PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.
HEALTH petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent evidence just exactly how such
SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III
FACTS: On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President
Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World
Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to
the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. the
Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and
child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are
informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on
July 7, 2006. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of The Milk Code, assailing that the RIRR was
going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of
said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of
the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR
RULING: The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being
ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said
provisions. The international instruments pointed out by the respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW,
are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the
RIRR. Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. Custom or
customary international law means a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. Generally accepted principles of
international law refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding
on all states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit
advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the Milk Code
expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if
such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In this
regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-
binding. This may constitute soft law or non-binding norms, principles and practices that
influence state behavior. Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced
by at least a majority of the member states and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA
Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by
executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature. On the other hand, the
protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory provisions
under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no
harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in
consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code.
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-
crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP
Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law
or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing
with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial
law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of
the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant
the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it
is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which
involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and
thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine
the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that
the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge
such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no
justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of ISSUES: (1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings,
law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in
of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority (2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.
belonging to the PNP
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a
Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it Is state
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was
will adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to mee
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not
t the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the
destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean
up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-
PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN AND ZOSA up operations and expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons
and/ or entities responsible for such pollution.
FACTS: In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60
of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to HELD: (1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
do so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law. operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional. as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best
usage. Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such
an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the
duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist line between a specific and a general pollution incident.
therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service,
does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance (2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
therewith. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service. enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may
be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuin
g mandamus , the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the
MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law) end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay or indifference.
GR No. 171947-48 December 18, 2008
NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the
rules of procedure for environmental cases.
FACTS: The complaint by the
residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way 20 days Temporary restraining order
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152
or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly
and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water
quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
BASCO VS. PAGCOR
197 SCRA 52 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection Clause establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The
Municipal Corporation Local Autonomy Imperium in Imperio
FACTS: In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was
created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power to
establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCORs operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399 was
passed which expanded PAGCORs power. In 1983, PAGCORs charter was updated through PD
1869. PAGCORs charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to
centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or
permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal protection
clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes
PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like Manila to
waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that Section 13 par.
(2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind
or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether
National or Local is violative of the local autonomy principle.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
HELD:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal
protection is not clearly explained in Bascos petition. The mere fact that some gambling
activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes,
lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while
others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
Bascos posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the laws.
The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does
not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1
of the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not prohibit the Legislature from
Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in
law as though they were the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing
powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and
limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed
that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create
and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore,
has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila
the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the
power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter,
PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its
operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local
governments.
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON.CALIXTO
CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONYCALVENTO,
respondents. G.R. No. 129093
FACTS: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked
Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayors permit to open the lotto
outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for
said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna
entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this
resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent
Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs:
(1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain
from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon.
Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet;
and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10,
1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the
petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid
HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local governments objection to the lotto, such
resolution is valid. This is part of the local governments autonomy to air its views which may be
contrary to that of the national governments. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views
does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly
enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and
should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our
system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances
and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs.
Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons
for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the
COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section
26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to
those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties.
The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the
presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the
office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous
national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international
campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege
to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which
suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to
any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that
would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as
written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is
difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means
and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed
under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their
inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people
an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be
sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations
apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are
meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of
candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and
orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for
logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation
for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous
enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies
which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged
by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The
basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the
reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of
further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a
nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is
thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under
the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born
citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years
of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.