line reactor water.
up to and including the outboard isolation valve,
pumps, demineralizer, pump suction line including System Components
suction valves up to and including the demineralizer The supply side of the RWCU/SDC system is
downstream isolation valve, demineralizer bypass designed for the RCPB design pressure plus 10%.
valve and upstream piping are constructed of stain- Downstream of the pumps, the pump shutoff head
less steel. The remaining system is constructed of at 5% overspeed is added to the supply side design
carbon steel. pressure.
The RWCU/SDC system includes the following
During reactor startup, while maintaining the major components:
flow within the cooling capacity of the NRHX, the
flow from the demineralizers can be directed to
Demineralizers
the main condenser hotwell or the liquid radwaste
system low conductivity tank for the removal of Pumps and adjustable speed motor drives
reactor water that thermally expands during heatup Non-regenerative heat exchangers
and for removal of inflow from the Control Rod Regenerative heat exchangers
Drive (CRD) system to the RPV.
Valves and piping
For RPV hydrotesting and startup, external
heating of the reactor water is required if decay heat Demineralizers The RWCU/SDC system
is not available or the heatup rate from decay heat has a mixed bed demineralizer. A full shutdown flow

5-2
Chapter 5 Auxiliary Systems

bypass line with a flow control valve is provided and is returned to the reactor vessel via the feedwater
around each demineralizer unit for bypassing these lines.
units whenever necessary. Resin breakthrough to the
reactor is prevented by a strainer in the demineralizer Startup During heatup, feedwater is intro-
outlet line to catch the resin beads. Non-regeneration duced in the reactor to raise its temperature, while
type resin beads are used, minimizing the potential cold water is overboarded to the main condenser by
for damaged beads passing through the strainer to the RWCU/SDC system. The system is designed
the reactor. The demineralizer is protected from high to provide sufficient flow through the bottom head
pressure differential by a bypass valve. The demin- connections during heatup, cooldown, and startup
eralizer is protected from excessive temperature by operations to prevent thermal stratification and to
automatic controls that first open the demineralizer prevent crud accumulation.
bypass valve and then close the demineralizer inlet
valve. When it is desired to replace the resin, the During reactor startup, it is necessary to remove
resin vessel is isolated from the rest of the system the CRD purge water injected into the RPV and also
before old resin removal and new resin addition. the excess reactor water volume arising from thermal
expansion. The RWCU/SDC system accomplishes
Pumps and Adjustable Speed Drives (ASD) these volume removals and thereby maintains proper
The RWCU/SDC pumps are each powered from reactor level until steam can be sent to the turbine
an ASD. The ASDs receive power at constant AC and main condenser.
voltage and frequency. The ASDs convert this to a
variable frequency and voltage in accordance with a After warmup, the RPV pressure is brought to
demand signal. The variable frequency and voltage saturation by opening the vessel to the main con-
is supplied to vary the speed of the pump motor. denser through the main steam and turbine bypass
The ASD allows effective control of cooldown rate lines to promote deaeration of the reactor water.
and reactor temperature after cooldown. The higher The RWCU/SDC system normally removes excess
capacity pump is used primarily for shutdown cool- water by dumping (overboarding) to the condenser
ing and the lower capacity pump is used primarily hotwell. If the demineralizer is bypassed, the rad-
for reactor water cleanup. waste system is used as an alternative flow path
to avoid contaminated coolant from entering the
Non-Regenerative Heat ExchangerEach condensate system.
NRHX cools the reactor water by transferring heat
to the RCCWS. Overboarding During hot standby and
startup, water entering the reactor vessel from the
Regenerative Heat ExchangerEach RHX CRD System or water level increase due to thermal
is used to recover sensible heat in the reactor water expansion during plant heatup, may be dumped
and to reduce the closed loop heat loss and avoid (overboarded) to the main condenser to maintain
excessive thermal stresses and thermal cycles of the reactor water level. Overboarding of reactor water is
feedwater piping. accomplished by using one of the two system trains
for overboarding and the other train for the reactor
System Operation - Cleanup Mode water cleanup function.
The modes of operation for the cleanup function
are described below. The train in the overboarding mode uses a
combination of RWCU/SDC pump flow and pres-
Power Operation During normal power sure control to maintain the reactor water level. A
operation, reactor water flows from the reactor ves- pressure control station is located downstream of the
sel and is cooled while passing through the tube side demineralizer. The pressure control station consists
of the RHXs and the tube side of the NRHXs. The of a pressure control valve, a high pressure restriction
RWCU/SDC pumps then pump the reactor water orifice, an orifice bypass valve, and a main condenser
through the demineralizers, and back through the isolation valve.
RHX shell side where the reactor water is reheated

5-3
Chapter 5 Auxiliary Systems

Reactor water level is automatically controlled RWCU/SDC permit shutdown cooling even if one
by controlling the pump speed and the pressure train is out of service; however, cooldown time is
control valve position through a combination of extended when using only one train. In the event of
flow, level, and pressure control signals. During the loss of preferred power, the RWCU/SDC system, in
early phases of startup, when the reactor pressure is conjunction with the isolation condensers, is capable
low, the restriction orifice is bypassed. The restric- of bringing the RPV to the cold shutdown condition
tion orifice bypass valve automatically closes when in a day and a half, assuming the most limiting single
the pressure upstream reaches a predetermined set active failure, and with the isolation condensers
point to ensure the pressure drop across the pres- removing the initial heat load.
sure control valve and the orifice bypass valve are
maintained within their design limits. The modes of operation of the shutdown cooling
function are described below:
During overboarding, the RHX is bypassed
since there is no return flow to the RPV, and the Normal Plant Shutdown The operation of
NRHX is in service to cool the reactor water to mini- the RWCU/SDC system at high reactor pressure
mize flashing and two-phase flow in the pressure reduces the plant reliance on the main condenser or
reducing components and downstream piping. The ICS. The entire cooldown is controlled automati-
demineralizer is also in service to ensure the water cally. As cooldown proceeds and reactor tempera-
overboarded to the condenser meets water quality tures are reduced, pump speeds are increased and
specification requirements. In the event high radia- various bypass valves are opened, as described
tion is detected downstream of the demineralizer, the below. During the early phase of shutdown, the
overboarding flow is manually shifted to the Liquid RWCU/SDC pumps operate at reduced speed to
Waste Management System (LWMS) by first open- control the cooldown rate to less than the maximum
ing the remote manual isolation valve to the radwaste allowed RPV cooling rate.
system and then closing the remote manual system
isolation valve to the main condenser. In order to maintain less than the maximum al-
lowed RPV cooling rate, both RWCU/SDC trains
RefuelingDuring refueling, when the reactor are placed into operation early during the cooldown,
well water may have a stratified layer of hot water but with the pumps and system configuration
on the surface, the RWCU/SDC system can be used aligned to provide a moderate system flow rate.
to supplement the FAPCS to cool the reactor well The flow rate for each train is gradually increased
water. as RPV temperature drops. To accomplish this, in
each train the bypass line around the RHX and the
System Operation - Shutdown Cooling Mode bypass line around the demineralizer are opened to
In conjunction with the heat removal capacity obtain the quantity of system flow required for the
of either the main condenser and/or the isolation ending condition of the shutdown cooling mode. In
condensers, the RWCU/SDC system can reduce addition to the RCCWS inlet valve to each NRHX
the RPV pressure and temperature during cooldown being open, at an appropriate point, the air-operated
operation from the rated design pressure and tem- RCCWS bypass control valve to each NRHX will
perature to below boiling at atmospheric pressure start to close in order to increase the cooling water
in less than one day. The system can be connected supply to each NRHX.
to non safety-related standby AC power (diesel-
generators), allowing it to fulfill its reactor cooling The automatic reactor temperature control func-
functions during conditions when the preferred tion controls the ASD, controlling the cooldown by
power is not available. gradually increasing the speed of the system pumps
up to the maximum pump flow. Water purification
The shutdown cooling function of the RWCU/ operation is continued without interruption. Over
SDC system provides decay heat removal capabil- the final part of the cooldown, maximum flow is
ity at normal reactor operating pressure as well as developed through the RWCU/SDC pumps. After
at lower reactor pressures. The redundant trains of about two weeks, flow rate reduction becomes pos-

5-4
Chapter 5 Auxiliary Systems

sible while maintaining reactor coolant temperatures ditional precaution, there is a third remote manual
within target temperature ranges. value located outside the containment which can be
used to effect isolation.
CRD System flow is maintained to provide
makeup water for the reactor coolant volume con-
traction that occurs as the reactor is cooled down.
The RWCU/SDC system overboarding line is used
for fine level control of the RPV water level as Fuel and Auxiliary
needed.
Pools Cooling System
Hot Standby During hot standby, the reactor
is at rated pressure and shut down. The RWCU/SDC The Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System
system may be used as required, in conjunction (FAPCS) consists of two 100% cooling and cleaning
with the main condenser or isolation condensers, to (C/C) trains, each with a pump, a heat exchanger and
maintain a nearly constant reactor temperature by a water treatment unit for cooling and cleaning of
processing reactor coolant from the reactor bottom various cooling and storage pools except for the Iso-
head and the mid-vessel region of the reactor vessel lation Condenser and Passive Containment Cooling
and transferring the decay heat to the RCCWS by System (IC/PCCS) pools (Figure 5-2). A separate
operating both RWCU/SDC trains and returning subsystem with its own pump, heat exchanger and
the purified water to the reactor via the feedwater water treatment unit is dedicated for cooling and
lines. cleaning of the IC/PCCS pools independent of the
FAPCS C/C train operation during normal plant
The pumps and the instrumentation necessary operation (Figure 5-3).
to maintain hot standby conditions are connectable
to the Standby AC Power supply during any loss of The primary design function of the FAPCS is
preferred power. to cool and clean pools located in the containment,
reactor building and fuel building during normal
plant operation. The FAPCS provides flow paths
Refueling The RWCU/SDC system can
for filling and makeup of these pools during normal
be used to supplement the FAPCS spent fuel heat
plant operation and during post accident conditions,
removal capacity during refueling (or other times).
as necessary.
It also can provide additional cooling of the reactor
well water when the RPV head is off in preparation
The FAPCS C/C train is also designed to provide
for removing spent fuel from the core.
the following accident recovery functions in addition
to the spent fuel pool cooling function:
Operation Following Transients In con-
junction with the isolation condensers, the system
has the capability of removing the core decay heat, Suppression pool cooling (SPC)
plus drain excess makeup due to the CRD purge Drywell spray
flow, after one-half hour following control rod
Low pressure coolant injection of suppression
insertion.
pool water into the RPV
In addition to the MS and Feedwater Systems, Alternate Shutdown Cooling
RWCU/SDC is the only other normally operating
process system with primary system high pressure During normal plant operation, at least one
water located outside the containment. Therefore, FAPCS C/C train is available for continuous opera-
special attention is paid to providing prompt system tion to cool and clean the water of the spent fuel
isolation in case of a postulated system pipe break pool, while the other train can be placed in standby
in the Reactor Building. Inlet and outlet flows are or other mode for cooling the Gravity Driven Cool-
measured and the difference, if large, will cause ing System (GDCS) pools and suppression pool. If
containment isolation valves to close. As an ad- necessary during refueling outage, both trains may

5-5
Chapter 5 Auxiliary Systems

TO RWCU/SDC REACTOR BUILDING

POST LOCA
FILL UP
CONNECTION
YARD AREA

FUEL
REACTOR WELL BUILDING
AUXILIARY
POOLS IFTS
DRAIN
MAKEUP
WATER
FROM
FPS
RWCU/SDC
A TRAIN B
A
LPCI
DRYWELL SPENT OTHER
SPRAY A FUEL POOLS
SKIMMER
SURGE STORAGE
TANKS POOL

FW A
NMO
RPV
NMO
MAKEUP WATER
FROM CS&TS
A
A
NMO

NMO
GDCS
POOLS CONNECTIONS RPV MAKEUP
FOR WATER FROM FPS
PORTABLE
COOLING RCCWS
EQUIPMENT ASD

S/P AND GDCS


POOLS
MAKEUP WATER POOL
SUPPRESSION FROM CS&TS WATER
POOL TREATMENT
OPTIONS
ASD

NMO NMO
PRIMARY
CONTAINMENT RCCWS
BOUNDARY NMO NMO

Figure 5-2. Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System Schematic

be used to provide maximum cooling capacity for temperature signal. Instruments are provided for
cooling the spent fuel pool. indication of operating conditions to aid the operator
during the initiation and control of system operation.
Each FAPCS C/C train has sufficient flow and Provisions are provided to prevent inadvertent drain-
cooling capacity to maintain spent fuel pool bulk ing of the pools during FAPCS operation.
water temperature below 48.9C (120F) under
normal spent fuel pool heat load conditions. During System Operation
the maximum spent fuel pool heat load conditions of The following discuss the major design operat-
a full core off-load plus irradiated fuel in the spent ing modes of FAPCS.
fuel pool resulting from 10 years of plant operations,
both FAPCS C/C trains are needed to maintain the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup One
bulk temperature below 60C (140F). of the FAPCS C/C trains is continuously operated
All operating modes are manually initiated in this mode to cool and clean the water in the spent
and controlled from the main control room (MCR), fuel pool during normal plant operation and during
except the SPC mode, which is initiated either manu- a refueling outage. This mode may be initiated fol-
ally or automatically on high suppression pool water lowing an accident to cool the fuel pool for accident

5-6
Chapter 5 Auxiliary Systems

REACTOR BUILDING YARD AREA essary during normal plant operation, one of the
MAKEUP
FAPCS C/C trains that is not operating in spent fuel
IC POOL
WATER VENT
FROM MWS

POST LOCA
pool cooling mode is placed in this mode. In this
IC/PCCS POOL
FILL UP
CONNECTION mode of operation, water is drawn from GDCS pools
MAKEUP
WATER
A and C. The water is cooled and cleaned and is then
FROM
FPS
returned to GDCS pool B. During the operation, the
water level in the GDCS pool B rises and the water
HX
is cascaded and discharged at a submerged location
in the adjacent GDCS pools A and C.
RCCWS
TREATMENT
UNIT
Suppression Pool Cooling and Cleanup As
necessary during normal plant operation, one of the
Figure 5-3. FAPCS IC Subsystem Schematic FAPCS C/C trains that is not operating in spent fuel
pool cooling mode is placed in this mode. In this
recovery. During this mode of operation, water mode of operation, water drawn from the suppres-
is drawn from the skimmer surge tanks, pumped sion pool is cooled and cleaned and then returned to
through the heat exchanger and water treatment unit the suppression pool. This mode may be initiated
to be cooled and cleaned and then returned to the following an accident to cool the suppression pool
spent fuel pool. When necessary, a portion or all of for accident recovery.
the water may bypass the water treatment unit.
Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) This
Fuel and Auxiliary Pool Cooling and Cleanup mode may be initiated following an accident after
During a refueling outage, one or both FAPCS C/C the reactor has been depressurized to provide reactor
trains are placed in this mode of operation to cool and makeup water for accident recovery. In this mode
clean the water in the spent fuel pool and pools listed the FAPCS pump takes suction from the suppression
below depending on the heat load condition in these pool and pumps it into the reactor vessel via RWCU/
pools. During this mode of operation, water is drawn SDC loop B and then Feedwater loop A.
from the skimmer surge tanks, pumped through the
heat exchanger and water treatment unit to be cooled Alternate Shutdown Cooling This mode
and cleaned and then returned to these pools. When may be initiated following an accident for accident
necessary, a portion or all of the water may bypass recovery. In this mode, FAPCS operates in conjunc-
the water treatment unit. This applies to: tion with other systems to provide reactor shutdown
cooling in the event of loss of other shutdown
Upper fuel transfer pool cooling methods. During this mode of operation,
Buffer pool FAPCS flow path is similar to that of LPCI mode.
Water is drawn from the suppression pool, cooled
Reactor well and then discharged back to the reactor vessel via
Dryer and separator storage pool LPCI injection flow path. The warmer water in the
reactor vessel rises and then overflows into the sup-
IC/PCCS Pool Cooling and Cleanup As pression pool via two opened safety-relief valves on
necessary during normal plant operation, the sepa- the main steam lines A and B, completing the loop
rate IC/PCCS pool C/C subsystem is placed in this for this mode of operation.
mode. During this mode of operation, water is drawn
via a common suction header from IC/PCCS pools. Drywell Spray This mode may be initiated
Water is cooled and cleaned by the IC/PCCS pool following an accident for accident recovery. Dur-
C/C subsystem and is then returned to the pools ing this mode of operation, FAPCS draws water
through a common line that branches and discharges from the suppression pool, then cools and sprays
deep in the pools. the cooled water to drywell air space to reduce the
containment pressure.
GDCS Pool Cooling and Cleanup As nec-

5-7
Chapter 5 Auxiliary Systems

The FAPCS is a non safety-related system with through various auxiliary equipment heat exchang-
the exception of piping and components required for ers and rejects the heat to the PSWS. In the event of
containment isolation and refilling of the IC/PCCS a LOPP, the RCCWS supports the FAPCS and the
pools and the spent fuel pool with emergency water RWCU/SDC in bringing the plant to cold shutdown
supplies from offsite. condition in 36 hours if necessary, assuming the most
limiting single active failure. In addition, RCCWS
provides cooling water to the Standby On Site Power
System Diesel Generators.
Reactor Component Each RCCWS train consists of 3 parallel pumps,
Cooling Water System 3 parallel heat exchangers, one surge tank, connect-
ing piping, and instrumentation. Both trains share a
The Reactor Component Cooling Water System chemical addition tank. The two trains are normally
(RCCWS) provides cooling water to non safety-re- connected by cross-tie piping during operation for
lated components in the Reactor, Fuel, Electrical and flexibility, but may be isolated for individual train
Radwaste Building and provides a barrier against operation or maintenance of either train. The pumps
leakage of radioactive contamination of the Plant in each train discharge through check valves and
Service Water System (PSWS). butterfly valves to a common header leading to
the RCCWS heat exchanger header. Crosstie lines
The RCCWS consists of two 100% capac- between each train are provided up and downstream
ity independent and redundant trains (Figure 5-4). of the heat exchangers; at the pump suction and
RCCWS cooling water is continuously circulated discharge headers; and downstream of the Radwaste

Chemical Pot Hx3A


Feeder

Pump 3A

Surge Hx2A
Tank A
Pump 2A

Hx1A
Pump 1A R21 Diesel P25 Train A
Generator A Chillers
AO
AO

Reactor/Fuel
Building
Heat Loads
(Train A
Equipment)
AO

AO

AO

Radwaste
AO

Building
AO

AO
Reactor/Fuel
Building
Heat Loads
(Train B
Equipment)
AO

R21 Diesel P25 Train B


Pump 1B Hx1B Generator B Chillers
Surge
Tank B

Pump 2B
Hx2B

Pump 3B

Hx3B

Figure 5-4. Reactor Component Cooling Water System Schematic

5-8
Chapter 5 Auxiliary Systems

Building cooling water supplies. The heat exchanger through an automatic level control valve to the surge
outlet isolation valves are automatic. The heat tank. A manual valve provides a backup source of
exchanger flow control valves, bypass temperature makeup from the Fire Protection System.
control valves, and cross-tie isolation valves are
pneumatically operated. System Operation
The RCCWS operates during startup, normal
RCCWS cooling water is supplied to the fol- power, hot standby, normal and extended cooldown,
lowing major users: shutdown, and LOPP. If any of the redundant users
requires cooling in addition to the primary users,
Chilled Water System (CWS) Nuclear Island additional pumps may need to be started.
chiller-condenser
RCCWS heat exchanger operation is coordi-
RWCU/SDC non-regenerative heat exchanger nated with PSWS flow. RCCWS cooling water flow
FAPCS heat exchanger through a RCCWS heat exchanger is only allowed if
Standby On Site AC Power Supply Diesel there is a corresponding PSWS water flow to absorb
Generators the heat load.
Radwaste Building Equipment

The flow paths to heat exchangers and coolers


are provided with flow balancing features that may
Plant Service Water
be fixed orifice plates and/or control or manual
valves (that can also be used for isolation). The ma-
System
jor heat exchangers and coolers have motor-operated The Plant Service Water System (PSWS) rejects
isolation valves for operator convenience. heat from non safety-related components in the
reactor and turbine buildings to the environment. It
The RCCWS pumps and heat exchangers are consists of two independent and 100% redundant
located in the Turbine Building. open trains that continuously recirculate raw water
through the RCCWS and the Turbine Component
Normally, the pumps in each train are powered Cooling Water System (TCCWS) heat exchangers.
from independent buses. During a Loss of Preferred The heat removed is rejected to either the normal
Power (LOPP), the pumps in either train can be pow- power heat sink (NPHS) or to the auxiliary heat
ered from the Standby On Site AC Power System. sink (AHS) by mechanical draft cooling towers (site
specific). In the event of a LOPP, the PSWS supports
The RCCWS utilizes plate type heat exchangers. the RCCWS in bringing the plant to cold shutdown
Leakage through holes or cracks in the plates is not condition in 36 hours, assuming the most limiting
considered credible based on industry experience single active failure
with plate type heat exchangers. In addition, the
heat exchangers are designed such that any gasket Each PSWS train consists of two 50% capac-
leakage from either RCCWS or PSWS will drain to ity vertical pumps taking suction in parallel from
the Equipment and Floor Drain System. This design a plant service water (PSW) basin (Figure 5-5).
prevents the potential for cross-contamination of Discharge is to a common header. Each common
RCCWS by PSWS or PSWS by RCCWS. Pressure header supplies PSW to each RCCWS and TCCWS
and air relief valves are provided as necessary. heat exchanger train arranged in parallel. The PSW
is returned via a common header to the mechanical
Surge tanks provide a constant pump suction draft cooling tower in each train. Remotely-operated
head and allow for thermal expansion of the RC- isolation valves and a crosstie line permit routing
CWS inventory. The tanks are located above the of the PSW to either cooling tower. The TCCWS
highest point in the system. Makeup to the RCCWS heat exchangers are provided with isolation valves
inventory is from the Makeup Water System (MWS) for remote operation. Manual balancing valves are

5-9
Chapter 5 Auxiliary Systems

RCCW
AO HX 1A AO

AO HX 2A AO

AO HX 3A AO

PUMP 1A
MECH

AO
DRAFT
COOLING
TCCW TOWER
PUMP 2A AO
HX 1A AO A

NATURAL
DRAFT
RCCW COOLING
AO HX 1B AO
TOWER

AO HX 2B AO

AO HX 3B AO

PUMP 1B
MECH
DRAFT
AO

COOLING
TOWER
PUMP 2B TCCW B
AO
HX 1B AO

PLANT SERVICE WATER BASIN

Figure 5-5 Plant Service Water System Schematic

provided at each heat exchanger outlet. located inside the plant security protected area. Each
PSWS train is provided with a separate, multi-celled
The PSWS pumps are located at the plant ser- mechanical draft cooling tower with 50% of the
vice water basins. Each pump is sized for 50% of cell fans supplied by one of the redundant electrical
the train flow requirement for normal operation. The buses. During a LOPP, the fans are powered from
pumps are low speed, vertical wetpit designs with the two non safety-related standby diesel-generators.
allowance for increase in system friction loss and The adjustable-speed, reversible motor fan units can
impeller wear. Normally, the pumps in each train be controlled for cold weather conditions to prevent
are powered from redundant electrical buses. Dur- freezing in the basin. The mechanical and electrical
ing a LOPP, the pumps are powered from the two isolation of the cooling towers allows maintenance,
nonsafety-related standby diesel-generators. including complete disassembly, during full power
operation. Makeup, for blowdown, drift, and evapo-
Valves are provided with hard seats to with- ration losses to the basin is from the Station Water
stand erosion caused by raw water. The valves are System. Provision for anti-fouling treatment of the
arranged for ease of maintenance, repair, and in-ser- PSWS is provided.
vice inspection. During a LOPP, the motor-operated
valves are powered from the two non safety-related Blowdown from the PSWS basins is by gravity
standby diesel-generators. into the main cooling tower basin or directly to the
plant waste effluent system.
The PSWS cooling towers and PSWS basins are

5-10
Chapter 5 Auxiliary Systems

System Operation makeup or PSWS pumps is sufficient for the design


During normal operation, the primary source heat load removal in any normal operating mode
of cooling water for the PSWS is the cooling tower with the exception of the normal cooldown mode,
makeup pumps, with the PSWS pumps serving as when three pumps are initially required.
a backup. Heat removed from the RCCWS and
TCCWS is rejected to the main cooling tower ba- During a LOPP, the running PSWS pumps re-
sin when the cooling tower makeup pumps are in start automatically using power supplied by the non
operation. If the PSWS pumps are in operation, the safety-related standby diesel-generators.
PSWS mechanical draft cooling towers are used to
reject the heat removed from RCCWS and TCCWS
to the environment.

During periods when the required makeup water Drywell Cooling System
for the main cooling tower basin is reduced (e.g.
winter months) or when the cooling tower makeup The DCS is a closed loop recirculating air/ni-
pumps are unavailable, the PSWS pumps are the trogen cooling system with no outside air/nitrogen
source of cooling water for the RCCWS and TC- introduced into the system except during refueling.
CWS heat exchangers. The system uses direct-drive type Fan Cooling Units
(FCUs) to deliver cooled air/nitrogen to various
Operation of any two of the four cooling tower areas of the upper and the lower drywell. Ducts dis-

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY


UPPER DRYWELL

RPV HEAD DUCT RING

P25
T41
FAN 1A GD
PIPING AREA
C/C FAN 2A GD

FCU "A" UPPER DRYWELL


SHIELD WALL

P25
T41
FAN 1B GD

C/C FAN 2B GD RPV SUPPORTS


DUCT RING (UD)
FCU "B" UPPER DRYWELL

TYP X 8
TYP X 8
LOWER DRYWELL

RPV SUPPORTS
DUCT RING (LD)

P25 P25
T41 T41
GD
FAN 1A GD FAN 1B

C/C FAN 2A GD GD FAN 2B C/C

FCU "A" LOWER DRYWELL FCU "B" LOWER DRYWELL

T41 C21

Figure 5-6 Drywell Cooling System Schematic

5-11
Chapter 5 Auxiliary Systems

tribute the cooled, recirculated air/nitrogen through the upper drywell and one FCU in the lower drywell
diffusers and nozzles. The drywell heat loads are are piped in parallel to Nuclear Island subsystem
transferred to the Nuclear Island subsystem of the of CWS train A and the remaining two are piped in
Chilled Water System (CWS) circulating through the parallel to Nuclear Island subsystem of CWS train
cooling coils of the FCUs. The DCS consists of four B. The system is designed so both FCUs in the up-
FCUs, two located in the upper drywell and two in per drywell and both FCUs in the lower drywell are
the lower drywell (Figure 5-6). always operating during normal plant operation,
assuming the loss of a single electrical group or
Each upper drywell FCU has a cooling capacity failure of any single FCU motor or fan. Upon failure
of 50% of the upper drywell design heat load dur- of one FCU, the two fans of the remaining FCU
ing normal plant operating conditions. Both FCUs are in service. One FCU with two fans in opera-
are normally operating. Each FCU is comprised of tion maintains the drywell temperature below the
a cooling coil and two fans downstream of the coil. maximum allowed.
Nuclear Island subsystem of CWS train A supplies
one FCU, and Nuclear Island subsystem of CWS System Operation
train B supplies the other. One of the fans operates During normal plant operating condition, two
while the other is on standby status. The fan on FCUs in the upper drywell and two FCUs in the
standby automatically starts upon loss of the lead fan. lower drywell are continuously operating to maintain
Cooled air/nitrogen leaving the FCUs enters a com- the required ambient conditions.
mon plenum and is distributed to the various zones in
the upper drywell through distribution ducts. Return During plant refueling conditions, one FCU in
ducts are not provided. The FCUs draw air/nitro- the upper drywell and one FCU in the lower drywell
gen directly from the upper drywell. Each FCU is continuously operate with two fans in service to
equipped with a condensate collection pan. maintain a habitable environment in the drywell for
maintenance activities.
Each lower drywell FCU has a cooling capac-
ity of 50% of the lower drywell design heat load. Non-safety related onsite diesel generators
Each FCU is comprised of a cooling coil and two power the FCUs during a LOPP as long as there is
fans downstream of the coil. One of the fans oper- no LOCA signal.
ates while the other is on standby status. The fan on
standby automatically starts upon loss of the lead
fan. Nuclear Island subsystem of CWS train A sup-
plies one FCU, while Nuclear Island of subsystem
CWS train B supplies the other. Cooled air/nitrogen Containment Inerting
is supplied below the RPV and in the RPV support
area through supply ducts. Return ducts are not
System
provided. The FCUs draw air/nitrogen directly from
The Containment Inerting System (CIS) is de-
the lower drywell.
signed to establish and maintain an inert atmosphere
(nitrogen) within the primary containment volume
Each FCU has a condensate collection pan. The (PCV) (Figure 5-7). An inert atmosphere is main-
condensate collected from the FCUs in the upper and tained in all operating modes except plant shutdown
the lower drywell is piped to a Leak Detection and for refueling and/or maintenance. The CIS is sized
Isolation System (LD&IS) flowmeter to measure to reduce containment oxygen concentrations from
the condensation rate contribution to unidentified atmospheric to <4% by volume in less than 4 hours
leakage. and < 2% in 8 hours in order to assure the limit of
<3% during operation. After shutdown, the system
The piping for train A and train B of the Nuclear also permits de-inerting of the containment for safe
Island subsystem of CWS independently penetrate operator access without breathing apparatus within
the containment. The cooling coils of one FCU in 12 hours.

5-12
Chapter 5 Auxiliary Systems

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

UTILITY
SCOPE

AO AO AO
UPPER INERTING
DRYWELL
LINE
VAPORIZER

AO
MCOPS
PATHWAY

HVAC AIR SUPPLY


(DE-INERTING)
HVAC

AO

AO
EXHAUST

REACTOR BUILDING
AO

SUPPRESSION SUPPRESSION NITROGEN


POOL POOL STORAGE
TANK SKID

LOWER YARD
AO AO
DRYWELL AO AO ELECTRIC
MAKEUP
LINE
AO AO HEATER

DRYWELL
BLEEDLINE

Figure 5-7. Containment Inerting System Schematic

The CIS consists of a pressurized liquid stor- lines converge to common injection points in the
age tank, a steam-heated main vaporizer for large upper drywell and suppression pool airspace.
nitrogen flow, electric heater for vaporizing makeup
flow, two injection lines, an exhaust line, a bleed line The CIS includes an exhaust line from the lower
and associated valves, controls and instrumentation. drywell on the opposite side of containment from
All CIS components are located inside the Reactor the injection points. The discharge line connects to
Building except the liquid nitrogen storage tank and the Reactor Building HVAC system exhaust before
the steam-heated main vaporizer that are located in being diverted to the plant stack. A small bleed line
the yard. bypassing the main exhaust line is also provided for
manual pressure control of the containment during
The first of the injection lines is used only for normal reactor operation.
makeup. It includes an electric heater to vaporize
the nitrogen and to regulate the nitrogen tempera- During plant startup, liquid nitrogen from the
ture to acceptable injection temperatures. Remotely storage tanks is vaporized and injected into the
operated valves, together with a pressure-reducing wetwell and drywell regions of the containment.
valve, enable the operator to accomplish low rates The nitrogen is mixed with the PCV atmosphere
of nitrogen injection into the drywell and suppres- by the Drywell Cooling System (DCS) fans. Once
sion pool airspace. inerting is complete, the CIS provides nitrogen
makeup to maintain the required oxygen concentra-
The second injection line is used for the inert- tion and maintain a slightly positive pressure within
ing function where larger flow rates of nitrogen are the PCV to preclude air in-leakage from the reactor
required. This line provides the flow path for vapor- building.
ized nitrogen at an appropriate temperature from the
steam-heated main vaporizer to be injected into the In case of a severe accident where containment
containment through remotely operated valves and a failure by overpressure is threatened, it is possible for
pressure-reducing valve to injection points common operators to use the CIS to manually vent the wetwell
with the makeup supply. The inerting and makeup (MCOPS). For more information see Chapter 11.

5-13
Chapter 6 Core and Fuel Design

Chapter
Core and Fuel Design 6
Introduction and kPa), reduce cladding temperatures and stress lev-
els.

Summary The low coolant saturation temperature,


high heat transfer coefficients, and neutral water
The design of the ESBWR core and fuel is based chemistry of the ESBWR are significant, advanta-
on the proper combination of many design variables geous factors in minimizing Zircaloy clad tempera-
and operating experience. These factors contribute to ture and associated temperature-dependent corrosion
the achievement of high reliability, excellent perfor- and hydride buildup. This results in improved clad-
mance, and improved fuel cycle economics. ding performance at high burnup.

The core and fuel design methods employed for The basic thermal and mechanical criteria
design analyses and calculations have been verified applied in the ESBWR design have been proven
by comparison with data from operating plants, by irradiation of statistically significant quanti-
gamma scan measurements, testing facilities, and ties of fuel. The design heat fluxes and linear heat
Monte Carlo neutron transport calculations. GE con- generation rates are similar to values proven in fuel
tinually implements advanced core and fuel design assembly irradiation in the large fleet of operating
technology, such as control cell core, spectral shift BWRs.
operation, axially varying gadolinia and enrichment
zoning, fuel cladding with improved corrosion re- In-reactor experience of fuel components
sistance, part length fuel rods, interactive channels, acquired in the existing fleet is applicable to the
and wider water gaps in the ESBWR core. As these ESBWR.
technological improvements are added, the core
and fuel design parameters are optimized to achieve Because of the large negative moderator
better fuel cycle economics, while improving fuel density (void) coefficient of reactivity, the ESBWR
integrity and reliability and while maintaining over- has a number of inherent advantages, including (1)
all reactor safety. self-flattening of the radial power distribution, (2)
spatial xenon stability, and (3) ability to override
The reactor lattice configuration and fuel ele- xenon in order to follow load. The inherent spatial
ment design for the ESBWR are basically the same xenon stability of the ESBWR is particularly im-
as employed in previous GE designed plants operat- portant for large-sized plants, and permits daily load
ing around the world. Key features of the ESBWR following over a large range of core power levels.
reactor core design are summarized in the following
paragraphs: The moderate power density and the power
distributions used in sizing the ESBWR core include
The ESBWR core mechanical design is margins providing for operational flexibility.
based on conservative application of stress limits,
operating experience, and experimental test results. The ESBWR fuel assembly pitch is 0.1 inch
The moderate pressure levels characteristic of a di- more than the conventional BWR fuel assembly
rect cycle reactor, approximately 1,000 psia (6,900 pitch, a feature it shares with the ABWR, so that it

6-1
Chapter 6 Core and Fuel Design

can accommodate more water in the bypass gaps 10x10 array of 78 full length fuel rods, 14 part length
between the fuel assemblies, which improves cold rods which span roughly two-thirds of the active
shutdown margin and core thermal hydraulic stabil- core, and two large central water rods. Additionally,
ity and results in milder response for pressurization a new fuel assembly intended to provide optimum
transients. characteristics for the ESBWR natural circulation
reactor is presently under development. The new
assembly is anticipated to be designed, licensed
and available for ESBWR initial cores. Thus, GE
provides two 10x10 fuel designs for the ESBWR.
Core Configuration Figure 6-3 shows the GE14 design with the
major components identified. The cast stainless steel
The reactor core of the ESBWR is arranged as lower tie plate includes a conical section which seats
an upright cylinder containing a large number of into the fuel support and a grid which maintains the
fuel assemblies (1,132) located within the reactor proper fuel rod spacing at the bottom of the bundle.
vessel. The coolant flows upward through the core. The cast stainless steel upper tie plate maintains the
The core arrangement (plan view) and the lattice fuel rod spacing at the top of the bundle and provides
configuration are shown in Figures 6-1 and 6-2, the handle that is used to lift the bundle.
respectively. Important components of this arrange-
ment are described in the following pages.
The fuel bundle assembly is held together by
eight tie rods located around the periphery of the fuel
As can be seen from Figure 6-1, the ESBWR
bundle. Each tie rod has a threaded lower end plug
reactor core is comprised of fuel assemblies, control
which screws into the lower tie plate and a threaded
rods and nuclear instrumentation. The fuel assembly
upper end plug which extends through a boss in the
and control rod mechanical designs are basically the
upper tie plate and is fastened with a nut. A lock tab
same as used in all but the earliest GE boiling water
washer is included under the tie rod nut to prevent
reactors; however, evolutionary improvements have
rotation of the tie rod and nut. The part-length rods
been made to these components throughout the his-
also have lower end plugs which are threaded into
tory of the GE BWR. The current generation of these
the lower tie plate to prevent movement of the rods
components will be described below for application
during shipping or handling with the bundle oriented
to the ESBWR.
horizontally. The upper end plugs of the full length
fuel rods and water rods have extended shanks that
protrude through bosses in the upper tie plate to
accommodate the differential growth expected for

Fuel Assembly
high exposure operation. Expansion springs are also
placed over each upper end plug shank to assure that

Description
the full length fuel rods and water rods are properly
seated in the lower tie plate.

The BWR fuel assembly consists of a fuel Eight high performance Zircaloy ferrule spacers
bundle and a channel. The fuel bundle contains the are located axially to maintain the proper rod spac-
fuel rods and the hardware necessary to support and ing along the length of the fuel bundle, to prevent
maintain the proper spacing between the fuel rods. flow-induced vibration, and to enhance the critical
The channel is a Zircaloy box which surrounds the power performance. These spacers are captured in
fuel bundle to direct the core coolant flow through the correct axial locations by pairs of tabs welded
the bundle and also serves to guide the movable to one of the two water rods. The water rod with
control rods. tabs is placed through the spacers and then rotated
to capture the spacers. Once assembled, rotation
The GE14 product line is GEs current fuel of the water rod with tabs is prevented by a square
assembly design. The GE14 designs both contain a lower end plug which fits into a square hole in the

6-2
Chapter 6 Core and Fuel Design

Fuel Assembly (1028)


Peripheral Fuel Assembly (104)
Control Rod Assembly (269)
LPRM Assembly (64)

Figure 6-1. ESBWR Core Configuration

lower tie plate.

The fuel assembly includes a Zircaloy-2 inter-


active fuel channel which channels flow vertically
through the fuel bundle, provides lateral stiffness
to the fuel bundle and provides a surface to support
the control rods as they are inserted. To channel
the fuel bundle, the channel is lowered over the
upper tie plate, spacers and lower tie plate. At the
bottom end, the channel fits tightly over Inconel
alloy X-750 finger springs, which seal the passage
between the channel and lower tie plate to control
leakage flow.

The channel and channel fastener are attached


to the fuel bundle by the channel fastener cap screw
IN-CORE INSTRUMENT TUBE
which extends through a hole in the clip (or gusset)
FUEL ROD TIE ROD welded to a top corner of the channel and is threaded
PART LENGTH ROD WATER ROD into a post on the upper tie plate. Figure 6-4 shows
the channel fastener assembly.
Figure 6-2. Four Bundle Fuel Module (Cell)

6-3
Chapter 6 Core and Fuel Design

features, including part-length fuel rods, high per-


formance spacers, low pressure drop upper tie plate,
Interactive channel lower tie plate with debris filter, large central water
rods, and interactive channels. These key design
features are individually discussed below.
Upper tie plate
Part Length Rods
Part length fuel rods (PLRs) were introduced
Water rods
with the GE11 fuel design and have been used in
all subsequent GE designs. For GE14, the 14 PLRs
terminate just above the fourth spacer to provide
increased flow area and reduce the two-phase pres-
Part length fuel rods sure drop. This reduction in two-phase pressure drop
leads to an improvement in core and channel stability
and allows for an increase in the cladding diameter to
maximize the fuel weight for a given overall pressure
Zircaloy ferrule
spacers
CHANNEL CAPSCREW
FASTENER
Lower tie plate ASSEMBLY

debris filter

SPRING
(2 SIDES)
CHANNEL

Figure 6-3. GE14 Fuel Assembly

The fuel rod design includes annealed, fully


recrystallized Zircaloy-2 cladding tubing, UO2 fuel
pellets, a retainer spring assembly, and lower and
upper end plugs. The fuel rods are loaded with UO2 UPPER
TIE PLATE
or (U, Gd)O2 fuel pellets as required for shutdown GUARD
margin control and power shaping. A plenum spring (2 SIDES)
EXPANSION
is used to apply a preload to the fuel column to pre- SPRING
vent fuel from shifting and being damaged inside the
fuel rod during shipping and handling. This plenum
FUEL
spring is also shown in Figure 6-4. CLADDING

The lower end plug is welded to the lower end PLENUM


SPRING
of the cladding before loading any of the internal
fuel rod components mentioned above. After loading
all internal components, the fuel rod is evacuated,
FUEL
then backfilled with helium. The upper end plug is PELLET
inserted into the top end of the fuel rod, compressing
the retainer spring, and welded to the cladding. FUEL
ROD

GE14 Key Fuel Design Features


The GE14 design utilizes several key design Figure 6-4. Channel Fastener Assembly

6-4
Chapter 6 Core and Fuel Design

drop. In addition, the PLRs increase the moderator


to fuel ratio in the top of the core to improve cold
shutdown margins and fuel efficiency.

High Performance Spacers


The high performance Zircaloy ferrule spacer
provides excellent critical power performance
with acceptable pressure drop characteristics. This
spacer concept is also used in a number of previous
products. Six spacers are used to maintain rod bow
and flow-induced vibration margins for the reduced
diameter 10x10 fuel rods of the GE14 design, while
at the same time providing excellent critical power
capability.

Low Pressure Drop Upper Tie Plate


The upper tie plate (UTP) is designed to mini-
mize two-phase pressure drop to improve fuel sta-
bility performance and reduce the pumping power Figure 6-5. Top View of Debris Filter Lower Tie Plate
required to drive core flow.
highest and thinner flat sides where stresses are low.
Lower Tie Plate with Debris Filter This design minimizes the amount of Zircaloy-2
As discussed previously, the use of part length material in the channel in order to improve nuclear
rods and the low pressure drop upper tie plates to efficiency, increases the moderator in the bypass re-
reduce two-phase pressure drop allows for retaining gion for improved reactivity and hot-to-cold swing,
adequate single-phase pressure drop at the lower tie and increases the control rod clearance.
plate for thermal-hydraulic stability performance.
In addition, it allows for the use of restricted flow ESBWR Advanced Fuel Design
paths in the lower tie plate (LTP), which serve to The advanced fuel design under development
effectively filter debris. Figure 6-5 shows a top for ESBWR will take advantage of technology de-
view of one of the three possible debris filter LTPs. velopments made since the introduction of GE14,
Debris filter LTP designs are standard with all GE including spacer manufacturing and performance
fuel designs. Any of GEs debris filter LTPs can enhancements to improve critical power perfor-
be applied to ESBWR, as they all have the same mance and improve fuel reliability. Optimized part
hydraulic resistance. length rod radial and axial positioning is envisioned
to further balance the trade-offs between fuel assem-
Large Central Water Rods bly pressure drop, stability and nuclear efficiency
One of the basic characteristics of a BWR is that in the natural circulation reactor. Features, such as
it is under-moderated at operating temperatures. In total bundle uranium mass are also considered in
order to improve moderation and fuel efficiency, fuel optimizing fuel cycle costs. The latest technology
rods are removed from the center of the fuel bundle in debris filtration will be applied to the advanced
and replaced with water rods to provide a zone for bundle to insure maximum fuel durability and reli-
non-boiling water flow. The GE14 design includes ability. Component design will continue to be shared
two large central water rods to replace eight fuel rod between the ESBWR and the standard BWR fleet,
locations and provide improved moderation. thereby providing irradiation experience for compo-
nents developed for the advanced fuel design.
Interactive Channels
The interactive fuel channel design has an
optimized cross section, as illustrated in Figure 6-
6, which includes thick corners where stresses are

6-5
Chapter 6 Core and Fuel Design

for reactivity regulation, as well as a hydraulically


actuated rapid scram insertion function. The design
of the rod-to-drive connection permits each control
THICK CORNER
rod to be attached or detached from its drive during
refueling without disturbing the remainder of the
control functions. The bottom-mounted drives per-
mit the entire control function to be left intact and
operable for tests with the reactor vessel open.

Typically, the cruciform control rods contain


stainless steel tubes in each wing of the cruciform
filled with boron carbide (B4C) powder compacted
to approximately 75% of theoretical density. The
THIN SIDE
tubes are seal welded with end plugs on either end.
Stainless steel balls are used to separate the tubes into
individual longitudinal compartments. The stainless
steel balls are held in position by a slight crimp in the
Figure 6-6. Cross Section of Interactive Channel
tube. The individual tubes act as pressure vessels to
contain the helium gas released by the boron-neutron

Control Rod Description capture reaction.

The tubes are held in cruciform array by a


As shown in Figures 6-1 and 6-2, cruciform stainless steel sheath extending the full length of
shaped control rods are configured for insertion the tubes. A top casting and handle, shown in Figure
between every four fuel assemblies comprising 6-7, aligns the tubes and provides structural rigidity
a module or cell. The four assemblies in a cell at the top of the control rod. Rollers, housed by the
provide guidance for insertion and withdrawal of top casting, provide guidance for control rod inser-
the control rods. tion and withdrawal. A bottom casting is also used to
provide structural rigidity and contains positioning
The control rods perform dual functions of rollers and a coupler for connection to the control
power distribution shaping and reactivity control. rod drive mechanism. The castings are welded into
Power distribution in the core is controlled during a single structure by means of a small cruciform post
operation of the reactor by manipulation of selected located in the center of the control rod. Control rods
patterns of rods. The rods, which enter from the are cooled by the core leakage (bypass) flow.
bottom of the reactor, are positioned in such a man-
ner as to maintain the core in a critical state, and to In addition to boron carbide, hafnium absorber
control the radial power distribution. These groups may be placed in the highest burnup locations of se-
of control elements, which are inserted during power lect control rods, the full length outside edge of each
operation, experience a somewhat higher duty cycle wing and, optionally, the tip of each wing. Hafnium
and neutron exposure than the other rods, which are is a heavy metal with excellent neutron absorbing
used mainly for reactor shutdown. characteristics and does not swell at high burnups.

The reactivity control function requires that all


rods be available for either reactor scram (prompt
shutdown) or reactivity regulation. Because of this,
the control elements are mechanically designed
to withstand the dynamic forces resulting from a Core Orificing
scram. In the ESBWR, they are connected to bottom-
mounted drive mechanisms which provide electric Control of the core flow distribution among the
motor-driven fine motion axial positioning control fuel assemblies is accomplished by fixed orifices.

6-6
Chapter 6 Core and Fuel Design

These orifices are located in the fuel support pieces


and are not affected by fuel assembly removal and
CENTER POST
replacement. The core is divided into two orifice
zones. The outer zone of fuel assemblies, located
HANDLE
near the core periphery, has more restrictive orifices
ROLLER than the inner zone. Thus, flow to the higher power
XXX
XX fuel assemblies is increased. The orificing of all
fuel assemblies increases the thermal-hydraulic
XX
XXX stability margin of both the core and individual fuel
channels.

NEUTRON

Other Reactor Core


ABSORBER
RODS

Components
In addition to fuel assemblies and control rods,
there are also in-core monitoring components and
SHEATH neutron sources located in the reactor core.

SRNM Assembly
LOWER There are 12 Startup Range Neutron Monitor-
TRANSITION ing (SRNM) assemblies, each consisting of a fixed
position in-core regenerative fission chamber sen-
sor located slightly above the midplane of the fuel
region. The sensors are contained within pressure
barrier dry tubes located in the core bypass water
region between fuel assemblies and distributed
evenly throughout the core. The signal output exits
the bottom of the dry tube under the vessel.

LPRM Assembly
There are 64 Local Power Range Monitoring
(LPRM) assemblies evenly distributed throughout
the reactor core. Each assembly extends vertically
in the core bypass water region at every fourth in-
tersection of the fuel assemblies and contains four
fission chamber detectors evenly spaced at four
axial positions adjacent to the active fuel. Detector
COUPLING ROLLER
signal cables are routed within the assembly toward
SOCKET the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel where the
assembly penetrates the vessel pressure boundary.
Below the vessel bottom, the pressure boundary is
formed by an extended portion of the in-core instru-
ment housing tube that houses the assembly.

Figure 6-7. ESBWR Control Rod


The LPRM assembly enclosing tube also

6-7
Chapter 6 Core and Fuel Design

CONTAINMENT stainless steel sleeve enclosing two californium-252


sources. The resulting neutron emission strength
is sufficient to provide indication on the source
range neutron detectors for all reactivity conditions
equivalent to the condition of all rods inserted prior
to initial operation.
REACTOR
PRESSURE
VESSEL The active source material is entirely enclosed
in a stainless steel cladding. The source is cooled by
natural circulation of the core leakage flow in the
annulus between the stainless steel sleeve and the
CORE californium sources.

LPRM/AFIP
ASSEMBLY SRNM
ASSEMBLY
CORE INLET
THERMOCOUPLES

TOP
GUIDE HOLDER
FLEXIBLE
CABLES TIP

Figure 6-8. AFIP, LPRM and SRNM Schematic


SOURCE
HOLDER
houses the Automatic Fixed In-Core Probe (AFIP)
subsystem, which are gamma thermometer calibra-
STAINLESS STEEL
tion devices. A schematic of the AFIP, LPRM and SLEEVE
CALIFORNIUM
CAPSULE (CF-252)
SRNM assemblies is shown in Figure 6-8.

Finally, the LPRM assembly contains two


thermocouples located just below the core plate.
These thermocouples are used to calculate core inlet
enthalpy, core moderator temperature, and indirectly
core flow by means of a heat balance.
CORE
Neutron Sources MIDPLANE
Several californium-252 startup sources are
located within the core. They are positioned verti-
cally in the reactor by fit-up in a slot (or pin) in CORE
PLATE
the upper grid and a hole in the lower core support
plate (Figure 6-9). The compression of a spring at
the top of the housing exerts a column-type loading
on the source. Though anchored firmly in place, the
sources can easily be removed, but they need not be
disturbed during refueling.

The active portion of each source consists of a


Figure 6-9. Neutron Source Schematic

6-8
Chapter 6 Core and Fuel Design

Core Nuclear Design Fuel Doppler Reactivity Coefficient: As in


all light water moderated and low enrichment
The reactor core is designed to operate at rated reactors, the fuel Doppler reactivity coefficient
power without any limitations, while delivering the is negative and prompt in its effect, opposing
total cycle length and energy desired by the utility. reactor power transients. When reactor power
These design goals are achieved by designing with increases, the UO2 temperature increases with
sufficient margin to thermal and reactivity limits to minimum time delay and results in higher neu-
accommodate the types of uncertainties encountered tron absorption by resonance capture in the U-
in actual operation. Based on its extensive experi- 238.
ence in BWR core design, GE has developed a con-
sistent set of design margins to ensure meeting these
Moderator Density Reactivity Coefficient:
objectives without compromising overall efficiency
During normal plant operations, the steam void
due to the use of undue conservatism.
component of the moderator density reactivity
coefficient is of prime importance. The steam
Core Configuration void component is large and negative at all
The ESBWR core map is illustrated in Figure power levels. This steam void effect results in
6-1. There are 1,132 fuel assemblies, 269 control the following operating advantages:
rods and 64 LPRM assemblies. Also the core pe-
riphery zone with more restrictive inlet flow orifices
is shown. Xenon Override Capability: Since the
steam void reactivity effect is large com-
As an option, ESBWR can employ the Con- pared with xenon reactivity, the ESBWR
trol Cell Core (CCC) operating strategy in which core has the capability of overriding the
control rod movement to offset reactivity changes negative reactivity introduced by the build-
during power operations is limited to a fixed group up of xenon following a power decrease.
of control rods. Each of these control rods and its
four surrounding fuel assemblies comprise a control
cell. All other control rods are normally withdrawn Xenon Stability: The steam void reac-
from the core while operating at power. tivity is the primary factor in providing
the high resistance to spatial xenon oscil-
Low reactivity fuel assemblies are placed on lations in a boiling water reactor. Xenon
the core periphery and in the control cells, to reduce instability is an oscillatory phenomenon of
neutron leakage and provide for control rod mo- xenon concentration throughout the reac-
tion adjacent to low power fuel, respectively. For tor that is theoretically possible in any type
an initial core, the low reactivity fuel is comprised of reactor. These spatial xenon oscillations
of natural uranium or low enrichment fuel. For a give rise to local power oscillations which
reload core, the low reactivity fuel is typically the can make it difficult to maintain the reactor
high exposure fuel; fresh and low exposure fuel are within its thermal operating limits. Since
scatter loaded in the remaining core fuel assembly these oscillations can be initiated by reac-
locations. tor power level changes, a reactor which
is susceptible to xenon oscillations may be
Core Nuclear Characteristics restricted in its load-following capability.
Reactivity Coefficients: In a boiling water The inherent resistance of the ESBWR to
reactor, two reactivity coefficients are of primary xenon instability permits significant flex-
importance: the fuel Doppler coefficient and the ibility in load-following capability.
moderator density reactivity coefficient. The mod-
erator density reactivity coefficient may be broken Load Changing by Control Rod Move-
into two components: that due to temperature and ment: The ESBWR is capable of daily
that due to steam voids. load following between 100% and 50%

6-9
Chapter 6 Core and Fuel Design

power by adjusting control rod density supported depending on licensing limits and uranium
within the core. supply considerations. While GE can recommend
operating margins that have been proven adequate,
Reactivity Control utility specifications on operating margins can be
Reactor shutdown control in BWRs is assured readily introduced into the ESBWR core.
through the combined use of the control rods and
burnable poison in the fuel. Only a few materials The average bundle enrichments and batch sizes
have nuclear cross sections that are suitable for are a function of the desired cycle length. The initial
burnable poisons. An ideal burnable poison must ESBWR core has an average enrichment ranging
be essentially depleted in one operating cycle so from approximately 1.7 wt% U-235 to approxi-
that no residual poison exists to penalize the cycle mately 3.2 wt% U-235 for cycle lengths ranging
length. It is also desirable that the positive reactivity from one to two years. For ESBWR reload cores
from poison burnup match the almost linear decrease using GE14 fuel, the average bundle enrichment is
in fuel reactivity from fission product buildup and roughly 4.2 wt% U-235 with a reload batch fraction
U-235 depletion. A self-shielded burnable poison of 35% for a two year cycle.
consisting of digadolinia trioxide (Gd2O3), called
gadolinia, dispersed in selected fuel rods in each

Neutron Monitoring
fuel assembly provides the desired characteristics.
The gadolinia concentration is selected such that the

System
poison is essentially depleted during the operating
cycle. Gadolinia has been used in GE BWRs since
the early 1970s, and has proven to be an effective
and efficient burnable poison. In addition to its use The Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) is
for reactivity control, gadolinia is also used to im- a system of in-core neutron detectors and out-of-
prove axial power distributions by axial zoning of core electronic monitoring equipment. The system
the burnable poison concentration. provides indication of neutron flux, which can be
correlated to thermal power level for the entire
The core is designed so that adequate shutdown range of flux conditions that can exist in the core.
capability is available at all times. To permit margin There are four subsystems in the NMS: the Startup
for credible reactivity changes, the combination of Range Neutron Monitoring (SRNM) Subsystem,
control rods and burnable poison has the capability to the Power Range Neutron Monitoring (PRNM)
shut down the core with the maximum worth control Subsystem [comprised of the Local Power Range
rod pair fully withdrawn at any time during the fuel Monitors (LPRM) and Average Power Range Moni-
cycle. This capacity is experimentally demonstrated tors (APRM)], the Automatic Fixed In-Core Probe
when reactivity alternations are made to the reactor (AFIP) Subsystem, and the Multi-Channel Rod
core, such as during the initial core startup, and dur- Block Monitoring (MRBM) Subsystem.
ing each startup after a refueling outage.
The NMS design has been greatly simplified
for ESBWR application. Key simplification features
Fuel Management include the SRNM, period-based trip logic, and the
The flexibility of the ESBWR core design per- Automatic Fixed In-Core Probe (AFIP) System.
mits significant variation of the intervals between The SRNMs replace the separate Source Range
refueling. The first shutdown for refueling can Monitor (SRM) and Intermediate Range Monitor
occur anywhere from one to two years after com- (IRM) found in conventional BWRs. Use of these
mencement of initial power operation. Thereafter, fixed in-core SRNM detectors eliminates the drive
the cycle length can be varied up to 24 months with mechanism and the associated control systems for
GE14 fuel. The desired cycle length can be obtained the moveable SRM and IRM detectors. IRM range
by adjusting both the refueling batch size and the switches have been eliminated by incorporating
average enrichment of the reload bundles. A wide a period-based trip design in the startup power
range of batch average discharge exposures can be range. Hence, operability is greatly improved and

6-10
Chapter 6 Core and Fuel Design

accidental trips due to manual range switching are CABLE PACK


eliminated. The AFIP uses fixed in-core gamma
thermometers for automatic core flux mapping and CORE TUBE

calibrating the power range monitors in the ESBWR FILL GAS


design, thereby substantially reducing reactor room JACKET TUBE

space for the old TIP system, enhancing operability,


and reducing personnel radiation dosage.

Startup Range Neutron Monitoring


(SRNM) Subsystem
The SRNM Subsystem monitors the neutron
flux from the source range to approximately 100%
of the rated power. The wide range (11 decades) HEATER WIRE
makes the SRNMs suitable for RG 1.97 flux moni-
toring. The SRNM Subsystem provides neutron
flux related trip inputs (flux level and period) to
the Reactor Protection System (RPS), including a
non-coincident trip function for refueling operations THERMOCOUPLE
HOT JUNCTION
and a coincident trip function for other modes of
operation. The SRNM Subsystem has 12 channels
where each channel includes one detector installed
at a fixed position within the core.

Power Range Neutron Monitoring


THERMOCOUPLE
(PRNM) Subsystem COLD JUNCTION
The PRNM Subsystem provides flux infor-
mation for monitoring the average power level
of the reactor core. It also provides information
for monitoring the local power level. The PRNM Figure 6-10. Gamma Thermometer Cross-section
Subsystem monitors local thermal neutron flux up nals are also transmitted through dedicated interface
to 125% of rated power and overlaps with part of units to various systems such as the RCIS, and the
the SRNM range. plant process computer.
The PRNM Subsystem consists of two subsys-
An Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM)
tems:
is also part of the APRM. Each OPRM receives iden-
tical LPRM signals from the corresponding APRM
Local Power Range Monitoring (LPRM) Sub- as inputs, and forms many OPRM cells to monitor
system the neutron flux behavior of all regions of the core.
Average Power Range Monitoring (APRM) The LPRM signals assigned to each cell are summed
Subsystem and averaged to provide an OPRM signal for this
cell. The OPRM trip protection algorithm detects
The LPRM Subsystem continuously monitors thermal hydraulic instability and provides trip output
local core neutron flux. It consists of 64 detector to the RPS if the trip setpoint is exceeded.
assemblies with 4 detectors per assembly. The 256
LPRM detectors are separated and divided into four Automated Fixed In-Core Probe (AFIP)
groups to provide four independent APRM signals. Subsystem
The APRM Subsystem averages the readings of the The AFIP subsystem is comprised of AFIP
assigned LPRM detectors and provides measure- sensors and their associated cables, as well as the
ment of reactor core power. Individual LPRM sig- signal processing electronic unit. The AFIP sensors

6-11
Chapter 6 Core and Fuel Design

are gamma thermometer in design (Figure 6-10). The AFIP gamma thermometer, however, can
A gamma thermometer consists of a stainless steel be calibrated, either manually or automatically, by
rod that has short sections of its length thermally using a built-in calibration device inside the gamma
insulated from the reactor coolant. The insulation, thermometer/LPRM assembly. The calibrated new
normally a chamber of Argon gas, allows the tem- sensitivity data of the AFIP sensors are stored in
perature to rise in the insulated section in response the AFIP control unit and are readily applied to the
to gamma energy deposition. A two junction newly collected AFIP data to provide accurate lo-
thermocouple measures the temperature difference cal power information. The interval of the gamma
between the insulated and non-insulated sections of thermometer calibration is to be specified in the plant
the rod. The thermocouple reading is thus related technical specification.
in a straight forward way to the gamma flux. When
properly adjusted for the number and spectrum of With its stable sensitivity and rugged hardware
the gamma rays produced from fission and neutron design, the AFIP sensor has a lifetime much longer
capture, the fission density in the surrounding fuel than that of the LPRM detectors. The AFIP sensors
can be inferred from the gamma flux and therefore, in an LPRM assembly are replaced together with the
indirectly from the thermocouple reading. LPRM detectors when the whole LPRM assembly
is replaced. The AFIP detectors within the LPRM
The AFIP gamma thermometer sensors are in- assembly are installed such that physical separa-
stalled permanently within the LPRM assemblies. tion is maintained between the LPRM detectors
In each LPRM assembly in the core, there are seven and the AFIP detectors. The AFIP cables are also
AFIP gamma thermometer sensors with one gamma routed separately within the LPRM assembly from
thermometer installed next to each LPRM detector. the LPRM detector cables, with separate external
Consequently, there are AFIP sensors at all LPRM connectors.
locations. The AFIP sensor cables are routed within
the LPRM assembly and then out of the reactor pres- Multi-Channel Rod Block Monitor (MRBM)
sure vessel through the LPRM assembly penetration Subsystem
to the vessel. The AFIP subsystem generates signals The MRBM Subsystem is designed to stop the
proportional to the axial power distribution at the withdrawal of control rods and prevent fuel damage
radial core locations of the LPRM detector assem- when the rods are incorrectly being continuously
blies. The AFIP signal range is sufficiently wide to withdrawn, whether due to malfunction or opera-
accommodate the corresponding local power range tor error. The MRBM averages the LPRM signals
that covers from approximately 1% to 125% of surrounding each control rod being withdrawn. It
reactor rated power. compares the averaged LPRM signal to a preset rod
block setpoint and, if the averaged values exceed this
During core power and LPRM calibration, the setpoint, the MRBM Subsystem issues a control rod
AFIP signals are collected automatically to the AFIP block demand to the RCIS.
data processing and control unit, where the data are
properly amplified and compensated by applying Those portions of the Neutron Monitoring
correct sensor calibration adjustment factors. Such System that input signals to the RPS qualify as a
data are then sent to the plant computer function of nuclear safety system. The SRNM and the APRM
the N-DCIS for core local power and thermal limit Subsystems, which monitor neutron flux via in-core
calculations. The calculated local power data are detectors, provide scram logic inputs to the RPS to
then used subsequently for LPRM calibration. The initiate a scram in time to prevent excessive fuel
AFIP data collection and processing sequences are clad damage as a result of overpower transients. The
fully automated, with manual control available. The APRM Subsystem also generates a simulated ther-
AFIP gamma thermometer sensor has near constant, mal power signal. Both upscale neutron flux and up-
very stable detector sensitivity due to its operation scale simulated thermal power are conditions which
principle, and its sensitivity does not depend upon provide scram logic signals. A block diagram of a
fissile material depletion or radiation exposure. typical NMS division is shown in Figure 6-11.

6-12
Chapter 6 Core and Fuel Design

DETECTOR DETECTOR DETECTOR DETECTOR

SRNM PREAMP

LPRM/APRM
(INCLUDES OPRM)

SRNM

IN-CORE
MRBM INSTRUMENT
CALIBRATION
SYSTEM

NMS
BOUNDARY

MAIN ATLM PROCESS


RCIS SSLC
CONTROL COMPUTER
(ROD BLOCK) (RPS TRIP) (NOTE 2)
ROOM SYSTEM
DISPLAY

SSLC PAS SSLC


(FLUX, PERIOD, (NBS /ADS)
(SLC SYSTEM AND (NOTE 3)
ROD BLOCK)
FEEDWATER RUNBACK)
(NOTE 3)

NOTES:
1. DIAGRAM REPRESENTS ONE OF FOUR NMS DIVISIONS (MRBM IS A DUAL CHANNEL SYSTEM.
THERE IS ONLY ONE IN-CORE INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION SYSTEM).
2. ATLM MONITOR IS AN RCIS FUNCTION THAT BLOCKS ROD MOTION
AS THE CORE APPROACHES THERMAL LIMITS.
3. SRNM AND APRM ATWS PERMISSIVE SIGNALS TO SSLC.
4. INTERCONNECTIONS MAY BE FIBER-OPTIC OR METALLIC.

Figure 6-11. Basic Configuration of a Typical Neutron Monitoring System Division

6-13
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

Chapter
Instrumentation and Control 7
Overview the control room and forms the I&C interface
to the operator- there is no single process com-
puter.
The ESBWR instrumentation and control (I&C)
design (sometimes referred to as DCIS distributed The instrumentation of the ESBWR is generally
control and information system) features redun- associated with the control of the reactor, control of
dancy, diversity, fault tolerant operation, and self- the balance of plant (BOP), an extensive and intel-
diagnostics while the system is in operation. This ligent alarm system, prevention of the operation of
is made possible by the extensive use of advanced the plant under unsafe or potentially unsafe condi-
digital technologies. tions, monitoring of process fluids and gases, and
monitoring of the performance of the plant.
Previous BWRs used hard wired point-to-point
connections from field instrumentation to control Design goals of the I&C System include:
systems and panels in the control room. Essentially,
there was one wire per function or ~30-50,000 Minimize reactor trips/system unavailability
wires coming from the field to the cable spreading due to human errors and eliminate scrams and
room and then control room. Instead, the ESBWR trips from single active component failures
is designed with an I&C system that uses extensive Design any systems necessary for power gen-
data communication functions and fiber optics; this eration (except the electrical system) to be sin-
allows far fewer cables to the control room and gle-failure proof for both control and trips
elimination of the cable spreading room. Computerize operator aids and normal/emer-
gency procedures to reduce manual data pro-
The system design comprises: cessing and centralize human engineered op-
Remote Multiplexing Units (RMUs) in the erator interface to minimize operator burden
field. This equipment generally handles 200- Provide for most I&C equipment communica-
400 signals per RMU and interfaces the I&C tion and display protocols to follow interna-
system with the normal field signal inputs (an- tionally recognized standards
alog transmitters, dry contacts and thermocou- Use standardized modular equipment and ex-
ples/RTDs) and signal outputs (typically valve tensive self-diagnostics/fault identification to
position demands, switchgear and squibs). minimize operation and maintenance costs,
A distributed, networked controller layer that reduce surveillance requirements and frequen-
includes the dual and triple redundant control- cies, and reduce the burden on the maintenance
lers that operate the plant and generally acquire staff
and send signals to/from the RMUs. Achieve a high degree of plant automation
A distributed, networked computer system,
display, control and alarm/annunciator layer. Digital Measurement and Control
This equipment includes all the workstations, A standardized set of microprocessor-based
flat panel displays, peripherals and alarms in instrument modules is used to implement most

7-1
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

ESBWR monitoring and control functions. The to support the monitoring and control of interfacing
standardized safety-related Logic Units (LU), non- plant systems. The system contains safety-related
safety-related Control Processors (CP) , and Remote DCIS (Q-DCIS) cabinets and nonsafety-related
Interface Multiplexing Units (RMU) exploit the DCIS (N-DCIS) cabinets that respectively acquire
many advantages of digital technology, including and output signals to/from safety and non-safety/
self-test, automatic calibration, user interactive front BOP systems. The system provides all electrical
panels, standardization of the man-machine interface devices and circuitry (such as data communication
and, where possible, use of common circuit cards. functions, bus controllers, formatters and data buses)
These features reduce calibration, adjustment, diag- between sensors, display devices, controllers and
nostic and repair time and reduce spare circuit card actuators, which are defined and provided by other
inventory requirements, as well as reduce control plant systems. The DCIS also includes the associ-
room instrument volume. As a result, system avail- ated data acquisition and communication software
ability is improved due to the enhanced reliability required to support its function of plant-wide data
and reduced mean time to repair. and control distribution; all data communication
networks use redundant data paths and power sup-
The LU chassis, CP chassis, RMU chassis and plies to increase reliability. As shown on Figure
Human System Interface (HSI) chassis are standard 7-1, digital technology and networked fiber optic
for all similar ESBWR applications; only modular, signal transmission technology have been combined
plug-in, interchangeable circuit boards differ be- in the ESBWR design to integrate control and data
tween systems. Functional features provided in the acquisition for all of the plant buildings.
I&C design include:
Signals from various plant process sensors
Sensor signal processing provide input to RMUs located near those sensors.
Redundant sensor power supplies to meet the The RMUs digitize input signals and multiplex the
requirements of all sensors signals via fiber optic cables to the control room.
There, the signals are sent to the various comput-
Functional microcomputers implementing data ers, controllers and display devices as needed. The
transfers, self-test functions and communica- process is bidirectional in that signals from the
tions operator or plant controllers are put on the network
High-speed parallel data bus for communica- and directed to the various actuators for control ac-
tion between the functional microcomputer tion. A functional network diagram of the ESBWR
and other modules DCIS is shown in Figure 7-2.
Trip and analog outputs driving external relays,
actuators, logic circuits, meters, and recorders The Q-DCIS has four control data networks
Redundant power supplies and power feeds for (each of which is redundant), one per division and
both the safety and non-safety electronics the N-DCIS being a control data network with dual
(and sometimes triple) redundancy. Whether Q-
Fiber optic and other interfaces, allowing the DCIS or N-DCIS, redundancy is such that a single
LU/CP and HSI units to communicate directly cable or power feed can be lost or any RMU can fail
with plant multiplexing networks without affecting the operation of the remainder of
Menu-driven front panel for operator/techni- the system.
cian interface
Finally, each RMU is itself single-failure proof
Data Control Networks down to a small number of signals; all single fail-
The Distributed Control and Information System ures are self-diagnosed. The RMUs are located
(DCIS) provides redundant and distributed control throughout the plant to keep plant wiring as short
and instrumentation data communications networks as possible.

7-2
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

Plant Level
Alarms System Alarms Large Variable Display
CCTV Monitor
Mimic TSC EOF NDL
Flat Panel
Displays
CCTV Monitor

Consoles / Compartments
Flat Panels w/soft controls, hard controls, page/party phone, meters, silence/acknowledge, recorders,
main gen. synchronizing inset, PAX phone, radio handsets, keyboards/trackballs, etc.
SIM
MCR Wide Display Panels / Consoles

Site Lan (Comm.)/Firewall

Comm. Ethernet
Interfaces Network
Switches

Ethernet
Network
Switches

REDUNDANT
RPS DPS NONSAFETY-RELATED VDU
Diverse (Monitoring and Control)
Q-DCIS Scram
(See Insert) SSLC / Diverse Other Plant
LD&IS Gateway ESF 3D Control
ESF NMS RCI&S FWCS SB&PC PAS TGCS System Computer
Cabinets Monicore Processors
Logic ATWS ARI, Processors Functions
ATWS FMCRD
Run-In Logic
SLC
Logic Misc.
Controls

(Typical)

BPV Control, Turbine TSVs, TCVs,


Diverse I&C Commands RMUs
Flow Demand Intermediate
and Initiations
Valves
FW ASD Speed Condensate
Supv. Commands
Demand, LFCV Pos. Purification, Sensors
to Core Controllers
Control, RWCU/SDC Offgas, (Not part of N-DCIS)
Dump Flow Control Radwaste,
RMUs RMUs RMUs Legend:
Meterological,
Safety Related etc.
ECCS SCRAM SAFETY-RELATED VDU
Actuation Isolation (Monitoring and Control)
Nonsafety-Related
Sensors (Not part of Q-DCIS) Q-DCIS
(Safety-related Network)
(Hard Wire / Field Bus) REACTOR TRIP PLATFORM(S) ESF ACTUATION
(Dual Data Link) DIGITAL HARDWARE BASED SYSTEM PLATFORM
(Communication Link) ATWS ECCS
RPS Mitigation
& LD&IS ADS CRHS
NMS Logic (PLDs) SLC Logic
MSIV Isolation SLCS Initiation& (PLCs) (Non-MSIV)GDCS HABITABILITY
Notes: portion of LD&IS Feedwater ICS (CR HVAC)
1. Q-DCIS general description summary is found in Section 7.1.2 with details in Section 7.1.3 Runback SLCS
2. N-DCIS general description summary is found in Section 7.1.4 with details in Section 7.1.5 RTIF CABINETS SSLC/ESF CABINETS
3. ATWS/SLC logic processing uses diverse hardware, hardwired sensors and outputs

Figure 7-1. ESBWR Instrumentation & Control Simplified Block Diagram

Digital Protection System prevents spreading of electrical faults between safety


system divisions and between safety and non-safety-
Applications related equipment. Communication between safety
divisions and nonessential equipment is through
Advanced Safety Systems Design Data Gateways, which allow information to flow
The Reactor Protection System (RPS), Neutron in only one direction.
Monitoring System (NMS), Leak Detection and
Isolation System (LD&IS) and the ECCS (ICS, Some control signals bypass data control net-
GDCS and ADS) are four-channel (divisional) works when the signal design requirements are such
systems actuated by two-out-of-four logic from that processing the signal through them might not
four-channel (divisional) sensor inputs. NMS is satisfy the established design requirements (signal
described in Chapter 6. Figure 7-3 shows a more processing speed).
detailed interface diagram.
The SSLC also controls the automatic actuation
Safety System Logic and Control and operation of the following Emergency Core
Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) and Cooling Systems (ECCS) during emergency opera-
the associated Q-DCIS equipment are divided into tion:
four divisions. Each division is physically and elec-
trically separated from the other divisions. Commu- Isolation Condenser System (ICS)
nications between divisions is via fiber optic cable Safety relief valves and depressurization
which provides complete electrical isolation and valves of the Automatic Depressurization Sys-

7-3
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

A B
REDUNDANT CONTROL BUILDING INDIVIDUAL NONSAFETY DCIS ROOMS Nonsafety Nonsafety
ETHERNET
DCIS Room DCIS Room
NETWORK

Dedicated Dedicated
N-DCIS DEDICATED NETWORK SWITCHES (GENE) DEDICATED NETWORK SWITCHES (PCS) DEDICATED NETWORK SWITCHES (BOP) Network Switches Network Switches
(PIP A) (PIP B)

Gateway Gateway Gateway Gateway Gateway Gateway Gateway Gateway Gateway Gateway Gateway Gateway Gateway Gateway Gateway Gateway Gateway
Switch Switch

Dual 3D
Monicore
DIV 1 DIV 2 MAIN
VDUs VDUs DIV 3 DIV 4
MAIN CONTROL (Including RSS) (Including RSS) VDUs Displays Fixed CONTROL ROOM
NONSAFETY Mimic, Alarms/
ROOM CONTROL ROOM In-Core Annunciators, Large
HARD INDICATORS Detector AREA Variable Display,
SAFETY AREA Controller
(As Required) Process Computer
Functions
Division 1 and 2 Dual
VDUs also on RSS Redundant
ATLM
Dual
Redundant
Q-DCIS RWM
Redundant Redundant Redundant Redundant
Dual Workstations/ Workstations/ Workstations/ Workstations/
Redundant VDUs VDUs VDUs VDUs
MRBM
Dual
Redundant Typical of Nonsafety VDUs
SIU (Including RSS)

Dual
Redundant
CONTROL RCIS

BUILDING Turbine Turbine Turbine Turbine


INDIVIDUAL Building
Hard Input
Building
Hard Input
Building
Hard Input
Building
Hard Input
SAFETY
DCIS ROOMS
SSLC SSLC SSLC SSLC NMS NMS NMS NMS RTIF RTIF RTIF RTIF Non-Micro Non-Micro DPS Triple Typical of Typical of Typical of Dual Redundant Dual Redundant
ESF ESF ESF ESF Processor Processor Redundant Control Dual Redundant Foreign BOP Triple Redundant PIP A PIP B
Q-DCIS Based Logic Based Logic BOP Controllers Controllers BOP Controllers Controllers Controllers
SB&PC, FWCS

Non- Micro Non-Micro


Processor Processor Redundant
Based Logic Based Logic Workstations/
VDUs

Foreign
Non-Safety System
Typical of
Seismic, Meteorological,
Area Radiation, Etc.
N -D C IS N -D C IS

SRNM RTIF ESF SRNM RTIF ESF SRNM RTIF ESF SRNM RTIF RMU PLC PLC RMU RMU RMU RMU RMU RMU
ESF
Preamps/LPRMS RMU RMU Preamps/LPRMS RMU RMU Preamps/LPRMS RMU RMU Preamps/ RMU Fixed In-Core
RMU
LPRMS Detectors and
Under Core T/Cs HARDWIRE
Hard I/O Hard I/O Hard I/O Hard I/O I/O TO RTIF/SSLC PIP A PIP B
Hard Hard ATWS/SLC Hard Hard Hard ATWS/SLC Hard Hard Hard ATWS/SLC Hard Hard Hard ATWS/SLC Hard Hard Hard DIV 1 - 4 Hard Hard Hard Hard Hard Hard
Hard
Inputs Inputs 2/4 Logic I/O Inputs Inputs 2/4 Logic I/O Inputs Inputs 2/4 Logic I/O Inputs Inputs 2/4 Logic I/O I/O I/O I/O I/O I/O I/O I/O I/O
I/O
Triple Redundant TURBINE BUILDING
Data Acquisition BOP Foreign Triple
Severe Accident Platform
FMCRD Redundant Controllers Redundant
Load Drivers Load Drivers Deluge System
Controllers Controllers (Condensate Data
(Nonsafety)
(Nonsafety) Polishing, Acquisition
2/2 Logic
Off Gas,
RPS, MSIV RPS, MSIV Radwaste,
SOLENOIDS SOLENOIDS Etc.)

REACTOR OR REACTOR OR REACTOR OR REACTOR OR


CONTROL BUILDING CONTROL BUILDING CONTROL BUILDING CONTROL BUILDING REACTOR, CONTROL,
SAFETY-RELATED SAFETY-RELATED SAFETY-RELATED SAFETY-RELATED REACTOR BUILDING REACTOR, CONTROL, FUEL, TURBINE AND FUEL, TURBINE AND
DIV 1 AREA DIV 2 AREA DIV 3 AREA DIV 4 AREA NONSAFETY-RELATED AREA ELECTRICAL BUILDING ELECTRICAL BUILDING

Q-DCIS Q-DCIS Q-DCIS Q-DCIS N-DCIS N-DCIS N-DCIS

Figure 7-2. ESBWR Instrumentation & Control Simplified Block Diagram

tem (ADS) process controls and is based on a fail-safe design


Gravity Driven Cooling System (GDCS) philosophy that allows appropriate protective action
by providing reliable single-failure-proof capability
Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) logic to automatically or manually initiate a reactor scram
is separate and diverse from SSLC, but contained while maintaining protection against unnecessary
within the RTIF cabinets. scrams resulting from single failures. This is ac-
complished through the combination of fail-safe
Reactor Protection System equipment design and redundant two-out-of-four
The Reactor Protection System (RPS) is the logic arrangement that reconfigures to a two-out-
overall complex of instrument channels, trip logic, of-three logic if a channel is bypassed. It should be
trip actuators and scram logic circuitry that initiate noted that despite any reconfiguration actions or
rapid insertion of control rods (scram) to shut down bypasses, the RPS system will never degrade to a
the reactor if monitored system variables exceed pre- capability that does not support a reactor trip in the
established limits. This action avoids fuel damage, presence of two unbypassed parameters exceeding
limits system pressure and thus restricts the release their trip value.
of radioactive material. The RPS also establishes
reactor operating modes and provides status and Leak Detection and Isolation System
control signals to other systems and alarms. The Leak Detection and Isolation System
(LD&IS) is a four-division system consisting of tem-
The RPS overrides all operator actions and perature, pressure, flow and fission-product sensors

7-4
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

In-Core Sensors NMS


Mode
Switch
Manual
Trip
Manual
Scram
provided with a separate manual control switch in the
Local Area
Sensors Local Area
control room which is independent of the automatic
RPS Devices/Actuators and manual leak detection isolation logic.
NBS RPS Logic
LD CRD HCUs
CRD

Diverse Instrumentation
LD&IS MSIV Logic
LD MSIV Isolation
CMS
SPTM Logic

and Control
NMS SLC Squib Valves
ATWS/SLC
NBS Feedwater Runback
Manual Initiation

RTIF

LD&IS (non-MSIV) Logic Other Isolation


Diversity Overview
ECCS LOGIC
GDCS Squib Valves To preclude common mode failures and to
NBS -
-
ADS/SRV (NBS)
ADS/DPV (NBS)
ICS Valves
satisfy NRC requirements, the ESBWR DCIS is
deliberately configured using different hardware
SRV Solenoids
CMS - GDCS
- ICS DPV Squib Valves
- SLC
SLC Squib Valves and software platforms. The NMS and RPS safety
PRM CRHS Isolation Logic Inlet/Exhaust
Dampers & EFU systems are diverse from the ECCS safety systems
and both are diverse from the investment protec-
Manual Initiation

SSLC/ESF
tion and BOP non-safety systems. Further, there is
Note:
1. Local area sensors include:
RPS: turbine stop valve position, turbine CV oil pressure, turbine bypass valve position
a diverse protection (DPS) system which, although
NBS: MSIV position (for RTIF only), RPV pressure, water level
CRD: HCU accumulator charging water header pressure
non-safety, duplicates many of the RPS scram func-
tions and several ECCS functions but does not use
CMS: drywell pressure, suppression pool temperature
2. Manual Scram interrupts power to the circuit.
3. LD&IS shares sensors inputs with RTIF (for MSIV isolation) and SSLC/ESF

the same hardware/software of those safety systems.


Additionally, the monitoring and control of the A
Figure 7-3. ESBWR SSLC Interface Diagram and B plant investment protection systems (like
the PSWS and RWCU/SDC systems) are arranged
with associated instrumentation, alarm, and isolation in different networks such that they can be operated
functions. This system detects and alarms leakage independently (and separate from BOP control and
and provides signals to close containment isolation monitoring) should one of the A or B DCIS systems
valves, as required, in the following: fail.
Main Steamlines Despite these different systems, the DCIS
Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling appears seamless to the operator in that all of his
System interfaces through the Video Display Unit (VDU)
Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System displays have the same operating format and menus.
The non safety network is such that an A or B plant
Feedwater System
investment protection system can be normally oper-
Isolation Condenser System ated on any control room non-safety VDU; however
Other miscellaneous systems should a DCIS failure occur such that half of the
DCIS is lost (more than a single failure is required),
Small leaks are generally detected by monitor- the other half will remain operational. There are
ing the air cooler condensate flow, radiation levels, no common mode, single failures or control room
equipment space temperature, and drain sump fill-up evacuations that will prevent the operators from
and pump-out rates. Large leaks are also detected by safely shutting down the plant using either safety or
changes in reactor water level, drywell pressure, and non-safety systems. There are no single failures that
changes in flow rates in process lines. will result in the loss of power generation.

Manual isolation control switches are provided System Description


to permit the operator to manually initiate (at the The Anticipated Transient Without Scram
system level) isolation from the control room. In (ATWS) mitigation system and the Diverse Pro-
addition, each Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) is tection System (DPS) comprise the diverse I&C

7-5
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

systems. The diverse I&C systems are part of the Local Area
Triplicate Channels (in Control Bldg.)
Local Area

ESBWR defense-in-depth and diversity strategy Sensors Devices/Actuators


NBS
and provide diverse backup to the RPS and the CMS Diverse RPS Logic LD CRD HCUs

SSLC/ESF. The ATWS mitigating logic system is B


implemented with the Q-DCIS and N-DCIS. RPS SCRAM
OR SCRRI
A Manual Initiation
COMMANDED
Diverse RPS

The ATWS/Standby Liquid Control (SLC) miti-


Diverse ECCS Logic
gation logic provides a diverse means of emergency - SLCS
SLCS Squib Valves

ICS

shutdown using the SLC for soluble boron injection. NBS - ICS
- GDCS
- SRV (NBS)
DPV Squib Valves

Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI), which hydraulically - DPV (NBS) GDCS Squib Valves

SRV Solenoids

scrams the plant using the three sets of air header Manual Initiation

dump valves of the Control Rod Drive System Feedwater Isolation

(CRD), is also used for ATWS mitigation. This logic Diverse Containment MSIVs

is implemented in the DPS.


Isolation RWCU/SDC

ICS

The nonsafety-related DPS (which is part of the Diverse ESF

SCRRI
N-DCIS) processes the nonsafety-related portions PARAMETERS
SRI Logic CRD HCUs

of the ATWS mitigation logic and is designed to NBS


mitigate the possibility of digital protection system
CRD HCUs
ARI /
NBS B
FMCRD Run-In
common mode failures.
FMCRD Run In
A
Manual Initiation

The DPS is a nonsafety-related, triplicate re- ARI/


FMCRD Run-In
dundant system, powered by redundant nonsafety- NOTE:

related load group power sources. The highly reli- LOCAL AREA SENSORS FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTIONS NOT SHOWN.

able, isolated and independent DPS provides diverse


reactor protection using a subset of the RPS scram Figure 7-4. ESBWR Simplified DPS Block Diagram
signals. The DPS also provides diverse emergency
core cooling by independently actuating the emer- (SCRRI)/Select Rod Insert (SRI) has been un-
gency core cooling systems. The DPS also performs successful in reducing reactor power to an ac-
selected containment isolation functions as part of ceptable level
the diverse ESF function. Figure 7-4 shows a simpli-
fied block diagram of the DPS. The portion of the ATWS mitigation system
implemented as safety-related logic is contained
ATWS Mitigation within the four divisions of the Reactor Trip and
The following ATWS mitigation functions use Isolation function (RTIF) cabinets (see Figure 7-2).
control logics that are diverse from the primary The ATWS/SLC logic processing components are
protection system: separate and diverse from the software-based RPS
logic, which is also located in the RTIF cabinets.
Automatic SLC system initiation ATWS/SLC analog trip modules (ATMs), instead
Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) of DTMs, perform setpoint comparisons for the
Fine Motion Control Rod Drive (FMCRD) automatic trip parameters in each division. Hard-
run-in ware-based discrete digital logic substitutes for
software-based trip logic to perform two-out-of-four
Feedwater runback (FWRB)
voting. The hardware and software-based logic of
Inhibit of the Automatic Depressurization Sys- this alternate emergency shutdown function is thus
tem (ADS) and GDCS injection diverse from the hardware and software logic of the
ARI and diverse scram plus delayed feedwa- RPS function.
ter runback for events where the RPS scram
command has been unsuccessful to shutdown Manual initiation capability of the ATWS SLC
the reactor, or Selected Control Rod Run-In liquid boron injection is provided in the MCR (with

7-6
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

SLC, ARI and Feedwater runback initiation occur- provides the necessary diverse protections.
ring from the same manual controls).
This diverse set of scram logics resides in inde-
The actuating signals for SLC system and pendent and separate hardware and software equip-
FWCS are hardwired (not multiplexed) to their re- ment from the RPS. The process variables sensors
spective system controllers. If one of the four ATWS that provide input to this diverse set of logics use dif-
logic processors is inoperable, bypass signals are ferent sets of sensors from that used in the RPS. The
initiated to bypass the input signals from the out- diverse logic equipment is nonsafety-related with
of-service processor, so that the input voting logic triplicate redundant channels processing coincidence
changes from two-out-of-four to two-out-of-three. A logic from four (4) sensor channels. The DPS also
manual bypass switch for this function is provided provides the ability to initiate a manual scram from
in the MCR. either hard-wired switches or the DPS VDU.

The ARI function of the ATWS mitigation logic The ESBWR has several ESF functions, in-
is implemented as nonsafety-related logic that is cluding core cooling provided by the GDCS and
processed by the DPS. Additionally, the DPS gen- SLC system, and the ADS function using SRV and
erates a signal to the Rod Control and Information DPVs. It also has the pressure relief and core cooling
System (RC&IS) to initiate electrical insertion (that function provided by the Isolation Condenser Sys-
is, FMCRD Run-In) of all operable control rods on tem (ICS). The ESF functions of the GDCS (squib
signals initiating ARI. This ARI and FMCRD Run-In valves), SLC system (squib valves), ICS, and ADS
logic resides in the DPS, which is totally separate (SRVs and DPVs) are included in the DPS to provide
and independent from the Q-DCIS with both diverse diverse initiation of emergency core cooling.
hardware and software. The RPV pressure and level
input sensors for the ARI logic are independent and Manual initiation capability is provided in the
separate from the sensors used in the Q-DCIS. DPS logic circuitry to initiate the diverse ECCS
functions of GDCS, SLC system, ICS and ADS
Diverse Protection System (DPS) (SRVs and DPVs). The DPS also provides the ability
In addition to the ATWS mitigation functions to generate a diverse manual ECCS actuation from
described previously, other diverse instrumenta- the DPS VDU.
tion and control functions are included in the DPS.
The DPS has a set of diverse reactor protection and This set of nonsafety-related diverse ESF logics
diverse ESF logics, which are implemented using resides in separate and independent hardware and
separate and independent hardware and software software equipment from the SSLC/ESF system.
from that of the RPS and SSLC/ESF. The DPS trans- The process sensors that provide inputs to this di-
mits the feedwater runback signal from the ATWS verse set of logics are different from the sensors used
mitigation logic to the feedwater control system. The in the SSLC/ESF systems. The diverse logic equip-
DPS also trips the feedwater pumps on high RPV ment is nonsafety-related with triplicate redundant
water level. Additionally, the DPS provides diverse channels. The diverse equipment power source is
monitoring and indication of critical safety functions nonsafety-related.
and process parameters required to support manual
operations and assessment of plant status. For the SRV opening function, three of the four
SRV solenoids on each SRV are powered by three
The DPS reactor trip functions provide a diverse of the four divisional safety-related power sources
means of reactor shutdown and serve as backups to in the ESF ADS. A fourth solenoid on each SRV is
the RPS. A subset of the RPS scram signals are se- powered by the nonsafety-related load group, with
lected for inclusion in the DPS scope, which provide the trip logic controlled by the DPS. All ten SRVs
acceptable diverse protection results. This set of di- in the ADS are controlled by the DPS through the
verse protection logics for reactor scram, combined fourth solenoid on each valve.
with the ATWS mitigation features and other diverse
backup scram protection and diverse ESF functions, For the DPV opening function, one of the

7-7
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

four squib initiators on each DPV is controlled by on continuous output signals (e.g., valve position
and connected to the nonsafety-related DPS logic. demand), and two-out-of-three voting on discrete
However, the three squib initiators on each of all the outputs (e.g., pump trip). Additionally, the triply
DPVs are controlled simultaneously by the SSLC/ redundant controllers are furnished with three in-
ESF ADS logic. The reliability and availability of dependent uninterruptible power feeds. Thus, the
DPV initiation by the SSLC/ESF ADS function is FTDC design eliminates plant trips due to single
not affected by the DPS logic. failures of control system components.

The DPS also provides diverse backup for: For dual redundant process control, one FTDC
is active and the other is in hot standby; both pro-
LD&IS for Main Steam, RWCU/SDC and IC cessors receive all inputs but only one processor at
isolation upon break detection signals. a time provides an output to the N-DCIS network
and to the RMUs. The other FTDC is live and can
Runback or trip of feedwater pumps on high
automatically and bumplessly assume command if
water level.
the primary FTDC fails.
Initiation of ICS on low water level or MSIV
closure. All important control signals are typically mea-
sured with three independent transducers; these input
signals are delivered to all controllers by the Non-Es-
sential Multiplexing System (NEMS) and validated

Fault-Tolerant Process
before control action is taken. This scheme and the
controller redundancy eliminate plant trips due to

Control Systems
single failures of control system components.

The FTDC architecture includes:


The ESBWR control system necessary for
power generation is made up of a network of triple Two or three identical processing channels,
redundant and dual redundant Fault Tolerant Digital each of which contains the hardware and firm-
Controllers (FTDCs). Single controllers may be ware necessary to control the system.
used where the function is not important to power Dual multiplexing interface units per controller
generation. for communication to the redundant N-DCIS
networks (triply redundant controllers use tri-
In general, the key ESBWR boiler control sys- ply redundant data acquisition).
tems such as the feedwater control, reactor pressure Interprocessor communication links between
regulator and plant automation systems are based processing channels to exchange data in order
on the triplicated, microprocessor-based FTDC; the to prevent divergence of outputs and to moni-
main turbine is also controlled with a triply redun- tor processor failures.
dant control system to minimize DCIS failures caus-
ing either lost generation or reactor transients. The Redundant power supplies.
remaining important BOP control systems are based Signal processing techniques applied to vali-
on dual redundant FTDCs. Each FTDC includes two date the redundant input signals for use in con-
or three identical processing channels, which receive trol computations.
all the redundant process sensor inputs and perform A Technician Interface Unit (TIU) for certain
the system control calculations in parallel. controllers providing a menu-driven system
which allows the technician to inject test sig-
For triple redundant process control, all FTDCs nals, perform troubleshooting and calibrate
are active simultaneously and each uses dedicated process parameters; all other controllers can
triply redundant RMU data acquisition; all control be accessed centrally for troubleshooting pur-
inputs are made available to all processors and all poses.
outputs are two-out-of-three voted mid-value voting

7-8
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

The fault-tolerant architecture of the FTDC controllers provide other Nuclear Island and BOP
design provides assurance that no single active automation functions by providing the setpoints of
component failure within the sensing, control, or lower level controllers and commands to various
communication equipment can result in loss of BOP equipment for normal plant startup, shutdown,
system function or plant power generation. The dual and power range operations.
and triplicated design also provides on-line repair
capability to allow repair and/or replacement of a Feedwater Control System
faulty component without disrupting any important The Feedwater Control System (FWC) auto-
plant process. matically controls the flow of feedwater into the
reactor pressure vessel to maintain the water within
Plant Automation System the vessel at normal and predetermined levels for
The primary objective of the Plant Automation all modes of reactor operation, including heatup and
System (PAS) is to both control the balance of plant shutdown. The operator can control reactor level
and to set reactor temperature, pressure, power and between the requirements of the steam separators
neutron flux to those values required by the au- (this includes limiting carryover, which affects tur-
tomation scheme. This control is only possible in bine performance, and carryunder, which adversely
normal plant operation and PAS controller failures affects plant thermal limits).
will trip the plant out of automation and leave the
plant as is for manual control. It should be noted A fault-tolerant, triplicated digital controller
that system control is only in that systems logic and using a conventional three-element control scheme,
the PAS only issues supervisorial commands to be provides control signals to the four adjustable speed
carried out by system controllers; all automatic and drives (ASDs) that, in turn, control the four feed-
manual reactor protection and BOP protection func- water pump motors. Feed flow to the reactor (and
tions are always operative and cannot be bypassed thereby reactor level) is regulated by changing the
by any automation control. speed of the feedpump motor; a lower capacity Low
Flow Control Valve (LFCV) is used to control level
Either thermal power or gross generator elec- at low reactor powers.
trical power can be controlled/demanded by the
operator. Alternatively, the operator can engage a The FWC may operate in either single- or three-
pre-programmed daily load-following schedule. element control modes. At feedwater and steam
flow rates below 25% of rated when the steam flow
The PAS also has the ability to pull the reactor measurement is outside of the required accuracy
critical and heat it to rated temperature and pressure or below scale, the FWC utilizes only water level
from either a cold or hot standby condition. The PAS measurement in the single-element control mode.
can also bring the reactor down to cold shutdown
conditions. For either heatups or cooldowns, the When steam flow is negligible, as during hea-
reactor temperature rate is controlled to within Tech tup and cooldown, the FWC automatically controls
Spec limits by the PAS commands to the Steam By- both the Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling
pass and Pressure Control System (SB&PC) and Rod (RWCU/SDC) System dump valve and the feedwa-
Control and Information System (RC&IS). ter low flow control valve to control reactor level
in the single element mode in order to counter the
The PAS consists of both dual and triply redun- effects of density changes during heatup in the reac-
dant process controllers; these receive information tor. At higher flow rates, the FWC in three-element
from the various plant sensors and issue commands control mode uses water level, main steamline flow,
to the BOP system controllers and to RC&IS to main feedwater line flow, and feedpump suction flow
position control rods and to the SB&PC to set pres- measurements for water level control.
sure.
Steam Bypass and Pressure Control System
While triply redundant controllers provide com- The Steam Bypass and Pressure Control Sys-
mands to the main reactor control systems, the dual tem (SB&PC) is a triply redundant process control

7-9
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

system: in Manual, the operator can adjust bypass Non-redundant turbine-generator supervisory
valve position and provide reactor pressure set- instrumentation is provided for operational analysis
point demands; in Automatic, these functions are and malfunction diagnosis. Automatic control func-
provided by the APR. Only the operator can switch tions are programmed to protect the turbine-genera-
the SB&PC System to Automatic, but either the tor from overspeed and to trip it; the trip logic for
operator or the APR can switch the SB&PC System all but bearing vibration is at least two-out-of-three
to Manual. logic.

Unlike previous BWRs, reactor pressure and not Other Control Functions
turbine inlet pressure is controlled by the SB&PC. The following control functions are dual redun-
In normal power generation, reactor pressure is dant. The software functions are deliberately spread
controlled by automatically positioning the turbine through many controllers to facilitate verification
control valves - the pressure control signal passes and validation (V&V), quality assurance and initial
through the SB&PC to the turbine control system. construction setup.
During modes of operation where the turbine is
off-line, flow limited, tripped or under control of its Rod Control and Information System
speed/acceleration control system during turbine roll The Rod Control and Information System
or coastdown, reactor pressure is controlled by the (RC&IS) is a dual redundant process control system:
bypass valves which pass steam directly to the main in Manual, the operator can select and position the
condenser under the control of the pressure regulator. control rods manually, either one at a time or in a
Steam is also automatically bypassed to the con- gang mode. If the RC&IS is in Semi-Automatic
denser whenever the reactor steaming rate exceeds mode, the operator needs to only give permission
the flow permitted to pass to the turbine generator. to start and stop control rod motion and the RC&IS
With a full bypass design option, the turbine bypass will insert or withdraw the control rods following
system has the capability to shed up to 100% of the a predefined control rod sequence. If the RC&IS is
turbine-generator rated load without reactor trip or in Automatic mode, it responds to commands for
operation of SRVs. For all these modes of operation, rod insertion or withdrawal from the PAS; this will
the pressure regulation system provides main turbine also follow a predefined control rod sequence. As
control valve and bypass valve flow demands so as with all automated control systems, only the opera-
to maintain a nearly constant reactor pressure. tor can switch the RC&IS controllers to Automatic,
but either the operator or the PAS can switch the
Turbine Control System RC&IS to Manual.
The Turbine Control System is a redundant
process control system: in Manual, the operator The RC&IS provides the means by which
can adjust the turbine load set; in Automatic, this control rods are positioned from the control room
function is provided by the APR. Only the operator for power control. The RC&IS controls changes
can switch the turbine controller to Automatic, but in the core reactivity, power, and power shape via
either the operator or the APR can switch the turbine the FMCRD mechanisms which move the neutron
controller to Manual. absorbing control rods within the core. For normal
power generation, the control rods are moved by
The turbine generator uses a digital monitoring their electric motors in relatively fine steps; for
and control system which, in coordination with the reactor scrams, the control rods are inserted both
turbine SB&PC, controls the turbine speed, load, and hydraulically and electrically. For operation in the
flow for startup and normal operations. The control normal gang movement mode, one gang of control
system operates the turbine stop valves, control rods can be manipulated at a time. The system in-
valves, and combined intermediate valves. The tur- cludes the logic that restricts control rod movement
bine control system also provides automation func- (rod block) under certain conditions as a backup to
tions like sequencing the appropriate turbine support procedural controls.
systems and controlling turbine roll, synchronization
of the main generator and initial loading. The RC&IS contains, as a subsystem, the ATLM

7-10
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

(automatic thermal limit monitor), which provides (ARMS) provides operating personnel with a record
an on-line measurement of plant thermal limits from and indication, in the main control room, of gamma
the LPRMs and periodic process computer updates. radiation levels at selected locations within the vari-
The ATLM will automatically block rod motion if it ous plant buildings and gives warning of excessive
detects operation near Tech Spec thermal limits. gamma radiation levels in areas where nuclear fuel
is stored or handled.
Another RCIS subsystem is the Rod Worth
Minimizer (RWM) Subsystem, which forces com- The ARMS consists of gamma-sensitive detec-
pliance to the defined control rod sequencing rules tors, digital radiation monitors, auxiliary units, and
by independently issuing rod blocks should a high local audible warning devices. System recording,
worth rod pattern develop. like all process functions, is done by the process
computer. The detector signals are digitized and
The RC&IS and the scram timing panel also multiplexed for transmission to the radiation moni-
support automatic measurement of control rod Tech tors and to the main control room. Each local monitor
Spec scram speeds for either planned or unplanned has two adjustable trip circuits for alarm initiation.
scrams. Auxiliary units are provided in local areas for radia-
tion indication and for initiating the sonic alarms on
All of the rod blocks, sequence controls and abnormal levels. Radiation detectors are located in
thermal limit monitoring remain operative whether various areas of the plant to provide early detection
or not the plant is being controlled by PAS. and warning for personnel protection.

Process Radiation Monitoring System Containment Monitoring System


The Process Radiation Monitoring System The Containment Monitoring System (CMS)
(PRMS) monitors and controls radioactivity in pro- measures alarms and records radiation levels and
cess and effluent streams and activates appropriate the hydrogen and oxygen concentration in the
alarms, isolations, and controls. The PRMS indicates containment under post-accident conditions. It is
and records radiation levels associated with selected automatically put in service upon detection of LOCA
plant liquid and gaseous process streams and efflu- conditions.
ent paths leading to the environment. All effluents
from the plant, which are potentially radioactive, The CMS provides normal plant shutdown and
are monitored both locally and in the control room. post-accident monitoring for gross gamma radiation
These include the following: and hydrogen/oxygen concentration levels in both
drywell and suppression chamber. The CMS consists
Main steamline tunnel area. of two divisions which are redundantly designed so
that failure of any single element will not interfere
Reactor and Fuel Building ventilation exhaust
with the system operation. Electrical separation is
(including fuel handling area).
maintained between the redundant divisions. All
Control Building air intake supply. components used for safety-related functions are
Drywell sumps liquid discharge. qualified for the environment in which they are
Radwaste liquid discharge. located. The system can be actuated manually by
the operator, or automatically initiated by a LOCA
Offgas discharge (pretreated and post-treated). signal (high drywell pressure or low reactor water
Gland steam condenser offgas discharge. level). The CMS does not actuate nor interface with
Plant stack discharge. any other safety-related systems.
Turbine Building vent exhaust.
Plant Computer
Radwaste Building ventilation exhaust. On-line networked computers are provided to
monitor and log process variables and make certain
Area Radiation Monitoring System analytical computations. The process computer
The Area Radiation Monitoring System function is distributed in various workstations and

7-11
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

cabinets on the same network as the plant controllers; would be operated. Since it is battery operated, the
the important functions are redundant and there is no safety-related equipment is always available. The
longer a centralized process computer. The process non-safety related systems availability (i.e., control,
computer functions include: not monitoring) is dependent on the status of offsite
power and the diesel generators.
Most nonsafety-related display support.
Core three-dimensional power monitoring (3D The remote shutdown system panels are located
Monicore). in enclosed rooms in their corresponding divisional
areas of the reactor building and are normally locked;
Balance-of-plant (BOP) performance calcula- any access to these rooms is alarmed in the main
tions. control room.
Sequence of events.
Manual and automatic logging.
SPDS (Safety Parameter Display System).

Historian (normal slow speed recording).


TRA (Transient Recording & Analysis).
Main Control Room
SOE (Sequence of Events.) The key elements of the ESBWR main con-
trol room (MCR) design (Figure 7-5) are (1) the
Alarm & Annunciator.
compact main control console (MCC) for primary
Firewalls to support offsite simulator and operator control and monitoring functions, and (2)
emergency response functions. the integrated wide display panel, which presents an
General Displays. overview of the plant status that is clearly visible to
the entire operating crew. Each of the units incor-
Remote Shutdown System (RSS) porates advanced man-machine interface technolo-
In the event that the control room becomes in- gies to achieve enhanced operability and improved
accessible, the reactor can be brought from power reliability. Human factors engineering principles
range operation to cold shutdown conditions by have been incorporated into the design of the MCR
use of controls and equipment that are available panels and into the overall MCR arrangement. The
outside the control room. The reactor can be manu- Lungmen (ABWR) simulator demonstrates the
ally scrammed, and MSIVs can be closed from the control approach.
RSS but all of the remaining RSS control is accom-
plished with a division 1 (or division 2 depending Total plant control is achieved from the Main
on the RSS panel) Video Display Unit (VDU) and Control Console (MCC) for all phases of operation.
a non-safety VDU. These VDUs remain operational The console design incorporates flat panel display
with a complete loss of all control room equipment devices, and a limited number of hard switches as
since neither the safety nor non safety networks the primary operator interface devices. The flat panel
are physically in the main control room nor does displays are driven by the DCIS. The main control
the loss of the fiber and Ethernet cables connecting console has a low profile so that the operators can
the control room VDUs to the network adversely perform their duties from a seated position and still
affect the network. Additionally control room fires view the wide display panel.
or smoke will not adversely affect the safety-related
or non-safety related controllers/network equipment The Wide Display Panel (WDP) provides sum-
or their power feeds. mary information on plant status parameters and
key alarms to the operators, supervisors and other
As a result, all safety-related control and moni- technical support personnel in the MCR. The WDP
toring (division 1 and 2 only) and all non-safety is located immediately in front of the operators
related control and monitoring remain available to when they are at their normal work station seated
the remote shutdown panel operator in the same way at the main control console. This WDP includes a
that the same equipment in the main control room fixed mimic display, an approximately 250 cm large

7-12
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

Closed Alarm Wide display Fixed mimic Variable


Circuit TV indicators panels display display

Main control Flat Supervisory Hard switch Flat


console display console panels display

Figure 7-5. Lungmen Simulator

variable display, top-level plant alarms, summary The MCC comprises the work stations for the
and detailed system level alarms, touch-control flat two control room plant operators (only one is nec-
panel displays and system level annunciators. The essary to operate the plant), and is configured such
WDP incorporates the Safety Parameter Display that the operators are provided with controls and
System (SPDS) as part of the plant status summary monitoring information necessary to perform as-
information. signed tasks and allows the operators to view all of
the WDP from their seated position at the MCC. The
The MCR also includes a supervisors console console is configured in a truncated V shape. The
which has flat panel displays for monitoring plant normal plant control and monitoring functions are
status. The supervisors console is set back directly performed in the central area of the console, while
behind the operators in a position which ensures the safety-related Nuclear Steam Supply (NSS) Sys-
that a clear view of all control room activities is tems functions are located on the left-hand side and
available. the non-safety reactor and balance-of-plant (BOP)
functions are located on the right-hand side.
Main Control Console
The Main Control Console (MCC) provides A primary means for operator control and
the displays and controls necessary to maintain monitoring is provided by the color-graphic flat
and operate the plant during normal, abnormal, panel displays mounted on the MCC. The displays
and emergency conditions. This console is used in are driven by the DCIS. There are many types of
conjunction with the information provided on the system display formats which can be shown on the
vertical surface of the Wide Display Panel. flat panels and all are accessible from menu displays.

7-13
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

Displays include summary plant status displays, portion of the WDP. Flat panel displays for monitor-
P&ID/control displays, trend plots, system status ing and control of major non-safety systems are also
formats, alarm summaries, plant operating procedure located on the MCC.
guidance displays, and plant automation guidance
displays. In addition to the flat panel display devices de-
scribed above, the MCC is equipped with dedicated,
Although each flat panel is nominally assigned hard switches located on the horizontal desk sur-
to a specific system or systems, it should be under- faces of the console. Some of these hard switches are
stood that this is under the control of the operator; the sequence master control push-button switches
any non-safety VDU can show any non-safety used for initiating automation sequences for normal
display and each safety VDU can display anything plant operations and for changing system operating
within its associated division. Any system can be modes. Other hard switches are hard-wired directly
controlled by only one VDU at a time; this multi- to the actuated equipment (for absolute assurance of
redundant display capability ensures continued function) and provide backup capability for initiat-
normal plant operation in the event of a failure of ing safety system functions and key plant protection
one or more of the flat panels. features, such as manual scram, SLCS initiation and
turbine trip functions.
The system status displays provide information
on individual plant systems. The touch screens on the A limited number of dedicated operator inter-
safety/non-safety flat panels provide direct control faces are provided in the center of the MCC for key
for safety-related and non-safety related systems systems such as the Rod Control and Information
at the system component level. The application of System. These dedicated interfaces contain hard
this touch screen capability for control of non-safety switches and indicators to provide quick and con-
systems, along with the incorporation of automated venient access to key system interfaces under all
plant operation features, was a major factor in re- plant conditions
ducing the size of the MCC to its present compact
dimensions. Wide Display Panel
The Wide Display Panel (WDP) is a large ver-
The alarm summary displays on the MCC flat tical board which provides information on overall
panel displays support the operators decision-mak- plant status with real-time data during all phases
ing process. The presentation of alarms employs of plant operation. The information presented on
optimization techniques designed to prioritize alarms the WDP is clearly visible from the Main Control
and filter or suppress nuisance alarms which require Console, the supervisors console, and other posi-
no specific operator action. An example of this alarm tions in the control room where support personnel
processing would be the suppression of the audible may be stationed. The WDP provides a fixed mimic
alarms associated with the Reactor Protection Sys- display and a large (~250 cm diagonal) variable dis-
tem during the period of a reactor scram. play. Spatially dedicated alarm windows for critical,
plant-level alarms are also provided on the left-hand
The flat panel display devices are used to sup- side WDP. Spatially-dedicated detailed system level
port both safety-related and nonsafety-related sys- annunciators are located above their respective sys-
tem monitoring and control functions. The flat panel tems on the fixed-mimic display. Below the WDP,
displays, which are used as safety-system interfaces, there are multiple flat display devices for individual
are fully qualified to Class 1E standards. The safety- system surveillance, monitoring and control and
related flat displays are located on the left side of specialized functions like main and diesel generator
the MCC and provide for control and monitoring sequencing.
of the four redundant and independent divisions of
the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and The fixed mimic display is arranged on two,
reactor primary containment heat removal. There adjacent, upright panels which comprise the center
are two flat panel displays per division, one on the and right-hand sections of the WDP. Information
MCC and the other on the left side of the horizontal on this panel includes the critical plant parameters

7-14
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

required for a safety parameter display system and The touch-control flat displays located at the
Type A post-accident monitoring indications. Spe- base of the WDP provide the capability for surveil-
cific information displayed on this panel includes lance of systems and equipment during normal plant
the status of the core cooling systems, reactor pres- operation. In addition, these devices can be used
sure vessel and core parameters, containment and for control and monitoring of plant systems during
radiation parameters, and the status of safety-related maintenance and refueling outages and during pe-
equipment. The information displayed completely riods when a portion of the MCC may be taken out
satisfies the requirement for safety parameter and of service for maintenance.
post-accident monitoring without the need for any
other display equipment (although any non-safety
VDU can also indicate SPDS parameters and moni-

Plant Automation
toring). The right panel of the fixed mimic display
contains information on the BOP power genera-
tion cycle, such as the condensate and feedwater
system, turbine/generator, and power transmission The ESBWR design incorporates extensive au-
systems. tomation of the operator actions which are required
during a normal plant startup, shutdown and power
Also, within the area of the fixed mimic display, range maneuvers. The automation features adopted
dedicated alarm windows are provided for impor- for the ESBWR provide for enhanced operability
tant, plant-level alarms that affect plant availability and improved capacity factor relative to conven-
or safety. Examples of the plant-level alarms include tional BWR designs. However, the extent of automa-
high reactor pressure, low reactor water level and tion implemented in the ESBWR has been carefully
high suppression pool temperature. selected to ensure that the primary control of plant
operations remains with the operators. The operators
The large variable display is located on the right remain fully cognizant of the plant status and can
upright panel of the Wide Display Panel. The basic intervene in the operation at any time, if necessary.
purpose of the large variable display is to provide
information on important plant process parameters The ESBWR automation design provides for
which supplements the overview information on the three distinct automation modes: Automatic, Semi-
fixed mimic display. The information presented on Automatic, and Manual. In the Automatic mode, the
the large variable display can be changed, depending operator initiates automated sequences of operation
on the plant operating conditions and the needs of from the MCC. Periodic breakpoints are inserted
the operating crew. Any display format available on in the automated sequence which require operator
the MCC flat panel displays can also be displayed on verification of plant status and manual actuation of a
the large variable display. Examples of the full color breakpoint control push-button to allow the automat-
graphic displays that can be shown on the variable ed sequence to continue. When a change in the status
display are the various flat panel display formats of a safety system is required, automatic prompts
(including SPDS and plant normal and emergency are provided to the operator and the automation is
procedures) which would be selected under plant suspended until the operator manually completes the
emergency conditions. necessary safety system status change.

Closed circuit TVs are provided which allow In the semi-automatic mode of operation, the
remote observation of equipment and operations in progression of normal plant operations is monitored
areas that are not normally accessible and of other and automated prompts and guidance are provided
critical activities such as fuel handling and mainte- to the operator; however, all actual control actions
nance tasks. Communication between the control must be performed manually by the operator. In the
room crew and other areas of the plant is enhanced Manual mode of operation, no automated operator
with this visual feedback capability. These closed guidance or prompts are provided. The operator can
circuit TVs have high definition with color capability completely stop an automatic operation at any time
and are radiation hardened where appropriate. by selecting the Manual mode of operation; this will

7-15
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Control

also happen automatically for any abnormal events, During emergency plant operations, plant-level
such as turbine trips or reactor scrams. automation is automatically suspended, but system
level automation is available. One operator would
be responsible for the NSS systems and the other
for the BOP systems, with the supervisors providing

Operation
both direction and guidance. Again, system-level
automation allows for simplified execution of both
the safety and non-safety system operations. In lieu
The ESBWR control room design provides of system-level automation, direct manual control
the capability for a single operator to perform all of individual system equipment is available on the
required control and monitoring functions during flat displays.
normal plant operations as well as under emergency
plant conditions. One-man operation is possible due Surveillance
to implementation of several key design features: Unlike previous BWR designs, the ESBWR
(1) the Wide Display Panel for overall plant moni- DCIS is specifically designed to facilitate tech
toring; (2) plant-level automation; (3) system-level spec surveillance tests during normal operation
automation; (4) the compact MCC design; and (5) for operator confirmation. For example, redun-
implementation of operator guidance functions, dant parameters between the four safety divisions
which display appropriate operating sequences on are automatically and continuously checked for
the main control panel flat panel displays. The opera- consistency and alarmed when not consistent; the
tor only has to click on any alarm to see the alarm daily channel checks are either the absence of an
response procedure text and similarly normal and alarm or an automatically generated printout of the
emergency operating procedure text is available on appropriate parameters. Similarly, although digital
any non-safety VDU (including the large variable setpoints do not drift, the DCIS automatically and
display). The role of the operator will primarily be continuously checks the various trip setpoints and
one of monitoring the status of individual systems alarms when they are not correct.
and the overall plant and the progress of automation
sequences, rather than the traditional role of moni- Maintenance
toring and controlling individual system equipment. As with all modern DCIS, the ESBWR incorpo-
However, to foster a team approach in plant opera- rates extensive self diagnostics and self calibration
tion and to maintain operator vigilance, the operating and will direct the operator to the lowest level of
staff organization for the reference ESBWR control failed module/card; these can be replaced on line
room design can support having two operators nor- with no loss of power generation.
mally stationed at the main control console.

7-16
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

Chapter
Plant Layout and Arrangement 8
Plant Layout solid and liquid radioactive waste generated by the
plant.

The ESBWR Standard Plant includes buildings Development of the ESBWR plant and build-
dedicated exclusively or primarily to housing sys- ing arrangements has been guided by the following
tems and equipment related to the nuclear system or criteria:
controlled access to these systems and equipment.
Six such main buildings are within the scope for Retain the passive and well established
the ESBWR. BWR pressure suppression containment technol-
ogy. Use of the horizontal vent configuration was
Reactor Building houses safety-related confirmed for the Mark III containments.
structures, systems and components (SSC), except
for the main control room, safety-related Distributed Separate clean and controlled radiation ar-
Control and Information System equipment rooms in eas to minimize personnel exposure during operation
the Control Building and spent fuel storage pool and and maintenance.
associated auxiliary equipment in the Fuel Building.
The Reactor Building includes the reactor, contain- Emphasize improved layout of systems to
ment, refueling area and auxiliary equipment. improve access and equipment maintenance activi-
ties.
Fuel Building houses the spent fuel stor-
age pool and its associated auxiliary equipment. Locate major equipment for early installa-
tion using open top construction approach and large
Control Building houses the main control scale modularization.
room and safety-related controls outside the reactor
building. Arrange the Reactor Building around the
primary containment to provide multiple barriers
Turbine Building houses equipment as- to post-accident fission product leakage, and high
sociated with the main turbine and generator, and tolerance to external missiles.
their auxiliary systems and equipment, including
the condensate purification system and the process Place the passive safety systems (GDCS,
offgas treatment system. PCCS, ICS) within and adjacent to the primary
containment.
Electrical Building houses the two non-
safety-related standby diesel generators and their Separate temporary fuel storage from long
associated auxiliary equipment. It also houses the term fuel storage by adopting the Inclined Fuel
non-safety grade batteries. Transfer System from BWR/6.

Radwaste Building houses equipment The site plan of the ESBWR includes the Re-
associated with the collection and processing of actor, Control, Fuel, Turbine, Radwaste, Electrical

8-1
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

TC

FPE
FO FO
PL
RAT
SY FWS FWS
AD
LDA
AT
EB/TSC
RAT

AT CB SB/OSC
DS
MT
TB
RB FB
ST HM
LO
AB
PL
CIRCULATING
WD
WATER INLET

CS CIRCULATING
PH
WATER OUTLET
RW
PL

CT STP

MS CM WH
SF/WT
NT
WS

BUILDING LEGEND 0 20 40 60 80
1:10

N
SCALE IN METERS
AB AUXILIARY BOILER OSC OPERATION SUPPORT CENTER
AD ADMINISTRATION BUILDING PH PUMP HOUSE
AT UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER PL PARKING LOT
CT CB CONTROL BUILDING RAT RESERVE AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER
CM COLD MACHINE SHOP RB REACTOR BUILDING
CS CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK RW RADWASTE BUILDING
CT MAIN COOLING TOWER SB SERVICE BUILDING
DS INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE SF SERVICE WATER BUILDING
FB FUEL BUILDING ST SPARE TRANSFORMER
FO DIESEL FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK STP SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT
FPE FIRE PUMP ENCLOSURE SY SWITCHYARD
FWS FIRE WATER STORAGE TANK TB TURBINE BUILDING
HM HOT MACHINE SHOP & STORAGE TC TRAINING CENTER
LDA LAY DOWN AREA TSC TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER
LO DIRTY/CLEAN LUBE OIL STORAGE TANK WD WASH DOWN BAYS (EQUIPMENT ENTRY)
MS MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE AREA WH WAREHOUSE
MT MAIN TRANSFORMER WS WATER STORAGE
NT NITROGEN STORAGE TANK WT WATER TREATMENT

Figure 8-1. ESBWR Site Plan

Buildings and supporting buildings. Provision is ment to minimize material quantities. This, when
made within the Fuel Building for ten years plus combined with the volume reduction compared to
a full core offload of spent fuel storage. Separate previous designs, contributes to the substantial re-
buildings can be provided for additional onsite duction in both the estimated construction schedule
waste storage. Figure 8-1 illustrates a site plan of and plant capital cost.
the ESBWR for a single unit arrangement. Although
the heat sink is based on natural draft cooling tow- The layout of the Reactor and Turbine Buildings
ers in the figure, other heat sinks are possible. A was based on the following considerations:
3-dimensional artists concept of a single unit site
is shown in Figure 8-2. In this picture, mechanical Personnel access for all normal operating
draft cooling towers are shown. and maintenance activities is a primary concern. Ac-
cess routes from the change room to contaminated
A 3-dimensional perspective of most of the Reactor and Turbine Building areas are as direct as
power block (the Reactor, Fuel, Control and Turbine possible and clearly separated from clean routes. At
Buildings) is shown in Figure 8-3. each floor, 360 access is provided, if practical, to en-
hance daily inspections and normal work activities.
The ESBWR design is an enhanced arrange- Access to equipment not reachable from floor level

8-2
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

Cooling
Towers

Sewage Treatment
Water Treatment Pump House
Switchgear
Plant stack
Turbine
Service Building
Area Radwaste Reactor Electrical
Building Building Transformers
Cold Machine Shop Building

Warehouse Fuel Building Control Building


Fire Water Storage
Hot Machine Shop Service & OPS Support

Fuel Oil Storage

Administration Building

Training Center
Security

Figure 8-2. ESBWR Conceptual Site Plan

is via platform and stair access wherever possible. the other area without returning to the change area.
Redundant equipment is located in shielded cells
Equipment access is provided for all surveil- to permit servicing one piece of equipment while
lance, maintenance and replacement activities with the plant continues to operate. Valve galleries are
local service areas and laydown space. Adequate provided to minimize personnel exposure during
hallways and other equipment removal paths, includ- system operation or preparation for maintenance.
ing vertical access hatches, are provided for mov-
ing equipment from its installed position to service The turbine generator is aligned with its
areas or out of the building for repair. Lifting points, axis in-line with the Reactor Building. This is done
monorails and other installed devices are provided to minimize the possibility of turbine missile impact
to facilitate equipment handling and minimize the on the containment vessel.
need for re-rigging individual equipment move-
ments. Equipment access also considers the need The main and auxiliary transformers are
for temporary construction access. located adjacent to the main generator at the end of
the Turbine Building. This location minimizes the
Radiation levels are controlled and mini- length of the isophase bus duct between the genera-
mized. The Reactor Building is divided into clean tor and transformers, as well as the power supply
and controlled areas. Once personnel enter a clean cables back to the main electrical area of the power
or controlled area, it is not possible to crossover to block.

8-3
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

The site plan includes consideration for con- Main Steam and Feedwater piping and part of
struction space and site access. The arrangement the steam tunnel connecting the Reactor Building
provides a clear access space around the Reactor and with the Turbine Building can be seen in Figure 8-8.
Turbine Buildings for heavy lift mobile construction At this elevation the SRVs and MSIVs can be seen
cranes without interference with other cranes, access on the Main Steam piping. Also showing at this
ways and miscellaneous equipment. elevation are the Standby Liquid Control System
(SLC) accumulators in the Reactor Building, and
HVAC equipment in the Fuel Building.

Safety Buildings
The drywell-wetwell vent piping and SRV
quenchers can be seen in Figure 8-9. Also shown
at this elevation is the sliding block support system
The ESBWR safety buildings are the Reactor for the RPV.
Building, Fuel Building and Control Building.
The safety-grade batteries are the main feature
The Reactor Building houses the containment, of Figure 8-10.
drywell, and major portions of the Nuclear Steam
Supply System, steam tunnel, refueling area, Isola- The basemat level in the Reactor Building
tion Condensers, Emergency Core Cooling Systems, contains the Hydraulic Control Units (HCU) for the
HVAC System, and other supporting systems. FMCRDs as well as the pumps and heat exchangers
for the RWCU/SDC system, shown in Figure 8-11.
The ESBWR Reactor-Fuel Building is a rein- Also seen at this level are the FAPCS pumps and
forced concrete structure. The integrated Reactor- heat exchangers in the Fuel Building.
Fuel Building and containment structure has been
analyzed for a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) of a Figure 8-12 shows the Main Control Room
minimum of 0.3g for an all-soils site envelope. (MCR) general layout.

The Reactor Building surrounds the primary Careful attention has been given to ease of
containment and provides a second barrier to fission construction with this building arrangement. The
product release. construction scheme embodied assumes that the
major cooling equipment has been placed on the
Figure 8-4 shows an elevation view of the Re- lowest floors of the building to allow early installa-
actor Building and Fuel Building These two build- tion during construction.
ings have a common basemat. Visible in this view
is the Inclined Fuel Transfer System (IFTS) which Modularization techniques are implemented to
manages the transfer of fuel between the Reactor reduce costs and improve construction schedules.
Building and the Fuel Building. These techniques are applied to such Reactor-Fuel
Building items as (1) building reinforcing bar as-
Figure 8-5 shows an elevation view of the Reac- semblies, (2) structural steel assemblies, (3) steel
tor Building and adjacent Control Building. liners for the containment and associated water
pools, (4) selected equipment assemblies, and (5)
The refueling floor is shown in Figure 8-6. On drywell platform and piping supports.
this figure the Reactor Building crane and refueling
machine are displayed. Removal of decay heat when the reactor is iso-
lated from the main turbine is achieved by the Isola-
The 4 Isolation Condenser (IC) heat exchang- tion Condenser System (see Chapter 3). Removal of
ers, 6 Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS) the post-LOCA decay heat is achieved by the Passive
heat exchangers and their interconnected pools are Containment Cooling System (see Chapter 4). The
shown in Figure 8-7. large volume of water in the suppression pool serves
as a fission product scrubbing and retention mecha-

8-4
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

33
34

36

21 32
18

35

20
16 30
19 17
3

6
28 4 31
11
29 15
23 1
22
5
9 26
24 10

2
27
ESBWR
7
14 1. Reactor Pressure Vessel 19. Buffer Fuel Storage Pool
8
2. Fine Motion Control Rod Drives 20. Refueling Machine
12 3. Main Steam Isolation Valves 21. Reactor Building
4. Safety/Relief Valves (SRV) 22. Inclined Fuel Transfer Machine
25 13 5. SRV Quenchers 23. Fuel Building
6. Depressurization Valves 24. Fuel Transfer Machine
7. Lower Drywell Equipment Platform 25. Spent Fuel Storage Pool
8. BiMAC Core Catcher 26. Control Building
9. Horizontal Vents 27. Main Control Room
10. Suppression Pool 28. Main Steam Lines
11. Gravity Driven Cooling System 29. Feedwater Lines
12. Hydraulic Control Units 30. Steam Tunnel
13. Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown 31. Standby Liquid Control
Cooling (RWCU/SDC) Pumps System Accumulator
14. RWCU/SDC Heat Exchangers 32. Turbine Building
15 Containment Vessel 33. Turbine-Generator
16. Isolation Condensers 34. Moisture Separator Reheater
17. Passive Containment 35. Feedwater Heaters
Cooling System 36. Open Feedwater Heater
18. Moisture Separators and Tank

Figure 8-3. ESBWR Cutaway View of the Reactor, Fuel, Control and Turbine Buildings

8-5
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

8-6
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

BLOWOUT
STEAM PANEL (TYP)
REACTOR BUILDING CRANE
CHASE

REFUELING
MACHINE WINCH
LOCATION
5F
REACTOR WELL
GRATING HINGED SPLASH
PLATFORMS GUARD (TYP)

4F

GDCS
AHU POOL
FUEL BUILDING
3F CRANE

2F SPILLOVER FUEL TRANSFER


HOLE MACHINE
1F
QUENCHER (TYP)
GRADE GRADE
ELECTRICAL
PENETRATION

B1F INCLINED FUEL


CLASS 1E TRANSFER TUBE
BATTERIES
B2F

B3F
HYDRAULIC CONTROL BiMAC GRATING CLASS 1E
UNIT (HCU) (TYP) PLATFORM BATTERIES

REACTOR BUILDING FUEL BUILDING

Figure 8-4. ESBWR Reactor and Fuel Building Section AA

REACTOR BUILDING
CRANE

PASSIVE CONTAINMENT REFUELING


COOLING SYSTEM MACHINE
HEAT EXCHANGERS

5F
GRATING PLATFORMS

HINGED SPLASH 4F
GUARD (TYP)

GDCS GDCS
POOL POOL
SPILLOVER 3F HVAC LOUVER (TYP)
HOLE (TYP) LOUVER (TYP)
2F
QUENCHER (TYP) LOUVER
1F

GRADE GRADE
GRADE

ELECTRICAL
PENETRATION B1F

CLASS 1E
BATTERIES B2F

REACTOR WATER CLEANUP/ BiMAC


SHUTDOWN COOLING B3F
CLASS 1E
CONTROL BUILDING
HEAT EXCHANGER HYDRAULIC CONTROL
UNITS (TYP) BATTERIES
REACTOR BUILDING

Figure 8-5. ESBWR Reactor and Control Building Section BB

8-7
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

B-B
DRYWELL MAIN HOOK LIMIT
HEAD STORAGE
AUX HOOK LIMIT

STEAM CHASE
(TYP)
REFUELING MACHINE
AUXILIARY PLATFORM NEW FUEL
STORAGE

A-A A-A

STEAM DRYER/SEPARATOR HIGH DENSITY


STORAGE POOL FUEL RACKS
REACTOR
BUILDING FUEL GRAPPLE
CRANE TEST PIT
REACTOR HEAD AND
INSULATION STRONG BLADE GUIDE
BACK/CAROUSEL STORAGE STORAGE
CONTROL BLADE
STORAGE (TYP)
B-B

Figure 8-6. ESBWR Reactor Building IRefueling Floor (5F)


B-B

ISOLATION CONDENSER
HEAT EXCHANGERS
(TYPICAL 4 PLACES)
MAINTENANCE/
MOISTURE
ISOLATION VALVE (TYP)
SEPARATOR

STEAM CHASE
(TYP) NEW FUEL STORAGE

INCLINED FUEL
TRANSFER TUBE

A-A A-A

HIGH DENSITY
FUEL RACKS

FUEL GRAPPLE
TEST PIT
BLADE GUIDE STORAGE
CONTROL BLADE
STORAGE (TYP)

PASSIVE CONTAINMENT COOLING


SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGERS
(TYPICAL 6 PLACES)
B-B

Figure 8-7. ESBWR Reactor Building IC-PCCS Level (4F)

8-8
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL

B-B
SYSTEM (SLCS) TANK

SLC MIXING DRUM FUEL BLDG


ELECTRICAL REPAVS AHUs
PENETRATION (TYP) ADS-SRV
CLAVS RETURN/
ACCUMULATORS (TYP)
EXHAUST FANS
IC
PIPING ACCUMULATOR IC
PENETRATION (TYP) ACCUMULATOR
GRATING VACUUM
REACTOR BLDG
BREAKER (TYP)
REPAVS AHUs
FEEDWATER INCLINED FUEL SLC PUMPS
TRANSFER TUBE
AHU
MAIN STEAM
MSIV
ACCUMULATORS HIGH DENSITY FUEL FUEL
A-A FUEL RACKS BLDG
A-A
SRV(TYP) BLDG
AHU AHU

AHU
STANDBY LIQUID
CONTROL SYSTEM
(SLCS) TANK CLAVS CLAVS
AHU AHU
GRATING

IC NON SAFETY HVAC AIR


ACCUMULATOR HANDLING UNIT ROOMS
GDCS POOLS

CONAVS CONAVS
AHU AHU
SLC MIXING DRUM
B-B

Figure 8-8. ESBWR Reactor and Fuel Building Steam Line Level (3F)
B-B

SKIMMER SURGE TANK (TYP)

RCC RCC RBCC RCC RCC


PDP ERIP FMDC PDP

LPM
FMDC
NLPL RBCC
POWER CENTER
1000KVA FMCRD

XFMR RCIS AT
S
POWER SUPPLY RCC PDP
480-208/120V
XFMR 480-208/120V
XFMR FUEL
RCIS SYNC RCC
TRANSFER
DISTR PNL
MACHINE
FMDC

SUPPRESSION POOL
RCIS LOCAL RBCC
DISTR PNL
STRP FUEL PREP
QUENCHER (TYP) ERIP MACHINE (TYP)

A-A FUEL CASK A-A


RPV SUPPORT (TYP) VENT (TYP) HEAD STORAGE
INCLINED FUEL NEW FUEL
STRP
TRANSFER TUBE PREP MACHINE

FUEL GRAPPLE
TEST PIT
ERIP

RBCC DECONTAMINATION
FACILITY
RCIS LOCAL
POWER CENTER
1000KVA FMCRD

DISTR PNL
RCIS SYNC FMDC
DISTR PNL
RCC
RB DISTR PNL 480-208/120V
AT XFMR
S
480-208/120V RCIS S RCC PDP
XFMR POWER SUPPLY AT

RBCC
FMDC NLPL FMDC PDP
XFMR

PDP ERIP
RCC RCC RBCC RCC RCC
B-B

Figure 8-9. ESBWR Reactor and Fuel Building Suppression Pool Level (Grade)

8-9
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

B-B
RWCU/SDC FILTER/
DEMINERALIZER (TYP)
SKIMMER SURGE TANK (TYP)

FUEL STORAGE RACKS


CONTROL ROD
STORAGE RACKS

72 HR BATTERY EQUIPMENT STORAGE


BANK (TYP) RACKS (TYP)
CHANNEL
STORAGE RACK

RWCU/SDC REGEN LDW HVAC


AND NON-REGEN
HEAT EXCHANGER
INCLINED FUEL
ROOM
A-A TRANSFER TUBE A-A
ROTATING
PLATFORM FAPCS FILTER/
72 HR BATTERY
BANK (TYP) DEMINERALIZER (TYP)

OVERHEAD CRANE
CRD PUMP
HOOK LIMIT
AIR HANDLING
UNIT (AHU)

SAFETY SHOWER
EYE WASH (TYP)

CRD MAINTENANCE
B-B

CONTROL PANEL

Figure 8-10. ESBWR Reactor and Fuel Building Battery Level (B2F)

REACTOR WATER CLEANUP/


SHUTDOWN COOLING
B-B

COOLING WATER
(RWCU/SDC) PUMP MIXING SKID
SKIMMER SURGE TANK (TYP)

REACTOR WATER SUMP PUMPS FUEL STORAGE


CLEANUP/SHUTDOWN RACKS
COOLING(RWCU/SDC) CONTROL ROD
NON-REGEN HEAT STORAGE RACKS
EXCHANGER (TYP)
EQUIPMENT STORAGE
RACKS (TYP)

CHANNEL STORAGE
REACTOR WATER RACK
CLEANUP/SHUTDOWN
REACTOR INCLINED FUEL
COOLING(RWCU/SDC)
SUMP PUMPS BUILDING TRANSFER TUBE
NON-REGEN HEAT
SAMPLE
EXCHANGER (TYP)
PANEL CASK
PIT
IC
A-A ANALYZER A-A
DIV 1 DIV 3
DIV 4 DIV 2
FUEL AND AUXILIARY POOLS
COOLING SYSTEM (FACPS)
HYDRAULIC CONTROL PUMP (TYP)
UNITS (HCU) (TYP)
FUEL AND AUXILIARY POOLS
INSTRUMENT
COOLING SYSTEM (FACPS)
RACK (TYP)
HEAT EXCHANGERS

SUMP
PUMPS

CRD PUMP
DISCHARGE
FILTERS
NLPL FUEL AND AUXILIARY POOLS
COOLING SYSTEM (FACPS)
XFMR
BACKWASH TANK

REACTOR WATER CLEANUP/


SHUTDOWN COOLING
(RWCU/SDC) PUMP N2 SUPPLY HCU
B-B

CHARGING UNIT BACKWASH TRANSFER PUMP

Figure 8-11. ESBWR Reactor and Fuel Building Basemat Level (B3F)

8-10
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

ITV CONTROL & RECORDING CONSOLE


SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S CONSOLE SHIFT SUPERVISOR
CLERK
MAIN CONTROL CONSOLE

45KVA
AHU AHU
XFMR
45KVA
XFMR

PNL
BOARD
MAIN FIRE
45KVA 30KVA ALARM PANEL
XFMR XFMR
WIDE DISPLAY PANEL

B-B

SKIMMER SURGE TANK (TYP)


BTRY MON
XFMR NLPL
MCC PPL PPL
NLPL RMU RMU FUEL STORAGE
XFMR SRNM/MONS RPS/MSIV PPL SRNM/MONS RACKS
RMU
RMU
DC POWER PPL DC POWER
CENTER PPL RPS/MSIV PPL CENTER CONTROL ROD
MR
XF STORAGE RACKS
24HR/100KVA MR RM 24HR/100KVA
72HR/10KVA INVT XF U INVT MCC
INVT MCC
XF
MCC

72HR/10KVA BTRY MON


MR

BTRY CHGR EQUIPMENT STORAGE


XF

OLU/RPS
MR

OLU/MSIV SOL FUSES RACKS

RMU
SOL FUSES
SDBY BTRY STBY
CHGR BTRY CHGR CHANNEL STORAGE
100KVA REG RACK
XFMR
24HR 100KVA
BTRY CHGR XFMR FINE MOTION 24HR/100KVA 100KVA REG
CONTROL ROD BTRY CHGR XFMR
NLPL
DRIVE (FMCRD)
FUEL CASK HEAD
RMU

10KVA REG XFMR


XFMR NLPL

A-A A-A

INCLINED FUEL
10KVA REG TRANSFER TUBE
XFMR
24HR/100KVA
BTRY CHGR
RMU

NLPL
NLPL
XFMR NEW FUEL
XFMR 24HR/100KVA SDBY INSPECTION STAND
BTRY CHGR BTRY CHGR
100KVA REG 100KVA REG
CHGR SDBY BTRY 72HR/10KVA XFMR
CHGR ELECTRICAL BTRY CHGR
PENETRATION (TYP) 72HR/10KVA
OLU/RPS INVT OLU/MSIV
SOL FUSES BTRY MON
BTRY MON SOL FUSES
24HR/100KVA 24HR/100KVA
INVT
INVT
MCC

MCC XF XFMR NLPL


MCC MR XFMR
XF
NLPL MR
MR XF
PP
L P MR
DC POWER P XF DC POWER
L
RPS/MSIV PPL PPL
CENTER PPL CENTER
SRNM/MONS SRNM/MONS
RMU RPS/MSIV PPL
RMU XFMR
XFMR
NLPL RMU RMU RMU RMU NLPL
MCC
B-B

Figure 8-12. ESBWR Reactor, Fuel and Control Buildings MCR Level (B1F)

nism. The Reactor Building serves as an additional Key distinguishing features of the ESBWR
barrier between the primary containment and the Reactor-Fuel Building design include:
environment. Any fission product leakage from the
primary containment is expected to be contained Elimination of the recirculation system, which
within the Reactor Building. reduces the containment volume associated
with high construction costs.
Analyses of the radiological dose consequences
Reduced building volume which reduces ma-
for design basis accidents, based on an assumed
terial costs and construction schedule.
containment leak rate of 0.5% per day, show that
the offsite doses after an accident are about 15 Rem Design with conventional structural shapes to
TEDE for the standard US site (see Chapter 11). improve constructability, which reduces capi-

8-11
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

tal costs and construction schedule.


REFUELING

Improved personnel and equipment access for


MACHINE

WINCH LOCATION
NORMAL WATER

enhanced operability and maintainability.


LEVEL

MINIMUM
FOR SHIELDING

The Reactor Building layout utilizes the grade FUEL

level entry area for major servicing of the cooling


equipment. All of the major pieces of equipment
can be moved into the reactor building area through UPPER TERMINAL
hatches (not shown on the figures). FUEL BUILDING
CRANE

FUEL CARRIAGE

The volume of the ESBWR Safety Buildings


(IN TRANSIT)

INCLINED FUEL

is reduced to approximately 210,000 m3, an 18% TRANSFER TUBE

reduction compared to ABWR. Since this reduced FUEL HANDLING


MACHINE

volume was obtained by simplification of the reactor


supporting systems and optimization of their ar- NORMAL
WATER LEVEL

rangement with improved access (rather than simply BELLOWS

by compaction), it provides attractive material cost BOTTOM GATE VALVE

savings over previous BWRs and helps reduce the LOWER TERMINAL FUEL RACK

construction schedule without adversely impacting


maintenance.

Inclined Fuel Transfer System


The Reactor and Fuel Buildings share the fuel
storage requirements. There is a buffer pool in the Figure 8-13. ESBWR Inclined Fuel Transfer System
Reactor Building with sufficient storage for 60%
of a full core load of fresh fuel plus 154 spent fuel fuel transport carriage. There is a means to seal off
assemblies (in the deep pit section of the pool). The the upper and lower end of the tube while allowing
spent fuel storage in the Fuel Building is sufficient filling and venting of the tube.
for the spent fuel from 10 calendar years of opera-
tion plus a full core offload. All fuel pools are lined There is sufficient redundancy and diversity
with stainless steel. in equipment and controls to prevent loss of load
(carriage with fuel released in an uncontrolled man-
The ESBWR is equipped with a non-safety ner) and there are no modes of operation that allow
grade, but Seismic Category I, Inclined Fuel Transfer simultaneous opening of any set of valves that could
System (IFTS). In general the arrangement of the cause draining of water from the upper pool in an
IFTS (refer to Figure 8-13) consists of a terminus uncontrolled manner. The carriage and valves may
at the upper end in the Reactor Building buffer pool be manually operated in the event of a power failure
that allows the fuel to be placed in a fuel transport to allow completion of the fuel transfer process.
carriage and tilted from a vertical position to an
inclined position prior to transport to the Spent Fuel The IFTS terminates in a separate pit in the fuel
Pool. There is a means to lower the fuel transport storage pool. The lower terminus of the IFTS allows
carriage, means to seal off the top end of the transfer for thermal expansion (axial movement relative
tube, and a control system to effect transfer. It has to the anchor point in the Reactor Building). The
a lower terminus in the fuel building storage pool lower terminus allows for differential movement
and a means to tilt the fuel transport carriage into between the anchor point in the Reactor Building
a vertical position allowing it to be removed from and the fuel pool terminus, and allows it to have
the transport device. There are controls contained in rotational movement at the end of the tube relative
local control panels to monitor the transfer, opening to the anchor point in the Reactor Building. The
and closing valves, and raising or lowering of the lower end interfaces with the fuel storage pool with

8-12
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

a bellows to seal between the transfer tube and the other uses. The pool girders, which serve as barri-
Spent Fuel Pool wall. ers for the pools, rigidly connect the top slab and
the Reactor Building (RB) walls. The RB floors
The IFTS carriage primarily handles nuclear that surround the containment walls and walls that
fuel using a removable insert and control blades in are under the suppression pool floor slab are also
a separate insert in the transfer cart. Other contami- integrated structurally with the concrete contain-
nated items may be moved in the carriage utilizing ment. The containment foundation mat is continuous
a suitable insert. with the RB foundation mat, and the Fuel Building
(FB) as well. The containment and the structures
For radiation protection, personnel access into integrated with the containment are constructed of
areas of high radiation or areas immediately adjacent cast-in-place, reinforced concrete. The containment
to the IFTS is controlled. Access to any area adjacent system is designed to have the following functional
to the transfer tube is controlled through a system of capabilities (Figure 8-14):
physical controls, interlocks and an annunciator.
The containment structure has the capability to
The IFTS has sufficient cooling such that a maintain its functional integrity during and fol-
freshly removed fuel assem- lowing the peak transient
bly can remain in the IFTS pressures and tempera-
until it is removed without REACTOR BUILDING
tures which would occur
damage to the fuel or exces- following any postulated
sive overheating. PASSIVE CONTAINMENT
PRIMARY
CONTAINMENT loss-of-coolant accident
COOLING SYSTEM
HEAT EXCHANGERS
BOUNDARY
(LOCA). The containment
TOP SLAB structure is designed for

Primary
the full range of loading
conditions consistent with

Containment
normal plant operating
and accident conditions,

System
UPPER
including LOCA related
VACUUM GDCS
DRYWELL POOL
BREAKER

REACTOR
loads in and above the
VENT WALL
SHIELD
WALL
DIAPHRAGM suppression pool (SP) to-
FLOOR
The ESBWR contain- RPV
gether with a concurrent
ment is a low-leakage re- SUPPRESSION
CHAMBER SUPPORT
CYLINDRICAL
safe shutdown earthquake
inforced concrete structure WALL (SSE).
with an internal steel liner The containment structure
in the drywell and suppres- SUPPRESSION is designed to accommo-
sion chamber to serve as a POOL SLAB
date the maximum inter-
leak-tight membrane. The LOWER RPV PEDESTAL nal negative pressure dif-
containment is a cylindrical DRYWELL
ference between DW and
shell structure, which con- WW, and the maximum
FOUNDATION
sists of the reactor pressure MAT BiMAC
external negative pressure
vessel (RPV) pedestal, the difference relative to the
containment cylindrical wall, Figure 8-14. ESBWR Reactor Building and Containment reactor building surround-
the top slab, the suppression ing the containment.
pool slab and the foundation mat. The containment is
divided by the diaphragm floor and the vent wall into The containment has capability for rapid clo-
a drywell chamber (DW) and a suppression chamber, sure or isolation of all pipes and ducts that
or wetwell (WW). The top slab of the containment penetrate the containment boundary in order
is an integral part of the Isolation Condenser/Pas- to maintain leak tightness within acceptable
sive Containment Cooling (IC/PCC) pools and the limits.
services pools for storage of Dryer/Separator and The containment structure and isolation, with

8-13
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

concurrent operation of other accident mitiga- FLANGE


HORIZONTAL RPV FLANGE

tion systems, is designed to limit fission prod- CONTINUOUS


AROUND RPV

uct leakage during and following the postulat-


ed DBA to values less than leakage rates that
could result in offsite radiation doses greater BOLT HOLES

than those set forth in 10CFR50.67.


FLANGE
The containment structure is designed to ac- CONTINUOUS
AROUND RPV
1.4 m
commodate flooding to a sufficient depth SLIDING
SUPPORT BLOCK

above the active fuel to permit safe removal of


the fuel assemblies from the reactor core after 0.5 m
GUIDE BLOCK
the postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA). ANCHORED TO
RPV PEDESTAL

The containment structure design provides


means to channel the flow from postulated pipe
ruptures in the DW to the suppression pool.
UNRESTRICTED RADIAL

Drywell Structure EXPANSION

The drywell (DW) is comprised of two volumes:


Figure 8-15. RPV Sliding Block Support
An upper DW volume surrounding the upper
portion of the RPV and housing the main steam and vessel tangential directions.
and feedwater piping, Gravity Driven Cooling
System (GDCS) pools and piping, PCCS pip- Penetrations through the liner for the DW head,
ing, Isolation Condenser System (ICS) pip- equipment hatches, personnel locks, piping, electri-
ing, SRVs and piping, depressurization valves cal and instrumentation lines are provided with seals
(DPVs) and piping, DW coolers and piping, and leak-tight connections.
the reactor shield wall, RPV support brackets,
and other miscellaneous systems. Wetwell Structure
A lower DW volume below the RPV support The wetwell (WW) is comprised of a gas vol-
system housing the lower portion of the RPV, ume and suppression pool filled with water to rapidly
fine motion control rod drives, other miscella- condense steam from a reactor vessel blowdown
neous systems and equipment below the RPV, via the SRVs or from a break in a major pipe inside
and vessel bottom drain piping. the drywell through the vent system. The WW is
connected to the DW by a vent system comprised
The upper DW is a cylindrical, reinforced of twelve (12) vertical/horizontal vent modules.
concrete structure with a removable steel head and Each module consists of a vertical flow steel pipe,
a diaphragm floor constructed of steel girders with with three horizontal vent pipes extending into the
concrete fill. The RPV sliding block support system suppression pool water. Each vent module is built
supports the RPV while accommodating relative into the vent wall, which separates the DW from
thermal expansion and has openings for communica- the WW. The cylindrical vent wall is supported off
tion between the UD and LD. Refer to Figure 8-15. the RPV pedestal. The WW boundary is the annular
There are eight sliding block supports. One end of region between the vent wall and the cylindrical
each sliding support is fastened to a circumferential containment wall and is bounded above by the DW
RPV flange segment that is forged integral to the diaphragm floor. All normally wetted surfaces of
vessel shell ring at that RPV elevation. The other the liner in the WW are stainless steel and the rest
end of each sliding block is restrained by sets of are carbon steel.
steel guide blocks that are attached to the reactor
pedestal support brackets. Under this configuration, Containment Structure
each sliding support is relatively free to expand in The containment structure includes a steel liner
the radial direction but is restrained in the vertical to reduce fission product leakage. All normally wet-

8-14
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

ted surfaces of the liner in the suppression pool are


made of stainless steel. Penetrations through the liner REACTOR BUILDING
CRANE

for the drywell head, equipment hatches, personnel PASSIVE CONTAINMENT


COOLING SYSTEM
REFUELING
MACHINE

locks, piping, and electrical and instrumentation


HEAT EXCHANGERS

lines are provided with seals and leak-tight connec-


tions. The allowable leakage is 0.5% per day from GRATING PLATFORMS HINGED SPLASH
GUARD (TYP)

all sources, excluding main steam isolation valve GDCS


POOL
GDCS
POOL

(MSIV) leakage. SPILLOVER


HOLE (TYP)

QUENCHER (TYP)

Containment System ELECTRICAL


PENETRATION

The DW is designed to withstand the pressure


and temperature transients associated with the rup- REACTOR WATER CLEANUP/
SHUTDOWN COOLING

ture of any primary system pipe inside the DW, and HEAT EXCHANGER

BiMAC

also the negative differential pressures associated HYDRAULIC CONTROL

with containment depressurization events, when


UNITS (TYP)

the steam in the DW is condensed by the PCCS, the


GDCS, the Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System Figure 8-16. Water Levels After a FW Line Break
(FAPCS), and cold water cascading from the break
following post-LOCA flooding of the RPV.
REACTOR BUILDING
CRANE

In the event of a pipe break within the DW, the PASSIVE CONTAINMENT
COOLING SYSTEM
REFUELING
MACHINE

increased pressure inside the DW forces a mixture


HEAT EXCHANGERS

of noncondensable gases, steam and water through


either the PCCS or the vertical/horizontal vent pipes HINGED SPLASH
GUARD (TYP)

and into the suppression pool where the steam is GDCS


POOL
GDCS
POOL

rapidly condensed. The noncondensable gases trans- SPILLOVER

ported with the steam and water are contained in the


HOLE (TYP)

QUENCHER (TYP)

free gas space volume of the WW. The design pres-


sure of the containment is 310 kPa(g) (45 psig).
REACTOR WATER CLEANUP/
SHUTDOWN COOLING

There is sufficient water volume in the suppres- HEAT EXCHANGER

BiMAC

sion pool to provide adequate submergence over HYDRAULIC CONTROL

the top of the upper row of horizontal vents, as well UNITS (TYP)

as the PCCS return vent, when water level in RPV


reaches one meter above the top of active fuel and Figure 8-17. Water Levels After a Bottom Drain Line Break
water is removed from the pool during post-LOCA
equalization of pressure between RPV and the WW.
Water inventory, including the GDCS, is sufficient In both of these examples, the equalizing lines
to flood the RPV to at least one meter above the top in the GDCS did not open. If they did, the water
of active fuel. level in the SP and RPV would be almost the same,
and in the UD the level would be at the spillover
To help manage the water within containment pipe level.
there are 12 spillover vents connecting the lower part
of the UD with the SP. The actual water levels in the Control of potential hydrogen generation in an
RPV and containment compartments will depend on accident is handled by maintaining an inerted con-
the LOCA break location. For example, Figure 8-16 tainment atmosphere via the Containment Inerting
shows the water levels in the GDCS, RPV, DW and System (CIS), which inerts the containment atmo-
SP in the long term after a FW pipe break LOCA, sphere with nitrogen to maintain < 3% oxygen- see
and Figure 8-17 shows the water levels after an RPV Chapter 5.
bottom drain line break LOCA.

8-15
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

Containment Heat Removal vacuum breaker system is to protect the integrity of


The containment design includes a Drywell the diaphragm floor slab and vent wall between the
Cooling System (DCS) to maintain DW tempera- DW and the WW, and the DW structure and liner,
tures during normal operation within acceptable and to prevent backflooding of the suppression pool
limits for equipment operation (see Chapter 5). water into the DW. Refer to Figure 8-18.

Isolation transients do not present a heat removal Each vacuum breaker is designed for high reli-
challenge to the ESBWR containment, due to the ability, leak tightness, stability (i.e., elimination of
use of the Isolation Condenser System (ICS). See chatter) and resistance to debris. It operates pas-
Chapter 3 for more details. sively in response to a negative SC-to-DW pressure
gradient and is otherwise held closed by a combina-
A safety-related PCCS is incorporated into the tion of gravity and the normally positive SC-to-DW
design of the containment to remove decay heat pressure gradient. A vertical-lift poppet disk with
from DW following a LOCA. The PCCS uses two bearings to maintain alignment constitutes the
six elevated heat exchangers (condensers) located only moving part. The valve assembly is equipped
outside the containment in large pools of water at with inlet and outlet screens to prevent debris entry.
atmospheric pressure to condense steam that has A leak-tight design is achieved by use of a non-me-
been released to the DW following a LOCA. This tallic main seat and a backup hard seat. The seats
steam is channeled to each of the condenser tube- are designed such that the lodging of a particle of the
side heat transfer surfaces where it condenses and maximum size which can pass through the inlet/out-
the condensate returns by gravity flow to the GDCS let screens on either seat will not prevent sealing of
pools. Noncondensable gases are purged to the sup- the valve. An anti-chatter ring around the periphery
pression pool via vent lines. The PCCS condensers of the disk reduces seat to disk impact force and
are an extension of the containment boundary, do provides damping by energy absorption.
not have isolation valves, and start operating im-
mediately following a LOCA. These low pressure Each vacuum breaker is provided with redun-
PCCS condensers provide a thermally efficient heat dant proximity sensors to detect its closed position.
removal mechanism. No forced circulation equip- On the upstream side of the vacuum breaker, a DC
ment is required for operation of the PCCS. Steam solenoid operated butterfly valve designed to fail-
produced, due to boil-off in the pools surrounding close is provided. During a LOCA, when the vacuum
the PCCS condensers, is vented to the atmosphere. breaker opens to equalize the DW and WW pres-
There is sufficient inventory in these pools to handle sure and subsequently does not completely close as
at least 72 hours of decay heat removal. The PCCS detected by the proximity sensors, a control signal
is described in more detail in Chapter 4. will close the upstream butterfly valve to prevent
extra bypass leakage due to the opening created by
After an accident, the non-safety related Fuel the vacuum breaker and therefore maintain the pres-
and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System (FAPCS) sure suppression capability of the containment. Plant
may be available in the suppression pool cooling operators can also manually close the backup valve.
mode and/or containment spray mode to control the Redundant vacuum breaker systems are provided to
containment pressure and temperature conditions. protect against a single failure.
Heat is removed via the FAPCS heat exchanger(s)
to the Reactor Component Cooling Water System The ESBWR vacuum breaker has undergone
(RCCWS) and finally to the Plant Service Water engineering development testing using a full-scale
System (PSWS). These systems are described in prototype to demonstrate the proper operability,
Chapter 5. reliability, and leak-tightness of the design. Figure
8-19 shows one of the modules tested.
Vacuum Breakers
A vacuum breaker system, consisting of 3 Severe Accident Mitigation
vacuum breakers, has been provided between the The ESBWR design uses a passively-cooled
DW and WW. The purpose of the DW-to-WW boundary that is impenetrable by the core debris in

8-16
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

VACUUM BREAKER
DAMPER DISK STEM
BONNET
UPPER BEARING
CABLE
BALLAST PENETRATIONS (2)
WEIGHT
PROXIMITY PROBES (5)
SOFT SEAL

ANTI-CHATTERING
DISK OUTLET SCREEN

HARD SEAL

DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER BODY


(4 NOZZLES)

REACTOR
BUILDING
FLOOR

VACUUM
BREAKER
SUPPORTING
STANDPIPE
WAFER-DISC LOWER BEARING WITH
(SPRING LOADED) ANTI-ROTATION DEVICE

WETWELL
SOLENOIDS
(ENERGIZE TO CLOSE)

OPEN CLOSED

Figure 8-18 ESBWR Wetwell-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker with Backup Closure Valve

squib-valve-activated deluge lines. The timing and


flows are such that (a) cooling becomes available
immediately upon actuation, and (b) the chance of
flooding the LDW prematurely, to the extent that
opens up a vulnerability to steam explosions, is very
remote. The jacket is buried inside the concrete
basemat and would be called into action only in the
event that some or all of the core debris on top is
non-coolable.

The device, called Basemat Internal Melt Arrest


and Coolability device (BiMAC), is illustrated in
Figure 8-19. Prototype Vacuum Breaker
Figure 8-20. Important considerations in implemen-
whatever configuration it could possibly exist on the tation of this concept are as follows:
LDW floor in severe accident scenarios. For ex-ves-
sel implementation, this boundary is conveniently Pipe inclination angle. An inclination in the
and advantageously made by a series of side-by-side range of 10 promotes excellent heat removal.
placed inclined pipes, forming a jacket which can
be effectively and passively cooled by natural cir- Sacrificial refractory layer. A refractory mate-
culation when subjected to thermal loading on any rial is laid on top of the BiMAC pipes so as to protect
portion(s) of it. Water is supplied to this device from against melt impingement during the initial (main)
the GDCS pools via a set of temperature actuated relocation event, and to allow some adequately short

8-17
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

GDCS
DELUGE
CONTAINMENT the BiMAC plate is sufficient to accommodate the
LINER
LINES
STEEL LID
full-core debris, and the entire coolable volume, up
OVER GRATING
to the height of the vertical segments of the BiMAC
pipes is ~400% of the full-core debris. Thus, there
1.5m
is no possibility for the melt to contact the LDW
liner. Similarly, the two sumps needed for detecting
DISTRIBUTOR COOLING JACKET leakage flow during normal operation are positioned
and protected, as is the rest of the LDW liner, from
1cm 20cm SACRIFICIAL LAYER being subject to melt attack.

10cm The LDW deluge system. This system consists


of three main lines that feed off the three independent
GDCS pools, respectively, each separating into a pair
of lines that connect to the BiMAC main header.
Figure 8-20. BiMAC Concept

time for diagnosing that conditions are appropriate


for flooding. This is to minimize the chance of in- Turbine Building
advertent, early flooding. The material is selected
to have high structural integrity and high resistance The Turbine Building (TB) houses all the
to melting, such as ceramic Zirconia. components of the power conversion system. This
includes the turbine-generator, main condenser, air
Cover plate. As shown in Figure 8-20, a ejector, steam packing exhauster, offgas condenser,
supported steel plate covers the BiMAC. On the main steam system, turbine bypass system, conden-
one hand, this allows that the top is a normal floor sate demineralizers, and the condensate and feedwa-
as needed for operations and that the BiMAC is ter pumping and heating equipment. It also includes
basically out of the way until its function is ever the Chilled Water Systems, the Reactor Component
needed. On the other hand, the so-created cavity, Cooling Water System (RCCWS) and the Turbine
with a total capacity of ~100 m3, is there to receive Component Cooling Water System (TCCWS). The
and trap the melt in a hypothetical ex-vessel severe small size of the ESBWR Turbine Building makes
accident evolution, including a high pressure melt a significant contribution to capital cost savings and
ejection. For this purpose the top plate is stainless a shorter construction schedule.
steel of thickness such as to be essentially instanta-
neously penetrable by a high-velocity melt jet. The The TB is a Seismic Category II, non-safety
plate is made to sit on top of normal floor grating, building. Figures 8-21 through 8-25 show various
which itself is supported by steel columns as indi- elevation and plan views.
cated schematically in Figure 8-18. Between the
plate and the grating there is a layer of refractory

Electrical Building
material, such as a mat of zirconium oxide, so as to
protect the steel material from thermal loads from
during the ~ 40 seconds steam blowdown period,
yet not able to provide any structural resistance to The Electrical Building houses the two non-
melt penetration as needed for the trapping func- safety related standby diesel generators and their
tion noted above. For low pressure severe accident associated auxiliary equipment, as well as the non-
sequences, this whole cover structure has no bearing safety grade batteries. It also houses the Technical
on the outcome. Support Center. Figure 8-26 shows the grade level
floor layout. The building is non safety-related and
The BiMAC cavity. The space available below Seismic Category NS.

8-18
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

SMOKE EXTRACTION PARAPET


FAN (TYP.)

TB CRANE
TB CRANE RAIL

GENERATOR

LP TURBINE C LP TURBINE B LP TURBINE A


EXCITER HP TURBINE
WASH-DOWN
FCU GENERATOR FIELD MS S.&C.V. AREA

REMOVAL SPACE CURB

1ST STAGE RH 2ND STAGE RH


ISO-PHASE BUSES MSR DR. TK. DR. TK.
DR. TK.

ISO-PHASE BUSES
COOLING UNIT
STEAM TUNNEL
FW HTRS. 1C&2C FW HTRS. 1B&2B FW HTRS. 1A&2A
VALVE
COOLER COOLER ROOM
H2RECOMB. H2RECOMB. MAIN CONDENSER C MAIN CONDENSER B MAIN CONDENSER A
FCU

COND.
DR. TK. CURB

FCU SJAE SJAE


"B" "A" GRADE
GRADE
MAIN TB. CCW H/X'S
TRANSFORMERS REACTOR
FEEDWATER PUMP

C.W. PIPES (OUTLET) C.W. PIPES (INLET)


FL. DR. FL. DR.
SUMP SUMP
H2 RECOMB.
LOOP SEALS
CONDENSATE PUMPS

Figure 8-21. ESBWR Turbine Building Section BB

SMOKE EXTRACTION
PARAPET FAN (TYP.)

TB CRANE

PARAPET

FW HTR 5 &
STORAGE TANK

MSR-B MSR-A
CIV CIV
CONDENSATE
PURIFICATION SYS.
CONTROL ROOM

FW HTR 4A FW HTR 4C
FW HTR 3A FW HTR 3C

FW HTRS. 2C

CABLE RACEWAY INTERFACE


FCU FW HTR 7A
FW HTRS. 1C WITH ELECTRICAL BUILDING
FW HTR 6A HORIZONTAL CHASE

INSTR. AIR COMPRESSOR A


INSTR. AIR DRYERS A

MAIN CONDENSER COND. D/B DEMINERALIZER


VALVE
COND. HFF ROOM
MAINTEN.
AREA CORRIDOR
RESIN STRAINER
GRADE

VALVE
C. W. PIPES
FCU ROOM
(OUTLET)

COND. HOLLOW RESIN


FIBER FILTER STORAGE TANK

Figure 8-22. ESBWR Turbine Building Section AA

8-19
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

A-A
HWS PUMPS
HWS

MCC MCC
CONDENSATE
ROOM RESERVED PURIFICATION SYS. FCU INSTRUMENT TOOLING/STORAGE HVAC DUCT/PIPE CHASE
FOR A SPARE NI WTR CHILLER CONTROL ROOM ROOM ROOM
CHILLED WTR PUMP TRAIN A

FCU

WATER CHILLER TRAIN A


PIPE CHASE
HVAC DUCT CHASE

MCC
FCU
FCU
CHILLED WTR PUMP TRAIN B DECONTAMINATION GSE
ROOM
FCU
FW HTR 5 & STORAGE TANK
WATER CHILLER TRAIN B
FCU

RMU

FCU FCU FCU


MSR - A
FCU
TURBINE RMU
CIV (TYP.) FCU
FCU

HP TURBINE

RB STEAM
LP TURBINE C LP TURBINE B LP TURBINE A

TUNNEL
B-B EXC. B-B
GENERATOR FIELD WASH-DOWN
REACTOR
GENERATOR
REMOVAL SPACE AREA BUILDING

REMOVABLE
REMOVABLE
STEEL SHIELD
STEEL SHIELD

FCU FCU
CIV (TYP.) FCU TURBINE RMU
FCU
FCU MSR - B FCU
FCU
RMU
A-A

Figure 8-23. ESBWR Turbine Building Operating Floor


A-A

OFFGAS CHARCOAL
CONDENSATE D/B DEMINERALIZERS (TYP.) PIPE CHASE
ADSORBER (TYP.)
DEWATERING PIT DEWATERING PIT
MCC RMU MCC RMU
PIPE/HVAC
RCCW PUMPS "A" RCCW PUMPS "B" DUCT CHASE
FCU

FCU FCU
RCCW H/X's "A" RCCW H/X's "B"
FCU

RESIN STRAINER COND. HFF ACCESS


(TYP.) HATCH COVER (TYP.)
RMU
F.P. VALVE STATION MONORAIL FCU
HVAC DUCT FCU
CHASE

RMU
CO ANALYZERS HUMIDITY
ANALYZER
FCU FCU
MCC

O2 INJECTION CURB
SYSTEM EQPT.
H2 ANALYZER (TYP.) O2 TK.
O2 ANALYZER (TYP.)
MCC RMU

PIPE/HVAC CHASE
FCU SJAE "A"
FW
FW
B-B MAIN B-B
CONDENSER REACTOR
C B A FW BUILDING
SJAE "B" CONDENSATE
DRAIN TK.
FW

ZINC
DRAIN COOLERS
INJECTION
SKID

FCU CURB FCU


DEWATERING PIT RMU
A-A

Figure 8-24. ESBWR Turbine Building Grade Elevation

8-20
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

A-A
RESIN RECEIVING TK.
OFFGAS CHARCOAL RECYCLE
RESIN ADDITION TK.

ADSORBER (TYP.) PUMPS RESIN


STORAGE TK.
RESIN
STORAGE TK.
PIPE CHASE
(ABOVE)
CONTROL
NRD
BUILDING
RMU
SUMP

MCC
PIPE/HVAC
FCU DUCT CHASE

EQ. DR.
FL. DR.

CHEMICAL
DR. SUMP

DR. SUMP
SUMP

SUMP

DETERG.
(ABOVE)
RMU
HFF BACKWASH TRANSFER PUMPS FCU

CONDENSATE HOLLOW COND. PURIFICATION


FIBER FILTER (TYP.) VALVE ROOM AIR SURGE TK.
RFP ASD
PIPE CHASE MCC
POWER UNITS (TYP.)

F.P. VALVE
NRD STATION T.B. SAMPLING PANELS SAMPLE CONDITIONING TMR RMU
SUMP PANEL

HFF BACKWASH
RMU

FCU
RECEIVING TANK CORROSION PRODUCTS RFP A
CONDENSATE PUMPS CONDENSER MONITORING PANEL
FCU SAMPLING PANEL
FCU
CONDENSER FCU
H2 RECOMB. NRD
SAMPLING PUMPS A
LOOP SEALS SUMP

REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMPS


(TYP.)
PIPE/HVAC DUCT
TCCW H/X'S CHASE (ABOVE)
RFP B
C.P. SUCTION
STRAINER (TYP.)
B-B FL. DR. FL. DR. B-B
SUMP FCU MAIN SUMP REACTOR
EQ. DR. CONDENSER EQ. DR. BUILDING
SUMP C B A SUMP
FCU FCU
RFP C

FCU

SYSTEM EQPT.
HYDROGEN
CONDENSER TUBE
CLEANING PUMPS

COND. TUBE CL.


TCCW PUMPS CONTROL PANEL FCU
RFP D
CONDENSER
SAMPLING PUMPS B
RMU MCC FCU

C.W. PIPES (OUTLET) C.W. PIPES (INLET)


A-A

Figure 8-25. ESBWR Turbine Building Basement Level

CABLE CHASE (ABOVE) (TYP.)

D-G ELECTRICAL & D-G AUXILIARY


CONTROL EQPT. ROOM MECH. EQPT. AREA
125 VDC BATTERY A

250 VDC BATTERY A2


CABLE CHASE
(ABOVE)
DIESEL-GENERATOR A

TECHNICAL
250 VDC BATTERY A1 SUPPORT CENTER
(TSC)
125 VDC BATTERY B

250 VDC BATTERY B2


D-G ELECTRICAL & D-G AUXILIARY
CONTROL EQPT. ROOM MECH. EQPT. AREA

250 VDC BATTERY B1 DIESEL-GENERATOR B

Figure 8-26. ESBWR Electrical Building Grade Level

8-21
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

Radwaste Building cooling systems. In general, systems are grouped by


safety division so that in case of fire only one division
is affected. Complete burnout of any fire area does
The Radwaste Building houses all equipment not prevent safe shutdown of the plant, since there
associated with the collection and processing of the will always be three other divisions available.
liquid and solid radioactive waste generated by the
plant. The Offgas System components are located in The remote shutdown panels provide redundant
the Turbine Building (see Chapter 10 for system de- control of the safe shutdown function from outside
scriptions). Figures 8-27 and 8-28 show the general the control room in case the control room becomes
arrangements and access for mobile technologies. uninhabitable.

Fire Containment

Other Principal Buildings


Fire containment is achieved through the use
of concrete fire barrier floors, ceilings and walls
designed to contain a fire for a duration of three
Other buildings on the site include the Service hours without structural failure. Fire dampers are
Water Building, Service Building, Water Treat- required for any HVAC duct penetrating a fire bar-
ment Building, Administration Building, Training rier and they have a rating of three hours. Electrical
Center, Sewage Treatment Plant, warehouse, hot and piping penetrations through a fire barrier have
and cold machine shops, the intake structure, heat seals with a three-hour rating.
sink (cooling towers) and yard facilities for electri-
cal equipment. There are three firewater pumps in the plant, one
motor driven and two diesel driven. Each of these
meets requirements for flow and pressure demand

Fire Protection at the most hydraulically remote hose connection in


the plant. Fire water supply piping and systems in the
Reactor, Control and Fuel Buildings are designed to
The basic layout of the plant and the choice of remain functional following an SSE.
systems to mitigate the effects of fire enhance the
resistance of the ESBWR plant to fire. The safety-re-
lated systems are designed such that there are four in-
dependent divisions. In addition, there are non-safety
related systems, such as the RWCU/SDC, which Flood Protection
can be used to achieve safe shutdown. The plant ar-
rangement is such that points of possible common The ESBWR design incorporates measures for
cause failure between non-safety related systems and flooding protection of safety-related structures, sys-
safety-related systems have been eliminated. tems, and components from both external flooding
and flooding from plant component failures.
Plant Arrangement
The plant is laid out in such a way that power Flood Protection from External Sources
and control signals from the Reactor and Turbine Seismic Category I structures remain protected
Buildings are routed directly to the Control and for safe shutdown of the reactor during all external
Electrical Buildings. This arrangement ensures that flood conditions. The safety-related systems and
a potentially damaging fire in the Turbine Building components are flood-protected either because
will not disable non-safety related systems capable they are located above the design flood level or are
of providing safe shutdown in both the Turbine and enclosed in reinforced concrete Seismic Category I
Reactor Buildings. structures. These structures have features for flood
protection, including minimum thickness for walls
below flood level, water stops in construction joints,
Divisional Separation
waterproof coating on external surfaces, roof design
There are four complete divisions of passive

8-22
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

GRADE A-A

SECTION A-A
AIR EXHAUST
FACILITIES ROOM
AIR CONDITIONING ROOM

(AIR INTAKE AND CLEAN


AREA EXHAUST FACILITIES)

AIR EXHAUST
FACILITIES ROOM
GRADE GRADE
MOBILE SYSTEM MOBILE SYSTEM
(WASTE SURVEY (HIGH DOSE
CONTROL ROOM / RELEASE) RATE WASTE
(PACKAGED WASTE STORAGE AREA)
STAGING AREA)

MOBILE SYSTEM
ELECTRICAL (WASTE SORTING
AND CONDITION)
EQUIPMENT ROOM

MOBILE SYSTEM
(HAZMAT MIXED
MOBILE SYSTEM WASTE STORAGE
(WASTE
AREA)
EQUIPMENT DRAIN HIGH ACTIVITY RESIN ACCUMULATION
EQUIPMENT DRAIN FLOOR DRAIN
AREA)
SAMPLE TANK COLLECTION TANK COLLECTION TANK HOLDUP TANK
EQUIPMENT DRAIN
SAMPLE PUMP ROOM
MOBILE SYSTEM TRAILER
(CHEMICAL DRAIN ACCESS
PRE-TREATMENT)

MOBILE SYSTEM
(DEWATERING
EQUIPMENT)

MOBILE SYSTEM
MOBILE SYSTEM (CONCENTRATE
(HOLLOW FIBER FILTER & TREATMENT SYSTEM)
DEEP-BED DEMINERALIZER)
(REVERSE OSMOSIS SYSTEM &
DEEP-BED DEMINERALIZER)
MOBILE SYSTEM
(CHEMICAL DRAIN
(DETERGENT DRAIN PRE-FILTER
PRE-TREATMENT UNIT)
& CHARCOAL FILTER SYSTEM)

A-A

Figure 8-27 ESBWR Radwaste Building Section and Grade Elevation

A-A

FOYER WITH PERSONNEL


B1F CONTAMINATION
MONITORS B2F A-A

ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT ROOM

CONTROL ROOM CHEMICAL DRAIN


SUMP TANK

FLOOR DRAIN EQUIPMENT DRAIN HCW SUMP TANK


SAMPLE TANK SAMPLE TANK

FLOOR DRAIN
SAMPLE PUMP

CHEMICAL DRAIN
FLOOR DRAIN EQUIPMENT DRAIN
COLLECTION TANK COLLECTION PUMP SAMPLE PUMP
FLOOR DRAIN
COLLECTION TANK
LOW ACTIVITY SLUDGE
PHASE SEPARATOR
DETERGENT DRAIN LOW ACTIVITY RESIN DETERGENT DRAIN
SAMPLE TANK CIRCULATION PUMP COLLECTION TANK
CHEMICAL DRAIN DETERGENT DRAIN
DETERGENT DRAIN LCW
COLLECTION PUMP CONDENSATE RESIN SUMP
COLLECTION PUMP
SAMPLE PUMP CIRCULATION PUMP TANK

LOW ACTIVITY SLUDGE


PHASE SEPARATOR
DETERGENT DRAIN
SUMP TANK
LOW ACTIVITY RESIN
TRANSFER PUMP CONDENSATE RESIN
CONDENSATE RESIN HOLDUP TANK EQUIPMENT DRAIN
TRANSFER PUMP COLLECTION TANK
EQUIPMENT DRAIN
LOW ACTIVITY COLLECTION PUMP
DECANT PUMP

LOW ACTIVITY RESIN


HOLDUP TANK

HIGH ACTIVITY RESIN A-A HIGH ACTIVITY RESIN


A-A CONCENTRATED
TRANSFER PUMP CIRCULATION PUMP WASTE TANK
HIGH ACTIVITY HIGH ACTIVITY RESIN CONCENTRATED
DECANT PUMP HOLDUP TANK WASTE PUMP

Figure 8-28. ESBWR Radwaste Building Basement Levels

8-23
Chapter 8 Plant Layout and Arrangement

to prevent pooling of large quantities of water, and the flooding effects to one safety division:
penetrations and access openings below grade are
watertight. Watertight doors and sealed penetrations to
prevent water seepage or flow.
Flood Protection from Internal Component
Fire doors designed to hold back water pres-
Failures sure, which also prevent spray from crossing
All piping, vessels, and heat exchangers with divisional boundaries.
flooding potential in the Reactor Building are seis-
mically qualified. Floors, floor penetrations and equipment
hatches designed to prevent water seepage to
Water spray, foaming, and flooding effects in a lower elevations through the use of seals and
room with a pipe crack or break are conservatively curbs and routing of drain lines.
assumed in the safety analysis to take any safe- Water sensitive safety-related equipment raised
shutdown equipment in the room out of service. on pads above the floor elevation for protection
The following provisions have been made to limit against expected seepage under non-watertight
doors.

8-24
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

Chapter
Major Balance of Plant Features 9
It is difficult to completely standardize the plant of the main steam system, the main turbine genera-
design beyond the nuclear island. In addition to util- tor system main condenser, condenser evacuation
ity preferences in the steam and power conversion system, turbine gland seal system, turbine bypass
system, there are also site-unique issues, such as the system, extraction steam system, condensate puri-
ultimate heat sink (UHS) location and temperature, fication system, and the condensate and feedwater
and the offsite power distribution system which can pumping and heating system. The heat rejected to
play a significant role in the selected configuration. the main condenser is removed by a circulating
What follows, therefore, is an example configura- water system and discharged to the power cycle
tion, showing one possible implementation. Changes heat sink.
in this part of the plant will not have any significant
impact on the Nuclear Island design or operation. Steam, generated in the reactor, is supplied to the
high-pressure turbine and the steam reheaters. Steam
leaving the high-pressure turbine passes through a
combined moisture separator/reheater prior to enter-
Steam and Power ing the low-pressure turbines. The moisture separator
drains, steam reheater drains, and the drains from the
Conversion System two high-pressure feedwater heaters are returned to
the direct contact feedwater heater (deaerator). The
low-pressure feedwater heater drains are cascaded
The Turbine Building houses all equipment to the condenser.
associated with the main turbine generator and
other auxiliary equipment. The turbine employs Steam exhausted from the low-pressure turbines
a conventional regenerative cycle with condenser is condensed and deaerated in the condenser. The
deaeration and condensate demineralization. The condensate pumps take suction from the condenser
turbine-generator is equipped with an electrohydrau- hotwell and deliver the condensate through the filters
lic control system and supervisory instruments to and demineralizers, gland steam condenser, SJAE
monitor performance. The gross electrical output of condensers and offgas recombiner condensers to the
the turbine-generator is approximately 1550 MWe. direct contact feedwater heater where it is mixed
with turbine extract steam and high pressure feed-
The components of the Steam and Power Con- water heater and MSR drains. The feedwater booster
version (S&PC) System are designed to produce and feedwater pumps take suction from the direct
electrical power utilizing the steam generated by contact feedwater heater and discharge through the
the reactor, condense the steam into water, and high-pressure feedwater heaters to the reactor.
return the water to the reactor as heated feedwater,
with a major portion of its gaseous, dissolved, and The S&PC System main conceptual features are
particulate impurities removed in order to satisfy the illustrated on Figure 9-1, assuming a triple pressure
reactor water quality requirements. condenser. This type of condenser and other site
dependent ESBWR plant features and parameters
The S&PC System includes the turbine portion are reported herein based on typical central U.S.

9-1
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

Reactor
Vessel
Moisture Low
Separator Pressure
Main Reheater
Turbines
Steam

Generator
Feedwater

High Circulating
High Pressure Pressure Stack
Water
Feedwater Turbine
Heaters
Offgas
CP System
Direct Contact
Feedwater Heater Steam Jet
Air Ejector
Feed- Feed- Low Pressure
water water Feedwater Heaters
Pump Boost
Pump Gland Steam
Condenser

Condensate
Condenser Purification
System

Figure 9-1. ESBWR Steam and Power Conversion System

site conditions. connected to a header upstream of the turbine stop


valves to permit testing of the MSIVs during plant
Normally, the turbine power heat cycle uti- operation with a minimum load reduction. This
lizes all the steam being generated by the reactor; header arrangement is also provided to ensure that
however, an automatic pressure-controlled turbine the turbine bypass and other main steam supplies
bypass system designed for 110% of the rated steam are connected to operating steamlines and not to
flow is provided to discharge excess steam directly idle lines.
to the condenser. This allows a loss of full load with
the ability to drop to house load without a turbine A drain line is connected to the low points of
overspeed trip or a reactor scram. each main steamline, both inside and outside the
containment. Both sets of drains are headered and
Turbine Main Steam Systems connected with isolation valves to allow drainage to
The Turbine Main Steam System delivers the main condenser. To permit intermittent draining
steam from the reactor to the turbine generator, the of the steamline low points at low loads, orificed
reheaters, the turbine bypass system, and the steam lines are provided around the final valve to the
jet air ejectors (SJAEs) from warmup to full-load main condenser. The steamline drains, maintain a
operation. The Main Steam System also supplies the continuous downward slope from the steam system
steam seal system and the auxiliary steam system low points to the orifice located near the condenser.
when other sources are not available. The drain line, from the orifice to the condenser, also
slopes downward. To permit emptying the drain lines
The main steam piping consists of four lines for maintenance, drains are provided from the line
from the seismic interface restrain to the main low points going to the radwaste system.
turbine stop valves. The four main steamlines are

9-2
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

The drains from the steamlines inside contain- turbine Steam Bypass and Pressure Control System,
ment are connected to the steamlines outside the controls the turbine speed, load, and flow for startup
containment to permit equalizing the pressure across and normal operations. The control system operates
the MSIVs during startup and following steamline the turbine stop valves, control valves, and combined
isolation. intermediate valves (CIVs). TG supervisory instru-
mentation is provided for operational analysis and
Main Turbine/Generator malfunction diagnosis.
The turbine-generator consists of an 1800 rpm
turbine, moisture separator/reheaters, generator, TG accessories include the bearing lubrication
exciter, controls, and associated subsystems. oil system, turbine control system (TCS) , turning
gear, hydrogen and CO2 system, seal oil system,
The turbine for the ESBWR reference plant stator cooling water system, exhaust hood spray
consists of a double-flow, high-pressure unit, and system, turbine gland sealing system, and turbine
three double flow low-pressure units in tandem. supervisory instrument system.
The high-pressure turbine has two stages of steam
extraction. The TG unit and associated piping, valves, and
controls are located completely within the Turbine
Moisture separation and reheating of the high- Building. Any local failure associated with the TG
pressure turbine exhaust steam is performed by four unit will not affect any safety-related equipment.
moisture separator/reheaters (MSRs) installed in Failure of TG equipment cannot preclude safe shut-
the steam path between the high and low pressure down of the reactor system.
turbines. The MSRs are located on each side of the
TG centerline. The MSRs serve to dry and reheat The gross electrical output of the turbine gen-
the high pressure turbine steam exhaust before it erator is approximately 1550 MWe. For utilities
enters the low pressure turbines. This improves cycle generating 50 Hz power, the turbine shaft speed is
efficiency and reduces moisture-related erosion and 1500 rpm.
corrosion in the low pressure turbines. Moisture is
removed in chevron-type moisture separators and Main Condenser
is drained to the moisture separator drain tank and The main condenser for the ESBWR reference
from there to the direct contact feedwater heater. The plant design is a multi-pressure, three-shell, reheat-
dry steam passes upward across the heater which is ing/deaerating unit. Each shell is located beneath its
supplied with both main and extraction steam. Fi- respective low-pressure turbine.
nally, the reheated steam is routed to the combined
intermediate valves which are located upstream of The three condenser shells are designated as the
the low pressure turbines inlet nozzles. low-pressure shell, the intermediate-pressure shell,
and the high-pressure shell. Each shell has at least
The steam passes through the low-pressure two tube bundles. Circulating water flows in series
turbines, each with three extraction points for the through the three single-pass shells.
three low-pressure stages of feedwater heating, and
exhausts into the main condenser. In addition to the Each condenser shell hotwell is divided longi-
external MSRs, the turbine blades are designed to tudinally by a vertical partition plate. The hotwells
separate water from the steam and drain it to the next of the three shells are interconnected by condensate
lowest extraction point feedwater heater. channels. The condensate pumps take suction from
the high-pressure condenser hotwell.
The generator is a direct driven, three-phase, 60
Hz, 1800 rpm synchronous generator with a water- The condenser shells are located below the
cooled stator and hydrogen cooled rotor. Turbine Building operating floor and are supported
on the Turbine Building basemat (see Chapter 8).
The turbine-generator uses a digital monitoring Failure of or leakage from a condenser hotwell
and control system, which, in coordination with the during plant shutdown only results in a minimum

9-3
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

water level in the Turbine Building condenser area. in the TBCE system and plant vent stack alarm in the
Expansion joints are provided between each turbine Main Control Room (MCR) if abnormal radioactiv-
exhaust opening and the steam inlet connections of ity is detected. Radiation monitors are provided on
the condenser shell. Water seals and their level in- the main steamlines which trip the vacuum pump if
dication, if required, are provided around the entire abnormal radioactivity is detected in the steam being
outside periphery to prevent leakage through the supplied to the condenser.
expansion joints. Level indication provides detection
of leakage through the expansion joint. Two low- The SJAEs are placed in service to remove the
pressure feedwater heaters are located in the steam gases from the Main Condenser after a pressure of
dome of each shell. Piping is installed for hotwell about 0.034 to 0.051 MPa absolute is established
level control and condensate sampling. in the Main Condenser by the mechanical vacuum
pump and when sufficient nuclear steam pressure
During plant operation, steam expanding is available.
through the low-pressure turbines is directed down-
ward into the Main Condenser and is condensed. The During normal power operation, the SJAEs are
Main Condenser also serves as a heat sink for the normally driven by main steam, with the auxiliary
turbine bypass system, emergency and high level steam supply system on automatic standby. The
feedwater heater and drain tank dumps, and various main steam supply, however, is normally used during
other startup drains and relief valve discharges. startup and low load operation, and auxiliary steam
is available for normal use of the SJAEs during
Main Condenser Evacuation System early startup, as an alternative to the main steam
The Main Condenser Evacuation System or should the mechanical vacuum pumps prove to
(MCES) removes the noncondensable gases from be unavailable.
the power cycle. The MCES removes the hydrogen
and oxygen produced by radiolysis of water in the Turbine Gland Steam System
reactor, and other power cycle noncondensable The Turbine Gland Steam System (TGSS)
gases, and exhausts them to the Offgas System provides steam to the turbine glands and the turbine
during plant power operation, and to the Turbine valve stems. The TGSS prevents leakage of air into
Building compartment exhaust system at the begin- or radioactive steam out of the turbine shaft and
ning of each startup. turbine valves. The gland steam condenser collects
air and steam mixture, condenses the steam, and
The MCES consists of two 100% capacity, discharges the air leakage to the atmosphere via the
double stage Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) units main vent by one of two redundant motor-driven
(complete with intercondenser) for power plant blowers.
operation where one SJAE unit is normally in op-
eration and the other is on standby, as well as two Turbine Bypass System
50% capacity mechanical vacuum pumps for use The Turbine Bypass System (TBS) provides the
during startup. The last stage of the SJAE is a non- capability to discharge main steam from the reac-
condensing stage. tor directly to the condenser to minimize step load
reduction transient effects on the Reactor Coolant
During the initial phase of startup, when the System. The TBS is also used to discharge main
desired rate of air and gas removal exceeds the steam during reactor hot standby and cooldown
capacity of the SJAEs, and nuclear steam pres- operations.
sure is not adequate to operate the SJAE units, the
mechanical vacuum pumps establish a vacuum in The TBS consists of twelve Turbine Bypass
the Main Condenser and other parts of the power Valves (TBV) mounted on four chests (three valves
cycle. The discharge from the vacuum pumps is per chest) connected to the TMSS Main Steam Line
then routed to the Turbine Building Compartment equalizer. The outlets of TBVs are connected to the
Exhaust (TBCE) system, since there is then little or Main Condenser via pressure reducers.
no effluent radioactivity present. Radiation detectors

9-4
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

The system is designed to bypass at least 110% operated in conjunction with a normally closed filter
of the rated main steam flow directly to the con- bypass. The CPS also includes bead resin, mixed
denser. The TBS, in combination with the reactor bed ion exchange demineralizer vessels arranged
systems, provides the capability to shed 100% of in parallel. A resin trap is installed downstream of
the T-G rated load without reactor trip and without each demineralizer vessel to preclude gross resin
the operation of SRVs. leakage into the power cycle in case of vessel un-
derdrain failure, and to catch resin fine leakage as
The turbine bypass valves are opened by triply much as possible. The CPS system achieves the
redundant signals received from the Steam Bypass water quality effluent conditions required for reactor
and Pressure Control System whenever the actual power operation defined in the plant water quality
steam pressure exceeds the preset steam pressure specification. The CPS components are located in
by a small margin. This occurs when the amount of the Turbine Building.
steam generated by the reactor cannot be entirely
used by the turbine. This bypass demand signal Provisions are included to permit cleaning and
causes fluid pressure to be applied to the operating replacement of the ion exchange resin. Each of the
cylinder, which opens the first of the individual demineralizer vessels has fail-open inlet and outlet
valves. As the bypass demand increases, additional isolation valves which are remotely controlled from
bypass valves are opened, dumping the steam to the local CPS control panel and the main control
the condenser. The bypass valves are equipped with room.
fast acting servo valves to allow rapid opening of
bypass valves upon turbine trip or generator load A demineralizer system bypass valve is also pro-
rejection. vided which is manually or automatically controlled
from the main control room. Pressure downstream
The bypass valves automatically trip closed of the demineralizer or high demineralizer differ-
whenever the vacuum in the main condenser falls be- ential pressure is indicated and is alarmed in the
low a preset value. The bypass valves are also closed main control room to alert the operator. The bypass
on loss of electrical power or hydraulic system pres- is used only in emergency and for short periods of
sure. The bypass valve hydraulic accumulators have time until the CPS flow is returned to normal or the
the capability to stroke the valves at least three times plant is brought to an orderly shutdown. To prevent
should the hydraulic power unit fail. unpolished condensate through the bypass, the by-
pass valve control scheme is redundant.
When the plant is at zero power, hot standby or
initial cooldown, the system is operated manually During power operation, the condensate is well
by the control room operator or by the plant automa- deaerated in the condenser and continuous oxygen
tion system. The measured reactor pressure is then injection is used to maintain the level of oxygen
compared against, and regulated to, the pressure set content in the final FW.
by the operator or automation system.
To minimize corrosion product input to the
Steam Extraction System reactor during startup, recirculation lines to the
Extraction steam from the high pressure turbine condenser are provided from the high-pressure FW
supplies the last stage of feedwater heating and heater outlet header.
extraction steam from the low pressure turbines
supplies the first three stages. An additional low Prior to plant startup, cleanup is accomplished
pressure extraction drained directly to the condenser by allowing the system to recirculate through the
protects the last-stage buckets from erosion induced condensate polishers for treatment prior to feeding
by water droplets. any water to the reactor during startup.

Condensate Purification System Condensate and Feedwater System


The Condensate Purification System (CPS) con- The C&FS consists of the piping, valves, pumps,
sists of high efficiency filters arranged in parallel and heat exchangers, controls and instrumentation, and

9-5
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

the associated equipment and subsystems that sup- Another input to the feedwater tank consists of
ply the reactor with heated FW in a closed steam the drains, which originate from the crossaround
cycle utilizing regenerative FW heating. The system steam moisture separators and reheaters and from
described in this subsection extends from the main the two sets of high-pressure FW heaters.
condenser outlet to (but not including) the seismic
interface restraint outside of containment. The re- The reactor FW pumps discharge the FW into
mainder of the system, extending from the restraint three parallel high-pressure FW heater strings,
to the reactor, is described in Chapter 3. Turbine each with two stages of high-pressure FW heaters.
cycle steam is utilized for a total of seven stages of Downstream of the high-pressure FW heaters, the
FW heating, six stages of closed FW heaters and two strings are then joined into a common header,
one direct contact FW heaters (feedwater tank). which divides into two FW lines that connect to the
The drains from each stage of the closed low-pres- reactor.
sure FW heaters are cascaded through successively
lower pressure FW heaters to the main condenser. A bypass is provided around the FW tank and
The high-pressure heater drains are routed to the reactor FW pumps to permit supplying FW to the re-
feedwater tank. actor during early startup without operating the FW
pumps, using only the condensate pumps. During
The highest pressure FW heater is fed steam startups, a low flow control valve, with flow supplied
directly from the main steam line and is used only by either the condensate pumps or via pre-selected
during power maneuver operations. Feedwater (two out of four) FW pumps operating at their mini-
temperature is raised from its normal 215.6 C (420 mum fixed speed, control the RPV level.
F) up to 251.7 C (485 F) in order to lower reactor
power by ~15%. This will retain the same flexibility One more bypass, equipped with a flow control
in power maneuvers for minimizing fuel duty that valve, is provided around the high-pressure heaters
forced circulation BWRs have. for isolating them during power operation for heater
maintenance or for reducing final FW temperature
The C&FS consists of four 33-37% capacity to extend the end of fuel cycle.
condensate pumps (three normally operating and
one on automatic standby), four 33-45% capacity Circulating Water System
reactor FW/FW Booster pumps (three normally The Circulating Water System (CIRC), which
in operation and one on automatic standby), three operates continuously during power generation,
stages of low-pressure closed FW heaters, a direct including startup and shutdown, provides cooling
contact FW heater (feedwater tank) and three stages water for removal of the power cycle waste heat
of high-pressure FW heaters, piping, valves, and from the main condensers and transfers this heat to
instrumentation. The condensate pumps take suction the power cycle heat sink.
from the condenser hotwell and discharge the deaer-
ated condensate into one common header, which The Circulating Water System (CIRC) consists
feeds the Condensate Purification System (CPS). of the following components:
Downstream of the CPS, the condensate is taken
by a single header, through the auxiliary condenser/ Screen house and intake screens
coolers (one gland steam exhauster condenser and Pumps and pump discharge valves
two sets of SJAE condensers and offgas recombiner
condenser/coolers). The condensate then branches Condenser water boxes and piping and valves
into three parallel strings of low-pressure FW heat- Condenser tube cleaning equipment
ers. Each string contains three stages of low-pressure
Water box drain subsystem
FW heaters. The strings join together at a common
header which is routed to the feedwater tank, which Related support facilities for inventory makeup
supplies heated feedwater to the suction of the reac- and blowdown
tor FW pumps. Each reactor FW/FW Booster pump
is driven by an adjustable speed electrical motor. The cooling water is circulated by four, fixed

9-6
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

speed, motor-driven pumps. The pumps are arranged


in parallel and discharge lines combine into two par- Station Electrical
allel circulating water supply lines to the main con-
denser. Each circulating water supply line connects Power
to a low pressure condenser shell inlet water box.
An interconnecting line fitted with a butterfly valve Offsite Power System
is provided to connect both circulating water supply The offsite power system consists of the set of
lines. The discharge of each pump is fitted with a electrical circuits and associated equipment that are
fast actuated motor-operated or electro-hydraulically used to interconnect the offsite transmission system
operated butterfly valve. This arrangement permits with the plant main generator and the onsite electri-
isolation and maintenance of any one pump while cal power distribution system, as indicated on the
the others remain in operation and minimizes the one-line diagram, Figure 9-2.
backward flow through a tripped pump.
The system includes the plant switchyard and
The CIRC and condenser are designed to permit the high voltage tie lines to the main generator circuit
isolation of each set of the three series connected breaker, the high-side motor operated disconnects
tube bundles to permit repair of leaks and cleaning (MODs) of the unit auxiliary transformers (UATs),
of water boxes while operating at reduced power. and the high-side MODs of the reserve auxiliary
transformers (RATs).
The CIRC includes water box vents to help
fill the condenser water boxes during startup and Power is supplied to the plant from the switch-
removes accumulated air and other gases from the yard connected to two electrically independent
water boxes during normal operation. and physically separate offsite power sources as
follows:
A chemical additive subsystem is also provided
to prevent the accumulation of biological growth Normal Preferred source through the unit
and chemical deposits within the wetted surfaces auxiliary transformers (UAT).
of the system. Alternate Preferred source through the re-
serve auxiliary transformers (RAT).

During plant startup, normal or emergency

Other Turbine Auxiliary shutdown, or during plant outages, the offsite


power system serves to supply power from the off-

Systems site transmission system to the plant auxiliary and


service loads.

Turbine Component Cooling Water System During normal operation, the offsite power
The Turbine Component Cooling Water System system is used to transmit generated power to the
(TCCWS) is a closed-loop cooling water system offsite transmission system and to the plant auxiliary
that supplies cooling water through the TCCW heat and service loads.
exchangers to Turbine Island equipment coolers
and rejects heat to the Plant Service Water System The onsite power distribution system is powered
(PSWS, see Chapter 5). It operates at a higher pres- continuously by the offsite power source through-
sure than the PSWS, so that any intersystem leakage out plant startup, normal operation, and normal or
will not affect Turbine Building equipment. The sys- emergency shutdown. When the generator breaker
tem consists of a single loop with 2-100% capacity is tripped, power to the plant continues to be fed
pumps and 2-100% capacity heat exchangers. from the offsite power source through either the
UATs or the RATs.

9-7
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

NORMAL PREFERRED ALTERNATE PREFERRED


POWER SUPPLY (SITE SPECIFIC) POWER SUPPLY (SITE SPECIFIC)

SWITCHYARD
OFFSITE POWER
ONSITE POWER TURBINE ISLAND/
TRANSFORMER YARD
MAIN
GENERATOR CIRCUIT CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT BREAKER BREAKER
BREAKER UNIT AUX-A UNIT AUX-B RES AUX-A RES AUX-B

MAIN
XFMR's
(3+SPARE)

MAIN GEN
1933 MVA
27kV

PG A1 13.8 kV PG B1 13.8 kV PG A2 13.8 kV PG B2 13.8 kV

SPARE SPARE SPARE


SPARE
M M M M
MOTOR MOTOR MOTOR MOTOR
480 V 480 V 480 V FEEDER 480 V
FEEDER FEEDER FEEDER
(TYP) TURBINE COOLING COOLING (TYP) ASD
TURBINE COOLING COOLING (TYP) ASD PUMP ELECTRICAL COOLING COOLING (TYP) PUMP ELECTRICAL COOLING COOLING
ASD ASD
BUILDING TOWER TOWER BUILDING TOWER TOWER HOUSE BUILDING TOWER TOWER HOUSE BUILDING TOWER TOWER
POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER
M CENTER CENTER CENTER M CENTER CENTER CENTER M CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER M CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER
FW PUMP FW PUMP FW PUMP FW PUMP

PIP-A3 6.9 kV PIP-B3 6.9 kV

Figure 9-2. ESBWR Electrical One-Line

Onsite AC Power Distribution buses exclusive of the safety-related Isolation


General Power Center buses.
The onsite AC power system is configured into
two separate power load groups (see Figure 9-2). The PG nonsafety-related buses feed nonsafety-
Each power load group is fed by a separate unit related loads that are required exclusively for unit
auxiliary transformer (UAT), each with a redundant operation and are normally powered from the normal
reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) for backup, and preferred power source through the UATs. These
consists of two types of buses: buses are also capable of being powered from the
alternate preferred power source (RATs) in the event
Power Generation (PG) nonsafety-related that the normal preferred power source is unavail-
buses - are those buses that are not directly able. On restoration of UAT power, a manually
backed by standby onsite AC power sources selected bus transfer may be performed.
and have connections to the normal or alter-
nate offsite source through the UATs or RATs, The PIP nonsafety-related buses feed non-
respectively. The PG nonsafety-related buses safety-related loads generally required to remain
are the 13.8 kV unit auxiliary switchgear and operational at all times or when the unit is shut
associated lower voltage load buses. down. In addition, the PIP nonsafety-related buses
Plant Investment Protection (PIP) non- supply AC power to the safety-related buses. The PIP
safety-related buses - are those buses that are nonsafety-related buses are backed up by a separate
backed by the standby onsite AC power sup- standby onsite AC power supply system connected
ply system and have connections to the normal to each PIP bus. These buses are also capable of
preferred and alternate preferred offsite sourc- being powered from the alternate preferred power
es through the UATs and RATs, respectively. source (RATs), through an auto bus transfer, in the
Backfeed to the standby onsite AC power event that the normal preferred power source is un-
source is prevented by reverse power relaying. available. On restoration of UAT power, a manually
The PIP nonsafety-related buses are the 6.9 kV selected bus transfer may be performed. Refer to
PIP buses and associated lower voltage load Figure 9-3 and 9-4.

9-8
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

PIP-A A3 6.9 kV
TO BUS B2 TO BUS B2 TO BUS B3 TO BUS B3
2 3 4 6

SPARE
M
480 V
MOTOR 5 7 8 9
FEEDER
(TYP) BUS A31 TO BUS B31 BUS C31 TO BUS D31 TO FMCRD TO FMCRD

SERVICE FMCRD DCIS SWING BUS ELECTRICAL REACTOR CONTROL ISOLATION POWER CENTER ISOLATION POWER CENTER
WATER BLDG (REACTOR BLDG) BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING
POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER
CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER
A2-01A A2-02A A2-03A

DIESEL GENERATOR-A
6.9 kV

PIP-A A3 6.9 kV

SPARE
M
480 V
MOTOR
FEEDER
(TYP)
WATER PUMP RADWASTE ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL REACTOR TURBINE CONTROL RADWASTE TURBINE SWITCHYARD RADWASTE BLDG
TREATMENT HOUSE BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING POWER CENTER POWER CENTER
BLDG POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER
POWER CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER
CENTER A3-01A A3-02A A3-03A A2-04A

Figure 9-3. ESBWR PIP Bus - A

PIP-B B3 6.9 kV
TO BUS A3 TO BUS A3
5 7

SPARE
M
480 V
MOTOR 2 3 4 6
FEEDER
(TYP) TO FMCRD TO DCIS BUS TO BUS A31 BUS B31 TO BUS C31 BUS D31
POWER
SERVICE ELECTRICAL REACTOR CONTROL ISOLATION POWER CENTER ISOLATION POWER CENTER
CENTER
WATER BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING
BUILDING POWER POWER POWER
POWER CENTER CENTER CENTER
CENTER B2-01B B2-02B B2-03B

DIESEL GENERATOR-B
6.9 kV

PIP-B B3 6.9 kV
TO BUS B3 TO BUS B3
8 9

SPARE
M
480 V
MOTOR
FEEDER
(TYP)
WATER CONTROL RADWASTE ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL REACTOR TURBINE RADWASTE TURBINE ALTERNATE SWITCHYARD RADWASTE BLDG FMCRD POWER CENTER FMCRD POWER CENTER
TREATMENT BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING POWER CENTER POWER CENTER
BLDG POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER POWER
POWER CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER CENTER
CENTER B3-04B B3-01B B3-02B B3-03B

Figure 9-4. ESBWR PIP Bus - B

9-9
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

Medium Voltage AC Power Distribution System MCCs. The power centers are of the single-fed or
Power is supplied from the UATs and RATs at double-ended type depending on the redundancy
13.8 kV and 6.9 kV to the PG and PIP buses. There requirements of the loads powered by a given power
are four PG buses, each being powered from one center. The power supplies to the double-ended
of the two UATs, or if the UATs are unavailable, power center transformers of the PIP nonsafety-re-
from one of the two RATs. The source breakers for lated buses are supplied from different buses. Each
each PG bus are electrically interlocked to prevent double-ended power center is normally powered by
simultaneous connection of the UATs and RATs to its normal power source through its normal source
the PG buses. main breaker, with the alternate source main breaker
open. The power center normal and alternate source
Two 6.9 kV PIP buses (PIP-A and PIP-B) main breakers are electrically interlocked to prevent
provide power for the nonsafety-related PIP loads. simultaneous powering of the power center by nor-
PIP-A and PIP-B buses are each backed by a separate mal and alternate sources.
standby onsite AC power supply source. Each PIP
bus is normally powered from the normal preferred Isolation Power Centers
power source through the UAT of the same load The isolation power centers are powered from
group. Additionally, in the event of unavailability of the PIP nonsafety-related buses, which are backed
the normal preferred power source, each PIP bus has up by the standby diesel generators. There are four
connections to and can be powered from the alternate isolation power centers, one each for Divisions 1,
preferred power source through the RAT of the same 2, 3 and 4. Each isolation power center is double-
load group. The source breakers of the normal and ended and can be powered from either of the PIP
alternate preferred power sources are electrically load group buses. The normal and alternate source
interlocked to prevent simultaneous connection of main breakers of each isolation power center are
UATs and RATs to the PIP buses. electrically interlocked to prevent powering the
isolation power center from the normal and alternate
Standby AC power for the PIP nonsafety-related sources simultaneously. The isolation power centers
buses is supplied by standby diesel generators at 6.9 are shown in Figures 9-3 and 9-4.
kV and distributed by the nonsafety-related power
distribution system. The 6.9 kV PIP buses are auto- The isolation power centers supply power to
matically transferred to the standby diesel generators safety-related loads of their respective division.
when the normal and alternate preferred power sup- These loads consist of the safety-related battery
plies to these buses are lost. The startup time for the chargers, rectifiers and regulating transformers.
standby diesel generators is much less critical than In addition, there is no safety-related lighting that
in previous BWRs, due to the passive ECCS one operates directly from the 480 VAC in the ESBWR
minute to start and 10 minutes to fully load. design. There are no safety-related actuators (pumps,
valves, etc.) that operate directly from 480VAC (or
Low Voltage AC Power Distribution System higher) in the ESBWR design.
The low voltage AC power distribution sys-
tem includes power centers, motor control centers Motor Control Centers
(MCCs), distribution transformers, and distribu- MCCs supply 99 kW and smaller motors,
tion panels as well as the associated overcurrent control power transformers, process heaters, motor
protective devices, protective relaying, and local operated valves and other small electrically operated
instrumentation and controls. It also includes all auxiliaries, including 480 to 208/120V and 480 to
cables interconnecting the buses to their sources 240/120V transformers. MCCs are assigned to the
and loads. same load group as the power center that supplies
their power.
Power is supplied from the power center trans-
formers to the 480V power centers. The power Safety-Related Uninterruptible AC Power Sup-
centers supply power to motor loads of approxi- ply System
mately 100 kW through 249 kW, and to the 480V Figure 9-5 shows the overall safety-related

9-10
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

Uninterruptible AC Power Supply (UPS) system. A third nonsafety-related UPS is provided to


The safety-related UPS for each of the four divisions supply the nonsafety-related DCIS loads. This load
is supplied from a 480V isolation power center in groups nonsafety-related UPS is normally powered
the same division. The isolation power centers are from a 480 VAC double-ended power center, which
connected to PIP non safety-related buses, which can receive power from either of the two power
are backed by standby diesel generators. Divisions load groups. The power center normal and alternate
1, 2, 3, 4 each have two rectifiers, two batteries and source main breakers are electrically interlocked
two inverters. Each rectifier receives 480 VAC nor- to prevent the normal and alternate sources from
mal power from the isolation power center of that simultaneously providing power to the power center.
division converts it to 250 VDC. The 480VAC/250 Additionally, standby onsite AC power from either
VDC rectifier and a safety-related 72-hour battery of the two load groups provides backup power
of that division supply 250 VDC power through should a failure of the normal and alternate supplies
diodes to a common inverter with an output of 120 occur. Emergency power of the same load group
VAC single phase. from 250 VDC batteries is provided should loss
of normal, alternate, and standby onsite AC power
Power is distributed to the individual safety- sources occur.
related loads from associated 120 VAC distribution
panels, which supply power to the Reactor and Two dedicated, nonsafety-related UPSs are
Control Buildings. provided for the Technical Support Center (TSC),
also in a two-load group configuration. Power for
Nonsafety-Related Uninterruptible Power Sup- each TSC nonsafety-related UPS is normally sup-
ply System plied from a 480 VAC power center in the same
Figure 9-6 shows the overall nonsafety-related load group, with standby onsite AC power of the
UPS. The nonsafety-related UPS for each of the same load group providing backup power should a
two plant power distribution load groups is supplied failure of the normal supply occur. Backup power
from a 480V power center in the same load group, of the same load group from 125 VDC batteries is
with standby onsite AC power of the same load provided should loss of normal and standby onsite
group providing backup power should a failure of AC power sources occur.
the normal supply occur. Emergency power of the
same load group from 250 VDC batteries is provided The nonsafety-related UPS provides reliable,
should loss of normal and standby onsite AC power uninterruptible AC power for nonsafety-related
sources occur. equipment needed for continuity of power plant
operation. UPS loads are divided into three load
480V ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS A31
groups. Each UPS load group includes a solid-state
inverter, solid-state rectifier, solid-state transfer
250V DC BUS 12 250V DC BUS 11
switch, manual transfer switch, and distribution
transformers with associated distribution panels.

480/120V INVERTER
120VAC
480/120V INVERTER
120VAC
Instrumentation and Control Power Supply System
SXS

MTS
SXS

MTS
Regulating step-down transformers provide
208/120VAC power to I&C loads not requiring
120V AC BUS 12 72h 120V DIST. PANEL BUS 11 72h
uninterruptible power. The I&C buses are each sup-
CONTROL BLDG REACTOR BLDG
plied independently from separate 480VAC power
UPS CONTROL BLDG UPS REACTOR BLDG centers.
DCIS MCR DCIS RPS

Instrumentation and control buses are supplied


LIGHTING (DIV 1&2 ONLY)
DCIS MCR DCIS RPS
LIGHTING (DIV 1&2 ONLY)

SAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY DIVISION 1 from the DCIS Swing Bus power center to supply
(TYP OF DIV 1, 2, 3, 4)
nonsafety-related I&C loads. This system supplies
AC loads of the Nonsafety-Related Distributed
Figure 9-5. ESBWR Safety-Related Uninterruptable AC Control and Information System (N-DCIS), solenoid

9-11
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

480V POWER CENTER BUS A3 480V POWER CENTER DCIS SWING BUS C23 480VAC POWER CENTER BUS A2-01A

480V POWER CENTER BUS A3


480V POWER CENTER BUS A2

250V DC BUS A1 250V DC BUS A2 250V DC BUS C

RECTIFIER A1 RECTIFIER A2 RECTIFIER C

480/480V INVERTER A1 INVERTER A2 480/480V INVERTER C 480/480V


125V DC BUS A3
SXS SXS SXS

MTS MTS MTS

RECTIFIER A3
480/120V

480V AC BUS A1 480V AC BUS A2 480V AC BUS C TSC INVERTER A3


SXS

MTS

480/208-120V 480/208-120V
480/208-120V 480/120V 480/120V

CONTROL BLDG REACTOR BLDG TURBINE/SWITCHGEAR CW PUMPHOUSE CONTROL BLDG REACTOR BLDG TURBINE/SWITCHGEAR TSC DCIS
LOAD GROUP A LOAD GROUP A BLDG LOAD GROUP A BLDG LOAD GROUP A LOAD GROUP C LOAD GROUP C BLDG LOAD GROUP C LIGHTING AND COMMUNICATIONS

NONSAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY NONSAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTABLE NONSAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTABLE


(TYP OF BUS A3 & B3) POWER SUPPLY (SWING BUS) TSC SYSTEM (TYP OF A2 AND B2)

Figure 9-6. ESBWR Nonsafety-Related Uninterruptable AC Power

valves and other I&C loads. Figure 9-7 shows the overall 250 VDC system
provided for Class 1E Divisions 1, 2, 3 and 4. Divi-
The non-safety Instrumentation and Control sions 1, 2, 3 and 4 consist of two separate battery
Power Supply System does not perform any safety sets for each division. Each set supplies power to
function. the safety-related inverters for at least 72 hours
following a design basis event. The DC systems
DC Power Distribution are operated ungrounded for increased reliability.
General Each of the safety-related battery systems has a 250
Completely independent safety-related and VDC battery, a battery charger, a main distribution
nonsafety-related DC power systems are provided. panel and a ground detection panel. One divisional
The safety-related DC system is shown in Figure battery charger is used to supply each groups DC
9-7. The nonsafety-related DC system is shown in distribution panel bus and its associated battery. The
Figure 9-8. divisional battery charger is fed from its divisional
480V Isolation Power Center. The main DC distribu-
Eight independent safety-related 250 VDC tion bus feeds the UPS inverter. Each division has
systems are provided, two each for Divisions 1, 2, a standby charger to act as backup to either of the
3 and 4. They provide four divisions of independent batteries of that division.
and redundant onsite sources of power for opera-
tion of safety-related loads, monitoring and MCR The four safety-related divisions are supplied
emergency lighting. power from four independent Isolation Power
Centers. The 250 VDC systems supply DC power
Five independent nonsafety-related DC systems to Divisions 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. The safety-
are provided consisting of three 250VDC systems related DC system is designed so that no single ac-
and two 125 VDC systems. The nonsafety-related tive failure in any division of the 250 VDC system
DC systems supply power for control and switch- results in conditions that prevent safe shutdown of
ing, switchgear control, TSC, instrumentation, and the plant while a separate division has been taken
station auxiliaries. out of service for maintenance.

Safety-Related Station Batteries and Battery The plant design and circuit layout of the DC
Chargers systems provide physical separation of the equip-
250V Class 1E DC Systems Configuration ment, cabling, and instrumentation essential to

9-12
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

480V ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS A31

72h BATTERY 72h BATTERY


250VDC 250VDC

NORMAL
BATTERY NORMAL
CHARGER BATTERY
CHARGER

STANDBY
BATTERY
CHARGER

250V DC BUS 12 250V DC BUS 11

250V DC POWER CENTER

TO INVERTER TO INVERTER
72h UPS 250V DC DIVISION 1 72h UPS
(TYP OF DIV 1, 2, 3, 4)

Figure 9-7. ESBWR Safety-Related DC Power

plant safety. Each 250 VDC battery is separately associated with that battery.
housed in a ventilated room apart from its charger,
distribution, and ground detection panels. Equip- Standby chargers are supplied from the same
ment of each division of the DC distribution system Isolation Power Center as the normal charger. Each
is located in an area separated physically from the battery charger is capable of recharging its battery
other divisions. All the components of safety-related from the design minimum charge to a fully charged
250 VDC systems are housed in Seismic Category condition within 24 hours while supplying the full
I structures. load associated with the individual battery.

Safety-Related Batteries The battery chargers are the constant voltage


In divisions 1, 2, 3 and 4 the two separate 250 type, adjustable between 240 and 290 volts, with
volt safety-related batteries per division are each the capability of operating as battery eliminators.
rated to exceed 72-hour station blackout conditions. The battery eliminator feature is incorporated as a
The DC system minimum battery terminal voltage at precautionary measure to protect against the effects
the end of the discharge period is 210 VDC. of inadvertent disconnection of the battery.

The safety-related batteries have sufficient The battery chargers output is of a current
stored capacity without their chargers to indepen- limiting design. The battery chargers are designed
dently supply the safety-related loads continuously to prevent their AC source from becoming a load on
for the time periods stated above. The battery banks the batteries because of power feedback from loss
are designed to permit the replacement of individual of AC power.
cells.
Nonsafety-Related Station Batteries and Battery
Safety-Related Battery Chargers Chargers
The safety-related battery chargers are full 125V and 250V Nonsafety-Related DC Systems
wave, silicon-controlled rectifiers. The chargers are Configuration
suitable for continuously float charging the batteries. Figure 9-8 shows the overall 125V and 250V
The chargers operate from a 480 volt, 3 phase, 60 nonsafety-related DC systems. The DC systems are
Hz supply. The power for each divisional battery operated ungrounded for increased reliability. Each
charger is supplied by that divisions dedicated Iso- of the DC systems has a battery, a battery charger, a
lation Power Center. The standby battery charger is standby battery charger, main DC distribution panel,
used to equalize either of its associated divisional and ground detection panel. The main DC distribu-
batteries, or as a replacement to the normal charger tion buses feed the local DC distribution panels, UPS

9-13
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

POWER CENTER BUS A2-01A POWER CENTER DCIS SWING BUS C23

FROM 480V
NORMAL
AC BUS C23 STANDBY
BATTERY
CHARGER BATTERY
CHARGER NORMAL
BATTERY NORMAL STANDBY
BATTERY BATTERY CHARGER BATTERY BATTERY
250V 2h 250V 2h CHARGER CHARGER
BATTERY
250V 2h

250V DC BUS A1 250V DC BUS A2 250V DC BUS C

INVERTER A1 INVERTER A2 INVERTER C


MCC
250V DC BUS TURBINE BLDG

NONSAFETY-RELATED 250V DC POWER SYSTEM (TYP OF BUS A2 & B2) NONSAFETY-RELATED 250V DC POWER SYSTEM DCIS SWING BUS

POWER CENTER BUS A2-01A

FROM BUS B2
TO BUS B2
STANDBY NORMAL
BATTERY BATTERY
CHARGER CHARGER

BATTERY
125V 2h

125V DC BUS A3

DC POWER PANEL DC POWER PANEL TSC


SWITCHGEAR DC POWER INVERTER A
EMERGENCY LIGHTING
CONTROL SUPPLY

NONSAFETY-RELATED 125V DC POWER SYSTEM(TYP OF BUS A2 & B2)

Figure 9-8. ESBWR Nonsafety-Related DC Power

inverter and/or DC motor control center. for 2-hour duty cycles at a discharge rate of 2 hours.
The DC system minimum battery terminal voltage
The plant design and circuit layout of the non- at the end of the discharge period is 105 volts. The
safety-related DC systems provide physical separa- maximum equalizing charge voltage for 125V bat-
tion of the equipment, cabling and instrumentation teries is 141 VDC.
associated with the load groups of nonsafety-related
equipment. Each 125V and 250 VDC battery is The 250 volt nonsafety-related batteries are
separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its sized for 2-hour duty cycles at a discharge rate of
charger, distribution, and ground detection panels. 2 hours. The DC system minimum battery terminal
Equipment of each load group of the DC distribu- voltage at the end of the discharge period is 210
tion system is located in an area separated physically volts. The maximum equalizing charge voltage for
from the other load groups. 250V batteries is 282 VDC.

The nonsafety-related DC power is required for The nonsafety-related batteries have sufficient
standby lighting, control and switching functions stored capacity without their chargers to indepen-
such as the control of 6.9 kV and 480V switchgear, dently supply their loads continuously for at least
DC motors, control relays, meters and indicators. 2 hours. Each distribution circuit is capable of
transmitting sufficient energy to start and operate all
Nonsafety-Related Batteries required loads in that circuit. The battery banks are
The 125 volt non-Class 1E batteries are sized designed to permit replacement of individual cells.

9-14
Chapter 9 Major Balance-of-Plant Features

Nonsafety-Related Battery Chargers type, with the 125 VDC system chargers having a
The nonsafety-related battery chargers are full voltage adjustable between 120 and 145 volts and the
wave, silicon-controlled rectifiers or an acceptable 250 VDC system chargers having a voltage adjust-
alternate design. The chargers are suitable for float able between 240 and 290 VDC, with the capabil-
charging the batteries. The chargers operate from a ity of operating as battery eliminators. The battery
460 volt, 3 phase, 60 Hz supply. Each charger is sup- eliminator feature is incorporated as a precautionary
plied from a separate power center, which is backed measure to protect against the effects of inadvertent
by the standby diesel generator. disconnection of the battery.

Standby chargers are used to equalize battery The battery chargers output is of a current
charging. Standby chargers are supplied from a dif- limiting design. The battery chargers are designed
ferent power center than the main charger, except to prevent their AC source from becoming a load
when both are supplied from the swing bus. on the batteries caused by power feedback from a
loss of AC power.
The battery chargers are the constant voltage

9-15
Chapter 10 Radioactive Waste Systems

Chapter
Radioactive Waste Systems 10
Overview tem (LWMS) is designed to control, collect, process,
handle, store, and dispose of liquid radioactive waste
The radwaste facility has been significantly im- generated as the result of normal operation, including
proved compared to past designs. The use of mobile anticipated operational occurrences. All potentially
reprocessing technologies for both liquid and solid radioactive liquid wastes are collected in sumps or
radwaste processing improves the efficiency of the drain tanks at various locations in the plant and trans-
process and allows new mobile technologies to be ferred to collection tanks in the radwaste facility.
readily adapted to the existing ESBWR radwaste
system. The radwaste building is designed to be very System components are designed and arranged
flexible. The only permanently installed equipments in shielded enclosures to minimize exposure to plant
are the collection and sample tanks and the support personnel during operation, inspection, and mainte-
systems required by the mobile reprocessing skids. nance. Tanks, processing equipment, pumps, valves,
The liquid radwaste system is designed for 100% and instruments that may contain radioactivity are
recycle with no offsite release. located in controlled access areas.

The impact of these improvements in the ES- The LWMS normally operates on a batch basis.
BWR design gives assurance that dewatered or Provisions for sampling at important process points
powdered solid waste volume is less than 70 m3/year are included. Protection against accidental discharge
and dry solid waste volume is less than 370 m3/yr, re- is provided by detection and alarm of abnormal
ducing the radwaste volume significantly compared conditions and by administrative controls.
to current U.S. operating plants. Annual releases to
the environment from the ESBWR radwaste systems The LWMS is divided into several subsystems,
are as low as reasonably achievable in accordance so that the liquid wastes from various sources can
with guidelines set forth in 10CFR50, Appendix I. be segregated and processed separately, based on
These levels are several orders of magnitude below the most economical and efficient process for each
the NRC established limits in 10CFR20. specific type of impurity and chemical content.
Cross-connections between subsystems provide
The Radwaste systems include the Liquid Waste additional flexibility in processing the wastes by
Management System (LWMS), the Offgas System alternate methods and provide redundancy if one
(OGS ), and the Solid Waste Management System subsystem is inoperative.
(SWMS).
The LWMS is housed in the radwaste building
and consists of the following four subsystems:

Liquid Radwaste Equipment (low conductivity) drain subsys-


Management System
tem.
Floor (high conductivity) drain subsystem.
The ESBWR Liquid Waste Management Sys- Chemical drain subsystem.

10-1
Chapter 10 Radioactive Waste Systems

Detergent drain subsystem. high conductivity waste. Cross-connections with the


floor drain subsystem allow processing through the
These process subsystems ensure that liquid mobile system for floor drain treatment.
waste from various sources can be segregated and
treated separately, based on the most economical and Mobile based chemical addition equipment is
efficient process for each specific type of impurity provided to add chemical agent(s) for recovering
and chemical content. LWMS has been designed to the performance of the HFF System. The equip-
recycle 100% of the ESBWRs liquid waste. ment provides for an addition of chemical agent(s)
for the Reverse Osmosis System (RO) in the floor
Equipment (Low Conductivity) Drain Subsystem drain subsystem.
The subsystem block flow diagram is shown
in Figure 10-1. The equipment drain collection A strainer or filter is provided downstream of
tanks receive low conductivity inputs from various the last ion exchanger in series to collect any crud
sources within the plant. These waste inputs have a and resin fines that may be present.
high chemical purity and are processed on a batch
basis. The equipment drain subsystem consists of The process effluents are collected in one of
three collection tanks and collection pumps, a mobile the two sample tanks for chemical and radioactiv-
based Hollow Fiber Filter (HFF) and Deep-Bed Ion ity analysis. If acceptable, the tank contents are
Exchanger system including organic material pre- returned to the condensate storage tank for plant
treatment equipment, an intermediate tank/pump, reuse. A recycle line from the sample tanks allows
and two sample tanks and sample pumps. One col- the sampled effluents that do not meet water quality
lection tank is normally used as a surge tank that can requirements to be pumped back to an Equipment
collect waste from the low conductivity waste and/or (Low Conductivity) Drain Collection Tank or Floor

Chemical
Injection Mobile Equipment
Deep-Bed
Demineralizers LCW Sample
Charcoal Hollow Fiber Tank
Filter Filter
LCW
Drains

Recycle or
Discharge

LCW or
HCW
Packaging Collection
Tank
LA Phase
Spent Resin
Separator
Storage Tank

NOTE: Cross-tie lines not shown


LCW
Collection
Tank

Figure 10-1. Equipment Drain Subsystem Schematic

10-2
Chapter 10 Radioactive Waste Systems

(High Conductivity) Drain Collection Tank for ad- Ion Exchanger System including suspended solid
ditional processing. If the plant condensate inven- pre-treatment equipment, an intermediate tank/pump
tory is high, the sampled process effluent may be and two sample tanks and sample pumps. The
discharged. waste collected in the floor drain collection tanks
is processed on a batch basis. Cross-connections
The HFF is backwashed periodically to maintain with the equipment drain subsystem also allow for
filtration capacity. Backwash waste is discharged to processing through that subsystem. Additional col-
a low activity phase separator. Spent deep-bed ion lection capacity is also provided by one additional
exchanger resin is discharged to a low activity spent equipment drain collection tank that is shared with
resin holdup tank as slurry. the equipment drain subsystem.

Floor (High Conductivity) Drain Subsystem A strainer or filter is provided downstream of


The subsystem block flow diagram is shown in the last ion exchanger in series to collect any crud
Figure 10-2. The floor drain collection tanks receive and resin fines that may be present.
high conductivity waste inputs from various floor
drain sumps in the reactor building, turbine building, The floor drain sample tanks collect the process
and radwaste building. The floor drain collection effluent, so that a sample may be taken for chemi-
tanks also receive waste input from chemical drain cal and radioactivity analysis before discharging or
collection tanks. recycling. The discharge path depends on the water
quality, dilution stream availability and plant water
The floor drain subsystem consists of two floor inventory. Off-standard quality effluent can be re-
drain collection tanks and collection pumps, a mo- cycled to floor drain collection tanks or equipment
bile based Reverse Osmosis (RO) and Deep-Bed drain collection tanks. If the treatment effluent meets

Chemical
Injection Mobile Equipment
Deep-Bed
Demineralizers HCW Sample
Pre- R/O
Tank
Filter
HCW
Drains

Recycle or
Effluent HCW
Discharge
from LD Collection
TankNote
Packaging LCW or
HCW
Concentrated CD Resin Spent Resin Collection
Waste Tank Holdup Storage Tank Tank
Tank

Chemical Drain
Chemical Collection Tank
Injection Chemical
Drains NOTE: Cross-tie lines not shown
2 Pumps

Figure 10-2. Floor Drain Subsystem Schematic

10-3
Chapter 10 Radioactive Waste Systems

water quality standards and if the water inventory then taken and if discharge standards are met, then
permits it to be recycled, the processed floor drain the waste may be discharged offsite. A cross-con-
effluent can be recycled to the condensate storage nection with the detergent drain subsystem is also
tank or discharged offsite. provided.

The liquid waste is concentrated in the RO sys- Detergent Drain Subsystem


tem and is periodically discharged to a concentrated The subsystem block flow diagram is shown in
waste tank. Spent deep-bed ion exchanger resin is Figure 10-3. Waste water containing detergent from
discharged to a low activity spent resin holdup tank the controlled laundry and personnel decontamina-
as a slurry. tion facilities and decontamination waste water from
the reactor building or turbine building throughout
The capability exists to accept used conden- the plant is collected in the detergent drain collec-
sate polishing resin in a Condensate Resin Holdup tion tanks. The detergent drain subsystem consists of
Tank. The used condensate polishing resin from two detergent drain collection tanks and collection
Condensate Purification System is transferred to the pumps, a mobile-based detergent drain filter and
Condensate Resin Holdup Tank prior to use in the charcoal filter system including organic material pre-
pre-treatment deep-bed ion exchanger in the floor treatment equipment, an intermediate tank/pump,
drain subsystem. and two sample tanks and sample pumps. The de-
tergent wastes are processed through a suspended
Chemical Drain Subsystem solid removal process and organic material removal
The subsystem block flow diagram is shown process and collected in sample tanks. A sample is
in Figure 10-2. The chemical waste collected in the then taken and if discharge standards are met, then
chemical drain collection tank consists of labora- the waste is discharged offsite. Off-standard quality
tory wastes and decontamination solutions. After water can either be recycled for further processing
accumulating in the chemical drain collection tank, to the detergent collection tank or to the floor drain
chemical agents may be added to the chemical drain collection tank. A cross-connection with the chemi-
by mobile-based chemical pre-treatment equipment cal drain collection subsystem is also provided.
if necessary and the pre-treated chemical drain is
transferred to floor drain collection tanks for fur- Mobile Subsystems
ther processing. Chemical pre-treatment operation For Equipment Drain ProcessingThe equip-
is typically a neutralization process. A sample is ment drain mobile system utilizes non-precoat type

Mobile Equipment
Charcoal
Filter LD Sample
Pre-Filter
Tank

Detergent
Drains

TOC Removal
HCW
Laundry LD Process
Drains Collection
Tank
Discharge
Packaging Packaging

NOTE: Cross-tie lines not shown

Figure 10-3. Detergent Drain Subsystem Schematic

10-4
Chapter 10 Radioactive Waste Systems

Hollow Fiber Filter (HFF) for removing suspended spent resin tank when some chosen effluent purity
solid and radioactive particulate material and char- parameter (such as conductivity) exceeds a preset
coal filters for organic material removal. Backwash limit or upon high differential pressure. Fine mesh
operation for HFF is performed when the differential strainers with backwashing connections are provided
pressure of HFF exceeds a preset limit. HFF back- in the ion exchange vessel discharge and in the
wash waste is discharged to a low activity phase downstream piping to prevent resin fines from being
separator. A charcoal filter is located upstream of carried over to the sampling tanks. The chemical
HFF for the purpose of removing organic material, drain pre-treatment unit performs a pre-conditioning
which may cause fouling of the HFF. Spent char- of chemical waste, such as pH adjustment, prior to
coal is packaged directly into the container when processing in the RO system. The mobile system is
the differential pressure exceeds a preset limit or of a skid-mounted design and configured for rela-
waste quality of the effluent from the charcoal filter tively easy installation and process reconfiguration.
exceeds a preset value. The equipment drain ion In-plant supply and return connections from perma-
exchangers following the HFF are of the mixed-bed nently installed equipment to the mobile system are
type. Exhausted resins are sluiced to the low activity provided to ensure operational flexibility.
spent resin holdup tank when some chosen effluent
purity parameter (such as conductivity) exceeds For Detergent Drain ProcessingThe detergent
a preset limit or upon high differential pressure. drain mobile system typically utilizes a charcoal
Fine mesh strainers with backwashing connections filter to remove organics and a cartridge type filter
are provided in the ion exchange vessel discharge to remove suspended solids. When the deferential
and in the downstream piping to prevent resin fines pressure of the filter exceeds a preset value, the
from being carried over to the sampling tanks. The filter media is exchanged and the spent filter me-
mobile system is skid-mounted and is designed dia is packaged as active solid waste. The mobile
and configured for relatively easy installation and system is of a skid-mounted design and configured
process reconfiguration. In-plant supply and return for relatively easy installation and process recon-
connections from permanently installed equipment figuration. In-plant supply and return connections
to the mobile system are provided to keep opera- from permanently installed equipment to the mobile
tional flexibility. system are provided to ensure operational flexibility.
The mobile systems are located in the Liquid Waste
For Floor and Chemical Drain ProcessingFloor Treatment System bay to allow truck access and
drain and chemical drain wastes are more complex mobile system skid loading and unloading. Modular
to process than equipment drains. The floor drain shield walls are provided in the Radwaste Building
mobile system utilizes pre-filtration equipment for to allow shield walls to be constructed to minimize
removing suspended solids and organic impurities, exposure to personnel during operation and routine
Reverse Osmosis System (RO) for removing ionic maintenance.
impurities, and finally, deep-bed ion exchangers for
polishing. The pre-filtrated liquid waste is collected
into the feed tank of the RO System. The feed tank
serves as a front-end supply tank to the process.
The liquid waste is transferred to the RO unit via a Offgas System
booster pump. The RO unit uses membrane tubes
that are made of a semi-permeable material. When The Gaseous Waste Management or Offgas
pressure is applied to the feed side of the membrane, System (OGS) processes and controls the release
the solution passes through the membrane (perme- of gaseous radioactive effluents to the site environs
ates) and the solids and high molecular wastes are so as to maintain the exposure of persons outside
rejected. The rejected solids and ionic impurities the controlled area and personnel working near the
are returned to the feed tank and the final permeate system components to as low as reasonably achiev-
is polished by deep-bed ion exchangers. The floor able. The OGS process flow diagram is shown in
drain ion exchangers following the RO are of the Figure 10-4.
mixed-bed type. Exhausted resins are sluiced to the

10-5
Chapter 10 Radioactive Waste Systems

FROM FINAL CONDENSER


PREHEATER RECOMBINER
STAGE SJAE
COOLER
CONDENSER
TO MAIN
CONDENSER LOOP SEAL

FROM FINAL PREHEATER RECOMBINER CONDENSER


STAGE SJAE
COOLER
CONDENSER
TO MAIN
CONDENSER LOOP SEAL

A A
TO STACK

A
GUARD
VESSEL

CHARCOAL ADSORPTION BEDS A

Figure 10-4. Offgas System Schematic

The OGS is an all-welded, leak-tight system The OGS also reduces the possibility of an
with redundant active components. The OGS pro- explosion from the buildup of radiolytic hydrogen
cess equipment is housed in a reinforced-concrete and oxygen. This is accomplished by the recombi-
structure to provide adequate shielding. Charcoal nation of the radiolytic hydrogen and oxygen under
adsorbers are installed in a temperature monitored controlled conditions within a catalytic recombiner.
and controlled vault. The facility is located in the This process strips the condensables and reduces
turbine building to minimize piping. the volume of gases being processed. Recombiner
preheaters preheat gases to provide for efficient
The main condenser evacuation system removes catalytic recombiner operation and to ensure the
the noncondensable gases from the main condenser absence of liquid water that suppresses the activity
and discharges them to the OGS. The evacuation of the recombiner catalyst.
system consists of two 100% capacity, multiple-ele-
ment, two stage steam jet air ejectors (SJAEs) with Each recombiner is part of an integrated pre-
intercondensers, for normal station operation, and heater-recombiner-condenser pressure vessel as-
mechanical vacuum pumps for use during startup. sembly. The preheater section uses nuclear quality
The OGS receives air and noncondensable gases steam to heat the offgas process stream gases before
from the SJAEs and processes the effluent for the they reach the catalyst in the recombiner section.
decay and/or removal of gaseous and particulate The recombined hydrogen and oxygen, in the form
radioactive isotopes. of superheated steam, which leaves the recombiner

10-6
Chapter 10 Radioactive Waste Systems

section is then condensed (by power cycle con- Wet solid waste collection subsystem.
densate) to liquid water in the condenser section Mobile wet solid waste processing subsystem.
of the assembly, while the noncondensable gases
Dry solid waste accumulation and condition-
are cooled. The condensed water in the condenser
ing subsystem.
section is drained to a loop seal that is connected to
the main condenser hotwell. Condensed preheater Container storage subsystem.
section steam is also drained to the above loop seal
that is connected to the hotwell. No flow paths ex- Wet Solid Waste Collection Subsystem
ist whereby unrecombined offgas can bypass the The wet solid waste collection subsystem col-
recombiners. lects spent bead resin slurry, filter and tank sludge
slurry and concentrated waste into one of the five
The gaseous waste stream is then further cooled tanks in accordance with the waste characteristics
by chilled water in the cooler condenser. The cooler (see Figure 10-5).
condenser is designed to remove any condensed
moisture by draining it to the offgas condenser. Spent bead resin sluiced from the RWCU,
FAPCS, Condensate Purification System and
The remaining noncondensables (principally air LWMS are transferred to three spent resin tanks for
with traces of krypton and xenon) are passed through radioactive decay and storage. Spent resin tanks are
activated charcoal beds which are operated at an categorized as follows:
ambient temperature and provide a holdup volume
to allow time for the krypton and xenon to decay. High Activity Resin Holdup Tank for receiving
In order to insure enough noncondensable flow, a RWCU and FAPCS spent bead resin.
small quantity of air is deliberately introduced into
Low Activity Resin Holdup Tank for receiving
the system. After processing, the gaseous effluent
LWMS spent bead resin.
is monitored and released to the environs through
the plant stack. Condensate Resin Holdup Tank for receiving
Condensate Purification System spent bead
The OGS process equipment is housed in a resin.
reinforced-concrete structure to provide adequate
shielding. Charcoal adsorbers are installed in a The capability exists to keep the higher activity
temperature monitored and controlled vault. The resins, the lower activity resins and condensate resins
facility is located in the turbine building to minimize in separate tanks. Excess water from a holdup tank is
piping. sent to the equipment drain collection tank or floor
drain collection tank by a decant pump.

When sufficient bead resins have been collected


Solid Radwaste Man- in the high/low activity resin holdup tank, they are

agement System
mixed via the high/low activity resin circulation
pump and sent to the mobile wet solid waste process-
ing subsystem via the high/low activity resin transfer
pump. When sufficient bead resins have been col-
The Solid Waste Management System (SWMS) lected in the condensate resin holdup tank, they are
is designed to control, collect, handle, process, mixed via the condensate resin circulation pump
package, and temporarily store wet and dry solid and sent to the LWMS pre-treatment ion-exchanger
radioactive waste prior to shipment. This waste for reuse or the mobile wet solid waste processing
is generated as a result of normal operation and subsystem via the condensate resin transfer pump.
anticipated operational occurrences. The SWMS is
located in the radwaste building. It consists of the Two Low Activity Phase Separators receive
following four subsystems: suspended solid slurries from the Condensate Pu-
rification System, mobile filtration system of the

10-7
Chapter 10 Radioactive Waste Systems

Decant Water
LCW or HCW Process

Decant Pump
Mobile Equipment
High Activity HA Resin
Beads Resin Holdup Tank Slurry
RWCU/FACPS HA Dewatering
Equipment

HA Resin Transfer HIC Container


Low Activity Pump
LA Resin
Beads Resin Holdup Tank Re-using of CD Resin
LCW/HCW Slurry
HCW Demineralizer

Mobile Equipment
Condensate
CD Resin
Polisher Resin Slurry LA Dewatering
Holdup Tank
from CD Equipment

HIC Container
LA Resin
Transfer Pump
Filter Sludge
from LA Phase
CF/LCW Separators Concentrate Treatment
Slurry
(2) Feed Tank

NOTE: Cross-tie lines not shown

Figure 10-5. Wet Solid Waste Collection Subsystem Schematic

LWMS and high integrity containers (HIC) efflu- Mobile Wet Solid Waste Processing Subsystem
ent. The suspended solids are allowed to settle and The mobile wet solid waste processing subsys-
the residual water is transferred by the low activity tem consists of a dewatering station for high activity
decant pump to the equipment drain collection tanks spent resin, a dewatering station for low activity
or floor drain collection tanks for further processing. spent resin and sludge and a dewatering station (or
When sufficient sludges have been collected in the dryer) for concentrated waste (see Figures 10-5
tank, the sludges are mixed by the low activity resin and 10-6). An empty HIC is lifted off of a transport
circulation pump and sent to the mobile wet solid trailer and placed in each empty dewatering station.
waste processing subsystem by the low activity resin The tractor/trailer may then be released. The HIC
transfer pump. closure lid is removed and placed in a laydown
area. Spent cartridge filters may be placed in the
During transfer operations of the spent bead HIC at this point, if they are not shipped in separate
resins and the sludges, the suspended solids are kept containers.
suspended by a circulation pump to prevent them
from agglomerating and possibly clogging lines. Next, the fill head is positioned over the HIC
using a crane. The fill head includes a closed circuit
One Concentrated Waste Tank receives concen- television camera for remote viewing of the fill op-
trated waste from the mobile reverse osmosis system eration. The HIC is then filled with each kind of wet
of the LWMS. When sufficient concentrated waste solid waste. The capability to obtain samples during
has been collected in the tank, the concentrated waste the fill operation is provided.
is sent to the mobile wet waste processing subsystem
by a mixing/transfer pump. Excess water is removed from the HIC and sent
by a resin pump to the high activity resin holdup

10-8
Chapter 10 Radioactive Waste Systems

HCW R/O System


NOTE: Cross-tie lines not shown

Low Activity Filter


Sludge Slurry
Mobile Equipment

Concentrated Concentrates
Waste Treatment Feed Optional Thermal
Tank Drying System

HIC Decant or
Concentrated Thermal Drying
Waste Tanks Condensate to
HCW Collection
Concentrates Tank or Sump
Treatment Feed HIC Container Note: This process
Pump filled with Waste uses a standard HIC
with standard
Condensate
dewatering internals.
Resin from the No special equipment
CD Resin Holdup is required
Tank

Figure 10-6. Mobile Wet Solid Waste Subsystem Schematic

tank or a low activity phase separator that is in the and maintenance. The filled containers are sealed
receiving mode by a resin pump. Sufficient water and moved to controlled-access enclosed areas for
is removed to ensure there is very little or no free temporary storage (see Figure 10-7).
standing water left in the HIC. Drying of the HIC
contents may also be performed with heated air. Most dry waste is expected to be sufficiently
low in activity to permit temporary storage in un-
The fill head is then removed and placed in a shielded, cordoned-off areas. Dry active waste will
laydown area. The closure head is then placed on the be sorted and packaged in a suitably sized container
HIC. The HIC is vented just prior to being shipped that meets DOT requirements for shipment to either
offsite for disposal to ensure that pressure is not an offsite processor or for ultimate disposal. The dry
building up. Radiation shielding is provided around active waste is separated into three categories: non-
the HIC stations. contaminated wastes (clean), contaminated metal
wastes, and other wastes, i.e., clothing, plastics,
Dry Solid Waste Accumulation and Conditioning HEPA filters, components, etc.
Subsystem
Dry solid wastes consist of air filters, miscel- In some cases, large pieces of miscellaneous
laneous paper, rags, etc., from contaminated areas; waste are packed into larger boxes. Because of its
contaminated clothing, tools, and equipment parts low activity, this waste can be stored until enough
that cannot be effectively decontaminated; and is accumulated to permit economical transportation
solid laboratory wastes. The activity of much of this to an offsite burial ground for final disposal. The
waste is low enough to permit handling by contact. capability exists to bring a shipping container into
These wastes are collected in containers located in the truck bay during periods of peak waste genera-
appropriate areas throughout the plant, as dictated tion. Bagged dry active waste can be directly loaded
by the volume of wastes generated during operation into the shipping container for burial or processing in

10-9
Chapter 10 Radioactive Waste Systems

requirements.
offsite facilities. A truck scale is provided to ensure
optimum shipping/disposal weight of the shipping Container Storage Subsystem
container. Onsite storage space for 6-months volume of
packaged waste is provided. Packaged waste in-
Cartridge filters that are not placed in HICs are cludes HICs, shielded filter containers and 55-gallon
placed in suitability-sized containers meeting DOT (200-liter) drums as necessary.

Waste Sorting and Packaging

Dry Active Wastes

HEPA filters,
Paper, Rubber, Disposing
Filter Cartridge, Container
DSW etc.

Active Metal Wastes

Pipes, Valves, Disposing


Cans, etc. Container

Clean Wastes

Disposing
Container

Figure 10-7. Dry Solid Waste Subsystem Schematic

10-10
Chapter 11 Safety Evaluations

Chapter
Safety Evaluations 11
Overview
9.0
Dome Pressure
Steam Line Pressure
8.5 TCV Pressure
Vessel Bottom Pressure
SRV Opening Setpoint

Absolute Pressure (MPa)


8.0 High Pressure SCRAM Setpoint

The ESBWR represents a new approach to 7.5


Low Steam Line Pressure Setpoint

reactor safety. The use of natural circulation and


7.0
passive ECCS requires a reactor vessel with a rela-
tively large steam volume at power and a relatively
6.5

large water volume when shutdown. These features 6.0

permit a reactor design with a more gentle response 5.5

to design basis transients and accidents. The use of 5.0


0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
passive containment cooling together with passive Time (sec)

drywell flooding and a lower drywell core catcher


leads to a containment virtually certain to survive Figure 11-1. MSIV Closure Transient
severe accidents
the transient change in MCPR (MCPR) is no longer
limiting. Figure 11-1 shows the ESBWR pressure
response to an MSIV closure event.
Transient Performance All transients proceed at a slower pace than in
Transient performance, in the safety sense, previous BWRs. In fact, the most limiting transient
becomes translated into fuel performance and oper- for MCPR is a loss of feedwater heating event
ating margins. The primary BWR measures are mini- which (assuming no operator action) takes place
mum critical power ratio (MCPR), and maximum over several hundred seconds, and the use of Se-
linear heat generation rate (MLHGR). These design lect Control Rod Insert (SCRI) establishes a lower
parameters vary, depending on the specific fuel de- power operating point with CPR margin restored
sign being used (e.g., 9x9 or 10x10). However, the - see Figure 11-2.
ESBWR was designed to assure flexibility of use
160 15.5
of advancing fuel technologies while maintaining Total Power (%)
Sim. Thermal Power (%)
140 Core Flow (%) 15
significant operating margins to fuel limits (15% Feedwater Flow (%)
Steamflow (%)
Level (meters above TAF)

High neutron flux SCRAM Setpoint


120 14.5
or more up to 18 month cycles and 10% or more High Thermal Flux SCRAM Setpoint
NR Sensed Level above TAF
L8

100 14
for 24 month cycles).
% of Rated

80 13.5

60 13
Pressurization transients historically have 40 12.5
limited BWR transient performance. With the com- 20
L3
12
bination of a large steam volume in the RPV (for 0 11.5
transient pressure rise) and the use of isolation con- 0 50 100 150 200 250

densers (for longer term heat removal), the pressure Time (sec)

rise is less than SRV setpoints, so there is no relief


valve lift even for isolation transients. In addition, Figure 11-2. Loss of Feedwater Heating Transient

11-1
Chapter 11 Safety Evaluations

short term after a GDCS line break. This event has


One other characteristic of a large natural cir- the lowest short-term water level, but it is still well
culation reactor is a larger level swing upon scram above the top of active fuel. Longer term, the water
due to collapsing voids in the tall chimney. The level in the RPV depends on the break location, but
most limiting of these is the Loss of Feedwater it will be at least as high as the spillover vent in the
event, shown in Figure 11-3. Even though there is drywell (see Chapter 8).
approximately an 8 m level drop upon loss of feed-
water, the minimum level is still 5 m above the top The ability of the PCCS to remove decay heat
of active fuel (TAF). and maintain containment pressure well within
design limits is shown in Figure 11-5.
14

13

12 450
Water Level (meters above TAF)

Design DW and WW Pressure, 413.7 kPa (60 psia)


11 400

10 350
9
300

Pressure (kPa)
8 Drywell Pressure
250
Wetwell Pressure
7
NR Sensed Level above TAF RPV Pressure
200
6 WR Sensed Level above TAF Design Pressure
L1 Setpoint over TAF 150
5
L2 Setpoint over TAF
4 L3 Setpoint over TAF 100

3 50

2
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 66 72
Time (sec) Time (hr)

Figure 11-3. Loss of Feedwater Transient


Figure 11-5. Main Steam Line LOCA - Containment

Accident Performance Calculated doses for the Exclusion Area Bound-


ary (EAB) and Low Population Zone (LPZ) were
The ESBWR uses passive systems (GDCS, done using USNRC R.G. 1.183 with conservative
PCCS, IC) to mitigate loss-of-coolant accidents meteorology, to bound potential sites. For example,
(LOCA). More information about these systems the /Q used for EAB was 2 x 10 -3 s/m3 which
can be found in Chapters 3 and 4. Another design should allow even poor meteorological sites to estab-
feature is provided by the raised suppression pool in lish the EAB at 800 m. The calculated dose of ~ 15
the containment and sufficient in containment water Rem (TEDE) is well within the regulatory limits.
to assure long term core coverage. Finally, there
are no large pipes attached to the RPV below core
elevation. The combination of these features assures

Special Event
the ESBWR has no core uncovery even for the most
limiting design basis loss-of-coolant accident (DBA
LOCA). Figure 11-4 shows core water level in the
Performance
24
Static Head Inside Chimney
22 Chimney 2-Phase Level
Downcomer 2-Phase Level
Special events are those that are required by
20 Top of Active Fuel
regulation to be analyzed regardless of expected
frequency of occurrence. Two of the most challeng-
18
Water Level, m

16

14
Top of Chimney Partition
ing events are discussed here - Station Blackout
12 (SBO), and Anticipated Transients Without Scram
10 (ATWS).
8 Top of Active Fuel

6
Station Blackout events have historically been
the most demanding for BWRs to cope with, and
4
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000

Time (s)
have usually been the dominant sequence for Severe
Figure 11-4. GDCS Line LOCA - Water Levels Accidents. However, the ESBWR passive features

11-2
Chapter 11 Safety Evaluations

- IC, GDCS, PCCS - provide means for heat removal 10.5 360

and inventory control. Due to loss of drywell cooling 10.0


Dome Pressure
355

in an SBO, the combination of low water level in the


Pool Temperature 350
9.5

Dome Pressure (MPa)


RPV and high drywell pressure eventually leads to a
345

Temperature (K)
9.0
340
blowdown, followed by GDCS injection and PCCS 8.5
335

operation. The safe endpoint could be considered to 8.0


330

be the same as a no-break LOCA. Therefore the 7.5


325

ESBWR coping time of at least 72 hours (without 7.0 320

operator action) far exceeds the regulatory require- 6.5 315


0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750
ments. Time (sec)

With the adoption of FMCRDs and automa-


tion of actions needed to mitigate ATWS events, Figure 11-8. MSIV Closure ATWS - RPV Pressure, SP
Temperature
the probability of such events leading to significant
consequences has been greatly reduced for ES-

Severe Accident
BWR. Nonetheless, analyses have been performed
to demonstrate meeting ATWS acceptance criteria.
One of the most limiting of this class of transients
is the MSIV Closure ATWS because it challenges Performance
peak reactor power, minimum water level, RPV
pressure, and suppression pool temperature. The Although demonstration of performance for the
response of ESBWR to an MSIV Closure ATWS is traditional set of design basis transients and accidents
shown in Figures 11-6 to 11-8. The ESBWR safely is important, in recent years regulatory emphasis
mitigates this event. has shifted toward performance for beyond design
basis events, classified as severe accidents. The
250 1000
ESBWRs capability to prevent severe reactor acci-
Steam flow (%)
Neutron Flu x (% )
900 dents from occurring, and the capability to withstand
a severe accident in the extremely unlikely event
Feedwater Flo w (%)
200 Average Fuel T emperature 800

700
that one should occur, were evaluated with several
Temperature (K)

150 600
probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) during the
% Rated

500
Feedwater Runback
100 400 design and development process. These evaluations
SLC Initiation
300
influenced the design choices and certain design
features in the final product. The final evaluation
50 200

100

0 0 indicates that events resulting in damage to the


0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750
Time (sec) reactor core are extremely unlikely, but that if such
events were postulated to occur, passive accident
Figure 11-6. MSIV Closure ATWS - Power
mitigation features would limit the offsite dose such
that the effect on the public and surrounding land
16
would be insignificant.
14
Downcomer Level above TAF
Two Phase Level above TAF

In the ESBWR, GE has provided passive severe


Water Level (m above TAF)

12

10
accident mitigation features to protect the contain-
8
ment from overpressurization and to limit the con-
6 sequences to the public.
4

2 ESBWR Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)


0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750
PRA studies played a major role in improving
Time (sec)
the overall plant design. For example, early PRAs
were used in deciding to use diverse valves in the IC.
Figure 11-7. MSIV Closure ATWS - Water Level Insights gained from the PRAs were used to improve

11-3
Chapter 11 Safety Evaluations

plant technical specifications, emergency procedure Medium Liquid


IORV
0.4%
Loss of Condenser
guidelines, and the control room interface. The im- LOCA
0.9%
0.1%
Transient
portant insights from the PRA were also collected to 0.4%
Feedwater Line
Break
0.1%
provide input into the integrated reliability assurance Large Steam LOCA

program. These insights will be used throughout the 3.2% RWCU Line Break
0.1%

lifetime of the plant to ensure that plant operations


maintain a high level of safety.

A comparison of the internal events PRA for


the ESBWR to PRAs performed for other reactors
Loss of
clearly demonstrates the overall improvement in Loss of Feedwater
38.0% Offsite Power
56.8%
safety (Figure 11-9). The USNRC risk goal for the
frequency of core damage events in new reactors is
Figure 11-10. Core Damage Risk by Event
1 x 10 -4/ry, and the Utility requirement for ALWR
plants is 1 x 10 -5/ry. The core damage frequency
(CDF) for the ESBWR was found to be approxi- High Pressure Core
Damage
ATWS
1%
Containment Bypass
<< 1%
mately 3 x 10 -8/ry. This represents a factor of five Containment
Overpressure
1%

improvement compared to ABWR, and a factor of 8%

100 or more improvement compared to most operat-


ing light water reactors.

10-4
10-5 10-5

10-5
Core Damage Frequency

10-6
(per reactor year)

Low Pressure Core


10-6
Damage
2.4x10-7 90%
1.6x10-7

10-7 3.2x10-8

10-8
Figure 11-11. Core Damage Risk by Accident Class
ESBWR AP1000 ABWR ALWR BWR/6 BWR/4
Goal

core melt dominate core melt is the major reason


why the CCFP is so low.
Figure 11-9. Comparison of Internal Event PRAs

In addition to events at power, the risk of core


Even with such a low CDF, due to the passive damage during shutdown was also evaluated. This
PCCS for containment heat removal and BiMAC can occur primarily because of operator errors
core catcher (see Chapter 8), the Contingent Contain- or small line breaks which might drain the RPV
ment Failure Probability (CCFP) is 2.5%, meaning while the lower containment hatches are open. The
that the probability of a large release is exceedingly mitigating factor in these scenarios is the significant
low. The key reasons for this are explained below. amount of time available to correct the situation. The
quantitative evaluation of the risk while in shutdown
The contribution to core damage by event is mode is 4 x 10 -9/ry, a small fraction of the internal
shown in Figure 11-10. As can be seen, transients events risk.
(Loss of Feedwater, Loss of Offsite Power) domi-
nate the risk. Another perspective is given in Figure Probabilistic methods were also applied to
11-11, which shows the breakdown by Accident events initiated externally (e.g. tornado, flood, fire
Class. It can be seen that low pressure core melt and earthquake). The important design features to
sequences dominate. ensure plant safety for each of these events were
identified in a manner similar to that for the internal
The fact that transients that lead to low pressure events PRA.

11-4
Chapter 11 Safety Evaluations

Tornado risk: The CDF due to a tornado was screening analyses of fire risk. The results from these
found to be extremely low because all safety com- conservative screening analyses show that all the
ponents are located in the concrete Reactor Building screening cases analyzed have a CDF much lower
and the internal events PRA already evaluates the than the internal events CDF and therefore do not
ESBWR probabalistically for loss-of-offsite power require a further detailed fire analysis. The following
due to other causes. insights are provided on the fire mitigation capability
of the ESBWR:
Flood risk: The objective of the ESBWR in-
ternal probabilistic flood analysis is to identify and Safety system redundancy and physical sepa-
provide a quantitative assessment of the core dam- ration by fire barriers ensure that one fire lim-
age frequency due to internal flood events. Internal its damage to one safety system division. PIP
floods may be caused by large leaks due to rupture system commonality is limited and is only af-
or cracking of pipes, piping components, or water fected by a few fire areas.
containers such as storage tanks. Other possible
flooding causes are the operation of fire protection Fires in the control room have the capacity to
equipment and human errors during maintenance. affect the execution of human actions. One
feature relevant to the design is that a fire in
The results of the ESBWR bounding analysis the control room does not affect the automatic
show that the CDF for internal flooding is consid- actuations of the safety systems. The remote
erably less than the total plant CDF. The risk from shutdown panels allow the mitigation of any
internal flooding is acceptably low. The following accident condition as if the operator were in the
insights concerning the flooding mitigation capabil- main control room.
ity of the ESBWR are identified:
Seismic Risk: The risk of seismic events was
Safety system redundancy and physical sepa- evaluated using the seismic margins method. The
ration for flooding by large water sources along ESBWR was designed for a Safe Shutdown Earth-
with alternate safe shutdown features in build- quake (SSE) of at least 0.3g. In the margins method,
ings separated from flooding of safety systems the margins implicit in the system designs are evalu-
give the ESBWR significant flooding mitiga- ated to determine a somewhat conservative estimate
tion capability. of the actual capacity of each system. Then, using
fault trees and event trees similar to those developed
A small number of location-specific design for the internal events analysis, the system capacities
features must be relied on to mitigate all poten- are combined to determine the overall plant capacity.
tial flood sources. The flood specific features The ESBWR was shown to have a factor of margin
are: watertight doors on the Control and Reac- to 0.3g SSE of more than two. This ensures that there
tor Buildings, floor drains in the Reactor and is very little possibility of a core damage event as a
Control Buildings, Circulating Water System result of an earthquake.
(CIRC) pump trip and valve closure on high
water level in the condenser pit.

While timely operator action can limit poten- ESBWR Features to


Mitigate Severe Accidents
tial flood damage, all postulated floods can be
adequately mitigated (from a risk perspective)
without operator action.
In the event of a core damage accident, the ES-
Fire risk: The evaluation of fires was based on BWR containment has been designed with specific
the Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation method- mitigating capabilities. These capabilities not only
ology developed by the Electric Power Research mitigate the consequences of a severe accident but
Institute (EPRI). This conservative methodology also address uncertainties in severe accident phe-
provides procedures for performing quantitative nomena. The capabilities are listed below.

11-5
Chapter 11 Safety Evaluations

Isolation Condenser System (ICS): Although vessel implementation, this boundary is provided
the primary purpose of the IC is to prevent lifts of by a series of side-by-side inclined pipes, forming a
SRVs during reactor isolation transients (see Chapter jacket which can be effectively and passively cooled
3), the IC pool has been sized to provide capability by natural circulation when subjected to thermal
for approximately 72 hours. This will provide a heat loading on any portion(s) of it. Water is supplied to
sink outside of containment during SBO events. this device from the GDCS pools via a set of squib-
valve-activated deluge lines. The timing and flows
Passive Containment Cooling System are such that (a) cooling becomes available immedi-
(PCCS): The PCCS heat exchangers are located ately upon actuation, and (b) the chance of flooding
directly above the containment in water pools and the LDW prematurely, to the extent that this opens up
form part of the containment boundary. There are no a vulnerability to steam explosions, is very remote.
valves in the system and they act totally passively The jacket is buried inside the concrete basemat and
to remove heat added to the containment after any would be called into action only in the event that
accident. some or all of the core debris on top is non-coolable.
More details can be found in Chapter 8.
AC-Independent Water Addition: The Fire
Protection System (FPS) and Fuel and Auxiliary Analyses have shown that the containment will
Pools Cooling System (FAPCS) not only play an not fail by Basemat melt-through or by overpres-
important role in preventing core damage through surization as long as the BiMAC functions.
common lines but they are the backup source of
water for flooding the lower drywell should the core Manual Containment Overpressure Protec-
become damaged and relocate into the containment tion: If an accident occurs that increases contain-
(primary source is the deluge subsystem pipes of ment pressure to a point where containment integrity
Gravity Driven Cooling System). The primary point is threatened, this pressure will be relieved through
of injection for these systems is the LPCI injection, a line connected to the wetwell atmosphere by
through the feedwater pipeline, to the reactor pres- opening the wetwell atmosphere to the plant stack
sure vessel. Flow can also be delivered through the via a remote manual valve. Providing a relief path
drywell spray header to the drywell. The drywell from the wetwell airspace precludes an uncontrolled
spray mode of this system not only provides for de- containment failure. Directing the flow to the stack
bris cooling, but it is capable of directly cooling the provides a monitored, elevated release. Reliev-
upper drywell atmosphere and scrubbing airborne ing pressure from the wetwell, as opposed to the
fission products. drywell, takes advantage of the decontamination
factor provided by the suppression pool. This func-
Three fire protection system pumps are provided tion of the Containment Inerting System is called
on the ESBWR: two pumps are powered by AC the Manual Containment Overpressure Protection
power, the other is driven directly by a diesel engine. System (MCOPS); see Chapter 5.
A fire truck can provide a backup water source.

Inerted Containment: The ESBWR con-

Protection of the Public


tainment is normally inerted with nitrogen
containing < 3% oxygen (see discussion of the Con-
tainment Inerting System in Chapter 5). Therefore,
any potential for hydrogen burning or detonation The low core damage frequency combined with
after a severe accident is avoided. low failure probability of the containment leads to
very low offsite doses, even after severe accidents.
Basemat Internal Melt Arrest and Coolabil- Figure 11-12 shows the offsite dose at 800 m (0.5
ity Device: The ESBWR design uses a passively- mile) as a function of probability for a nominal U.S.
cooled boundary that is impenetrable by the core site. It can be seen that large releases do not occur
debris in whatever configuration it could possibly even at a one-in-a-billion probability per year.
exist on the lower drywell (LDW) floor. For ex-

11-6
Chapter 11 Safety Evaluations

10 -6
Probability of Exceedence

10 -7

10 -8

10 -9
0.01 0.1 1 10
Population Dose, Sv

Figure 11-12. ESBWR TEDE Dose at 800m

11-7
Appendix A Key Design Characteristics

Appendix
Key Design Characteristics A
This appendix lists key design characteristics for the ESBWR, using the standard design licensed in
the U.S. as a reference. Further details can be obtained from the ESBWR Standard Safety Analysis
Report, Chapter 1 (26A6642AD).

Overall Design
Site Envelope
Safe shutdown earthquake, g 0.3 envelope
Wind design, km/h 242
Maximum tornado, km/h 531
Max dry bulb/wet bulb ambient temperature, C 46/27
Thermal and Hydraulic
Rated Power, MWt 4500
Generator Output, MWe 1600
Steam flow rate, Mkg/h 8.76
Core coolant flow rate, Mkg/h 36.0
System operating pressure, MPa 7.17
Average core power density, kW/l 54.3
Maximum linear heat generation rate, kW/m 44.0
Average linear heat generation rate, kW/m 15.1
Minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) 1.4 - 1.5*
Core average exit quality, % 17.0
Feedwater temperature, C 215.6

* Depending on the cycle length

A-1
Appendix A Key Design Characteristics

Core Design
Fuel Assembly
Number of fuel assemblies 1132
Fuel rod array 10 x 10
Overall length, cm 379
Weight of UO2 per assembly, kg 144
Number of fuel rods per assembly 92
Rod diameter, cm 1.026
Cladding material Zircaloy-2
Fuel Channel
Thickness corner/wall, mm 3.05/1.91
Dimensions, cm 14 X 14
Material Zircaloy-2
Reactor Control System
Moveable control
Method of variation of reactor power
rods
Number of control rods 269
Shape of control rods Cruciform
Pitch of control rods, cm 31
Bottom entry elec-
Type of control rod drive tric hydraulic fine
motion
Rod step size, mm 36.5
Number of hydraulic accumulators 135
Hydraulic scram speed, sec to 60% insert 1.15
Electric drive speed, mm/sec 30
Burnable poison;
Type of temporary reactivity control gadolinia urania
fuel rods
High pressure coolant injection 1/2 pumps, m 3/h 118/235
Incore Neutron Instrumentation
Total number of LPRM detectors 256
Number of incore LPRM penetrations 76
Number of LPRM detectors per penetration 4
Number of SRNM penetrations 12

A-2
Appendix A Key Design Characteristics

Reactor Vessel and Internals


Reactor Vessel
Low-alloy steel/
Material stainless and Ni-
Cr-Fe alloy clad
Design pressure, MPag 8.62
Inside diameter, m 7.1
Inside height, m 27.6
Steam Separators and Dryers
Separator type AS-2B
Number of separators 379
Dryer type Chevron
Main Steam
Number of steam lines 4
Diameter of steam lines, cm 70
Number of safety/relief valves 18
Number of depressurization valves 8
Isolation Condenser
Number of loops 4
Capacity of each loop, MWt 34
Number of safety/relief valves 18

A-3
Appendix A Key Design Characteristics

Emergency Core Cooling


Gravity Driven Core Cooling
Number of loops 4
Number of pumps 0
Flow rate, m 3/h 500*
Automatic Depressurization
Number of relief valves 10
Number of depressurization valves 8
Passive Containment Cooling System
Number of loops 6
Heat removal duty per loop, MWt 11
Standby Liquid Control
Number of accumulators 2
B10 enrichment, % 94
Capacity per accumulator, m 3 7.8
Initial flow rate per accumulator, m 3/h 66

* At runout

A-4
Appendix A Key Design Characteristics

Containment
Primary
Pressure suppres-
Type
sion
Reinforced con-
Construction crete with steel
liner
Drywell Concrete cylinder
Wetwell Concrete cylinder
Design pressure, MPa 0.31
Design leak rate, % free volume/day 0.5*
Drywell free volume, m 3 7206
Wetwell free volume, m 3 5432
Suppression pool water volume, m 3 4424
Number of vertical vents 12
Vertical vent diameter, m 1.2
Number of horizontal vents/vertical vent 3
Horizontal vent diameter, m 0.7
Reactor Building
Type Low leakage
Reinforced con-
Construction
crete/steel
Design in leakage rate at 6.4 mm water, %/day 100
* Excluding MSIV leakage

A-5
Appendix A Key Design Characteristics

Auxiliary Systems
Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling
Number of trains 2
Number of pumps per train high/low capacity 1/1
Type Canned rotor
Flow rate per train (cleanup mode), m 3/h/ % of feedwater 116/1
No. of regenerative heat exchangers per train 2
No. of non-regenerative heat exchangers per train 3