IMP 006 Schierbaum - Okham's Assumption of Mental Speech - Thinking in A World of Particulars 2014 PDF

Ockhams Assumption of Mental Speech
Investigating Medieval Philosophy
Managing Editor
John Marenbon
Editorial Board
Margaret Cameron
Simo Knuuttila
Martin Lenz
Christopher J. Martin
VOLUME 6
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Ockhams Assumption of Mental
Speech
Thinking in a World of Particulars
By
Sonja Schierbaum
LEIDEN | BOSTON
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Schierbaum, Sonja.
Ockhams assumption of mental speech : thinking in a world of particulars / by Sonja Schierbaum.
pages cm. -- (Investigating medieval philosophy, ISSN 1879-9787 ; VOLUME 6)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-27734-2 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-27762-5 (e-book) 1. William, of Ockham,
approximately 1285-approximately 1349. 2. Philosophy of mind. 3. Language and languages--Philosophy.
4. Semantics. 5. Thought and thinking. I. Title.
B765.O34S35 2014
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Contents
Acknowledgementsvii
Abbreviationsviii
Introduction1
1 The Basic Characteristics of Language: Signification

and Supposition12
1.1 Introduction12
1.2 Signification and Supposition of Terms: First Approximation14
1.3 Absolute vs. Connotative Terms21
1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of Signify (significare)24
1.5 The Property of Supposition37
1.5.1 The Standard Case: (Personal) Supposition and the Truth
and Falsity of Affirmative Propositions47
1.5.2 Personal Supposition of Terms and Taking a Term Significatively
(sumi significative)55
1.5.3 Improper Use and Improper Supposition64
1.5.4 Simple and Material Supposition70
1.6 Summary78
2 Ockhams Semantic Model: Subordination, Correspondence,

and the Role of Mental Speech with Respect to Spoken Language80
2.1 Introduction80
2.2 Signification in Relation to Subordination and Imposition82
2.3 Conventional Signification and Equivocation93
2.4 Mental Propositions and Spoken Propositions: The Relation
of Correspondence102
2.4.1 The General Explanation of Truth and Falsity111
2.4.2 Correspondence: Synonymy Again123
2.4.3 Correspondence: Equivocation Again129
2.5 Demonstratives, Correspondence, and Supposition of Mental
Terms134
2.6 Summary143
3 Ockhams Model of Thought146

3.1 Introduction 146
3.2 How to Acquire an Absolute Simple Concept152
vi contents
3.2.1 The Three Steps of Concept Acquisition155

3.2.2 Some Objections171
3.3 Ockhams Model of Non-Propositional and Propositional Acts174
3.3.1 Propositional Acts of Apprehension: Mental Propositions178
3.3.2 Propositional Acts of Apprehension: Spoken Propositions185
3.3.3 Acts of Judgement190
3.3.3.1 The First Kind of Assent194
3.3.3.2 The Second Kind of Assent199
3.4 Intuitive Cognition and Evident Judgement203
3.4.1 General Propositions and Evident Judgement: propositiones
per se notae215
3.5 Summary228
4 Why Ockham Is Not Fodor231

4.1 Behaviourism vs. Cognitive Science233
4.2 Fodor on Language Acquisition236
4.3 Fodors Language of Thought (lot)240
4.4 Fodor on Mental States and Acts242
4.5 Why Ockham Is Not Fodor (Summary)249
5 Conclusion251
Bibliography257
Index of Names264
Index of Subjects266
Acknowledgements
The present work is a revised version of my doctoral thesis, which I defended

in June, 2012 at the University of Hamburg, Germany. My doctoral research was
conducted under the supervision of Wolfgang Knne and Dominik Perler. I am
deeply indebted to both. As a student, I learned from Wolfgang Knne how to
use the tools of analytical philosophy fruitfully. I benefited enormously from
his incisive criticism. Dominik Perler made me aware of the richness of medi-
eval philosophy. He always gave me the greatest possible encouragement and
support. I am also indebted to many colleagues for much feedback and stimu-
lating conversations about Ockhams philosophy, especially to Martin Klein,
Martin Lenz, Calvin Normore, Claude Panaccio, and Mikko Yrjnsuuri. Special
thanks go to Christian Nimtz for taking the trouble to go through drafts of this
work. His detailed comments helped to give it its final shape. Any remaining
errors in form and content are entirely my own.
Abbreviations
Brev. Summa Physic. Brevis Summa Libri Physicorum

Exp. Aur. Expositio aurea et admodum utilis super artem veterem edita
per venerabilem inceptorem fratrem Guilielmum de Occham
cum questionibus Alberti parvi de Saxonia
Exp. in Libr. Art. Logicae Expositionis in Libros Artis Logicae Prooemium
Exp. in Perih. Expositio in Librum Perihermenias Aristotelis
Exp. Porph. Expositio in Librum Porphyrii de Praedicabilibus
Exp. in Praedicament. Expositio in Librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis
op Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Philosophica
Ord. Ordinatio. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum
ot Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Theologica
Rep. Reportatio. Quaestiones in Libros II, III, IV Sententiarum
sl Summa Logicae
Summ. Phil. Nat. Summula Philosophiae Naturalis
Quaest. in Phys. Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis
Quaest. Var. Quaestiones Variae
Quodl. Quodlibeta Septem
Introduction
At least four assumptions appear to be part of the common ground of inter

pretation among scholars of Ockham. The first can be described as a kind of
general methodological presupposition, in that it has become standard to
explore the Franciscan as a potential contributor to current philosophical
debates, such as the issue of externalism in the philosophy of language and in
the philosophy of mind.1 The view that medieval philosophers or at least,
Ockham are of interest only to historians and theologians does not enjoy
great popularity, especially not among philosophers working in the tradition
of analytic philosophy.2
Second, Ockham is usually labelled a nominalist. While nominalism is not a
single unified position,3 Ockham can be called a nominalist insofar as he sub
scribes to the view that there are only particular things in this world: he admits
only of two kinds of things in his ontology, namely particular substances
(Socrates, this apple) and particularized qualities (the wisdom of Socrates, the
redness of this apple).4 It would perhaps be more fitting to call Ockhams posi
tion particularistic. He thereby takes a conceptual stance on the problem of
universals.5 According to Ockham, universals are nothing but concepts exist
ing in the intellect. There is nothing universal out there in the world. That a
concept such as whale or wisdom is universal means that whale is semantically
1 See for instance Peter King, Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages, in H. Lagerlund
(ed.), Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy, Hampshire, 2007; Calvin
Normore, Burge, Descartes and Us, in M. Hahn; B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies:
Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, Massachussetts, 2003; Claude Panaccio, Ockhams
Externalism, in G. Klima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval
Philosophy, New York, (forthcoming).
2 See A. Freddoso and H. Schuurman (transl.; ed.), Ockhams Theory of Propositions Part II of
the Summa Logicae, Indiana, 1998, viii.
3 See Paul Vincent Spade and Claude Panaccio, William of Ockham, in E.N. Zalta (ed.),
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), url: http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2011/entries/ockham, Section4. Metaphysics. Last access March 7th 2014.
4 On Ockhams nominalism and the attempt to connect his nominalism with contemporary
forms of nominalism, see Claude Panaccio, Nominalisme occamiste et nominalisme con
temporain, Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review 26 (1987), 281287; id., Les mots, les con-
cepts et les choses. La smantique de Guillaume dOccam et le nominalisme daujourdhui, Paris,
1992; Cyrille Michon, Nominalisme La thorie de la signification dOccam, Paris, 1994.
5 For the problem of universals see Wolfgang Knne, Abstrakte Gegenstnde, Frankfurt/M.,
1983, [2] 2007. And for its specific form in the Middle Ages see Martin M. Tweedale, Abelard
on Universals, Amsterdam, 1976.
koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014|doi 10.1163/9789004277625_002

2 Introduction
related to every particular whale.6 Ockham calls this a relation of signification.

By approaching the problem of universals in this way, Ockham ontologically
reduces universals to mind-dependent general concepts signifying concrete
particular things.7 Concepts in turn belong to the category of qualities or acci
dents: they are qualities or accidents of the intellect. Note, however, that con
cepts are immaterial. Although Ockham admits only of particular substances
and particularized qualities, there are material substances (Socrates) and
immaterial substances (angels) as well as material qualities (the whiteness of
Socrates beard) and immaterial qualities (Socrates thoughts). Ockham does
not use his eponymous razor to eliminate the mental from his ontology: he is a
dualist.
Third, there is no doubt that the assumption of mental speech (oratio men-
talis, ams for short) takes a prominent place in Ockhams philosophy of lan
guage and epistemology. The literature on different aspects of ams is vast;
semantic and syntactic aspects such as the theories of signification and of sup
position have received extensive scholarly attention, as has the question of
their relation to Ockhams nominalist ontology.8 The standard take on ams
sees it as the idea that thought is prior to every natural language, but is itself a
kind of language. According to this view, the semantics and syntax of language
can be explained in terms of the semantics and syntax of thought. As Calvin
Normore has pointed out in a recent paper, the assumption that thought is a
kind of language, prior to any natural language, was commonly embraced
throughout the 14th and 15th century by authors such as Ockham and Buridan.
It has its roots in Boethius, Augustine, and Aristotle.9 Rather than arguing for
the assumption of mental speech as a valid idea, Ockham, and others in the
fourteenth century, merely applied and developed it.
6 To make the point differently, Ockham takes terms such as whale as concrete, general terms,
but not as singular, abstract terms. See Knne, Abstrakte Gegenstnde, 37. According to the
medieval theory of supposition, whale in (1) whale is a species is used differently as in (2)
Moby Dick is a whale: in (1) whale is used for the species whale, whereas in (2) whale is used
for the things it signifies. As will become clear later, in Ockhams view, species are nothing but
concepts.
7 That is, there is no other kind of relation involved here, such as the so-called one-over-many
relation between a Platonic Form and its instantiations.
8 See for instance the Annotated Bibliography of Medieval theories of mental language www
.ontologymirror.com/biblio/supposition-biblio-one.htmandwww.ontologymirror.com/
biblio/supposition-biblio-two.htm by Raul Corazzon.
9 See Martin Lenz, Mentale Stze, Wilhelm von Ockhams Thesen zur Sprachlichkeit des Denkens,
Stuttgart, 2003 for an account of the historical development of the mental-speech
assumption.
Introduction 3
ams is also part of the theological background of the time, harking back to
authorities such as Petrus Lombardus and Dionysius.10 Ockham argues that
mental speech is a means of communication for immaterial beings such as
angels. Angels can communicate by apprehending or reading one anothers
actual thoughts, just as human beings can communicate by producing and
hearing utterances. Note that in Ockhams nominalist view, there are only
occurrences of written, spoken, or mental propositions, where written propo
sitions are inscriptions, spoken propositions are utterances, and mental propo
sitions are acts of propositional thinking.11 Taken by themselves, the medieval
tenets regarding celestial inhabitants seem of little, if any, philosophical inter
est to the contemporary reader;12 however, if mental speech should in fact be
conceived as a potential means of communication what if human beings
were able to read each other minds then this would have consequences
regarding the function of ams. What then, is the overall function of the
assumption of mental speech?
There are competing views in the literature of how to evaluate the purpose
and function of ams. According to a prominent interpretation which was first
suggested by John Trentman in the 1970s, Ockham attempts to develop a kind
of ideal language in the Fregean sense.13 This interpretation was seriously chal
lenged by Panaccio and others who have argued that in fact Ockham admits, at
least to some extent, the possibility of equivocation and synonymy in the lan
guage used in mental speech.14 The current tendency in the literature is not to
10 See Quodl. I, q.6 (ot IX, 36). For the abbreviations of Ockhams works see Abbreviations.
11 In this work, I will speak of written, spoken, or mental propositions, where I use proposi
tion to render Ockhams Latin propositio. Thus I do not mean to speak about proposi
tions in the modern sense, where a proposition is conceived as an abstract entity which
can somehow become the content of an act of thought by being grasped and which can
be expressed by (a token of) a sentence. See Wolfgang Knne, Conceptions of Truth,
Oxford, 2003, 251252.
12 Note that the alleged cases of mind-reading allow for the possibility of arriving at coun
terfactuals. These counterfactuals play an important role, for instance, in the current
debate regarding the issue of externalism and internalism with respect to mental content.
See Susan Brower-Toland, Intuition, Externalism, and direct Reference in Ockham,
History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (2007), 317336; and Panaccios recent reply Intuition
and Causality: Ockhams Externalism Revisited, Quaestio 10: 2010 (Later Medieval
Perspectives on Intentionality), 241254. For a more general account of the role of angels in
medieval theological and philosophical debates see I. Iribarren, M. Lenz (eds.), Angels in
Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance, Aldershot, 2008.
13 John Trentman, Ockham on Mental, Mind 79 (1970), 586590 (589).
14 David Chalmers, Is There Synonymy in Ockhams Mental Language? in P.V. Spade (ed.),
The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, New York, 1999, 7699; Claude Panaccio,
4 Introduction
view this language as a kind of ideal language.15 Panaccios alternative inter

pretation takes the assumption of mental speech as providing a theory of dis
cursive thought.16
This is where the present work fits in. I claim that it is correct to view ams
as an attempt by Ockham to explain what thinking and saying that p amounts
to in a world inhabited by particular things. I claim that the first and immedi
ate purpose of the mental-speech assumption is to provide an account of the
content of thought. Note that this interpretation complies with Ockhams
tenet that mental speech is also a potential means of communication.
I emphasize this point since the fourth assumption I want to distinguish is
that it seems accepted among scholars to view Ockhams assumption of men
tal speech as an ancestor of the Language of Thought Hypothesis (loth),
most ardently defended since the 1970s by the American philosopher Jerry
Fodor.17 Another scholar, Calvin Normore, has argued that the assumption of
mental speech disappeared at the beginning of the 16th century, and was
only to reappear in the guise of the loth in the second half of the twentieth
century.18 However, one has to be very clear about the exact limits of this
similarity. It is not unusual to view the mental-speech assumption as a direct
ancestor of loth, where the similarity is, rather tacitly, taken to bear on the
asymmetrical dependence of language on thought: both Fodors loth and
Ockhams mental-speech assumption are usually taken to imply that thought
is semantically and syntactically prior to natural languages such as English
or Latin.
A terminological remark is called for here: it is common to distinguish
between non-episodic and episodic thinking in terms of states or (propositional)
Connotative Terms in Ockhams Mental Language, Cahiers dpistmologie, no. 9016, 1990,
Montral; id., Ockham on Concepts, Ashgate, 2004; Martin M. Tweedale, Ockhams
Supposed Elimination of Connotative Terms and His Ontological Parsimony, Dialogue,
31 (1992), 431444.
15 Spade and Panaccio, William of Ockham, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), url: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/
ockham/>, Section3.3 Mental Language, Connotation and Definitions.
16 It is one of Ockhams major innovations to have systematically transposed the terminist
logic [] into a theory of discursive thought. Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 8.
17 See Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought, Cambridge, Mass., 1975.
18 See Calvin Normore, The End of Mental Language, in J. Biard (ed.), Le langage mental du
moyen ge lge classique, Louvain-La-Neuve, 2009, 293306. It should be clear from the
beginning that, although historical questions are of course of considerable interest in
their own right, I am not interested in the historical reasons for the appearance and disap
pearance of the assumption of mental speech.
Introduction 5
attitudes on the one hand and acts on the other hand.19 According to this dis
tinction, a thought-ascription is an ascription sometimes of acts and sometimes
of states. One might exemplify the former in the following way: examining the
roof of his house, Peter comes to the conclusion that the roof needs to be fixed
and tells Anne: I think the roof needs to be fixed. And, in a later instance, Anne
correctly ascribes a state to Peter when she tells her friend: Peter thinks that the
roof needs to be fixed while Peter is temporarily unconscious having fallen off
the roof.
Ockham marks a similar distinction. In an Aristotelian stance, he distin
guishes between acts (actus) and habits (habitus). Habits are nothing but dis
positions. Accordingly, a mental act is a cognitive episode leading to the
acquisition of a disposition to elicit similar acts.20 That is, the act of judging
that p leads to the acquisition of the disposition to judge that p. This disposi
tion to judge that p can also be called the belief that p.21 In Ockhams termino
logy, we can correctly ascribe the mental act of judging that the roof needs to
be fixed to Peter in the first case while we can ascribe the habit or belief that
the roof needs to be fixed to him in the second case, since Peter does not lose
the disposition to judge that the roof needs to be fixed while he is unconscious
for a short period of time. As Panaccio points out, mental acts in Ockhams
sense roughly correspond to what contemporary philosophers of mind call
mental episodes.22 However, sometimes acts of thinking are also referred to
as (actual) states in the literature. In this case, the episode in question is taken
to be of some temporal duration.23 For instance, Ockham conceives of a kind of
intellectual cognition that is modelled on sense-perception, namely intuitive
cognition (cognitio intuitiva).24 Since a subject can intellectually intuit a thing
for the length of time it is present to him, it is correct to describe intuitions as
being extended in time. Note that the Latin expression actus indicates the
19 See Wolfgang Knne, Some Varieties of Thinking. Reflections on Meinong and Fodor, in
R. Haller (ed.), Meinong und die Gegenstandstheorie, Grazer Philosophische Studien 50,
1995, 365395 (365367).
20 See for instance Ord. I, prol., q.1, (ot I, 17).
21 Knne asks [s]hould we join those many philosophers who say: x believes that p if and
only if x is ready to judge that p whenever x considers the question whether p? Knne,
Some Varieties of Thinking, 367. He provides an example that shows that there might be
some difficulties with the if-part of the bi-conditional.
22 Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 21.
23 See Brower-Toland, Intuition, Externalism, and direct Reference in Ockham, 317.
24 I discuss intuitive cognition in some detail in chapter three. See 3.2.1 The Three Steps of
Concept Acquisition and 3.4 Intuitive Cognition and Evident Judgement.
6 Introduction
actualization of the intellectual or volitional powers of the rational soul; it

does not indicate by itself whether what is actualized is extended in time or
merely occurs at some point of time. Ockhams use of actus can be traced
back to the Aristotelian idea of actuality as opposed to mere potentiality.25 In
this work, I shall focus on Ockhams conception of episodic thinking, that is, on
his conception of mental acts, not of habits.
In claiming that Ockhams mental-speech assumption can plausibly be said
to provide a theory of the content of thought I do not deny that Ockham is
committed to the view that thought is semantically and syntactically prior to
natural languages such as English. On the contrary, it will become clear that by
conceiving of language as being asymmetrically dependent on thought,
Ockham can account for the meaning of linguistic expressions in terms of the
semantic properties of mental items.
I argue that in postulating mental speech Ockham can be understood to
account for both the possibility of propositional thought and the possibility of
meaningful utterance in a way that respects the ontological constraints of his
nominalist view. In order to show this, it is necessary to establish that Ockham
does not merely describe thought as analogous to overt speech, but in fact
holds that at least some propositional acts of thought are syntactically struc
tured. As I indicated above, Ockham speaks about mental propositions as
propositional acts, at least according to his later theory of concepts.26
According to this so-called actus-theory, tokens of concepts are conceived as
non-propositional mental acts which can be syntactically put together. For
instance, if Peter thinks that the roof needs to be fixed, then this propositional
act of thought presupposes not only the tokening of the concepts the roof,
needs, etc., but also the composition of them in a syntactically appropriate way.
For instance, if Peter, regaining consciousness after his fall, murmured some
thing like fixed to be roof needs, then one would be reluctant to ascribe Peter
the act of thinking that the roof needs to be fixed in Ockhams sense. It appears
that propositional acts of apprehending p and acts which Ockham calls men
tal propositions are extensionally the same.
25 [] sometimes it [actus] is taken as being distinct from that which is potentially, that is,
from that which is not in reality, but can be. ([] aliquando accipitur prout distinguitur
contra esse in potentia, hoc est contra illud quod non est in rerum natura, sed esse
potest.) Summ. Phil. Nat., I, 10 (op VI, 182).
26 According to the later actus-theory, tokens of concepts are simply identified with mental
acts. See Marylin McCord Adams, William Ockham, Notre Dame, Indiana, (2 vols.), 1987,
84105. In this section and throughout, I will mainly refer to the actus-theory of concepts,
unless indicated otherwise.
Introduction 7
Some further terminological remarks with respect to the notions of the con-
tent and the object of an act are in order here: in Ockhams conception, the
immediate object of an act of judging is a mental act of apprehension, namely
the so-called mental proposition. However, the content of the judgement
what is judged is identical to the content of the mental proposition which is
the object of the act of judging. For instance, when Peter judges that the roof
needs to be fixed, then the object of this act is the presupposed mental proposi
tion. And the content of this judgement that the roof needs to be fixed is the
same as the content of the mental proposition which is the object of Peters
act of judging.
It seems to me that scholars especially those committed to the similarity-
claim concerning ams and loth sometimes simply assume that mental
speech literally involves the use of some kind of language having both a seman
tics and a syntax, without asking whether it could be the case that Ockham
would describe thought as merely analogous to overt speech. Some authors
have accused Ockham of carrying the analogy much too far: according to Peter
Geach, Ockham merely transferred grammatical features of Latin to the lan
guage involved in the use of mental speech and then accounted for the fea
tures of Latin in terms of the features of this mental language.27 In a similar
vein, other opponents of the similarity-claim hold that in fact Ockham does
not conceive of mental speech as involving the use of a complete language that
is prior to natural language; rather, this language derives both its semantics and
its syntax from the semantics and syntax of a natural language such as English.
For instance, Martin Lenz argues that Ockham can be taken to account for the
systematicity of thought in terms of the systematicity of language.28 As Lenz
says, according to Ockham, [a]ll we can do as it were from the outset is to
exercize mental acts.29 But in order to exercize mental acts in a systematic
way, a human subject has to learn a language such as English or Latin. That is,
a subject learns to think in a systematic way by learning a natural language.
27 Peter Geach writes: Without being able to say just how far the analogy of inner language
can be carried, I think men of good sense would see immediately that Ockham carries it
much too far. He merely transfers features of Latin grammar to Mental, and then regards
this as explaining why such features occur in Latin []. Peter Geach, Mental Acts,
London, 1957, 102.
28 Martin Lenz writes that in claiming the priority of conventional language over mental
language, Ockham established a novel explanation of the systematicity of thought an
explanation which anticipates the idea that thought becomes systematic through the
acquisition of conventional language. Martin Lenz, Why Is Thought Linguistic?
Ockhams Two Conceptions of the Intellect, Vivarium 46 (2008), 302317 (304).
29 Ibid., 309.
8 Introduction
It should be noted that Lenzs interpretation is based on Ockhams early

conception of mental language in the Liber Sententiarum. Although the pas
sages Lenz relies on might support this reading, I think one rather general
objection against this interpretation is that ams itself appears to become
redundant: if it is held that human subjects learn how to think in a systematic
way by learning how to use a natural language in a systematic way, then would
it not be more economical to claim straight away that thinking is done in or
using spoken natural language?30 If the systematicity of thought is explained
in terms of the systematicity of natural language, then what can be explained
by postulating ams?
In general, if the assumption of mental speech is taken as merely a meta
phorical description of thought, then the explanatory power of ams is some
what minimal. But if ams is taken as the assumption that mental speech does
indeed involve the use of a kind of language prior to natural language, then its
explanatory power is considerably higher. In this work I argue that in the
Summa Logicae Ockham uses the explanatory power of ams to account for the
meaning of spoken terms and spoken propositions in terms of the meaning of
mental terms and mental propositions. To this purpose, he confers the basic
properties usually assigned to linguistic expressions on to mental expressions.
These two interpretations are mutually exclusive: if Ockham is taken to hold
that mental language derives both its semantics and its syntax from the seman
tics and syntax of conventional language (Latin, English), then he cannot at
the same time plausibly account for the meaning of spoken propositions in
terms of the meaning of mental propositions. This illustrates a fundamental
problem of interpretation: there is no single work by Ockham titled Mental
speech (oratio mentalis); rather, the assumption of mental speech is presup
posed in various contexts, such as in his discussion of logic in the Summa
Logicae, or with respect to epistemological questions in the Quodlibeta, or in
his early commentary on Petrus Lombardus Liber Sententiarum. It seems that
the question of the function of ams depends on the context (for instance, logic
or epistemology) in which the answer is given. I think the best a scholar can do
when confronted with passages allowing for apparently incompatible inter
pretations is to lay open the textual basis on which he relies, since an interpre
tation can be adequate with respect to one passage, but inadequate with
respect to another. However, one should not attempt to force the various
30 The phrase is Normores. He writes: Many philosophers have favoured the idea that
thinking is done in or using spoken natural language. Normore, The End of Mental
Language, 293. Thus it seems that by the above interpretation Ockham would join those
philosophers who in fact favour this idea.
Introduction 9
aspects of mental speech into one unified, harmonious theory. Due to the fact
that we are dealing with a fourteenth-century writer, it should be accepted that
there simply is not one unified theory that Ockham develops in a deductive
manner, as could be expected of a philosopher such as Kant. Rather, there are
various works in which Ockham discusses problems of logic, epistemology,
and theology while presupposing ams in one form or another. In other words,
I think it is essential to respect the somewhat fragmentary character of
Ockhams account of ams. To be absolutely clear: the goal of interpretation is
to arrive at a more complete picture of mental speech, but nevertheless with
out violating its textual foundation. Within these parameters, considerations
concerning the explanatory power of an interpretation determine how an
interpretation is to be evaluated. This leads to a more general methodological
problem: how can one read old texts so as to render explicit their possibly valu
able contribution to contemporary debates while preserving their integrity?
This might sound trivial, but it is a fundamental problem of the interpretation
of historical texts, since the aim of the philosopher working in the field of his
tory of philosophy is not to do genealogical research it is idle to look for
ancestors of assumptions such as loth while cutting of the theoretical frame
works in question, since what is apparently the same assumption or theorem
can have a completely different role within a different theoretical framework.
In this book, I will attempt to meet the following challenge: how can Ockhams
mental-speech assumption be interpreted so as to contribute to the current
debate about the workings of the mind while respecting the theoretical frame
work in which it appears? First, this requires a careful reconstruction of some
basic tenets of ams.
With respect to the textual basis I rely with few exceptions on the critical
edition of Ockhams philosophical and theological writings completed at St.
Bonaventure University in the late 1980s. Regarding the methodological con
ventions of scholarship, my account of Ockhams position will be based on the
thorough interpretation of relevant passages which I translate and discuss. The
goal is a sound reconstruction of some basic tenets of ams which will enable a
more powerful explanatory interpretation of the mental-speech assumption.
On the basis of this reconstruction it shall be possible to (briefly) compare
the mental-speech assumption to Fodors loth with respect to its function. It
will turn out that the similarity of Fodors loth to Ockhams ams is of less
systematic interest than it might appear at first sight. Nevertheless, it is possi
ble to see the project of the naturalization of the mind in yet another light due
to the similarity of Fodors and Ockhams assumption: although the comput
er-metaphor of mind mental processes are nothing but the manipulation of
(physically implemented) mental symbols commits one to the assumption
10 Introduction
of a kind of Language of Thought, conceiving of the operation of thinking as

involving the use of a kind of language does not commit one to the computer-
metaphor of the mind. In other words, the claim that the content of thought is
syntactically structured does not imply a mechanized view on rational thought.
In general, it does not go so far as to commit one to the project of the natural
ization of the mind.
Perhaps what is most interesting, then, in discussing Ockhams mental-
speech assumption in detail is that it shows that it is part and parcel of a com
pletely different philosophical project: the project of accounting for thought
under the restrictions of a nominalist ontology which nevertheless admits of
two irreducibly different kinds of things, immaterial and material. My inten
tion is solely to render explicit this alternative interpretation, and to leave the
reader to judge its plausibility. Only in this way, I think, is it possible to criti
cally appreciate a medieval philosopher as great as William of Ockham.
The first chapter has the preparatory function of setting the stage for the
discussion of mental speech: according to the fourteenth centurys terminist
logic, signification and supposition are the fundamental properties of terms
and terms are the basic semantic units of which propositions are composed.
I explain in some detail the properties of signification and of supposition with
respect to spoken terms in order to prepare the treatment of the signification
and supposition of mental terms. Roughly, the signification of a term is its
applicability to things independently of any actual propositional context
within which the term might occur, whereas a terms actual supposition partly
depends on how a term is taken or used within a proposition. That is, a term
can supposit or stand for things in different ways within different kinds of
propositions. It is possible to give the truth conditions of propositions in terms
of the supposition of their terms. Thus Ockham is in a position to claim that it
is possible truly or falsely to utter that p because the truth conditions of p
can be given in terms of the supposition of the parts of p.
Following the explanations of signification and supposition of spoken
terms, I argue in the second chapter that Ockham takes mental expressions to
be constitutive of the signification and supposition of spoken expressions in a
way that commits him to the view that mental speech involves the use of a
kind of language with both a semantics and a syntax. As mentioned above, it is
commonly held in the literature that spoken language and mental speech dif
fer insofar as equivocation and synonymy are phenomena only of spoken
language.
Although Panaccio and others have convincingly argued that there are
cases of equivocation and synonymy in mental speech, it should be stressed
that mental expressions happen to be equivocal or synonymous only when
Introduction 11
occurring within propositional contexts; that is, a spoken expression such as

bank is equivocal, just as the two German expressions Geige and Violine are
synonymous, whereas mental terms are not equivocal or synonymous inde
pendently of the propositional context in which they occur. I argue that equiv
ocation and synonymy of mental expressions are restricted to supposition,
due to the constitutive role of mental terms with respect to the signification
of spoken terms. That is, a mental term happens to be equivocal only with
respect to its actual occurrence within a propositional context. Since the sup
position of an expression is by definition variable with respect to the proposi
tional context, this kind of context-dependent equivocation does not turn
mental language into a language like English or Latin. At the end of the second
chapter it will become clear that, according to the mental-speech assumption,
the content of thought is syntactically structured in a way similar to spoken
propositions. The goal of the second chapter is to identify and evaluate the dif
ferences between the use of spoken or written languages like English or Latin
and the use of mental speech.
In the third chapter I aim to show that according to this reading of the men
tal-speech assumption Ockham can be taken to provide a theory of the con
tent of propositional thought. For this purpose, I discuss in some detail
Ockhams model of hierarchically ordered mental acts as a model of thought.
It turns out, I will argue, that acts of judging are not themselves syntactically
structured. As I explained above, the content of an act of judging is identical to
the content of the mental proposition which is its (immediate) object. This is
exemplified by the case of evident judgements. To see what is special about
evident judgements it is necessary to note that some evident judgements are
made due to what Ockham calls intuitive cognition of particular things.
Ockham introduces intuitive cognition as a singular cognition of particular
things that are present to the subject and as such are the starting point of
knowledge, since intuitive acts of cognition can lead to evident judgements
about the things intuited. However, an evident act of judging is not itself syn
tactically structured, since the act of judging is not identical to the mental
proposition that is its object. Finally, it will become clear that mental speech
has a compensating function within the ontological constraints of Ockhams
nominalist framework: it explains how it is possible to truly or falsely think
and say that p in a world of particulars. The work concludes by briefly contrast
ing Fodors loth with Ockhams ams.
Chapter 1
The Basic Characteristics of Language

Signification and Supposition
1.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to set the stage for the discussion of mental speech
(oratio mentalis). It is usually held that Ockhams mental speech involves the
use of a kind of language which is both semantically and syntactically prior to
any natural language. This assumption implies that thinking takes place in
some sort of language, since the level of mental speech is exactly the same as
the level of thought. Proponents of the view that Ockhams mental speech
involves indeed a kind of language happily concede this.1
Philosophers from all quarters agree that it is uncontroversial to describe
thought as analogous to overt speech, as, for instance, when we ascribe the
occurrence of thoughts to human subjects in the following way: she thought
that p. The analogy between thought and overt speech can be even illuminat-
ing, but it should not be carried too far, as Knne warns.2 At least, I should add,
not without good reasons. So the question arises with respect to Ockhams
mental speech (oratio mentalis): does he merely conceive of thought as analo
gous to overt speech, or are there are any good reasons to conceive of mental
speech as involving the use of a kind of language? A good reason would be, for
instance, Ockhams understanding of mental items as possessing certain func-
tions in such a way that makes it necessary to think of mental speech as involv-
ing the use of a kind of language. In the next chapter I discuss two such
functions of mental items with respect to spoken language.
As a preface to the discussion of mental speech it is necessary to explain the
two basic notions of signification and of supposition. According to fourteenth-
century terminist logic, signification and supposition are the fundamental
properties of terms and terms are the basic semantic units of which proposi-
tions are composed. It seems likely that if someone in Ockhams time were to
conceive of mental speech as involving the use of a kind of language, then he
would be likely to ascribe these two basic properties to mental items as well.
Indeed, Ockham distinguishes between three kinds of terms, namely, men-
tal, spoken, and written as parts of mental, spoken, and written propositions,
1 See Normore, The End of Mental Language, 294.

2 Knne, Some Varieties of Thinking, 379.

The Basic Characteristics Of Language 13
following the traditions of both Boethius and of Augustine.3 Ockham literally

ascribes both signification and supposition to all kinds of terms. Nevertheless,
in view of the fact that the ascription of signification and supposition to men-
tal items implies a transfer of these two properties from the level of spoken
language to the mental level, it should suffice if in this chapter we begin by
treating signification and supposition with respect to spoken terms as means
of arriving at an appropriate understanding of these basic properties.
The relation between spoken and written terms and propositions has
received special attention from modern philosophers such as Frege.4 However
in this chapter the starting point for my focus on spoken terms and proposi-
tions is in the assumption of Ockham himself that spoken terms and proposi-
tions have semantic priority over written terms and propositions. Ockham
follows Aristotles De Interpretatione, 16a3-8 in this respect.5
The assumption underlying my approach is that there are differences
between mental and spoken terms with respect to signification and supposi-
tion, although both are literally taken to have signification and supposition.
The question is how these differences are to be evaluated. One preliminary
remark: in this chapter I do not discuss the fact that Ockham takes spoken
terms to have conventional signification, whereas mental terms are said to
have natural signification. This distinction is related to the question of how a
term obtains the property of signification.6 Instead I attempt to conceive
Ockhams view of (spoken) language as resting on the notions of signification
and supposition. That is, I attempt to render explicit what it amounts to that a
spoken term signifies and supposits for something.
3 See Boethius, In librum De interpretatione, ed. 2a, I, cap. De signis (pl 64, 407 b); Augustinus,
De Trinitate XV, c.10.
4 For a discussion of the relation between the spoken and the written see Wolfgang Knne, Die
Philosophische Logik Gottlob Freges, Frankfurt/M., 2010, 160; 166168. Frege explicitly dis-
cusses this relation in his short Logische Allgemeinheit, in his Nachgelassene Schriften,
Hamburg, 1969, 278281.
5 Here Aristotle holds that sounds are symbols of affections (pathemata) in the soul, and writ-
ten marks are symbols of spoken sounds. As will become clear, however, Ockham does not
hold that spoken terms are symbols of mental terms, while written terms are symbols of spo-
ken terms, since spoken terms do not signify mental terms, but spoken terms signify the same
as mental terms. Spoken terms have semantic priority over written terms just as mental
terms have semantic priority over spoken terms, since spoken terms have signification due to
being subordinated to mental terms, whereas written terms have signification due to being
subordinated to spoken terms. See the next chapter for the discussion of subordination. See
Aristotle, De Int. 16a 38. J.A. Ackrill (transl.), De Interpretatione, Oxford, 1966.
6 I discuss this genetic question in the next chapter. See 2.2 Signification in Relation to
Subordination and Imposition.
14 Chapter 1
To do so, I proceed as follows: in the following section (1.2), I first give a gen-
eral account of what the properties of signification and supposition amount
to, as I go on to focus on the relation between them later in the chapter. Next I
prepare the discussion further by expounding the difference between absolute
and connotative terms (1.3), before discussing signification (1.4). It turns out
that signification can be rendered in terms of (correct) applicability. Since the
applicability of a term implies its possible use within a proposition, and the
use of a term is intimately connected with its supposition, it becomes clear
why Ockham accounts for signification in terms of supposition and vice versa.
However, in the next section (1.5), I show that the notion of supposition is
wider than the notion of signification. I then discuss the canonical case of affir-
mative present tense propositions to show that the truth conditions of propo-
sitions can be given by means of the (non-)identity of the things the terms
stand for within a proposition (1.5.1).
I then venture to determine how the notions of taking a term significatively
and a terms personal supposition relate to each other (1.5.2). This is important
insofar as I claim that the significative use of a term at least partly determines
its personal supposition. Then I briefly discuss Ockhams attempt to account
for the improper that is, metaphorical or equivocal use of terms by means
of what he calls improper supposition to illustrate further how the use of a
term can be taken to determine its supposition (1.5.3).
Finally, I discuss material and simple supposition as opposed to personal
supposition (1.5.4). Important here is that the difference between personal
supposition on the one hand and material or simple supposition on the other
reflects a hierarchy of uses: I argue that the significative use of terms is primary,
while the non-significative use of terms is only secondary. It should become
clear that the supposition of a term depends on how a term is taken, that is,
used or interpreted. I begin the chapter by giving a rough idea of signification
and supposition.
1.2 Signification and Supposition of Terms: First Approximation
In accordance with the Aristotelian tradition of taking terms as the basic

semantic units into which propositions can be analysed, Ockham ventures to
give a complete account of the properties of terms in the first part of the
Summa Logicae, his major work on logic. The modern reader should beware a
terminological difference here: the medieval propositio should not be mistaken
for a proposition in the modern Fregean sense. According to Ockham,
there are mental, spoken, and written terms and these can be composed to
form propositions, where a written propositio is nothing but an inscription and

a spoken propositio is an utterance. A mental proposition, according to the
later works, can be identified as an occurrence of a thought.7 When I speak of
a proposition in this work, then I mean a propositio in Ockhams sense.
In fourteenth-century logic, terms are commonly taken to have the basic
properties of signification and supposition. According to Marylin McCord
Adams, the latter is one of the most discussed but highly perplexing parts of
medieval logic.8 There have been various attempts to unravel the mystery
of supposition by aligning Ockhams theory of supposition more or less suc-
cessfully with contemporary theories of reference,9 of quantification,10 and
of truth.11
Certainly, these are all issues related to supposition. What can be said with-
out endorsing any of these approaches exclusively is that the truth conditions
of various kinds of propositions can be given by means of the supposition of
their terms, as Ockham shows in the second part of the Summa Logicae.12
Signification and supposition are related properties. Yet there are crucial differ-
ences between them which are reflected by the structure of the first part of the
Summa. Ockham first discusses signification of different kinds of terms in chap-
ters 1 to 61 and then dedicates the rest of the first part to supposition. Supposition
depends on signification, but signification does not depend on supposition in
the same way. A term has signification independently of any propositional con-
text, but a term has supposition only within a proposition. What a term suppos-
its for is determined inter alia by its signification. However, the signification
of a term is not determined at all by its actual supposition within a proposition.
In this sense, signification is the more fundamental property of a term.
7 In Ockhams vocabulary, an occurring thought is an act of understanding (actus intelli
gendi) which is composed of mental terms or concepts. See Quodl. III, q.12 (ot IX, 246
247); Quodl. V, q.18 (ot IX), 551. On the medieval account of propositiones see Gabriel
Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers
of Truth and Falsity, Amsterdam, 1973.
8 See McCord Adams, William Ockham, 317. The literature on supposition is vast. See www
.ontology.co/biblio/supposition-biblio-one.htm. Last access 24th February 2014.
9 See Mikko Yrjnsuuri, Supposition and Truth in Ockhams Mental Language, Topoi
16, 1997, 1525.
10 See McCord Adams, William Ockham, 367377; Herrmann Weidemann, William of
Ockham on Particular Negative Propositions, Mind (1979), 270275.
11 See Ernest A. Moody, Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic, Amsterdam, 1953;
Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Medieval Theories of Truth, submitted to the Encyclopedia of
Medieval Philosophy, (ed.) H. Lagerlund.
12 See Freddoso, Ockhams Theory of Truth Conditions, in Freddoso; Schuurman, Ockhams
Theory of Propositions. Part II of the Summa Logicae, 15.
16 Chapter 1
According to Ockham, a term has an extension; however, the term does not
signify its extension, it signifies the things within its extension. For instance,
the term man signifies all men, since man has all men in its extension. In
general, signify expresses a relation between a term and the things within its
extension; this relation is prior to the terms actual occurrence within a propo-
sition.13 Put roughly, signification is applicability. More precisely: a term signi-
fies an entity x if and only if it can be correctly applied to x. A term that is never
applied to x may nevertheless be correctly applicable to x.
By contrast, a term can rightly be said to supposit only if it actually occurs
within a proposition.14 In Ockhams words, supposition is something like being
posited in place of something else, [] such that we use this term for some-
thing [].15 Broadly speaking, a theory of supposition is a theory about what a
term stands for if the term is used in different ways within different kinds of
propositions, since a terms actual supposition partly depends on how a term is
taken or used within a proposition.16
A term can be taken in more than one way; for example, it can be taken
significatively (sumi significative) in which case the term has personal suppo-
sition, or it can be taken materially or simply in which case the term has
material or simple supposition. If a term is taken materially, it supposits for
spoken or written terms, and if a term is taken simply, it supposits for mental
terms. Roughly speaking, if a term is taken materially it is as one would say
today mentioned as opposed to being used-and-not-mentioned.17 On con-
temporary accounts, a term which is merely mentioned and put into quotation
13 Panaccio writes: (2) le principe atomiste, selon lequel certains signes infrapropositionnels
simples les noms, notamment possdent en eux-mme une signification indpendam-
ment des propositions (ou des phrases) dans lequelles ils peuvent figurer; []. Panaccio,
Les mots, les concepts et les choses, 167.
14 I use the expression supposit as a translation of the inflected Latin supponit to speak of
a term actually having supposition within a proposition. I follow Alfred Freddoso in this
use. Treating Ockhams conception of truth conditions for various kinds of propositions
he writes for example: (3) Socrates is a man is true if and only if there is something for
which both Socrates and man supposit in Socrates is a man. See Freddoso, Ockhams
Theory of Truth Conditions, 9.
15 [] pro alio positio, [], ita quod utimur illo termino pro aliquo []. sl I, 63 (op I, 194)
(Italics mine).
16 Panaccio and Perini-Santos take Ockham to account for contextual elements metonymi-
cally in terms of the will of the speaker (voluntas utentium). See Claude Panaccio and
Ernesto Perini-Santos, Guillaume dOckham et la Suppositio Materialis, Vivarium 42 (2004),
202224 (221). See also McCord Adams, William Ockham, 328.
17 Material and simple supposition and the corresponding material or simple use of terms
will be treated separately in 1.5.4 Simple and Material Supposition.
marks becomes a new term, that is, the name of the term. On the medieval
account, it is still the same term which taken materially is used for itself.18
In spoken language, there are no special marks which indicate that a term is
used not for something it signifies, but merely for itself, apart from gestures for
inverted commas one can make with ones fingers.19 It follows that a spoken
term having material supposition remains the same, insofar as its (phonetic)
features remain the same.20
Ockham attempts to mark a difference between a common or literal use of
terms and deviant uses by postulating a certain difference between personal
supposition on the one hand and material and simple supposition on the
other: a term can have personal supposition within any proposition it actually
occurs in, while a term can have material or simple supposition only if it occurs
within a proposition where the other term signifies, and thus supposits per-
sonally for, either spoken, written or mental terms.21 These deviant uses can be
classified as broadly metalinguistic.22 That Ockham considered personal sup-
position to take priority over the two other kinds of supposition is also indi-
cated by the fact that he only further subdivides personal supposition.23
18 As Panaccio and Perini-Santos have pointed out, simple and material supposition can be
seen as different referential uses of the same mental, spoken or written terms.
Contrairement ce que pose aujourdhui lapproche tarskienne, selon laquelle un mot
ainsi mentionn et plac entre guillemets devient par le fait mme une nouvelle
expression qui est le nom du mot en question et non pas le mot lui-mme, lapproche
mdivale, en cela plus proche de lintuition commune, voit la supposition matrielle
comme un usage spcial du mme mot: dans cheval est un nom, nous avons bien affaire,
selon cette thorie, une occurrence du mot cheval lui-mme, plutt qu son nom.
Lusage en supposition matrielle apparat alors comme un cas particulier de ces varia-
tions de la fonction rfrentielle qui intressent, globalement, la thorie de la suppositio.
Panaccio; Perini-Santos, Guillaume dOckham et la Suppositio Materialis, 203.
19 For a detailed discussion of quotation and quotation marks see Knne, Die Philosophische
Logik Gottlob Freges, 282288.
20 If a written term is put into quotation marks, it changes its features insofar as the quota-
tion marks framing the sequence of letters become part of its features: the written term
becomes a new expression due to the addition of quotation marks.
21 Notandum est etiam quod semper terminus, in quacumque propositione ponatur, potest
habere suppositionem personalem, []. Sed terminus non in omni propositione potest habere
suppositionem simplicem vel materialem, sed tunc tantum quando terminus talis comparatur
alteri extremo quod respicit intentionem animae vel vocem vel scriptum. sl I, 65 (op I, 197).
22 Ockham formulates some general rules about this alleged difference which are not with-
out problems. I discuss this issue further in 1.5.4 Simple and Material Supposition.
23 Ockham subdivides personal supposition first into discrete and common. The former
pertains to singular terms while the latter pertains to general terms. He then proceeds to
18 Chapter 1
The difference between signification and personal supposition can be stated

more accurately now: signification involves a semantic relation obtaining
between a term and all the things within its extension in the same way and at
the same time, while the personal supposition of a term involves a relation
obtaining between a term and a part of its extension within a certain proposi-
tional context.24 By contrast, material and simple supposition involve relations
between a term and itself or between terms of different kinds.25
Certainly, there is the threat of circularity, if signification is explained in
terms of personal supposition and vice versa.26 It should have become clear
nevertheless that signification implies the possibility of (personal) supposi-
tion, just as (personal) supposition implies signification. However, not all
terms have signification in the sense of implying the possibility of personal
supposition. Although in the opening chapter of the Summa a term is broadly
defined as that which either is or can be part of a proposition it is not the case
that all terms are of the same nature.27
As Ockham puts it, categorematic terms have a finite (finitam) and deter-
minate signification, such as man or whiteness which signify all men and all
particular whitenesses (omnes albedines) respectively.28 Having a signification
in this sense means that such a term is (correctly) applicable to a particular
thing or things without being combined with another term to build a more
complex term.29 On the contrary, syncategorematic terms such as the copula
is or quantifiers such as only or some do not have a finite and determinate
subdivide the personal supposition of general terms further. See McCord Adams, William
Ockham, 352367.
24 By part I mean to include either all, some, or one of the things of the terms extension for
which a term can supposit personally within an affirmative proposition. This use of the
part of a terms extension corresponds largely to the aforementioned subdivision of per-
sonal supposition. See also McCord Adams, William Ockham, 367377.
25 According to Ockham, a spoken term can also supposit simply, that is, for a mental term.
For instance, in the spoken proposition man is a mental term, the spoken term man sup-
posits simply for the mental term man. Ockham writes: Quando vero comparatur
extremo significanti intentionem animae, est distinguenda, eo quod potest habere sup-
positionem simplicem vel personalem. sl I, 65 (op I, 199).
26 See McCord Adams, William Ockham, 346; id., What Does Ockham Mean by Supposition?
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, XVII (1976), 375391.
27 Sed quamvis omnis terminus pars sit propositionis, vel esse possit, non omnes termini
tamen eiusdem sunt naturae. sl I, 1 (op I, 7).
28 Termini categorematici finitam et certam habent significationem, sicut hoc nomen
homo significat omnes homines et hoc nomen animal omnia animalia, et hoc nomen
albedo omnes albedines. sl I, 4 (op I, 15).
29 From now on, I omit the correctly when I speak of a term being applicable in this con-
text, for the sake of brevity. I ask the reader to bear the correctly in mind.
signification, since they are not applicable to a particular thing or things with-
out being combined with other terms. Ockham says that a syncategorematic
term is added to another term.30 For instance, man is correctly applicable to
men but not to dogs, but some is not applicable to one particular thing or
things without being combined with another term; however, in combination
with a term such as man it is applicable to men, and in combination with dog
it is applicable to dogs.31
Generally speaking, syncategorematic terms are not related semantically to
particular things, but they help to determine the truth conditions of proposi-
tions. For instance, the copula is helps to connect subject and predicate terms
to form propositions, sentential connectives such as if or and connect atomic
propositions to form complex propositions which Ockham calls indiscrimi-
nately hypothetical, while quantifiers such as some or every specify the sup-
position of the predicate and the subject term further.32 For instance, the two
(spoken) propositions
(1) Socrates is wise
and
30 [] sed addita alteri figurae facit eam significare, ita syncategorema proprie loquendo
nihil significat, sed magis additum alteri facit ipsum aliquid significare sive facit ipsum
pro aliquo vel aliquibus modo determinato supponere vel aliud officium circa categorema
exercet. sl I, 4 (op I, 15).
31 In this sense, the term number (numerus) does not have a finite and determinate signi-
fication. Number belongs to the category of quantity. In the Aristotelian sense, a number
is a discrete quantity (quantitas discreta) best quoted in the nominative in instances like
this; therefore, [] number is nothing but the things themselves enumerated. ([]
numerus nihil aliud est quam ipsae res numeratae.) sl I, 44 (op I, 138). In another chapter
Ockham states: [] if I asked [] how many men are here. The answer to this question
is to be counted among discrete quantities, as it expresses a plurality. And in this manner
number is a discrete quantity, because if it is asked how many men are these and I answer
three, my answer expresses many. ([] si quaeram [] quot homines sunt hic. Et tunc
illud per quod respondetur ad talem quaestionem est inter quantitates discretas connu-
merandum, quando scilicet exprimit pluralitatem. Et isto modo numerus est quantitas
discreta, quia si quaeratur quot sunt isti homines et respondeam tres, illud per quod
respondeo exprimit plura.) sl I, 46 (op I, 146). For Ockhams conception of numbers
see also Quaest. in Phys., q.46 (op VI, 521523); Quaest. in Phys. (op VI, 688690); ibid.,
(op VI, 690691).
32 Ockham writes: Propositio hypothetica est illa quae ex pluribus categoricis est compos-
ita. sl II, 1 (op I, 241). See also McCord Adams, William Ockham, 318. Ockhams use of
hypothetical clashes with the use of this expression by the Stoics and by Frege. The latter
restricts this expression to conditionals.
20 Chapter 1
(2) Socrates was wise
differ only with respect to the tense of the copula. This affects the truth condi-
tions insofar as the subject term Socrates and the predicate wise in (1) must
supposit both for something presently existing in order for (1) to be true while
this is not so with respect to (2).33 Likewise, the propositions
(3) The sun is larger than the moon or a unicorn is an animal
and
(4) The sun is larger than the moon and a unicorn is an animal
differ with respect to their truth conditions, because they contain different
connectives. Note that (3) and (4) also differ with respect to their truth value.
(3) is true while (4) is false, since a unicorn is an animal is false according to
Ockham, and even necessarily. The point is that in Ockhams conception the
present tense copula implies that there actually is a particular thing or things
for which the subject term supposits personally within an affirmative proposi-
tion if the proposition is true, but there simply are no unicorns in this world at
any time.34 Only categorematic terms can be subject or predicate of proposi-
tions fitting the Aristotelian standard subject-predicate- form S is P, if they are
used for something they signify.35 It should also be noted that there are differ-
ences among categorematic terms: it is not the case that all such terms can
supposit personally for everything they signify.36 This sound unnecessarily
33 For simplicitys sake, I leave until later discussion of those cases where the thing for which
the subject of a past tense proposition supposits exists presently, while the predicate does
not apply correctly to the thing at present, as in Arnold Schwarzenegger was the governor
of California. See 1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of signify (significare).
34 There is more on the signification of fictional terms in 1.4 The Narrow and the Wider
Sense of signify.
35 [] acipitur terminus praecise et magis stricte pro illo quod significative sumptum
potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis. Et isto modo nullum verbum, nec
coniunctio nec adverbium nec praepositio [] est terminus; []. sl I, 3 (op I, 9).
36 Interestingly, Ockham gives only examples of absolute terms signifying substances or par-
ticularized qualities in his exposition of categorematic terms, namely, man, animal and
whiteness: Termini categorematici finitam et certam habent significationem, sicut hoc
nomen homo significat omnes homines et hoc nomen animal omnia animalia, et hoc
nomen albedo omnes albedines. sl I, 4 (op I, 15). However, the criterion of having a finite
and determinate signification also applies to connotative terms such as white or sick, since
white can be applied to a thing without being combined with another term to form
perplexing now, but the distinction I am alluding to, between absolute and
connotative terms, will be explained later on as a prelude to further discussion
of the relation between signification and personal supposition.
1.3 Absolute vs. Connotative Terms
Although both absolute and connotative terms can be used for things they sig-
nify within propositional contexts, they differ insofar as absolute terms signify
exclusively, and in one and the same way, one kind of things, while connotative
terms can signify more than one kind of things in different ways. Ockham
explains the signification of absolute terms as follows:
Absolute nouns or adjectives are those which do not signify something

primarily and something else or the same secondarily; rather whatever is
signified by such a noun is signified primarily and equally, as it is obvious
in the case of the noun animal which signifies only cows, donkeys, and
men and other living beings, and which does not signify one thing pri-
marily and the other secondarily.37
What does it mean for a term to be absolute if everything it signifies is signified

in one and the same way? Ockham claims that the general term animal is an
absolute term insofar as animal signifies indiscriminately all living beings. For
instance, animal does not signify all men in the first place and all other ani-
mals only secondarily.
Ockham does not posit primary and secondary signification for the purpose
of representing a hierarchy within the order of being. Rather, primary and sec-
ondary signification is crucial with respect to the possibility of personal sup-
position, because a term can supposit personally within a proposition only for
something it signifies primarily. Since absolute terms do only signify some-
thing primarily, they can supposit personally for everything they signify. Thus
the term animal within a proposition can supposit personally for every living
being. For instance, in the proposition
a more complex term. According to Ockham, white can be applied correctly to white
things, not to black things.
37 Nomina mere absoluta sunt illa quae non significant aliquid principaliter et aliud vel
idem secundario, sed quidquid significatur per illud nomen, aeque primo significatur,
sicut patet de hoc nomine animal quod non significat nisi boves, asinos et homines, et
sic de aliis animalibus, et non significat unum primo et aliud secundario, []. sl I, 10
(op I, 35).
22 Chapter 1
(5) Donkeys and men are animals
the predicate term animals supposits personally for all donkeys and men.38
And in the proposition
(6) Bucephalus is an animal
animal supposits personally for a particular horse. It is important to note that

general terms (animal, man) as well as singular terms (Socrates, the fly on
the wall) have signification in this sense. Recall that according to Ockhams
nominalist view whatever exists is either a substance or a particularized qual-
ity. So both singular and general terms signify exclusively particular things. It
should also be emphasized that both the subject and the predicate term can
have personal supposition according to this account.39
By contrast, a connotative term cannot supposit personally for everything it
signifies, but only for that which it signifies primarily. The signification of con-
notative terms is rendered by Ockham as follows:
A connotative noun or adjective is a term which signifies something pri-

marily and something [different or the same] secondarily. And such a
noun or adjective has a proper nominal definition, and often one of its
defining words should be put in the nominative case, and the other in an
inflected case.40
It is possible to render explicit what a connotative term signifies primarily and

what it signifies secondarily by means of what Ockham calls a nominal defini-
tion.41 Ockham proceeds by rendering the concrete term white (album) as
something having a whiteness (aliquid habens albedinem):
38 For the sake of grammaticality, it is necessary to use the plural form here.
39 I discuss personal supposition of subject and predicate terms in 1.5.1 The Standard Case:
(Personal) Supposition and the Truth and Falsity of Affirmative Propositions.
40 Nomen autem connotativum est illud quod significat aliquid primario et aliquid
secundario. Et tale nomen proprie habet definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, et fre-
quenter oportet ponere unum illius definitionis in recto et aliud in obliquo. sl I, 10 (op
I, 36). Since the Latin expression nomen covers both adjectives and nouns, I translate
nomen as noun or adjective if it is clear from the context that nomen can be taken to
apply to both.
41 A nominal definition in this sense is an explanation of what a connotative term signifies.
It is not to be taken as a definition in the modern sense. Panaccio determines the role of
nominal definition as follows: The primary goal of a nominal definition, for Ockham, is
[] since white has a nominal definition in which one part is posited in

the nominative case and something else in an inflected case. Therefore, if
you ask what this adjective white signifies, you will say that it signifies
the same as the phrase [] something having a whiteness.42
White signifies primarily the thing, that is, the substance that is white and
signifies secondarily the quality of whiteness. Ockham claims that such a
defining phrase implies a grammatical criterion by which it can be determined
what is signified primarily and what is signified secondarily, since in many
cases (frequenter) the term denoting what is signified primarily stands in the
nominative case (in recto) while the term denoting what is signified second-
arily stands in an inflected case (in obliquo). As to white, the term aliquid in
the nominative case denotes what is signified primarily and the term albedi
nem in the accusative case denotes what is signified secondarily.43 Now con-
sider the following proposition:
(7) This wall is white
In this proposition, the subject term this wall supposits personally for a cer-
tain wall, and the predicate term white supposits likewise for the wall which
to make explicit the ontological commitment which is to be associated with the normal
use of a given term. That is the whole secret: it is all a matter of ontology. That is why nomi-
nal definitions are so important within the framework of Ockhams nominalism. Their
function is to make perspicuous that the things that are referred to in one way or another
by a meaningful connotative term are but singular things, and more precisely, singular
substances and singular qualities. Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 90.
42 [], nam album habet definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, in qua una dictio poni-
tur in recto et alia in obliquo. Unde si quaeras, quid significat hoc nomen album, dices
quod illud idem quod ista oratio [] aliquid habens albedinem. sl I, 10 (op I, 36). I spec-
ify the English translation here, since Ockham talks about concrete connotative terms
such as white in this passage which are nothing but adjectives.
43 This grammatical criterion works fairly well in the cases of concrete positive terms whose
corresponding abstract absolute terms signify qualities (white whiteness). It fails with
respect to negative (immaterial) and privative (blind) terms and thus, as McCord
Adams rightly remarks, is inadequate because not universally applicable to all connota-
tive terms. McCord Adams further remarks: It seems that things signified negatively
albeit by nominative case expressions in the nominal definition are to be counted among
the secondary significata of the term defined. Ockhams use of the term frequenter (that
often something is put in the nominative case etc.) seems to indicate, as she puts it, that
Ockham implicitly acknowledged this limitation of his grammatical criterion. McCord
Adams, William Ockham, 321322.
24 Chapter 1
is white, and not for the walls particular quality of being white, since white
supposits personally only for that which it signifies primarily, that is, the white
thing, and not for the particular quality of whiteness. This is stressed by
Ockham in numerous passages of the Summa Logicae.44 Take the following:
And therefore, white does not supposit for the whiteness but merely for the
subject of the whiteness, although white expresses (exprimat) whiteness,
[].45 Put simply, express is used here interchangeably with signify.46 That
is, although white signifies particular whitenesses, it cannot supposit person-
ally for a particular whiteness within a proposition.
Both absolute and connotative terms can supposit personally for things
they signify, but the difference is that an absolute term can supposit indiscrim-
inately for everything it signifies, while a connotative term can supposit per-
sonally for that which it signifies primarily, but not for that which it signifies
secondarily. Again, the distinction between primary and secondary significa-
tion in this context bears on the possibility of personal supposition within a
proposition. With this distinction between absolute and connotative and pri-
mary and secondary signification in mind, I shall now discuss what it means
for a term to supposit personally for something it signifies, explaining first
what it amounts to that a term signifies something. As I indicated above, signi-
fication implies the possibility of (personal) supposition, just as (personal)
supposition implies signification. I limit the discussion to the relation between
signification and personal supposition, since it will turn out in the second
chapter that one important difference between spoken and mental terms con-
cerns their possible range of personal supposition.
1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of Signify (significare)
In a chapter dedicated to the explanation of the expression signify (signifi

care), Ockham states that logicians use this expression in various ways, of
which he discusses three.47 In this section, I concentrate on the first and the
44 See sl I, 33 (op I, 95); sl I, 57 (op I, 184); sl II, 11 (op I, 280); sl III, 18 (op I, 652); sl III-4, 10
(op I, 797); sl III-4, 10 (op I, 817).
45 The whole sentence reads: Et ideo sicut album quamvis exprimat albedinem non tamen
supponit pro albedinem sed tantum pro subiecto albedinis, ita differentiae illae quamvis
exprimant partes rei non tamen supponunt pro partibus rei sed praecise pro toto com-
posito ex partibus illis. sl I, 26 (op I, 85).
46 See 2.4 Mental Propositions and Spoken Propositions: The Relation of Correspondence.
47 Significare multipliciter accipitur apud logicos. sl I, 33 (op I, 95).
second sense, since these are crucial to the relation of signification to (per-
sonal) supposition. This is the first sense of signify:
(1)In one sense a sign is said to signify something when it supposits or

can supposit for something, namely such that the sign is predicated
by means of the verb is of the pronoun which demonstrates it [the
thing signified]. And in this manner white signifies Socrates, since
this proposition is true: this [one] is white, pointing at Socrates.48
One preliminary remark about Ockhams use of predicate here: Ockham literally
says that a term is predicated of a pronoun.49 He means that a term x is con-
nected as a predicate with a term y, since in Ockhams view it is absurd that an
extramental thing could be the subject or predicate of a proposition.50 He states
in the Quodlibeta that a proposition, whether mental, spoken or written, is not
composed of extramental things, but of mental, spoken or written terms:
[] and [the intellect] does not compose extramental things; otherwise,

the subject of a proposition could be in heaven and the predicate could
be in hell, and the copula in my intellect; rather the intellect composes
the intentions of things, not for themselves, but for the signified things.51
48 Nam uno modo dicitur signum aliquid significare quando supponit vel natum est sup-
ponere pro illo, ita scilicet quod de pronomine demonstrante illud per hoc verbum est
illud nomen praedicatur. Et sic album significat Sortem; haec enim est vera iste est
albus, demonstrando Sortem. sl I, 33 (op I, 95).
49 In this respect, Ockhams use of predicate deviates from the Aristotelian use of the verb
predicate (kategoreisthai) which does not merely indicate that terms are connected: to
predicate wise of Socrates means to say of Socrates that he is wise. See Knne, Conceptions
of Truth, 95100 for the Aristotelian account of true predication.
50 In this respect, Ockham deviates from views of his contemporaries, for instance Walter
Chatton (see Chattons Reportatio, I, Prol., q.4, art.3 (ed. Cova, 318ss)) and from views of
modern philosophers, for instance, Bertrand Russell (see Russells Principles of
Mathematics, London, 1950 (2nd edition, repr.), 47, 51). See also Knne, Conceptions of
Truth, 8 for further discussion and further literature, esp. 8, fn. 16.
51 [] quia intellectus [] non componit res extra; aliter subiectum propositionis posset
esse in caelo, et praedicatum in inferno, et copula in intellectu meo; sed intellectus com-
ponit intentiones rerum ad invicem, non pro se, sed pro re significata. Quodl. III, q.12 (ot
IX, 250). See also Quodl. IV, q.12 (ot IX, 354). There Ockham writes: Every predication is
either with respect to concepts or with respect to spoken terms or with respect to written
terms. ([] omnis praedicatio vel est in conceptu vel in voce vel in scripto.) This clearly
indicates that he accounts for predication in terms of the syntactic connection of mental,
spoken, or written terms.
26 Chapter 1
Note that an intention of things is nothing but a mental term or concept. The
crucial point is that if a term x is connected as a predicate with another term y
nothing is thereby said of the term y, but rather, something is said of the thing
y supposits for. For instance, if the demonstrative this is connected by means
of the copula is with the term white, then someone uttering this is white
while pointing for instance to a white wall would say something true of the
wall, namely, that it is white; he would not say of the demonstrative that it is
white.52
Although Ockham does not explicitly restrict signification to spoken terms
in his exposition, there is one point which indicates that this exposition actu-
ally takes place on the level of spoken terms. Although Ockham makes use of a
certain kind of proposition containing two indexical elements, namely, a
demonstrative pronoun and the present tense copula to account for the first
sense of signify, he seriously doubts in various passages whether there are
demonstrative pronouns on the mental level at all.53
Demonstratives are somewhat special. Suffice it to note here that they do
not have a determinate signification such as man which signifies all men;
rather they can be used by a speaker to pick out a particular thing, where the
demonstrative can supposit personally for that which it singles out.54 As
Ockham states in the Quodlibeta, a demonstrative is significative only due to
the intention of the speaker.55 Remember that in this chapter I restrict the
52 Ockham makes a similar point in the following passage, by stating that if the spoken
proposition Socrates is white is true, it does not follow that Socrates is (merely) a name,
and I would add, nor does it follow that the name Socrates is white , but it does follow
that Socrates is white. Et sic dicatur quod si in istis propositionibus praedicatur vox [],
ergo si Sortes est albus sequitur quod Sortes est vox [] dicendum quod per istam
propositionem Sortes est albus, non denotatur quod Sortes sit vox, quantumcumque vox
praedicatur hic, cuius ratio est quia per propositionem non denotatur quod subiectum sit
praedicatum, sed denotatur in tali propositione quod illud pro quo subiectum supponit
sit illud pro quo praedicatum supponit. Exp. Porph., cap.1 (op II, 25). The modern reader
should be warned: the Latin denotari is not used in the modern sense of denote, as for
instance in Russells sense.
53 After doubting whether there are mental participles, he articulates the following doubt
with respect to the existence of mental pronouns: Et de pronominibus posset esse consi-
milis dubitatio. sl I, 3 (op I, 95). See also Panaccio, Les mots, les concepts et les choses,
177181 for a discussion of Ockhams conception of the signification of demonstratives.
54 See 2.5 Demonstratives, Correspondence, and Supposition of Mental Terms for a discus-
sion of the signification and supposition of demonstrative pronouns.
55 [] dico quod pronomen demonstrativum non est significativum nisi ex intentione pro-
ferentis; []. Quodl. II, q.19 (ot IX, 193).
discussion to spoken terms.56 That a term signifies something according to the

first sense of signify means that it is related in a certain way to presently exist-
ing things: what Ockham attempts to capture by means of the demonstrative
is the possibility of deictic application of a term to a thing. Take his example of
the general term white. White signifies a particular thing, for instance
Socrates, if the following proposition is true: this (one) is white, where this is
used to pick out Socrates such that this supposits for Socrates. I claim that his
account is not to be understood as a definition of the concept of signification,
since its use of the notion of supposition would render a definition of the fol-
lowing kind circular: a spoken term A signifies a particular thing a if and only
if the term supposits for a within a true spoken proposition of the form This is
(an) A, where this supposits for a, and A supposits for a if and only if A signi-
fies a. Rather, the account gives us sufficient and necessary conditions of what
must obtain in order for a term to signify in this sense. It can be held in
general:
(A) A spoken term A signifies1 a thing a at time T if and only if a exists

at T and A can correctly be applied to a at T.57
It is crucial that for a term to signify1 something, it is not necessary that any
proposition of this kind actually occurs. It is sufficient that a proposition such
as This (thing) is white would be true if it were to occur. Note that in the pas-
sage cited above Ockham formulates a conditional whose antecedent contains
a disjunction, that is [] a sign is said to signify something when (quando) it
[actually] supposits or (vel) can supposit for it [].58 Accordingly:
(B) A spoken term A signifies1 a thing a at time T if and only if a speaker

would say something true if he were to say This is an A at T while
pointing at a.
56 What is said about the signification and supposition of spoken terms applies to written
terms as well.
57 I use the index to indicate the first sense of signify. That is, if I want to indicate that a
term signifies something according to the restricted sense of number one, I write: A term
t signifies1 something.
58 Nam uno modo dicitur signum aliquid significare quando supponit vel natum est suppo
nere pro illo, []. sl I, 33 (op I, 95) (Italics mine). Although in this passage Ockham is
using when (quando) and not if (si) it is possible to take the sentence in question as a
conditional, since the use of the temporal expression is motivated largely by the nom
inalist assumption that propositions can be identified with respect to their occurrence in
time.
28 Chapter 1
The problem is that the consequent clause while pointing at a does not
cover cases where it is not possible to literally point to a. Consider the following
case. Having a sore throat, Peter croaks out: This really hurts. He uses the
demonstrative to pick out the pain in his throat, although it is of course not
possible to literally point to a pain.59 Thus (B) should be modified in the fol-
lowing way:
(B1) A spoken term A signifies1 a thing a at time T if and only if a speaker

would say something true if he were to say This is an A at T while
pointing at a or referring to a by This and a exists at T.
Given the distinction of actual and possible supposition, the mere ability of a
term to supposit within a spoken proposition of the form This is (an) A is suf-
ficient for a term to signify1 something. That is, a term signifies1 all things at T to
which it can be applied correctly at T.
According to the second sense, a term does not only signify those things at T
to which it can be applied correctly at T. Ockham writes:
(2)signify is taken in a different sense when a sign can supposit in

some [true] proposition in the past or the future or the present
tense or in some true modal proposition for it [sc. that which it sig-
nifies]. So white signifies not only that which is white at the pres-
ent moment, but also that which can be white; for in the proposition
a white thing can run, by means of taking the subject for that which
can be, the subject supposits for those things which can be white.60
Although Ockham here uses the same term white for his example, white in
this second case is not the predicate, but the subject. This is due to differences
59 I thank Wolfgang Knne for drawing my attention to these cases.

60 Aliter accipitur significare quando illud signum in aliqua propositione de praeterito vel
de futuro vel de praesenti vel in aliqua propositione vera de modo potest pro illo suppo-
nere. Et sic album non tantum significat illud quod nunc est album, sed etiam illud quod
potest esse album; nam in ista propositione album potest currere, accipiendo subiectum
pro eo quod potest esse, subiectum supponit pro his quae possunt esse alba. sl I, 33 (op
I, 95). One remark concerning the translation: I take the scope of the Latin vera to include
all kinds of propositions Ockham enumerates here, although in the Latin version, its posi-
tion indicates that it applies only to modal propositions and not to the others; but there is
no obvious reason why a term should be said to signify2 something if it can either supposit
for something within a true modal propositions or within true or false propositions of the
other kinds.
between the supposition of the subject and the predicate within differently
tensed propositions: the subject term of a past or future tense proposition can
always be taken to supposit for both the presently existing things it signifies as
well as for the things it signifies in the past or future tense or modally, which do
not exist at present. But this does not hold in all cases with respect to the predi-
cate term.61 I will come back to this peculiarity in a moment.
First note that Ockham here does not distinguish between the actual and
possible supposition of a term as he did with respect to the first sense above.
A term signifies2 something when it can supposit for something.62 I take this as
saying something about the (logical) possibility of supposition: it is possible
that a term supposit for something if it does not imply a contradiction to say
that a term supposits for something. For example, it would imply a contradic-
tion to say that the term chimera, Ockhams standard example for a fictional
term, can have personal supposition within an affirmative proposition, since
thereby it is implied that there is something the term can stand for. However in
the case of chimera, there simply is no such thing. Even the affirmative propo-
sition the chimera is a non-being implies the false proposition the chimera is
something.63
A term signifies something according to the second sense if the term can
supposit either in a (true) past or a future or a present tense proposition or
a modal proposition for it. Again, this is not to be regarded as a definition,
since it would make use of the notion of a terms supposition within a true
61 [] quod terminus semper supponit pro his quae sunt, ubicumque ponatur, vel potest
pro eis supponere. Nam illam regulam intellexi de termino posito a parte subiecti; sed
quando ponitur a parte praedicati non est universaliter vera. Unde posito quod nullus
homo modo sit albus, sed quod fuerint multi homines albi antea, in ista tunc homo fuit
albus praedicatum non potest supponere pro his quae sunt sed tantum pro his quae
fuerunt. sl I, 71 (op I, 218).
62 Analogously to the first sense above, I use the index to indicate the second sense of sig-
nify. That is, when I want to say that a term signifies something according to this wider
sense, then I write: A spoken term ts signifies2 something.
63 Propter quod quaelibet propositio affirmativa, in qua subicitur hoc nomen chimaera
significative sumptum vel praedicatur, [], est falsa de virtute sermonis, quia habet ali-
quam exponentem falsam. Ista enim est falsa de virtute sermonis chimaera est non-ens
[], quia quaelibet talis habet istas exponentes chimaera est aliquid et illud est non-
ens, quarum prima falsa est. sl II, 14 (op I, 287). Freddoso writes with respect to fictional
terms in general: Since figment [fictional] terms are necessarily empty, there is no true
affirmative proposition in which such a term has personal supposition. For each such
proposition implies that there is or was or will be or might be something of which the
figment term in question is truly predicable. Freddoso, Ockhams Theory of Truth
Conditions, 64.
30 Chapter 1
proposition and Ockham states the truth conditions of propositions with

respect to the supposition of the terms contained in them. It would thus be
circular to define their (possible) supposition with respect to their occurrence
within true propositions. It shows rather that in this sense a term like white
signifies everything of which it can truly be said that it either is or was or will be
or can be white. It is no mere coincidence that Ockham presents the second
sense of signify using the example of a connotative term, since a term such as
white signifies primarily the thing which is white and secondarily the quality
of whiteness.64 For instance, if white is the predicate of a true past tense prop-
osition, then white signifies2 a particularized quality which at the time of
the propositions occurrence existed and might have ceased to be at present,
whereas its subject the substance which was white still exists at present.65
I shall discuss an example to illustrate this point in a moment.
The possibility of deictic application of a term to a thing is the basic model
for a term signifying a thing or things in Ockhams sense of the word: that a
term signifies1 something depends upon the existence of a thing the term can
be applied to correctly. In Ockhams view, existence is nothing but actual exist
ence. He states that by distinguishing between actual beings (ens in actu) and
potential beings (ens in potentia) Aristotle does not intend to divide things,
but what is predicable of these things.66 If a thing has not yet come into being
and exists only potentially, to use the Aristotelian terminology, then Ockham
64 See above 1.3 Absolute vs. Connotative Terms.

65 According to Ockhams ontological picture, there are only particular things and every-
thing that exists or can exist in this world is either a substance or a quality (an accident)
in the Aristotelian sense. [] since nothing is a thing but not a substance or an accident;
[]. ([] quia nulla res est quin sit substantia vel accidens; [].) sl I, 38 (op I, 108).
66 The whole sentence reads Et est notandum quod non intendit Philosophus dicere hic
quod ex parte rei quaedam sit causa in actu et quaedam in potentia, quia loquens scien-
tifice hic et alibi non dividit res sed praedicabilia de rebus. Brev. Summa Physic., lib.II (op
VI, 33) (Italics mine). Note that in this passage Ockham explicitly discusses the being of
causes; nevertheless, though, this extends to all things, since causes are not distinct from
particular things. Andr Goddu comments: [] Ockham decided to proceed with a criti-
cal reduction of the notion of the potential. Contrary to the implication contained in the
comments of Aristotle and some earlier scholastics, Ockham did not overlook the ambi-
guity involved in speaking about things which are in act or exist actually and things which
are in potentia or exist potentially. Ockhams view is quite clear: []. When Socrates is not
the actually existing Socrates, Socrates is not a being. To say Socrates can be a man or []
Socrates can be black is to say nothing more than that some predicables are predicated
of something by means of the verb can be rather than by means of the verb is. Andr
Goddu, The Physics of William of Ockham, Leiden; Kln, 1984, 173.
would rather say that it simply does not (yet) exist, just as a thing which has
ceased to be simply does not exist (any more). For a term to signify in this sec-
ond sense it is necessary that the term can correctly be applied to a thing at
some time in the present, past, or future. The basic idea of deictically apply-
ing a term to things at present is transferred to the idea of possible (and cor-
rect) application of a term to things at some past or future time.
Therefore, if a term signifies1 something, then it also signifies2 something,
but not vice versa. That the signification1 of a term automatically includes the
terms signification2 can be illustrated in the following way: discussing the dif-
ferent senses of signify in a passage of the Quodlibeta, Ockham states with
respect to the second sense:
And [] white signifies not only that thing which is white now, but
that which was white and which will be white, and that which can
be white. []. Likewise, in the proposition a white thing was an animal,
white supposits for those things which are white and for those which
were white. Likewise in the proposition a white thing will be a man,
white supposits for those things which are white and for those which
will be white.67
The proposition a white thing was a man might strike the contemporary
reader as awkward.68 Consider the following example instead: imagine that
Peter has forgotten to put on his glasses and does not recognize the snowman
in his garden. The next day, he reports to Anne:
(8) A white thing was in the garden
67 Et [] album non tantum significat illud quod nunc est album, sed quod fuit album et
erit, et quod potest esse album, []. Similiter in ista album fuit animal li album supponit
pro his quae sunt alba et pro his quae fuerunt. Similiter in ista album erit homo supponit
album pro his quae sunt et quae erunt alba. Quodl. V, q.16 (ot IX, 543) (Italics mine).
68 But this proposition can be reformulated according to the rules of the conversion of
propositions as follows: a man was white (homo fuit albus), since the latter is implied by
the former. Ockham gives rules of the conversion of propositions in the second part of
the Summa. In Chapter 21 he discusses first the conversion of affirmative and negative
present tense propositions. Concerning the kind of affirmative indefinite proposition
involved here, he writes: Similiter, tam indefinita quam particularis affirmativa converti-
tur tam in propositionem particularem quam indefinitam vel singularem, secundum
quod habet pro praedicato terminum commune vel singularem. sl II, 21 (op I, 319). Then
he states with respect to the example: Sicut sequitur homo est albus, igitur aliquod
album est homo et album est homo; []. sl II, 21 (op I, 319).
32 Chapter 1
According to Ockham, the subject term a white thing does not only supposit
personally for something which was white the day before, but also for some-
thing which is still white at the moment of utterance, if the snowman has not
melted in the meantime. Here the point mentioned above becomes crucial.
Ockham claims that the subject term of a proposition can always be taken to
supposit personally for things which presently exist, that is, for things the term
signifies1, whether the term is subject of a present or past or future tense prop-
osition. As I indicated above, this does not hold in general with respect to the
predicate term, since the subject to which a particularized quality is ascribed
within a past tense proposition might no longer have this quality when the
proposition occurs. Take the following example: while Peter is asleep Anne
paints the wall of his room red. Peter wakes up and exclaims:
(9) But the wall was white.
The predicate term white does not supposit for something which is white at
the moment of utterance, but only for something which previously was white.
A preliminary remark concerning my use of extension is called for here: in
the modern sense, all things to which a term is correctly applicable at some
time belong to the terms extension. In this sense, Socrates does not cease to
belong to the extension of man when he ceases to be. Since Ockham is com-
mitted to the view that only that which actually exists has existence at all, a
term loses the things it signifies1 when they cease to exist.69 For convenience,
when I speak of the extension at T of a term, I thereby mean to include all and
only those things existing at T to which the term is correctly applicable at T.
It would be misleading to claim that a term which signifies2 has merely past
or future things within its extension. I follow Freddoso who holds that [a]n
Ockhamistic semantics, [], is not irrevocably committed to the existence of
either merely past or merely future individuals. Freddoso argues that talk
about merely past individuals in fact, talk about a past individual in general,
whether or not it has ceased to exist can be dispensed with in favor of talk
about the semantic relations which terms once entered into in the context of
present-tense propositions.70 It can be added that the talk of merely past or
future individuals can also be replaced by talk about the possibility of correct
application of terms to things at past, present or future times.
69 I discuss the case of terms losing their significates below.

70 Freddoso states: Thus, in order to give truth conditions for past-tense propositions, Ockham
has to talk only of what terms once supposited for in present-tense propositions and not
of what terms now supposit for in past-tense propositions. And this interpretation
For a term to signify2 a thing a one would not necessarily be saying some-
thing true if one were to utter now this is (a) A where this supposits for a.
Note that in the case of connotative terms such as pale or white it is not even
necessary for one to correctly apply the term at any time, but it is sufficient that
it be not inconsistent to apply the term.71 For instance, the proposition the
chimera can be an animal is not possible in this sense since it implies a contra-
diction, as I stated above. In this context, possible is equivalent to not impos-
sible. Hence to say that Socrates can be pale is to say that it is not impossible
for Socrates to be pale. Ockham states elsewhere [] what is called possible is
that which is not impossible.72 But according to Ockham it is impossible that
a chimaera can be an animal can be true.73 To mark the difference between a
is suggested [] by the essential role that Ockham assigns to present-tense propositions

in his account of the truth conditions of past-tense (and future-tense) propositions.
Freddoso, Ockhams Theory of Truth Conditions, 38.
71 As Knne pleads, reference is not an existence-dependent relation: Bezugnahme setzt
nicht die Existenz eines Gegenstands voraus, auf den Bezug genommen wird. Eine
Relation R ist genau dann existenzindifferent, wenn aus aRb nicht folgt, da es etwas
gibt, zu dem a in der Relation R steht. In diesem Sinne sind z.B. Verehrung und Vorstellung
existenzindifferente Relationen; denn man kann sich Baal auch dann vorstellen und ihn
verehren, wenn es ihn nicht gibt. Knne, Abstrakte Gegenstnde, 23. In Ockhams sense,
reference is still an existencedependent relation in a somewhat metaphysical sense, since
it implies that x can exist or has existed.
72 [] illud dicitur possibile quod non est impossibile. Exp. Aurea., fol.126a. In another pas-
sage of the Summa Ockham states: [] that possible is the same as a proposition which
is not impossible. (ut possibile sit idem quod propositio non impossibilis.) sl II, 25 (op
I, 330).
73 It is impossible for the chimera can be an animal to be true because chimera is neces-
sarily empty. That the term is necessarily empty is grounded metaphysically. These meta-
physical reasons can only be indicated here. According to Ockham, God knows intuitively
everything that can exist: Therefore God saw from eternity on all things which can be
created, but they were still nothing as yet. Quodl. VI, q.6 (ot IX, 606607). The talk about
res factibiles involves talking about things as of a specific kind (species). It can be held
that it is a metaphysical principle that every animal which can exist is of one species, such
that one species-term can truly be predicated of it. But a chimera is nominally defined as
being composed of animals of more than one species. Thus, the principle underlying the
chimera contradicts the metaphysical principle. Therefore, it is impossible for the chi-
mera can be an animal to be true at any point in time. As Jennifer Ashworth notes, []
there were general terms which placed an obstacle in the path of those seeking a unified
theory, []. The favourite example of such terms was chimera, but irrational man, []
also served as illustrations. The problem was not merely that they failed to refer, but
rather that they were thought to be incapable of referring because the objects which they
apparently denoted were impossible just as, for the modern reader, a round square is
34 Chapter 1
true modal and a true future tense proposition, consider the following pair of
spoken propositions:
(10) This man will be pale. (Pointing at a sun-tanned man).

(11) This man can be pale. (Pointing at the same tanned man).
For (10) to be true, there must be a time when a present tense proposition this
man is pale will be true, where this is used to pick out the sun-tanned man
pointed at in (10). But for (11) to be true, it is not required that a present tense
proposition this man is pale will ever be true at any time. For (11) to be true it
is only required that the application of pale to the tanned man in question
should imply no contradiction. That is:
(C) A spoken term ts signifies2 a thing a if and only if ts can correctly be

applied to a at some present, past, or future time or if ts can be
applied to a without contradiction at some present, past, or future
time.74
Correct applicability of a term is necessary and sufficient for signification2 in

the case of absolute, categorematic terms such as man or dog, whereas mere
applicability without contradiction is necessary and sufficient for signification2
in the case of connotative terms such as pale or sick.75 The following question
arises with respect to future tense propositions where the subject term sup-
posits for a thing which does not exist at the moment of the propositions
occurrence. If Peter says to Anne,
(12) Our first born child will be named Peter
impossible. Jennifer Ashworth, Chimeras and Imaginary Objects: A Study in the Post-
Medieval Theory of Signification, Vivarium 15, 1 (1977), 5777 (58).
74 I use ts to indicate a spoken term and ps to indicate a spoken proposition. In what fol-
lows, I refer to spoken terms and spoken propositions, if not indicated otherwise, even if
I only speak about terms and propositions.
75 Something is a man if and only if man can be correctly applied to it at every point of
time of its existence: therefore correct applicability is necessary and sufficient for sig-
nification2 in the case of categorematic terms. On the contrary, for a connotative term
such as sick to signify2 something it is necessary and sufficient that it be applicable to
something without contradiction, although the term might in fact never be correctly
applicable to the thing within a present tense proposition. Therefore, applicability
without contradiction is necessary and sufficient for the signification2 of connotative
terms.
but Anne is not even pregnant, then there simply is nothing within the exten-
sion of the subject term in the sense explained. But what does the term supposit
for? The rather uninformative answer is that it supposits for something which it
does not signify1, but merely signifies2. Recall that in the introductory Section I
claimed signification to be more fundamental than supposition.76 Now signifi-
cation is more fundamental than supposition insofar as a term signifies1 every-
thing within its extension at T, prior to any propositional context it can occur
within. A term has an extension at T because it has signification in the first
sense at T. Having an extension at T implies the possibility of deictic application
of a term to existing things. Things are different with respect to the second
sense, since a term can be taken to signify2 at T even if there is nothing within its
extension at T. For a term to signify2, the possibility of application at some past,
present or future time is most crucial. It can be seriously doubted whether the
notion of signification in this second sense is more fundamental than the
notion of supposition, since the signification2 of a term is nothing but its pos-
sible supposition for something within present, past or future tensed or modal
propositions whether there is something in the terms extension or not.
To illustrate further this alleged difference between the first and the second
sense of signify, it is worth considering what Ockham calls the case of the loss
of significate(s). He writes:
Taking signify in the first way and the signified in the corresponding
way, it is often the case that due to a mere change in a thing the sound as
well as the concept lose their significate(s), that is, something which was
signified previously is not signified anymore. Taking signify in the sec-
ond way and the signified in the corresponding way, the sound or the
concept does not lose its significate(s) due to a mere change of an extra-
mental thing.77
76 See above 1.2 Signification and Supposition of Terms: First Approximation.

77 Accipiendo significare primo modo et significatum sibi correspondens, per solam
mutationem rei frequenter vox et etiam conceptus cadit a suo significato, hoc est, aliquid
cessat significari quod prius significabatur. Secundo modo accipiendo significare et sig-
nificatum sibi correspondens, vox vel conceptus per solam mutationem rei extra non
cadit a suo significato. sl I, 33 (op I, 95). Note that in the first case Ockham uses and (vox
et etiam conceptus) while he uses or in the second case (vox vel conceptus). It can be asked
whether there is an important reason for these different uses. One reason might be that
the loss of significates is in fact the only possible case of change of a concepts significa-
tion according to Ockham. This is emphasized by Ockham when he states that frequently
a sound as well as concepts (et etiam conceptus) lose their significates. See 2.2
Signification in Relation to Subordination and Imposition for further discussion.
36 Chapter 1
Ockham considers two cases of change which correspond to the two senses of
signify. Note that he explicitly mentions both the thing which is signified and
the sense in which a term can be taken to signify. Consider again his example
of white: in the first case, white can be applied deictictally to all those pres-
ently existing things which are white. It is winter, and there are snowmen
standing in gardens and parks. Weather changes, they melt. Thereby, Ockham
holds, white loses these snowmen as its significates, since, white does not
have these snowmen in its extension any more, and it is not possible to apply a
term deictically to things which have ceased to be.78 Loss of significates here is
the depletion of the terms extension in the sense explained.
In the second case, white does not lose its significates, because a terms
signification2 of past or future things means that the term is being used by a
speaker within a past or future tense or modal proposition for something
which does not exist at the moment of utterance. The point is simply that it is
still possible to say something true about a thing which has ceased to be by
means of a past tensed proposition, because it was possible at some time to say
something true about the thing by means of a present tense proposition.
To summarize, that a term signifies1 something at T means that it is possible
to deictically apply the term to a thing existing at T; and that a term signifies2
something means that it can be applied correctly or without contradiction
to a thing at some time or other. If the second adjunct applicability without
contradiction were missing, then the class of the significates of a concrete,
connotative term A such as white, sick, or loud would be identical to what
logicians call the extension of A: according to them, A has all and only those
things within its extension to which it can be correctly applied at some time T.
In my view, applicability without contradiction is crucial for Ockhams concep-
tion of signification2. This has something to do with how Ockham conceives of
the truth conditions of modal propositions such as Socrates can be sick. As
stated above, for this proposition to be true it is not required that Socrates is or
was sick at some time. It is only required that it is possible for Socrates to be
sick. And it is possible for Socrates to be sick if there is some potency in Socrates
to become and hence be sick. The notion of possibility involved here is not
78 A remark concerning grammar: it should be noted that in the passage cited above and
throughout in the Summa Logicae Ockham uses the Latin phrase cadit a suo significato
where significato is a singular form. Taken literally, the phrase says that a term loses its sig-
nificate. It should have become clear that by this it is implied that a term can lose some, that
is, one or more, or even all of its significates. In general, Ockham tends to speak just of the
significate (significatum) of a term; it depends on the context whether thereby one, some or
all of the signified things of a term are picked out. Explaining supposition Ockham also
writes that a term supposits for that which it signifies. See sl I, 64 (op I, 195).
mere logical possibility, but physical or real possibility.79 It does not imply a
contradiction to say of Socrates that it is possible for him to be sick because he
has this physical potency. By contrast, to say of a wall that it is possible for it to
be sick implies a contradiction because there is no such physical potency in
the wall. Thus if Ockham were to drop the adjunct applicability without con-
tradiction, he could not explain why propositions about the possible states of
things can be true by means of signification and supposition. Recall that the
signification2 of a term is nothing but its possible supposition for something
within some proposition. The point is that a term can supposit personally only
for something it signifies1/2. Thus given Ockhams view on the truth conditions
of modal propositions, together with his attempt to account for the truth con-
ditions of propositions in terms of signification and supposition, it follows that
the adjunct applicability without contradiction is indispensable for his con-
ception of signification2. By accounting for signification in terms of applicabil-
ity, Ockham unavoidably resorts to the notion of supposition, since the notion
of applicability pertains to the use of a term within a proposition. And the use
of a term at least partly determines the supposition of a term.80 It is time now
to turn to Ockhams treatment of (personal) supposition in general.
1.5 The Property of Supposition
After the treatment of the property of signification, Ockham starts his discus-
sion of supposition in Chapter 63 of the first part of the Summa, where he gives
a general account of it.81 Remarkably, he begins with an account of personal
supposition. He states:
Supposition means something like standing in place of something else, so

that, when a term stands for something [different from itself] within a
proposition in such a way that we are using that term (or rather the pro-
noun demonstrating it) for something of which the term (or its nominative
79 For a discussion of this notion of potency see Marylin Adams, Norman Kretzmann,
William of Ockham: Predestination, Gods Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, 2nd ed.,
Indianapolis, 1983, 5ff.
80 See 1.2 Signification and Supposition of Terms: First Approximation above and the fol-
lowing section.
81 To cite it again: Dicto de significatione terminorum restat dicere de suppositione, quae est
proprietas conveniens termino sed numquam nisi in propositione. sl I, 63 (op I, 193)
(Italics mine).
38 Chapter 1
form if it is inflected) is verified, the term supposits for it. And this is true at
least when the suppositing term is taken significatively.82
The notion of being verified (verificari) is central to this account, just as the
notion of being predicated was crucial in the exposition of the first sense of
signify.83 I hold that Ockham uses predicate to indicate that a term x is con-
nected as a predicate with a term y. Nevertheless, if a term x is connected as a
predicate with a term y then nothing is said of the term y, but something is said
of the thing y supposits for according to Ockham.84
I claim that Ockham uses verificari in this passage to indicate that a term
x is truly predicated or rather, truly predicable of a term y. The point is that a
term supposits for a thing, if it is possible to truly predicate the term of a
pronoun standing for the thing itself.85 This applies to both the subject and
the predicate. For instance, if the subject and the predicate of the proposi-
tion Socrates is a man supposit personally for Socrates, then it is possible to
truly predicate Socrates as well as man of a pronoun standing for Socrates,
such that the two singular propositions this is Socrates and this is a man are
true. Ockhams use of or (sive) is somewhat misleading here. It clashes with
this interpretation that as Ockham literally states a spoken term is veri-
fied of either (a) a thing or of (b) a pronoun suppositing for the thing, since a
term is connected as a predicate only with another term, not with a thing. By
82 Dicitur autem suppositio quasi pro alio positio, ita quod quando terminus in propositi-
one stat pro aliquo, ita quod utimur illo termino pro aliquo de quo, sive de pronomine
demonstrante ipsum, ille terminus vel rectus illius termini si sit obliquus verificatur, sup-
ponit pro illo. Et hoc saltem verum est quando terminus supponens significative accipi-
tur. sl I, 63 (op I, 193).
83 Nam uno modo dicitur signum aliquid significare quando supponit vel natum est sup-
ponere pro illo, ita scilicet quod de pronomine demonstrante illud per hoc verbum est
illud nomen praedicatur. Et sic album significat Sortem; haec enim est vera iste est
albus, demonstrando Sortem. sl I, 33 (op I, 95) (Italics mine).
84 Ockham states in a later chapter of the Summa, [] these verbs to be predicated, to be
subjected to, to be verified, [] or the like [] signify all the same. ([] hoc verbum
praedicari vel subici vel verificari [] vel huiusmodi [] idem significant.) sl I, 66 (op
I, 202). Note however that there is no strict synonymy, since being the predicate of a prop-
osition and being the subject of a proposition are two distinct relations. Perhaps it can be
held that these predicates belong to the same kind of predicates which express a terms
syntactic connection with another term, that is, either as subject or as predicate.
85 Generally, verificatur can be taken in both ways: in the context of actual supposition, it
can be rendered as truly predicated of, since a term supposits actually only if it occurs
within a proposition. For instance, in the proposition this is a man, man is verified, that
is, truly predicated of this.
adding rather in (or rather the pronoun demonstrating it) for something of
which the term (or its nominative form if it is inflected) is verified,86 I want
to make clear that the relation indicated by verificatur, namely, of being truly
predicated or predicable of a term, obtains between terms, and not between
a term and a thing. It should be stressed again that a term supposits for a
thing only if it is possible to truly predicate the term of a pronoun standing
for the thing.
However, the alternative reading for (a), that a spoken term is verified of a
thing, can be supported by turning to Tarskis conception of satisfaction
(Erfllung). Knne explains: Roughly, satisfaction is the converse of the rela-
tion signified by applies to: a number satisfies the open sentence x is odd just
in case the predicate is odd applies to it.87 The central idea is that there are
two converse relations which are expressed respectively by the two predicates
applies to and satisfies. If we adapt this idea to Ockhams conception,
it can be held that there are two converse relations which are expressed by the
predicates (correctly) applies to and verifies. For instance, Socrates
verifies the term man just in case man is correctly applicable to Socrates.88 In
this sense, it would be possible to say that man is verified by Socrates.89
Ockham also uses verificari in connection with propositions, for instance,
in his commentary on Aristotles Physics. Generally, this latter use is more com-
mon, since propositions are the proper candidates for truth, not terms. The
Franciscan says that the signified things (res) verify a proposition or that a
proposition is verified for things (verificatur pro rebus)90 or that things are
sufficient for the truth of a proposition.91 Ockham uses verificari here to con-
vey that the signified things make the proposition true: it was common to use
verificari in this sense in Ockhams time.92 Ockham can be taken to adapt
86 [] utimur illo termino pro aliquo de quo, sive de pronomine demonstrante ipsum, ille
terminus [] verificatur, []. sl I, 63 (op I, 193).
87 Knne, Conceptions of Truth, 197.
88 For further discussion of Tarskis conception of satisfaction, see Knne, Conceptions of
Truth, 197198; 201202; 212213.
89 The question is of course whether Ockham intended to use verificari in this sense.
90 Quando propositio verificatur pro rebus, si res permanentes sufficiunt ad verificandum
frustra ponitur alia res; []. Quaest. in Phys., q.8 (op VI, 413).
91 Quia quando propositio est vera pro rebus, si res permanentes non sufficiunt ad eius veri-
tatem oportet addere aliquid ultra. Quaest. in Phys., q.13 (op VI, 425).
92 Knne writes on the notion of verifying: Russells use of verifying in 1940 is just a lati-
nized echo of his former use of making true. Obviously, in his mouth verifying does not
mean what it meant in Vienna: finding out that (or checking whether) something is true.
Russell reactivates here a fairly old use of this verb. We find it in Aquinas when he says
40 Chapter 1
Aristotles (alleged) view that as Knne puts it a truth owes its truth to
something, is true in virtue of something, is rendered or made true by some-
thing.93 Aristotle writes: It is not because of our having the true thought that
you are pale, that you are pale; rather it is because of your being pale that we
who say so have a true thought.94 Knne discusses in some detail the various
senses of making true, starting with Aristotle. Knnes propositional reading
of making true is of special interest in this context. He suggests that it is pos-
sible to take the connection expressed by x makes y such-and-such in non-
causal terms, namely, in terms of conceptual explanation.95 Ockham could
readily agree with this, since that a proposition is true simply means that it is
in reality as it is signified by the proposition; [].96 If one uses because with
regard to conceptual explanation, it can also be said that, for instance, Socrates
is wise is true, because Socrates is wise.97 Interestingly, Ockham appears to use
because in a similar way when he states that [] if Socrates is sitting,
then Socrates is sitting is true, because it is as it is indicated by the proposi-
tion Socrates is sitting.98 However, it is clear that in the exposition of
that statements implying a flat contradiction cannot be veri-fied even by divine interven-
tion [nullo miraculo verificari possunt]. Knne, Conceptions of Truth, 146.
93 Ibid., 150.
94 Aristotle, Metaph. 10: 1051b 6-9. The translation is Knnes. Knne, Conceptions of
Truth, 150.
95 Knne writes: In other words, (R*) He is your first cousin because he is a child of a sibling
of one of your parents. This is the because of conceptual explanation: the second part of
(R*) elucidates the sense of the first part. If we take the use of make which is exemplified
by (R) [He is a child of a sibling of one of your parents, which makes him your first cousin]
as our model of understanding philosophical pronouncements like (S) The fact that snow
is white makes the statement that snow is white true, then they do not affirm a relation of
any kind between a truth vehicle and something in the world. Knne, Conceptions of
Truth, 155. See for further discussion Knne, Conceptions of Truth, 154157.
96 Unde propositionem esse veram est: ita esse in re, sicut significatur per eam; []. Exp.
Aur., In periherm., prooem., ad: Est autem quemadmodum See Philotheus Boehner,
Ockhams Theory of Truth, in Ph. Boehner, Collected Articles, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1958,
200. I discuss Ockhams general account of truth in some detail in Chapter 2, Section2.4.1
The General Explanation of Truth and Falsity. There I argue that truth and true are
relative terms connoting a relation which does not obtain independently of some opera-
tion of the intellect.
97 According to Knnes propositional reading, to say that Socrates is wise is true, because
that Socrates is wise does not imply the affirmation of a relation of any kind between a
truth vehicle and something in the world. Knne, Conceptions of Truth, 155.
98 Unde si Sortes sedet, tunc haec est vera, Sortes sedet, quia ita est sicut denotatur per
istam propositionem Sortes sedet; []. Exp. in Perih. (op II, 376) (Italics mine).
actual personal supposition, Ockham resorts to the notion of verificari as

applied to terms. In the passage cited above Ockham determines further the
relation or possible relation of true predication between terms by adding
another disjunction.99 He writes: [] the term (or its nominative form if it is
inflected) is verified, [].100 How should we interpret this? Take the following
(Latin) sentence:
(13) Sortes diliget Platonem. (Socrates loves Plato).
According to (b), Socrates supposits for Socrates within (13) if and only if a
singular proposition of the form this is Socrates would be true, if uttered,
where this supposits for Socrates. Likewise, Platonem supposits within (13)
for Plato if and only if this is Plato (iste est Plato) would be true, if uttered,
where this supposits for Plato. That is, although the term occurs in the accu-
sative case within (13), its nominative case is predicated of the demonstrative.
Generally speaking, every term contained in a proposition can be taken
to supposit according to Ockham. Although not stated explicitly in the pas-
sage cited above, the account of supposition is not restricted to present
tense propositions.101 Recall that the second sense of signify is explained by
means of supposition within past, present, or future tense or modal proposi-
tions. Thus:
(D) For every spoken term ts contained in a spoken proposition ps: ts

supposits for a thing a within ps if and only if a proposition of one
of the following forms would be true, if uttered: This is (a) ts or
This was (a) ts or This will be (a) ts or This can be a ts, where This
supposits for a.
Ockham relates supposition to the question of how a term is taken or used

within a given proposition by saying that we use a term in place of
something.102
99 In general, this reading seems to be closer to Ockhams use, as the textual evidence sug-
gests. See 1.5.1 The Standard Case: (Personal) Supposition and the Truth and Falsity of
Affirmative Propositions.
100 [], ille terminus vel rectus illius termini si sit obliquus verificatur. []. sl I, 63 (op I, 193).
101 Ockham presents his account of supposition with respect to present tense propositions
by using the present tense verb verificatur in ille terminus vel rectus illius termini si sit
obliquus verificatur, supponit pro illo. sl I, 63 (op I, 193).
102 Note that the aspect of use is twofold since it extends to both a speaker who uses an
expression in a certain way and a hearer (in the case of utterances) who interprets an
42 Chapter 1
He does not so much explain what it is for a term to stand for something
within a propositional context, but rather shows what a term can be used for,
and hence supposit for, within a proposition. This relates supposition to signi-
fication. Further, he relates supposition to the question of how a terms suppo-
sition can be determined. This is a matter of interpretation. Freddoso remarks:
[] although Ockham sometimes appeals to speakers intentions in order

to disambiguate equivocal propositions in which the same term can be
taken to supposit in two or more ways, such intentions only help deter-
mine which thing or things a speaker intends the term in question to
stand for. The basic notion of a terms standing for or being posited for a
thing remains itself undefined.103
To Freddosos last point it could be said that Ockham might not be interested
in delivering definitions in the strict sense. Recall that logic in Ockhams age is
a practical science dealing with propositions (and their syllogistic combina-
tions), and these are exclusively man-made.104 So the main task of logic is not
so much to explain what supposition is, as to determine how the terms can be
taken to supposit within different kinds of propositions. And the logician is
justified in presupposing that a propositions syntactical structure indicates
how the terms can be taken to supposit within a proposition, since there is a
purely syntactical criterion of supposition; whether a term can be said to sup-
posit or not is a matter of syntax, not of semantics. Perhaps supposition is a
basic relational property of a term.
I would like to draw attention to a later chapter devoted to some of the prob-
lems surrounding the notion of (personal) supposition. In this passage Ockham
tries to answer the objection that if simply nothing is signified1 by a term con-
tained in a present tense affirmative proposition of the form S is P, then the
term also fails to supposit personally for something which it signifies1, and
utterance in a certain way (that is, in the same way as the speaker or in another). It makes
sense in both cases to say that a speaker and a hearer can take a term significatively.
103 Freddoso, Ockhams Theory of Truth Conditions, 71, fn. 17.
104 In another treatise of logic Ockham writes: [] dicendum est, quod sicut dicit Avicenna
in principio suae Metaphysicae, quod distinctio est inter practicas et speculativas scien-
tias, quia scientiae practicae sunt de operibus nostris, scientiae autem speculativae non
sunt de operibus nostris. Ex quo patet quod logica practica est dicenda, quia cum scientia
logicae tractet de syllogismis, propositionibus et huiusmodi quae non nisi a nobis fieri pos
sunt, sequitur quod est de operibus nostris; non quidem exterioribus nisi forte secundario,
sed de interioribus quae vere opera nostra sunt; et per consequens ista scientia est prac-
tica et non speculativa. Exp. in Libr. Art. Logicae (op II, 7) (Italics mine).
hence, the objection goes, the term does not supposit personally at all. Ockham
distinguishes between two cases of the (personal) supposition of terms:
[] it must be said that, by virtue of linguistic conventions, we must con-

cede that, if no man is white and if no man sings the missal, [], the
subjects of the aforementioned propositions supposit for nothing. But
they are nonetheless taken significatively, since to take significatively or
to supposit personally can apply in two ways: (1) because a term suppos-
its for something it signifies, or (2) because it is indicated that it supposits
for something [].105
Ockham replies that even if there literally is nothing for which a term in such a
proposition supposits, the term is nonetheless taken significatively. Consider
an example, similar to Ockhams own. Anne, unaware that the snow has melted
away, says:
(14) The snowman in the garden is tall.
The term the snowman in the garden is taken significatively in this present
tense proposition such that it supposits personally, although it does not signify1
anything. Recall that according to the first sense of signify, a term can lose its
significate(s), that is, the extension of a term can be depleted due to the ceas-
ing-to-be of certain extramental things in the sense explained.106 However the
snowman in the garden is used significatively in (14), since it is used as if it
could be correctly applied to a presently existing thing, although it cannot,
because there is nothing within the terms extension at the time of utterance.
So a term is taken significatively within a false present tense affirmative propo-
sition if it is used or interpreted as if it could be correctly applied to something
presently existing. This illustrates that the supposition of a term is at least
partly determined by the intention of the speaker to use the term in a certain
way within a proposition.107 And in the case of utterances, the supposition of a
105 [] dicendum est quod de virtute sermonis est concedendum, si nullus homo est albus
et si nullus homo cantat missam [], quod in praedictis propositionibus subiecta pro
nullo supponunt. Et tamen sumuntur significative, quia sumi significative vel supponere
personaliter potest dupliciter contingere: (1) vel quia pro aliquo significato terminus sup-
ponit, (2) vel quia denotatur supponere pro aliquo []. sl I, 72 (op I, 218).
106 See 1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of signify (significare) above.
107 For a more detailed discussion of the relation between taking a term significatively and
personal supposition see 1.5.2 Personal Supposition of Terms and taking a term significa-
tively (sumi significative).
44 Chapter 1
term is also partly determined by the interpretation of the hearer of the utter-
ance. Clearly Ockham intends the treatment of supposition in the Summa to
be a semantic treatment, and seeks to determine the semantic properties of
terms within propositions. Both the signification and the supposition of a term
are pivotal in this respect.
The crucial difference between signification and supposition is that for a term
to signify1/2, it is necessary that the term can be applied to something at some
present, past, or future time whereas for a term to supposit personally within a
proposition it is sufficient that it is used as if it could apply to something: if it is
used in this way within a proposition, then Ockham also says that it is indicated
(denotatur) by the syntactical structure of the proposition that the term applies
to something, even though it might not apply to anything. It should be noted that
Ockham uses the term denotari quite consistently to designate characteristics of
propositions as opposed to characteristics of mere terms.108 The notion of per-
sonal supposition is wider than the notion of signification insofar as signification
implies the possibility of application to a thing at some time, whereas personal
supposition merely implies that the term is used within a proposition as if it
could be applied to something. Therefore if Anne corrects herself and utters
(15) The snowman in the garden has melted completely
the syntactic structure of her utterance (15) indicates not only that the term
the snowman in the garden here is used as if it apply to something, but also
that the snowman in the garden correctly applies to something. So one differ-
ence between (14) and (15) is that while both propositions meet the syntactic
criterion of being structured in a certain way, the semantic criterion of apply-
ing correctly to something is only met by (15). A further example may help to
distinguish more clearly the semantic criterion of signification and the purely
syntactic criterion of supposition. Ockham holds that the signification of spo-
ken terms is conventional. That is, a spoken term signifies only due to the
intention of speakers to use it for something.109 In the Ordinatio Ockham illus-
trates the conventionality of the signification of spoken terms by means of
non-significant sounds:
108 There are numerous places in the Summa Logicae where Ockham uses the term denotari
for something which is indicated or implied by the proposition: sl I, 72 (op I, 218ff.); sl
II, 27 (op I, 339); sl III-1, 2 (op I, 363); sl III-4, 2 (op I, 752).
109 I discuss the difference between spoken terms signifying conventionally and mental
terms signifying naturally in some detail in the next chapter. See 2.5 Demonstratives,
Correspondence, and Supposition of Mental Terms.
Although it is at present false that bu is ba, nevertheless if later bu was

established as signifying that which man signifies, and in the same way
and similarly ba was established as signifying that which the sound ani-
mal signifies [in the same way that the sound man signifies what it sig-
nifies], then after this act of establishment, the following proposition will
have to be granted: bu was ba before the act of establishment, but still
before the act of establishment it was false that bu is ba.110
First, Ockham holds that on the level of spoken terms any aggregate of
sounds satisfying the syntactical structure S is P can be said to be a spoken
proposition, regardless of whether it contains non-significant sounds in the
position of the subject or the predicate term. Thus:
(ps)weak For all spoken propositions ps: ps is a spoken proposition if

(a) ps has the syntactical structure S is P and if (b) there is some
sound in the position of S and some sound in the position of P.111
It is a purely syntactic criterion by which Ockham distinguishes (spoken) propo-

sitions from mere aggregates of sounds. That is, while bu is ba is a (spoken)
proposition in Ockhams sense, the following sequence of sounds is not: bu be
ba. The crucial point is that the proposition bu is ba is not true at least before
the secondary institution of bu for men and ba for animals.112 By the syntactical
110 Quia haec modo est falsa bu est ba, et tamen si postea instituatur bu ad significandum
illud quod significat homo, et eodem modo et similiter ba ad significandum illud quod
significat haec vox animal [et eodem modo], tunc post institutionem haec erit conce-
denda bu fuit ba ante institutionem, et tamen ante institutionem haec fuit falsa bu est
ba. Ord. I, dist.35, q.IV, (ot IV, 475).
111 By sound I mean any combination of vowels and consonants. And by (ps)weak I mean
spoken proposition in the weak sense.
112 Ockham says that bu is ba is false: since the subject and predicate of bu is ba do not have
signification, it follows that bu is ba is not true. And since Ockham subscribes to the
principle of bivalence, it follows that bu is ba is false. According to Baudry, Ockham prob-
ably did not subscribe to a three value logic. Baudry writes: [] [Ockham] connat la
thorie dAristote relative la vrit des futurs contingents. Daprs Michalski il laurait
tenue pour philosophiquement irrfutable de sorte quon devrait voir en lui un reprsent-
ant de la logique trois valeurs. [] Guillaume rejette la thorie dAristote et ce nest pas
seulement pour des raisons thologiques quil le fait. Lon Baudry, Lexique Philosophique
de Guillaume dOckham. tudes des Notions Fondamentales, Paris, 1958, 219220. I would
like to add that although Ockham holds that there are neutral propositions (propositiones
neutrae) this does not mean that these propositions are in fact neither true nor false but
merely that the thinker remains neutral with respect to the truth of the proposition: he
46 Chapter 1
structure of bu is ba it is indicated that the sounds in the position of the subject

and the predicate term apply (correctly) to something.
But since neither bu nor ba signifies1/2 anything at all, both sounds in the
spoken proposition bu is ba fail to supposit for something they signify within
this propositional context. In Ockhams words: Since always in such affirma-
tive propositions it is indicated that the term supposits for something, and
therefore if it supposits for nothing, the proposition is false.113
Notice that (14) above is false, since it is indicated by the syntactical struc-
ture of the snowman in the garden is tall that the snowman in the garden
applies to something but the term does not apply to anything in actuality.
Supposition therefore plays a central role in the account of the truth condi-
tions of propositions.114 I used the borderline-case of bu is ba for illustrative
purposes only, and one may wonder whether something can correctly be called
a (spoken) proposition in any substantial or strong sense according to Ockham
if it merely meets the syntactical criterion.115 At this point, I assume that being
syntactically structured is only a necessary condition for being a proposition in
the strong sense.116 For something to be a proposition in the strong sense it
should comply with another condition: it must contain terms. Terms have per
definitionem the property of signification.117 That is, the relevant cases which
judges the proposition to be neither true nor false. In fact, the attribute neutra character-
izes the propositional attitude of the thinker towards the content of the proposition. See
also P.T. Geach and W.F. Bednarowski, The Law of Excluded Middle (Symposium),
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 1956, 5990.
113 Nam semper in propositionibus talibus affirmativis denotatur terminus supponere pro
aliquo, et ideo si pro nullo supponit est propositio falsa. sl I, 72 (op I, 218).
114 For a discussion of truth conditions see the next section.
115 See 2.4 Mental Propositions and Spoken Propositions: The Relation of Correspondence
for further discussion.
116 I omit the bracketed spoken here since the criterion of being syntactically structured
applies to mental and written propositions as well.
117 Otherwise, it would not be possible to distinguish between dummy-propositions con-
taining items which are not even terms, since they do not have the property of significa-
tion, and other propositions which for example contain fictional terms. That is, if the
syntactical criterion were the only means of distinguishing between items which are
propositions and those which are not, then a proposition such as a chimera is a chimera
would be treated on a par with nonsense propositions like bu is ba: according to Ockham,
they are both not true since the terms contained fail to supposit for something which they
signify1/2 within the proposition. But the term chimera has the property of signification,
although it cannot stand within a proposition for that which it signifies. This important
difference would simply be withdrawn.
Ockham has in mind in his discussion of supposition are those where terms are
put together in a syntactically appropriate way. According to him, there is
always an interpretation or reading of a proposition in which the terms can be
said to have personal supposition.118
Thus it is possible to give different readings of a proposition by interpreting
its terms with respect to their supposition: an interpreter has to determine
what it is that the terms of the proposition supposit for, since within a proposi-
tion a term can either be used for something it signifies1/2 or it can be used as if
it could be applied to something it signifies1/2. In this way the truth conditions
of propositions can also be given by means of the terms supposition. In the
next Section I show how Ockham determines the truth conditions of affirma-
tive present tense propositions by means of the supposition of their terms.
1.5.1 The Standard Case: (Personal) Supposition and the Truth and
Falsity of Affirmative Propositions
Ockham starts his account of supposition in Summa Logicae I, 63 which
I quoted at the beginning of the last section with the case where a term stands
for something it signifies1 within a present tense affirmative proposition. This
could be called the positive case. Analogously, the case where a term does not
stand for a thing it signifies1 because there is nothing within the terms exten-
sion could be called the negative case.119
It is possible that the general account of supposition and the account of the
first sense of signify are intimately connected because Ockham considers the
positive case of supposition, where a term stands for something it actually
signifies1, as the canonical case of personal supposition. I cite Ockhams
account of supposition again:
Supposition means something like standing in place of something

else, so that, when a term stands for something [different from itself]
within a proposition in such a way that we are using that term (or rather
118 This seems to be Ockhams position: Note too that a term can always have personal sup-
position, in whatever proposition it occurs, []. (Notandum est etiam quod semper ter-
minus, in quacumque propositione ponatur, potest habere suppositionem personalem,
[].) sl I, 65 (op I, 197). It also explains from the speakers point of view what happens
when someone asserts that p while it is not the case that p: although an utterance takes
the form of an assertion by satisfying the syntactical criterion, its terms do not apply to
anything such that the proposition is not true.
119 Recall that I use extension here in the following sense: the extension of a term includes
all and only those things existing at T to which the term is (correctly) applicable at T. See
1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of Signify (significare).
48 Chapter 1
the pronoun demonstrating it) for something of which the term (or its
nominative form if it is inflected) is verified, the term supposits for it. And
this is true at least when the suppositing term is taken significatively.120
Ockham here makes use of the same kind of true, singular proposition as in his
account of signification. If a proposition of the form This is (an) A is true, this
indicates that the term supposits personally for something it signifies1.121 Note
that it is not implied that a term supposits within a proposition for everything
it signifies1.
How does the truth of a singular proposition of this special kind relate to the
personal supposition of the subject and the predicate term within a singular
affirmative proposition of the form This S is P?122 Ockham emphasizes that
both the subject and the predicate term supposit personally: And in this sense
the subject as well as the predicate supposit; and generally whatever can be the
subject or the predicate of a proposition supposits.123
Neither is it clear in what respect the function of the subject differs from
the function of the predicate, nor what must obtain in order for a proposition to
be true. According to Ockham, every term which signifies1/2 something can be
the subject or the predicate of a proposition since every term which signifies1/2
something has the properties of signification and of (personal) supposition,124
such that being the subject or being the predicate of a proposition
is a relational property of a term that enters as subject or predicate into a
120 Dicitur autem suppositio quasi pro alio positio, ita quod quando terminus in propositi-
one stat pro aliquo, ita quod utimur illo termino pro aliquo de quo, sive de pronomine
demonstrante ipsum, ille terminus vel rectus illius termini si sit obliquus verificatur, sup-
ponit pro illo. Et hoc saltem verum est quando terminus supponens significative accipi-
tur. sl I, 63 (op I, 193).
121 It should be noticed further that in this general account of supposition (in sl I, 63)
Ockham seems to rely entirely on the first sense of signify.
122 Ockham starts his discussion of the truth conditions of different kinds of propositions in
the second part of the Summa with singular, (affirmative) non-modal propositions such
as Socrates is a man (Sortes est homo) or this is an angel (iste est angelus). See sl II, 2
(op I, 249250). That is, the subject of such a singular proposition can either be a proper
name like Socrates, a demonstrative, or a mixed singular term such as this man. I will
refer to the latter kind of singular terms throughout this section.
123 Et sic tam subiectum quam praedicatum supponit; et universaliter quidquid potest esse
subiectum propositionis vel praedicatum supponit. sl I, 63 (op I, 193).
124 It follows that according to Ockham, terms such as me or it can be predicates. According
to his grammatical description, however, it is the predicate of a proposition such as this
is it or me in its only me.
proposition.125 And whether a term is the subject or the predicate of a proposi-

tion is wholly determined by its position within the proposition. Ockham
describes these positions somewhat boldly, by following the grammatical (sur-
face) structure of sentences in the Aristotelian standard form: Just as the sub-
ject is that part of a proposition which precedes the copula, so that part of the
proposition which follows the copula is called the predicate.126 The copula
then is that verb that connects the predicate with the subject.127 Ockham
explains:
Generally a term supposits for that thing of which the predicate is indi-
cated as being predicated by a proposition, if the suppositing term is the
subject; if the suppositing term is the predicate, then it is indicated that
the subject is subject with respect to the thing or to the pronoun demon-
strating the thing, if a proposition is formulated.128
The syntactical structure of a proposition [S is P] indicates that there is a rela-

tion between the things the subject supposits for and the things the predicate
term supposits for. Note again the ambiguity Ockham introduces when he says
that it is indicated that the subject is subject with respect to the thing or to the
pronoun demonstrating the thing.129 The ambiguity can be avoided by claim-
ing that a relation between the terms indicates that there is a relation between
the things the terms supposit for.130 In the case of present tense affirmative
125 This is relevant with respect to Ockhams overall approach to predication. I claim that the
distinction between being a predicate and being a subject is not supposed to mark a
difference between two kinds of terms according to Ockham, since every term that can be
the subject or predicate applies to particular things. There is a meta-linguistic description
of this purely syntactical function of subject and predicate in the Quodlibeta where
Ockham states that the terms subject and predicate are co-relative terms indicating a
relation of reason. See Quodl. VI, q.30 (ot IX, 699).
126 Sicut subiectum dicitur illa pars propositionis quae praecedit copulam, ita illa pars prop-
ositionis quae sequitur copulam dicitur praedicatum. sl I, 31 (op I, 93).
127 Copula autem vocatur verbum copulans praedicatum cum subiecto. sl I, 31 (op I, 94).
128 Et sic universaliter terminus supponit pro illo de quo vel de pronomine demonstrante
ipsum per propositionem denotatur praedicatum praedicari, si terminus supponens sit
subiectum; si autem terminus supponens sit praedicatum, denotatur quod subiectum
subicitur respectu illius, vel respectu pronominis demonstrantis ipsum, si propositio
formetur. sl I, 63 (op I, 194).
129 For a discussion of this ambiguity see 1.5 The Property of Supposition.
130 In general the ambiguity Ockham expresses in various places can be avoided in this sense,
so I will not explicitly come back to this point every time in this work.
50 Chapter 1
propositions this relation is nothing but the identity of the thing (or things) the
two terms supposit for.131 In the Quodlibeta Ockham writes:
[] that for every true affirmative proposition to be true it is required

that the subject and the predicate signify the same and supposit for the
same. [] since every true, affirmative proposition is true due to the
identity of the thing signified by the subject and the predicate; since
by the proposition it is not indicated that the subject is [identical with]
the predicate, but it is indicated that the thing imported132 by the
subject is [identical with] the thing imported by the predicate, since
we use sounds and other terms, not for themselves, but for the thing
they signify.133
That is, if an affirmative proposition of the form S is P is true, then what is

indicated by the proposition is in fact the identity of the supposita the
things the terms stand for within p and not the identity of the subject and the
131 As Dominik Perler holds: Er (Ockham) behauptet nmlich: Wenn der supponierende
Terminus Subjekt ist, so steht er fr ein Objekt x, fr das gilt: Durch die syntaktische
Verbindung Subjekt- Prdikat wird ausgesagt, da das Prdikat von x ausgesagt wird.
Wenn der supponierende Terminus Prdikat ist, so steht er fr ein Objekt x fr das gilt:
Durch die syntaktische Verbindung Subjekt- Prdikat wird ausgesagt, da das Subjekt in
bezug auf x als Subjekt fungiert. Dominik Perler, Der propositionale Wahrheitsbegriff im
14. Jahrhundert, Berlin; New York, 1992, 114.
132 Ockham uses the term import to denote the things a term supposits for within a proposi-
tion. Note that Ockham also uses the expression in connection with propositions, in fact
he uses a variety of terms with respect to what a proposition says or conveys as a whole.
For instance, he says of propositions that something is signified (significatur) or imported
(importatur) or indicated (denotatur) by them. The terms are used interchangeably to
express the fact that a proposition says something as a whole. See Quodl. II, q.19 (ot IX,
197); Quodl. VI, q.29 (ot IX, 697); Quodl. III, q.14 (ot IX, 253); Exp. in Perih. (op II, 376); sl
II, 2 (op I, 250). For the discussion of what a proposition imports see 2.4.1 The General
Explanation of Truth and Falsity.
133 [] quod omnis propositio affirmativa vera requirit ad veritatem suam quod subiectum
et praedicatum significent idem et supponant pro eodem. [] quia omnis propositio
affirmativa vera est vera propter identitatem rei significatae per subiectum et praedica-
tum; quia per talem propositionem non denotatur quod subiectum sit praedicatum, sed
denotatur quod res importata per subiectum sit res importata per praedicatum, quia
utimur vocibus et aliis terminis, non pro se, sed pro re quam significant. Quodl. III, q.12
(ot IX, 250).
predicate term.134 Ockham designates other relations, for instance, logical

inference by the very same expression.135
What about the truth of a singular affirmative proposition of the form This
S is P then? Such a proposition is true if and only if the subject and the predi-
cate supposit for the same. Thus:
(E) A proposition of the form This S is P is true if and only if there is

something for which both This S and P supposit.136
It is fitting to start with the truth conditions of singular affirmative proposi-

tions because singular propositions play a crucial, inferential role with respect
to the truth of any kind of affirmative proposition. For instance, a universal
affirmative proposition of the form Every S is P is true if and only if all its sin-
gulars are true, that is, if the conjunction of all singular propositions This S1 is
P and this S2 is P andthis Sn is P is true. Some of Ockhams examples are
helpful in illustrating the supposition of the subject and the predicate. He
starts with the subject:
Just as by the [proposition] man is an animal it is indicated that Socrates

is truly an animal, so the [proposition] this is an animal would be true if
it were formulated while pointing at Socrates.137
Ockham holds that it is indicated by the general proposition man is an animal

that Socrates is truly an animal. The Latin proposition homo est animal can
134 It is permissible to translate the expression denotatur as being implied in those instances
where this function relates to the syntactical structure of the proposition.
135 It can be held in general that Ockham indiscriminately designates different (proposi-
tional) functions by this expression, namely, syntactical as well as logical functions; and
sometimes he uses the expression to designate semantic or other relations which obtain
between terms and the things they denote on the propositional level. It will be shown that
Ockham also uses this expression to characterize what is said or expressed by a proposi-
tion as a whole as well.
136 Again I rely on Freddoso: A similar account holds for all affirmative S-propositions [that
is, a present-tense non-modal singular proposition]. Let N stand for a proper name or
demonstrative pronoun and let P stand for a term capable of occupying the predicate
position of an S-propositon. Then, [] an affirmative S-proposition N is P is true if and
only if there is something for which both N and P supposit. Freddoso, Ockhams Theory
of Truth Conditions, 9.
137 Sicut per istam homo est animal denotatur quod Sortes vere est animal, ita quod haec sit
vera si formetur hoc est animal, demonstrando Sortem. sl I, 63 (op I, 194) (Italics mine).
52 Chapter 1
be interpreted as universal (every man is an animal.) How can the relation

between the universal proposition every man is an animal and the (true) sin-
gular proposition Socrates is an animal be described? Ockham uses the
expression of denotatur here to indicate a logical relation of inference and not
a mere syntactical relation.138 (It would have been helpful if Ockham had cho-
sen this man is an animal instead of Socrates is an animal, since from man is
an animal alone it does not follow that Socrates is an animal. What is further
required as a premise is Socrates is a man.)
The subject term every man in the proposition every man is an animal
supposits for all living men, of which Ockham then picks out Socrates. That is,
every man supposits for everything it signifies1. And since everything that
belongs to the extension of the species term man necessarily belongs to the
extension of the genus term animal, Socrates belongs to the extension of both
terms.139 The point is that precisely those things belonging to both extensions
are picked out by the supposition of the subject and the predicate term of the
universal proposition.
The universal affirmative proposition every man is an animal is true only if
there is at least one thing belonging to the extension of both man and of ani-
mal. As Ockham says, this is an animal would be true, pointing at Socrates.
That is, if Socrates were the only presently existing man, then the universal
138 Jol Biard takes the expression denotari as characterizing a proposition in logical respect:
Alors que la premire fallacie (lquivoque) nat de la signification ou de la supposition
dun mot, la deuxime (lamphibolie) nat de la diversit dacceptations dune expression
complexe, dun nonc (oratio). Le premier mode survient quand un nonc a plusieurs
sens (diversos sensus). Comment entendre un tel sens, si tant est que la signification, au
sens strict, concerne les termes et non pas, autant que lon sache, un signifi total de la
proposition? Guillaume emploie souvent le verbe denotare pour caractriser une relation
smantique spcifique la proposition, mais il sagit toujours dindiquer une interprta-
tion logique: []. Jol Biard (transl.), Somme de Logique, III 2me volume, Mauvezin, 2008,
2223.
139 In Ockhams terms, a genus contains (continet) a species, but not vice versa. That a genus
contains a species means that a genus term can truly be predicated of species terms. For
instance, the genus term animal can truly be predicated of species terms such as man,
dog, horse etc. Note that if a genus is predicated of a species term as in man is an ani-
mal, both man and animal supposit personally for the particular things within their
extensions, not for themselves. What is implied here is that every genus contains more
than one species, since Ockham claims that genera and species differ insofar as a genus
can be predicated of many while a species cannot be predicated of many, but only of its
genus. He writes: [] genus continet speciem, species autem non continet genus. Quod
est sic intelligendum quod genus natum est praedicari de pluribus, hoc enim hoc
proposition every man is an animal would be true as well, because the inter-
section of the extensions of the terms man and animal would not be empty.140
(E) can be integrated into the account of the truth conditions of a universal,
affirmative proposition of the form Every S is P:
(F) A universal affirmative proposition Every S is P is true if and only if

there is something for which both S and P supposit such that
every singular proposition This S1 is P and This S2 is P andThis Sn
is P is true, where This S1 supposits for a thing a and This S2 sup-
posits for b and , This Sn supposits for n and a, b, , n exhaust the
extensions of S and of P.141
If there is at least one true singular proposition of this kind, then the
intersection of the extensions of the subject and the predicate term is not
empty.142 It is not the case that for a proposition of the form Every S is P to be
true it would suffice for only one of its singulars to be true, since it is necessary
(and sufficient) that all of its singulars be in fact true. The condition of the
non-emptiness of the intersection of the suppositing terms extensions in the
positive case is illustrated by Ockham with respect to the predicate term
as well:
continere vocatur , species autem non potest praedicari de pluribus quam genus suum.
sl I, 22 (op I, 72). See also Exp. Porph., cap.1 (op II, 19).
140 As Gyula Klima puts it: As is well-known, what determines the truth-conditions of asser-
toric categorical propositions for Ockham is the co-supposition of their terms, which in
turn is determined by the emptiness or non-emptiness of the intersection of the sets of
their ultimate significata (relative to the time connoted by the copula). And the ultimate
significata of these terms are nothing but the individuals represented by the concepts to
which these terms are subordinated. Gyula Klima, Mental Representations and Concepts
in Medieval Philosophy, 7 (unpublished paper, Leuven Kolloquium 2010, Varieties of
Cognitive Theory in the Late Middle Ages. (Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte, Katolieke
Universiteit Leuven, February 1820, 2010).
141 Again, as Freddoso remarks: Ockham thus extends to present-tense, non-modal particu-
lar and universal propositions the same sort of account which he gives of the truth
conditions of S-propositions [present-tense non-modal singular proposition]. And, once
again, his theory of predication construed here to include his theory of signification
guarantees that the truth of particular and universal propositions does not presup-
pose the existence of non-individual things. Freddoso, Ockhams Theory of Truth
Conditions, 19.
142 Ockham states: Et hoc est quod communiter dicitur quod ad veritatem talis propositio-
nis universalis sufficit quod quaelibet singularis est vera. sl II, 4 (op I, 260).
54 Chapter 1
And this can proportionally be said of the predicate: for by the proposi-
tion Socrates is white it is indicated that Socrates is that thing which has
a whiteness; and if there were nothing apart from Socrates having a
whiteness, then the predicate would supposit only for Socrates.143
If there was nothing but Socrates in the extension of the term white then
Socrates would be the only thing white could supposit for as predicate within
any present tense affirmative proposition.144 This is not to say that the proposi-
tion Socrates is white would be the only true, affirmative proposition in which
white was predicate. Recall that Socrates can be signified in different ways,
since there is more than one term having Socrates in its extension, for instance
man and animal, such that the propositions this man is white and this ani-
mal is white would be true, where this man and this animal supposit for
Socrates.
What about false affirmative propositions? Consider again the proposition
every man is an animal and suppose that not even Socrates exists any more.
The proposition then would be false because there simply would be nothing
for which the two terms supposit: the identity of the supposita presupposes
their existence.145 Analogously to (E) it can be held:
(G) A proposition of the form This S is P is false if and only if there is

nothing for which both S and P supposit.146
It has become clear that Ockham accounts for the truth and falsity of affirma-
tive propositions by means of the supposition of their terms. One objection to
this approach has been mentioned already: if the subject or the predicate term
143 Et sic, proportionaliter, dicendum est de praedicato: nam per istam Sortes est albus
denotatur quod Sortes est illa res quae habet albedinem; et si nulla res haberet albedinem
nisi Sortes, tunc praedicatum praecise supponeret pro Sortes. sl I, 63 (op I, 194).
144 For the difference between the supposition of the subject and the predicate within pres-
ent, past and future tensed propositions see above 1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense
of Signify.
145 Notice that the proposition every man is an animal is somewhat special because every
time it is actually formulated (thought, uttered, or written) by a human being it is true,
since at least the human actually formulating the proposition exists such that man is not
empty. To make the point in question the proposition actually exists, but no human
being Ockham could argue that the proposition is formulated by a non-human being,
e.g. an angel or some alien.
146 In general then: a proposition of the form S is P is false if and only if there is nothing for
which both S and P supposit.
of a present tense affirmative proposition does not supposit positively for a

presently existing thing, then it does not supposit personally at all. Ockhams
answer is that even if the subject or the predicate term does not supposit per-
sonally for an existing thing or things, it is still taken significatively. Above
I mentioned that the supposition of a term is at least partly determined by its
use. The question then is what exactly it amounts to say that the significative
or literal use of a term determines its personal supposition. I now turn to the
relation between significative or literal use and personal supposition.
1.5.2 Personal Supposition of Terms and Taking a Term Significatively

(sumi significative)
What does it mean that the significative or literal use of a term at least partly
determines its personal supposition? The significative use of a term is always a
use within a proposition. It is doubtful whether there are in fact any genuine
uses of terms which are strictly speaking not propositional.147 Recall that
Ockham pointed to the significative use of a term to meet the objection that if
a term does not supposit positively for a thing or things within its extension,
then it does not supposit at all. It is time now to take a closer look at the
crucial passage in Summa Logicae I, 72 where Ockham discusses this objec-
tionto his notion of personal supposition. The objection is advanced in the
following way:
147 I claim that, strictly speaking, there is no non-propositional use of a term, since a single
term can if used anaphorically be used as a proposition. In his commentary on
Aristotles Perihermenias Ockham discusses truncated (spoken) propositions. He gives
the following example: If it is asked what swims in the sea? And it is answered the fish,
then the fish is strictly speaking not a spoken proposition, since these contain at least a
noun and a verb. However, he continues, the utterance of the fish is equivalent to a whole
proposition, since the audience is able to complete the missing part of the truncated
proposition. The whole passage reads: Puta: si quaeratur quid natat in mari?, et respon-
deatur piscis, de virtute vocis proferendo hoc nomen nihil vere enuntiat, cum omnis
enuntiatio componatur ad minus ex subiecto et verbo, igitur talis non enuntiat sed pro-
fert tantum. Intelligendum est quod sic respondens per unum nomen vel per unum ver-
bum, de virtute vocis non profert propositionem, nec complete respondet sed truncate;
tamen secundum usum loquentium tale nomen vel verbum aequivalet uni propositioni,
quia audientes communiter subintelligunt aliam partem propositionis. Exp. in Perih.,
lib.1, c.4, 5 (op II, 394). It is important to note that this possibility seems to pertain exclu-
sively to the level of spoken and written propositions, since it is just a question of the
communicative use of expressions. It is quite another question whether it is possible to
use a mental term anaphorically or in place of a complete mental proposition.
56 Chapter 1
The second doubt concerns propositions like a white man is a man,

someone singing the missal is a man, [], supposed that nobody is white
and that no-one sings the missal []. What do the subject terms supposit
for? For it seems that they supposit for nothing which they signify, because
they cannot be verified of any such thing; and neither is it possible to
verify them of themselves, because then they would not have personal
supposition; therefore they do not supposit determinately for something,
and consequently, they do not have determinate supposition.148
The objector argues that the subject term of a false non-singular present tense
affirmative proposition does not supposit determinately, if it does not supposit
for something it signifies1.149 Determinate supposition is one of the two modes
of common personal supposition.150
The general subject term of a particular affirmative proposition has deter-
minate supposition if it is possible to descend to a disjunction of singular prop-
ositions under it. For instance, it is possible to descend from the proposition
some man runs to the disjunctively connected singular propositions this
man1 runs or that man2 runs orthat mann runs.151 The truth of one of the sin-
gular disjuncts is sufficient for the truth of the non-singular affirmative propo-
sition. This kind of common personal supposition is called determinate
because such a proposition is only true if it is true of at least one particular
148 Secundo est dubium de istis homo albus est homo, cantans missam est homo, [],
supposito quod nullus sit albus et quod nullus cantet missam [] Pro quibus subiecta
supponunt? Quia videtur quod pro nulla re significata, quia de nulla tali verificantur; nec
pro se ipsis, quia tunc non haberent suppositionem personalem; igitur non supponunt
determinate pro aliquo, et per consequens non habent suppositionem determinatam. sl
I, 72 (op I, 214).
149 Ockham distinguishes between different kinds of non-singular propositions, namely uni-
versal propositions, such as all men are mortal or every dog has a tail, indefinite proposi-
tions such as a man runs, and particular propositions such as some man plays the piano.
See sl II, 1 (op I, 244).
150 Baudry characterizes determinate supposition as follows: Elle est dite dtermine quand
la proposition permet de passer par disjonction des propositions singulires. On la
nomme dtermine parce que la proposition indique quelle doit tre vraie pour un indi-
vidu dtermin et que la vrit de nimporte quelle proposition singulire suffit en
assurer la vrit. Exemple, lhomme court, de l on peut conclure que cet homme ou cet
autre ou un troisime court. Baudry, Lexique Philosophique de Guillaume dOckham, 260.
151 Suppositio determinata est quando contingit descendere per aliquam disiunctivam ad
singularia; sicut bene sequitur homo currit, igitur iste homo currit, vel ille, et sic de sin-
gulis. sl I, 70 (op I, 210).
thing.152 For instance, some man is running is only true if at least one man is
actually running.
Ockhams objector here literally states that the subject term cannot be veri-
fied of something if there is nothing the subject term supposits for. Recall that
I explained verification in terms of true predication: according to Ockham,
that a term x is truly predicated of a term y means that by truly predicating a
term x of a term y, something true is said of the thing the terms supposit for.153
Hence, that a subject term cannot be verified of something means that it is
not possible to say something true of a thing or things by truly predicating the
term of another term, simply because there is nothing the term in question
supposits for.
The objector briefly considers the possibility of taking the subject term to be
truly predicable of itself, such that the subject term supposits at least for some
thing, if not for something it signifies1. But he discards this possibility immedi-
ately by pointing out that quite trivially the subject term would not have
personal supposition, rather it would have material supposition instead, (and
neither is it possible to verify them of themselves, because then they would not
have personal supposition.)154 The objector concludes that the subject term of
an affirmative non-singular proposition does not have determinate personal
supposition if the term does not supposit for something it signifies1. I would
like to add that if the subject term does not have determinate personal supposi-
tion, then it is questionable whether it can be taken to have personal supposi-
tion at all. The argument can be rendered as follows:
(P1) The subject term of a proposition of the form Some S is P has deter-
minate personal supposition if and only if at least one singular
proposition of the form This S is P is true, where This S supposits
for something S signifies1.
152 Et ideo dicitur suppositio determinata quia per talem suppositionem denotatur quod
talis propositio sit vera pro aliqua singulari determinata; quae singularis determinata
sola, sine veritate alterius singularis, sufficit ad verificandam talem propositionem. sl I,
70 (op I, 210).
153 For the notion of verificari see 1.5 The Property of Supposition.
154 Note however that this would clash with the general rule Ockham formulates elsewhere
that a term can have material supposition only if the other term is truly predicable of
spoken or written signs. Sed terminus non in omni propositione potest habere supposi-
tionem simplicem vel materialem, sed tunc tantum quando terminus talis comparatur
alteri extremo quod respicit intentionem animae vel vocem vel scriptum. sl I, 65 (op I,
197198). However, this is not the case here, since it is not possible to say something true
about a sign by predicating run of it.
58 Chapter 1
(P2) If the subject term of a proposition of the form Some S is P does
not supposit determinately for something S signifies1, then the sub-
ject term does not supposit personally at all.
(P3) If no singular proposition this snowman is in the garden is true,
where this snowman supposits for a particular snowman, then the
proposition some snowman is in the garden is false.
(P4) If the subject term of the false proposition some snowman is in the
garden does not supposit determinately for something it signifies1,
then due to (P2) the subject term does not supposit personally
at all.
(C) If the subject term of a false affirmative proposition of the form
Some S is P does not supposit for something it signifies1, then the
subject term does not supposit personally at all.
If the conclusion were true, then it would follow that Ockhams account of
truth conditions in terms of supposition partly fails with respect to false affir-
mative propositions. Ockhams strategy is to deny the truth of (P2). He gives
the following reply:155
[] it must be said that, by virtue of linguistic conventions, we must con-

cede that, if no man is white and if no man sings the missal, [], the sub-
jects of the aforementioned propositions supposit for nothing. But they
are nonetheless taken significatively, since to take significatively or to
supposit personally can apply in two ways: (1) because a term supposits
for something it signifies, or (2a) because it is indicated that it supposits for
something or (2b) it is implied that it does not supposit for something.156
Note that Ockham claims to distinguish between two senses of to take signifi-
catively or to supposit personally and then actually enumerates three differ-
ent cases. The point is that he largely distinguishes between two kinds of cases,
namely the positive case of a true affirmative proposition, where (1) a term
supposits for [some of] its significate[s] on the one hand and the two
155 For ease of reference, I mark the different cases by inserting numbers.
156 [] dicendum est quod de virtute sermonis est concedendum, si nullus homo est albus
et si nullus homo cantat missam [], quod in praedictis propositionibus subiecta pro
nullo supponunt. Et tamen sumuntur significative, quia sumi significative vel supponere
personaliter potest dupliciter contingere: (1) vel quia pro aliquo significato terminus sup-
ponit, (2a) vel quia denotatur supponere pro aliquo (2b) vel quia denotatur non suppo-
nere pro aliquo. []. sl I, 72 (op I, 218) (Italics mine).
other cases, where something is indicated by the syntactical structure of

theproposition, namely (2a) that the term supposits for something [it signi-
fies] or (2b) that the term does not supposit for something [it signifies]. (2a)
can be taken as the case of false affirmative propositions, where it is merely
indicated that the term supposits for something, but there is indeed nothing
the term supposits for. (2b) embraces the cases of true or false negative
propositions.157 It is questionable whether Ockham here uses the two expres-
sions to take significatively and to supposit personally interchangeably. How
is the disjunctive particle or (vel) to be taken here? The two expressions des-
ignate two closely related conceptions; it would be misleading, however, to
claim that the significative use of a term is identical to the terms personal
supposition.158
Above I held provisionally that a term is taken significatively within a false
present tense affirmative proposition if the term is used or interpreted as if it
could be correctly applied to something presently existing.159 This corresponds
to (2a); note that a term is likewise used significatively within a true present
tense affirmative proposition if it is used for something which the term signi-
fies1. This corresponds to the first case (1). It will soon become apparent that it
is necessary to modify slightly the account of a terms significative use.160 In
what follows, I concentrate on the first and the second cases. Consider an
example. At a party, Anne tells her guests:
(16) The cheesecake is in the kitchen.
She uses the subject term the cheesecake for the cheesecake she has put on
the kitchen table and the term actually supposits for this cake within (16). Half
an hour later a guest asks her where she could find the wonderful cheesecake.
Anne is ignorant about the fact that the cake has been consumed by her guests
in the meantime and sincerely utters
157 I discuss (2b) separately.

158 Baudry for example writes that [u]n terme est pris significative quand il est pris au sens
de la supposition personnelle, cest--dire quand il reprsente une chose distincte de lui-
mme et quil peut en tre affirm ou affirm du pronom dmonstratif par lequel on la
dsigne. Baudry, Lexique Philosophique de Guillaume dOckham, 249. Strictly speaking,
this characterizes only what I called the positive case of supposition.
159 See above 1.5 The Property of Supposition.
160 In my discussion of the objection and Ockhams reply I concentrate on subject terms,
because the objection explicitly concerns them.
60 Chapter 1
(17) The cheesecake is in the kitchen.
She intends to use the subject term the cheesecake again for the cake, but this
time, the term does not actually supposit for the cake, because it has already
been consumed. However, Anne intends to use the subject term the cheese-
cake in the same way in both cases. In other words, (16) and (17) do not differ
with respect to the propositional attitude involved: Anne sincerely asserts
something by uttering the cheesecake is in the kitchen in both cases. Asserting
something correctly and asserting something wrongly do not differ in kind, as
asserting something and desiring something do. In the first case, the speaker
does not only intend to use the term for something, but indeed the term sup-
posits personally for something it signifies1. In the second case, the speaker
sincerely intends to use the term for something, but the term does not supposit
personally for something it signifies1, simply because there is nothing that it
signifies1. That is, by uttering a proposition of the form S is P the speaker does
not merely pretend that there is a thing for which S supposits personally
rather the speaker is convinced that the term can be correctly applied to some-
thing, namely to the thing he wants to use it for.
It can be held in general that a term is used significatively within a false affirma-
tive present tense proposition if the speaker merely pretends to use the term for
something or if he sincerely intends to use the term for something when there
actually is nothing the term correctly applies to. In this manner it is possible to
distinguish between the use of fictional terms which are necessarily empty accord-
ing to Ockham and the use of terms which are contingently empty.161 An example
for the significative use of fictional terms I have in mind here would be the follow-
ing. On Easter Anne calls her little daughter to come outside by uttering
(18) The Easter Bunny was here.
Of course, Anne does not believe in the existence of the Easter Bunny. She
merely pretends to use the subject term for something; she uses the Easter
161 Knne marks a similar distinction by stating that it is not the case that every singular term
(Eigenname) is a fictional term. He writes: Nicht jeder leere Eigenname ist ein fiktio
naler Name. Vulkan war im Munde Urbain Le Verriers kein fiktionaler Eigenname.
Anders als Tolstoi, der so tat, als nehme er mit Natasha Rostowa auf eine Person Bezug,
tat der franzsische Astronom nicht blo so, als nehme er mit Vulkan auf einen
Himmelskrper Bezug: schlielich war der Planet Neptun, den er ebenfalls zu
Erklrungszwecken postuliert hatte, [] tatschlich gefunden worden. [], und Le
Verrier hatte gute Grnde fr die Hoffnung, dass es seiner Vulkan-Hypothese hnlich
ergehen wrde. Knne, Die Philosophische Logik Gottlob Freges, 241.
Bunny as if it could be applied to something. The significative use of a term

determines the personal supposition insofar as a spoken term supposits per-
sonally only if it is used significatively within a spoken proposition.162 But what
the term stands for is further determined by the semantic relation between the
suppositing term and things the term signifies1 or not.
Ockhams answer to the objection that if a term does not supposit for some-
thing, it does not have personal supposition at all is that a term has personal
supposition even if there is literally nothing that the term signifies1. That a term
supposits for nothing, as Ockham says, means that the speaker either intends
or pretends to use the term for something, although there is nothing that the
term actually supposits for, since there is nothing that the term signifies1.163 The
relation between the significative use and the actual supposition of a term can
be rendered explicit now.164 This is the first case where the subject of a true
affirmative proposition supposits personally for something it signifies1:
(H) A spoken term ts supposits personally for something in a true

affirmative present tense proposition ps if ts is used for something
and ts stands for something it signifies1 within ps.
The second case is a false affirmative proposition where the subject supposits
for nothing it signifies1, and can be given in the following way:
(I) A spoken term ts supposits personally for nothing within a false affir-
mative present tense proposition ps if the speaker intends or pre-
tends to use ts for something, but ts does not stand for something it
signifies1 within ps because there is nothing that ts signifies1.
Note that even if a speaker utters a true affirmative proposition it is possible

that the thing the speaker intends to use a term for is not identical to the thing
the term actually supposits for. Consider the following case: someone asks
Anne what kind of pet her friend owns. Peter owns a dog. Anne answers:
162 In 2.5 Demonstratives, Correspondence, and Supposition of Mental Terms, I discuss

what it amounts to that mental terms supposit personally and hence, are used
significatively.
163 [], quod in praedictis propositionibus subiecta pro nullo supponunt. sl I, 72
(op I, 218).
164 I claim this to hold for subject terms in the first place, since the objection concerns sub-
ject terms, but is applicable to predicate terms as well. Therefore I speak of spoken terms
in general and not of subject terms in particular.
62 Chapter 1
(19) Peters pet is a dog.
Imagine further that Anne does not know that Peter has bought a new dog
because his old dog died. Peters pet in (19) does in fact supposit for something
the term signifies1, namely, for the new dog.165 Anne, however, intends to use
the term for the old dog.166 That is, the thing the term actually supposits for is
not identical to the thing Anne wants to use the term for. Consider the third
case Ockham distinguishes, that is, when it is indicated (2b) that the term does
not supposit for something [it signifies].167 What Ockham has in mind here are
negative propositions, that is, true as well as false negative propositions. Let us
start with true negative propositions. Ockham claims that a negative proposi-
tion is true if (a) the subject term supposits for nothing or if (b) the subject and
the predicate term do not supposit for the same:168
[] if such a proposition is negative [sc. an indefinite one], then it is

required that the subject and the predicate (do) not supposit for all the
same. In fact, it is required that the subject supposit for nothing or that it
supposit for something for which the predicate does not supposit.169
Above I held that a term supposits personally for nothing if it is used for some-
thing when there is in fact nothing the term stands for, simply because in this
case there is nothing it signifies1. Ockham gives the following example of a
negative proposition:
165 Recall that according to Ockhams account of signify, a term often loses a significate from
its extension due to a mere change of the signified thing. See 1.4 The Narrow and the
Wider Sense of Signify (significare). In this case, it is the relation of owner to what is
owned that has changed.
166 What the speaker has in mind at the moment of utterance is important insofar as Ockham
holds that in order to intentionally utter a spoken proposition it is necessary for the
speaker to form a mental proposition. Unde quandocumque aliquis profert propositio-
nem vocalem, prius format interius unam propositionem mentalem, quae nullius idiom-
atis est, []. sl I, 12 (op I, 42).
167 [] (2b) vel quia denotatur non supponere pro aliquo. sl I, 72 (op I, 218).
168 From a contemporary view, it seems strange that a proposition such as Jupiter is not a
horse or a unicorn is not a horse are true according to Ockhams account.
169 Sed si talis sit negativa, requiritur quod subiectum et praedicatum non supponant pro
omni eodem, immo requiritur quod subiectum pro nullo supponat, vel quod supponat
pro aliquo pro quo praedicatum non supponit. []. sl II, 3 (op I, 255) (Italics mine). The
translation is Freddosos and Schuurmans. See Freddoso; Schuurman, Ockhams Theory of
Propositions Part II of the Summa Logicae, 92.
The proposition a white man does not exist has two reasons to be true:
(a) either because there is no man, and therefore no man is white or
(b) because there is a man, but he is not white.170
The negative proposition
(20) Some men are not wise
is true if either (a) there are no men or if (b) there is at least one man, but the man
is not wise. The subject term of a proposition S is (not) P supposits for nothing if
there is nothing the subject term signifies1 when the proposition occurs.
The aspect of time is important with respect to the variableness of a terms
signification since, by contrast, the fictional term chimera does not signify1/2
anything at any time. Chimera cannot be the subject term of any true affirma-
tive proposition at any time.171 Any negative proposition in which chimera is
the subject is true, since chimera supposits for nothing. If the following two
propositions are true, then both subject terms supposit for nothing:
(21) No snowman is in the garden.

(22) No unicorn is in the garden.
(I) can be specified further:
(J) A spoken term ts supposits personally for nothing within a false affir-
mative present tense proposition ps if the speaker intends or pretends
to use ts for something, but ts does not stand for something it signi-
fies1 within ps, because there is nothing ts signifies1 at the moment of
utterance or because there is nothing ts signifies1 at any time.
That is, if the student of logic in the fourteenth century, interpreting (21) and
(22) respectively, were to bear this additional distinction in mind, then he
would be able not only to determine that both propositions are true; he would
170 [] ista homo albus non est habet duas causas veritatis: vel quia homo non est, et ideo
non est albus; vel quia homo est, et tamen non est albus. sl I, 72 (op I, 219). It should be
asked whether this is equivalent to homo non est albus (some man is not white).
171 Propter quod quaelibet propositio affirmativa, in qua subicitur hoc nomen chimaera
significative sumptum vel praedicatur, [] est falsa de virtute sermonis, quia habet ali-
quam exponentem falsam. Ista enim est falsa de virtute sermonis chimaera est non-ens
[] quia quaelibet talis habet istas exponentes chimaera est aliquid et illud est non-ens,
quarum prima falsa est. sl II, 14 (op I, 287).
64 Chapter 1
also be able to determine that (21) is contingently true whereas (22) is necessar
ily true: (21) could have been false at T, but (22) could not have been false at T.172
Finally, Ockham can be taken to account for false negative propositions. At
Annes party Peter is playing the piano. In the next room, a guest asks Anne
who is making such a noise in there. Anne asserts sincerely, but wrongly,
(23) Peter is not playing the piano.
It is indicated by the negation that there is nothing for which both the subject
and the predicate term supposit. As things stand, (23) is false, because there is
something for which both the subject and the predicate supposit, namely,
Peter. The significative use of a term is not identical to its actual supposition,
since it is possible for the thing a speaker wants a term to tand for not to be
identical with the thing the term actually stands for.173 However, a term sup-
posits personally only if it is used significatively by a speaker.
Whether a proposition is true or not is not a matter of how a speaker uses a
term; it is a matter of the actual supposition of the terms involved. And the
actual supposition of a term is a semantic relation. The interpretation of a
given spoken proposition implies the ascription of a truth value to it. And the
truth value depends on both the signification and the actual supposition of the
terms involved. To illustrate further the relation between the significative use
of a term and the terms personal supposition, I shall now discuss briefly the
case of improper (personal) supposition of a term.
1.5.3 Improper Use and Improper Supposition

Ockham completes his discussion of supposition with a chapter about
improper supposition. Improper supposition has to be taken as improper
172 Ockham writes in the Quodlibeta: Ad argumentum principale dico quod contradictio est
quod visio sit, et tamen quod illud quod videtur non sit in effectu nec esse possit. Ideo
contradictio est quod chimaera videatur intuitive, sed non est contradictio quod illud
quod videtur nihil sit in actu extra causam suam, dummodo possit esse in effectu vel ali-
quando fuit in rerum natura. Et sic est in proposito. Unde Deus ab aeterno vidit omnes res
factibiles, et tamen tunc nihil fuerunt. Quodl. VI, q.6 (ot IX, 606607).
173 Ockham points to cases where a proposition has to be distinguished (distinguenda) if
there is more than one possible interpretation of the signification or the supposition of
the terms involved; this is the case when a proposition (spoken or written) contains an
equivocal term. He writes: Secundo notandum est quod quaelibet propositio in qua
ponitur talis dictio aequivoca semper de virtute sermonis est distinguenda, eo quod
potest accipi sic vel sic, et hoc sive sit in uno sensu vera et in alio sensu falsa, sive in
utroque sensu falsa sive in utroque sensu vera. sl III-4, 2 (op I, 753754).
personal supposition, as Ockham again proceeds from the positive or canoni-

cal case of personal supposition a term stands for something it signifies
within a proposition and then goes on to contrast it with improper supposi-
tion. He states:
It is necessary to recognize that just as supposition is proper when a term

supposits for that which it signifies properly, so supposition is improper
when the term is taken improperly.174
Proper and improper personal supposition is connected with proper and

improper use in this passage. Recall that a term supposits personally only if it
is used significatively. Using a term significatively according to the canonical or
positive case means using it for something it signifies: the significative use is
the literal use of a term. Analogously, a term supposits improperly, if it is used
for something the term does not properly signify: the improper use of a term is
a non-literal use. Nevertheless, the improper use differs from the material or
simple use of a term. A spoken term is used materially if it is used for itself and
not for something it signifies. For instance, in the spoken proposition
(24) Anne is a nice name
the subject term Anne is not used for Anne, but for the singular term Anne.175
Material or simple uses of terms are non-significative uses, since the terms are
not used for something they signify.176 The improper use Ockham has in mind
here differs from both the material and the simple use of terms insofar as a
term which is used improperly is not used for itself or for a mental term.
Ockham here alludes to the equivocal or metaphorical use of terms. The under-
lying assumption is that it is possible to say something true even though a term
is used metaphorically or equivocally. This is important insofar as the sayings
(sermones) of the authors are often not true if taken literally. In the second part
of the Summa Ockham states:
174 Oportet cognoscere quod sicut est suppositio propria, quando scilicet terminus supponit
pro eo quod significat proprie, ita est suppositio impropria, quando terminus accipitur
improprie. sl I, 77 (op I, 236).
175 Analogously, a term is used simply if it is used for a mental term and not for something it
signifies.
176 Note that according to Ockham, all kinds of terms, that is, mental, spoken and written can
have personal, material, and simple supposition. See sl I, 64 (op I, 195ff.) for personal
supposition, sl I, 67 (op I, 205ff.) for material supposition and sl I, 68 (op I, 207ff.) for
simple supposition.
66 Chapter 1
[] frequently an authors words are false in terms of the sense that they
create, i.e. according to linguistic conventions and proper speaking, but
they are true in the sense they were made. And this is due to the fact that
frequently the authors speak in an ambigious and improper and meta-
phorical way.177
That a spoken or written proposition is false with regard to the sense that it cre-
ates means that it is false if it is understood that the terms are intended to supposit
personally for something they signify. And that the spoken or written proposition
is true in the sense in which it was made means that it is possible to arrive at a
true reading of the proposition if the terms are taken to supposit personally for
something they do not signify according to proper conventions of language.178
As Ockham states in the last line, the authors often speak in an ambigious
and improper and metaphorical way. To reconcile the claims that (a) it is pos-
sible to say something true by using a term or even a whole proposition meta-
phorically or equivocally and that (b) it is possible to give the truth conditions
of every kind of proposition by means of the supposition of the terms involved,
Ockham arrives at the notion of improper personal supposition.179 That is, he
accounts for figures of speech, such as metonymy, synecdoche, and metalepsis
by means of improper personal supposition of terms. Ockham writes:
There are many forms of improper supposition, []. Synecdoche is one

example, when a part supposits for the whole. Another example is
metonymy, when that which contains supposits for that which is con-
tained, [].180
177 [] frequenter sermones authentici falsi sunt in sensu quem faciunt, hoc est de virtute
sermonis et proprie loquendo, et tamen veri sunt in sensu in quo fiunt. Et hoc quia aucto-
res frequenter aequivoce et improprie et metaphorice loquuntur. sl II, 4 (op II, 264)
(Italics mine).
178 In the next chapter, I introduce the relation of correspondence between mental and spo-
ken propositions as a semantic principle. According to this principle, a spoken proposi-
tion imports that is, conveys or says something if and only if there is a mental
proposition importing the same. That is, it is possible to account for the different readings
or interpretation of spoken propositions in terms of different mental proposition. See 2.4
Mental Propositions and Spoken Propositions: The Relation of Correspondence.
179 Note that in a chapter of the third part of the Summa Logicae, discussing different modes
of equivocation, Ockham states en passant that sometimes one proposition is posited for
another. (Et quandoque una propositio ponitur pro alia.) sl III-4, 3 (op I, 759).
180 Multiplex autem est suppositio impropria, []. Alia est synecdochica, quando pars sup-
ponit pro toto. Alia est metonymica, quando continens supponit pro contento, []. sl I,
77 (op I, 237).
Suppose one cardinal says to another:
(25) Rome called.
The problem is that the proposition is trivially false, if it is taken literally, since
Rome signifies the city of Rome, but cities do not make phone calls. Neither is
it possible to arrive at a true reading of Rome called if the subject term is
taken to supposit either materially or simply. If Rome is taken materially, then
the proposition could be rendered as follows:
(25a) [The spoken term] Rome called.
And if Rome is taken to have simple supposition, then the proposition can be
rephrased in the following way:
(25b) [The mental term] Rome called.
Both readings are not true, and even necessarily, since to predicate the verb to
call of a spoken term or a mental item is to commit a category mistake. Ockham
writes: For instance, in the proposition a man runs a man cannot have sim-
ple or material supposition, because to run relates neither to an intention of
the soul nor to a spoken or written term.181 When Ockham says that the sub-
ject term cannot have simple or material supposition, this can be taken to
mean that a reading of a man runs where the subject term is either taken
materially or simply is false, and even necessarily, because the predicate term
can be applied correctly only to substances. He formulates the general rule
that a term can have either simple or material supposition only if the other
end of the proposition that is, either the predicate or the subject relates
(respicit) to spoken, written, or mental terms.182 That is, a reading of a spoken
proposition where the subject is taken to have material supposition can only
be true if the predicate taken significatively can be correctly applied to spo-
ken or written terms. For instance, the predicate of
(26) Man has three letters
181 Verbi gratia in ista propositione homo currit li homo non potest habere suppositionem
simplicem vel materialem, quia currere non respicit intentionem animae nec vocem nec
scripturam. sl I, 65 (op I, 198).
182 Sed terminus non in omni propositione potest habere suppositionem simplicem vel
materialem, sed tunc tantum quando terminus talis comparatur alteri extremo quod
respicit intentionem animae vel vocem vel scriptum. sl I, 65 (op I, 197198).
68 Chapter 1
can be applied correctly only to spoken or written terms containing three let-
ters. It follows that a reading of Rome called as true requires that the subject
term be taken to have personal supposition, because to call can be applied
correctly only to things belonging to the category of substance.183
It is possible to arrive at a true reading of Rome called if this proposition is
considered as a case of metonymy where that which contains supposits for
that which is contained.184 The singular term Rome should be taken to sup-
posit improperly for a certain person in Rome, for instance, the pope, since
Rome is used here metonymically for the pope (or anyone representing the
Vatican). The proposition might be rendered finally as follows:
(25c) The pope called.
According to Ockham, figures of speech can be defined as different principles

of the transfer of literal or proper personal supposition to non-literal or
improper personal supposition, since a term only supposits in a certain way if
it is used in a certain way. Studying the different figures of speech provides the
scholar with the linguistic knowledge necessary to recognize contexts or sen-
tential environments in which it is likely that a term has been transferred
according to one of the principles. For instance, the metonymical shift of a
term is based on contiguity while the figure of hyperbole is based on some sort
of exaggeration.185 We can formulate as a general rule that if a spoken proposi-
tion is trivially false when the terms are taken literally, then an interpreter
should try to take the terms non-literally according to one of the principles.186
This kind of improper use of a term is a significative use nonetheless: it can be
183 For ease of exposition, I simply exclude the case of machines or robots making phone
calls. The crucial point is that the verb to call cannot correctly be applied to mental acts
or spoken or written signs. That is, I take the verb to call to be in the same boat as verbs
such to run, to sleep or to eat.
184 Alia est metonymica, quando continens supponit pro contento []. sl I, 77 (op I, 237).
185 See Severin Schroeder, Why Juliet is the Sun, in M. Siebel, M. Textor (eds.), Semantik und
Ontologie. Beitrge zur philosophischen Forschung, Frankfurt, 2004, 63101 (93). On meta-
phors and metonymy see Wolfgang Knne, Wahrheit, Metonymie und Metapher, in
F.J. Czernin; Th. Eder (eds.), Zur Metapher, Mnchen, 2007, 5774.
186 In general, metaphors are obviously or trivially false, if taken literally. Davidson
writes: Generally, it is only when a sentence is taken to be false that we accept it as a
metaphor and start to hunt out the hidden implication. It is probably for this reason that
most metaphorical sentences are patently false, just as all similes are trivially true.
Donald Davidson, What Metaphors Mean, in id., Inquiries into Truth and Predication,
Oxford, 2001, 245265 (258).
held that when a speaker uses a term metaphorically for something then he
uses the term as if it could be correctly applied to the thing in question.
Actually, in the third part of the Summa, Ockham even speaks of improper
signification and improper supposition.187 Note that in order to use a term met-
aphorically for something the speaker should know that the term does not
properly signify the thing he nevertheless uses the term for. Otherwise, he
would merely be using the term incorrectly. In this respect, the literal, but
incorrect use of a subject term within a false affirmative proposition differs
from the non-literal use of a subject term within an (allegedly) true affirmative
proposition.
Consider Tyler Burges famous example of arthritis.188 Arthritis is specifi-
cally an inflammation of joints.189 Imagine that Peter suffers from arthritis in
his ankles. When he suffers an inflammation of the sinuses, he tells Anne:
(27) I have arthritis in my nose.
If Anne assumes that this utterance is to be taken literally, with Peter not know-
ing that arthritis is an inflammation of joints only, then the spoken proposition
is simply false. However, if Anne finds out that Peter is well informed about this
disease, and further knows that Peter is a jokester, then she could look for ways
of taking arthritis metaphorically. For instance, she could think that the spe-
cific termarthritis is used in place of a more general term, namely that of
inflammation. Thus she could render the utterance in the more common way:
(27a) I suffer from an inflammation of the sinuses.
Ockhams attempt to account for the non-literal, e.g., metaphorical use of

terms by means of their non-literal or improper supposition illustrates how the
use of a term determines its personal supposition: when a term is used meta-
phorically for something within a proposition, the interpreter can always
arrive at a true reading of the proposition, if he can find out what the term is
used for by the speaker. By briefly discussing material and simple supposition
187 See sl III-4, 3 (op I, 759). I discuss this in some detail in the next chapter. There I show that
Ockham tries to account for equivocation of terms by distinguishing between original
and derivative signification. The crucial point is that this derivative signification of a term
is established by the mere use of the term for something the term does not signify origi-
nally. See 2.3 Conventional Signification and Equivocation.
188 Tyler Burge, Individualism and the Mental, in id.: Foundations of Mind, Philosophical
Essays, Vol.2, 2007, Oxford, 100150 (104106).
189 Burge, Individualism and the Mental, 105.
70 Chapter 1
in the next section, I aim to elucidate further the difference between the sig-
nificative and the non-significative uses of a term, a difference reflected by the
distinction between personal supposition on the one hand and material or
simple supposition on the other.
1.5.4 Simple and Material Supposition

After briefly discussing the general notion of supposition in Summa Logicae I,
63, Ockham goes on to distinguish between the three kinds of supposition in
the subsequent chapter.190 He first presents personal supposition and then
turns to simple supposition, which he characterizes as follows:
Simple supposition is when a term supposits for an intention of the soul,

but is not taken significatively. For example in man is a species, the term
man supposits for the intention of the soul, because this intention is a
species; however, properly speaking, the term man does not signify that
intention, [] as simple supposition is when a term supposits for
an intention of the soul, which properly speaking is not the significate of
the term, because such a term signifies real things and not intentions
of the soul.191
Some terminological remarks: Ockham uses the expressions intention of the

soul and concept interchangeably in his works. An intention of the soul or a
concept can be part of a mental proposition.192 That is, they can likewise be
called mental terms.193 The term man let us presume it is written, for sim-
plicitys sake in
190 See sl I, 63 (op I, 193195) for the brief account of the general notion of supposition.
191 Suppositio simplex est quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, sed non tene-
tur significative. Verbi gratia sic dicendo homo est species iste terminus homo suppo-
nit pro intentione animae, quia illa intentio est species; et tamen iste terminus homo
non significat proprie loquendo illam intentionem, [], quia suppositio simplex est
quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, quae proprie non est significatum
termini, quia terminus talis significat veras res et non intentiones animae. sl I, 64 (op
I, 196).
192 I discuss mental propositions in some detail in 2.4 Mental Propositions and Spoken
Propositions: The Relation of Correspondence and in 3.3.1 Propositional Acts of
Apprehension: Mental Propositions.
193 Illud autem exsistens in anima quod est signum rei, ex quo propositio mentalis compo-
nitur ad modum quo propositio vocalis componitur ex vocibus, aliquando vocatur inten
tio animae, aliquando conceptus animae, aliquando passio animae, aliquando similitudo
rei, et Boethius [] vocat intellectum. sl I, 12 (op I, 4142) (Italics mine).
(28) Man is a species194
can have simple supposition, such that it supposits for the mental term man.
The term species is a so-called second intention which means that it can sup-
posit personally for mental terms such as dog, man or horse which in turn are
called first intentions.195 According to Ockham, to say that man is a species is
to say something about the mental term man, namely, that it belongs to the
class of species terms, just as the mental terms horse or dog. In general, species
and genera are only mental terms in Ockhams nominalist conception.196 Man
is a species exemplifies the general rule cited above that a term can have either
simple or material supposition only if the other end of the proposition in
this case, the predicate species relates to spoken, written, or mental
terms.197 To say of the subject or the predicate of a proposition that it relates to
(respicit) terms is to say that it can supposit personally for terms.198
194 Note that there is a problem of notation: how can it be marked that the written term sup-
posits for a mental term? Knne adequately renders the written sentence (28) in the fol-
lowing way: Man is a concept.
195 Not all terms signify1/2 extramental things, but some signify1/2 other terms. Ockham further
distinguishes between terms of first and of second imposition. See sl I, 11 (op I, 3841).
I discuss the notion of imposition in connection with the notion of subordination in the
following chapter. See 2.2 Signification in Relation to Subordination and Imposition.
Ockham himself emphasizes that personal supposition does not imply that a term
supposits for an extramental thing or things. He says: [] those who say that personal
supposition obtains when a term supposits for a thing do not describe personal supposi-
tion sufficiently.([] non sufficienter describunt suppositionem personalem dicentes
quod suppositio personalis est quando terminus supponit pro re.) sl I, 64 (op I, 195).
Rather, a term supposits personally if it supposits for its significate[s] and significatively.
The whole sentence reads: Sed ista est definitio quod suppositio personalis est quando
terminus supponit pro suo significato et significative. sl I, 64 (op I, 195).
196 This is how Ockham approaches the problem of universals: species and genera are only
concepts or mental terms. For a discussion of the problem of universals see Knne,
Abstrakte Gegenstnde; Wolfgang Stegmller (ed.), Das Universalien-Problem, Darmstadt,
1978. For a discussion of Ockhams approach see Gordon Leff, William of Ockham: the
metamorphosis of scholastic discourse, Manchester, 1975, 104123.
197 Sed terminus non in omni propositione potest habere suppositionem simplicem vel
materialem, sed tunc tantum quando terminus talis comparatur alteri extremo quod
respicit intentionem animae vel vocem vel scriptum. sl I, 65 (op I, 197198). See 1.5.3
Improper Use and Improper Supposition.
198 Freddoso remarks with respect to this general rule: It is tempting though not
unproblematic to take respicit here as equivalent to significat. For in a subsequent
passage Ockham claims that man in Man is a species may have simple supposition,
72 Chapter 1
Consequently, a reading of man is a species can only be true if the subject has
simple supposition. If man were to supposit personally, then the proposition
would be false, since the term does not signify the mental term man, rather
man signifies1/2 men. Therefore, a term which has simple supposition does not
supposit for something it signifies: this is because [] simple supposition
obtains when a term supposits for an intention of the soul, which, properly
speaking, is not the significate of the term, [].199 The same restriction holds
for material supposition which Ockham characterizes as follows:
Material supposition obtains when a term does not supposit significa-

tively, but supposits either for a sound or for a written (term). So in the
case of man is a noun, man supposits for itself but does not signify itself.
Similarly in the proposition man is written there can be material sup-
position, since the term supposits for that which is written.200
In his examples, Ockham holds that the subject supposits for itself (pro se
ipso) but does not signify itself (non significat se ipsum), as in
(29) Man is a noun
and
(30) Man is written.
Note that man in man is written can be taken as suppositing for a particular
token of the written term. To illustrate this point, consider another example.
Imagine that Anne is very angry at Peter and in a childish mood writes on
the wall in big red letters Peter ist doof (since German is the language she uses
whenever she gets really angry.) Now someone who does not speak German
tells Peter
since species signifies (significat) intentions of the soul. Freddoso, Ockhams Theory of
Truth Conditions, 70, fn. 9.
199 [] quia suppositio simplex est quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, quae
proprie non est significatum termini, []. sl I, 64 (op I, 196).
200 Suppositio materialis est quando terminus non supponit significative, sed supponit vel
pro voce vel pro scripto. Sicut patet hic homo est nomen li homo supponit pro se ipso, et
tamen non significat se ipsum. Similiter in ista propositione homo scribitur potest esse
suppositio materialis, quia terminus supponit pro illo quod scribitur. sl I, 64 (op I, 196).
In more recent times, Frege, Carnap, and others discuss the case where a term is used for
itself. See Knne, Die Philosophische Logik Gottlob Freges, 282288.
(30a) Peter ist doof is written on the wall in big red letters.201
It seems plausible to hold that Peter ist doof is here used to pick out one par-
ticular token of Peter ist doof, namely that which is written on a particular
wall. Likewise, it is plausible to hold that man in man is a noun supposits for
one particular token of man.202
What is crucial here is the difference between personal supposition on the
one hand and material or simple supposition on the other, since Ockham does
not restrict the personal supposition of terms as he restricts simple and mate-
rial supposition. Therefore he does not say that a term can only have personal
supposition if the other end of the proposition can be correctly applied to
particular substances, such as man in Socrates is a man. Quite the contrary: it
is always possible for the subject and predicate of a proposition to have per-
sonal supposition. Ockham states: It should also be noted that a term can
always have personal supposition, in whatever proposition it occurs [].203 If
this is taken literally without further qualification, then it follows that it is like-
wise possible that man in man is a species has personal supposition, although
by this reading the proposition is trivially false, since to say that particular men
belong to the class of species terms is to commit a category mistake.204 It is
simply not intelligible why it should be possible for man in
201 Ockham discusses the case where a whole proposition is the subject of another proposi-
tion in the Summa Logicae. He writes: And [] a proposition can also be a term, just as it
can be part of a proposition. For instance man is an animal is a true proposition, is true:
in it, the whole proposition man is an animal is subject, and true proposition is predi-
cate. (Et [] etiam una propositio potest esse terminus, sicut potest esse pars proposi-
tionis. Haec enim vera est homo est animal: est propositio vera, in qua haec tota
propositio homo est animal est subiectum, et propositio vera est praedicatum.) sl I, 2
(op I, 9). In this case man is an animal supposits materially for itself.
202 Ockham does not seem to mark a distinction between the material or simple use of a
term for either a particular token of a term or for every token of a term.
habere suppositionem personalem, []. sl I, 65 (op I, 197).
204 Ockham is fully aware of this. He says that man in man is a species can be taken to sup-
posit either personally or simply, although if man is taken personally here, then the
proposition is simply false. He writes: Sed in ista propositione homo est species, quia
species significat intentionem animae ideo potest habere suppositionem simplicem. Et
est propositio distinguenda, [], eo quod subiectum potest habere suppositionem sim-
plicem vel personalem. Primo modo est propositio vera, quia tunc denotatur quod una
intentio animae sive conceptus sit species, et hoc est verum. Secundo modo est proposi-
tio simpliciter falsa, quia tunc denotatur quod aliqua res significata per hominem sit spe-
cies, quod est manifeste falsum. sl I, 65 (op I, 198).
74 Chapter 1
(31) Man is a species
to have personal supposition, while at the same time it should not be possible
for man in
(32) Man is an animal
to supposit materially for the spoken or written term man, even though both
propositions are trivially false under these two respective readings. Again, we
must ask what it amounts to that it is possible for man in man is a species to
supposit personally or simply, while it is not possible for man to supposit per-
sonally or simply in man is an animal, but only personally? First, however,
how is the talk of possibilities and impossibilities of supposition to be under-
stood here?
The riddle can be solved if we take into account that a terms supposition
depends at least partly on how the term is taken, namely personally, materi-
ally, or simply. Notice that Ockham refers explicitly to the will of the speaker
by specifying the general assumption about the personal supposition of terms
cited above. I quote again: It should also be noted that a term, whatever propo-
sition it is placed in, can always have personal supposition, provided it [the term]
is not limited by the will of the users to a different [kind of supposition].205
Strictly speaking, Ockhams general rule that a term can always have per-
sonal supposition does not apply in all cases of written propositions. Consider
the following two written propositions:
(33) man is a concept
and
(34) man is a noun.
Both propositions are disambiguated by the use of quotation marks in such a

way that it would not be intelligible to take the subjects in (33) and (34) as hav-
ing personal supposition. The medievals used the syllable li in written lan-
guage to mark the material use of a written term. Recall however that I restrict
the discussion to spoken terms and spoken propositions.
habere suppositionem personalem, nisi ex voluntate utentium arctetur ad aliam, []. sl I,
65 (op I, 197) (Italics mine).
One remark about the Latin phrase: taken literally, arctare means some-
thing like to limit or to abridge;206 in connection with the will of the users,
this means that the users can agree to take a term only materially, for instance,
although, according to the general rule, a term can always have personal sup-
position.207 For instance, speakers can agree to neglect readings of proposi-
tions in which a term such as canis (dog) is taken personally for the purpose
of discussing things such as the grammatical features of Latin nouns, since it is
clear from the context that this interpretation does not help to explain the
properties of Latin words.
In other words, the talk of the possibilities or impossibilities of a terms
supposition implies some norms that govern the interpretation or use of
terms: that a term can always have personal supposition implies that we can
understand a term as having personal supposition in any proposition within
which it occurs. And that a term cannot always have material or simple sup-
position implies that we must not understand a term as having material or
simple supposition in any proposition whatsoever. It is possible to formulate
two rules or principles concerning the interpretation or use of terms cor
responding to the two general rules about personal and material or simple
supposition of terms. These are the general rules about the personal suppo-
sition of terms:
(Pers)208A spoken term ts can have personal supposition within any

spoken proposition ps.
And this is the general rule about material or simple supposition:
(Mat/Simp)209A spoken term ts can have material or simple supposi-

tion within a spoken proposition ps only if the other
term ts1 of ps can supposit personally for terms.
The following rule of use or interpretation can be stated with respect to per-
sonal supposition:
206 arcto, arctare, arctavi, arctatus wedge in, fit/close firmly; tighten/compress/abridge/
contract; pack/limit/cramp. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3A
text%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3Darto.
207 One further remark about the translation: I take the aliam to indicate another kind of
supposition, since suppositio is feminine.
208 Pers abbreviates Personal supposition. This applies to written terms as well.
209 Mat/Simp abbreviates Material or simple supposition.
76 Chapter 1
(Int-Pers)210It is allowed to use or interpret a spoken term as having

personal supposition within any spoken proposition ps,
even if under this reading ps is false.
And this is the general rule of interpretation with respect to material or simple
supposition:
(Int-Mat/Simp)211A spoken term ts should only be used or interpreted

as having material or simple supposition within a spo-
ken proposition ps, if the other term of ps can sup-
posit personally for terms, such that under this
reading ps can be true.
According to Ockhams rules of supposition, there is a further difference

between spoken propositions such as man is an animal and man is a species,
namely that propositions of the latter kind are ambiguous, since it is always
possible according to the general rule of personal supposition for a term to
supposit personally, whereas propositions of the former kind are not ambig
uous, due to the restriction of material and simple supposition.212 Or at least it
can be held that there are always two admissible readings of propositions such
as man is a species, but there is only one admissible reading of a proposition
like man is an animal.213
I understand talk of the possibilities or impossibilities of a terms supposi-
tion not as talk about the logical possibility of supposition it is of course pos
sible to take man in man is an animal materially, just as it is possible to take
man in man is a species personally but as implying something normative
about the use and interpretation of terms. Therefore the problematic differ-
ence can now be restated: why is it permissible to take the spoken term man
in the spoken proposition man is a species as having either personal or simple
210 Int-Pers abbreviates Interpretation or use of terms with respect to personal

supposition.
211 Mat/Simp abbreviates Material or simple supposition.
212 Ockham discusses the ambiguity which results from the differences between kinds of
supposition in the third part of the Summa Logicae. See sl III-4, 4 (op I, 759ff.)
213 A problem lurks here since Ockham admits that this kind of ambiguity applies at the
mental level as well: Et est notandum quod iste [] modus aequivocationis potest
reperiri in propositione pure mentali, []. sl III-4, 4 (op I, 763). For a critical discussion
of this kind of ambiguity on the mental level see McCord Adams, William Ockham,
348351; Paul Vincent Spade, Synonymy and Equivocation in Ockhams Mental Language,
Journal of the History of Philosophy 18 (1980), 922.
supposition, whereas it is not permissible to interpret the spoken term man in

man is an animal as having either personal or simple supposition (or material
supposition)?
A tentative answer is that Ockham tries to account for a hierarchy of uses by
means of the two rules of supposition: the significative use of a term is its pri-
mary use, while the material or simple use is only secondary; the latter can also
be called metalinguistic, following Panaccio and Perini-Santos.214 This label is
justified insofar as terms are used materially or simply to say something about
the properties of terms or propositions. Perhaps Ockham implicitly assumes
that it should be allowed to interpret a term as standing for something it signi-
fies in any case, just because the significative use of a term is primary, although
according to this reading the proposition in question might be false; by con-
trast, it is not permissible to take a term materially if taken significatively
the proposition in question is true, as in man is an animal.
However, these normative assumptions about the use and interpretation of
a terms supposition conflict with the logical possibility of the supposition of
terms.215 It has become clear at least that a term has personal supposition only
if it is taken that is, either used or interpreted significatively just as a term
has material or simple supposition only if it is taken materially or simply. In
general the supposition of a term whether it supposits personally, materially,
214 Ockham distinguishes two kinds of acts, (a) the actus exercitus which corresponds to the
level of predication in the object-language and (b) the actus signatus corresponding to a
metalinguistic level in which a term is not actually predicated but only said to be predi-
cated. Examples for (a) are man runs, the weather is nice, Socrates is white, examples
for (b) are nice is predicated of weather, white is verified of Socrates. An expression is
also used materially as well if the signification of the expression is explained, that is, in
the context of what Ockham calls nominal definitions. As Ockham states: Est autem
actus exercitus qui importatur per hoc verbum est, vel aliquod huiusmodi, quod non
tantum significat aliquid praedicari de aliquo sed exercet, praedicando unum de alio, sic
dicendo homo est animal, homo currit, homo disputat, et sic de aliis. Actus autem sig-
natus est ille qui importatur per hoc verbum praedicari vel subici vel verificari vel
competere vel huiusmodi, quae idem significant. Verbi gratia sic dicendo animal praedi-
catur de homine, hic non praedicatur animal de homine, quia in ista propositione animal
subicitur et non praedicatur, et ideo est actus signatus. Et non est idem dicere animal
praedicatur de homine et homo est animal, quia una est multiplex et alia non. [] Nec
est idem dicere genus praedicatur de specie vel haec vox animal praedicatur de hac
voce homo et species est genus vel haec vox homo est haec vox animal, nam pri-
mae duae sunt verae et secundae duae sunt falsae. sl I, 66 (op I, 202).
215 See McCord Adams, William Ockham, 346348. McCord Adams points out that the differ-
ence between personal supposition on the one hand and simple and material supposition
on the other was traditional.
78 Chapter 1
or simply depends on how a term is used or interpreted, namely either

significatively and personally, or non-significatively and materially/simply.
Trivially, if a speaker were not to use a term in a certain way within a proposi-
tion, then the term would not supposit at all, simply because it would not
occur at all.
1.6 Summary
My goal in this chapter was to explain the two basic properties of signification
and supposition with respect to spoken terms, as conceiving of Ockhams men-
tal speech as involving the use of a kind of language implies ascribing these
very properties to mental items. It seems reasonable to ask what the implica-
tions of a linguistic expressions signifying and suppositing for something are
before asking this same question with respect to items on the mental level. The
deictic applicability of a term at T to a thing or things existing at T serves as the
basic model of signification. The signification of absolute categorematic terms
such as man or dog can be understood as instances of correct applicability
while the signification of connotative terms such as white or big can be
understood as instances of applicability without contradiction.
The applicability of a term implies the possible use of the term within a
proposition, and hence the possible personal supposition of the term; this is
why Ockham tends to account for signification in terms of personal supposi-
tion and vice versa. Nevertheless, the notion of personal supposition is wider
than the notion of signification, since signification implies applicability to a
thing whereas the personal supposition of a term merely implies that a speaker
pretends or intends to use a term for something.
The use of a term partly determines the terms supposition: a term has per-
sonal supposition only if it is taken significatively. What the term supposits
personally for, and what it does not, are further determined by a semantic rela-
tion obtaining or not obtaining between the term and things the term signifies.
This is the crucial relation between the signification and the personal supposi-
tion of a term: a term can stand for something it actually signifies within a
proposition, in which case it is implied that the extension of the term is not
empty. Ockhams account of the truth conditions of various kinds of proposi-
tions by means of the (non-)identity of the supposita is founded on the seman-
tic relation between the terms of a proposition and the things they stand for.
I discussed the paradigmatic case of the truth and falsity of affirmative present
tense propositions. I then turned to the case of improper supposition to illus-
trate how far the use of a term determines its supposition. I argued that
Ockham introduces a sort of improper personal supposition in order to align

the improper that is, equivocal or metaphorical use of terms with his gen-
eral account of supposition: it is possible to say something true by using terms
metaphorically or equivocally, because the truth conditions of such proposi-
tions can also be given in terms of supposition.
Finally, I discussed material and simple supposition as opposed to personal
supposition to show that there is a difference between the primary significative
use and the secondary non-significative use of terms. This is reflected by
Ockhams general rules about the possibility and impossibility of supposition,
which state that it is always possible for a term to supposit personally, but it is
not always possible for a term to supposit materially or simply. It can be stated
as a general rule that how a term is taken, that is, personally, materially or sim-
ply, is determined by the use or interpretation of the speaker, but what a term
stands for personally, materially or simply is determined by the semantic
relations between the term and things it actually supposits for. I conclude that
both the signification and the supposition of spoken terms are intimately con-
nected with their use, although in different respects: the signification of a term
implies its applicability to things while the supposition of a term implies its
possible use for something within propositions regardless of whether or not
there is something the term applies to. With these notions of the signification
and the supposition of spoken terms at hand, I now turn to the relation
between spoken and mental terms.
Chapter 2
Ockhams Semantic Model

Subordination, Correspondence, and the Role of Mental Speech with
Respect to Spoken Language
2.1 Introduction
Incontestably, the assumption of mental speech (oratio mentalis) takes a

prominent place in Ockhams philosophy of language and epistemology. The
canonical view is to interpret mental speech that is, thought as involving
the use of a kind of language which is semantically and syntactically prior to
any natural language such as Latin or English. As Calvin Normore states,
Ockham does not argue for the hypothesis that there is a mental language, but
merely develops and applies it.1 Thus mental speech is commonly taken to be
explanatorily powerful with respect to spoken language insofar as the seman-
tic and syntactic properties of the parts of spoken language can be explained
by means of their relation to parts of mental speech.2
My aim in this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, I want to scrutinize the
rather strong assumption which is usually ascribed to the Franciscan, since
from this it seems but a small step to view Ockhams assumption of mental
speech as an ancestor of the Language of Thought Hypothesis (loth).3 To do
so, I want to explore the alleged explanatory power of mental speech in its rela-
tion to language. Recall that at the beginning of the last chapter I held that a
good reason to conceive of mental speech as involving the use of a kind of
language would be that mental items have functions which according to
Ockham imply that they form a kind of language.4 In the Summa Logicae
Ockham approaches the problem of the appropriate interpretation of spoken
and written propositions by pointing to the mental level. The signification of
spoken terms is constituted by their being subordinated to mental terms
whereas what a spoken proposition conveys is determined by corresponding
mental propositions.
I concentrate on the relation between spoken and mental terms and spoken
and mental propositions, since Ockham takes spoken terms and propositions as
1 See Normore, The End of Mental Language, 297.

2 Ibid., The End of Mental Language, 293.
3 See Fodor, The Language of Thought.
4 See 1.1 Introduction.

Ockhams Semantic Model 81
having semantic priority over written terms and propositions. Subordination

and correspondence are both asymmetrical relations between mental and lin-
guistic entities.5 I argue that, in fact, positing subordination and correspondence
implies conceiving of mental speech as involving the use of a kind of language.
To show this, I begin by explaining the constitutive role of subordination for
spoken terms property of signification (2.2). How does imposition thereby
relate to subordination? It can be shown that Ockham conceives of mental
terms as signifying naturally, and of spoken terms as signifying conventionally.
The question is whether this distinction merely indicates how a term has
received its signification, or whether it characterizes two different properties.
I argue for the former. The crucial point is that subordination can be shown to
establish a counterfactual stable relation regarding the signification of spoken
terms. But this is not to say that there are no differences between natural and
conventional signification at all. Rather, these differences become apparent
with respect to the personal supposition of mental and spoken terms, that is,
with respect to the use of mental and spoken terms.
In order to make clear the difference between natural and conventional sig-
nification, I consider the somewhat special case of equivocal terms in some
detail (2.3) before turning to the propositional level. Next I show that Ockham
accounts for the import of spoken propositions by means of the relation of
correspondence (2.4). (I use import with respect to propositions in the follow-
ing way: what a proposition imports is nothing but what a proposition says or
conveys as a whole. In this sense, the import of a proposition is what the prop-
osition says or conveys.)
I claim that Ockham introduces correspondence between mental and spo-
ken propositions as a foundational principle of the semantic analysis of spo-
ken propositions. This interpretation of correspondence commits Ockham to
the assumption of a parallelism between mental and spoken propositions:
I argue that there is an asymmetrical dependence of the import of spoken on
the import of mental propositions due to the co-variation of the terms signifi-
cation as established by subordination. To arrive at a suitable notion of the
import of a proposition, I discuss Ockhams general account of the truth of a
proposition (2.4.1), since according to Ockham, that a proposition is true
5 For the ease of exposition, if I merely speak of signification, this is meant to include either
signification1/2 of absolute categorematic terms or of connotative terms, or the co-significa-
tion of syncategorematic terms or all other kinds of terms; that is, I specify signification as
signfication1/2 only if necessary. The same applies to the verbs signify and signify1/2. See 1.4
The Narrow and the Wider Sense of Signify (significare) for the discussion of
signification.
82 Chapter 2
means that it is as it is imported by the proposition. It can be shown that

ascribing a truth value to a proposition presupposes the identification of its
import. I then show that in some cases the import of a spoken proposition can
simply be derived from the signification and supposition of the spoken terms;
this is especially pertinent in the case of propositions containing synonymous
terms which can be substituted salva veritate (2.4.2). It is also crucial in the
case of propositions containing equivocal terms (2.4.3). Of subordination and
correspondence, subordination is the more fundamental relation. Finally, I
turn to spoken propositions containing demonstratives as a case where the
intention of the speaker wholly determines the supposition of a spoken term
(2.5). Here the differences between mental and spoken propositions can be
rendered with respect to the personal supposition of the mental and spoken
terms. I argue that a mental term can supposit personally only for something it
actually signifies, whereas a spoken term can also supposit personally for
something it does not signify at all. This difference will be explained further at
the end of this chapter. I turn now to subordination.
2.2 Signification in Relation to Subordination and Imposition
My aim in this section is to render explicit the constitutive role of subordina-

tion in the property of signification.6 In a passage from the opening chapter of
the Summa, Ockham paints the following picture of subordination:
I say that sounds are signs subordinated to the concepts or intentions of

the soul, not because in the proper acceptance of the expression signs,
the sounds would always signify the very concepts in the first and proper
sense, but because sounds are imposed to signify those very same things
which are signified by the concept of the mind, so that the concept in the
first place signifies something naturally and the sound signifies the same
thing secondarily, that is, in such a way that once the sound is set up to
signify that which is signified by the concept of the mind, if the concept
in question would change its significate, the sound in question would
change its significate by itself also, without any new act of institution.7
6 See 1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of Signify (significare).
7 Dico autem voces esse signa subordinata conceptibus seu intentionibus animae, non quia
proprie accipiendo hoc vocabulum signa ipsae voces semper significent ipsos conceptus
animae primo et proprie, sed quia voces imponuntur ad significandum illa eadem quae per
conceptus mentis significantur, ita quod conceptus primo naturaliter significat aliquid et
Ockham explicitly states:
And what is said about sounds with respect to [] concepts, is to be held

proportionally [and] in the same way regarding that which is written
with respect to sounds.8
First then, what follows from a sound or a sequence of sounds being subordi-
nated to a concept of the mind, that is, to a mental term? It follows that the
sound signifies something and hence can be correctly called a spoken term.
Ockham explicitly states that the mental term the sound is subordinated to
signifies something. Being subordinated to a mental term having signification
is a necessary as well as a sufficient condition for a sound to have the property
of signification at all. Thus, according to Ockham, the following can be stated
with respect to the signification of spoken terms:
(A) A sound (or any sequence of sounds) has signification if and only if
it is subordinated to a mental term having signification.
However the spoken term in that case does not signify just anything:
(B) If a sound (or any sequence of sounds) is subordinated to a mental

term then it signifies the same as the mental term.
The claim of identity of what is signified is central to Ockhams conception of

subordination: it is not the case that the spoken term signifies the mental term
in the proper sense of signification. Recall that I rendered signification as (cor-
rect) applicability: the spoken term man is applicable to men, not to the con-
cept man. The spoken term man signifies the same as the mental term man,
namely, particular men.
Ockham holds that subordination if not itself an act somehow presup-
poses an act of what he calls imposition (impositio). In the passage above he
speaks of a sound being set up to signify (vox instituta ad significandum) that
which is signified by the concept of the mind. That a sound should be subor-
dinated to a mental term can be regarded as somehow resulting from some
secundario vox significat illud idem, in tantum quod voce instituta ad significandum aliquid
significatum per conceptum mentis, si conceptus ille mutaret significatum suum eo ipso ipsa
voce, sine nova institutione, suum significatum permutaret. SL I, 1 (OP I, 78).
8 Et sicut dictum est de vocibus respectu [] conceptuum, eodem modo proportionaliter,
quantum ad hoc, tenendum est de his quae sunt in scripto respectu vocum. SL I, 1 (OP I, 8).
84 Chapter 2
arbitrary act or contingent event at some time T. Due to this contingent occur-
rence, spoken and written expressions signify at pleasure.9 For the moment, I
leave open the question of how to conceive of the relation of imposition to
subordination. When this relation is investigated, it should be considered that
while subordination is a genuine semantic conception that relates different
kinds of terms to each other, imposition is a kind of act.10
Nevertheless, the contingent act of imposition is constitutive in some
respect because it somehow sets up a semantic dependence of the sounds sig-
nification on the signification of the mental term in question. Ockham seeks to
illustrate this dependence by dwelling on one of its implications. I quote the
central phrase again: [] if the concept in question were to change its signifi-
cate, the sound in question would change its significate by itself (as well), with-
out any new (act of ) institution.
First of all, this statement neither commits Ockham to the view that mental
terms actually do change their signification or that they can change their signi-
fication, and nor does it commit him at all to the view that mental terms can
change their signification at pleasure, as some scholars have taken him to
hold.11 The latter position would utterly jettison Ockhams distinction between
mental and spoken or written terms. Even if mental and spoken terms signify
9 Note that the arbitrariness of imposition as a signification-fixing act is twofold: on the one
hand, the choice of the sound or the sequence of sounds which are endowed with signi-
fication is contingent, but the choice of what to signify seems to be equally contingent
although the latter seems somewhat restricted by the condition that a speaker should
have already a mental term of the thing or the kind of things he wants to name in this way.
10 See 2.3 Conventional Signification and Equivocation.
11 For example, Dominik Perler refers to precisely the same passage of the opening chapter
of the Summa when he says: Ockham behauptet, da die mentalen Termini zwar auf
natrliche Weise und unmittelbar, aber vernderbar bezeichnen. Der mentale Terminus
kann seine Referenz derart variieren, da der entsprechende konventionelle Terminus ohne
neue Festsetzung ebenfalls das Referenzobjekt verndert. Wie kann aber der mentale
Terminus seine Referenz verndern, wenn er sich gerade dadurch auszeichnet, da er
nicht konventionell festgesetzt ist, sondern den Gegenstand durch eine
hnlichkeitsrelation bzw. durch eine Vergegenwrtigung im Erkenntnisakt unmittelbar
bezeichnet? Jede Vernderung der Bezeichnung setzt voraus, da es etwas eine sprachli-
che Norm, eine Sprechergemeinschaft oder einen einzelnen Sprecher gibt, was diese
Vernderung festsetzt, und da gewisse Konventionen bestehen, nach denen die
Vernderung vollzogen wird. Somit werden auch die mentalen Termini ad placitum ver-
wendet. Die starre Gegenberstellung von Termini, die auf natrliche Weise bezeichnen,
und Termini, die konventionell bezeichnen, ist offensichtlich unvertrglich mit der These,
da die Bezeichnung der mentalen Termini vernderbar ist. Perler, Der propositionale
Wahrheitsbegriff im 14. Jahrhundert, 181182. (Italics mine).
the same things, there is a difference in the way or in the mode they signify
whatever they signify. This difference is marked by Ockham in the following
way:
(C) A mental term tm signifies whatever it signifies naturally
while
(D) A spoken term ts signifies whatever it signifies conventionally.
The fixing of a spoken terms signification presupposes that there is a mental

term having non-conventional signification. In other words, Ockhams concep-
tion of subordination relies entirely on the distinction of two different modes
of signification. If there were only one kind of signification, that is, conven-
tional signification, then the condition of being subordinated to a (mental)
term for a term to signify at all would lead to an infinite regress. If a mental
term were to signify conventionally, it would signify only due to some arbitrary
act of imposition.
And as a result of this arbitrary act, the mental term t1 in its turn would be
subordinated to another term t2 to signify the same as t2. But for t2 to signify
something, t2 would necessarily have to be subordinated to another term t3,
and so on ad infinitum. And worse, if the possibility of arbitrary change of a
mental terms signification really were implied in the conditional cited above,
then Ockham could be accused of not being able to give any plausible account
of signification by means of subordination at all. That Ockham is at least com-
mitted to the view that there are two different modes of signification, since in
his view subordination implies a semantic dependence with respect to signifi-
cation (even if it is debatable whether this commits him to the view that there
are two different kinds of signs) is trivial. However it is a somewhat different
question whether, on the other hand, subordination really requires an act of
imposition by some speaker. So if we compare the two predicates
(p1) is subordinated to ---
and
(p2) is imposed to signify ---
we can state first that (p2) allows for a reformulation that includes some
speaker S, while (p1) does not: while it seems acceptable to say that a speaker
86 Chapter 2
imposes a sound so as to signify something, and hence, that a sound is imposed

by a speaker so as to signify something, it does not seem acceptable to say that
a sound is subordinated to a mental term by a speaker. It seems questionable
even if the two predicates concern the same entities. (p1) is about terms, for
example:
(a) The spoken term cat is subordinated to the mental term cat.
(p2), on the other hand, seems to involve things:
(b) The sound cat is imposed to signify cats.
One difference between imposition and subordination seems to be that even if

we can plausibly say that, in order to impose any sound so as to signify some-
thing, a speaker should have a mental term for the thing or the kind of things
he wishes to name, it is not necessary that the speaker should thereby know
that the sound signifies the same thing as the mental term. In my view, it is suf-
ficient that the speaker should somehow know what it is that he wants to
name, that is, that he should know the thing in some way.
Even if it could be said that in Ockhams sense knowing a thing is tanta-
mount to having a mental term for that thing, this does not imply that the
speaker thereby knows that in fact he has a mental term of the thing, because
this kind of semantic knowledge requires more than merely knowing extra-
mental things.12 Ockhams co-friar Roger Bacon speaks only of arbitrary acts of
imposition without referring to subordination at all. That is, Bacon only con-
siders spoken and written terms to be signs in the semantically relevant sense.
He conceives of imposition as an act of baptism in the case of names or more
generally, categorematic terms: [] it should be noted that imposition of
12 It may help to illustrate the claim I try to make for imposition by considering Ockhams
distinction of two kinds of assent that is, assent to that so-and-so is the case and assent
to that a proposition is true. Ockham holds that it is possible that someone who does not
possess the semantic concepts of a proposition and of truth should nonetheless give his
assent to that so-and-so is the case by merely thinking that so-and-so is the case, that is,
by merely formulating a mental proposition. But, as Ockham says, he thereby does not
acknowledge the truth of the mental proposition. Now I maintain that merely thinking
that something is the case in Ockhams terms does not seem to imply that the thinking
subject should possess any semantic knowledge about mental language. I claim that it
can equally be held with respect to imposition that an act of imposition does not imply
that the imposing subject should possess any semantic knowledge about the mental lan-
guage at all.
names occurs in two ways: [] in one way via a vocally expressed form of
imposing, in which fashion names are commonly imposed upon infants and
other things, [].13
So it can be held that in Ockhams sense, even if (a) somehow presupposes
(b), thereby it is not implied that the speaker in (b) should know that (a) some-
how follows from his act: the semantic relation of subordination is not some-
thing which must be known by someone in order to correctly apply the
expression cat to cats. The relation of subordination to imposition can be cap-
tured in the following way:
(E) By being imposed by some speaker to signify Fs, a spoken term is
subordinated to a mental term signifying Fs.
In order to appreciate Ockhams conception of subordination, I suggest

thinking of his conditional [] if the concept in question were to change its
significate, the sound in question would change its significate by itself (as
well), without any new (act of ) institution in the sense of a (true) counter-
factual conditional. Textual evidence supports this reading, since in the Latin
text Ockham uses a subjunctive form of the imperfect, that is: permutaret.
Grammarians speak of an irrealis.14 According to the grammatical rules
of classical Latin this indicates that, given the ordinary course of the world,
the content of the antecedent incidentally never happens to be realized,
although God could bring this about, according to the theological principle
that He is able to replace any efficient cause in the world by causing some-
thing directly.15
Next, I argue that Ockham wishes to stress that once a sound is in fact sub-
ordinated to a mental term and hence is identical in signification with it then
subordination guarantees the identity of signification, albeit along with any
(possible) change of the mental terms signification. Subordination then
can be understood as being foundational with respect to the signification of
13 Dicendum est quod [] dupliciter fit impositio nominum: uno modo sub forma impo-
nendi vocaliter expressa, ut communiter imponuntur nomina infantibus et aliis rebus,
[]. Roger Bacon (Th.S. Maloney, ed.), Compendium Studii Theologiae, Leiden, 1988, 105.
14 Irrealis: Der Sprecher hlt den Inhalt des bedingenden Satzes fr nicht wirklich.
Bedingung und Folgerung stehen fr die Gegenwart im Konjunktiv Imperfekt, fr die
Vergangenheit im Konjunktiv Plusquamperfekt. Hans Rubenbauer and J.B. Hofmann,
Lateinische Grammatik, Bamberg; Mnchen, 1975, 259, 313.
15 One formulation of this principle can be found in the Quodlibeta: [] quidquid Deus
producit mediantibus causis secundis, potest immediate sine illis producere et conser-
vare. Quodl. VI, q.6 (OT IX, 604605).
88 Chapter 2
spoken terms, such that the following holds: the signification of a spoken term
is founded in the signification of a mental term, but the signification of a men-
tal term is not founded in the signification of a spoken term. (At this point the
question of what constitutes the signification of mental terms remains open.)16
In my view, this is what Ockham tries to account for by using the conditional.
I think the case of the preservation of the identity of signification serves to illus-
trate the following foundational relation:
(F) If a mental term tm were to change its signification, then the subor-
dinated spoken term ts would thereby change its signification in the
same way.
The crucial point is that the spoken term would then, as Ockham says, change
its signification without any new (act) of institution, no matter whether a men-
tal term actually ever changes its signification or not. An example may help to
illustrate this kind of change: referring to (E) we can say that
(c) if cat is imposed by some speaker to signify cats, then cat is subor-
dinated to the mental term cat and hence, cat and cat signify the
same, that is, cats.
Imagine that all cats existing at the present moment turned into stone (now it
becomes clear why Ockham uses the irrealis). If it is plausible to hold that, in
this case, the signification of the mental term cat would change, because it
would not signify cats any more but something like statues of a kind of domestic
animal, then it could be held as well that the spoken term cat would thereby
change its signification in the same way, such that the identity of signification
would be preserved without any further act of any speaker. Thus:
(d) If cat were not to signify cats anymore but cat-statues, then cat
would signify cat-statues as well.
Note that Ockham uses the very same formulation in the case of written terms
being subordinated to spoken terms. In his commentary on Aristotles Peri
Hermenias Ockham writes: [] the written expression will not signify the
sound but only the thing, and if the sound were to change its significate,
immediately and by itself the written expression would change its significate.
But now he adds one further sentence which really marks the difference
16 See 3.2 How to Acquire an Absolute Simple Concept.

between the two cases: And indeed it appears to be (so) (et ita apparet de
facto).17
Recall that spoken and written terms both signify only conventionally.
Since Ockham conceives of the initial fixation of a spoken or written terms
signification as due to a contingent act of some speaker, it could be argued that
conventional signification is open to equally arbitrary changes of its significa-
tion by further acts of imposition. This is how Ockham approaches the prob-
lem of the equivocation of conventionally signifying terms.18
Indeed this is the relevant difference between, on the one hand, spoken
terms being subordinated to mental terms and, on the other hand, written
terms being subordinated to spoken terms: it does actually happen that some-
times spoken and written terms change their signification due to further acts
of imposition, but this never happens with respect to mental terms, since a
speaker simply cannot arbitrarily or voluntarily change their natural significa-
tion. Is it possible, however, in the ordinary course of the actual world for a
mental term to change its signification?
Ockham does actually mention one such case: imagine that cats were sim-
ply to become extinct. According to Ockham, this would bring about a change
concerning the mental terms signification, since cat would not signify cats any
more. To be precise: it would not signify something actually existing in the
world: the mental term cat would lose its signification1 but it would keep its
signification2.19 It should be enough for the moment to state that Ockham
seems to conceive of loss as a possible case of change of a mental terms signi-
fication1. In his commentary on Peri Hermenias Ockham writes:
But many sounds [] are imposed to signify things in the first place, just
as the sound man is imposed primarily to signify all men and only when
there are men. So when men cease to be, they cease to be signified by this
sound man.20
17 [] dictio scripta non significabit vocem sed rem tantum, et si vox mutaret significatum
suum, statim eo ipso dictio scripta mutaret significatum suum. Et ita apparet de facto.
Exp. in Perih., prooem., 2 (OP II, 348).
18 Ockham tends to explain the equivocation of linguistic expressions along the following
lines: a spoken or written term is equivocal if it is subordinated to more than one concept.
For a further discussion of equivocation see the next section.
20 Sed multae voces [] sunt impositae ad significandum primo res, sicut haec vox homo
imponitur primo ad significandum omnes homines et nonnisi quando sunt homines, ita
quod quando cessant esse homines, cessant significari per hanc vocem homo. Exp. in
Perih., prooem., 2 (OP II, 347).
90 Chapter 2
Notice that although Ockham here explicitly refers to spoken and not to men-
tal terms, the example serves to illustrate the semantic dependence of spoken
on mental terms, since the loss of signification concerns the spoken term only
insofar as it signifies the same as the mental term man to which it is subordi-
nated.21 Thus, the loss of signification concerns the mental and the spoken
term. The crucial point is that the change occurs due to the extinction of the
signified things that is, men and not due to any speakers act. Textual evi-
dence suggests that Ockham does in fact conceive of this kind of complete loss
as possible, since in the Latin original he does not use a conditional clause
(si), but only a temporal clause (quando) in the indicative mood.
But there is still another possibility, as Panaccio claims: referring to the con-
ditional quoted from the opening chapter of the Summa, he takes Ockham to
have in mind here the fact that the whole population of cats, for instance, is
continually changing due to birth and death and hence the extension of
the mental term cat is also continually changing; and since the extension
of the mental term cat and of the spoken term cat is identical, the extension
of the spoken term is continually changing in the same way.22 This kind of
actual change does not involve any new act of institution(s) or imposition on
the part of the spoken term.23
To summarize: every kind of change presented so far, possible or actual, can
serve to illustrate the role of subordination with respect to the signification of
spoken terms. Thus subordination guarantees that a spoken term signifies the
same as the mental term it is subordinated to and continues to signify the same
even if the mental term changes its signification. Subordination preserves the
identity of signification of a mental term and the spoken term subordinated to
it. Ockham claims the identity of signification to hold between spoken terms as
subordinated to mental terms and also between written terms as subordinated
21 In the surroundings of the cited passage, Ockham again stresses the point that the spoken
term does not signify the mental term, but that it signifies the same as the mental term.
22 Private communication. Recall that I use extension in the following way: the extension of
a term at T includes all and only those things existing at T to which the term is (correctly)
applicable at T. See 1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of Signify (significare). Panaccio
uses extension similarly in this context.
23 Note that the kind of change Panaccio has in mind is merely a kind of exchange of the
things in the terms extension, but it is neither a change of the kind of things within a
terms extension nor the total depletion of a terms extension. Thus it could be objected
that Panaccio does not present a case of change in a way crucial to the alteration of a
terms signification: the point is that the fact that some individuals of the feline species are
born and others die does not affect the fact that cat signifies1 all existing cats.
to spoken terms.24 Recall that I rendered the signification of a spoken term as

its (correct) applicability. Now, how can the signification of a term whether
mental, spoken or written be explained in general?25 I suggest the following,
perhaps somewhat lengthy explanation:
(sign)gen A mental, spoken or written term A signifies1/2 a thing a if and

only if a mental, spoken or written proposition of the form (1)
This is an A or a proposition of the form (2) This can be an A
would be true, if mentally formed,26 uttered, or written at
some present, past, or future time T by a subject or if a propo-
sition of form (2) would at least not imply a contradiction,
when mentally formed, uttered, or written at some present,
past, or future time T.
Note however that, so far, all that has been demonstrated is that a term and the
term subordinated to it relate to the same things; it has not been shown that
they relate to the same things in the same way. Perhaps it would be better to
speak of the identity of the signified things at least provisionally, since to
speak of the identity of signification is somewhat misleading. This is especially
problematic with respect to spoken terms being subordinated to mental terms.
Ockham himself states an important difference by ascribing natural significa-
tion to mental and conventional signification to spoken and written terms:
while neither acquisition nor loss of a mental terms signification depend on
any act by a speaker, both acquisition and loss of a spoken or a written terms
signification depend on such an act. So it can be held that
(G) if a mental term tm signifies2 Fs, then tm signifies1/2 the Fs necessarily
while
(H) if a spoken or written term ts or tw signifies2 Fs, then ts or tw signi-

fies1/2 the Fs contingently.
24 I quote again: And what is said with respect to passions or intentions or concepts holds
in the same way and proportionally with respect to the written terms in relation to
sounds. (Et sicut dictum est de vocibus respectu passionum seu intentionum seu con-
ceptuum, eodem modo proportionaliter quantum ad hoc tenendum est de his, quae sunt
in scripto respectu vocum.) SL I, 1 (OP I, 8).
25 See again 1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of Signify (significare).
26 For Ockhams notion of forming a mental proposition see 3.3.1 Propositional Acts of
92 Chapter 2
(G) says that if there is a mental term, then it is not possible in the ordinary
course of the world for it to signify1/2 any things other than those it actually
signifies1/2.27 On the other hand, (H) indicates that if there is a spoken term,
then it is possible for it to signify1/2 things other than those it actually signifies1/2,
since it is possible for the spoken term to become equivocal, as I indicated
above. Generally speaking, in Ockhams conception conventional signification
depends on intentional acts of speakers while natural signification does not.
Does this distinction indicate that the signification of mental terms and
the signification of spoken or written terms are indeed two different proper-
ties? To settle this question it will help to consider the somewhat special
case of equivocal terms in some detail. Since if it turns out that at least in
some cases the imposition that leads to the establishment of a subordination
is in fact nothing but the regular use of it, then we might ask whether it is
adequate to conceive of natural and conventional signification as merely
two modes of one and the same semantic property. Equivocation applies
exclusively to conventionally signifying terms, since Ockham explains equivo-
cation in terms of what can be called a multiple subordination involving
a multitude of impositional acts. For this reason, Ockham claims mental
categorematic terms like dog to be strictly speaking neither equivocal nor
univocal.28
The case of equivocal terms allows us to draw a clearer line between the
semantic relation of subordination and any given speakers activity. To
recall the relation of imposition to subordination: speakers do not actually
subordinate any sound to any mental term, but they impose a sound to
signify something. The question then is: what speakers act is involved in
the case of a term becoming equivocal? And Ockhams answer again is
imposition. To explain this further, I now turn to Ockhams treatment of
equivocal terms.
27 Notice that I use the modal adverb necessarily here in accordance with Ockhams use.
Take for example Ockhams conception of a necessary proposition: a necessary proposi-
tion is not necessary because it is always true, but because it is true if it exists and cannot
be false. As he writes in the Summa Logicae: Tamen de propositione necessaria est sci-
endum quod propositio non propter hoc dicitur necessaria quia semper sit vera, sed quia
est vera si sit et non potest esse falsa. SL II, 9 (OP I, 275). This applies to the signification of
mental terms as well. A mental term signifies necessarily, because if there is a mental
term, then it is not possible that the mental term could signify something different from
the kind of things that initially fixed its signification.
28 See for instance the following lines: Est autem sciendum quod sola vox vel aliud signum
ad placitum institutum est aequivocum vel univocum, et ideo intentio animae vel con-
ceptus non est aequivocus nec univocus proprie loquendo. SL I, 13 (OP I, 44).
2.3 Conventional Signification and Equivocation
In the Summa Logicae, Ockham attempts to explain the equivocation of spo-

ken and written terms with reference to subordination and imposition: a spo-
ken or written term is equivocal if it is subordinated to more than one concept.
It is worth citing the relevant passage in its entirety:
But the equivocal sound that signifies a plurality of things is not a sign
subordinated to one concept, rather it is one sign [] subordinated to
several concepts []. But such an equivocal [term] is twofold. One is
equivocal by chance, that is when a sound is subordinated to a plurality
of concepts, and in such a way as if it were subordinated to the one but
not to the other and signified the one even if it would not signify the
other; such is the case with the name Socrates which is imposed upon a
plurality of men. The other is equivocal by consideration, when a sound
is first imposed for one or more [things] and is subordinated to one con-
cept and later due to some similarity of the first significate with some-
thing else or due to any other reason it is imposed for another [thing],
such that it would not have been imposed for the second if it was not first
imposed for the other thing; such is the case with the noun man. It was
first imposed to signify all rational beings hence it was imposed to signify
everything which belongs to the extension of the concept rational being.
But later some users, seeing a resemblance of man to such an image of
man, used this noun man for such an image regularly so that had this
noun man not been imposed for men, they would neither have used nor
imposed this noun man to signify or stand for such an image; and due to
this, this kind of term is called equivocal by consideration.29
29 Est autem vox illa aequivoca quae significans plura non est signum subordinatum uni
conceptui, sed est signum unum pluribus conceptibus [] subordinatum []. Tale autem
aequivocum est duplex. Unum est aequivocum a casu, quando scilicet vox pluribus con-
ceptibus subordinatur, et ita uni ac si non subordinaretur alteri et ita significat unum ac
si non significaret aliud, sicut est de nomine Sortes, quod imponitur pluribus hominibus.
Aliud est aequivocum a consilio, quando vox primo imponitur alicui vel aliquibus et sub-
ordinatur uni conceptui et postea propter aliquam similitudinem primi significati ad ali
quid aliud vel propter aliquam aliam rationem, ita quod non imponeretur illi alteri nisi
quia primo imponebatur alii, sicut est de hoc nomine homo. Primo enim imponebatur
ad significandum omnia animalia rationalia, ita quod imponebatur ad significandum
omne illud quod continetur sub hoc conceptu animal rationale, postea autem utentes,
videntes similitudinem inter talem hominem et imaginem hominis, utebantur quan-
doque hoc nomine homo pro tali imagine, ita quod nisi hoc nomen homo fuisset primo
94 Chapter 2
First, a historical remark: the division of terms which are either equivocal by
chance or by consideration was conveyed by Boethius in his commentary on
Aristotles Categories. The first case of terms being equivocal by chance
involves a plurality of acts of imposition occurring independently of each
other, that is, the act of imposition a2 is not dependent on the occurrence of an
act a1, just as a3 is neither dependent on a2 nor on a1. If for example several girls
are called Anne, then the spoken term Anne is subordinated to each mental
term of one of those girls which are named Anne, as if it [the spoken term]
were subordinated to the one but not to the other so that it signifies the one
even if it would not signify the other. This is not restricted to proper names but
applies to all homonyms, such as bank, meaning both a financial institution
and a shore.
What does being subordinated to a plurality of concepts in this case
amount to? It is helpful to consider the case of univocal terms first, because the
case of terms being equivocal by chance merely reiterates the point in ques-
tion.30 Since subordination is constitutive with respect to the signification of
spoken terms insofar as a spoken term signifies the same as some mental term,
it is possible in the case of univocal terms to conceive of subordination as a
kind of functional relation which maps each (token of a) spoken term onto a
(token of a) mental term. Thus each univocal (token of a) term is part of an
ordered pair of terms. Let f be the function of signifying the same as which is
displayed by the relation of being subordinated to a (token of a) mental term,
then for each (token of a) univocal term ts there is a (token of a) mental term
tm such that f <ts, tm>.31 With respect to imposition it can be said that a pair as
for example f <cat, cat> presupposes an act of imposition. Now if, due to a plu-
rality of independently occurring acts of imposition, (tokens of) the spoken
term ts happen to be subordinated to different mental terms tm1, tm2, tm3, then
an utterance of ts is subordinated either to tm1, tm2 or tm3.
What about terms being equivocal by consideration? A plurality of acts of
imposition is involved in this case as well. But the crucial difference is that
these acts do not occur independently of each other, since an act of imposition
a2 presupposes an act a1. As Ockham says, [] such that it [the spoken term]
impositum hominibus, non uterentur nec imponerent hoc nomen homo ad significan-
dum vel standum pro tali imagine; et propter hoc dicitur aequivocum a consilio. SL I, 13
(OP I, 45).
30 [] accipitur stricte quando scilicet subiectum et praedicatum significant illa pro quibus
supponunt una impositione et mediante uno conceptu et uno modo significandi logicali
et grammaticali. Et sic omnis praedicatio univoca est in quid. Quodl. IV, q.12 (OT IX, 356).
31 I insert the bracketed token of a to avoid that my description implies that spoken terms
are types, not mere tokens.
would not have been imposed for the second had it not first been imposed for
the other thing. Thus it is not yet clear what being subordinated to a plurality
of concepts exactly amounts to in this case. It is also not clear what the impo-
sitional activity here is, if not to some kind of use. But is it possible to distin-
guish this impositional use from mere equivocal use of a term at all?
For a start, Ockham is able to distinguish between different uses of terms,
for example, c-equivocal and incorrect use.32 According to him, there are rea-
sons for c-equivocal use. The possibility of accounting for reasons is crucial
since it really marks the difference between c-equivocal use and other cases of
use. Note that the few reasons Ockham actually gives for a terms use being
classified as c-equivocal are real relations that is resemblance, causality, and
proportion.33 The crucial difference between a real relation (relatio realis)
as opposed to a relation of the mind (relatio rationis) is that the former rela-
tion can hold between particular things independently of any subjects intel-
lectual activity, while the latter as the name indicates cannot. For example,
two white things are alike, Ockham says, no matter whether there is someone
comparing the two things or not. So resemblance or likeness is a real
relation.34
On the contrary, a spoken term signifies if and only if it is set up to signify,
since, he argues, to set up its signification is an operation of the intellect.
Conventional signification then is a relation of the mind.35 If I mistakenly
apply the term dog to a cat, I do not use dog c-equivocally, I simply use it
incorrectly. And, Ockham could add, there is no real relation such as likeness
that could render the use c-equivocal in this case. The speakers intention of
32 In what follows, when I speak of c-equivocal terms I refer to terms being equivocal by
consideration.
33 In his Quodlibeta, he enumerates several such reasons, that is, similarity, causality, and
proportion: []; et imponitur uni quia prius imponitur alteri, et hoc propter aliquam
similitudinem, causalitatem, proportionem etc. Exemplum: animal est sic aequivocum ad
animal verum et animal pictum, quia imponitur animali picto quia prius imponebatur
animali vero, et hoc propter similitudinem inter illa. Quodl. IV, q.12 (OT IX, 353). (Italics
mine).
34 Sed quando res est talis qualis denotatur esse per relationem vel concretum relationis
sine omni operatione intellectus, ita quod operatio intellectus nihil facit ad hoc, tunc
potest dici relatio realis []. Exemplum: quia unum album est simile aliteri albo sine
omni operatione intellectus comparantis vel non comparantis, ideo dicitur similitudo
relatio realis. Quodl. VI, q.30 (OT IX, 700).
35 Similiter quia vox non significat rem nisi per institutionem, quae est operatio intellectus,
ita quod si numquam fuisset haec vox homo instituta per intellectum ad significandum,
non significaret nec esset vox significativa, ideo significatio istius vocis potest vocari rela-
tio rationis. Quodl. VI, q.30 (OT IX, 699).
96 Chapter 2
how to use a term seems to be crucial for the classification of different uses.36
The different uses can be classified with respect to subordination as well.
Ockham could claim the following with respect to incorrect use:
(I) A spoken term ts is used incorrectly if it is used for an F, but it is not

the case that ts is subordinated to a mental term signifying Fs.
Since an c-equivocal term is one sign subordinated to several concepts, it

could be claimed that for instance
(J) A spoken term such as bank is used c-equivocally, if bank is used

for an institution for the keeping, lending etc. of money and for a
shore and if bank is subordinated to a mental term signifying an
institution for the keeping, lending etc. of money as well as to a
mental term signifying a shore.
The crucial point is that the c-equivocal use of a term presupposes that at least
two relations of subordination actually obtain. Now what about imposition
and subordination with respect to terms being c-equivocal? Above I tried to
account for imposition and subordination by claiming that
(E) By being imposed by some speaker to signify Fs, a spoken term is
subordinated to a mental term signifying Fs.
This can be specified now to express the relation of initial or independent sub-
ordination which is also involved in cases of terms being equivocal by chance.
There is no explicit allusion to the use of a term in this case: although the pos-
sibility of using a spoken term presupposes an act of imposition, this does not
seem to hold conversely, since just as a baptismal act of naming is not an act of
actually using a name, so it is possible to impose a sound so as to signify some-
thing without thereby actually using it. Maybe this act of imposition can be
called imposition without use because, strictly speaking, for a sound to be
imposed so as to signify something and thus to be subordinated to a mental
term, it is not necessary that the term should ever be used at all. This is not
mere quibbling, but marks an important difference between initial imposition
and the further act of imposition, since I claim that without the (derivative)
36 At this point, it remains open whether it really matters that the reasons for the equivocal
use of a term are real relations. It should be possible in principle to give an example of an
equivocal use which could be explained by referring to a relatio rationis.
use of a term, there would simply be no further imposition.37 Ockham himself

speaks of use and imposition in one and the same breath: [] if this noun
man had not been imposed for men, they would neither have used nor imposed
this noun man to signify or stand for such an image.38 Thus Ockham con-
cedes that this kind of equivocation is established by regular or repeated use
when he says that later some language-users (utentes), seeing a similarity
between man and such an image of man, used this noun man for such an
image repeatedly (quandoque). Imposition here amounts to nothing but regu-
lar or repeated use of a term having an established signification for something
the term was not originally set up to signify, where the derivative use can be
traced back to some similarity or other reason.39 Ockhams argumentation for
the term man becoming equivocal can be rendered as follows:
(a) Man signifies men.

(b) There is a likeness of men to pictures of men.
37 It is interesting to note that Roger Bacon marks a similar distinction between two differ-
ent cases of imposition: the first seems to correspond roughly to Ockhams initial imposi-
tion while the second seems to describe, just as in the case of equivocal terms, an act of
further imposition or more specifically, an act of re-imposition: I already mentioned the
first case above: [] it should be noted that imposition of names occurs in two ways: []
in one way via a vocally expressed form of imposing, in which fashion names are com-
monly imposed upon infants and other things, []. But now to the second: But it can
occur in another way, in the case of sole the intellect thinking about a vocal sound and a
significate, and in this way the one uttering the expression John is dead imposes a name
for the thing of the past or the corpse, and thus [the name] is necessarily renewed, and
those hearing it receive it with the same sense as the speaker understands it. ([S]ed ali-
ter potest fieri apud solum intellectum cogitantem de voce et significato, et sic proferens
hanc orationem Johannes est mortuus imponit nomen rei praeteritae vel cadaveri, et
ideo de necessitate renovatur, quam recipiunt audientes sicut proferens intelligit.)
Bacon, Compendium Studii Theologiae, 105.
38 The example of the term man being equivocally used both for men and pictures of men
is Aristotles. Ashworth claims that [m]edieval logicians seem to have been totally
unaware of the fact that the Greek word used by Aristotle was genuinely polysemous,
meaning both animal and image, and they explained the extended use of animal in
terms of a likeness between the two referents [] Jennifer E. Ashworth, Medieval
Theories of Analogy, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter
2013 Edition), url:http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/analogy-medieval/,5.
Divisions of Analogy, last access March 8th 2014.
39 Since Ockham claims the similarity to hold between things it can be asked whether there
is also a similarity between the concepts to whose extensions the things belong respec-
tively. I owe this point to Christian Nimtz.
98 Chapter 2
(c) If a speaker S knows (a) and (b), then S can use man c-equivocally
for pictures of men.
(d) Thus, if S regularly uses man for men and for pictures of men, then
S derivatively imposes man to signify pictures of men.
(e) That is, man is subordinated to both the concepts man and picture
of man.
Maybe the regularity of use involved in (c) and presupposed by (d) can be
made more explicit by referring to occasions of use. Thus:
(K) If ts originally signifies Fs and if ts is used by a speaker at the occa-

sion o1 for a G and Fs and Gs are really related (e.g., by being alike),
and if ts is used by the speaker on similar occasions o2,, on for a G,
then ts is derivatively imposed by the speaker to signify Gs.
According to Ockham then, the spoken term is derivatively subordinated to

another mental term by being used regularly for something which the spoken
term did not signify originally; however, there is some reason for this deriva-
tive use. Consequently, the c-equivocal use of a term is not impositional, but
merely c-equivocal if it relies on the derivative signification established by reg-
ular use.
But then one might ask how it can be maintained that a term like man is
an absolute, categorematic term that signifies exclusively one kind of thing,
without co-signifying anything else, if in fact it signifies representations
of men as well as men. This is a question that Ockham could have answered.
First, note that the derivative case of imposition does not merely presuppose
an initial act of imposition, but is likewise asymmetrically dependent on both
the initial imposition and the terms initial subordination to a mental term,
since man would not signify representations of men if it did not signify men.
But man would still signify men even if it were not secondarily imposed for
representations of men. I quote Ockham again: [] if this noun man had not
been imposed for men, they would neither have used nor imposed this noun
man to signify or stand for such an image. A consequence of this asymmetric
dependence is that it implies a hierarchy within the multiple subordination
of a term such that there is one mental term to which the term is originally
subordinated and one or more mental terms to which it is derivatively subordi-
nated.40 Thus:
40 My terminological vacillation is rather harmless; I use mental term and concept inter-
changeably here.
(L) A spoken term ts is c-equivocal if ts is originally subordinated to a

mental term signifying Fs and if ts is derivatively subordinated to a
mental term signifying Gs where Fs and Gs are really related.41
Ockham could reply to the objection in the following way: it is sufficient for a
term to be an absolute categorematic term if it does not signify more than one
kind of things originally. If such a term is used for the things it was originally
imposed to signify, then it is not used c-equivocally; it is used c-equivocally
only if the term is used for the things it was derivatively imposed to signify. If
this is correct, then it follows that there is a real difference between a terms
being c-equivocal (with respect to its multiple signification) and its unequivo-
cal or c-equivocal use according to Ockham. Hence, in order to use such a term
c-equivocally, a speaker must somehow be aware of the asymmetric depen-
dency among the terms multiple signification. That is, he must know what the
term signifies originally as well as what it signifies by deviating from this origi-
nal signification.
As mentioned above, Ockham holds that there are reasons for this kind
of equivocal use of terms. To know such reasons might help a speaker to
learn the derivative signification of a term, but it is not necessary that the
speaker should be able to account for this reason in order to use such a term
c-equivocally.42 It is possible to formulate the following epistemological condi-
tion with respect to the use of terms being equivocal by consideration by
modifying (J):
(J)1 A spoken term ts is used c-equivocally if a speaker S uses ts for Gs

and ts originally signifies Fs and derivatively signifies Gs and if S
knows that ts signifies Fs originally and Gs derivatively.
41 With respect to the asymmetric dependence I claim that any imposition other than the
initial act of imposition is secondary due solely to the initial act of imposition and not to
any other, further imposition, such that a spoken term is subordinated originally to just
one mental concept. In other words, there seems to be no inner hierarchy among the
mental terms to which the spoken term is derivatively subordinated. Thus it is possible for
the spoken term to be derivatively subordinated to more than one mental term; there is no
obvious restriction to derivative subordination. For example, man could not only be used
equivocally to refer to representations of men, but to refer to dead bodies as well. But this
latter use does not seem to depend on the other, equivocal use, but on the original use of
man for men.
42 It remains open whether the equivocal use of terms is in fact restricted, insofar as it seems
necessary for there to be a reason such as likeness between what is signified originally
and what is signified derivatively.
100 Chapter 2
Thus it is possible to distinguish c-equivocal use of a term from incorrect use.

For instance, if a speaker were to use man for representations of men while
believing that man signifies representations of men originally, then Ockham
would presumably believe that speaker to be misapplying the term man. In
addition to (I) above, this represents another possible case of incorrect use of
a term.
Finally, there is a further issue related to derivative subordination that can
be articulated in the following way: at the beginning of this Section I tried to
represent terms being equivocal by chance as ordered pairs of (tokens of)
terms. Consider now the cases of c-equivocal terms and multiple subordina-
tion: does the relation of derivative subordination constituted by repeated use
exhibit the same kind of counterfactual stability as initial subordination? The
answer should be in the negative. For one thing, the conditional Ockham uses
to characterize c-equivocal terms [] if this noun man had not been
imposed to refer to men, they would neither have used nor imposed this noun
man to signify or stand for such an image indicates that the derivative signi-
fication of a c-equivocal term is not necessarily preserved by this kind of deriv-
ative subordination in every possible case in which the original signification is
changed. Recall that the derivatively subordinated term is asymmetrically
dependent on the originally subordinated term. There are two possible cases
illustrating that derivative subordination is not (necessarily) as counterfactu-
ally stable as initial subordination: first, the mental term to which the spoken
term is originally subordinated does not change its signification, but the spo-
ken term changes its derivative signification, and second, the mental term to
which the spoken term is originally subordinated changes or loses its significa-
tion, but the spoken term does not lose its derivative signification. This is a
(speculative) example for the latter case: suppose that the term fly originally
signifies a certain kind of six-legged, buzzing insect. Suppose further that fly
is c-equivocal because it is also used to signify the activity of flying in general
and hence is derivatively subordinated to the mental term flying. Now imagine
that the insects were actually to lose their ability for flying, due to some eco-
logical disaster for instance, and to suddenly reach the size of rats. Is it not
plausible that the spoken term fly would lose its original signification, because
the mental term fly would no longer signify flies, but rather rat-like animals?
However, is it not plausible that the derivative signification of fly as signifying
the activity of flying in general could remain unchanged?
If this is plausible, it shows that in the case of a term being c-equivocal it is
not appropriate to speak of derivative subordination as subordination in the
strict sense, since this kind of derivative subordination lacks the function of
leading necessarily to a counterfactually stable relation of signification.
I would like to conclude that subordination in the strict sense exhibits its
counterfactual stability necessarily only in the case of original subordination.
The case of imposition-by-use which Ockham uses to account for terms being
c-equivocal does not lead to a relation of subordination in the strict sense. Thus
by conceiving of c-equivocation along the lines of what I called derivative sub-
ordination Ockham introduces an ambiguity within the very relation of subor-
dination itself since, strictly speaking, there are two kinds of subordination,
that is, original and derivative subordination.
In the former kind, the signification of a spoken term is established inde-
pendently of the signification of any other spoken term. Sometimes, a sound
is imposed only once to signify so that it is subordinated exactly to one men-
tal term, and sometimes a sound is imposed several times simultaneously
or successively to signify so that it is subordinated to several mental terms
and the spoken term is equivocal (and not merely used c-equivocally). By the
latter kind of subordination, the signification of a spoken term is not estab-
lished independently of the signification of any other spoken term, but pre-
supposes that there is some spoken term whose signification is then
extended, for instance, by regular use of a term for things other than those it
was set up to signify. As a consequence, signification established by original
subordination is a counterfactually stable relation, while signification by
derivative subordination is not at least not necessarily. But of course, this is
not to say that imposition-by-use necessarily leads to derivative subordina-
tion, since it is likewise possible to establish a spoken term simply by regu-
larly using it.
To come back to the relation between subordination and imposition: the
impositional activity leading to the establishment of a relation of subordi-
nation can be an initial act of naming or merely regular use. That is, it does
not depend on the kind of impositional activity which kind of subordination
is thereby established; pivotal, however, is whether or not the spoken term,
which is imposed so as to signify, already has a signification by being subor-
dinated to a mental term or terms: if not, the impositional activity leads to
original subordination, and if so, the activity of naming or using leads only
to derivative subordination. In each case, there is some mental term signify-
ing the same as the spoken term in question. What is crucial is that the dis-
tinction of original and derivative signification does not apply to mental
terms, since it implies the regular, equivocal use of a term. Rather the signi-
fication of a mental term is not intentionally set up at all according
to Ockham, that is, neither by use nor by some initial act. I now turn to the
propositional level: Ockham claims the relation of correspondence to be
relevant here.
102 Chapter 2
2.4 Mental Propositions and Spoken Propositions: The Relation of

Correspondence
Ockham employs the verb to correspond (correspondere) throughout his

works regarding a relation between mental and spoken propositions, and
regarding a relation between mental and spoken terms. This might strike the
reader as a little confusing, since I claimed previously that correspondence
relates to spoken propositions. Perhaps the air of confusion is dispersed if we
take into account the context in which Ockham discusses both the correspon-
dence of terms and the correspondence of propositions of different kinds.
In the Summa Logicae Ockham introduces talk of correspondence in the
third chapter of the first part, having discussed in the first chapter the broad
division of terms into three kinds (mental, spoken, and written) and how they
are related by subordination.43 Here in the third chapter he turns to the more
specific question of whether it is further required to divide the mental terms
into different kinds such as nouns and verbs or even more specific kinds, such
as adverbs or participles. At this point, he remarks: But there can be some
doubt whether certain intentions in the mind, apart from verbs, correspond to
spoken and written participles, because it does not seem of great necessity to
posit such a plurality of mental terms.44 In other words, the question is
whether the division of kinds of spoken terms also applies to the mental level
in general. Ockhams answer is in the affirmative.
But how does he argue for a diversity of kinds of mental terms? Quite
remarkably, he argues that it follows from the correspondence of mental prop-
ositions to spoken propositions that there are different kinds of mental terms.
Compare the following passage, also from the third chapter of the Summa.
Ockham writes:
But that it is necessary to assume such mental names and verbs and
adverbs and conjunctions and prepositions follows from the fact that to
every utterance another mental proposition corresponds in mind, and
43 It is no mere coincidence that Ockhams account of subordination implicitly sticks to

absolute categorematic terms from the start, since these mental terms can be said to sig-
nify naturally insofar as their extension is determined causally, that is, by a relation to a
particular thing such as a particular horse or dog. See 3.2 How to Acquire an Absolute
Simple Concept.
44 Utrum autem participiis vocalibus et scriptis correspondeant in mente quaedam inten-
tiones a verbis distinctae potest esse dubium, eo quod non videtur magna necessitas
talem pluralitatem ponere in mentalibus terminis. SL 1, 3 (OP I, 11).
therefore, just as those parts of the spoken proposition that are imposed
due to the necessity of signification are distinct, so the parts of the men-
tal proposition are distinct correspondingly.45
He argues in a similar fashion in his commentary on Aristotles Categories:
It is to be noted here that although Aristotle marks a distinction of

sounds, he intends a similar division of the intentions of the soul or of the
concepts which correspond to these spoken terms. For to every [] spo-
ken proposition a mental proposition corresponds, and therefore, just as
some spoken terms are complex, some non-complex, some parts of men-
tal propositions [] are non-complex, [].46
Ockham argues along similar lines in the two passages: according to him, it
follows from the correspondence of mental propositions to spoken proposi-
tions that there are different kinds of mental terms, so that, as he empha-
sizes in the passage from the Summa, the mental terms divide into the same
kinds as the spoken terms. Again, he argues that the correspondence of
propositions implies a correspondence of the terms. I reconstruct the argu-
mentation in the passage from the commentary on the Categories as
follows:
(a) There are different kinds of spoken terms.

(b) Every mental proposition corresponds to some spoken proposition.
There is a further premise which should be rendered explicit, that is:
(c) Terms are the constituent parts of propositions.
45 Sed quod oporteat ponere talia nomina mentalia et verba et adverbia et coniunctiones et
praepositiones ex hoc convincitur quod omni orationi vocali correspondet alia mentalis
in mente, et ideo sicut illae partes propositionis vocalis quae sunt propter necessitatem
significationis impositae sunt distinctae, sic partes propositionis mentalis correspon-
denter sunt distinctae. SL I, 3 (OP I, 14) (Italics mine).
46 Notandum est hic quod quamvis Aristoteles hic ponat divisionem vocum, vult tamen
consimilem divisionem esse intentionum in anima seu conceptuum ipsis vocibus corre-
spondentium. Nam omni [] propositioni in voce correspondet propositio in mente, et
ideo sicut voces quaedam sunt complexae, quaedam incomplexae, ita etiam partes prop-
ositionum in mente quae sunt quaedam intentiones in mente quaedam sunt incom-
plexae []. Exp. in Praedicament., cap.4, 1 (OP II, 148) (Italics mine).
104 Chapter 2
Since Ockham, taken literally, holds (c) to apply to both mental and spoken
propositions,47 he safely infers from (a), (b) and (c) that
(d) spoken and mental terms divide into similar kinds.
The crucial assumption is (b). Ockham here seems to presuppose that the cor-
respondence of a mental to a spoken proposition implies that the parts of the
mental proposition divide into similar kinds as the parts of spoken propositions.
The interesting question is: why does Ockham argue for the assumption that
mental terms divide into similar kinds as spoken terms? To put it differently,
what is the purpose of claiming that spoken terms correspond to mental terms
due to the fact that mental propositions correspond to spoken propositions?
In what follows, I want to show that Ockham introduces correspondence
between mental and spoken propositions as a foundational principle of the
semantic analysis of spoken propositions. It should be emphasized that his
aim as I take it is not to account for the possibility of producing or generat-
ing spoken propositions, but rather to account for the possibility of interpret-
ing spoken propositions in the first place. Quite trivially, it is only possible to
interpret a spoken proposition if the spoken proposition is not meaningless,
since a spoken proposition is interpreted with respect to what it says or
imports.48 It is plausible that a speaker who is able to interpret spoken proposi-
tions is likewise able to intentionally utter spoken propositions himself. But this
is only secondary here. The crucial point is that Ockhams perspective on spo-
ken propositions in the Summa Logicae is one of analysis and interpretation.
Recall that Ockham established in the first chapter of the Summa that a
spoken term is meaningful if and only if it is subordinated to a mental term.49
Conversely, if an occurring spoken proposition is meaningful then necessarily
its parts are meaningful due to their being subordinated to some mental terms.
Thus in order to distinguish the meaningful parts of a spoken proposition it
is necessary to identify the mental terms they are subordinated to. And this
47 See for example SL I, 1 (OP I, 7): Unde terminus aliud non est quam pars propinqua propo-
sitionis. [] Sed quamvis omnis terminus pars sit propositionis, vel esse possit, non
omnes termini tamen eiusdem sunt naturae; []. He then goes on to distinguish the
three basic kinds of terms mental, spoken, and written.
48 At the end of 1.5.2 Personal Supposition of Terms and Taking a Term Significatively
(sumi significative) I showed that ascribing a truth value to a given spoken proposition is
part of its interpretation. I will discuss in the next section how the truth (or falsity) of a
spoken proposition relates to what it means or says.
49 At this point, when I speak of a term as meaningful, I mean that it has signification1/2.
identification of mental terms should be guided by what Ockham calls the

necessity of signification. I quote the passage from the Summa again:
But that it is necessary to assume such mental names and verbs and
adverbs and conjunctions and prepositions follows from the fact that to
every utterance another mental proposition corresponds in mind, and
therefore, just as those parts of the spoken proposition which are imposed
due to the necessity of signification are distinct, so the parts of the men-
tal proposition are distinct correspondingly.50
Although Ockham also infers from the general assumption
(b) every mental proposition corresponds to some spoken proposition
that
(e) it is necessary to posit different (kinds of) mental terms
the difference here is that he explicitly refers to imposition to argue for (e). In
one sense, it merely follows from the very conception of imposition and subor-
dination that, for instance, if there are two spoken terms that signify different
things, then they do so by virtue of being subordinated to two different mental
terms. Thus it can be formulated that
(f) two spoken terms are distinct in signification if they are subordi-
nated to two mental terms.
But Ockham also claims that the question of whether or not it is necessary to
posit another (kind of) mental term in order to distinguish the meaningful
parts of a spoken proposition is to be decided in terms of the necessity or
need of signification.51 He literally says that those spoken terms are distinct
which are imposed due to the necessity of signification. That is,
(g) if two spoken terms are distinct in signification due to the necessity
of signification, then it is necessary to posit two mental terms.
50 See fn. 45.

51 Interestingly, Ockham implicitly claims that the necessity or need of signification
guides the imposition (and subordination) of spoken terms: it is semantic necessity
which determines imposition and subordination in general.
106 Chapter 2
What does this semantic necessity amount to? It is helpful to consider the
case of synonymous spoken terms, although Ockham explicitly states that syn-
onymous terms are not imposed due to some semantic need. It is instructive to
see why. In the same chapter of the Summa Ockham writes:
Because just as the multiplicity of synonymous names is not invented

due to the need of signification but due to the ornament of speech []
since whatever is signified by all synonyms [that is, spoken terms] could
be expressed sufficiently by one of them, and therefore no multitude of
concepts corresponds to such a plurality of synonymous terms, [].52
Although every spoken term presupposes an act of imposition Ockham here

literally says that synonymous terms are invented (inventa) such that it is
subordinated to some mental term, it is not the case that every term is imposed
for the same reason or purpose.53 According to Ockham, synonymous terms are
not imposed to answer the purpose of some semantic need, (necessitas signifi-
cationis) but the purpose of what he calls the ornament of speech (ornatum
sermonis).54 The following phrase is crucial with respect to Ockham account
of synonymous terms: Whatever is signified by all synonymous spoken terms
could be expressed sufficiently by one of them, and therefore, no multitude of
concepts (mental terms) corresponds to such a plurality of synonymous terms.
Note that Ockham uses the terms signify and express in one and the same
breath. For the moment, I simply assume that Ockham himself uses the two
expressions as stylistic variants.55 Since a spoken term signifies if and only if it
is subordinated to some mental term, it is possible to account for synonymous
terms in terms of subordination. Thus:
52 Propter quod sicut nominum synonymorum multiplicatio non est propter necessitatem
significationis inventa, sed propter ornatum sermonis [], quia quidquid per omnia syn-
onyma significatur posset per unum illorum exprimi sufficienter, et ideo multitudo concep-
tuum tali pluralitati synonymorum non correspondet, []. SL I, 3 (OP I, 11) (Italics mine).
Note that Ockham here uses the imperfect subjunctive form posset and not the present
indicative form potest. Therefore, I translate could and not can.
53 That is, I take the Latin propter (due to, because of) to indicate the reason why a term has
been imposed. Or perhaps it would be better to say that it relates to the purpose of impo-
sition. For instance, Ockham distinguishes between a purely semantic purpose (propter
necessitatem significationis) and another purpose (propter ornatum sermonis).
54 I turn to the ornament of speech shortly.
55 There are passages in the Ordinatio supporting this reading. For instance, Ockham writes:
[] I say that sounds are invented to express things and to express concepts []. And
therefore some [sounds] signify things and some signify concepts of the mind. For
instance, sounds such as man and animal and the like are invented to express things.
(Syn)ts56 Two spoken terms ts1 and ts2 are synonymous if and only if ts1
and ts2 are subordinated to the same mental term tm.
Remember that a mental term signifies the things it signifies naturally so that
if there is a mental term, then it is not possible in the ordinary course of the
world for it to signify things other than those it actually signifies.57
It follows, then, that two mental terms which signify naturally are distinct in
signification if they signify different (kinds of) things. Conversely, it is not pos-
sible that there be two different mental terms that signify the same (kind of)
things naturally. Now take the following example of the two German expres-
sions Violine and Geige. In Ockhams terminology the two terms signify the
same namely violins because they were imposed for the same (kind of)
things such that they are subordinated to the same mental term (violin).58 And
consequently, it is not the case that the two spoken terms Violine and Geige
are distinct in signification due to the necessity of signification since, as
Ockham puts it, whatever is signified by all synonyms [i.e. spoken terms]
could (posset) be expressed sufficiently by one of them.59
What does it mean that a spoken term could express sufficiently what is
signified by all its synonyms? First, I would like to replace the term express
([] dico quod voces sunt inventae ad exprimendum res et ad exprimendum conceptum
[]. Et ideo aliquae significant res et aliquae significant conceptus mentis. Sicut istae
voces homo, animal et huiusmodi sunt inventae ad exprimendum res.) Ord. I, dist.22,
q.1 (OT IV, 50). For one thing, Ockham here is replying to the authoritative opinion of
Aquinas (inter alia): it is his vocabulary Ockham uses. Ockham rejects the view that spo-
ken terms signify concepts in the first place. So it seems that in this passage he uses expri-
mere and significare as synonymous expressions as applied to spoken terms. Note further
that Ockham does not use the term to express (exprimere) as a technical term, as he does
the terms to signify or to supposit for instance. It is quite revealing that the term
exprimi is not found in the index either of the Summa or the Quodlibeta or of any other
of the Works edited by the Franciscan Institute.
56 Syn is an abbreviation for Synonymy of spoken terms. Note that this account fits abso-
lute spoken terms in the first place. For a discussion of the synonymy of connotative spo-
ken terms, see Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 6974.
57 See 2.2 Signification in Relation to Subordination and Imposition.
58 One objection could be that I chose a term for an artefact. Other than natural kind terms
which are absolute, it could be the case that Ockham would think of the terms Geige and
Violine as connotative terms. But I do not see why Geige or Violine should be con-
ceived of as connotative terms: it is not clear what is signified primarily and what is signi-
fied secondarily: I would say that violins are signified primarily and nothing else.
59 [], quia quidquid per omnia synonyma significatur posset per unum illorum exprimi
sufficienter, []. SL I, 3 (OP I, 11). (Italics mine).
108 Chapter 2
with signify, which I take to be its variant, such that the crucial phrase can be
reformulated thus: whatever is signified by all synonymous spoken terms could
be signified sufficiently by one of them. How is the adverbial modification suf-
ficiently of the verb could be signified to be taken? And why is Ockham here
so careful to say that it could be signified (posset) and not that it can (potest) be
signified? I claim that the could should be read counterfactually: for instance,
if it were the case that instead of the two spoken terms Violine and Geige
there were only the term Geige, then the same (kind of) things would still be
signified by the remaining term. That is, it would be sufficient to have one spo-
ken term to signify violins. Ockhams general assumption can be rendered as
follows:
(M) Whatever is signified by the synonymous spoken terms ts1, , tsn, is

signified by each term ts1, , tsn, such that it would be sufficient if
only one of the terms ts1 or , tsn, had been imposed to signify.
To state negatively that two synonymous spoken terms are not distinct in sig-
nification due to the necessity of signification, and to state positively that two
synonymous terms signify the same (kind of) things so that there is only one
mental term to be distinguished, amounts to the same. Earlier I explained sig-
nification in terms of (correct) applicability to things.60 If two spoken terms
are synonymous, it follows that they do not differ with respect to their signifi-
cation. But it is clear that they do differ in some other respect.
How can this difference between synonymous terms be described then? It is
rather trivial that two synonymous terms such as Geige and Violine differ at
least with respect to their phonetic features. However there is more to gain by
considering the purpose for which, according to Ockham, synonymous terms
are imposed, namely, the ornament of speech (ornatum sermonis).61 The
ornament of speech is a rhetorical category serving different purposes.62 If
one were to write a poem, it might indeed be good to have the choice between
different terms with the same signification. Consider the famous poem of the
61 Propter quod sicut nominum synonymorum multiplicatio non est propter necessitatem
significationis inventa, sed propter ornatum sermonis []. SL I, 3 (OP I, 11). (Italics mine).
62 Der ornatus [] verdankt seine Bezeichnung den schmckenden Zubereitungen einer
Festtafel, wobei die Rede selbst als zu essendes Gericht aufgefat wird. Diesem Bildbereich
gehrt auch die Bezeichnung des ornatus (condita oratio, conditus sermo) an.
Anmerkung: Als Wrzung wird besonders der Gedanken-ornatus des Witzes bezeich-
net. Heinrich Lausberg, Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik, Ismaning, [10]1990, 162.
expressionist Else Lasker-Schler Mein blaues Klavier (in English, this would
be something like My blue piano).63 This is the first stanza:
(1) Ich habe zu Hause ein blaues Klavier

Und kenne doch keine Note.
Now if one were to replace the German Klavier in the first line with Pianoforte,
then the resulting
(2) Ich habe zu Hause ein blaues Pianoforte

Und kenne doch keine Note
would not differ in its signification from the original, since Klavier and
Pianoforte are synonymous, just as Geige and Violine are according to (M).
Now if we consider here the general assumption that every mental proposition
corresponds to some spoken proposition, we arrive at the conclusion that (1)
and (2) correspond to the same mental proposition. Of course, it is still an open
question what it amounts to that the same mental proposition corresponds to
two spoken propositions.64 But it can be held that there are different corre-
sponding mental propositions if there are differences between the significa-
tions of the constituent parts of the spoken propositions. However, the mental
propositions are not different if the constituent parts of the two spoken propo-
sitions differ in some other respect which does not affect the signification
and consequently, the personal supposition of their terms. (1) and (2) differ
in other respects: for instance, the term Pianoforte does not fit very well into
the rhythm of the poem due to its length: Klavier has only two syllables,
whereas Pianoforte has five. Further, in the poem Klavier, the last word of the
first line of the first stanza, rhymes with the last word of the first line of the
other stanzas. For instance:
Ich habe zu Hause ein blaues Klavier

Und kenne doch keine Note. []
Es spielten Sternenhnde vier

Die Mondfrau sang im Boote
Nun tanzen die Ratten im Geklirr.65
63 Else Lasker-Schler, Helles Schlafen dunkles Wachen, Mnchen, 1962, 146 (Italics mine).
64 See 2.4.2 Correspondence: Synonymy Again.
65 Lasker-Schler, Helles Schlafen, 146 (Italics mine).
110 Chapter 2
In general, synonymous terms serve the purpose of ornaments of speech inso-

far as the availability of synonymous terms enables the language user to vary
the spoken expresssions according to the special needs in certain contexts, as
in the context of poetry: having the choice between several synonymous terms
might enable the poet to find alternative rhyming-possibilities, or to avoid
unattractive repetition of words. These are all aesthetic purposes.
It is pivotal that the differences between spoken terms as constituent parts
of spoken propositions, which are explained with respect to mental terms, are
differences in the signification and hence the personal supposition of spo-
ken terms. Conversely, if two spoken terms differ from each other in their sig-
nification, they do so by virtue of being related by subordination to different
mental terms. Ockham, it seems, arrives at the maxim that it is necessary to
posit as many different mental terms as are required to account for every
(meaningful) part of a spoken proposition: if two parts of a spoken proposition
differ in signification, then it is necessary to posit two different mental terms.66
In general, Ockham accounts for the interpretability of spoken propositions in
terms of correspondence. Spoken propositions are interpretable because every
mental proposition corresponds to some spoken proposition. Correspondence
constitutes the interpretability of spoken proposition as a general principle.
Ockham postulates, rather than argues for this principle.67 From what has been
said so far it can be inferred that the general assumption that every mental prop-
osition corresponds to some spoken proposition implies a sort of parallelism
between mental and spoken propositions, which can be rendered as follows:
(Parallelism) If pm were to import that q (and not that p, as it actually

does), then ps would import that q as well (and not that
p, as it actually does).
What is formulated here is an asymmetrical dependence of the import of spo-

ken propositions on the import of mental propositions. And this asymmetrical
relation obtains because the import of a spoken proposition co-varies with the
import of its corresponding mental proposition, since if the mental terms were
to change their signification, and hence their personal supposition within the
corresponding mental proposition, then the spoken terms would change their
66 This maxim does not contradict the famous principle of parsimony, Ockhams Razor as
it can be found in the Summa: [] frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora. SL,
I, 12 (OP I, 43).
67 One could also describe this general correspondence as a transcendental condition for
the interpretability of spoken propositions.
signification, and hence their personal supposition within the spoken proposi-
tion in the same way. Recall that the co-variation of signification is guaranteed
by subordination.68
To show that Ockham relies on the same notion of a propositions import as
I illustrated above of, I now turn to the general explanation of the truth and
falsity of a proposition. It will become clear in a moment why is it necessary to
turn to the explanation of truth to arrive at a suitable notion of the import of a
proposition.
2.4.1 The General Explanation of Truth and Falsity

Ockhams concern as a logician is to determine rules for distinguishing read-
ings of propositions under which they are true from readings under which they
are false.69 A reading of a proposition implies giving the import of the proposi-
tion. Interpreting a proposition means giving its truth conditions and ascribing
a truth value to it.70 As Freddoso claims it is Ockhams project in the second
part of the Summa Logicae to give the truth conditions of different kinds of
propositions in terms of supposition.71 He points out that
[] there is simply no good reason to believe that in Part II Ockham

is trying to define the term true at all. It seems more likely that he accepts
something like the Aristotelian definition, e.g. proposition signifying
of what is that it is or of what is not that it is not. In Part II he is trying
68 See above 2.2 Signification in Relation to Subordination and Imposition.

69 Ockham explicitly notes that only declarative sentences can be true or false at all so that
logic is only concerned with them; all other kinds of propositions which cannot be true or
false pertain to the art of rhetoric or poetics: Dicit igitur primo quod non omnis oratio est
enuntiativa sed illa sola quae est vera vel falsa. Quod autem non omnis oratio sit enuntia-
tiva patet, quia oratio deprecativa est oratio et neque est vera neque falsa, et per conse-
quens non est enuntiativa. Et ideo tales orationes quae non sunt verae neque falsae, et per
consequens non enuntiativae reliquuntur, quia tales orationes magis spectant ad rhetori-
cam vel poeticam quam ad dialecticam, quia ad dialecticam non pertinet considerare nisi
de oratione enuntiativa tantum. Exp. in Perih., cap.4, 1 (OP II, 391).
70 See 1.5.2 Personal Supposition of Terms and Taking a Term Significatively (sumi
significative).
71 It is quite interesting that the distinction Ockham first draws in Summa Logicae II, 1 con-
cerns not the distinction between mental, spoken, and written propositions but the dis-
tinction between categorical and hypothetical (molecular) propositions. (OP I, 241ff.)
Although one could object that he does not need to dwell on the distinction between
mental, spoken and written propositions because he makes this distinction in the open-
ing chapter of the Summa, this reinforces the impression that Ockham is primarily con-
cerned with spoken and written propositions, and not with mental propositions.
112 Chapter 2
to formulate the conditions under which various types of propositions

fulfil that definition. But the definition of truth remains the same
throughout.72
Determining the truth conditions in terms of the identity or non-identity of

the things the terms supposit for must be consistent with the general account
of a propositions truth. I held that spoken propositions are interpretable due
to correspondence, since a spoken proposition imports something if and only
if there is some corresponding mental proposition. This implies that a spoken
proposition is true if and only if a corresponding mental proposition is true.73
How then does Ockham account for the truth and falsity of propositions? In
the Expositio Aurea he states:
But truth and falsity are predicable of propositions, importing that on the
part of that which is signified it is thus or it is not thus as it is indicated by
the proposition []. Therefore that a proposition is true means that it is
in reality as it is signified by the proposition; and that a proposition is
false means that it is other than is signified by it.74
As with other issues, Ockham starts his investigation with a semantic analysis
of the central terms involved.75 He first gives a so-called nominal definition of
72 Freddoso, Ockhams Theory of Truth Conditions, 15.

73 Ockham himself states that [] to every true and false spoken proposition a mental
proposition composed of concepts corresponds. ([] quod omni orationi vocali verae et
falsae correspondet aliqua propositio mentalis composita ex conceptibus; [].) Quodl. V,
q.8 (OT IX, 509). Thereby it should be implied that it is not possible that the spoken propo-
sition is true if the corresponding mental proposition is not true.
74 Sed veritas et falsitas sunt quaedam praedicabilia de propositione importantia, quod est
ita vel non est ita a parte rei significatae, sicut denotatur per propositionem, []. Unde
propositionem esse veram est: ita esse in re, sicut significatur per eam; et propositionem
esse falsam est: aliter esse, quam significatur per eam. Exp. Aur., In perherm., prooem., ad:
Est autem quemadmodum See Boehner, Ockhams Theory of Truth, 200. There are
numerous places throughout his Works where Ockham gives similar accounts of the truth
(and falsity) of propositions. See the following passage from his commentary on Aristotles
Perihermenias: Sed veritas et falsitas sunt quaedam praedicabilia de propositione, impor-
tantia quod ita est a parte significati sicut denotatur per propositionem quae est signum;
unde propositionem esse veram non est propositionem habere aliquam talem qualitatem
in se sed propositionem esse veram est ita esse sicut significatur per propositionem. Exp.
in Perih., prooem., 12 (OP II, 376).
75 For example, Ockham argues for the unity of the soul in the following way: although the
soul has different powers (of the will, of the intellect) it is only one in number, since the
the two terms truth and falsity, since they are not absolute, but connotative
terms. Recall that a connotative term signifies one kind of thing primarily and
connotes or signifies secondarily another, or the same, kind of thing.76 For
instance, he nominally defines the connotative term white as something hav-
ing (a) whiteness (aliquid habens albedinem).77 That is, white primarily signi-
fies the thing that is white and that connotes or signifies secondarily the quality
of whiteness such that if taken significatively white supposits personally
only for that which it signifies primarily, that is, the white thing, and not for the
particular quality of whiteness. The aim of a nominal definition is to deter-
mine what a connotative term can supposit for within a proposition, if the
term is taken significatively.
By distinguishing truth and falsity as relative terms in the Quodlibeta
Ockham elaborates on the nominal definitions of truth and falsity further.78
He writes:
[] I say that truth and falsity [] are relative concepts which signify the
propositions themselves, though not absolutely; truth however, or this
concept truth, connotes, beyond the proposition which it signifies, that
it is thus in reality as it is imported by the proposition; and falsity imports
that it is not thus in reality as it is imported by the proposition.79
A comment on terminology is called for here: Ockham uses the Latin term
significare as a technical term with respect to the signification of terms. But
Ockham uses a variety of terms with respect to what a proposition says or con-
veys. He says of propositions that something is signified (significatur) or
imported (importatur) or indicated (denotatur) by them. The terms are used
interchangeably to express the fact that a proposition says something as a
whole.80 To complicate matters, Ockham also occasionally uses import and
terms will (voluntas) and intellect (intellectus) are only connotative terms such that
both signify the soul primarily and connote acts of the will and acts of the intellect
respectively. See Rep. II, q.20 (OT V, 438).
76 See 1.3 Absolute vs. Connotative Terms.
77 SL I, 10 (OP I, 36).
78 All relative terms are connotative, but not vice versa.
79 [] dico quod veritas et falsitas [] sunt conceptus relativi significantes ipsas propositio-
nes, non absolute, sed veritas, sive iste conceptus veritas, ultra propositionem quam sig-
nificat, connotat quod ita sit in re sicut importatur per propositionem; et falsitas importat
quod non sit ita in re sicut importatur per propositionem. Quodl. VI, q.29 (OT IX, 697).
80 See Quodl. II, q.19 (OT IX, 197); Quodl. VI, q.29 (OT IX, 697); Quodl. III, q.14 (OT IX, 253); Exp.
in Perih., prooem., 12 (OP II, 376); SL II, 2 (OP I, 250).
114 Chapter 2
connote interchangeably with respect to terms, as in the passage cited (truth

connotes that [], falsity imports that []).
To avoid confusion, one should not say that a proposition signifies some-
thing. For instance, the signification1/2 of terms is dependent on the existence
of particular things, while the import of a proposition is not dependent on
(existing) things in the same way. Although whether a proposition is true or
false depends on how things are, the proposition would still import something
even if the things it says something about were non-existent. For instance,
Socrates is wise is true if and only if Socrates is wise. But the proposition
would still import that Socrates is wise even if Socrates were not wise, since
what the proposition imports is not identical with its truth (or falsity). On the
contrary, if there were no wise things in the world, then wise would simply not
signify1 anything.81 For claritys sake, I will use the verb import uniformly to
say that a proposition says something as a whole.82 Likewise, I will speak of the
import of a proposition. I use the verbs signify and connote exclusively with
respect to terms.
What difference does it make that Ockham is not content with the broad
classification of truth as a connotative term? Why does he specify it further?
With respect to concrete terms, Ockham distinguishes between connotative
and relative terms by means of the following criterion: when a concrete con-
notative term is nominally defined (for instance, white), then its abstract
counterpart (whiteness) is part of the defining phrase (something having (a)
whiteness), but when a relative term is defined, it is never the case that its
abstract counterpart is part of the defining phrase.83
What is the consequence of this rather formal criterion? In numerous places
Ockham argues against the view that truth and falsity are real qualities of
propositions. If a proposition is true, it is not the case that a particular truth
81 See 1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of Signify (significare). This illustrates again
the discrepancy between the signification of a term and its correct or incorrect use: it
is possible to use a term significatively even if the term does not signify1 anything (any
more). See also 1.5.2 Personal Supposition of Terms and Taking a Term Significatively
(sumi significative).
82 That is, I will use this verb even if Ockham might use one of the two other terms in the
Latin text.
83 Conceptus autem relativus, concretus maxime, omnes praedictas condiciones habet
quas habet conceptus connotativus. Sed differunt in hoc quod quandocumque conceptus
connotativus vere praedicatur de aliquo, convenienter potest sibi addi suum abstractum
in obliquo solum, [] Sed quando conceptus relativus vere praedicatur de aliquo, semper
potest sibi convenienter addi casus obliquus qui non est eius abstractum. Quodl. V, q.25
(OT IX, 584).
really inheres in the proposition in the same manner as a particular whiteness

really inheres in a wall, if the wall is white. If Ockham were to conceive of true
and false simply as connotative terms, then the nominal definition of true, for
instance, could be something like something having (a) truth (aliquid habens
veritatem).84 To avoid commitment to what seems to be a rather odd ontologi-
cal view in his eyes, Ockham claims truth and falsity and their concrete coun-
terparts true and false to be relative rather than connotative terms.85 In the
Quodlibeta, Ockham characterizes relative terms in the following way:
[] relative terms are those which principally signify some substances or

qualities, and connote determinate things sometimes. And such a term
cannot be verified of something, nor is it possible that it be recognized of
something [], without the existence of another determinate thing and
without the cognition of another thing. Examples are [] similar, cause,
effect, because it is only possible that something is [] similar or a cause,
if another thing exists which it is [] similar to or a cause of.86
Ockham literally states again that a term can be verified of a thing (verificari de
aliquo). Recall that in the discussion of supposition, I suggested taking this as
one of a pair of converse relations which are expressed respectively by the two
predicates is (correctly) applicable to and verifies87 For instance,
Socrates verifies the term man just in case man is correctly applicable to
Socrates. In this sense, man is verified of Socrates. I claim that the converse
of the relation expressed by verificari is indicated in this passage in terms of
84 By adding (a) in proposition having (a) truth I try to account for the fact that if Ockham
were to conceive of truth as a quality, then there would be particularized qualities of
truth: every true proposition would have a particular truth, just as every white wall has its
own particular whiteness.
85 Ockham is committed to the Aristotelian ontological thesis that only substances can
receive contrary qualities (whiteness, blackness) successively: [] est quod substantia,
cum sit una et eadem numero, est susceptiva successive contrariorum, sicut idem homo
numero est primo niger et postea albus. Haec autem proprietas ita convenit substantiae
quod nulli alii potest convenire, [] SL I, 43 (OP I, 126).
86 [] sunt termini relativi, qui significant aliquas substantias vel qualitates principaliter, et
connotant aliquando determinatas res. Nec potest talis terminus verificari de aliquo, nec
cognosci de aliquo [], sine existentia alterius rei determinatae nec sine cognitione alte-
rius rei. Huiusmodi sunt [] simile, causa, effectus, quia impossibile est quod aliquid sit
[] simile vel causa, nisi existat alia res cuius sit [] vel simile vel causa. Quodl. VI, q.16
(OT IX, 643).
87 See 1.5 The Property of Supposition; Knne, Conceptions of Truth, 197. For further discus-
sion of Tarskis conception of satisfaction see Knne, Conceptions of Truth, 197198; 201
202; 212213.
116 Chapter 2
cognition. Ockham literally states that a term can be recognized of something.

That is, a subject can know that a term is correctly applicable to something.
The converse of the relation expressed by verificari can be rendered here by
means of the predicate can be known to (correctly) apply to
According to Ockham, a relative term can be verified of something only if
there is another thing. Conversely, the relative term can be known to apply cor-
rectly to a thing only if the subject recognizes this other thing. For instance, the
term similar can be verified of a thing only if there is another thing which it is
similar to. Conversely, a subject can know that the term similar applies cor-
rectly to a thing only if he knows what other thing it is similar to. To make the
point differently: since is similar to is a two-place predicate, it is not ade-
quate to say simpliciter for instance
(3)? This dog is similar.
I add simpliciter since (3)? can also be used with an ellipsis. If Peter, watching
a pack of dogs chasing rabbits in the park, asks Anne
(4) Is there a dog similar to our Fido?
then (3)? can be taken to deliver the answer. Ockhams examples of relative
terms similar, cause, effect are a mixed bag: similarity is a symmetrical
relation which is expressed by the two-place predicate is similar to: if Fido
is similar to Snoopy, then Snoopy is similar to Fido. Being a cause and being an
effect is a pair of converse relations. If the rain storm is the cause of Annes
being wet, then Annes state of being wet is an effect of the rain storm. These
two relations are expressed respectively by the two-place predicates is the
cause of and is the effect of It is not possible to find a two-place predi-
cate in the case of true, since is true is a one-place predicate.
Note further that Ockham states that (a) a relative term sometimes connotes
particular things, and he also states that (b) it is possible to verify a relative term
of a thing a only if there is another thing b or other things c, d,, n. What a
relative term connotes or signifies secondarily is not necessarily identical to the
thing b (or the other things) required for the correct applicability of a relative
term to a thing a. How then does Ockham define truth and falsity nominally?88
88 Here Ockham explicitly refers to the mental terms (conceptus) of truth and falsity while
he generally speaks of truth and falsity as predicables (praedicabilia) in the passage
from the Expositio. In what follows, I speak of the predicate truth and true, since due
to subordination Ockhams account should apply to spoken terms as well.
To start with truth: what is signified primarily by truth and what is signified
merely secondarily? If we look at the passage from the Quodlibeta again,89
truth primarily signifies a proposition and secondarily signifies that it is thus
in reality as it is imported by the proposition. And falsity primarily signifies a
proposition and secondarily signifies that it is not thus in reality as it is
imported by the proposition.
That is, truth and falsity and their concrete counterparts can be verified of
propositions. Note that which is connoted is itself propositional in content (quod
ita est in re). Recall that Ockham uses verificari in the context of propositions to
indicate that the signified things make the proposition true,90 when he states for
instance that the signified things verify a proposition or that a proposition is veri-
fied for things91 or that things are sufficient for the truth of a proposition.92
What is connoted by true is not identical to the further things required for
the correct applicability of true to a proposition; for instance, true is cor-
rectly applicable to the proposition Socrates is a man if and only if Socrates
exists.93 That is, the other thing which must exist for true to be verifiable of
the proposition Socrates is a man is Socrates, nothing else. True applied to
Socrates is a man does not simply connote or secondarily signifies Socrates,
but that it is thus as it is imported by the proposition. As Ockham states, it is
not always the case that a relative term connotes or secondarily signifies merely
particular things: there are relative terms connoting or signifying secondarily
that p. Ockham accounts for modal terms such as contingency or necessity
and their concrete counterparts contingent and necessary in a similar way,
since these are likewise applicable to propositions.94 For instance, Ockham
89 See fn. 79.

90 See 1.5 The Property of Supposition.
91 Quando propositio verificatur pro rebus, si res permanentes sufficiunt ad verificandum
frustra ponitur alia res; []. Quaest. in Phys., q.8 (OP VI, 413).
92 Quia quando propositio est vera pro rebus, si res permanentes non sufficiunt ad eius veri-
tatem oportet addere aliquid ultra. Quaest. in Phys., q.13 (OP VI, 425). Recall further that I
took Knnes suggestion of taking the connection expressed by x makes y such-and-such
in non-causal terms, namely, in terms of conceptual explanation, as applying to Ockhams
conception as well.
93 For brevitys sake, I take it for granted that if Socrates exists, then he is a man.
94 Note that veritas and its concrete counterpart are likewise modes of propositions, as
Ockham states: [] oportet quod sit modus praedicabilis de tota propositione, et ideo
proprie dicitur modus propositionis tamquam verificabilis de ipsamet propositione. Et a
tali modo vel adverbio talis praedicabilis, si adverbium habeat, vel verbo dicitur proposi-
tio modalis. Sed tales modi sunt plures quam quatuor praedicti: nam sicut propositio alia
est necessaria, alia impossibilis, alia possibilis, alia contingens, ita alia propositio est vera,
alia falsa, alia scita, [] et sic de aliis. SL II, 1 (OP I, 242243).
118 Chapter 2
writes: Contingency connotes that it can be other than it is imported by a

proposition.95
Since what is special about the application of relative terms is that accord-
ing to Ockhams characterization above the subject has to recognize at least
two different things, namely the thing the term correctly applies to plus
another thing or things required, the following can be formulated: in order to
correctly apply true to a proposition, a subject has not only to know the import
of the proposition and thus, in one way or another, the things signified by sub-
ject and predicate, but he must further recognize that it is thus in reality as it is
imported by the proposition. Having the concept of truth requires that a sub-
ject know (a) that only propositions can be true and (b) what it amounts to
that a proposition is true, namely, that it is thus as it is imported by it.96 For
instance, to correctly apply true to the proposition Socrates is a man, the sub-
ject has not only to know that the proposition imports that Socrates is a man,
but also that it is thus as it is imported by the proposition.
Being thus as (ita-sicut) it is imported by a proposition is itself a relation. In
Ockhams terminology, it is a relation of the intellect. Recall that Ockham dis-
tinguishes between real relations (relationes reales) and relations of the intel-
lect (relationes rationis). He generally claims that relations are not things over
and above the things which are related in a certain way.97 Again, a relation is
said to be real if it does not depend on any operation of the intellect whether
it obtains or not. For instance, two white things are similar to each other
whether a subject actually compares them or not.98 By contrast, if a relation
obtains only due to some operation of the intellect, then it is a relation of the
intellect. For instance, being the predicate is a relation of the intellect, because
a term can only be the predicate if a proposition is formulated by a subject.99
Ockham discusses the term genus as an example of a relative term. In
Ockhams conception, genus is a term signifying nothing but other terms such
as animal, colour, etc. He writes:
95 Contingentia connotat quod aliter potest esse quam importatur per propositionem.
Quodl. VI, q.29 (OT IX, 697). And Ockham accounts for necessity as follows: Necessitas
importat quod ita est in re sicut importatur per propositionem, et quod non potest aliter
esse. Quodl. VI, q.29 (OT IX, 697).
96 See 3.3.3.1 The First Kind of Assent for a discussion of what is required for the possession
of the truth-concept.
97 For a discussion of Ockhams conception of relations see McCord Adams, William Ockham
(215276).
98 See fn. 34.
99 See fn. 35.
[] Genus just as species is a relative concept, and they can be called rela-
tions of the intellect, in the correct sense, []. And therefore animal
which is a genus can be understood by an absolute and non-propositional
cognition, but nevertheless without being understood to be a genus, [].
And the reason is that this concept genus does not only signify animal,
colour, body which are genera, but it imports that these [genera] can be
predicated of several different species.100
Suppose that Peter possesses the concepts of both animal and of genus.
Suppose further that Peter knows that animal is a genus. Ockham claims that
it is possible that Peter employs his concept animal without conceiving of ani-
mal as a genus. For instance, watching lions and tigers in the zoo, Peter could
think of them as animals, by tokening his concept animal, but without thereby
conceiving of animal as a genus. Conversely, to conceive of animal as a genus
implies what Ockham calls a relation of the intellect. This relation is second-
arily signified by genus, namely that these [genera] can be predicated of sev-
eral different species.101 The relation secondarily signified by genus is the
relation of being predicable of different species-terms, implying some intel-
lectual activity, since a term can be syntactically connected with another term
as predicate only by some compositional act of the intellect. To conceive of
animal as a genus implies conceiving of animal as being predicable of different
species-terms, such as man, dog, etc. Similarly, to conceive of a proposition as
true implies conceiving of the proposition as importing things as they are: that
is, it implies conceiving of the relation secondarily signified by true. Now the
relation of being thus (ita) as (sicut) it is imported by a proposition is also a
relation of the intellect: it cannot obtain independently of any intellectual
activity simply because one of its relata is a proposition, and a proposition is
the product of some compositional act of the intellect.
This leads us to the notion of the import of a proposition. It is instructive to
consider how Ockham accounts for the change of truth value with respect to
one and the same proposition. In the Quodlibeta he argues:
100 [] tam genus quam species sunt conceptus relativi, et possunt dici relationes rationis
secundum bonum intellectum, []. Et ideo tam animal quod est genus potest absolute
cognitione incomplexa intelligi et tamen non intelligi esse genus, []. Et causa est, quia
iste conceptus genus non tantum significat animal, colorem, corpus, quae sunt genera,
sed importat quod illa praedicatuntur de pluribus differentibus specie. Quodl. VI, q.29
(OT IX, 696697).
101 Note that Ockham literally states that the concept of genus can be called a relation of the
intellect. However, this amounts to the following: genus secondarily signifies a relation of
the intellect.
120 Chapter 2
[] true and false are contrary terms, and so a proposition receives

these contrary terms successively by predication, but not simultaneously,
because of one and the same proposition the term true is predicated
first and after that the term false. But by this predication the proposition
does not now receive something real which was not in it earlier, rather it
thereby receives precisely and successively the predication of these con-
trary terms, since now it imports that things are other than they are, and
earlier it imported that things are as they were. Thus the proposition you
are sitting let us assume that this has just become false and previously
was true , now imports that you are sitting however you are not sitting;
therefore it is false; but it was true earlier because you were at one point
sitting earlier.102
Time is a crucial factor in this account, as the repeated use of temporal adverbs
indicates, since Ockham stresses that true and false are predicated of one
and the same occurrence of a proposition at two different points in time.103 The
same occurrence of
(5) You are sitting (tu sedes)
is true at T1 and false at T2. It is revealing if we take a closer look at the Latin text
here, as it helps us develop a general scheme concerning the import of a propo-
sition. Consider the following pair of sentences which are contained in the
passage:
(a) A proposition imports that things are in a certain way. (propositio

significat ita esse)
(b) You are sitting imports that you are sitting. (tu sedes significat te sedere).
102 [] verum et falsum sunt contraria, et sic propositio recipit successive contraria per
praedicationem licet non simul, quia de eadem propositione numero primo praedicatur
iste terminus verum et post iste terminus falsum. Sed per hoc nihil reale recipitur in
propositione nunc quod prius non fuit, sed ideo praecise recipit successive praedicatio-
nem illorum contrariorum, quia nunc significat aliter esse a parte rei quam est, et prius
significavit ita esse a parte rei sicut fuit. Sicut ista propositio tu sedes, - ponamus quod
modo sit falsa et prius fuit vera -, nunc significat te sedere et tamen non sedes, ideo est
falsa, sed prius fuit vera quia prius sedisti. Quodl. V, q.24 (OT IX, 580). Note that I have
chosen to render the phrase a parte rei in this context differently, since it is about the
import of propositions here, not merely about a particular thing.
103 In what follows when I speak of propositions without further qualification, I mean spo-
ken propositions, if not indicated otherwise.
In (a) Ockham formulates quite generally that if something is a proposition

then it imports that things are in a certain way (ita esse). Note that the infini-
tive plus accusative construction used in (b) significat te sedere parallels the
construction in (a) significat ita esse. In the context of modal propositions,
Ockham uses this construction to distinguish the dictum of a proposition.
Compare the following passage from the Summa:
[] by the proposition that every man is animal is necessary it is indi-

cated that this mode necessary is verified of the proposition every man
is an animal the dictum of which is that every man is an animal; for
something is called the dictum of a proposition when the terms of the
propositions are taken in the accusative case and the verb in the infini-
tive mood.104
Freddoso rightly comments that in English the dictum of a proposition is nor-

mally formed by prefixing that to the proposition in question.105 What a
proposition imports can be given in the same way. A spoken proposition ps
imports that p. For instance, you are sitting (tu sedes) imports that you are
sitting (significat te sedere).
Now (5) is true at T1 since it imports that you are sitting and in fact you are
sitting. But (5) is false at T2 since it imports that you are sitting but you are not
sitting (any more). What has changed between T1 and T2 is not the import of
the proposition, but something about the things imported.106 It can be held
with respect to the import of a proposition that
(p)imp A spoken proposition ps imports that p.107
104 [] per istam omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium denotatur quod iste
modus necessarium verificetur de ista propositione omnis homo est animal, cuius dic-
tum est hoc quod dicitur omnem hominem esse animal; quia dictum propositionis dici-
tur quando termini propositionis accipiuntur in accusativo casu et verbum in infinitivo
modo. SL II, 9 (OP I, 273).
105 Freddoso, Ockhams Theory of Truth Conditions, 200, fn. 2.
106 Note that Ockham here employs a different term with respect to a false proposition: he
literally says that the proposition is false because it imports now that things are other
than they are (quia nunc significat aliter esse a parte rei quam est). But perhaps this
terminological difference should not be overestimated. The crucial point is that things are
different at T2; the import of the proposition remains the same whether the proposition
is actually true or false.
107 (p)imp abbreviates import of a proposition.
122 Chapter 2
Following Knne, it is possible to replace imports that by is true if and only

if salva veritate:108
(p)true A spoken proposition ps is true if and only if p.109
A spoken proposition such as a fly is flying is true if and only if it imports that
a fly is flying and a fly is flying. What about the falsity of a proposition? A fly is
flying is false if and only if it imports that a fly is flying, but no fly is flying.110
Note that whether a proposition is true or not depends on how things are,
nothing else. As Ockham says, the proposition is verified by the things. By con-
trast, whether true can be correctly applied to a proposition depends on
whether a subject can know that it is thus as it is imported by the proposition.
And a subject can come to know this by an act of judging.111 That true second-
arily signifies a relation amounts to the following: the term true can be (cor-
rectly) applied to a proposition only if a subject can judge that it is thus as it is
imported by the proposition. Since signification is (correct) applicability, it can
be held in general that a relative term can be (correctly) applied to a thing only
if the subject knows that the relation secondarily signified by the term obtains,
if a relation is secondarily signified. And since, as I indicated above, relations
are not things distinct from the things which are related in a certain way,
Ockham could hold that relations are ontologically innocent insofar as they
can be reduced to their relata: for a relation of being thus as it is imported by a
proposition to obtain, it is required that a proposition and the things imported
by it exist, and nothing else.
It is with respect to the import of a spoken proposition that correspondence
comes into play. According to Ockham a spoken proposition ps imports that p
if and only if some mental proposition pm corresponds to ps. It can be held
that the identification of the import of a spoken proposition implies the iden-
tification of a mental proposition. Above I formulated the assumption of a par-
allelism to which Ockham is committed:
108 See Wolfgang Knne, Wie scharf ist Ockhams Rasiermesser? in R. Puster (ed.), Klassische
Argumentationen der Philosophie, Paderborn, 2013, 113140 (126). Knne holds that is true
if and only if can be replaced by means that salva veritate in the following scheme: p is
true if and only if p.
109 (p)true abbreviates truth of a proposition.
110 It can be held analogously: (p)false A spoken proposition ps is false if and only if ps imports
that p and not p. For quantification into sentential position see Knne, Conceptions of
Truth, 365368.
111 For Ockhams account of judgement see 3.3.3 Acts of Judgement.
(Parallelism) If a mental proposition were to import that q (and not

that p, as it actually does), then the corresponding spo-
ken proposition would import that q as well (and not
that p, as it actually does).
The co-variation of signification, and hence personal supposition, between

mental terms and spoken terms can be taken to imply that the truth conditions
of mental propositions can also be given by means of the supposition of the
mental terms. But it will become clear that the personal supposition of mental
terms differs at least in some respect from the supposition of spoken terms due
to the natural signification of mental terms as opposed to the conventional sig-
nification of spoken terms. In the next Section I consider the case of synony-
mous spoken propositions in an attempt to determine correspondence further.
2.4.2 Correspondence: Synonymy Again

What does it mean to say that a spoken proposition ps imports that p if and
only if some mental proposition pm corresponds to ps? One way to approach
the question leads us back to synonymy. As I indicated above, Ockham holds
that the same mental proposition corresponds to two synonymous spoken
propositions so that they import the same. This import can be derived from the
signification and the supposition of the terms.112 Ockham gives a nice example
for this sort of synonymy in the Quodlibeta. There he writes:
[] assuming congruity with respect to spoken terms, the genus or figure

of the subject or predicate does not matter, since the spoken proposition a
diamond is a stone (lapis) is true, just as a diamond is a stone (petra) is
true, where there is a diversity of the predicate with respect to genus and
figure. However it is still not the case that distinct predicates in mind cor-
respond to different predicates in spoken language and it is not possible for
one of the spoken propositions to be true if the other is not true as well.113
112 See 2.4 Mental Propositions and Spoken Propositions: The Relation of Correspondence
above.
113 [] supposita congruitate vocis, nihil refert cuius generis vel figurae sit subiectum vel
praedicatum, quia sicut haec est vera adamas est lapis, ita haec est vera adamas est
petra, ubi est diversitas praedicati secundum genus et figuram. Et tamen in mente non
correspondent distincta praedicata sicut in voce, nec una potest esse vera etiam in voce
nisi altera sit vera. Quodl. V, q.8 (OT IX, 511). I have chosen to translate the last two lines
rather freely in order to make explicit the crucial point that there are no corresponding
mental predicates if the spoken predicates merely differ with respect to genus and
figure.
124 Chapter 2
He gives the following pair of spoken propositions as differing only with

respect to their predicate terms:
(6) A diamond is a stone1 (adamas est petra.)114
(7) A diamond is a stone2 (adamas est lapis.)
Ockham holds that (6) and (7) are synonymous because the predicate terms
are synonymous. And the predicate terms are synonymous because they do not
differ with respect to their signification, but only with respect to what he calls
their grammatical genus and their figure, that is, the shape of the term, where
these are accidental features or properties of spoken and written terms.115
As I said above, only differences in the signification of spoken terms are
explained as differences of mental terms.116 But grammatical genus and the
shape of the term do not make for such differences, as Ockham states in a pas-
sage preceding the one just cited: [] these accidental properties do not per-
tain to spoken names due to the necessity of signification, as other properties
do, [] but due to the ornament of speech and grammatical congruity.117
Genus belongs to the category of grammatical congruity.118 Ockham explicitly
states with respect to the two spoken propositions (6) and (7) that it is not the
case that distinct mental predicates correspond to the different spoken predi-
cates. That is, lapis and petra supposit personally for something they both
signify, namely, for some existing particular diamond.119
114 The indices 1 and 2 should indicate that the predicate terms in the English versions of (6)
and (7) are different.
115 Accidentia autem propria nominibus vocalibus et scripta sunt genus et figura. SL I, 3
(OP I, 12).
116 See above 2.4 Mental Propositions and Spoken Propositions: The Relation of Correspond
ence where I discussed the semantic criterion of the necessity of signification.
117 [] ista accidentia non conveniunt nomini propter necessitatem significationis, sicut
faciunt alia [] sed propter ornatum sermonis et congruitatem. Quodl. V, q.8 (OT IX, 510).
118 petra is feminine, while lapis is masculine.
119 According to his nominalist view that there are only particular things Ockham holds that
collective nouns (nomina collectiva) such as world, state, people signify and conse-
quently supposit for the many particular things that constitute, for instance, a state or the
world and not for one particular thing distinct from the many constituting things: []
talia praedicabilia populus, turba, mundus, civitas, regnum, et universaliter omnia
praedicabilia quae non supponunt nisi pro multis simul sumptis et pro nullo illorum divi-
sim, possunt poni in genere quantitatis. Exp. in Praedicament., cap.10 (OP II, 216). It can be
assumed that he treats terms such as wood or metal or water which signify a kind of
material along similar lines.
It is pivotal that Ockham states that it is not possible for one of the spoken
propositions to be true if the other is not true as well.120 How are we to under-
stand the fact that it is impossible for (6) to be true and (7) simultaneously not
true, or vice versa? At this point, an interpreter enters the scene. The interpreter
has the kind of semantic knowledge a scholar of the 14th century can be expected
to have. For instance, he has learned that a spoken term signifies in virtue of
being subordinated to a mental term. Thus he establishes the signification of the
terms by identifying mental terms diamond signifies diamonds in virtue of
diamond being subordinated to diamond. And let us assume that he finds out
that petra and lapis signify the same, namely stones, in virtue of being subor-
dinated to the same mental term (stone) the interpreter is then in a position to
give the import of (6) by identifying the following mental proposition:
(6) A diamond is a stone.
And with respect to (7):
(7) A diamond is a stone.
Since he identified the same mental proposition, the interpreter is able to con-
clude that contrary to outer appearances the two spoken propositions
import the same, namely, that a diamond is a stone. Thus it is not possible for
the spoken proposition (6) to be true while (7) is not (and vice versa) because
the same mental proposition is identified such that (6) and (7) import the
same. That is, if the mental proposition is true (false), then necessarily the two
spoken propositions are true (false) as well.
Two different spoken propositions import the same that p due to the
sameness of the mental proposition corresponding to them. Two spoken prop-
ositions are synonymous if and only if they import the same in virtue of cor-
responding to the same mental proposition. What does it mean that a mental
proposition corresponds to a spoken proposition in the first place? A mental
proposition corresponds to a spoken proposition if and only if the mental and
the spoken proposition import the same, namely, that p. That is:
(Import) a spoken proposition ps imports that p if and only if it is pos-

sible to identify a mental proposition pm such that ps imports
the same as pm, namely, that p.
120 [] Et tamen in mente non correspondent distincta praedicata sicut in voce, nec una
potest esse veram etiam in voce nisi altera sit vera. Quodl. V, q. 8 (OT IX, 511).
126 Chapter 2
A spoken proposition does not import a mental proposition, but it imports the
same as the corresponding mental proposition, just as a spoken term does not
signify a mental term, but signifies directly the same as the mental term which
it is subordinated to. It is illuminating to account for the import of a spoken
proposition by identifying a mental proposition. But it is not illuminating to
try to account for the import of a mental proposition in terms of another men-
tal proposition, since the explanation of the import of a proposition should
come to an end by pointing to a mental proposition: the identification of a
mental proposition should stop a regress, not initiate one. From this it can be
inferred that a mental proposition cannot consistently be taken to import that
p and that q due to the personal supposition of its terms.121
The relation of correspondence is nothing but the identity of import of a
mental and a spoken proposition. Spoken propositions import something
because a mental proposition having the same import can be found. According
to my discussion of Ockhams example (a diamond is a stone) the alleged
identification of the corresponding mental proposition amounts to nothing
but the derivation of this mental proposition from the signification and sup-
position of the terms of the spoken proposition: a diamond is a stone imports
that a diamond is a stone because it is possible to reconstruct the mental prop-
osition a diamond is a stone from the signification and supposition of the spo-
ken subject and predicate term. Perhaps it is due to the interpretative
perspective on spoken propositions in the Summa (and elsewhere) that the
syntactic structure of mental propositions is reconstructed in terms of the syn-
tactic structure of spoken propositions.
Note that a problem for Ockhams particularistic ontology lurks here.122 If
Ockham admits only of particular substances with their particular accidents,
then what kind of thing is the import of a proposition? The import of a propo-
sition cannot be a substance, because a proposition itself is only an accident.
Mental propositions are intellectual acts, and these acts are mental qualities or
accidents. Thus the import of a proposition should be an accident. But then, if
what a proposition p says as a whole, namely, that p is itself nothing but an
individual accident, how can it be something which is common to mental, spo-
ken or written tokens of p? In short, the challenge is to show that the talk of
121 I stress the personal with respect to supposition here because Ockham explicitly claims
that mental terms can also supposit simply or materially, that is, either for themselves as
a mental term (simply) or for a spoken term (materially). But the point is that if a mental
term supposits materially or simply, it is not taken significatively. It can be held provision-
ally that a mental term is taken significatively if it supposits personally, that is, for that
which it signifies naturally.
122 I thank Wolfgang Knne for drawing my attention to this point.
sameness of the import of propositions does not commit Ockham to the view
that the import of a proposition p is an extramental universal thing that can
be common to several tokens of p. Thus Ockham has to show that his way of
talking of what is imported just is a way of talking that does not force him to
reify the import of a proposition in this manner.
The basic problem of such a particularistic conception is that the identity
or sameness of properties in general cannot be explained by virtue of an
asymmetrical relation of particulars to a superordinate universal thing; rather,
it has to be accounted for by virtue of a symmetrical relation between particu-
lar things, such that (talk of) the identity of import can be reduced to inter
alia a relation obtaining between certain (tokens of) propositions, but not
between others. It is helpful to look at the case of two mental propositions
importing the same. Consider again an example. Peter, a hobby ornithologist,
hears a blackbird singing in his garden and thinks that
(8) blackbirds are songbirds.
Back in his living room, browsing his favourite book Birds of Britain and
Europe123 he comes across the description of blackbirds and thinks again that
(9) blackbirds are songbirds.
Now (8) says that blackbirds are songbirds. And (9) says that blackbirds are song-
birds. How is it to be taken that (8) and (9) import the same if according to
Ockham this does not mean that there is one universal thing, namely the import
that blackbirds are songbirds that is common to (8) and (9)? For one thing, the
mental subject terms blackbirds in (8) and (9) signify the same and supposit per-
sonally for the same things, namely blackbirds, just as the mental predicate terms
songbirds in (8) and (9) signify the same things and supposit for the same, namely
songbirds. That the terms of the two propositions signify the same and supposit
for the same things, however, is only a necessary condition for the propositions to
say the same. If Peter, for some reason, had thought on the second occasion that
(9*) songbirds are blackbirds
then (8) and (9*) would by no means say the same, since (8) then says that
blackbirds are songbirds whereas (9*) says that songbirds are blackbirds.124
123 Martin Woodcock and Hermann Heinzel, Birds of Britain and Europe, London, 1994, 73.
124 See Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 34 for an analysis of the structure of mental propositions.
128 Chapter 2
Thus a further condition for two mental propositions to import the same in
Ockhams sense is that the two propositions must be structurally alike insofar
as the terms of proposition p1 and of p2 that signify the same and supposit for
the same respectively must also have the same function within p1 and p2,
namely that of being both either subject or predicate.125 Thus I suggest the fol-
lowing with respect to the sameness of import of mental propositions:
(Import)mental A mental proposition pm1 imports the same as a mental

proposition pm2 if and only if (a) the subject term of pm1
signifies the same and supposits for the same things as
the subject term of pm2 and the predicate term of pm1
signifies the same and supposits for the same as the pred-
icate of pm2 (and similarly for all other terms of pm1 and
pm2), such that (b) pm1 and pm2 are structurally alike.
Now that a spoken proposition such as blackbirds are songbirds and a mental
proposition blackbirds are songbirds import the same means that the spoken
subject term blackbirds and the mental subject term blackbirds (signify and)
supposit personally for the same things, as do the spoken predicate term song-
birds and the mental predicate term songbirds, such that the terms of the two
propositions relate to the same things in the same way, namely as subject and
predicate respectively.
In general, the sameness of import can be rendered in a particularistic man-
ner with regard to the identity of what the terms of the propositions in ques-
tion (signify and) personally supposit for as subject and predicate. From the
identity of the terms respective function the structural likeness of the proposi-
tions then follows. Note that for two mental propositions to import the same,
it is in fact necessary that the respective subject and predicate terms do not
only supposit for the same, but in fact signify the same, whereas for a spoken
or written and a mental proposition, or for two spoken or written propositions
to import the same, it is only necessary that the respective subject and predi-
cate terms supposit for the same. The reason is that a mental term can only
supposit personally for something it signifies whereas a spoken or written term
can supposit personally for something it does not signify within a proposition.
This will become clear in a moment.126
125 Panaccio develops a similar solution to the problem of the sameness of import. See Sonja
Schierbaum Questioning Claude Panaccio, in Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch fr
Antike und Mittelalter 16 (2013): 266281 (275278).
126 See 2.5 Demonstratives, Correspondence, and Supposition of Mental Terms.
It is not the case that correspondence is constitutive with respect to the

import of a spoken proposition as subordination is constitutive with respect to
the signification of a spoken term. Correspondence and subordination differ in
one important respect. In general, correspondence does not presuppose an
initial act of imposition, because the import of a spoken proposition can be
derived from the signification and supposition of its terms.127 As I indicated
above, it is possible for a spoken term to supposit personally for something it
does not signify in virtue of subordination within a certain context. But still, a
term can be used for something it does not signify only if it also has some origi-
nal signification.
In this respect, then, subordination is the more fundamental relation, since
correspondence presupposes obtaining relations of subordination between
mental and spoken terms. I now turn to the case of disambiguating spoken
propositions containing equivocal terms where the import can be derived
from both the original and the derivative signification of the terms and their
actual supposition.128 That is, different readings of spoken propositions can be
reconstructed by means of different mental propositions. But what should it
mean to account for different readings of mental propositions in this sense?
Since, if it were possible to take the terms of a mental proposition to supposit
personally either for Fs or for Gs, then it would be necessary to posit one men-
tal term suppositing personally for Fs within a mental proposition p and
another suppositing for Gs within a mental proposition q.
2.4.3 Correspondence: Equivocation Again

If a spoken proposition contains equivocal terms, Ockham often says that a
proposition is to be distinguished (propositio distinguenda est).129 Compare
127 Panaccio argues that [s]poken sentences, in Ockhams theory, are not imposed to signify
anything and they are not, therefore, subordinated to anything in the relevant sense.
Ockham, [], subscribes to some form of semantical atomism. What is attributed a con-
ventional signification at the moment of imposition normally is a simple term, and the
semantical properties of complex phrases, such as a complete sentence, are supposed to
be systematically derived from those of their simple components, without any new sub-
ordination being needed in the process. We could set out, [], to introduce a derivative
notion of subordination which would be applicable to complete sentences. But [] it is
not quite obvious how to do it. And we should be aware, [], that this would not be sub-
ordination in Ockhams own sense anymore: the relation between a spoken and a mental
sentence, [], does not normally depend upon a special act of imposition. Panaccio,
Ockham on Concepts, 169.
128 See Section2.3 Conventional Signification and Equivocation.
129 SL III-4, 2 (OP I, 754).
130 Chapter 2
the following passage from the third part of the Summa, where Ockham dis-
cusses the different kinds of fallacies which can occur in spoken language. The
passage is again worth citing in its entirety:
[] a given proposition in which such an equivocal expression is posited

is always to be distinguished by means of linguistic conventions, since it
can be taken this way or that, and hence it can be true in one sense and
false in another sense, or false in both senses or true in both. Nevertheless,
the interlocutors can occasionally agree upon using those terms only in a
certain sense or with a certain (determinate) signification, and in this
case, the proposition is not to be distinguished.130 This can be done by
custom or a certain order between them. It can also be done by the addi-
tion of something; for instance, if an interlocutor were to say: whenever
I add a to this expression dog, I want it to stand precisely for the animal
which is able to bark. Then, if the interlocutor posits the proposition
every dog a can bark, it is not to be distinguished; but if he forwards the
proposition every dog can bark, it is to be distinguished.131
What it means to distinguish a proposition can be best understood if Ockhams

example is looked at:
(10) Every dog can bark (omnis canis est latrabilis).
The equivocal term contained in (10) is dog. According to Ockham, it is

c-equivocal because it was first imposed to signify1/2 all dogs the tail-wagging,
130 One remark about the Latin phrase illos terminos arctare ad certum sensum vel ad cer-
tam significationem: taken literally, it means something like limiting or abridging the
terms to a certain sense or signification. I have chosen the rather free translation which
refers explicitly to a special use of an equivocal term to make explicit Ockhams point
here: speakers can agree upon a certain limited use of an equivocal term within a special
context. But thereby, they do not really curtail the terms signification.
131 [] quaelibet propositio in qua ponitur talis dictio aequivoca semper de virtute sermo-
nis est distinguenda, eo quod potest accipi sic vel sic, et hoc sive sit in uno sensu vera et
in alio sensu falsa, sive in utroque sensu falsa sive in utroque vera. Tamen aliquando dis-
putantes possunt illos terminos arctare ad certum sensum vel ad certam significationem,
et tunc non est distinguenda. Potest autem hoc fieri vel per consuetudinem vel per cer-
tam ordinationem inter eos. Potest etiam hoc fieri per additionem alicuius; sicut si oppo-
nens dicat: volo quod quandocumque addo huic dictioni canis a, quod stet praecise pro
animali latrabili. Tunc si opponens proponat istam propositionem omnis canis a est
latrabilis, non est distinguenda; si autem proponat istam omnis canis est latrabilis, est
distinguenda. SL III-4, 2 (OP I, 753754).
four-legged animals which are able to bark and was then secondarily imposed
to signify1/2 the two constellations of the small and the great dog in Greek
astronomy and mythology due to some similarity. Strictly speaking, dog is
equivocal by consideration.132
It is precisely due to this linguistic convention (de virtute sermonis) viz.
that c-equivocal terms can be correctly applied to the particular things they
were originally imposed to signify and to the things they were derivatively
imposed to signify that a proposition containing such a term can be distin-
guished. For if a term can be taken in different ways within a spoken proposi-
tion, then it is possible that the whole proposition of which the term is part is
true if the term is taken in one way, and false if taken in another way. Note that
Ockham here explicitly speaks of different senses in which a proposition can
be taken. It is tempting to identify the different senses with mental proposi-
tions: if it is correct that a mental proposition can be reconstructed from the
signification and supposition of the terms of the spoken proposition then it
follows that the different senses of a spoken proposition can at least be ren-
dered in terms of different mental propositions.133,134
132 See 2.3 Conventional Signification and Equivocation above where I discuss the distinc-
tion between terms being equivocal by chance and by consideration. Note that it is
again a categorematic term in Ockhams example which is c-equivocal, probably for the
sake of simplicity.
133 But the reader should be warned: even if it can be shown that to give the sense of a spoken
proposition is nothing but to identify a mental proposition, it is not (yet) clear whether
the alleged identification of mental proposition has any strong ontological implications
with respect to mental propositions. That is, for a spoken proposition to import some-
thing is it necessary for there literally to be an occurrence of a mental proposition? Or
should it be enough that there can be such an occurrence? My guess is that the possibility
of identification should be enough. At least, there are passages supporting this reading:
[] potest concedi quod aliqua propositio est vera in voce quamvis non sit signum ali-
cuius propositionis in mente; de facto tamen quaelibet potest esse signum propositionis
in mente. Ord. I, d.2, q.8 (OT II, 287288).
134 This is tempting especially for the modern reader familiar with the Fregean distinction
between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung). But note that there is nothing like the
reference of a mental proposition along Fregean lines, since the truth or falsity of a men-
tal proposition are not entities according to Ockham as they are according to Frege: Jeder
Behauptungssatz, in dem es auf die Bedeutung der Wrter ankommt, ist also als
Eigenname aufzufassen, und zwar ist seine Bedeutung, falls sie vorhanden ist, entweder
das Wahre oder das Falsche. Diese beiden Gegenstnde werden von jedem, wenn auch
nur stillschweigend, anerkannt, der berhaupt urteilt, der etwas fr wahr hlt, []. Frege,
ber Sinn und Bedeutung (1892) 1969, 4065 (48). For further discussion, see Knne, Die
Philosophische Logik Gottlob Freges, 198219.
132 Chapter 2
Since Ockham explains equivocation of spoken terms by means of their

subordination to different mental terms, it follows that there are as many dif-
ferent mental propositions to be distinguished as there are different mental
terms to which a spoken term is subordinated. If Ockham says with respect to
a spoken proposition that it is to be distinguished he means that there are at
least two corresponding mental propositions to be identified. Look again at
(10): if dog is taken for the things it signifies originally, then the following men-
tal proposition can be identified:
(10) Every dog can bark.
And if it is taken for the constellations of stars, then we arrive at the following
mental proposition:
(10) Every constellation called dog can bark.
Clearly, (10) is true while (10) is not. And consequently, the spoken proposi-
tion (10) is true if it is taken to import that every dog can bark and false if it is
taken to import that every celestial constellation called dog can bark. As
Ockham states elsewhere: [] if the term dog in the proposition a dog is an
animal stands for the animal which can bark, it is true, if for the celestial con-
stellation, it is false.135
Remarkably, Ockham claims that speakers can avoid such ambiguities
within special contexts if they agree upon a certain use of equivocal terms. For
instance, the speakers could postulate that whenever they use the term dog
during their discussion, they intend to use it only for four-legged animals, and
not for celestial constellations. And one way to indicate this restricted use of
dog is to mark the term by adding a letter or index.136 If one of the speakers
utters
(11) Every dog1 can bark (omnis canis a est latrabilis)
under these circumstances, then (11) is not to be distinguished. In other words,

only one mental proposition is to be identified, namely
135 [] si iste terminus canis in ista propositione canis est animal stet pro animali latrabili
vera est, si pro caelesti sidere falsa est. SL I, 15 (OP I, 52).
136 Potest etiam hoc fieri per additionem alicuius; sicut si opponens dicat: volo quod quan-
documque addo huic dictioni canis a, quod stet praecise pro animali latrabili. SL III-4, 2
(OP I, 754).
(11) Every dog can bark.
But if under the same circumstances one of the speakers utters
(10) Every dog can bark (omnis canis est latrabilis)
then (10) is to be distinguished. That is, the two mental propositions
(10) Every dog can bark
and
(10) Every constellation called dog can bark
are to be identified with respect to (10), because dog is not used in the
restricted way. This account must be understood precisely, however: a speaker
can intend to use an equivocal term as if it had only an original signification.137
It would be somewhat misleading to conclude that a spoken proposition con-
taining the term in question would literally cease to be ambiguous under these
circumstances. Speakers can decide to take or interpret spoken propositions as
if they had only one rather than various imports such that they stick only to
one mental proposition but neglect the other. The possibility of restricting the
use of equivocal terms within certain contexts is not to be mistaken as a real
restriction of the terms signification.
Crucially, the notion of correspondence must allow the positing of mental
terms, whenever it is necessary, to account for differences concerning the
import of spoken propositions. Because of this, it does not matter whether the
differences of import are due to the multiple signification of the spoken terms
or due simply to the fact that the supposition of the terms varies contextually
according to the intentions of the speaker.138 If an interpreter wants to distin-
guish the different ways in which an ambiguous spoken proposition can be
taken he has to identify different corresponding mental terms as parts of
137 Potest etiam fieri sine additione tali; sicut si opponens dicat sic: volo in tota ista disputa-
tione accipere hoc nomen canis praecise pro animali latrabili. Tunc quandocumque in
ista disputatione proponatur propositio in qua ponitur haec dictio canis, non est dis-
tinguenda. SL III-4, 2 (OP I, 754).
138 See 2.4 Propositions and Spoken Propositions: The Relation of Correspondence. There I
showed that Ockham argues that there are different kinds of mental terms due to the
fact that every mental proposition corresponds to some spoken proposition.
134 Chapter 2
different mental propositions. But the mental terms thus postulated are not
necessarily identical with the mental terms to which the spoken terms are sub-
ordinated that is, neither originally nor derivatively. This becomes clear with
respect to spoken propositions containing demonstratives: by necessity, the
term that corresponds to a demonstrative is not identical with the mental term
the demonstrative is subordinated to, since demonstratives do not have the
property of signification in the same way as categorematic terms such as man
or dog. Accounting for the import of a spoken proposition containing a
demonstrative implies the identification of a mental term within the speakers
mind at the moment of utterance. By convention, a demonstrative can sup-
posit for anything the speaker wants to refer to by using it.139 This is to say that
the contextual variation of a spoken terms supposition is explained by point-
ing out different mental terms which the speaker has in mind at the moment
of utterance. Accordingly, it can be held that the relation of correspondence is
not constitutive with respect to the import of a spoken proposition in the same
way as subordination is constitutive with respect to the signification of spoken
terms, since, within a certain context, a spoken term can supposit personally
for something it does not signify by virtue of subordination, if the speaker
wants to use the term in this way.
Although the subordination-based identity of signification between men-
tal and spoken terms, and the identity of import between spoken and corre-
sponding mental propositions, might compel us to conceive of mental speech
as involving the use of a kind of language, there are important differences
between the use of mental and spoken language which here become
apparent.
2.5 Demonstratives, Correspondence, and Supposition of Mental

Terms
In this Section I aim to show that Ockham accounts for the contextual varia-
tion of the supposition of a spoken term by means of the different mental
terms within the speakers mind at the moment of utterance. These mental
terms are not always identical with the mental term the spoken term is subor-
dinated to. It is pivotal to recall that the actual truth value of a spoken proposi-
tion is determined by the actual supposition of its terms. The supposition of a
term, however, is determined, at least partly, by the intention of the speaker.
Most crucially, if a spoken proposition contains a demonstrative, the actual
139 See Quodl. II, q.19 (OT IX, 195).

supposition of it depends wholly on what the speaker refers to by the use of

that demonstrative.140
By discussing an instance of a spoken proposition containing a demonstra-
tive I also want to clarify the difference between mental and spoken proposi-
tions with respect to the personal supposition of mental and spoken terms. In
the Quodlibeta, Ockham presents the case of a spoken proposition containing
a demonstrative. This proposition is uttered only in a certain, religious context
by a certain person: Ockham considers the question whether the spoken prop-
osition this is my body (hoc est corpus meum) uttered by the priest during the
mass is true by linguistic conventions (de virtute sermonis). His answer is in
the affirmative. It is interesting to see how he conceives of the mental proposi-
tion corresponding to the utterance.
Ockham makes two preliminary remarks. One concerns demonstratives;
the other is nothing but the general principle of correspondence.141 First,
Ockham states with respect to demonstratives:
I say that a demonstrative pronoun is significative only due to the inten-

tion of the speaker; and so because by uttering it the speaker intends the
demonstrative pronoun to demonstrate the one or the other differently
so the truth of the proposition in which such a pronoun is posited must
be judged in the one way or the other. And therefore I say that the
pronoun does not signify something by itself due to some original
institution as do categorematic terms, for instance, man or animal
neither does it co-signify something with another term, as do syncateg-
orematic terms, for instance conjunctions or adverbs.142
The passage contains some important assumptions with respect to the signifi-
cation and personal supposition of demonstratives:
140 In this context, I use the expression to refer and referring for an activity of the speaker.
To say that a speaker refers to a thing a is to say that a speaker picks out a and identifies it
demonstratively by means of an expression. See Peter Strawson, Individuals An Essay in
Descriptive Metaphysics, London; New York, 1959, 1819.
141 [] omni propositioni vocali correspondet aliqua propositio mentalis. Quodl. II, q.19 (OT
IX, 194).
142 [] dico quod pronomen demonstrativum non est significativum nisi ex intentione pro-
ferentis; et ideo ex hoc quod proferens vocaliter pronomen demonstrativum intendit diver-
simode demonstrare unum vel aliud, est aliter et aliter iudicandum de veritate propositionis
in qua ponitur tale pronomen. Et ideo dico quod pronomen non significat aliquid per se ex
primaria institutione, sicut categorema, puta homo vel animal; nec consignificat cum
alio, sicut syncategorema, puta coniunctiones et adverbia. Quodl. II, q.19 (OT IX, 193).
136 Chapter 2
(a) A demonstrative pronoun such as this or that neither signifies1/2

something (as a categorematic term does) nor does it co-signify in
combination with another term (as a syncategorematic term does).
Nevertheless, a demonstrative can be used significatively within a proposition

such that it can have personal supposition.143 That is,
(b) a demonstrative pronoun can supposit personally within a spoken

proposition for that which the speaker refers to by means of the
demonstrative.144
Ockham explicitly states that in order to judge about the truth of a proposition
containing a demonstrative the subject has to find out what the speaker refers
to by means of the demonstrative, since the import, and hence the truth, of
such a spoken proposition is determined partly by the intention of the speaker
to pick out one thing rather than the other.145 Thus
(c) if a spoken proposition ps contains a demonstrative such as this or

that, a subject has to find out what the speaker refers to by means
of the demonstrative in order to identify the import of ps and hence
to judge whether ps is true.
Now with these preliminary remarks at hand, we are ready to take a look at
Ockhams example. Since giving the import of a spoken proposition implies
the identification of a mental proposition, it will be interesting to see what
143 See 1.5.2 Personal Supposition of Terms and Taking a Term Significatively (sumi signifi-
cative). There I claimed that according to Ockham a term has personal supposition or is
used significatively if (a) the term supposits for something it signifies or if (b) it is implied
(denotatur) that the term supposits for something or (c) if it is implied (denotatur) that it
does not supposit for something. It can be held that a demonstrative can supposit person-
ally according to (b) and (c), but not according to (a).
144 I owe this point to Christian Nimtz. Nimtz holds that although a demonstrative does not
have signification, it can have personal supposition within a spoken proposition never-
theless, since it can stand for the thing the speaker refers to by using it. For instance,
within the type of sentence thats a nice one, that does not signify anything. But if a lady
utters thats a nice one by picking out a hat in a milliners shop then that stands for a
certain hat within the spoken proposition. (Private communication).
145 Presumably, finding this out implies the occurrence of some mental term in the subjects
mind.
kind of mental term can correspond to a demonstrative. Again, the passage is

rather long, but worth citing:
[] I say with respect to the question that this spoken proposition uttered
by the priest is true, because by uttering it in the appropriate manner the
priest must intend to demonstrate the body of Christ by this uttered pro-
noun this. However, the priest will form one mental proposition at the
very moment or within this short time when he utters this pronoun, and
another at the end of the utterance of the proposition this is my body.
This is because if he wants to form a mental proposition in an appropri-
ate manner in which a sign suppositing for the body of Christ is predi-
cated of the pronoun demonstrating the same body, and if he wants to do
this before the utterance of this proposition is accomplished, for instance
in the middle or at the beginning, then he must form a mental proposi-
tion such as the body that, if this proposition is appropriately uttered,
will instantly assume that form [sc. bread] is my body. And the future
tense mental proposition which is formed at this very moment, or within
the short time when the pronoun is uttered, is simply true. But at the end
of the utterance he must form this proposition, if he is to proceed appro-
priately, this body existing in this form [sc. bread] is my body; such that
the first proposition is about the future and the second is about the
present.146
It might be useful to recapitulate briefly the religious context of the Eucharist:

it is held that a literal transformation of the bread into the body of Christ takes
place during the priests utterance of the proposition this is my body. The
146 [] dico tunc ad quaestionem quod ista propositio prolata a sacerdote vera est, quia
sacerdos debito modo proferens debet intendere demonstrare corpus Christi per hoc pro-
nomen hoc prolatum. Sed iste sacerdos unam propositionem mentalem formabit in illo
instanto vel tempore parvo in quo profert hoc pronomen, et aliam in fine prolationis
istius propositionis hoc est corpus meum. Quia si ante finem prolationem huius proposi-
tionis, puta in medio prolationis vel in principio, velit debito modo formare propositio-
nem mentalem in qua praedicatur signum supponens pro corpore Christi de pronomine
demonstrante idem corpus, debet formare talem propositionem mentalem hoc corpus
quod erit statim sub istis speciebus, si ista propositio debite proferatur, est corpus meum.
Et ista propositio mentalis de futuro formata pro illo instanto vel parvo tempore quo pro-
fertur pronomen, est simpliciter vera. Sed in fine prolationis debet formare istam propo-
sitionem, si debito modo procedat, hoc corpus existens sub istis speciebus est corpus
meum; ita quod prima propositio est de futuro et secunda de praesenti. Quodl. II, q.19
(OT IX, 194).
138 Chapter 2
problem of transubstantiation is a central theological problem.147 But disre-

garding the religious context, the literal transformation of one substance into
another represents a case where a mental term changes its natural significa-
tion due to a change of its significate such that the spoken term which is sub-
ordinated to the mental term changes its signification in the same way.148
The problem Ockham is faced with in this special case is that the utterance
of hoc est meum corpus must be true, for theological reasons. And since
Ockham accounts for the truth of a spoken proposition by identifying a true
mental proposition importing the same as the spoken proposition, the ques-
tion is: in the context described, what is the mental proposition corresponding
to the spoken proposition this is my body? There are certain difficulties: first,
the transformation of substance (bread into body) is supposed to take place
during the utterance of this is my body, such that at the beginning of the utter-
ance of
(12) This is my body (hoc est corpus meum)
the thing for which this supposits personally is still bread, but at the end of the
utterance, when the transformation is supposed to have taken place, it sup-
posits for the body in the guise of the bread. But (12) is true if and only if the
subject (this) and the predicate (my body) supposit for the same, namely, for
the body of Christ. A problem Ockham does not address at all is that the priest
uttering (12) does not refer to his own body by means of the possessive pro-
noun meum. That is, it seems that the priest takes the perspective of Jesus in
this context, as an actor impersonating Hamlet takes the perspective of the
Prince of Denmark.149
147 One obvious problem is of course that the transformed bread apparently keeps its quali-
ties (of being baked etc.); the other substance (the body of Christ) is to be said to be pres-
ent under these qualities (sub istis speciebus).
148 See above 2.2 Signification in Relation to Subordination and Imposition. There I dis-
cussed the possibility of the natural signification of a mental term in connection with
subordination as a counterfactually stable relation.
149 The analogy fails in one respect: if the actor impersonating Hamlet utters: Is this a dagger
which I see before me? then I and before me refer to the author of this utterance, namely
the actor. By contrast, if the priest utters this is my body, then he does not refer to his own
body, but to the bread. Thus the situation of the priest resembles more the situation of a pup-
pet player. For instance, if the puppet player would utter in place of his puppet-Hamlet:
Is this a dagger which I see before me? then by uttering this sentence, the player would
not (intend to) refer to himself by the first person pronoun, but to the puppet. For the time
being, however, I concentrate on the problem of the demonstrative pronoun.
According to Ockhams account of demonstratives, a demonstrative pro-

noun can have personal supposition for that which the speaker uses it. Now to
comply with the truth conditions in terms of the identity of supposition, the
priest as Ockham himself formulates must intend to demonstrate the
body of Christ by the uttering of the pronoun this.150 If the speaker merely
intended to use hoc for the bread, then the demonstrative would not supposit
personally for the same as the predicate term my body, since my body sup-
posits personally for the body in the guise of the bread. But at the beginning of
the utterance, the bread is still bread, and not yet the body of Christ. Strictly
speaking, the speaker must refer to two different things at two different points
of time: before the transformation takes place, the speaker must refer to the
bread which is not yet the body of Christ, and after the transformation, the
speaker must refer to the body of Christ in the form of the bread by means of
the demonstrative.
How does Ockham conceive of the mental term that corresponds to the
demonstrative hoc in view of the fact that the thing which the speaker refers
to changes substantially in the course of utterance? Ockham favours the follow-
ing solution: there are two different mental terms within two corresponding
mental propositions which the priest has to formulate:
However, the priest will form one mental proposition at the very moment
or within this short time when he utters this pronoun, and another at the
end of the utterance of the proposition this is my body.151
That is, the speaker has to form the first mental proposition before the substantial
change of the bread takes place and the second mental proposition after this sub-
stantial change has taken place, since a mental term is taken to change its natural
signification due to the substantial change of its significate.152 These mental prop-
ositions differ with respect to their subject term. How is it possible that a speaker
should form two different mental propositions while uttering one spoken proposi-
tion? Note that spoken and mental propositions differ with respect to their struc-
ture in time. Ockham describes this difference in the same Quodlibet:
150 [] quia sacerdos debito modo proferens debet intendere demonstrare corpus Christi
per hoc pronomen hoc prolatum. Quodl. II, q.19 (OT IX, 194).
151 Sed iste sacerdos unam propositionem mentalem formabit in illo instanti vel tempore
parvo in quo profert hoc pronomen, et aliam in fine prolationis istius propositionis hoc
est corpus meum. Quodl. II, q.19 (OT IX, 194).
152 For the notion of forming a mental proposition see 3.3.1 Propositional Acts of
140 Chapter 2
[] a mental proposition [] can be formed in an instant or in a short time.

[] But a spoken proposition is not a whole at once: it is successive.153
And still in another Quodlibet:
[] a mental proposition is a permanent thing, and can exist as a whole

at the beginning of an utterance at once; [] But a spoken proposition is
successive, and when one part actually exists, the other does not.154
That is, a spoken proposition has some extension in time, while a mental prop-
osition is not extended in time, but comes into existence by being formed by a
thinker at a single point in time. Therefore p takes place at one point of time,
but is itself not extended in time, while uttering a proposition can be said to
start at one point of time and stop at another.155 The crucial difference is that a
spoken proposition is successive, such that its parts never exist all at the same
time, while all parts of a mental proposition exist at the same time.156
Accordingly, a speaker can form a mental proposition at once while he utters
a spoken proposition. And he can even form more than one mental proposi-
tion in the course of uttering one spoken proposition.
How does Ockham conceive of the mental proposition corresponding to
(12) before the substantial change of the bread has occurred? This proposition
can be rendered as follows:
(12) This thing which is bread now but will have transformed into the body
of Christ before the end of this utterance is the body of Christ.
Note that the mental term corresponding to the demonstrative hoc before the
substantial change of the bread is a rather long definite description which
quite ingeniously signifies the body of Christ in the guise of the bread, but
only in the future tense; that is, the mental subject term does not signify1 a
153 [] propositio mentalis [], potest tota formari in instanti sive in parvo tempore. []
Sed propositio non est tota simul, sed successive. Quodl. II, 9.19 (OT IX, 196).
154 [] propositio mentalis est res permanens, et potest esse tota simul in principio prolatio-
nis; [] Sed propositio vocalis est successiva, et quando una pars est, alia non est. Quodl.
III, q.13 (OT IX, 251252).
155 Note that it is correct to say that a thought can be entertained for some time. I discuss the
structures of spoken and mental propositions in some detail in 3.3.1 Propositional Acts of
156 This is what Ockham calls a permanent being. In this sense, particular substances are
permanent beings as well.
presently existing thing, but merely signifies2 something that will exist.157
Ockham cautiously adds the condition that the body will exist in the guise of
the bread if in fact the proposition hoc est corpus meum is uttered appropri-
ately so that the transformation actually takes place. But if the transformation
has occurred in the course of the utterance, then the following mental proposi-
tion can be reconstructed at the end of the utterance, namely:
(12) This body existing under these qualities [of the bread] is the body of
Christ.
Here the mental subject term corresponding to the demonstrative is also a

definite description. But now the mental term signifies1 a presently existing
thing, namely the body of Christ in form of the bread.
Ockhams original question was: what corresponding mental proposition
must be formed in order for the spoken proposition hoc est corpus meum to
be true? Ockhams answer is that there must be two corresponding mental
propositions due to the fact that the thing the subject term supposits for
changes its substance during the utterance. The spoken proposition is about
two different things, namely, the bread and the body-as-bread; therefore, there
must be two different mental terms corresponding both to the demonstrative
hoc at different points of time, since a mental term signifies whatever it signi-
fies naturally, such that if the signified thing changes, then the mental term
changes as well.
It can be held in general that in order to use a demonstrative significatively
for a thing the speaker must entertain some mental term which supposits for
the thing.158 First, the mental subject term supposits for the bread, and later,
another mental term supposits for Christs body. It is necessary to posit two
different mental subject terms within two different mental propositions for
the spoken proposition to be true in this case. A demonstrative can be used to
pick out any particular thing or things by a speaker, but the corresponding
mental proposition must necessarily contain a mental term which supposits
for the thing in question in order for the spoken proposition to be true. Of
course the mental proposition corresponding to the spoken proposition con-
taining the demonstrative need not be true. Consider the following simple
case: if Anne actually believes to have spotted Peter and utters
158 Here the connection with intuitive cognition as a kind of singular cognition becomes
crucial. See 3.2.1 The Three Steps of Concept Acquisition and 3.4 Intuitive Cognition
and Evident Judgement.
142 Chapter 2
(13) That is Peter
by pointing to a man, the following mental proposition could be reconstructed:
(13) That man over there is Peter.
But if it is not Peter, then (13) is false, where the mental singular term that man
over there corresponding to that signifies1 and supposits personally for the
man picked out by Anne. Recall that according to Ockham a term has personal
supposition or is used significatively if (a) the term supposits for something it
signifies or if (b) it is indicated that the term supposits for something or (c) if it
is indicated that it does not supposit for something.159 Now (b) and (c) also
cover all cases of equivocal and improper use of spoken terms, since a speaker
might use a spoken term F for some Gs, although F does not signify1/2 Gs. But
it is not possible that a thinker forms a mental proposition of which the mental
term F is part where F does not supposit personally for Fs, but does for Gs.
For instance, it is not possible for Anne to form the following mental
proposition
(14) Peters blood boils
and thereby actually mean that
(14)? Peter is really angry.
Conversely, it is possible that Anne metaphorically utters
(15) His blood boils
And thereby means that
(15) Peter is really angry
since it is possible to form the mental proposition (15) corresponding to (15);

but if Anne does not merely repeat silently a spoken proposition to herself, but
actually forms the mental proposition (14), then (14) imports that Peters blood
159 See 1.5.2 Personal Supposition of Terms and Taking a Term Significatively (sumi
significative).
boils, since Peters blood supposits for Peters blood and boils supposits for the
state of boiling.
It can be held in general that mental and spoken terms differ with respect to
personal supposition in the following way: a mental term can supposit person-
ally only for that which it signifies naturally, while a spoken term can supposit
personally for whatever it is that the speaker uses it for significatively, whether
the spoken term signifies1/2 the thing in question or not. In short, it is not
possible to mentally say one thing but mean another. This is the major differ-
ence between mental and spoken language according to the interpretation
given so far.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter I aimed to demonstrate the explanatory power of the mental-

speech assumption with respect to language. I argued that, if approaching this
question from the point of view of the interpretation of spoken and written
propositions, it is worth asking what kind of functions Ockham understands
mental items to have, since one important goal of the Summa Logicae, where
he distinguishes between mental, spoken, and written terms and propositions,
is to provide the student of logic with some tools of interpretation. In order to
ascribe truth values to propositions correctly, the student must know how to
disambiguate sentences and how to recognize fallacious forms of argument.
Equivocation, synonymy, and metaphor are all features of natural languages
such as Latin or English.
I argued that the two functions of the mental-speech assumption that I dis-
tinguished imply a parallelism between mental and spoken propositions, since
the co-variation of the import of a spoken proposition and the corresponding
mental proposition is explained by means of the co-variation of the significa-
tion of the mental terms and the spoken terms: a spoken term has the property
of signification by virtue of being subordinated to a mental term signifying the
same, while the import of a spoken proposition is identical with the import of
a corresponding mental proposition.160
In Ockhams time the relevant properties of linguistic expressions were gen-
erally taken to be signification and supposition. So if someone in the four-
teenth century were to conceive of a mental language, he would be likely to
160 Again, I omit the disjunction spoken or written term or proposition, since it should be
clear that what is said applies to both.
144 Chapter 2
ascribe these properties to its constituent parts as well. To substantiate this,

I turned to the case of equivocal terms. Terms being equivocal by consider-
ation were shown to have an original as well as a derivative signification. The
derivative signification of a c-equivocal term amounts to the regular use of a
term for something it did not originally signify within certain propositional
contexts.
Next I turned to the notion of correspondence. I argued that of the two
notions of subordination and correspondence, subordination is the more fun-
damental insofar as it is possible to derive the import of a spoken proposition
and hence, the corresponding mental proposition from the original or deriv-
ative signification and supposition of the terms. To arrive at a suitable notion
of the import of a proposition I discussed Ockhams general account of truth
(and falsity). According to this account, a spoken proposition imports that p.
This prepared the ground for the discussion of correspondence.
Generally, Ockham postulates correspondence between mental and spoken
propositions as a foundational principle of the semantic analysis of spoken
propositions, so that it becomes possible to posit as many different mental
terms as are required to account for every part of a spoken proposition.
According to my interpretation, correspondence is nothing but identity of
import. I tried to show that this identity can be accounted for in terms of the
identity of what the terms of the proposition in question (signify and) person-
ally supposit for together with the structural likeness of the propositions. This
structural likeness, I argued, results from the fact that the terms of the proposi-
tions that (signify and) supposit for the same also have the same function,
namely that of being subject or predicate. I discussed the two cases of synony-
mous and ambiguous propositions as cases where the import of a spoken
proposition can be derived from the signification and supposition of the spo-
ken terms. I finally turned to spoken propositions containing demonstratives
to show that the personal supposition of the demonstrative pronoun is wholly
determined by the intentional activity of the speaker and not by the terms
subordination-based signification: this is a case in which some term of the spo-
ken proposition is not always related to some part of the corresponding mental
proposition by subordination.
I conclude that it is inevitable to conceive of mental speech as involving the
use of a kind of language due to the identity of signification via subordination
and the identity of import via correspondence. That is, mental speech involves
the use of a kind of language which has a semantics mental terms signify
naturally and a syntax, since the import of a mental proposition can be
derived from the signification and the supposition of its terms. But I claim that
there is also an important difference between mental and spoken propositions
with respect to the supposition of mental and spoken terms: a mental term can
supposit personally only for that which it signifies naturally, while a spoken
term can supposit personally for anything the speaker wants to use it for.
According to this interpretation, the major difference between mental and
spoken language can be stated as follows: it is possible to say one thing but
mean another thing, but it is not possible to mentally say one thing but mean
something else.
Chapter 3
Ockhams Model of Thought
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I discuss further Ockhams assumption of mental speech (ams)

by considering the main results of the discussion so far. The results of the first
chapter can be given as follows:
(1) In general, the signification of a spoken term can be rendered as its

(correct) applicability to things.
(2) The actual personal supposition of a spoken term implies its significative
use within a proposition, whether or not there is or can be something the
term (correctly) applies to.
The conclusions of the second chapter are:
(3) it is necessary to conceive of mental speech as involving the use of a kind

of language, since subordination-based signification of spoken terms
implies that the signification of a spoken term is identical to the significa-
tion of a mental term, and correspondence-based import of spoken prop-
ositions implies that the import of a spoken proposition is identical to
the import of a mental proposition. That is,
(4) the language involved in mental speech has a semantics mental
terms signify naturally and a syntax insofar as the import of a men-
tal proposition can be derived from the signification and supposition
of its terms.
However,
(5) mental terms can supposit personally only for things they signify whereas
spoken terms can supposit for anything the speaker uses them for.
What does Ockham seek to explain by ascribing signification and supposition

to mental terms or concepts? The answer, roughly, is that Ockham attempts to
account for the content of propositional thought in a systematic way. In this
sense, the content of a propositional act of thought is the same as the import of
a mental proposition, since mental propositions are nothing but propositional

Ockhams Model Of Thought 147
acts of thought. This is less trivial than it seems at first glance if it is taken
into consideration that Ockhams model of the workings of the intellect must
comply with the ontological constraints of his nominalist view.1 Recall that in
Ockhams ontological inventory, there are only substances and particularized
qualities. That is, in the world, there are things such as Socrates and Socrates
paleness and my thought that Socrates is pale, but there are no abstract things
such as propositions in the modern sense.2
My general assumption is that Ockham attempts to explain how it is possi-
ble to think, truly or falsely, that p in a world of particulars by the assumption
of mental speech. Several preliminary remarks are in order here to bring out
the importance of this assumption.
First, truth is explicitly confined to mental, spoken, and written proposi-
tions. Second, propositions cannot occur independently of a given subjects
activity: the only things having propositional content are products of the
human intellect leaving aside the question of divine or angelic thought.
Ockham repeatedly calls propositions fabrications (fabricationes) of the
intellect and speaks of mental propositions as truly our works (vere opera
nostra).3 Propositions are fabrications of the intellect because they are the
outcome of some compositional activity. Ockham also speaks of the forming
(formare) of a proposition.4 The verb formare indicates a creative activity,
such that a proposition is thereby literally brought into existence. In Fregean
terms, a subject grasps a thought. Note that it is implied by the very concep-
tion of grasping that a thought is not created by being grasped, just as a
pen is not created by being grasped manually.5 However, the constituent
non-propositional parts of which they are composed are not created by the
1 Calvin Normore makes a similar point. See Normore, The End of Mental Language,
300301.
2 See Knne, Die Philosophische Logik Freges, 209.
3 [] de syllogismis, propositionibus et huiusmodi quae non nisi a nobis fieri possunt, sequitur
quod est de operibus nostris; [] de interioribus quae vere opera nostra sunt; []. Exp. in Libr.
Art. Logicae (OP II, 7) (Italics mine). See also Ernest A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham,
New York, 1965, 184.
4 More on the forming of a mental proposition in Section 3.3.1 Propositional Acts of
5 It is interesting to see that these two fundamentally different conceptions give rise to the
two metaphors of grasping and of forming a thought: in Ockhams conceptions, thoughts
are nothing but mental acts, brought about by the human intellect, whereas in Freges con-
ception, the psychic episode of thinking is distinct from its propositional content (der
Gedanke) which is an abstract object. See Knne, Die Philosophische Logik Freges,
514520.
148 Chapter 3
intellect, but are to the result of some causal mechanism of cognition.6 These
parts are at least in Ockhams so-called mature account mental acts
themselves.7 A terminological remark is in order here: the Latin expression
actus does not necessarily indicate an intentional activity of some subject;
rather, it indicates the actualization of the intellectual or volitional powers
of the rational soul.8
Third, Ockham distinguishes between two sorts of non-propositional
cognitions, namely, intuitive and abstractive cognition which directly or indi-
rectly provide the intellect with the terms that can be put together syntacti-
cally.9 The intellect is directly linked to the world by intuitive cognition:
Ockham introduces intuitive cognition conceived as a singular cognition of
particular things which are present to the subject as the starting point of
knowledge, since intuitive acts of cognition can lead to evident judgements
about the things intuited. Generally, knowledge starts with this kind of evident
judgement.
Fourth, by ascribing the property of signification to concepts Ockham con-
ceives of (tokens of) concepts as (possible) parts of propositional acts of
thought, just as spoken terms are conceived as parts of spoken propositions,
since signification implies the possibility of personal supposition.10 In other
words, it is one of the conditions of concept possession that (a token of) the
concept can occur as subject or predicate within a propositional act of
thought. Thus the claim that Ockham attempts to explain how it is possible to
think, truly or falsely, that p in a world of particulars by means of the mental-
speech assumption is not trivial at all. It will become clear that the assumption
of mental speech implies some rather strong presuppositions about the
workings of the intellect: particularly the notion that the intellect is directly
related to particular things in the world, and is able to form (true or false)
6 According to Ockham, acts of the intellect are not caused freely, but naturally. See Quaest.
Var., q. 5 (OT VIII, 17 ff.).
7 See Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 2127.
8 Panaccio rightly comments on this: The first thing to notice concerning Ockhams gen-
eral notion of actus is that it is very different from todays idea of action as it occurs, say,
in the philosophy of action. An action in the modern sense roughly corresponds to some-
ones doing something intentionally. Acts in the medieval sense, by contrast, are not
always done intentionally, []. The relevant background here is Aristotles idea of actual-
ity (entelecheia), as opposed to mere potentiality. The act of something, in this vocabulary,
is its actual operation, []. Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 21.
9 I discuss the functions of intuitive and abstractive cognition in 3.2.1 The Three Steps of
Concept Acquisition and Section3.4 Intuitive Cognition and Evident Judgement.
10 [] terminus aliud non est quam pars propinqua propositionis. SL I, 1 (OP I, 7).
thoughts about these things voluntarily, because the non-propositional parts

of propositional thoughts have the property of signification: they can be veri-
fied of things and stand for these things within propositional acts of thought.
I further claim that although propositional acts of thought are syntactically
structured, it does not follow that other propositional acts such as acts of judg-
ing and states such as states of believing are syntactically structured as well.
I claim this as an important difference between Ockhams mental speech and
Fodors Language of Thought (lot).11 In contrast to Ockham, Fodor is not
only committed to the view that a propositional act of thinking is syntactically
structured, but he further claims that a mental state such as believing that p or
doubting whether p is itself syntactically structured. The crucial point is that
Fodor needs lot as a prerequisite for his computational model of mental pro-
cesses.12 Roughly speaking, the goal of Fodors computational model is to
explain the doings of a subject by identifying the relevant beliefs and desires as
links in a chain of causally efficient mental states which eventually lead to a
certain action.13 However, it is not sufficient that the content of a state of believ-
ing or desiring is syntactically structured, since the causal roles of mental states
are married with their content only via syntactic structure.14 Thus Fodor pos-
tulates lot because marrying causal powers with syntactic form involves the
manipulation of symbols or signs. By contrast ams is not merely conceived as
a prerequisite of a computational model of mental processes by Ockham.
According to Ockham the intellect is one of the two faculties of the rational
soul; the other is the will. In general, Ockham holds that acts of the will (volun-
tas) are brought about freely as opposed to naturally. For instance, whereas the
heat of an oven is naturally caused by a fire, an act of the will is not caused by
anything extraneous to it.15 In a similar way, extramental things cause non-
propositional acts of apprehending. As regards the level of non-propositional
cognition, the intellect is just as natural an agent as the fire.16 Things are differ-
ent on the level of propositional thought. According to Ockham, the forming
of a mental proposition involves an act of will as a necessary condition.17
11 See 3.6 Why Ockham is not Fodor.

12 Fodor, The Language of Thought, 27.
13 Jerry Fodor, Psychosemantics, The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind,
Cambridge, Mass., 1987, 136.
14 Ibid., 139.
15 See Quodl. I, q. 16 (OT IX, 87); Quodl. I, q. 17 (OT IX, 9093); Quodl. II, q. 2 (OT IX, 116);
Quodl. II, q. 8 (OT IX, 146).
16 See Dominik Perler, Die kognitive Struktur von Hoffnung Zwei mittelalterliche
Erklrungsmodelle, Deutsche Zeitschrift fr Philosophie, 60 (2012) 1, 117.
17 [] formatio propositionis non possit fieri nisi mediante voluntate, []. Ord. I, dist. 3,
q. 4 (OT II, 438).
150 Chapter 3
Of course, we must still explain in what respect the will determines the form-
ing of a mental proposition as a necessary factor. With respect to actions, how-
ever, it is not the case that propositional acts of the intellect cause the subject
to act, in view of the fact that an act of the will is always required in order to act
in a certain way. Human subjects considered apart from other, immaterial
rational beings are able to act voluntarily. Ockham explicitly states that acts
of the will are neither causally determined by the intellect, nor by affections or
passions.18 That is, neither acts of the intellect nor affections alone are suffi-
cient to determine the will of a subject to act in a certain way: it is possible that
a subject does not act in the same way in two similar situations, simply because
he wants to, all else being equal. To illustrate this freedom of the will Ockham
presents the following theological example: even if a subject accepts as true
that God is the highest good, and that God is to be loved, it is still possible for
him not to love him, due to an act of the will.19 There is nothing which could
dispose the will to elicit a certain act. Thus it becomes clear that ams cannot
have a function similar to the function of loth, since it is not possible to
account for actions merely in terms of causally efficient mental acts (and
states) according to Ockham.
In order to show how Ockham accommodates his model of the workings of
the intellect with the assumption that occurrences of thoughts are indeed syn-
tactically structured, I discuss Ockhams model of mental acts. The different
kinds of mental acts are hierarchically ordered: propositional acts presuppose
non-propositional acts. I start with concepts, since (tokens of) concepts are
conceived as non-propositional mental acts in Ockhams mature theory.20 In
(3.2) and (3.2.1) I treat the acquisition of simple, absolute mental terms cor-
responding largely to natural-kind concepts. I show that mental terms such as
man or fly signify naturally because their extension is determined in terms of
two non-intentional relations. In (3.2.2) some of the objections that can be
raised against this account of concept acquisition are discussed.
Then I present different propositional acts one by one, after briefly
sketching Ockhams model of mental acts as laid out in the Ordinatio (3.3),
where he distinguishes largely between acts of apprehension and acts of
18 [], adhuc est in potestate voluntatis elicere actum volendi respectu illius obiecti, vel
nolendi, vel nullum actum elicere. Quaest. Var., q. 8 (OT VIII, 448). Dominik Perler dis-
cusses Ockhams conception of the role of the will in his Transformationen der Gefhle:
philosophische Emotionstheorien 12701670, Frankfurt/M., 2011, 177 ff.
19 [] talis videns divinam essentiam, carens per potentiam divinam absolutam dilectione
Dei, [], potest nolle Deum. Ord. I, dist. 1, q. 6 (OT I, 505).
20 See Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 21.
judgement. Apprehensive acts can be both non-propositional and proposi-

tional. Accordingly, occurrences of concepts are non-propositional appre-
hensive acts. Ockham speaks of the apprehension of mental propositions
(3.3.1) as well as of the apprehension of spoken propositions (3.3.2): to appre-
hend a mental proposition means to form it. The apprehension of a spoken
proposition implies the forming of a corresponding mental proposition,
since to apprehend a spoken proposition is nothing but to understand it.21
Ockham distinguishes a further act of apprehension. This is a so-called
reflexive act whereby a subject explicitly takes notice of the mental proposi-
tion he has formed. In modern terms, the subject explicitly takes notice of
the thought he actually entertains. It will become clear that acts of merely
forming a mental proposition are first-order acts, whereas reflexive acts of
apprehension are second-order acts. This distinction between first-order and
second-order acts of apprehension bears on acts of judging, since judgement
presupposes apprehension (3.3.3). In modern terms, whenever a subject
acknowledges the truth of a thought, he entertains the thought.22 In his later
Quodlibeta Ockham distinguishes between two kinds of assent which are
discussed in (3.3.3.1) and (3.3.3.2) respectively. Assent of the first kind merely
presupposes a first-order act of apprehension, whereas assent of the second
kind presupposes a second-order act of apprehension. According to the first
kind of assent, a subject merely gives his assent that something is thus-and-
so without acknowledging the truth of a proposition. By contrast, assent of
the second kind implies acknowledging the truth of a proposition. This dis-
tinction between two kinds of assent helps to make clear what is special
about evident acts of judgement, namely that they presuppose only the
forming of a mental proposition (a first-order act) even though a proposi-
tion is acknowledged as true (this is a second-order act). That is, a subject
cannot merely entertain such a thought without acknowledging its truth.
I discuss evident judgements about singular mental propositions in (3.4) and
evident judgements about general mental propositions in (3.4.1). The non-
propositional cognition of intuition is involved in both cases. One major goal
of this chapter is to explain what it means that a subject can evidently judge
that p by virtue of (de virtute) intuitive cognition. I will show, however, that
an evident act of judgement is not identical to the mental proposition which
is acknowledged as true. Lastly, it should become clear that mental speech
has a compensating function within the ontological constraints of Ockhams
21 See 2.4 Mental Propositions and Spoken Propositions: The Relation of Correspondence.
22 See Knne, Some Varieties of Thinking, 373.
152 Chapter 3
nominalist framework. I now turn to the acquisition of mental terms or

concepts.
3.2 How to Acquire an Absolute Simple Concept
If one explains how the signification of a mental term is determined one

explains at the same time how a mental term is acquired: it is not even possible
to explain the determination of a mental terms signification separately from
the acquisition of the mental term. On the other hand, however, it is highly
desirable and perfectly possible to treat the determination of signification and
the acquisition of spoken terms apart. There is a trivial reason for this differ-
ence: the ability to acquire a spoken term, that is, to learn what it signifies,
presupposes an existing relation of subordination within a speech community,
since if a spoken term were not to signify something, then it would not be pos-
sible to learn its signification.23 By contrast, to acquire a mental term does not,
according to Ockham, presuppose that there are other individuals having the
mental term in question.
In a chapter of the third part of the Summa Ockham roughly outlines the
cognitive mechanism by which mental terms such as man or horse or more
general terms such as animal are acquired.24 These are absolute and categore-
matic in Ockhams terminology. The account I discuss in this section is
restricted to mental terms which correspond by and large to natural kind
terms. Recall that absolute terms signify exclusively one kind of thing in one
and the same way without connoting anything else.25 The acquisition of a term
such as man is described as a cognitive process which is triggered by the per-
ception of a particular thing, in this case a man. Ockham writes:
It is not that these concepts would precede an act of intuitive cognition

of a man, rather the process is this: first, (1) a man is conceived of
by means of a particular sense; then (2) the same man is [intuitively]
cognized by the intellect such that (3) due to that cognitive act a general
23 A speech community in Ockhams sense is nothing but a number of individuals sharing

one language such as English.
24 I use italics throughout to indicate the mental term man as opposed to the spoken or writ-
ten term man.
25 Nomina mere absoluta sunt illa, quae non significant aliquid principaliter et aliud vel
idem secundario, sed quidquid significatur per illud nomen, aeque primo significatur,
[]. SL I, 10 (OP I, 35). See also 1.3 Absolute vs. Connotative Terms.
notion common to every man is acquired. And that cognition is

called concept, intention, passion which is the concept common to every
man; [].26
A terminological remark first: Ockham uses the Latin expressions intentio,

conceptus, passio and notitia generalis in this passage synonymously.27 When
I speak of the acquisition of mental terms here, I mean primarily the acquisi-
tion of (lexical) concepts.28 Although Ockhams account is exasperatingly
short, there are three steps to be distinguished. First, a particular thing is
sensually perceived by someone, for instance, visually. Second, there is an
act of intuitive cognition of the same thing. Note that at the very beginning of
the passage, Ockham ascertains the priority of acts of intuitive cognition over
26 Non quod isti conceptus praecedant notitiam intuitivam hominis, sed iste est processus
quod primo (1) homo cognoscitur aliquo sensu particulari, deinde (2) ille idem homo
cognoscitur ab intellectu, quo cognito (3) habetur una notitia generalis et communis
omni homini. Et ista cognitio vocatur conceptus, intentio, passio, qui conceptus commu-
nis est omni homini; []. SL III-2, 29 (OP I, 557). I insert the numbers to distinguish clearly
between the three steps of concept acquisition here.
27 It would be misleading to read the Latin expression intentio as implying something
intentional in the modern sense, that is, it would be misguided to take an intentio as
opposed to something merely physical or natural: there simply is no such opposition in
Ockhams conception. One reason could be that he takes the intellect to be wholly passive
in the process of concept acquisition: in this sense, the intellect is a natural agent,
exposed to causes to which it merely responds. The scholastic conception of intentional-
ity was first taken up in the 19th century by Franz Brentano and then by Edmund Husserl
to explain the directedness of the mind towards the objects of its thoughts. See: Edmund
Husserl: Logische Untersuchungen, V, 10, 2. durchges. Auflg. Hamburg, 1988, 26 ff. When I
speak of intentional acts, I use the expression in the modern sense.
28 It is still another question whether all mental terms are concepts or whether Ockham
conceives still of other kinds of mental terms. I give an answer to this question in the next
section. It is common in the literature to ascribe two or even three different conceptions
of concepts to Ockham. The two most prominent are the early fictum-view and the late
actus-view: The fictum-view says that concepts are entities which exist in the intellect and
have an ontological status of their own, that is, a so-called objective being (esse obiecti-
vum). According to the late actus-theory, concepts are simply identified with mental acts.
For example, Baudry writes: Touchant la nature du concept, Ockham sest trouv en
prsence de trois thories, la thorie qui fait du concept un fictum, celle qui en fait une
qualit de lme distincte de lacte dintellection, celle qui lidentifie avec lacte
dintellection. Baudry, Lexique Philosophique, 51. See also McCord Adams, William
Ockham, 84105. In this section and throughout, I will mainly refer to the actus-theory of
concepts, if not indicated otherwise.
154 Chapter 3
concepts: acts of intuitive cognition precede concepts and not vice versa.29
Third, a general concept is generated by the act of intuitive cognition: if a man
is first intuited, then the general concept of man is evoked, if it is a cat, then the
act of intuitive cognition elicits the general concept of cat. If someone has
acquired the concept of man in the way described, he is then in a position to
acquire the more general concept of animal, provided he has apprehended
intuitively a particular thing of another kind, for example, a dog or a horse.
Ockham continues:
Following the apprehension of an animal that is different from man and

from other animals, there is evoked a notion common to all animals, and
that general notion of (every) animal is called passion or intention of the
soul or the concept common to every animal.30
Ockham seems to be aware that his account of acquiring a concept due to

the intuitive cognition of just one particular thing is highly idealized since,
in other places, he qualifies this view.31 However, these kinds of concepts
can be acquired via the cognition of particular things in principle. Recall
that Ockham calls concepts such as man and dog species and concepts
such as animal and colour genera.32 Species and genus are so-called sec-
ond intentions. This means that species can be truly predicated of mental
terms such as dog or man which in turn are called first intentions.33 In
29 The conception of intuitive cognition along with its problems will be treated separately
in the next section.
30 Deinde apprehenso alio animali ab homine vel aliis animalibus, elicitur una notitia gene-
ralis omni animali, et illa notitia generalis omni animali vocatur passio seu intentio ani-
mae sive conceptus communis omni animali. SL III-2, 29 (OP I, 557).
31 Oportet etiam scire quod, ut frequenter, ad cognoscendum universale requiruntur multa
singularia, quamvis subiectum talis universalis sit species specialissima, quia, ut fre-
quenter, non potest evidenter cognosci aliqua singularis contingens sine multis apprehen-
sionibus singularium. SL III-2, 10 (OP I, 523524) (Italics mine). That is, Ockham seems to
be well aware of the fact that the result of a generalization can be inaccurate or
defective.
32 [] tam genus quam species sunt conceptus relativi, et possunt dici relationes rationis
secundum bonum intellectum, []. [] iste conceptus genus non tantum significat
animal, colorem, corpus, quae sunt genera, sed importat quod illa praedicatuntur de
pluribus differentibus specie. Quodl. VI, q. 29 (OT IX, 696697). See 2.4.1 The General
Explanation of Truth and Falsity.
33 See 1.5.4 Simple and Material Supposition.
turn, genus can be truly predicated of first intentions such as animal or

color.34 Rudimentary as this account is, the general rule is this: the acquisi-
tion of a generic concept (animal, colour) implies the acquisition of at
least two different specific concepts (man, dog, blue, white) while the
acquisition of a specific concept does not imply the acquisition of another
concept, but merely the intuitive cognition of a particular thing (a man, a
white thing).35
3.2.1 The Three Steps of Concept Acquisition

To elucidate this process of concept acquisition, it is worth taking a closer look
at the three individual steps. For this purpose, I discuss the acquisition of a
specific concept. The first step is fairly uncontroversial: first, (1) there is a cog-
nitive act of a man by means of a particular sense; [].36 Ockham holds, as
Aristotle does, that the cognition of extramental things starts with sense per-
ception.37 At first glance it is rather trivial that the first cognitive act of a human
subject with respect to perceivable objects is an act of sense perception.
However, this assumption appears less trivial if the second step is taken into
consideration, then (2) there is an [intuitive] act of the intellect, [].38 Sense
perception can be said to be particular insofar as its objects are particular,
since a human subject can only see particular things (this dog or that man) or
can only hear particular sounds (that bark or this sneeze). Intuitive cognition
is particular in the same sense: the object of an act of intuitive cognition is a
particular thing. It is identical to the object of some perceptual act. In Ockhams
account, the same man is first seen and then intuited. Ockham states in the
Ordinatio:
34 According to Ockham, to say that man is a species is to say something about the mental
term man, namely, that it belongs to the class of species terms, just as the mental terms
horse or dog. In general, species and genera are only mental terms in Ockhams nominalist
conception. See again 1.5.4 Simple and Material Supposition.
35 Ockhams speaking of the apprehension of an animal other than man (apprehenso alio
animali ab homine []) is elliptical, since it is implied that the (intuitive) apprehension
of a thing other than man leads to the formation of another specific concept.
36 [] primo (1) homo cognoscitur aliquo sensu particulari, []. SL III-2, 29
(OP I, 557).
37 Et ideo, sicut secundum Philosophum I Metaphysicae et II Posteriorum scientia
istorum sensibilium quae accipitur per experientiam, de qua ipse loquitur, incipit a
sensu, id est a notitia intuitiva sensitiva istorum sensibilium, []. Ord. I, prol., q. 1,
art. 1 (OT I, 33).
38 [] deinde (2) ille idem homo cognoscitur ab intellectu, []. SL III-2, 29 (OP I, 557).
156 Chapter 3
[] the singular sensitive cognition is simply the first we have in this life,
such that the same particular thing which is first perceived by a sense is
first intuited by the intellect in the same respect.39
Two claims are contained in this passage. The first is the aforementioned
claim about the identity of the object: an intuitive act of the intellect has
the same object as some act of sense perception. What does it mean that
the same thing is perceived and intuited in the same respect? To answer
this, let us imagine a different possible scenario. Suppose that the object of
two cognitive acts of different kinds is the same, while the object is not
cognized in the same respect. Imagine that Peter sees a dog. He is seeing
the dog from a certain perspective. The perspective is partly determined by
the distance between perceiver and the thing perceived.40 Now suppose
that Peter thinks of the dog he is actually seeing as Fido. In this case, he
does not think of the dog in the same respect in which he perceives it.
Thinking of the dog as Fido does not even imply a certain perspective,
since Peter could also think of the same dog as Fido without seeing it at all.
That is, if Peter thinks of the dog he is seeing as Fido, then he does not
think of the colour of its fur or the length of its snout or other qualities he
perceives. By contrast, if Peter intellectually intuits the dog he is actually
seeing, then intuiting the dog implies the same perspective as seeing it.
Further, it implies intuiting all the qualities he perceives. Roughly speak-
ing, what Ockham refers to by sub eadem ratione in this context can be
taken as the way the object of an act is presented. Thus:
39 [] quod notitia singularis sensibilis est simpliciter prima pro statu isto, ita quod illud
idem singulare quod primo sensitur a sensu, idem et sub eadem ratione primo intelligitur
intuitive ab intellectu, []. Ord. I, dist. 3, q. 6 (OT II, 494) (Italics mine).
40 Ockham explicitly acknowledges distance as a determining factor of perception and
intuition respectively. In several places he discusses the case of seeing something in
the distance (viso aliquo a remotis). In the Quodlibeta he even states that the dis-
tance of the thing perceived (and intuited) determines the kind of concept which can
be acquired due to the intuitive cognition of the thing: And if you ask what (kind of)
abstractive cognition is had first by means of intuitive cognition, I answer: sometimes
merely the concept of being, sometimes the concept of a genus, and sometimes the
concept of a highly specific species, depending on whether the object is more or less
remote. (Et si quaeras quae notitia abstractiva primo habetur mediante intuitiva,
respondeo: aliquando conceptus entis tantum, aliquando conceptus generis, aliquando
conceptus speciei specialissimae, secundum quod obiectum est magis vel minus remo-
tum.) Quodl. I, q. 13 (OT IX, 78) (Italics mine).
(A)An intuitive act of the intellect has the same object as some act of
sense perception and presents its object in the same way as the act
of sense perception.41
According to Ockham, the power of the senses is inferior, but has priority over
the higher power of the intellect insofar as the power of the intellect presup-
poses the power of the senses.42 Intuitive cognition of the intellect is depen-
dent on sense perception insofar as an act of intuitive cognition presupposes
an act of sense perception as a necessary condition. An act of intellectual
intuitive cognition can only occur if an act of the senses actually occurs. More
41 This distinction between the object of a cognitive act and the mode of presentation of the
object might remind the modern reader of Freges distinction of sense (Sinn) and refer-
ence or meaning (Bedeutung) of a sign. Frege says that the sense is the mode of presenta-
tion (Art des Gegebenseins). As Knne says, Frege uses the metaphor of perspective to
characterize the sense of a sign. Knne writes: Frege bedient sich [] gern einer
Perspektiven-Metapher: Wenn wir eine Zahl als vierte Potenz von 2, wenn wir eine Person
als den Mann von Christiane Vulpius bezeichnen, dann wird ein Gegenstand jeweils nur
von einem bestimmten Standorte aus anvisiert []; nur eine Seite[] des bezeichne-
ten Gegenstandes erscheint dabei, er wird sozusagen nur einseitig beleuchtet[].
Knne, Die Philosophische Logik Gottlob Freges, 200. According to the Latin lexicon, ratio
can be taken in certain contexts as point of view or aspect. I would like to stress that I do
not claim that the same distinction between the sense (Sinn) and the meaning
(Bedeutung) of a sign can be ascribed to Ockham. This would be absurd. I only claim that
Ockhams distinction between the object of an act and the aspect (ratio) seems to bear a
certain similarity to Freges.
42 Ockham explains both the sameness of the object and the sameness of the mode of
presentation in terms of a hierarchical order of cognitive powers. In the Ordinatio he
states where the lower power ends, there the higher power starts; but the sensitive power
is limited to the cognition of particular things; therefore the intellective cognition starts
there. Furthermore, with respect to (hierarchically) ordered powers, whatever object the
lower power has power over, the higher power also has power over, in the same respect.
This is obvious with respect to the intellect and the will and the sensory powers [].
Therefore, whatever object the senses can [be limited to], the intellect can [be limited to]
the same; but the senses can [be limited] priorily to particular things, thus also the intel-
lect]. ([] ubi potentia prior terminatur ibi incipit potentia posterior; sed potentia sen-
sitiva terminatur in cognitione singularis; igitur ibi incipit cognitio intellectiva. Praeterea,
in potentiis ordinatis in quodcumque obiectum potest potentia inferior, in idem potest,
et sub eadem ratione, potentia superior. Patet de intellectu et voluntate et de potentiis
sensitivis []. Igitur in omne obiectum in quod potest [terminari] sensus, intellectus
potest in illud idem; sed sensus potest [terminari] primo in singulare, igitur et intellec-
tus.) Ord. I, dist. 3, q. 5 (OT II, 474). A note on my translation: I translate terminatur in the
first line as ends to stress that the higher power starts where the other ends.
158 Chapter 3
precisely, in order to intellectually intuit a particular thing a subject has to per-

ceive it at the same time. For instance, if Peter does not see the dog anymore,
then he does not intuit it anymore. Compare the following passage from the
Ordinatio:
[] I say that just as it is not atypical of some bodily change, for instance,
sickness or sleep, that every activity of the intellect fades away, so it is not
atypical of the fading of any sensation of a sense [] that the intellectual
intuitive cognition of the same also fades.43
In general:
(B)If a subject does not perceive a thing a, then (under normal circum-
stances) he cannot intellectually intuit a.44
Is it possible to perceive a thing a without intellectually intuiting a? To show

that the intellectual and the sensory powers are distinct, Ockham argues that
it is possible for an act of sense perception to occur without an intuitive act of
the intellect. He gives the example of madmen (furiosi): if a mad person sees a
cat she does not intellectually intuit the cat at the same time, because she lacks
the intellectual power of intuitive cognition.45 So in Ockhams view, the answer
is yes, in case a subject has the sensory power to perceive things, but lacks the
intellectual power to intuit things. Consequently, the mad subject lacks the
ability to judge evidently about the things he perceives. Is it possible that a
subject, having both the sensory power to perceive and the intellectual power
to intuit things, perceives a thing a without intuiting a? Put differently, is it
possible that an act of perceiving a occurs within a subject without a co-occur-
ring act of intuiting a if the subject has the intellectual power of intuition? But
then, what would a perception of a without an intuition of a amount to?
43 [] dico quod sicut non est inconveniens ad aliquam transmutationem corporalem,

puta infirmitatem vel somnum, cessare omnem actum intellectus, ita non est inconveni-
ens ad cessationem alicuius sensationis sensus [] cessare notitiam intuitivam intellecti-
vam eiusdem. Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 2728).
44 I insert the bracketed under normal circumstances to account for the at least logical
possibility of God acting directly as an efficient cause.
45 Eodem modo potest probari distinctio omnium sensuum et etiam distinctio sensus et
intellectus et voluntatis. Potest enim cognoscens sic disponi quod potest habere omnes
actus sensitivos, et tamen nullum actum intellectus nec voluntatis, puta si sit furiosus,
ideo necessario sequitur ex istis actibus quod potentiae sensitivae distinguuntur realiter
ab intellectu et voluntati. Rep. II, q. 20 (OT V, 445446).
What about this: that a subject perceives a without intellectually intuiting a

means that he perceives a without paying attention to a.46 This, however, will
not do. The reason is that Ockham explains paying attention to the extramen-
tal object of an act of cognition whether sensory or intellectual in terms of
an act of the will, not in terms of intuition. In the Quaestiones Variae he states:
Since if an act of the intellect is caused by an object or a habit or by a

sensory cognition, the will wants this act to be continued, or it wants to
cognize this object more perfectly, or cognize it inasmuch as it can be
cognized at all, and so it happens if the volition is efficacious.47
It is possible that although a subject both perceives and intuits a thing a, he

does not notice a.48 Consider the following case: suppose that from his win-
dow Peter is seeing and intellectually intuiting a blackbird on the lawn. At the
same time, he is hearing Anne laughing wildly and incessantly. Now although
Peter is seeing and intuiting the bird, he does not pay attention to it, but to the
wild laughter instead: Peter has both an auditory perception and an intuition
of the laughter, such that he can evidently judge that Anne is laughing wildly. In
Ockhams view, the objects of intuition are not confined to the objects of visual
perception.49 Whatever can be perceived by some sense can also be intuited by
the intellect.
Paying attention to the object, which is both perceived and intuited, is a
necessary condition for intuition to work properly, that is, to bring about evi-
dent judgements about the intuited objects on the one hand and to lead to the
formation of general concepts on the other. The question whether it is possible
46 I thank Wolfgang Knne for pointing out this possibility.

47 Quia causata intellectione in intellectu ab obiecto vel habitu vel cognitione in sensu, vult
voluntas illum actum continuari, vel vult illud obiectum perfectius cognosci, vel tantum
quantum potest cognosci, et ita [fiet si] volitio sit efficax. Quaest. Variae, q. 5 (OT VIII,
180181).
48 Ockham discusses the problem how it is possible that a subject perceiving a does not
notice a by referring to Augustines famous remark in De Trinitate XI, c. 8, n. 15 (PL 42, 996)
about different, but simultaneously obtaining acts, such as acts of seeing and acts of hear-
ing in Quodl. I, q. 14 (OT IX, 81).
49 [] concedo quod in omni sensu, tam interiori quam exteriori, est cognitio intuitiva hoc
est, talis cognitio virtute cuius potest praedicto modo cognoscere rem esse vel non esse,
licet non sit cognitio ocularis. Rep. II, qq. 1213 (OT V, 269). Ockhams formulation here is
rather careless: it is clear from the context that he speaks about sense perception, that is,
sensory intuitive cognition (notitia intuitiva sensitiva); however, he says that it is in vir-
tue of this [e.g. sensory intuitive] cognition that one judges that a thing exists or not.
160 Chapter 3
for an act of perceiving a to occur within a subject without a co-occurring act

of intuiting a can be answered as follows:50 if the subject has both the power
of sense perception and the intellectual power of intuition and if he perceives
a thing a, then normally, if there is no divine intervention, a together with the
perception of a will be sufficient to cause an intuition of a.51 In the Quodlibeta52
Ockham speaks of perception as a partial efficient cause of intuition.53 That is,
although it is possible under these circumstances that a subject does not pay
attention to the object he both perceives and intuits, it is not possible that a
perception of the object occurs without an intuition of it. In general:
(C)If a subject S has the sensory power of perception and the intellec-
tual power of intuition and if S perceives a, then (under normal
circumstances) S also intellectually intuits a.
The acquisition of concepts depends on intellectual acts of intuitive cognition,

and acts of intuitive cognition depend on acts of sense perception. In the
Ordinatio, Ockham says that the intellectual act of intuition is sufficient for
(evident) judgements insofar as it is their proximate cause (causa proxima).54
Intuition is also sufficient in this sense for the acquisition of general concepts:
intuition immediately precedes the formation of a general concept as the sec-
ond step of this process.55 What does it mean that a general concept such as
50 Two terminological remarks: (1) I use the two expressions intuitive cognition and intui-
tive acts interchangeably throughout this chapter, since the Latin actus and cognition
are likewise used interchangeably by Ockham. At least, Ockham does not distuingish
between the two expressions in a systematic way. (2) Note that Ockham calls sense per-
ception also sensory intuitive cognition (notitia intuitiva sensitiva). That is, sense percep-
tion is a kind of intuitive cognition. However, in this chapter, I will concentrate on
intellectual intuitive cognition. The reason is that Ockham ascribes the function to bring
about general concepts as well as evident judgements to intellectual intuitive cognition,
not to sense perception.
51 In the Quodlibeta, Ockham states that the object of perception and intuition is a partial
cause of them. I come back to this point in a moment.
52 Ad aliud dico quod visio sensitiva est causa partialis visionis intellectivae; sed non est
causa partialis actus assentiendi sine visione media, quia notitia complexa praesupponit
notitiam incomplexam in eodem subiecto. Quodl. I, q. 15 (OT IX, 86).
53 For the notion of partial cause see Ord. I, d. 45, q. 1 (OT IV, 664665). See also McCord
Adams, William Ockham, 765.
54 [] videtur quod sola notitia intellectiva sufficit ad iudicium tamquam causa proxima,
[]. Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 27).
55 According to Ockham, the acquisition of general concepts concerning mental acts pre-
supposes the intuition of particular mental acts. The intuition of mental acts, however,
cat can be acquired on the basis of the intuition of a particular cat? How can it
be understood that the intuitive cognition of a cat is sufficient for the forma-
tion of the general concept cat? The task is to explain how, according to
Ockham, an act of intuition can be the basis for a process of abstraction lead-
ing to the formation of a general concept.
Ockhams conception of intuition-based concept acquisition appears to be
open to objections raised by Geach against abstractionist accounts of concept
acquisition, where abstraction is understood as the process of singling out in
attention some one feature given in direct experience abstracting it and
ignoring the other features simultaneously given abstracting from them.56
But first, according to Ockham how can an act of intuition be the basis for the
formation of a general concept?
Fundamentally, there are three relations involved here: the first is a causal
relation, the second is a relation of similarity or likeness between things of the
same kind, and the last is a relation of intentional similarity or likeness between
an intuition and its object or objects. The first two relations are not intentional
according to Ockham the issue of causality is related to the issue of singular-
ity. In the Quodlibeta he argues that an intuitive act is singular because the act
is caused by a particular object. He writes:
[Intuitive cognition] is proper to particulars [] because it is immedi-

ately caused by a particular thing or is apt to be caused, and is not apt to
be caused by another thing, not even of the same species.57
does not presuppose the sensory perception of anything, because mental acts cannot be
perceived by the senses. Ockham states in the Ordinatio that intuitive cognition of the
thinkers own mental acts is possible. He writes: [] In this life, our intellect does not
only have cognition of these perceivable things, but [] has intuitive cognition of certain
things which can be understood but are not sensually perceivable, [], such as acts of the
intellect, acts of the will, the feelings of pleasure and pain [literally: sadness] consequent
upon [these acts] and the like, which man can experience to be in him, although they are
not sensually perceivable. ([] intellectus noster pro statu isto non tantum cognoscit
ista sensibilia, sed [] intuitive cognoscit aliqua intelligibilia quae nullo modo cadunt
sub sensu, [] cuiusmodi sunt intellectiones, actus voluntatis, delectatio consequens et
tristitia et huiusmodi, quae potest homo experiri inesse sibi, quae tamen non sunt sensi-
bilia, [].) Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 3940).
56 Geach, Mental Acts, 18.
57 Quod autem sit propria singulari [], quia immediate causatur a re singulari vel nata est
causari, et non est nata causari ab alia re singulari etiam eiusdem speciei. Quodl. I, q. 13
(OT IX, 73). In my translation I render the Latin singular form singulari by means of the
plural particulars.
162 Chapter 3
Note that in this passage from the Quodlibeta, Ockham omits sense perception
as a necessary condition of intellectual intuitive cognition; he even states that
intellectual intuitive cognition is immediately caused by the object. From now
on, I concentrate on intellectual intuition, leaving aside perception as a neces-
sary condition (and partial cause) of intuition.58 According to this passage, the
object of an intuitive act is fixed by a causal relation. In another passage of the
same Quodlibet Ockham makes the same point about the purely causal fixa-
tion of the object of intuition and then explains:
Therefore intuitive cognition is not called singular due to some likeness

any more than due to a first abstractive cognition, but solely due to cau-
sality, and it is not possible to assign another cause for this.59
Ockham speaks of some kind of likeness as opposed to a causal relation.60

This likeness is intentional.61 In this passage, Ockham is replying to the objec-
tion that an act of intuition is not properly singular because it does not only
represent (repraesentat) its particular object, but also every particular thing
that is very similar (simillimo) to its object.62 Ockham concedes that in this
respect, acts of intuitive cognition do not differ from acts of first abstractive
cognition. A concept acquired on the basis of intuition is a first abstractive
cognition.63
To understand the role of each of the three relations causality, non-
intentional likeness, and intentional likeness in the determination of an act
58 From now on, I also omit the intellectual. If I speak of intuition I thereby mean intel-
lectual intuition.
59 Unde propter similitudinem non plus dicitur intuitiva propria cognitio singularis
quam abstractiva prima, sed solum propter causalitatem, nec alia causa potest assignari.
Quodl. I, q. 13 (OT IX, 76).
60 As Panaccio points out, it is common in the Aristotelian tradition to call a concept a like-
ness of whatever it is a concept of. As Panaccio points out further, this idea comes from
Aristotles Perihermeneias, 16a8. See Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 119, fn. 1.
61 From now on, I omit the quotation marks, although it is not yet clear what this intentional
likeness amounts to.
62 [] quia quaecumque intuitiva detur, aequaliter assimilatur uni singulari sicut alteri
simillimo et aequaliter repraesentat unum sicut alterum; igitur non plus videtur esse cog-
nitio unius quam alterius. Quodl. I, q. 13 (OT IX, 74). This objection was raised by Walter
Chatton. See Chattons Reportatio, d. 3, q. 5, art. 3, 233.
63 [] dico quod cognitio prima abstractiva primitate generationis et simplex non est cog-
nitio propria singulari sed est cognitio communis aliquando, immo semper. Quodl. I, q. 13
(OT IX, 74).
of intuition (and also for general concepts), it is helpful to consider the follow-
ing example.64 Suppose Peter is perceiving (and intuiting) two houseflies at
the same time, one sitting on the wall, the other sitting on the back of a chair.
Of course, intuiting the fly on the wall is not the same as intuiting the fly on the
chair, simply because they are not numerically identical. The two flies resem-
ble each other in such a way that Peter is able to distinguish them only relative
to their position (on the wall, on the chair); Peter can identify the flies demon-
stratively (that fly on the wall and this fly on the chair) due to his intuitive
cognition of them. Generally, intuiting a thing implies the possibility of its
demonstrative identification because it implies a certain context-dependent
perspective on its object.65 However, Peter can identify the fly on the wall
demonstratively just in case the fly on the wall causes Peters intuitive act of
cognition. For instance, if Peter were merely hallucinating, then he could not
demonstratively identify a fly, since there would simply be no fly. In Ockhams
words, there would be no causal relation obtaining between a fly and a cogni-
tive act. Hallucinating is not an act of intuitive cognition. The object of an act
of intuitive cognition is singled out non-intentionally by means of a causal
relation obtaining between the object itself and the act.66 In other words, the
object of an act of intuitive cognition can be fixed sufficiently by a causal
relation:
(D)A subject S intuits a thing a only if a causes an act of intuitive cogni-

tion in S.
Now suppose further that after fighting over some crumbs of bread one of the
flies flies away. Peter can still demonstratively identify the remaining fly, as
that fly or also as that fly which is left. But he cannot determine on the basis
of his intuition of the remaining fly alone which of the two flies is still present
64 Ockham gives a similar example concerning the cognition of angels in Rep. II, q. 16
(OT V, 367).
65 Peter Strawson writes: A sufficient, but not necessary, condition [] is [] that the
hearer can pick out by sight or hearing or touch, or can otherwise sensibly discriminate,
the particular referred to, knowing that it is that particular. [] I shall say, when this first
condition of identification is satisfied, that the hearer is able directly to locate the particu-
lar referred to. We may also speak of these cases as cases of the demonstrative identifica-
tion of particulars. Strawson, Individuals, 19.
66 The causal determination of the object of the intuitive act invites an externalist reading of
intuitive cognition which is prominent in the literature. See for example Panaccio,
Ockhams Externalism.
164 Chapter 3
to him whether it is the one formerly identified as the one on the wall or as
the one on the chair. How can this be explained?
Consider the following comparison: for the comparison to work, think of
intuiting as analogous to taking a picture. The actual taking of the picture can
be distinguished from its result the picture. Just as the taking is determined
by a relation between the object of which a picture is taken and the camera,
the act of intuition is also determined by a relation to its object: one of the dif-
ferences is that the act of intuition is caused by its object, whereas a picture is
triggered by the release of the cameras shutter. Now the resulting picture rep-
resents its object: traditionally, representation is conceived as analogous to the
relation between picture and depicted a picture represents what is depicted.67
For the sake of comparison, then, Peters intuiting the (remaining) fly can be
described as taking a mental picture of the fly. He can identify the object of his
intuition due to the context of its taking: the fact of specific time and place and
perspective from which it was taken is not part of what the picture shows. If
Peter were merely to look at his picture of the fly, he would not be able to
identify the particular fly that was present when the shutter was released: the
picture does not show that it was a certain thing, and not another, very similar
thing, that was present when the picture was taken. This is to say that once the
causal relation to its object is removed, the possibility of demonstrative identi-
fication is removed as well. A picture does not represent its object in a unique
way, that is, in a way that would distinguish the representation of the object
from the representation of any other (very similar) thing. If a picture is a repre-
sentation of its object, it is not a singular representation. In his early Ordinatio,
Ockham states that it is a contingent or accidental matter that a picture should
represent only one thing, namely if the thing depicted happens to be the only
exemplar of its kind.68 Peter cannot know by merely looking at the picture
whether there exists exactly one fly, more than one fly, or maybe no fly at all.
What can be learned from this comparison about the role of the three relations
in intuition? How are causality, non-intentional likeness, and intentional like-
ness related to each other?
67 Ockham discusses this relation of representation in Ord. I, dist. 3, q. 9 (OT II,

546 ff.).
68 [] quod vestigium et imago ex natura sua non plus repraesentant unum individuum
quam aliud individuum sibi simillimum; quod autem aliquando repraesentant unum
individuum et non aliud, hoc est propter hoc quod non invenitur aliquod individuum
sibi simillimum. Et ita patet falsitas illius opinionis quae dicit quod imago repraesentat
aliquid sub ratione individui et vestigium sub ratione universalis. Ord. I, dist. 3, q. 9
(OT II, 546 ff.).
Although the object of an intuition is sufficiently fixed by a causal relation,

it should have become clear that an act of intuition also presents its object in a
certain way to the subject. The intuition of say, a fly, does not only present its
object as this or that, because it presents its object in the same way as the
(simultaneous) perception of it. That is, the intuition of a fly provides the sub-
ject with a clue of what the object is like for instance, what it looks like.69
In this sense, an act of intuition does not only have an (external) object, but it
also has a representational content.70 In Ockhams view, an intuition also rep-
resents its object to the intuiting subject due to some intentional likeness to
its object. Whatever this sort of likeness may amount to, it is not sufficient to
individuate the singular object of intuition, simply because usually there are
many kinds of things that look very much alike, such as flies or blackbirds
respectively. As a consequence, the intuition of, say, a fly does not uniquely
represent its object. However there is a good reason for assuming that intuition
has such representational content: it becomes (more) plausible that intuition
can be the starting-point of a process of abstraction that leads to the formation
of a general concept, because this representational content of intuition itself is
not singular, but general to some degree.71 The third step in the process of con-
cept acquisition, that is, the step from an intuition of, say, a fly to the concept
fly, implies the removal of the causal relation to the object of intuition. In the
Quodlibeta Ockham emphasizes that there is no direct causal relation between
an object and a concept. He writes:
[N]o simple abstractive cognition is a likeness of [just] one singular

thing more than another which is of greatest similarity to the singular
thing, nor is the abstractive cognition caused by a thing nor is it apt to be
69 Laurence and Margolis point to demonstratives as the canonical individual-representations.

They state: After all, with the canonical individual-representations demonstratives the
whole idea is that they represent their referents directly, conveying no information about what
the represented objects are like. Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, Abstraction and the
Origin of General Ideas, in Philosophers Imprint 12:19 (2012), 122 (5).
70 Some scholars claim that the (external) object of an intuition just is its content. See
Panaccio, Intuition and Causality: Ockhams Externalism Revisited. Against this, see
Brower-Toland, Intuition, Externalism, and direct Reference in Ockham.
71 Laurence and Margolis argue that to get an abstraction-process going, the initial repre-
sentation must be of some generality, since [b]y limiting the initial representations to
representations of the individual objects as such, the agent is effectively representation-
ally cut off from all the features of the object. Laurence; Margolis, Abstraction and the
Origin of General Ideas, 5.
166 Chapter 3
caused by a thing; therefore no such abstractive cognition is proper to a

particular thing, but any such cognition is general.72
A general kind-concept is such a simple abstractive cognition.73 That a concept

is simple means that it does not include other concepts as its parts.74 An
intuition-based concept such as fly does not have (conceptual) parts. It is
unstructured.75 For instance, fly does not contain the concepts say, of black and
buzzing as its parts. By contrast the intuition of, say, a fly represents also the flys
being black and buzzing, just as the perception of it does. Strictly speaking, a
subject cannot intuit only one particular thing at a time, since a substance does
not exist without having any qualities, and substances and qualities are two
different kinds of things. In some sense, the intuition of a fly is just as general
as the concept fly insofar as their representational content is of the same degree
of generality. They differ, however, with regard to their degree of complexity;76
whereas the intuition of a fly also represents (at least some of its) perceivable
qualities, the concept fly does not represent flies as having certain qualities
72 [] nulla cognitio abstractiva simplex est plus similitudo unius rei singularis quam alte-
rius sibi simillimae, nec causatur a re nec nata est causari; igitur nulla talis est propria
singulari sed quaelibet est universalis. Quodl. I, q. 13 (OT IX, 74) (Italics mine).
73 In SL III-2, 29 (OP I, 559) Ockham calls intuition-based kind-concepts simple
(simplex).
74 Tertio, distinguo de conceptu, et dico quod quidam est simplex qui non includit plures
conceptus, et quidam compositus qui non est simplex et includit plures conceptus modo
suo, sicut compositum includit actualiter realiter plures res reales, scilicet materiam et
formam; et magis in actu, suo modo, includit conceptus non simpliciter simplex quam
compositum materiam et formam, pro quanto minus faciunt unum, modo suo, quando
sunt alterius rationis quam materia et forma. Ord. I, dist. 3, q. 5 (OT II, 472473).
75 Since intuition-based concepts lack a structure, they are not the same as definitions. For
a discussion of the view that most concepts (esp. lexical concepts) are structured mental
representations that encode a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their applica-
tion, if possible, in sensory or perceptual terms, see St. Laurence and E. Margolis (eds.),
Concepts Core Readings, Cambridge, Mass., 1999, 1027.
76 At the end of the following passage, it becomes clear that abstraction consists in the
reduction of complexity: thinking about something by means of a general concept
implies focusing on one aspect of several aspects: Quia dico, sicut alias probabitur []
quod idem totaliter sub eadem ratione a parte obiecti est primum obiectum sensus
exterioris et intellectus primitate generationis, et hoc pro statu isto; et ita obiectum
intellectus in illa intellectione prima non est magis abstractum quam obiectum sensus.
Potest tamen postea intellectus abstrahere multa: et conceptus communes, et intelli-
gendo unum coniunctorum in re non intelligendo reliquum. Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 64)
(Italics mine).
insofar as it does not include the concepts of these qualities as its parts.77
The abstraction therefore consists in a reduction of the complexity of the
representational content of the intuition.78 One problem is that it is difficult to
ascertain that fly does not also represent fake-flies or robot-flies. The problem
of misrepresentation becomes most virulent on the level of kind-concepts,
because on this level there is no causal relation in terms of which the object of
the cognitive act is individuated.
At this point, Ockham draws on the non-intentional likeness between things
of the same kind to determine the extension of concepts based on intuition.79
Ockham holds that the only things that really resemble each other are those
which are of the same kind (species or genus).80 Also, real resemblance allows
for degrees, as Ockhams use of the superlative simillimae indicates. According
to Panaccio, the superlative simillimus can be taken as a technical term. He
writes: [] it usually applies to things which belong to the same species
specialissima. Two men, for example, will be said to be maximally similar to
each other [].81 Analogously, two things can be said to really resemble
77 I disagree with Panaccios assumption that [] an absolute concept might well be a com-
plex psychological state how, otherwise, could it be a similitude of its objects with
respect to their perceptual features? yet it is to be counted as a simple concept in so far
as none of its parts is itself a concept. Id., Ockham on Concepts, 134. What should it mean
that a concept somehow represents the perceptual features of the object originally intu-
ited, but not because it includes concepts of these features as its parts? One problem is
that not all exemplars of one species have the same perceptual features. Thus it is possible
that my concept cat misrepresents most existing cats, if the cat I happened to intuit origi-
nally had perceptual features that only some cats have? It is not clear what the degree of
generality of the perceptual features representation is in Panaccios view.
78 One problem is that although the determination of the representational content of such
a concept is based on the outer appearances of things, the representation of fly does not
include any perceivable qualities as its conceptual parts.
79 In this point, I follow Panaccio. He argues that it is real likeness of things which deter-
mines the extension of a concept, not representation. Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 129.
80 Recall that species and genera are no more than concepts in Ockhams view. Thus there is
the threat of circularity if the fixing of a concepts extension such as fly is explained in
terms of sameness of species. Could Ockham avoid circularity by claiming that the exten-
sion of a concept is fixed by the things being really similar? Particular substances have
systematic priority over concepts: roughly speaking, the concept cat has all and only cats
in its extension because all cats are really similar, but it is not the case that all cats are
really similar because they are in the extension of cat. See McCord Adams, William
Ockham, 111121 for a thorough discussion of Ockhams account of real similarity.
81 Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 123. Peter King is arguing against this view on real similar-
ity. See King, Le rle des concepts selon Ockham, Philosophiques 32: 2 (2005), 435447.
168 Chapter 3
minimally, if they are neither of the same species nor of the same genus. In
Ockhams sense, they would really resemble each other only insofar as both
are existing things (entia). A snail and an apple tree are candidates for two
things really resembling each other minimally. The question is how Ockham
can determine the non-intentional likeness between things of the same kind
on a strictly particularistic basis, that is, without having recourse to a universal
property that is common to all of them.82
It is necessary to turn to Ockhams ontological assumption that there
are only particular things and everything which exists or can exist is either a
substance or a quality (an accident).83 Particular substances such as human
beings have a rather complex ontological structure: they are composed of mat-
ter and form.84 They have essential parts85 namely their substantial forms
and their material bodies which are extended in space. What a thing is then is
determined by its ontological structure, whereby this structure can either be
simple, as in the case of angels which are simple substances or complex, as in
the case of human beings.86 That something is ontologically simple means that
it does not have parts.87 In the case of ontologically complex substances, how-
ever, Ockham thinks that they are the same as their essential parts.88 For
instance, a particular cat just is nothing over and above its body and its sub-
stantial feline form taken together, just as Socrates is the same as his body and
his substantial human form in their very combination. Further, it is a meta-
physical principle that every particular substance has exactly one substantial
form.89 It is possible to explain real or non-intentional (maximal) likeness
between substances through recourse to their substantial form:
82 This objection was raised by Wolfgang Knne.

83 [] quia nulla res est quin sit substantia vel accidens; []. SL I, 38 (OP I, 108).
84 For an illuminating discussion of Ockhams view on the ontological structure of different
kinds of things see Calvin Normore, Ockham on Being, in L. Haaparanta and H. Koskinen
(eds.), Categories of Being Essays on Metaphysics and Logic, Oxford, 2012, 7898.
85 See Quodl. I, q. 4 (OT IX, 28), on the point that bodies are essential parts of complex
substances.
86 On the ontological simplicity of angels, see Rep. II, q. 2 (OT V, 34).
87 See Calvin Normore, Ockhams Metaphysics of Parts, The Journal of Philosophy 103: 12
(2006), 737754 for a detailed discussion of Ockhams metaphysics of parts and wholes.
88 Normore writes: While Ockham thinks that substances are not identical with their inte-
gral parts, he does think that they are identical with both of their essential parts (that is,
with their form and their matter), taken together. Ibid., 744.
89 See Rep. II, q. 19 (OT V, 417). This is why the chimera is an impossible being: because it is
conceived as being composed of different animals. This property of being a mixture of
different animals implies that there are different substantial forms in such a thing. But it
(E)Two substances a and b are maximally similar if and only if they are
both F in virtue of being composed of a body and a substantial
F-form as their essential parts.
For instance, two flies are (maximally) similar in a non-intentional way because
both are composed of a body and a fly-form, whereas a fly and fly-robot are not,
because the fly-robot does not have a substantial fly-form as its essential part.
According to Ockhams particularistic view, a fly-form as an essential part of a
composite substance is not a universal. In each particular fly there is a particu-
lar fly-form in virtue of which the fly is a fly and not a butterfly.90 The exten-
sion of an intuition-based concept such as fly is determined non-intentionally,
namely by causality and non-intentional likeness:91 fly has all and only flies in
its extension, because (a) the intuition on the basis of which the concept has
been formed was causally related to a fly (and not to a spider or a butterfly) and
because (b) all flies are non-intentionally alike because all flies have a substan-
tial fly-form as their essential part. By contrast, the representational content of
the concept fly is determined intentionally, namely by the intentional likeness
of the concept fly to flies and also to everything else that merely appears to
be similar to flies, such as fake-flies.
Here is an attempt to make sense of Ockhams talk of this intentional
likeness of concepts to the things they represent. I think the key to an under-
standing is to take seriously the opposition between, on the one hand, real or
non-intentional likeness between things of the same kind and, on the other
is excluded by the metaphysical principle that something having more than one substan-
tial form can exist in this world.
90 One could object that this does not solve, but merely postpones the problem, since one
could ask again: how can the non-intentional likeness between substantial forms of the
same kind be determined on a strictly particularistic basis? Ockhams strategy is to deny
that similarity between things of the same kind requires a third item in terms of which
they are similar. In his view, the term similarity (similitudo) is relational. That is, it signi-
fies several particular things together: just as the term people signifies many men, but
none of them alone is a people, so two white things are similar, but none of them is a simi-
larity. See Quodl. VI, q. 16 (OT IX, 639). One problem, of course, is that thereby Ockham has
not yet explained why similar applies to certain things taken together. Also, one could
object that all things are similar to each other in a certain respect. He simply seems to
assume that some things just are really similar because they have similar substantial
forms.
91 Recall that I used the term extension in the following way: The extension of a term at T
includes all and only those things existing at T to which the term is (correctly) applicable.
See 1.4. The Narrow and the Wider Sense of Signify (significare).
170 Chapter 3
hand, intentional likeness between things that a subject takes to be similar.92

Recall that according to Ockham, a spoken term becomes c-equivocal by being
applied to things that speakers take to be similar in some respect to the origi-
nally signified things. For instance, Ockham says, speakers apply the term
man to pictures of men because they see some similarity (videntes similitu-
dinem) between them.93 To use Ockhams vocabulary, this kind of similarity
can be called a relation of the intellect.94 That an intuition-based concept
such as fly represents flies due to some intentional likeness to flies can be taken
to mean that the relation of representation between concept and represented
things is based on a mental operation of the subject possessing the concept in
question: fly represents flies to the subject only if the subject takes the repre-
sentational content of fly to be similar to flies. The subject can compare the
representational content of fly to the representational content of an act of
intuition: if he takes the representational content of his intuition of a to be
similar to the representational content of his concept of fly, he can come to
believe that a is a fly.95 The operation of comparing implies that the subject has
cognitive access to the representational content of his concept once he has
acquired it:96 the subject can think about flies even if there is no fly around,
since the representational content of fly gives him a hint of what flies are like.97
Also, as I stated above, there is no direct causal relation between an extramen-
tal thing and a concept.
92 See the following nominal definition of the term similar: [] simile est quale, corre-
spondens alteri quali, habenti qualitatem eiusdem speciei specialissimae. SL III-3, 26
(OP I, 690).
93 SL I, 13 (OP I, 45). See 2.3 Conventional Signification and Equivocation.
94 See Ch. II, fn. 35.
95 The role of intuition for what Ockham calls evident judgements will be discussed later.
See 3.4 Intuitive Cognition and Evident Judgement.
96 Caution should be exercized at this point: I do not wish to maintain that this operation of
comparing occurs voluntarily. I only want to indicate that intentional similarity always
implies some mental operation, because this is what distinguishes intentional similarity
from non-intentional similarity.
97 If this interpretation is correct, then the following objection raised by Geach against
abstractionist accounts of concept acquisition cannot rightly be raised against Ockham:
First, it is integral to the use of a general term that we are not confined to using it in situ-
ations including some object to which the term applies; we can use the terms black and
cat in situations not including any black object or any cat. How could this part of the use
be got by abstraction? Geach, Mental Acts, 3435. It shall become clear later that it is
part of the conditions of possession of such a concept that the subject is able to judge
(correctly) about both the actual and the possible existence of the kind of things in the
concepts extension. See 3.4.1 General Propositions and Evident Judgements.
Ockham does well to determine the extension of a concept non-intention-

ally. The advantage of this interpretation is that the problem of misrepresenta-
tion and misapplication does not affect the determination of the concepts
extension, and hence, the concepts signification. One problem is that if this
interpretation of Ockhams account of concept acquisition is adequate, there
follows the possibility of a discrepancy between the representational content
of a concept and its extension. Next I shall briefly discuss some objections that
can be raised against Ockhams account of concept acquisition.
3.2.2 Some Objections

If it is correct that there can be a discrepancy between the representational
content of a concept and its extension, then it is also possible for a subject to
be wholly mistaken about the extension of some of his concepts. Consider the
following case: suppose Peter has not yet acquired the concept of fern. Now
Anne is buying (among other things) a plastic fern from Ikea. Back home, she
shows Peter the plant. Peter does not realize that it is no real plant, but merely
plastic. Peter is intuiting the plastic fern. On this basis, he acquires a concept.
Presumably, this is not the concept of fern, because the intuition is causally
related to a plastic fern, not to a real fern. Due to the lack of having a substan-
tial fern-form, it is not non-intentionally similar to ferns. If at all, it is non-
intentionally similar only to plastic ferns.98 Thus Peter acquires the concept
plastic fern. Now the next day Peter visits the botanical garden and sees a fern.
What happens now? On the one hand, Peter acquires the concept fern because
his intuition is now causally related to a real fern. On the other hand, however,
it is possible that Peter fails to notice that the extensions of his two concepts of
plastic fern and of fern differ, because he is not aware of any difference between
his representations of plastic fern and fern.99 The problem is that Peter can
falsely believe that he has only one concept, namely that of fern, when in fact
he has two different concepts, namely a natural kind-concept of fern and a
pseudo or fake natural kind-concept of plastic fern.100 The problem is episte-
mological: the subject can have false beliefs about the extension of his natural
kind-concepts, due to the fact that the representation of a kind of substance
98 If a plastic fern is non-intentionally similar to all and only plastic ferns, then it is not
similar to them in virtue of having a substantial plastic fern-form. Whatever the criterion
for non-intentional likeness in this case, this concept could be called a pseudo
kind-concept.
99 It is even likely that there is no such difference.
100 Panaccio discusses a similar problem. In his view, problems of this kind are not a serious
threat to Ockhams account. See his Ockham on Concepts, 138.
172 Chapter 3
can be indistinguishable from the representation of things that merely look

like such a substance.101 Geach raises the following objection concerning more
general concepts:
Now it is quite impossible that I should form this concept, chromatic

colour, by discriminative attention to a feature given in my visual experi-
ence. In looking at a red window-pane I have not two sensations, one of
redness and one barely of chromatic colour; there are not, for that matter,
two distinct sense-given features, one of them making my sensation to be
barely a sensation of chromatic colour, the other making it a sensation of
redness. If I abstract from what differentiates red from other chromatic
colours I am abstracting from red itself; red is not chromatic colour plus a
differentia, so that we can concentrate our attention upon chromatic
colour and abstract from the differentia.102
Ockham does not think that it is possible to acquire a generic concept such as
colour or animal on the basis of intuition alone.103 According to him, it is nec-
essary to have acquired at least two different intuition-based species-concepts,
such as cat and fly. One problem is that it is unclear what it should mean for
there to be an intentional likeness of the concept animal to the things it repre-
sents.104 Above I held that the representational content of a concept such as fly
101 The point is that intuition-based natural kind-concepts are simple. Presumably, a subject
can also acquire an adequate pseudo natural kind-concept, for instance, if he is told that
something merely looks like a fern, but is made of plastic. Presumably, the corresponding
concept of plastic fern then is not simple insofar as it contains the plastic as a conceptual
part. I discuss an alternative account of concept acquisition in 3.4.1 General Propositions
and Evident Judgement: propositiones per se notae.
102 Geach, Mental Acts, 3.
103 See above 3.2 How to Acquire an Absolute Simple Concept.
104 According to Panaccio, a concept is a likeness of the things it represents insofar as it is the
typical posture the mind takes when it thinks about the things represented. Panaccio
writes: A generic concept simply is this characteristic posture that the intellect becomes
able to adopt after having met with several individuals of different species. The
Ockhamistic conjecture, here, is that as a result of having seen a nuthatch and a chicka-
dee, I must have acquired a new mental capacity, that of adopting a certain determinate
intellectual posture that can be reactivated by certain individuals () but not by others.
Such a recognizable posture will be an intentional similitude of everything it pertains to
in this way []. Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 132. However, if a concept such as fly or
animal is a similitude of the things it represents insofar as it is the typical posture the
intellect takes whenever it thinks about flies or animals, then the whole account becomes
circular. On this point see Schierbaum, QuestioningClaude Panaccio, 274.
gives the subject a hint of what flies are like, what they look like etc. But in
what respect does animal give the subject a hint of what animals are like, what
they look etc.? Also, I said above that the subject can compare the representa-
tional content of a concept such as fly to the representational content of an
intuition: if he takes them to be similar, then he can judge that the thing intu-
ited is a fly. But what should it mean for a subject to judge something to be an
animal if he takes his representation of animal to be similar to the representa-
tion included in his intuition of, say, a fly? One attempt to defend Ockham
could start by pointing out that a concept such as animal is never abstracted
from acts of intuition, but from other general concepts.105 Due to generic con-
cepts conditions of acquisition, is it not possible that one of the possession-
conditions of such a concept is that the subject knows that there are certain
connections between these concepts, for instance, that the extensions of fly,
cat etc. are part of the extension of animal? This knowledge does not need to
be part of the representational content of any of the subjects concepts.
Perhaps it is nothing but the ability to entertain certain thoughts, that is, to
form certain mental propositions.106 Still, another problem is the following: if
a subject acquires a general concept on the basis of his concepts of, say, cat and
fly, it is unclear why the concept thus formed should not be the concept of
fly-and-cat, having all cats and flies in its extension, instead of the concept of
animal having in its extension all cats, flies, and also all other existing animals.
Although serious objections can be raised against Ockhams account which
I think he would have difficulties answering, the important point to remember
is that Ockham seeks to explain our ability to have propositional acts of
thought by ascribing signification to mental items: what does it mean then
that a concept signifies something naturally? The intuition-based concept fly
signifies naturally all and only flies at T because it has all and only flies within
its extension at T, since the intuition leading to the formation of the concept
is causally related to a fly and not to a spider and the original fly is non-
intentionally similar to all flies and flies only, insofar as all flies are composed
of a body and a substantial fly-form as their essential parts. A subject can have
105 Again, this is Ockhams account of the acquisition of more general concepts: Deinde
apprehenso alio animali ab homine vel aliis animalibus, elicitur una notitia generalis
omni animali, et illa notitia generalis omni animali vocatur passio seu intentio animae
sive conceptus communis omni animali. SL III-2, 29 (OP I, 557). See above 3.2 How to
Acquire an Absolute Simple Concept.
106 See 3.4.1 General Propositions and Evident Judgement: propositiones per se notae. There
I show that it is part of the possession-conditions of a genus-concept that the subject can
form a mental proposition where the genus is connected as a predicate with a species-
concept while acknowledging the truth of such a proposition at the same time.
174 Chapter 3
thoughts about flies by virtue of having the concept fly because fly naturally
signifies all flies, and hence, fly can stand within mental propositions for flies.
I will show in the next few sections that a mental proposition is nothing but a
propositional mental act.107
As I said in the Introduction, intuitive acts of cognition can lead to evident
judgements about the things intuited. What does it mean that a subject can
evidently judge that p by virtue of intuitive cognition? Is an act of intuitive
cognition part of an evident judgement, just as a spoken term is a part of a spo-
ken proposition? In some places, Ockham literally states that an act of intuitive
cognition can supposit naturally for its object, just as a spoken term can sup-
posit for its significates by imposition.108 To explain what it means that a sub-
ject can evidently judge that p by virtue of intuitive cognition, it is useful to
elucidate Ockhams model of non-propositional and propositional acts first.109
3.3 Ockhams Model of Non-propositional and Propositional Acts
The presentation of this model, or rather, the rough sketch of such a model,
precedes Ockhams actual investigation of intuitive cognition in the Ordinatio.
This indicates that Ockham himself considers it helpful to outline the order of
different cognitive acts first. This sketch contains a preliminary, tentative
answer to the following question: what kind of mental acts are involved if a
subject judges that p? And how are these acts related to each other? This
involves both non-propositional and propositional acts, hierarchically ordered.
In the Prologue of the Ordinatio Ockham writes:
Therefore the first distinction is that there are two kinds of acts of the
intellect; one is apprehensive, regarding anything that can determine an
act of the intellectual power, propositional or non-propositional. This is
because we apprehend not only non-propositional things but also propo-
sitions and demonstrations [], and generally everything that relates to
the intellectual power. The other act can be called the judicative: here the
107 Thereby I refer to Ockhams mature theory. See Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 21.
108 In his Questions on the Physics of Aristotle he states: [] intellectus apprehendens intu-
itione rem singularem elicit unam cognitionem intuitivam in se quae est tantum cognitio
illius rei singularis, potens ex natura sua supponere pro illa re singulari [] Et ita sicut vox
supponit ex institutione pro suo significato, ita ista intellectio supponit naturaliter pro re
cuius est. Quaest. in Phys., q. 7 (OP VI, 411).
109 In the following section and throughout, if not indicated otherwise I speak about judge-
ments as acts. I do not intend to speak about the content of a judgement.
intellect does not merely apprehend an object but assents to or dissents

from it. And this act occurs only with respect to something propositional
because we assent to something intellectually only if we believe it to be
true, and we dissent from something only if we believe it to be false. And
thus it is clear that with respect to the propositional there can be two
kinds of acts, that is, an apprehensive and a judicative act.110
Two distinctions are pivotal here: first, Ockham distinguishes between two
kinds of mental acts, namely, apprehensive and judicative acts. Second, appre-
hensive acts are either of something non-propositional or propositional,
whereas judicative acts relate exclusively to something propositional.111 Note
also that judicative acts are nothing but acts of assent to or dissent from a
proposition.112 Assent is given only to something one believes to be true, while
one dissents from something which one believes to be false.
It should be stressed that according to Ockham one does not assent to
something one believes simpliciter, but to something one believes to be true.
Recall that due to the relation of correspondence between mental and spoken
propositions, mental propositions are the prime bearers of truth; it can be held
further that they are also the prime objects of acts of assent (and of dissent).113
Ockham explicitly states that an object (obiectum) is not only apprehended,
110 Est igitur prima distinctio ista, quod inter actus intellectus sunt duo actus, quorum unus
est apprehensivus; et est respectu cuiuslibet, quod potest terminare actum potentiae
intellectivae, sive sit complexum sive incomplexum; quia apprehendimus non tantum
incomplexa, sed etiam propositiones et demonstrationes [] et universaliter omnia quae
respiciuntur a potentia intellectiva. Alius actus potest dici iudicativus, quo intellectus
non tantum apprehendit obiectum, sed etiam illi assentit vel dissentit. Et iste actus est
tantum respectu complexi, quia nulli assentimus per intellectum, nisi quod verum repu-
tamus, nec dissentimus, nisi quod falsum aestimamus. Et sic patet quod respectu com-
plexi potest esse duplex actus, scilicet actus apprehensivus et actus iudicativus. Ord. I,
prol., q. 1 (OT I, 16).
111 That is, something which is incomplexum can be taken as something non-propositional
and something which is complexum can be taken as something propositional.
112 Assent and dissent are the two species of judgement. Boler remarks: Judgment, I shall
assume, serves Ockham in logical contexts as a general term covering both assent to and
dissent from propositions. It is slightly more flexible than they, allowing, for example,
I judge Sortes to be white, where assent to and dissent from are more comfortable with
an explicitly propositional object. Nevertheless, Ockham allows for a kind of assent in all
cases where know and a fortiori, judge are appropriate. John Boler, Ockham on evident
cognition, Franciscan Studies 14, 8598 (86).
113 See 2.4.2 Correspondence: Synonymy Again. There I held: (Import) a spoken proposition
ps imports that p if and only if it is possible to identify a mental proposition pm such that
ps imports the same as pm, namely that p.
176 Chapter 3
but assented to or dissented from.114 This object can be nothing other than a
(mental) proposition. As I showed in the discussion of Ockhams general con-
ception of the truth-concept, conceiving of a proposition as true implies con-
ceiving of it as importing things as they actually are.115 It follows from Ockhams
sketch that apprehensive and judicative acts are hierarchically ordered insofar
as judicative acts presuppose apprehensive acts: one can only assent to or dis-
sent from a (mental) proposition if one apprehends it.116 In turn, apprehend-
ing a (mental) proposition implies the apprehension of its non-propositional
parts. As a consequence, judicative acts can be said to presuppose the appre-
hension of the parts of the mental proposition, as Ockham himself states in a
passage which draws on the one cited above:
[] every judicative act presupposes in the same faculty a non-proposi-

tional cognition of the terms, because it presupposes an apprehensive
act. And an apprehensive act of something propositional presupposes
the non-propositional cognition of the terms.117
Ockham literally states that every act of judgement presupposes a non-propo-

sitional cognition of the terms. What does the cognition of the terms amount to
and how should we interpret his talk of terms?
First, a terminological remark: Ockhams use of the two Latin terms actus
and notitia is not very strict. Perhaps we can say that the cognition (notitia) of
the terms that is presupposed by an apprehensive act should be considered the
actual act of cognition of the terms, as opposed to some merely habitual or
potential cognition. For instance, if merely thinking that Socrates is wise can
114 Alius actus potest dici iudicativus, quo intellectus non tantum apprehendit obiectum, sed
etiam illi assentit vel dissentit. Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 16) (Italics mine). Recall that in the
Sentences Ockham is said to hold that concepts exist objectively in the intellect such that
the talk of an object can be taken quite literally here: if a mental proposition has mental
terms as its parts and these mental terms exist objectively in the intellect, it follows that
the object of the mental act is ontologically distinct from the act itself.
115 Recall that that it is thus as it is imported by the proposition is secondarily signified by
truth. See 2.4.1 The General Explanation of Truth and Falsity.
116 The apprehension and the assenting to (or dissenting from) a (mental) proposition can
occur (a) simultaneously or (b) successively. Ockham distinguishes between two kinds of
assent correspondingly. See 3.3.3.1 The First Kind of Assent and 3.3.3.2 The Second Kind
of Assent.
117 [] omnis actus iudicativus praesupponit in eadem potentia notitiam incomplexam termi-
norum, quia praesupponit actum apprehensivum. Et actus apprehensivus respectu alicuius
complexi praesupponit notitiam incomplexam terminorum. Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 21).
correctly be called an act of apprehension of a mental proposition, then this

act of apprehension implies actually thinking the predicate wise. The alleged
cognition of the terms which is presupposed by such an act of apprehension
is nothing but an actual occurrence of the terms, and Ockhams talk of the
cognition of terms should not be mistaken for anything more than this. Above
I showed that some concepts such as fly are acquired due to the intuitive cogni-
tion of particular things, that is, flies.118 If someone intuits a fly, then it is the fly
that determines (terminare) the act of intuitive cognition.
However, the intuitive cognition of a particular fly is not identical to the
actual occurrence of the concept fly. (For instance, when a subject thinks of
flies, this involves the activation of his fly-concept, but it does not necessarily
involve an intuitive cognition of a particular fly). It is not clear how the intui-
tive cognition of a fly relates to the concept fly. And the intuitive cognition of
a fly is certainly not to be mixed up with the spoken term fly. It is as though
Ockhams use of the Latin terminus here somehow differs from the explana-
tion of mental terms in the Summa Logicae: there he implicitly refers to gen-
eral mental terms. Ockham writes:
The term which is conceived is an intention or passion of the soul, either

signifying or co-signifying something naturally, apt to be part of a mental
proposition and apt to supposit for the same.119
Ockhams use of the Latin terminus in this context is wider than it is in the
Summa insofar as he can be understood to speak of non-propositional
apprehensive acts as terms because, broadly speaking, they can be part of
propositional acts of apprehension. Ockham speaks of all possible parts of
propositional acts of apprehension indiscriminately as terms. One should bear
in mind that these are mental items and not linguistic entities (spoken
terms).120 An apprehensive act is non-propositional if it pertains to or is of
something non-propositional. Similarly, an apprehensive act is propositional if
118 See 3.2.1 The Three Steps of Concept Acquisition.

119 Terminus conceptus est intentio seu passio animae aliquid naturaliter significans vel
consignificans, nata esse pars propositionis mentalis, et pro eodem nata supponere. SL I,
I (OP I, 7).
120 In a passage subsequent to his sketch of different mental acts Ockham literally states that
it is possible to apprehend spoken propositions as well. What does it mean to apprehend
a spoken proposition? At least, the apprehension of a spoken proposition should be dif-
ferent from the apprehension of a mental proposition. The different cases of apprehen-
sion are discussed in the following sections.
178 Chapter 3
it pertains to or is of something propositional. The precise significance of a

propositional apprehensive act pertaining to or being of a mental proposi-
tion is, however, still far from clear.121
Ockhams sketch can be summarized as follows: to judge, for instance, that
Socrates is wise implies the apprehension of the mental proposition Socrates is
wise which in turn presupposes the apprehension of its non-propositional
parts, that is, of Socrates and wise (the copula is somewhat special).122 In terms
of what exactly the apprehension of a mental proposition amounts to, perhaps
one way to apprehend a mental proposition such as Socrates is wise might be
merely to think that Socrates is wise.
3.3.1 Propositional Acts of Apprehension: Mental Propositions

It is certainly adequate to take propositional apprehensive acts as merely enter-
taining a thought in modern terms, that is, as thinking a thought without being
committed to its truth or falsity.123 Unlike many modern philosophers, Ockham
attaches some importance to the initiation of that episode of thinking that he
focuses on, speaking of the apprehensive act as the formation of a mental propo-
sition. For instance, in another passage in the Prologue of the Ordinatio he writes:
[] the intellect cannot form a proposition nor consequently apprehend

it, if it does not conceive particular things first, that is, the non-proposi-
tional elements.124
Although the grammatical construction notnor (nullamnec) suggests

that the formation of a mental proposition and its apprehension are two
121 Here in the Ordinatio Ockham is still attached to the fictum-theory of concepts. But the
hierarchical order of mental acts remains the same throughout.
122 According to Ockhams actus-theory, the copula is itself an act of predicating. In his com-
mentary on Aristotles Perihermenias he writes: [] propositio in mente homo est ani-
mal non est aliud quam actus quo confuse intelliguntur omnes homines et actus quo
intelliguntur confuse omnia animalia, et unus est actus qui correspondet copulae. Exp. in
Perih., prooem., (OP II, 355356).
123 Sometimes we merely think of an object m as being F, without thinking (either occur-
rently or dispositionally) that it really is F. Many English speaking philosophers of this
century use the expression merely entertain for this disengaged or non-committal way
of thinking a thought. Knne, Some Varieties of Thinking, 367368.
124 [] intellectus nullam propositionem potest formare, nec per consequens apprehen-
dere, nisi primo intelligat singularia, id est incomplexa. Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 21). Note
that in this passage Ockham implicitly sticks to mental propositions.
distinct kinds of acts, this reading would be mistaken. Rather, the passage should
be read as saying that if a mental proposition is formed then it is apprehended,
due to the fact that to form a mental proposition is nothing but to apprehend it.
In other passages, this is stated more clearly. For instance, in the second book of
the Sentences Ockham speaks of the apprehensive cognition (cognitio apprehen-
siva) by which I form a complex.125,126 The forming of a mental proposition is a
compositional act in which tokens of mental terms are syntactically put together.
Ockham also speaks of the forming of a mental proposition as composition or
division.127 For instance, if Peter forms the mental proposition that roses are
beautiful, then a token of the mental term beautiful is connected as predicate
with a token of the mental term roses.128 Not every case of apprehending a men-
tal proposition is also a case of forming a mental proposition, because a subject
can apprehend a mental proposition already formed.129 It seems trivial that a
subject can only entertain a thought if he has actually formed it.130 The distinc-
tion between forming a thought at one point of time and subsequently entertain-
ing it for some time reveals an important feature about the structure of mental
propositions: Ockham describes the forming of a mental proposition in the
Quodlibeta by contrasting mental with spoken propositions. The crucial point is
that they differ with respect to their structure in time. This difference is stated in
the following way:131
125 The whole passage reads: Sed respectu cognitionis apprehensivae per quam formo com-
plexum, non est cognitio intuitiva nec sensitiva nec intellectiva causa partialis, quia
sine ipsis potest formari omne complexum quod potest formari cum ipsis, quia ita in
absentia sicut in praesentia. Rep. II, qq. 1213 (OT V, 258) (Italics mine).
126 Ockham here uses the Latin term cognitio, but it is clear that he refers to apprehensive
acts. As I indicated above, Ockhams use of the terms actus and notitia is not very strict.
Note further that he uses the terms cognitio and notitia interchangeably. See Baudry,
Lexique Philosophique, 44; 172179.
127 [] apprehension is twofold: one is the composition and division of a proposition or its
formation: []. ([] duplex est apprehensio: una quae est compositio et divisio propo-
sitionis sive formatio; [].) Quodl. V, q. 6 (OT IX, 501). The division here refers to nega-
tive propositions, whereas composition refers to affirmative propositions.
128 See 1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of Signify.
129 I shall discuss this case shortly.
130 From now on, I omit the quotation marks: it should have become clear that the forming
of a mental proposition just is the act of connecting tokens of mental terms as subject and
predicate. For want of an adequate English expression, I will simply use the term form.
131 See also 2.5 Demonstratives, Correspondence, and Supposition of Mental Terms for a
discussion of the structure of mental propositions.
180 Chapter 3
(A)[] a mental proposition is a permanent thing, and can exist all at

once as a whole at the beginning of an utterance; [] But a spoken
proposition is successive, and when one part actually exists, the
other does not.132
(B)[] a mental proposition [] can be formed within an instant or in
a short time []. But a spoken proposition is not a whole all at once:
it is successive.133
According to (B), Ockham claims that a mental proposition can be formed

within an instant or in a short time. The forming of a mental proposition
should be taken literally as its bringing into being, in which it is created at
some point of time by a mental activity (potest tota formari in instanti).134 The
composition or forming of a mental proposition occurs at a single moment: it
is datable to one point of time, but it is not extended in time.135 It is not to be
conceived of as a process, since according to (A), a mental proposition is a
permanent thing (res permanens), that is, a thing whose parts exist simulta
neously. In general, a permanent thing is first created or caused and has to be
sustained to continue its existence.136
132 [] propositio mentalis est res permanens, et potest esse tota simul in principio prolatio-
nis; [] Sed propositio vocalis est successiva, et quando una pars est, alia non est. Quodl.
III, q. 13 (OT IX, 251252).
133 [] propositio mentalis [] potest tota formari in instanti sive in parvo tempore. []
Sed propositio non est tota simul sed successive. Quodl. II, q. 19 (OT IX, 196).
134 The disjunction within an instant or in a short time is rather unhappy. If a short time
is to be taken to comprise more than just one moment, this seems to contradict straight-
forwardly the assumption that all parts of a mental proposition exist at once at every
moment of its existence, since it seems to become possible that between some point of
time T1 and T2 the thought that p is not yet complete.
135 In this respect, an act of forming a mental proposition behaves like an act of judging: both
are datable, but not clockable. Knne attacks Geachs argument against the assumption
that acts of judging are not datable in his Thought, speech, and the language of thought,
in Christian Stein; Mark Textor (eds.), Intentional phenomena in context: papers from the
14th Hamburg Colloquium on Cognitive Science, Hamburg, 1996, 5390. For Geachs argu-
ment see his Mental Acts, 105106.
136 See the following passage from the Quodlibeta: [] to make this proposition true a stone
is created, it suffices [to pose] God and a stone and a first instance in which it is created
[] Similarly, to make this proposition true a stone is sustained, it suffices [to posit] God
and a stone and some instant after the instant of creation; []. ([] ad verificandum
istam propositionem lapis creatur sufficit Deus et lapis et primum instans in quo creatur,
[]. Similiter ad verificandum istam propositionem lapis conservatur sufficit Deus et
lapis et aliquod instans post instans creationis; [].) Quodl. VII, q. 1 (OT IX, 704).
Although in the Quodlibeta and not in the Ordinatio Ockham endorses

the view that mental terms and mental propositions are nothing but mental
acts, this does not affect the point in question, namely, the structure of mental
propositions. I claim that Ockham conceives of the structure of mental propo-
sitions in the Sentences and in the Quodlibeta in a similar way. Several acts can
exist simultaneously within the intellect. For instance, one can at one and the
same time both like Socrates and judge that one likes Socrates. Just as liking
Socrates requires some cognition of Socrates, judging that one likes Socrates
implies thinking that one likes Socrates.137 Most importantly, the order of these
mental acts existing simultaneously in the intellect is not linear as with the
order of spoken propositions.138 If we look again at (A), it can be stated that a
spoken proposition is linear or successive, because it is not possible that all
parts of a spoken proposition exist at the same time. As Ockham states in the
passage of the Quodlibeta, when one part actually exists, the other does not,
such that when the last part is uttered, the utterance does not exist anymore.
We can say that
(1)Peter forms the mental proposition that roses are beautiful at 4:00 a.m.
According to Ockham it would be odd to state that
(2)*Peter begins to form the mental proposition that roses are beautiful
at 4:00:00 am and finishes forming it at 4:00:10 am.
137 [] concedo quod in eodem intellectu sunt simul plures actus intelligendi. Et hoc non
tantum est verum de actibus ordinatis, sicut se habent actus apprehensivus et iudicativus,
sed etiam de actibus disparatis, sicut post dicetur. Istam conclusionem generalem probo:
quia omnis actus posterior naturaliter actu amoris distinguitur realiter ab actu prior natu-
raliter eodem actu amoris. Sed Plato potest diligere Sortem et scire se diligere Sortem; iste
actus sciendi terminatus ad istud complexum Plato diliget Sortem est posterior naturali-
ter isto actu amandi, quia actus amandi iste potest esse sine eo et non econverso, igitur est
prior naturaliter, et iste actus sciendi est simul cum isto actu amandi. Sed iste actus
amandi praesupponit noititiam incomplexam Sortis, vel aliquam aliam, et est simul cum
ea; ergo isti tres actus sunt simul: duo in intellectu et medius in voluntate. Ideo concedo
quod duo actus intelligendi possunt esse simul in intellectu. Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 1920).
138 [] composite mental acts do not need, in Ockhams eyes, to be linearly ordered. [] this
supposes, [] that the various parts of a complex mental act and even the parts of its
parts can all be simultaneously present to the mind. But Ockham never saw that as a
problem. He thought, on the contrary, that the possibility of simultaneous intellectual
acts had to be acknowledged by any sound theory of mental activity, []. Panaccio,
Ockham on Concepts, 3334.
182 Chapter 3
By contrast, it would be correct to state that
(2)Peter starts to utter the sentence roses are beautiful at 4:00:00 am

and finishes the utterance of this sentence at 4:00:10 am.
Similarly, it is possible to say that
(3)the whole afternoon, Peter thought that roses are beautiful.
since Peter could entertain this thought until he came to think of something
else: the thought (the mental proposition) exists as long as Peter actually enter-
tains it. Accordingly:
(Apment)139 A subject S apprehends a mental proposition pm if and only

if S forms pm at T and entertains it for some time.
Note that in Ockhams conception, propositional acts of apprehension

include both the initiation and the duration of an episode of thinking
that p. It seems to me that Ockham is often referring to the content of
such an apprehensive act when he speaks about mental propositions tout
court, as he does for instance in connection with correspondence of
mental to spoken propositions.140 The content of such an act and the
mental activity required for bringing this act about and sustaining it are
two aspects of one and the same propositional act of thought. There is a
complication here which I do not wish to hide, in the form of yet another
act of apprehension distinguished by Ockham in the Quodlibeta.141 There
he writes:
139 (Apment) abbreviates Apprehension of mental propositions.

140 For the relation of correspondence see 2.4 Mental Propositions and Spoken Propositions:
the Relation of Correspondence.
141 Panaccio claims that this distinction cannot be found in the Sentences. He writes:
At the time of his lectures on the Sentences, when Ockham was still supporting the
fictum-theory of concepts, this distinction was drawn in a quite straightforward
manner: the apprehension of a complex propositional content was identified with
its very formation within the mind, and it was taken to be presupposed by the judicative
act of assent or dissent. In the Quodlibeta, however, the subject gets more complicated.
Ockham now distinguishes between two sorts of apprehensive acts having to do
with propositions, and two sorts of judicative acts as well. Panaccio, Ockham on
Concepts, 35.
[] apprehension is twofold: one is the composition and division of a

proposition or its formation: the other is the cognition of a complex
which is already formed, just as the cognition of whiteness is called its
apprehension.142
The first kind, that is, the composition and division of a proposition or its for-
mation is rendered by (Apment). The second kind of apprehension presupposes
the first, since it is the cognition of a complex which is already formed. The
content of this secondary act of apprehension is identical to the content of the
presupposed first act of apprehension. Note that the content of the secondary
act of apprehension and the mental activity required to bring this secondary
act about are not aspects of one and the same mental act. It becomes clear now
that propositional apprehensive acts of the first kind and acts which Ockham
calls mental propositions are extensionally the same: forming a mental prop-
osition and hence entertaining this thought implies a compositional act of
syntactically connecting tokens of mental terms, such that a subject thinks
that p rather than that q.
With respect to secondary acts of apprehension it can be said that if Peter
thinks that roses are beautiful, he is able to apprehend this thought. He can
become aware that he is actually thinking that roses are beautiful:
(4)Peter thinks that he is thinking that roses are beautiful.143
Apprehensive acts of this second kind are reflexive acts, that is, second-order
acts having first order acts as their objects. This is how Ockham himself char-
acterizes reflexive acts in the Quodlibeta:
We call the direct act the act by which we conceive of an extramental

thing and the reflexive act that by which we conceive of that act.144
Again, it is important not only that the mental proposition (the thought) which
is reflexively apprehended was formed at some point of time, but also that the
142 [] duplex est apprehensio: una quae est compositio et divisio propositionis sive forma-
tio; alia est quae est cognitio ipsius complexi iam formati, sicut cognitio albedinis dicitur
eius apprehensio. Quodl. V, q. 6 (OT IX, 501).
143 As in the first case of apprehension, it is possible to distinguish between coming to think
and actually thinking that one is thinking that p.
144 [] vocatur actus rectus quo intelligimus obiectum extra animam, et actus reflexus quo
intelligitur ille actus. Quodl. II, q. 12 (OT IX, 165).
184 Chapter 3
subject actually entertains the first-order thought he then comes to appre-

hend. The distinction between forming a thought at one point of time and sub-
sequently entertaining it for some time is crucial again. It is implicit in Ockhams
comparison in which the reflexive apprehension of a thought is compared to
the apprehension of a whiteness.
How is this to be taken? I think the reflexive apprehension of a thought and
the apprehension of some quality (or rather, of a white thing) are similar in
one important respect: both require the existence of that which is appre-
hended. In contrast to the forming of a first-order thought, as in for instance
roses are beautiful, the second-order thought, thinking that one actually thinks
that roses are beautiful, requires that one actually think that roses are beautiful,
that is, it requires the existence of the first-order thought. In Ockhams onto-
logical vocabulary it can be said that both mental propositions and extramen-
tal things are permanent beings, that is, things whose parts exist simultaneously
at every moment of their existence. As regards the second kind of apprehen-
sion it can be said:
(Apment)2145 A subject S secondarily apprehends a mental proposition

pm if and only if S thinks that p and if S becomes aware that
he (actually) thinks that p and if he entertains the thought
that he (actually) thinks that p for some time.146
This explanation of secondary apprehension emphasizes the possibility of

self-ascription: if a subject apprehends another act, it is thereby implied that
he can ascribe the first-order act to himself. However, not every reflexive act
actually leads to the self-ascription of a first-order act. It will become clear that
secondary acts of apprehension play a crucial role with respect to the distinc-
tion between two kinds of assent.147
A further difficulty surrounding the account of apprehension is that Ockham
literally states that it is possible to apprehend spoken propositions in the
same way. In view of the structural differences between mental and spoken
145 (Apment)2 abbreviates Secondary apprehension of mental propositions.

146 This raises the question whether it is implied by the ontological structure of mental
propositions that in order to secondarily apprehend a mental proposition it is
necessary to actually entertain the thought in question. To put it differently: would it
suffice to think of a mental proposition in terms of a definite description (e.g., the first
thought I had yesterday) in order to apprehend it in the sense of something already
formed?
147 See 3.3.3.1 First Kind of Assent for further discussion.
propositions, apprehending a spoken proposition cannot be the same as

apprehending a mental proposition. At best, to speak of apprehension in both
cases is to use the term equivocally.
3.3.2 Propositional Acts of Apprehension: Spoken Propositions

Ockham gives the example of a layman not mastering the Latin language in the
Ordinatio to show that acts of apprehension and acts of judgement really are
distinct. Ockham writes:
[] a layman lacking knowledge of the Latin language can hear many

[spoken] propositions in the Latin language, which he neither assents to
nor dissents from.148
The layman merely hears the utterances of Latin sentences, without being able
to understand them. Following Knnes distinction of different levels of under-
standing, a hearer has mastered the very first level of understanding if he is
able to quote an utterance due to his auditory perception of it.149 In other
words, hearing a spoken proposition such that the hearer is able to reproduce
the sequence of sounds in the order of their appearance can merely count as
the very first step of apprehending a spoken proposition, since in order to
reproduce a spoken proposition the hearer does not need to understand the
proposition.150 In Ockhams vocabulary, the hearer does not need to be able to
form a corresponding mental proposition.151
148 [] laicus nesciens latinum potest audire multas propositiones in latino, quibus nec
assentit nec dissentit. Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 16).
149 See Knne, Abstrakte Gegenstnde, 196202; see also Knne, Verstehen und Sinn- eine
sprachanalytische Betrachtung, Allgemeine Zeitschrift fr Philosophie 6 (1981), 116.
150 [] Der Interpret hat eine uerung () perzeptiv verstanden, wenn er aufgrund seiner
Wahrnehmung der vom Anderen produzierten Zeichen imstande ist, sie wrtlich zu
zitieren. Offenkundig braucht der Interpret den Sinn des angefhrten Ausdrucks nicht
zu erfassen, um ihn verbatim wiedergeben zu knnen. Mehr noch, ein perzeptiv
verstandener Ausdruck braucht gar keinen Sinn zu haben. Knne, Abstrakte
Gegenstnde, 196.
151 That is, a mental proposition which can be derived from the signification1/2 and the sup-
position of the terms of the spoken proposition. See 2.5 Demonstratives, Correspondence,
and Supposition of Mental Terms for a discussion of the conditions of truly uttering a
spoken proposition containing indexicals and 2.4.2 Correspondence: Synonymy again.
There I formulated the following principle concerning the import of spoken propositions:
a spoken proposition ps imports that p if and only if it is possible to identify a mental
proposition pm such that ps imports the same as pm, namely, that p.
186 Chapter 3
Does this already show that acts of apprehension and acts of judgement are
really distinct in any relevant sense? Quite trivially, if a hearer is merely able
to quote an utterance, then he is not able to make a judgement about its truth.
However, Ockham does not attempt to show merely that it is possible to repro-
duce the sounds of a spoken proposition without being committed to its truth
(or falsity), since parrots and other animals lacking the intellectual power of
understanding and judging about propositions could likewise be held to appre-
hend spoken propositions in this minimal sense. Rather, Ockham wants to
show that it is possible to grasp the same spoken proposition without judging
about its truth. He remarks with respect to the case of talking birds:
Such a [spoken] proposition only has any being as a sound. This is obvi-
ous from the example of the magpie that utters [spoken] propositions,
but nevertheless does not have any propositional act.152
According to Ockham, the bird can be described as producing or imitating

sounds that present the phonetic material of a spoken proposition. However, a
bird cannot be described as intentionally uttering a spoken proposition, since
the bird is not able to form a corresponding mental proposition. As Ockham
says, the bird does not have any propositional act.153 In the Summa Logicae,
Ockham generally holds that whenever a speaker utters a spoken proposition,
he forms beforehand (prius) a corresponding mental proposition.154
Ockham also distinguishes between different levels of apprehending
(understanding) a spoken proposition in the following passage from the
Quodlibeta.155 The passage is worth citing in its entirety. Ockham writes:
152 [] talis propositio non habet aliquod esse nisi tantum in voce. Patet exemplum de pica
quae profert propositiones, et tamen nullum actum complexum habet. Rep. IV, q. 14
(OT VII, 314).
153 The bird cannot be described as quoting a spoken proposition, since quoting requires the
ability of intentionally uttering spoken propositions. The bird is merely imitating sounds.
154 [] whenever someone utters a spoken proposition, he forms beforehand a mental
proposition internally, which has no conventional expression, to such a degree that many
[speakers] often form propositions internally which they do not know how to express due
to their lacking the necessary conventional expression. ([] quandocumque aliquis pro-
fert propositionem vocalem, prius format interius unam propositionem mentalem, quae
nullius idiomatis est, in tantum quod multi frequenter formant interius propositiones
quas tamen propter defectum idiomatis exprimere nesciunt.) SL I, 12 (OP I, 42).
155 There he tries to explain what it means to say that a spoken proposition is true. The over-
all question of the Quodlibet is Whether some vocal proposition is true. Quodl. III, q. 13
(OT IX, 251).
[] by this proposition a spoken proposition is true the wise mean noth-

ing but that the hearer who knows the linguistic conventions is able to
conceive how it is thus on the part of what is signified as is indicated by
the proposition; but this is the case only at the end of the utterance and
not at the beginning. Therefore that proposition is only true at the end,
and not at the beginning, because (1) the hearer who hears the subject
term does not yet know what the copula or predicate will be; since if the
speaker says man the hearer does not know whether after this he will say
runs or is an animal; and therefore such a proposition cannot signify
something true to him [the hearer] at the beginning; but at the end of the
utterance even though the vocal proposition does not exist at that point
due to the fact that it nevertheless did exist, albeit successively, (2) the
proposition thereby remains in the memory of the hearer, (3) in virtue of
which the intellect conceives what the proposition imports and [con-
ceives] (4) that it is thus in reality as the proposition imports; and only
then is the proposition true to him.156
There are four steps to be distinguished. The first three steps concern appre-
hension, whereas the last one concerns judgement, since it involves the activa-
tion of the hearers truth-concept.157 Recall that due to its extension in time,
156 [] per istam propositionem propositio prolata est vera non intendunt sapientes aliud
nisi quod auditor sciens virtutem sermonis natus est concipere quomodo est ita a parte
significati sicut per propositionem denotatur; hoc autem solum est in fine prolationis et
non in principio. Ideo illa propositio solum est vera in fine, et non in principio, quia
(1) auditor audiens subiectum prolatum nescit adhuc quae erit copula vel praedicatum;
quia si proferens dicat homo, nescit auditor utrum post dicet currit vel est animal; et
ideo in principio non potest talis propositio sibi significare verum. In fine autem prolatio-
nis, quamvis tunc propositio vocalis non sit, quia tamen fuit, licet successive, ideo
(2) manet illa propositio in memoria audientis, (3) virtute cuius intellectus concipit illud
quod significat propositio, et [concipit] (4) quod ita est in re sicut significat propositio; et
ideo tunc primo est sibi illa propositio vera. Quodl. III, q. 13 (OT IX, 252) (I inserted num-
bers to facilitate reference).
157 I quote again: The other act can be called the judicative: here the intellect does not
merely apprehend something but assents to or dissents from it. And this act occurs only
with respect to something propositional because we assent to something only if we
believe it to be true, and we dissent from something only if we believe it to be false.
(Alius actus potest dici iudicativus, quo intellectus non tantum apprehendit obiectum,
sed etiam illi assentit vel dissentit. Et iste actus est tantum respectu complexi, quia nulli
assentimus per intellectum, nisi quod verum reputamus, nec dissentimus, nisi quod fal-
sum aestimamus.) Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 16).
188 Chapter 3
the parts of a spoken proposition exist only successively.158 The linear struc-
ture of spoken propositions bears on their apprehension insofar as the hearer
apprehends the parts of a spoken proposition one by one. Ockham does not
explicitly mark the mere perception of the phonetic material of an utterance
as the first step of apprehension of a spoken proposition here since the hearer
is supposed to be a competent speaker who knows the linguistic conventions
(sciens virtutem sermonis), as opposed to the layman who cannot apprehend
the parts of the spoken proposition as spoken terms because he does not know
the Latin language.159
First, Ockham demonstrates very nicely that the hearer, as a competent lan-
guage user, generally apprehends the parts of a spoken proposition as spoken
terms. The hearer first apprehends the subject term man and then waits for
the predicate term to come. He can be taken not only to hear, but also to under-
stand the terms of the spoken proposition one by one. This is why Ockham
states that such a proposition cannot signify something true to him [the
hearer] at the beginning of the utterance: if the hearer has only heard the
utterance of what could be a subject term, for instance, man, then he as
Ockham formulates does not yet know what the copula or predicate will be
[]. The hearer cannot know the import of the spoken proposition until it has
been completed, at which point it does not exist anymore. Understanding all
parts of the spoken proposition is the first step of apprehending a spoken
proposition. According to the results of the second chapter, a hearer under-
stands a spoken term by means of its corresponding mental term: understand-
ing a spoken term amounts to knowing its signification1/2, and a speaker knows
the signification1/2 of a spoken term if he has a mental term signifying the same
as the spoken term.160
Second, the hearer must likewise remember the parts in the order of their
appearance. For instance, if he hears someone uttering Plato likes Socrates
and apprehends all of the parts (Plato, Socrates, likes) but has lost track of
158 See 2.5 Demonstratives, Correspondence, and Supposition of Mental Terms.

159 [] Jemand erfat einen Satz ohne zu urteilen, wenn er nur die Laute, nicht aber
deren Bedeutung erfat, z.B. wenn jemand, der nicht Lateinisch versteht, einen latein-
ischen Satz hrt. Allerdings lt sich gegen diese Beispiel einwenden, da das akust-
ische Erfassen kein Erfassen von Komplexem im strengen Sinn ist. Das Komplexe
nmlich ist definitionsgem eine Verknpfung von Wrtern. Wer aber eine Sprache
nicht versteht, kann auch keine Wrter bzw. deren Verknpfungen erfassen, sondern
nur eine unstrukturierte Menge von Lauten. Perler, Der propositionale Wahrheitsbegriff
im 14. Jahrhundert, 214.
160 See 2.4 Mental Propositions and Spoken Propositions: The Relation of Correspondence,
2.4.2 Correspondence: Synonymy Again, 2.4.3 Correspondence: Equivocation Again.
their order, such that he cannot tell whether someone said Plato likes Socrates
or Socrates likes Plato, then he is not able to know the import of the spoken
proposition. Ockham distinguishes between (a) the apprehension of the non-
propositional parts of a spoken proposition and (b) the apprehension of the
import of a spoken proposition as two different levels of apprehension. This
corresponds to his model of hierarchically ordered mental acts.161
Ockham accounts for the apprehension of a spoken propositions import by
the third step, when he says that (3) by virtue of [the spoken proposition
remaining in the memory] the intellect conceives what the proposition imports
[]. Now if the hearer knows the signification1/2 of the spoken terms by means
of mental terms he possesses, and remembers their order of utterance, then he
is in a position to form a mental proposition. This act of forming takes place at
some point in time but is not extended in time.
According to Ockham then, it is one thing to apprehend the terms of a
spoken proposition but it is quite another thing to come to know what the
spoken proposition imports, since the latter implies forming a mental
proposition. Lastly then, if the hearer knows the import of the spoken
proposition, he can (4) [conceive] that it is thus in reality as the proposi-
tion imports; [].162 Conceiving that it is thus in reality as the proposi-
tion imports is to judge that the proposition is true. This last step implies
the activation of the truth-concept, since that it is thus in reality as the
proposition imports (quod ita est in re sicut significat propositio) is second-
arily signified by truth.163 Note that Ockham here explicitly states that
this [spoken!] proposition is true to him (sibi illa propositio vera) only
after this act of judging.164
That the spoken proposition is true to him means that a subject can thereby
judge that what a spoken proposition imports is true (or false), although
the spoken proposition has ceased to be as soon as it has been uttered.
Recall that Ockhams overall goal in the Quodlibet cited is to show that it
is reasonable to say that spoken propositions can be true, their successive
161 See 3.3 Ockhams Model of Non-Propositional and Propositional Acts above.
162 [] et [concipit] (4) quod ita est in re sicut significat propositio. Quodl. III, q. 13 (OT IX,
252).
163 [] dico quod veritas et falsitas [] sunt conceptus relativi significantes ipsas proposi-
tiones, non absolute, sed veritas, sive iste conceptus veritas, ultra propositionem quam
significat, connotat quod ita sit in re sicut importatur per propositionem; et falsitas
importat quod non sit ita in re sicut importatur per propositionem. Quodl. VI, q. 29 (OT
IX, 697).
164 [] et ideo tunc primo est sibi illa propositio vera. Quodl. III, q. 13 (OT IX, 252).
190 Chapter 3
structure notwithstanding.165 For this purpose, he gives the detailed analysis of

their apprehension from the hearers perspective. The hearer derives the import
of the spoken proposition from the signification1/2 of the apprehended parts.
Knowing the import of a spoken proposition is the result of the three-stage
process of apprehension. And if the hearer knows the import of a spoken prop-
osition, he is then able to judge whether the spoken proposition is true
(or false). We should now elucidate further the different kinds of judgements
in order to pave the way for discussion of evident judgements that have acts of
intuitive cognition as their parts. It is important to distinguish carefully
between the apprehension of spoken propositions and the apprehension of
mental propositions, since mental propositions are the contingent truths that
these evident judgements are supposedly concerned with.
3.3.3 Acts of Judgement

As noted above, acts of judgement are either acts of assent to or acts of dissent
from a proposition. Ockham rarely discusses dissent explicitly. The reason is per-
haps that it is possible to describe dissent as assent to the negation of a mental
proposition.166 In the Quodlibeta he distinguishes between two kinds of assent.167
The question is how this distinction fits the characterization in the Ordinatio.
There Ockham held that we assent only to something we believe to be true, and
165 Recall that if a proposition does not exist, it cannot be true (or false). See SL II, 9 (OP
I, 275). With respect to spoken propositions, Ockham adds that a spoken proposition
can be true (or false) if it has existed. In the Quodlibet cited he further writes: Et quia
ad veritatem cuiuscumque propositionis de mundo requiritur vel quod sit actualiter
vel quod fuerit, et propositio prolata in principio prolationis nec est nec fuit, ideo
tunc non est vera; nec in medio propter eamdem rationem, sed in fine; licet non sit
tunc actu, tamen prius fuit, non tota simul, sed successive pars post partem. Quodl.
III, q. 13 (OT IX, 252).
166 I thank Wolfgang Knne for making me aware of this way of describing dissent. Still,
I think that there is an important psychological difference between giving ones assent to
the negation of a mental proposition and dissenting from a mental proposition.
Unfortunately, there is no room for discussion here.
167 It is of historical interest that Ockham may have made this distinction between two kinds
of assent in the course of a dispute with his co-friar and adversary Walter Chatton about
the object of judgements. Susan Brower-Toland argues for this in her paper How Chatton
Changed Ockhams Mind: William Ockham and Walter Chatton on Objects and Acts of
Judgment, in G. Klima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in
Medieval Philosophy, New York (forthcoming). Chatton argues for the view that the men-
tal proposition never is the object of assent but merely a vehicle of assent. See Chatton,
Reportatio, Prol., q. 1, art. 1, 20 f.
we only dissent from something we believe to be false.168 In the Quodlibeta he

writes:
[] I say that the act of assent is twofold, just as the act of knowing is two-
fold: the first is the act by which something is known to be or not to be; for
instance, I know that stones are not donkeys, and even though I do not
know any stones nor donkeys, nevertheless I know that stones are not don-
keys; similarly, I assent that man is an animal. The other act is that act by
which I know something, such that the act of knowing is related to some-
thing. It follows from their separability that these acts are distinct.169
What does Ockham mean by acts of knowing (actus sciendi)? The distinction
between two acts of assent and two acts of knowing draws on the distinction
between acts (actus) and habits (habitus). By acts of knowing Ockham refers to
something which actually obtains. However, knowing is a state, that is, a habit
in Ockhams terms, not an act. By an act of knowing the Franciscan appears to
mean an act of assent that is the activation of a disposition to assent to a (true)
proposition, and not an act of assent leading to the acquisition of such a disposi-
tion. Thus in the first line Ockham can be taken to distinguish between two acts
of assent inaugurating (true) belief and two acts of assent activating acquired
(true) beliefs respectively.170 To complicate matters, Ockham mostly speaks
about states simpliciter throughout this passage: for instance, in the second and
third line, he says that I know that stones are not donkeys. By actus sciendi
Ockham seems to refer to both assent activating (true) belief and the state of
(truly) believing. That is, he might use the term actus sciendi equivocally
here. Of course, acts of assents and states of (truly) believing are connected
insofar as a (true) belief presupposes some (correct) judgement.171 The first
kind of assent inaugurating (true) belief, then, should give rise to a state of
168 [], quia nulli assentimus per intellectum, nisi quod verum reputamus, nec dissentimus,
nisi quod falsum aestimamus. Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 16).
169 [] dico quod actus assentiendi duplex est, sicut actus sciendi duplex est: unus, quo
aliquid scitur esse vel non esse; sicut scio quod lapis non est asinus, et tamen nec scio lapi-
dem nec asinum, sed scio quod lapis non est asinus; similiter assentio quod homo est
animal. Alius est actus quo aliquid scitur, ita quod actus sciendi referatur ad aliquid. Isti
actus distinguuntur; patet per separabilitatem eorum. Quodl. III, q. 8 (OT IX, 233).
170 See Knne, Some Varieties of Thinking, 367.
171 Note that I shall never use the term judgement for the content of a judgement, that is, for
what is judged, but only for the act of judging. The same applies to the term knowledge:
I shall never use it for what is known, but only for the mental state of knowing. For this use
see again Knne, Some Varieties of Thinking, 365366.
192 Chapter 3
(truly) believing of the first kind just as the second kind of assent inaugurating
(true) belief should give rise to a state of (truly) believing of the second kind.
For the ease of exposition, I shall talk about the different states of knowing in
this section.
According to the first kind, something (aliquid) is known to be (thus-and-so) or
not to be (thus-and-so), whereas according to the second kind something (aliquid)
is known simpliciter, such that it is related to something (referatur ad aliquid).
Note that what is denoted by something in the first case is not identical to what is
denoted by something in the second case. As something refers to the object of
knowledge in both cases, it follows that the two states of knowing differ with
respect to their object. Let us deal with the first kind, starting with Ockhams exam-
ple: [], I know that stones are not donkeys.172 That is:
(F)A subject S knows that stones are not donkeys.
One could object that I changed the perspective from first-person to third-
person in an unauthorized manner. But just a few lines after the passage cited
Ockham speaks about a layman who knows that stones are not donkeys.173
This indicates that the first-person is not crucial for the distinction Ockham
wants to draw here. With respect to the object of this first kind of state Ockham
remarks: But this [] has extramental things as objects, e.g. stones and don-
keys, and even though neither stones nor donkeys are known, yet it is known
that stones are not donkeys.174 A (true) belief that something is thus-and-so
has merely particular (extramental) things as its objects; this does not mean,
however, that these things are literally known. In Latin, the verb scire does not
take as its grammatical object substantives in the accusative case.175 Ockham
wants to call attention to this grammatical feature of scire.176
172 One remark about grammar should be made here: in Latin the singular form can be used
collectively with respect to natural kind terms, such that the Latin sentence lapis non
est asinus can be rendered either as a stone is not a donkey or stones are not donkeys in
English. See H. Rubenbauer; J.B. Hofmann, Lateinische Grammatik, Bamberg; Mnchen,
1975, 182, 218. I render the Latin sentence as stones are not donkeys throughout.
173 [] laicus sciens quod lapis non est asinus, []. Quodl. III, q. 8 (OT IX, 233).
174 []; sed iste [] habet res extra pro obiectis, puta lapidem et asinum, et tamen nec lapis
est scitus nec asinus, sed scitus quod lapis non est asinus. Quodl. III, q. 8 (OT IX, 234).
175 By contrast, the English verb know can take substantives as its grammatical object. That
is, in English, it makes perfectly sense to say that one knows donkeys. This use of the
English verb know corresponds to the use of the German kennen, as in Esel kennen. In
German, however, the verb wissen behaves in the same way as the Latin scire: it cannot
take substantives in the accusative case as its grammatical objects.
176 Again, I thank Wolfgang Knne for drawing my attention to this point.
The subject knows of stones (and not breadcrumbs or peas) that they are
not identical to donkeys. Likewise, the subject knows of donkeys (and not cows
or horses) that they are not identical to stones: stones and donkeys can be said
to be the objects of the state of knowing insofar as the subject knows some-
thing of these things. But what he knows is something propositional, that is,
that they are not identical. Thus (F) could be reformulated more formally:
(F)S knows1 of (all) Fs and (all) Gs that Fs are not Gs.177
We can now explain what it means that in the second case the state of knowing
relates to something simpliciter. In this case, the subject does not know of any
particular thing (or things) that it is thus-and-so; rather, what he knows relates
him directly to the object of this state, namely, a mental proposition. Ockham
explicitly claims that [] this act is a propositional act in the proper sense of
having a proposition as object, because this is the act by which something true
is known, but an extramental thing is not known; [].178 Thus:
(G)S knows2 that p.179
The crucial difference is that only the second deserves to be called knowledge
in the strict sense, since it has a (true) proposition as its object. This is because
the proper object of knowledge is something true. Ockham further states:
The philosophers also say that nothing is known unless it is true; and they
mean a true proposition. They also say that demonstrative science pro-
ceeds from first and true things; therefore only something true is the
object of science.180
It follows from Ockhams conception of the truth-predicate that true pro

positions are the proper object of knowledge, since true can be correctly
177 I insert the index 1 to indicate that this state of believing is related to the first kind of
assent.
178 [] quod ille proprie est actus complexus habens pro obiecto complexum, quia iste
actus est quo aliquod verum scitur; res autem extra non scitur. Quodl. III, q. 8 (OT IX, 235).
179 I insert the index 2 to indicate that this state of believing is related to the second kind of
assent.
180 Dicunt etiam philosophi quod nihil scitur nisi verum; et loquuntur de vero complexo.
Dicunt etiam quod scientia demonstrativa est ex primis et veris; igitur solum verum est
obiectum scientiae. Quodl. III, q. 8 (OT IX, 234235). See 3.3.3.2 The Second Kind of
Assent for further discussion.
194 Chapter 3
predicated only of propositions.181 It shall become clear in the next section

that the two kinds of assent differ insofar as the first kind does not imply the
activation of the subjects truth-concept, whereas the second does. At the
beginning of this Section I asked how the distinction of two kinds of assent in
the Quodlibeta relates to the characterization of acts of judgement in the
Ordinatio. The answer is that the latter corresponds to the second kind
of assent, since Ockham holds in the Ordinatio that assent is given only to
something we believe to be true.182 I now discuss the first kind of assent in
some detail.
3.3.3.1 The First Kind of Assent

How is it to be understood that a subject can correctly judge and hence know
that something is thus-and-so while ignoring that it is true that something is
thus-and-so? In the same Quodlibet Ockham characterizes the first kind of
assent further:
Speaking of the first kind of assent, I say that this act does not have a
proposition as an object; first, because this act can occur solely due to
the formation of the proposition and without any apprehension of
the proposition and thus it cannot be an act of assent to a proposi-
tion; and, second, because the layman knowing that stones are not
donkeys does not think about the proposition, and consequently does
not assent to the proposition. Although he assents to and knows that
it is thus in reality or not, by means of the proposition formed in the
intellect, nevertheless he does not perceive this. Rather this act has
extramental things as objects, e.g. stones and donkeys, but still nei-
ther stones nor donkeys are known, but it is known that stones are
not donkeys.183
181 See 2.4.1 The General Explanation of Truth and Falsity.

182 [], quod verum reputamus, []. Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 16).
183 Loquendo de primo assensu, dico quod ille actus non habet complexum pro obiecto;
tum quia ille actus potest esse per solam formationem complexi et sine omni apprehen-
sione complexi, et ita non potest esse actus assentiendi complexo; tum quia laicus sciens
quod lapis non est asinus, nihil cogitat de propositione, et per consequens non assentit
propositioni. Licet assentiat et sciat quod sic est in re vel non est, mediante propositione
formata in intellectu, tamen hoc non percipit; sed iste actus habet res extra pro obiectis,
puta lapidem et asinum, et tamen nec lapis est scitus nec asinus, sed scitus quod lapis non
est asinus. Quodl. III, q. 8 (OT IX, 233234).
Note that in this passage Ockham speaks about acts of assent, and not of acts
of knowing. Thus, I too shall speak about acts of assent in this section. The rela-
tion between apprehension and assent should be investigated first, since
Ockham argues that this kind of assent does not have a mental proposition as
its proper object due to the act of apprehension involved here.184 Consequently,
it is not necessary for the subject to activate his truth-concept in this case.185
I quote the relevant passage again:
I say that this act does not have a proposition as an object; first, because
this act can occur solely due to the formation of the proposition and
without any apprehension of the proposition and thus it cannot be an act
of assent to a proposition; [].186
Although not stated explicitly, generally speaking (a) every act of assent
presupposes an act of apprehension. Most importantly, (b) the apprehen-
sion presupposed by an act of assent here is merely the forming of a men-
tal proposition.187 Ockham puts it modally: [] this act can occur solely
due to the formation of a complex. That is, if such an act of assent1 occurs
at all, then it occurs due to the mere forming of some mental proposi-
tion.188 An act of assent1 cannot occur due to what Ockham calls the
apprehension of a proposition (complexum), nor, Ockham continues []
without any apprehension of a proposition at all. A secondary act of
apprehension2 has a mental proposition as its object which is already
formed.189 Apprehending a mental proposition in this secondary way is
nothing more than becoming aware of or explicitly taking notice of the
thought one actually entertains. Taking notice of a thought one actually
entertains is a so-called reflexive act.
184 See 3.3.1 Propositional Acts of Apprehension: Mental Propositions above.

185 If it could be added he is in possession of such a concept at all!
186 See fn. 183.
187 (Appment) A subject S apprehends a mental proposition pm if and only if S forms pm at T and
entertains it for some time.
188 assent1 abbreviates an act of assent of the first kind, whereas assent2 abbreviates an act
of assent of the second kind. Correspondingly, apprehension1 abbreviates act of appre-
hension of the first kind, that is, an act of apprehension identical to the formation of a
mental proposition, and apprehension2 abbreviates act of apprehension of the second
kind, that is, a reflexive act.
189 [] duplex est apprehensio: una quae est compositio et divisio propositionis sive forma-
tio; alia est quae est cognitio ipsius complexi iam formati, sicut cognitio albedinis dicitur
eius apprehensio. Quodl. V, q. 6 (OT IX, 501).
196 Chapter 3
Ockham concludes that (c) it is not possible for an act of assent1 to be an act
of assenting to a proposition, if it occurs, since an act of assent1 is not a reflexive
act. And it is not a reflexive act because the act of apprehension1 is not a reflex-
ive act.190 An act of assent1 merely presupposes an act of apprehension1 while
an act of assent2 presupposes an act of apprehension2.191 Why does assenting1
not imply the activation of the subjects truth-concept? I quote the relevant
passage again:
[]; because the layman knowing that stones are not donkeys does not
think about the proposition, and consequently does not assent to the
proposition. Although he assents to and knows that it is thus in reality or
not, by means of the proposition formed in the intellect, nevertheless he
does not perceive this; [].192
The lack of involvement is explained in terms of the nominal definition of

truth: the layman can know that it is thus in reality or not without as
I would like to add realizing that it is thus as it is indicated by the proposi-
tion.193 Ockham systematically draws on the nominal definition of truth in
his account of what giving ones assent requires epistemically. The subject
must have at least the notion of something being thus-and-so (ita esse) in order
to give his assent in this way, since the subject does not merely think that, for
instance, stones are not donkeys but in fact accepts that stones are not donkeys.
Assenting that something is thus-and-so (ita esse) does not involve the activa-
tion of the truth-concept, since the concept of something being thus-and-so
(ita esse) is part of the nominal definition of truth, but not vice versa.194 Since
190 I adapted the modal formulation and thus it cannot be an act of assent to a complex (et
ita non potest esse actus assentiendi complexo) to the interpretation correspondingly.
191 Ockham relies on the formal criterion of being non-reflexive to rule out the possibility of
assent1 being given to a mental proposition, since per definitionem a non-reflexive act does
not have another act (and thus, a mental proposition) as its object.
192 See fn. 183.
193 Remember that in the discussion of the apprehension of spoken propositions Ockham relied
on the nominal definition of truth in a similar fashion. There he explained what it amounts to
that a spoken proposition can be true, namely that a hearer can conceive that it is thus as the
proposition signifies. See 3.3.2 Propositional Acts of Apprehension: Spoken Propositions.
194 Here is the nominal definition of the truth (and falsity) of a proposition again: [] dico
quod veritas et falsitas [] sunt conceptus relativi significantes ipsas propositiones, non
absolute, sed veritas, sive iste conceptus veritas, ultra propositionem quam significat,
connotat quod ita sit in re sicut importatur per propositionem; et falsitas importat quod
non sit ita in re sicut importatur per propositionem. Quodl. VI, q. 29 (OT IX, 697).
it is possible in principle to have the concept of something being thus-and-so

without having the truth-concept, it is also possible to accept that something
is thus-and-so without thereby accepting the truth of a proposition. By con-
trast, it is not possible to acknowledge that a proposition is true without
thereby thinking that something is thus-and-so, since, according to Ockham,
acknowledging the truth of a proposition simply is to acknowledge that it is
thus as it is imported by the proposition.195
It is important to carefully distinguish between the possession and the acti-
vation of the truth-concept. Although Ockham refers to the layman as some-
one easily suspected of lacking the concept of truth at all, this should not lead
to the conclusion that only subjects lacking the truth-concept can give their
assent1. Rather, it is simply not necessary to activate ones concept of truth in
order to judge in this way. Note that Ockham merely states that the layman
judges that stones are not donkeys by means of the proposition formed in the
intellect but nevertheless () does not perceive this.196 Ockham does not
say that the layman cannot perceive this. The question arises what this (hoc)
refers to exactly.
In my view, there is one plausible reading whose only flaw is the imputa-
tion of a grammatical incongruity on Ockhams part, though it is a fairly
harmless flaw. According to this interpretation, Ockham simply wants to
point out that the layman entertains the thought that stones are not donkeys
but nevertheless does not perceive it. That is, the layman does not take
explicitly notice of his thought by means of another act. The problem is
grammatical: if the whole passage is looked at, it becomes clear that Ockham
first uses the Latin term complexum to refer to what cannot be the object of
assent1. But in the sentence immediately preceding the one in question
(tamen hoc non percipit), he employs the term propositione, not com-
plexum ([] mediante propositione formata in intellectu, []).197 Thus for
the sake of grammaticality he should use the form haec, not hoc.198 Since
Ockham consistently uses the term complexum to refer to the propositional
object of an act, what he has in mind by saying that the layman does not
perceive this (hoc) is that the layman does not take explicitly notice of the
mental proposition as the object of his act. Furthermore, in the subsequent
195 Furthermore, it is not possible to have the concept of truth without the concept of a prop-
osition since only propositions can be true (or not true). But conversely, it is possible to
have the concept of a proposition without having the concept of truth.
196 See fn. 183.
197 Quodl. III, q. 8 (OT IX, 234).
198 propositio is feminine, but complexum is neuter.
198 Chapter 3
passage Ockham points to extramental things as objects of acts of assent1:

But this act has extramental things as objects.199
Recall that this is how Ockham characterizes non-reflexive acts: An act
called non-reflexive (actus rectus) is one in which we cognize an extramental
object.200 In modern terms, non-reflexive acts are first-order acts, while reflex-
ive acts are second-order acts. There is a strong systematical connection
between the conceptual requirements and the non-reflexivity of assent1: an act
of assent1 presupposes only the concept of something being thus-and-so and
the ability to have first-order acts. By contrast, the conceptual requirements of
assent2 (the truth-concept and the concept of a proposition) imply the ability
to have second order acts. This interpretation fits the characterization of the
first kind of assent Ockham gives in the same Quodlibet. He writes:
If you ask which one of these acts is prior: it can be said that the act by
which something is known to be or not to be is prior as is commonly
accepted; nevertheless, though, the second (act) does not necessarily
presuppose it.201
In epistemological terms an act of assent1 takes priority over an act of assent2,

insofar as an act of assent1 implies only first-order acts and, inter alia, the acti-
vation of the concept something being thus-and-so; an act of assent2, mean-
while, presupposes both first and second-order acts, since it requires the
activation of the concepts something being thus-and-so, proposition and
truth.202 In short: everything presupposed by an act of assent1 is likewise pre-
supposed by an act of assent2, but not vice versa. Many of our everyday judge-
ments are assents of this kind since we often judge that things are thus-and-so
without becoming aware that the thought (the mental proposition) by means
of which we do so is in fact true.203 In the context of demonstrative science it
199 [] sed iste actus habet res extra pro obiectis, []. Quodl. III, q. 8 (OT IX, 234).
200 [] quia vocatur actus rectus quo intelligimus obiectum extra animam, []. Quodl. II,
q. 12 (OT IX, 165).
201 Si quaeras quis istorum actuum est prior: potest dici quod ille actus quo aliquid scitur
esse vel non esse, est prior ut communiter, quamvis alius non necessario praesupponat
eum. Quodl. III, q. 8 (OT IX, 235).
202 To put it differently: acts of assent1 do only imply first-order acts, because the concepts
involved merely imply the ability to perform first-order acts. Correspondingly, acts of
assent2 imply second-order acts, because the concepts involved imply the ability to per-
form second-order acts.
203 It is interesting to note that in another part of the Reportatio Ockham acknowledges a
kind of perceptual judgement by which children and simple-minded people (fatui)
is of course necessary to think about the truth of propositions, since the prin-
ciples of science are nothing but propositions.
What does it mean that the second act (of assent) does not necessarily pre-
suppose an act of assent1? Acts of assent2 presuppose acts of apprehension1,
since a subject can apprehend2 a mental proposition only if he has formed it,
but they do not presuppose acts of assent1, because acts of apprehension2 do
not presuppose acts of assent1: taking notice of a thought one actually enter-
tains, by means of a reflexive act, does not presuppose accepting that it is thus-
and-so. For instance, Peter can come to note that he is actually thinking that
the moon is made of cheese without accepting first that indeed the moon is
made of cheese. Of course it is possible to judge first that something is thus-
and-so and then to judge that the proposition importing that it is thus-and-so
is in fact true; however, it is not necessary. It is time now to turn to the second
kind of assent.
3.3.3.2 The Second Kind of Assent

What is required epistemically in order to give assent2 to a mental proposi-
tion?204 In another Quodlibet Ockham states with respect to the second kind
of assent:205
judge the harm or advantage of particular things. He says that this kind of judgement is
equivalent to an act of assent1, perhaps with respect to its result. (Ad aliud dico quod sensi-
tiva habet iudicium. Patet de brutis, pueris, fatuis etc., qui iudicant inter nociva et conve-
nientia, sed non habent actum iudicandi distinctum ab actibus apprehensivis incomplexis,
sicut intellectus habet. Quia talis actus assentiendi est complexus et praesupponit formatio-
nem complexi qualis non potest esse in parte sensitiva, quare talis actus ponitur in intel-
lectu.) Rep. IV, q. 14 (OT VII, 314). The crucial point is that these so-called judgements
concern operations on extramental things. As Ockham puts it: But these habits and non-
complex acts are equivalent to those (complex acts) as if they had a complex cognition, and
just as much with regard to external deeds. (Sed illi habitus et actus incomplexi aequiva-
lent eis ac si haberent notitiam complexi, et hoc quantum ad opera exteriora.) Ibid.
204 In the Quodlibet cited above Ockham argues against the assumption that it would be suf-
ficient to posit one kind of assent by pointing to the hierarchical order of intellectual acts
he speaks of the perfection of the intellectual powers which implies that the acts can
be formed one after another (quia potest unum actum formare post alium.) He claims
that this hierarchical order of intellectual acts applies to propositional acts just as it
applies to non-propositional acts. See Quodl. III, q. 8 (OT IX, 235). There he argues against
the assumption of Walter Chatton who claims that it is sufficient to posit one kind of
assent, namely the first kind. See Chatton, Rep., Prol., q. 1, art. 1, 21.
205 In this Quodlibet Ockham also discusses the distinction of two kinds of assent, focusing
on the problem whether every act of assent presupposes an act of apprehension of the
same object. Quodl. IV, q. 16 (OT IX, 376380).
200 Chapter 3
The other act of assent is that by which I assent to something, such that
this act of assent refers to something; for example I assent to the proposi-
tion man is an animal because I believe it to be true. And not only do
I assent to the proposition the proposition man is an animal is true,
where the proposition man is an animal serves as a subject, but I assent
to the proposition man is an animal in itself and absolutely, because
I know that it is in reality as it is imported by the proposition [].206
Note how the relata of the nominal definition of truth correspond to the
different first and second order acts presupposed by assent2. (1), noticing how
things are implies forming a mental proposition, that is, an act of apprehen-
sion1. (2) taking notice of its content (as it is imported by the proposition)
implies an act of apprehension2 of the mental proposition, and finally (3), the
subject accepts that in fact things are as they are said to be by it.207 And to
accept this is nothing but to accept the truth of the mental proposition.
Notice that in the passage cited Ockham gives two examples: he states that
(1) a subject can either assent2 to the mental proposition this proposition man
is an animal is true where man is an animal is part of the subject term of
another proposition.208 Here the name of the proposition becomes part of a
more complex proposition.209 Or (2) a subject can assent2 to the proposition
man is an animal without explicitly predicating true of it; as Ockham states,
206 Alius est actus assentiendi quo assentio alicui, ita quod actus assentiendi referatur ad
aliquid; sicut assentio complexo vel dissentio, puta assentio huic propositioni homo est
animal, quia reputo eam veram. Et non solum assentio huic propositioni haec propositio
homo est animal est vera, ubi haec propositio homo est animal est subiectum, sed
assentio huic propositioni homo est animal in se et absolute; et hoc quia scio quod sic
importatur per istam propositionem sicut est in re. Quodl. IV, q. 16 (OT IX, 377). Note that
quite exceptionally Ockham here changes the order of the relata of truth: in most cases
he states quod ita sit in re sicut importatur per propositionem; []. Quodl. VI, q. 29 (OT
IX, 697). Note that in my translation I did not account for this reversed order, because to
say that I know that it is thus imported by the proposition as in fact it is in reality would
sound odd. I think that this reversed order is of no great systematical importance simply
due to the fact that the relation of comparison indicated by ita (or sic) sicut is
symmetrical.
207 Perhaps it could even be held that to accept that things are as they are said to be by a
proposition is the result of some act of comparing how things are with how they are said
to be by a proposition.
208 Et non solum assentio huic propositioni haec propositio homo est animal est vera, ubi
haec propositio homo est animal est subiectum, []. Quodl. IV, q. 16 (OT IX, 377).
209 See 1.5.4 Simple and Material Supposition.
I assent to this proposition [] in itself and absolutely.210 In the latter case,

the proposition assented2 to is not metalinguistic, since the subject does not
accept a proposition about the proposition in question as true.211 I propose to
render (1) and (2) as follows:212
(H)A subject assents2 to the proposition that the proposition man is an

animal is true.
(I)A subject assents2 to the proposition that man is an animal.
Ockham introduces the metalinguistic case of (H) first because he is appre-

hensive of a regress. His formulation in the relevant passage (not only (non
solum) (H)but (sed) (I))213 indicates that some scholars, perhaps those
Ockham himself is addressing in this Quodlibet, may think about (H) first,
which is clearly metalinguistic, since by assenting to the proposition the sub-
ject accepts the proposition the proposition man is an animal is true as true.
Although assenting2 to a proposition is a second-order act, it is not necessarily
an act having a complex proposition of the form p is true or that p is true as
its object.214 By distinguishing between (H) and (I) Ockham draws attention to
the fact that one can be easily misled by the alleged analogy between semanti-
cally higher propositions and epistemologically higher mental acts. One could
be tempted to describe an act of assent2 as an act of predicating true of a
proposition. But accepting a proposition as true and predicating true of it are
not analogous insofar as a proposition ascends to a higher semantic level by
210 See fn. 206.

211 Panaccio writes: [] si je juge que tout homme est animal, je suis normalement dispos
juger aussi que la proposition tout homme est animal est vraie. Mais lassentiment
original, mme reflexive, nen porte pas moins, insiste-t-il, sur une proposition de premier
ordre en elle-mme et absolument []. Claude Panaccio, Le jugement comme acte men-
tal selon Guillaume dOckham, in J. Biard (ed.), Le langage mental du moyen ge lge
classique, Louvain-La-Neuve, 2009, 117133 (126).
212 From now on, I omit the specification of propositions as mental propositions, because it
is clear from the context that I exclusively refer to mental propositions here.
213 Et non solum assentio huic propositioni haec propositio homo est animal est vera, [],
sed assentio huic propositioni homo est animal in se et absolute; []. Quodl. IV, q. 16 (OT
IX, 377).
214 Ockham holds that a proposition such as (1) it is true that every man is an animal
(omnem hominem esse animal est verum) indicates that the predicate is true (est
verum) is predicated of the whole proposition corresponding to the dictum. See SL II, 9
(OP I, 273). Thus (1) it is true that every man is an animal is equivalent to (2) every man
is an animal is true insofar as they pertain to the same semantic level: true is predicated
either of (1) the nominalization or (2) the name of a proposition.
202 Chapter 3
having true predicated of it, whereas the proposition does not ascend to a
higher semantic level merely by being accepted as true. Ockham states that
acts of first assent are equal to acts of second assent at least in some respect.
He writes:
[] if you ask whether something is known by this [first kind] of act, I say
that properly speaking, it should not be said that something is known by
this act, but that by this act it is known that a stone is not a donkey; and
this act is in many respects equal to the propositional [second] act by
which something is known.215
If a subject knows2 that stones are not donkeys, then, necessarily, by accepting
that things are as they are said to be by the proposition he accepts that things
are in a certain way: acts of assent1 and acts of assent2 can overlap with respect
to what is accepted. This is not to deny that a subject assenting2 to a proposi-
tion importing that things are thus-and-so should also, as a consequence, be
ready to accept a proposition of the form p is true or it is true that p as true.
Second-order mental acts and metalinguistic propositions are clearly disanal-
ogous according to Ockham, since the act of assent2 is not attached to the spe-
cial (complex) syntactical structure of some mental proposition.
In summary, assent1 involves the first-order act of apprehension1 and the
concept of something being thus-and-so, whereas assent2 presupposes the first-
order act of apprehension1 and the second-order act of apprehension2 and the
concepts of something being thus-and-so, of a proposition and of its truth.
However, it has been shown that assenting2 to a proposition does not necessar-
ily imply predicating true of it. In order to explain what it means that a subject
can evidently judge that p by virtue of intuitive cognition it is necessary to
turn to evident judgements involving intuitive cognition of particular things.
Can acts of evident judgement be adequately described as acts of the first or of
the second kind of assent?216
215 [] si quaeras utrum aliquid scitur isto actu, dico quod proprie loquendo, non debet dici
quod aliquid scitur isto actu, sed quod isto actu scitur quod lapis non est asinus; et iste
actus aequivalet quantum ad multa alicui complexo quo aliquid scitur. Quodl. III, q. 8 (OT
IX, 234) (Italics mine).
216 It is illuminating to see whether any of the characteristics of the two kinds of assent can
be attributed to the case of evident judgements involving intuitive cognition. However,
one should bear in mind that the distinction of two kinds of assent was explicitly made in
the later Quodlibeta, whereas in the Ordinatio Ockham uniformly characterizes acts of
judgement as acts of assenting to something one believes to be true or acts of dissenting
3.4 Intuitive Cognition and Evident Judgement

Having laid out his model of different kinds of mental acts and their interrela-
tion in the Ordinatio,217 Ockham introduces intuitive cognition, which has the
role of making evident judgements possible. It has been shown that an act of
intuitive cognition is exactly of the particular thing to which it is causally
related, and of nothing else.218 In the Ordinatio Ockham states further:
[] the intuitive cognition of a thing is a kind of cognition by virtue of

which it can be known whether a thing exists or not, such that if the thing
exists, the intellect judges immediately that it exists and evidently recog-
nizes that it exists, [].219
For instance, if Peter intuits a particular fly, then he is able to evidently judge
that this fly exists on the basis of his intuitive cognition of that fly alone. The
epithet evident is used in adverbial form to characterize the act of judging. It
is not used to specify what is acknowledged, namely that this fly exists.220 This
short passage contains several difficulties surrounding the role or function of
intuitive cognition. The first concerns the way intuitive cognition works its
magic. How is it to be understood that a subject can evidently judge by virtue
of intuitive cognition? What does this by-virtue-of relation amount to? Is it a
causal relation? An intuitive act is caused by a particular thing, so perhaps an
act of intuitive cognition causes an act of evident judgement in turn?
Second, what does it mean to say that such an act of judging is evident?
Third, Ockham explicitly states that it is possible to evidently judge that a
particular thing exists or that it does not exist. The disjunction is to be
taken seriously. The last point relates to the notorious problem of the intui-
tive cognition of non-existent things which Ockham discusses separately
from something one believes to be false. The account of evident judgements the following
discussion is based on is found in the Ordinatio.
217 See 3.3 Ockhams Model of Non-Propositional and Propositional Acts.
218 Quod autem sit propria singulari [], quia immediate causatur a re singulari vel nata est
causari, et non est nata causari ab alia re singulari etiam eiusdem speciei. Quodl. I, q. 13
(OT IX, 73).
219 [] notitia intuitiva rei est talis notitia, virtute cuius potest sciri utrum res sit vel non, ita
quod si res sit, statim intellectus iudicat eam esse et evidenter cognoscit eam esse, [].
Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 31) (Italics mine).
220 In other words: it would be misleading to say that the (mental) proposition this fly
exists is evident, since it is only evident insofar as the act of acknowledging this is
evident. If the act were not evident, then what is acknowledged by that act would not
be evident either.
204 Chapter 3
in a corrolarium.221 It sounds rather odd that it should be possible to

intuit a thing which does not exist, if an intuitive cognition is (normally)
caused by its object.222 In support of Ockham it must be noted that he
attempts to account for evident judgements about affirmative and
negative contingent truths by means of intuitive cognition. In this section,
however, I concentrate on the first and second difficulty.223 Ockham
describes the possible content of evident judgement in the following way.
He writes:
[] intuitive cognition is such that when some things are cognized (a)
one of which inheres in another or (b) is located in some distance from
another or (c) relates to another thing in any other way, then it is known
immediately by virtue of the non-propositional cognition of these things
whether (Ia) one thing inheres (in another) or not, (Ib) whether it is
localized in some distance or not, and (Ic) likewise with respect to any
other contingent truth, [].224
221 See Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 3839). For further discussion of the intuitive cognition of non-
existents see for instance Philotheus Boehner, The notitia intuitiva of non-existents
according to William Ockham, in E. Buytaert (ed.), Collected Articles on Ockham,
St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1958, 268300; Sebastian Day, Intuitive Cognition: A Key To The
Significance Of The Later Scholastics, St. Bonaventure, ny, 1947, 174188.
222 Does the following case exemplify the case of a negative evident judgement based on
intuition in Ockhams sense? Suppose that Peter who is looking for his keys in his pocket
sees that they are not in his pockets. I think it does not. As Knne states in his discussion
of a similar example in his Sehen: eine sprachanalytische Betrachtung, Logos (Neue
Folge) 2 (1995), 103121 (115), the judgement that the keys are not in the pocket is inferen-
tial: it is based on something that the subject actually sees, namely the (empty) pocket.
I think the crucial point is that Ockham attempts to show that it is also possible to judge
both evidently and non-inferentially about negative contingent propositions in terms of
the intuition of non-existents.
223 Although the problem clearly remains of whether Ockham succeeds in conceiving of
evident judgements about affirmative and negative contingent propositions in terms of
intuitive cognition, and although the problem is certainly relevant, it can and should be
treated separately.
224 [] notitia intuitiva est talis quod quando aliquae res cognoscuntur quarum una
inhaeret alteri vel una distat loco ab altera vel alio modo se habet ad alteram, statim
virtute illius notitiae incomplexae illarum rerum scitur si res inhaeret vel non inhae-
ret, si distat vel non distat, et sic de aliis veritatibus contingentibus, []. Ord. I, prol.,
q. 1 (OT I, 31).
A subject can intuitively grasp two or more particular things at once.225 In gen-
eral, a subject cannot just intuit one particular thing at a time, since a sub-
stance does not occur without any qualities, and a particularized quality
cannot exist independently of a substance. Ockham calls the existential rela-
tion of a particularized quality to a substance a relation of inherence along
Aristotelian lines. He first draws attention to the case where it is evidently
judged that this thing inheres in that thing.226 According to this characteriza-
tion, evident acts of judging seem to be acts of the first kind of assent; at least,
Ockham does not explicitly state that the truth of a contingent proposition is
acknowledged in this instance.227 There is a problem lurking here since
Ockham, strictly speaking, characterizes what is evidently judged in this case
in two ways. In a passage after the one cited Ockham gives the following
example:
For instance, if Socrates is in fact white, then this cognition of Socrates

and his whiteness by virtue of which it can be evidently cognized that
Socrates is white is called intuitive cognition.228
Thus due to the intuitive cognition of Socrates and his whiteness, a subject
can evidently judge that (Ia) this whiteness inheres in Socrates or that (Ib)
Socrates is white. The predicate of the latter is general, whereas the predicate of
the former is not. Due to Ockhams conception of connotative terms, the
proposition
225 See the following passage from the Reportatio: Quia si intelligam aliqua extrema distincta
specie intuitive uno actu puta, si simul videam albedinem et nigredinem unico actu
intelligendi []. Rep. II, qq. 1213 (OT V, 280).
226 As indicated with respect to the disjunction contained in the first passage whether a
thing a is there or not I will ignore the negation in each correspondent case, that is,
whether a inheres in b or not, whether a is in close proximity to b or not, whether a relates
to b in any other way or not.
227 I claim that the passage can be interpreted in this way, although at the end of the passage
Ockham points to other contingent truths [] and likewise with respect to any other
contingent truth ([] et sic de aliis veritatibus contingentibus, [].) Ord. I, prol., q. 1
(OT I, 31). It is a question of the point of view: if a subject evidently acknowledges that
there is a fly, then what he acknowledges (that there is a fly) is contingently true. But it is
not yet said that he evidently acknowledges the truth of this contingent proposition. In
other words, it is not clear that Ockham points to other contingent truths from the point
of view of the judging subject.
228 Sicut si Sortes in rei veritate sit albus, illa notitia Sortis et albedinis virtute cuius
potest evidenter cognosci quod Sortes est albus, dicitur notitia intuitiva. Ord. I, prol., q. 1
(OT I, 31).
206 Chapter 3
(5)Socrates is white
is equivalent to a conjunction of the two propositions:
(6)Socrates exists and a whiteness inheres in Socrates.229
As Freddoso explains, [p]ropositions containing connotative terms, []

are exponible and thus equivalent to hypothetical propositions. And that a
proposition is exponible means that it can be expounded in terms of other
propositions which reveal more perspicuously its underlying logical form.230
(6) renders explicit the form of (5).231 (5) and (6) are equivalent insofar as
Socrates is white is true if and only if Socrates exists and a whiteness inheres
in Socrates are both true as well.232 It is quite another question whether a sub-
ject evidently judging that Socrates is white must also be ready to evidently
judge that this whiteness inheres in Socrates.233 I take the description involving
a general predicate term as paradigmatic, because it sounds more familiar to
our ears. Thus (a) if someone intuits a thing such as a fly he is likely to intui-
tively grasp some of its qualities as well, for instance, its colour. And the subject
will be able to evidently judge that for instance (Ia) this fly is black. Secondly,
229 Ockham explains in the second part of the Summa Logicae: Et est sciendum quod quae-
libet categorica ex qua sequuntur plures propositiones categoricae tamquam exponentes
eam, hoc est exprimentes quid illa propositio ex forma sua importat, potest dici proposi-
tio aequivalens propositio hypothetica. [] Huiusmodi etiam sunt omnes propositiones
in quibus ponuntur termini connotativi et relativi [] SL II, 11 (OP I, 279) (Italics mine).
One could object that the second conjunct (a whiteness inheres in Socrates) implies the
first conjunct (Socrates exists). However, is it not possible that the first conjunct is false
although the second is true? Consider the following case. Suppose that Fluffy the cat is
white. Unfortunately, Fluffy is killed by a car. Now although the proposition Fluffy exists
is not true, because Fluffy does not live anymore, the proposition A whiteness inheres in
Fluffy is true. Of course, Fluffy is now used for Fluffys corpse, not for Fluffy (alive). Thus
what is implied is that Fluffy supposits for exactly the same thing in the two conjuncts.
230 Freddoso, Ockhams Theory of Truth Conditions, 12.
231 See again Freddoso: Rather, its [Socrates is white] underlying logical form is most clearly
revealed by the following proposition: Socrates exists and a whiteness inheres in
Socrates. Ibid., 12.
232 See the following passage from the Summa Logicae: Sicut ad veritatem istius Sortes est
albus requiritur quod haec sit vera Sortes est et quod haec sit vera Sorti inest albedo. SL
II, 11 (OP I, 281).
233 The following difficulty is restricted to the case of particularized qualities inhering in sub-
stances: intuitive acts are genuinely singular, but what is judged evidently contains a gen-
eral predicate term.
(b) if a subject intuits two substances (two flies), he is ready to judge about
their spatial relation. For instance, he can judge that (Ib) this fly is near that fly.
Finally (c), Ockham groups together all other kinds of relation between one
thing and another. For instance, a subject still intuiting the two flies can
judge that (Ic) this fly is bigger than that fly. It is possible to distinguish the
three following forms of what is evidently judged correspondingly:
(a) a exists.
(b) a is F.
(c) a R b.
(a) accounts for the passage I quoted at the beginning of this section: if Peter
intuits a fly, he can judge evidently that this fly exists. Ockham calls contingent
propositions of this form first contingent propositions.234 Note that Ockham
denies that a relation is a thing distinct from the particular things related to
each other.235 For instance, evidently judging that this fly is near that fly does
not involve the intuitive cognition of three things, that is, of two flies and their
spatial relation, but only of the two flies. It would not be correct to say that a
subject intuits that one thing is near the other: only particular things are intu-
ited. Intuitive cognition is strictly non-propositional in kind. This is stated
quite explicitly in the Reportatio:
[] the intellect can form a proposition out of those non-propositional

[terms] which are grasped intuitively [] and assent to such a proposi-
tion; still, however, neither the formation of the proposition nor the act
of assenting to it is an intuitive cognition, since both [formation and
assent] are propositional acts of cognition, and intuitive cognition is
non-propositional.236
234 []; per hoc quod per notitiam intuitivam assentitur primo contingenti, et per abstracti-
vam non. Quodl. V, q. 5 (OT IX, 496) (Italics mine). Freddoso remarks: A primary or first
contingent truth is one that attributes existence to some absolute being, for example
Socrates exists or Socrates is a being. Freddoso, William of Ockham: Quodlibetal
Questions, Vol. 2, New Haven, 1991, 414, fn. 18. I would rather say that it is predicated of a
thing that it is present or even, that it is in the presence of the one who comes to entertain
this thought.
235 For an account of Ockhams conception of relations see again McCord Adams, William
Ockham, 215276.
236 [] possit intellectus complexum ex illis incomplexis intuitive cognitis formare [] et
tali complexo assentire, tamen nec formatio complexi nec actus assentiendi complexo est
cognitio intuitiva. Quia utraque cognitio est cognitio complexa, et cognitio intuitiva est
208 Chapter 3
A sharp distinction must be drawn between what is evidently judged or

acknowledged and the act of assent or judging which is not identical to a prop-
osition, as was shown in the last section. In this passage, Ockham explicitly
states that assent is given to a proposition. Thus it seems that evident acts of
judging are not mere acts of assenting that something is thus-and-so.237 Like
every act of judging, an evident act of judging presupposes an act of apprehen-
sion. And this apprehension is nothing but the forming of a mental proposi-
tion. Referring to the Prologue, where he first presented intuitive cognition
and evident judgement, Ockham writes later in the Ordinatio:
[] as it was said earlier in the first question of the Prologue, some-

times the intuitive cognition of the terms together with the forming of
a proposition is sufficient for the evident cognition of a contingent
truth.238
The intuitive cognition of a particular thing such as a black fly allows the sub-
ject to form at least three different mental propositions, namely, (a) this fly
exists or e.g. (b) this fly is black, or for instance (c) this fly is sitting on the wall,
since the subject can either (a) state the mere existence of the thing or he can
(b) ascribe a quality to the thing or he can (c) localize the thing, since intuiting
a thing implies having a certain perspective upon it; and this perspective is
determined inter alia by a spatial relation between the subject and the thing.
Note that this is a case where the forming of a mental proposition and the act
of assenting occur simultaneously, not successively. I think the point is that
one cannot merely entertain the thought that this fly is black if one is intuiting
cognitio incomplexa. Rep. II, q. 1213 (OT V, 257). Ockham clearly says that the intellect
can form a (mental) proposition (complexum) out of the non-propositional [terms] which
are grasped intuitively. Note that he does not state that the intellect can form a (mental)
proposition out of these non-propositional intuitive acts. The latter formulation would
suit his later theory of concepts (mental terms) better. But in the Ordinatio he still sub-
scribes to the fictum-theory of concepts, as Panaccio points out. Panaccio, Ockham on
Concepts, 12. Ockham chooses the former formulation, because it implies that the object
the fictum is distinct from the act. However, this difference can be neglected here.
237 Again, it has to be taken into account that the distinction between two kinds of assent
was explicitly drawn only in the later Quodlibeta.
238 [] sicut dictum fuit in prima quaestione Prologi, aliquando notitia intuitiva termino-
rum cum formatione propositionis sufficit ad notitiam evidentem veritatis contingentis.
Ord. I, dist. 3, q. IV (OT II, 438439).
a fly: it is not possible to seriously ask oneself whether this fly is black if one is
intuiting a black fly at the same time.
In Ockhams terminology, the forming of each of the propositions (a), (b) or
(c) implies an act of the will. The reason being his assumption that in general
no act of forming a mental proposition can occur without an act of the will.
Does Ockham think that a subject can decide whether he wants to form the
proposition (a) rather than (b) or (c) while intuiting a black fly? In the Ordinatio
he states:
[] the formation of a proposition can only occur by means of the will, the
will itself is required for the cognition of a proposition that is known by
itself as at least a mediate efficient cause.239,240
In this passage, Ockham discusses the case of propositions that are known by
themselves (per se notae).241 It will become clear in the next section that what
these mental propositions have in common with singular intuition-based
thoughts is that it is not possible to merely entertain them. What exactly does
it mean that an act of will is required for the forming of a mental proposition
if the subject cannot entertain the resulting thought without giving his assent
at the same time?
It does not mean that the subject can decide voluntarily which of several
propositions to form on the basis of his intuition. In order to decide this, the
subject has to ask himself explicitly whether on the basis of, for instance,
his intuition of a black fly, he should form the proposition (1) This fly exists or
(2) This fly is black or perhaps (3) This fly is sitting on the wall. The subject, how-
ever, cannot ask himself whether to form (1), (2) or (3) without forming these
very propositions. And since he cannot form (1), (2) or (3) while intuiting a
239 What does it mean that the will is at least a mediate efficient cause? In another passage,
Ockham explains that a cause is mediate if it is the cause of something that in turn
causes something else: it is the cause of a cause. See Brev. Summa Physic., q.132 (op VI,
753756). Thus that an act of will is a mediate cause can mean that the act of will does
not immediately cause the forming, since it is not the will that forms a mental proposi-
tion; rather, the act of will causes the intellect to form a mental proposition.
240 [], formatio propositionis non possit fieri nisi mediante voluntate, ad notitiam propositio-
nis per se notae requiritur ipsa voluntas tamquam causa efficiens saltem mediata. Ord. I,
dist. 3, q. 4 (OT II, 438) (Italics mine).
241 I shall dicuss this kind of proposition in the next section. See 3.4.1 General Propositions
and Evident Judgement: propositiones per se notae.
210 Chapter 3
black fly without giving his assent at the same time, the condition of the act of
will for the forming of a mental proposition cannot be spelled out in terms of
a voluntary choice between the forming of different mental propositions.
Perhaps by distinguishing an act of will as a necessary condition Ockham
attempts to account for the fact that a subject forming (1) at T1 might as well
have formed (2) or (3) on the basis of his intuition of a black fly at T1. The point
is that in order to form (2) and not (1) on the basis of his intuition, the subject
has to pay attention to the flys being black, whereas in order to form (1), the
subject does not need to focus his attention on this quality of the fly he intuits.
In general, the reason why a certain mental proposition is formed and not
another is a matter of focusing ones attention on certain features of what one
intuits while neglecting other features. Of course, ones attention can be drawn
in a certain direction. Imagine that Peter is listening to his favourite pianist
playing Bach on the radio. Suddenly he hears a woman laughing wildly in the
adjacent room. His attention is drawn away from the music to the laughter.
In another passage referring to the one just quoted, Ockham adds with respect
to the role of the will:
[] the complex word (a proposition) that is determinately affirmative

or negative only occurs by means of the will; nevertheless, though, there
is another cognition with respect to this act of the will, that is, the non-
propositional [cognition] of the term or terms, which is the cause of [the
act of will].242
Recall that acts of intuition are also a kind of cognition of terms. In his com-
mentary on Aristotles Physics, Ockham explicitly states that an intuitive cogni-
tion can by its nature (potens ex natura sua) supposit for its object, just as a
spoken term (vox) can supposit by imposition (ex institutione) for its signifi-
cate.243 That an act of intuition causes an act of will means that the subjects
242 [] verbum complexum, quod est determinate affirmativum vel negativum, non fit nisi
mediante voluntate, respectu tamen illius actus voluntatis est una alia notitia, scilicet
incomplexa termini vel terminorum, quae est causa ipsius. Ord. I, dist. 3, q. 10 (OT II, 567).
Ockham uses the Augustinian expression complex word (verbum complexum) in this
context since he discusses Augustines conception of the Trinitarian structure of the
human mind in this question (Italics mine).
243 The whole passage reads: [] intellectus apprehendens intuitione rem singularem elicit
unam cognitionem intuitivam in se quae est tantum cognitio illius rei singularis, potens
ex natura sua supponere pro illa re singulari [] Et ita sicut vox supponit ex institutione
pro suo significato, ita ista intellectio supponit naturaliter pro re cuius est. Quaest. in libr.
Phys. Aristot., q. 7 (OP VI, 411).
attention can be drawn to a particular by the very intuition of it. However,

considering Peters case again, Peter can focus his attention on certain aspects
of the laughter, for instance, its wildness, while neglecting others, as for
instance, its loudness. As a result, he can come to think that this laughter is wild
although he could have also come to think that this laughter is loud. In general,
although ones attention can be drawn to a particular thing by the intuition
one has of the thing, focusing ones attention on certain aspects of what one
intuits while neglecting others can occur voluntarily. Concerning the relation
between will and attention, Ockham states elsewhere:
[] I say that attention, making a greater or lesser effort, intensity or the

lack of it in (an) act are brought about only by an act of will, [].244
Above I showed that an act of intuition as opposed to a simple general con-

cept based on intuition has a rather complex representational content: the
intuition of say, a fly, comprises the flys being black and buzzing and other of
its perceivable qualities, as well as it might comprise its position in relation to
other things in its surrounding.245 I think it plausible that the mental proposi-
tion ultimately formed by the subject depends or at least, can depend on
his (voluntary) focus on certain aspects of what he intuits. There might be
cases where there is just no room for the subject to focus his attention on
a certain aspect.246 Note further that a mental proposition such as this fly is
black requires the tokening of the two general concepts fly and black: it
follows that the question of which of the subjects concepts are tokened and
combined within a mental proposition depends on the aspects the subject
pays attention to.247
The overall picture is this: an extramental object a causes an act of intuition
of it in the subject. The intuition of a that represents as perceivable qualities
as well as perhaps its spatial relation to other things causes an act of will in the
subject: this means that the subject is able in principle to voluntarily focus his
244 [] dico quod attentio, conatus maior vel minor, intensio vel remissio in actu sunt effec-
tive solum ab actu voluntatis, []. Quaest. Var., q. 5 (OT VIII, 180).
246 For instance, if the intuition of a certain particular is just too violent or too quick to leave
the subject sufficient time to focus on a certain aspect. Examples would be the violent
detonation of a bomb or a car crashing into a wall.
247 See Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 1416. There he discusses what he calls mixed cogni-
tions, that is, a kind of complex singular term that is composed of an act of intuition and
the token of a general concept. It follows that which mental propositions one can form on
the basis of intuition also depends on the concepts one possesses.
212 Chapter 3
attention to a certain feature of a, for instance, its being black. This focusing on
the colour can cause the intellect to form the mental proposition this is black
and not the proposition this exists. That is, the forming of one of the possible
mental propositions depends on the focus of ones attention. And since one
can focus on certain aspects voluntarily, the forming of a mental proposition
p rather than q depends (partly) on an act of will. But certainly, it does
not include the explicit choice between the forming of different mental
propositions.
To get a better idea of what the by-virtue-of relation between intuition and
evident judgement amounts to, and what it means that such a judgement is
evident, it is helpful to contrast intuitive cognition with another kind of singu-
lar cognition that Ockham calls abstractive.248 According to Ockham, an intu-
ition of a causes an abstractive cognition of a.249 Thereby, the abstractive
cognition of a inherits the entire representational content of the intuition of a.
This is clearly indicated in the following passage from the Reportatio:
[] not that something would be cognized by intuitive cognition which

is not grasped by abstractive cognition, but the same is grasped wholly
and in the same respect by both kinds of cognition [].250
The object of intuitive cognition and of singular abstractive cognition can be

the same: a subject can think of one and the same thing either in its presence
or its absence by means of intuitive and abstractive cognition respectively: the
subject can first intuit Socrates and then, when Socrates has disappeared, can
still think of Socrates. Ockham even claims that a subject can intuitively or
abstractively grasp the same thing in the very same respect (sub omni eadem
ratione). Recall that Ockham holds that a thing is first sensorily perceived and
then intellectually intuited in the same respect. I argued that what Ockham
refers to by sub eadem ratione can be taken as the way the object of an act is
248 In other passages Ockham accounts for the acquisition and determination of the exten-
sion of general mental terms (concepts) in terms of the intuitive cognition of particular
things. See above 3.2 How to Acquire an Absolute Simple Term.
249 [] cognitio intuitivam habere semper secum necessario cognitionem abstractivam
incomplexam, tunc cognitio intuitiva erit causa partialis illius cognitionis abstractivae, et
illa abstractiva erit causa partialis respectu habitus inclinantis ad aliam cognitionem
abstractivam incomplexam consimilem illi cognitioni ex qua generatur habitus sic
inclinans. Rep. II, qq. 1213 (OT V, 263).
250 [] Non quod aliquid cognoscatur per notitiam intuitivam quod non cognoscitur per
notitiam abstractivam, sed idem totaliter et sub omni eadem ratione cognoscitur per
utramque notitiam. Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 3132).
presented.251 Analogously, an intuitive act and a singular abstractive act pres-

ent their object in the same way as well. For instance, Peter can think about
Anne in her presence just as in her absence. According to Ockham, Anne is
presented in the same way by an intuitive act and by a singular abstractive act.
Intuitive and singular abstractive cognition differ with respect to what can be
called their epistemological function. Ockham continues:
But abstractive cognition is that cognition by virtue of which it cannot be

known evidently of a contingent thing whether it exists or not. [] a con-
tingent truth, especially one about something that is present, cannot be
evidently cognized by any abstractive cognition. Similarly it is clear that
when Socrates and his whiteness is grasped in his absence, then in virtue
of this non-propositional cognition it can neither be known that Socrates
exists or not, or that he is white or not white; [] and likewise with
respect to other contingent truths.252
On the one hand, if Peter intuits Anne and her blond hair, he cannot entertain
the thought that Anne is blond without at the same time giving his assent; on
the other hand, if he does not intuit Anne, but merely thinks of Anne in her
absence by means of a singular abstractive cognition of her, he can merely
entertain the thought that Anne is blond without at the same time giving his
assent.
In general, when intuiting a thing or things a subject cannot merely enter-
tain such a thought about that particular thing or things without at the same
time giving his assent, whereas if the subject does not intuit the thing or things
his thought is about he can merely entertain this thought without at the same
time giving his assent. I think we now have everything at our disposal to explain
(1) what the by-virtue-of relation amounts to and (2) the significance of an act
of judging based on intuition being evident. Note that for an act of assent to be
evident it is necessary that the proposition involved be in fact true. Ockham
nominally defines the term evident at least partially in terms of the nomi-
nal definition of truth. In the Quodlibeta he writes:

252 [] Notitia autem abstractiva est illa virtute cuius de re contingente non potest sciri
evidenter utrum sit vel non sit. [] per notitiam abstractivam nullam veritas contingens,
maxime de praesenti, potest evidenter cognosci. Sicut de facto patet, quod quando cog-
noscitur Sortes et albedo sua in absentia, virtute illius notitiae incomplexae nec potest
sciri quod Sortes est vel non est, vel quod est albus vel non est albus; [] et sic de aliis veri-
tatibus contingentibus. Ord. I, prol., q. 1 (OT I, 3132).
214 Chapter 3
[] evident cognition imports that it is thus in reality as it is indicated by

the proposition to which assent is given [].253
The nominal definition of evident and the nominal definition of truth are
construed analogously: what is secondarily signified by the term truth, namely
that in reality (in re) it is thus (ita) as (sicut) it is imported by the proposi-
tion,254 is part of what is secondarily signified by the term evident, since evi-
dent secondarily signifies that it is thus in reality as it is imported by the
proposition to which assent is given. What is primarily signified by evident
and by truth is also construed in an analogous way: truth primarily signifies
propositions255 and evident primarily signifies acts of judging. Truth can be
correctly applied to propositions, and evident can be correctly applied to acts
of judging. Hence:
(assentev)256 An act of assent to a mental proposition pm is evident only

if pm is true.
The truth of the proposition is only a necessary condition for assent to be evi-
dent. If (assentev) were both necessary and sufficient, then every act of assent
to a true proposition would be evident. However, not every assent to a true
proposition is evident nor is every assent to a true proposition based on intui-
tive cognition. What does it amount to that Peter can evidently judge that Anne
is blond by virtue of his intuitive cognition of Anne and her hair? This relation
is clearly a causal relation. It is due to this causal relation that a subject cannot
merely entertain a thought about the thing he cognizes intuitively: the possi-
bility of entertaining a thought in a non-committal way is simply ruled out if
the thought entertained is about a thing the subject is aware of by means of an
act of intuition. That an act of judging based on intuition is evident means that
253 [] cognitio evidens importat quod ita sit in re sicut denotatur per propositionem cui fit
assensus; []. Quodl. V, q. 5 (OT IX, 498).
254 [] quod ita sit in re sicut importatur per propositionem; []. Quodl. VI, q. 29 (OT IX,
697).
255 [] veritas, sive iste conceptus veritas, ultra propositionem quam significat, connotat
quod ita sit in re sicut importatur per propositionem []. Quodl. VI, q. 29 (OT IX, 697).
256 (assentev) abbreviates evident assent. I choose this abbreviation in accordance with
Ockham who can be taken to conceive of assent to a proposition as the standard case, just
as he proceeds from affirmative propositions in his discussion of (personal) supposition.
See 1.5.1 The Standard Case: (Personal) Supposition and the Truth and Falsity of
Affirmative Propositions.
it is not possible to form a mental proposition without at the same time giving
ones assent, where what is judged is true. Hence:
(assentev)1 A subject S judges evidently that (1) a exists or (2) a is F or (3)

aRb if and only if (a) S intuits a, b, or F and (b) S focuses
his attention on a, b or F and (c) S forms either (1), (2) or (3)
and simultaneously gives his assent and (d) it is true that
a exists or that a is F or that aRb.
Although characteristics of both kinds of assent can be found in Ockhams

characterization of acts of evident judgements, it should be taken into
account that in his early Ordinatio, where he outlines his notion of evident
judgements based on intuition, he still proceeds from the assumption that
one gives ones assent to a proposition: propositions are the proper objects of
assent. Therefore in the next Section I too proceed from the assumption that
assent is given to a proposition. There I want to show that with respect to a
kind of general proposition assent can also be given evidently.257 These
propositions are adorned with the epithet per se notae, that is, they are
known by themselves.
3.4.1 General Propositions and Evident Judgement: propositiones per se

notae
In the third part of the Summa Logicae Ockham treats the prerequisites and
different kinds of demonstration.258 Demonstrations are composed of propo-
sitions.259 In this context, he discusses general propositions such as man is an
animal or whiteness is a quality. This kind of general proposition is called a
definition. Only absolute terms signifying substances are defined in this
257 Compare the following passage from the Quaestiones variae where Ockham distinguishes
between different kinds of evident cognition (notitia evidens): [] quod assensus non
distinguitur ab evidentia in actu quando sunt respectu eiusdem obiecti evidenter cogniti.
Quia proprie loquendo de notitia, evidentia non est nisi notitia causata aliquo praedicto-
rum trium modorum: vel (1) ex terminis quocumque modo cognitis sicut in propositione
per se nota, vel (2) ex terminis intuitive cognitis sicut in propositione contingente evi-
denter nota, vel (3) ex notitia praemissa vel praemissarum evidenter notarum, [].
Quaest. Var., q. 5 (OT VIII, 188).
258 Summa Logicae, III-2, 1741.
259 Ockham remarks in Summa Logicae I, 1: Omnes logicae tractatores intendunt astruere
quod argumenta ex propositionibus et propositiones ex terminis componuntur. SL I,
1 (OP I, 7).
216 Chapter 3
way.260 The definition is further described as being not given by anything in

addition,261 because it contains nothing but a genus-term as one part and a
species-term as the other part. In Ockhams words, the definition imports
nothing extrinsic to the thing.262 Definition here is nothing but true predica-
tion: that a species is defined means that a genus is truly predicated of the
species. For instance, the species man is defined by animal being truly predi-
cated of man such that the proposition man is an animal imports something
about all men, namely that they are animals. Recall that in Ockhams concep-
tion species and genera are nothing but concepts.263
A subject can accept that man is an animal non-inferentially, that is, by
means of intuitive cognition. Since Ockham is dealing with this special kind of
general proposition in the context of demonstration, accepting that man is an
animal here is an act of assent2. Ockham writes:
The first part of a definition, for instance the genus, cannot be demon-
strated of what is defined, neither a priori nor a posteriori; for instance, that
man is an animal cannot be demonstrated, but such a proposition
is accepted (as true) without syllogism, by means of intuitive cognition.
Thus if these concepts man and animal exist in the intellect and some man
has been seen then it is immediately known that man is an animal.264
What does it amount to that a subject can accept immediately the proposi-
tion that man is an animal by means of (mediante) intuitive cognition?265
260 Recall that absolute terms are terms which do not signify something primarily and some-
thing else or the same secondarily; rather whatever is signified by such a noun is signified
primarily and in the same way, []. sl I, 10 (op, 35).
261 De definitione exprimente quid rei, non data per additamentum. SL III-2, 29 (OP I,
557560).
262 The whole sentence reads: Quaedam enim definitio talis est quae nihil importat extrin-
secum rei alio modo quam importat rem vel partem rei. Et talis definitio vocatur definitio
propriissime dicta, quae non potest esse nisi substantiarum vel nominum substantiarum,
[]. SL III-2, 28 (OP I, 556) (Italics mine).
263 See 1.5.4 Simple and Material Supposition, on species and genera.
264 Prima pars definitionis, puta genus, nec a priori nec a posteriori potest demonstrari de
definito; sicut quod homo sit animal demonstrari non potest, sed propositio talis sine syl-
logismo accipitur, mediante notitia intuitiva. Unde istis conceptibus homo et animal
existentibus in intellectu et aliquo homine viso statim scitur quod homo est animal. SL
III-2, 29 (OP I, 557).
265 A terminological remark aside: note that Ockham uses the Latin expression mediante
here while in the earlier Ordinatio he used the expression de virtute throughout to
Intuitive cognition is involved here in two respects: the account of the intu-
ition-based acquisition of simple absolute concepts, discussed above, imme-
diately follows upon this passage. This account of concept acquisition is
introduced as follows:266 It is not that these concepts would precede an act
of intuitive cognition of a man, but the process is this: first, there is a cognitive
act of a man by means of a particular sense; [].267 Recall that Ockham
distinguishes three steps of intuition-based concept acquisition. Since the
acquisition of such a concept is based upon an act of intuitive cognition, it
follows rather trivially that the occurrence of such a concept cannot pre-
cede any act of intuitive cognition. If a subject accepts the proposition that
man is an animal immediately, he must have acquired the specific concept
(man) and the generic concept (animal) due to the intuitive cognition of a
particular man and some other animal before.
However, intuition-based concept possession is not sufficient in order to
immediately accept that man is an animal. Some actual intuitive cogni-
tion of a particular man is further required (et aliquo homine viso). Why is
it necessary to actually intuit some man in addition? According to Ockham,
the proposition man is an animal is only contingently and not necessarily
true: [] the [proposition] man is a rational animal is simply contingent
[] since if there were no man, then any proposition like this would be
false.268 A proposition where a genus-term is predicated of a species-term
is necessary only if the proposition is modal or conditional. Ockham writes:
[] any hypothetical proposition which is composed of a definiens and a
definiendum is necessary and a possible proposition (de possibili) or
one equivalent to such a proposition is necessary as well.269 He gives
the following example: this [proposition] is necessary: if there is a man,
then there is a rational animal []; likewise, every man can be a rational
indicate the (epistemological) role of intuitive cognition. It will become clear that the
same role is indicated by both expressions.
266 See above 3.2 How to Acquire an Absolute Simple Concept.
267 The whole passage reads as follows: Non quod isti conceptus praecedant notitiam intu-
itivam hominis, sed iste est processus quod primo homo cognoscitur aliquo sensu par-
ticulari, deinde ille idem homo cognoscitur ab intellectu, quo cognito habetur una notitia
generalis et communis omni homini. Et ista cognitio vocatur conceptus, intentio, passio,
qui conceptus communis est omni homini; []. SL III-2, 29 (OP I, 557).
268 [] ista est simpliciter contingens homo est animal rationale [], quia si nullus homo
esset, quaelibet talis esset falsa. SL I, 26 (OP I, 87).
269 [] aliqua propositio composita ex definitione et definito hypothetica et etiam de pos-
sibili vel aequivalens tali sit necessaria []. SL I, 26 (OP I, 87).
218 Chapter 3
animal [].270 The latter is equivalent to it is possible that every man is

an animal.271
Whereas the truth of the contingent mental proposition man is an animal
requires the actual existence of at least one man, the truth of the necessary
propositions man can be an animal or it is possible that man is an animal does
not. A subject can assent2 immediately to the proposition man is an animal
only if he actually intuits a man, just as the subject can assent to a contingent
singular present tense proposition about a particular thing only if he actually
intuits the thing. Thus a subject can immediately assent2 to man is an animal
if (a) he has acquired the concepts of man and of animal due to the intuitive
cognition of some particular man and some other animal, for instance, a dog
or a horse, and (b) if he actually intuits a man.272 Of course it is further required
that the subject first forms the mental proposition man is an animal.273 After
sketching intuition-based acquisition of generic concepts Ockham states:
When this general concept of animal exists in the mind, then the intel-
lect can compose this concept with the prior concept [man], by using the
verb is; and the intellect assents immediately to this proposition [man is
an animal], without any syllogism.274
The point is that this act of assent2 does not presuppose an act of apprehen-
sion2, but only an act of apprehension1, namely the forming of the mental
proposition, like evident judgements about singular truths. It is not even pos-
sible for a subject to reflexively note that he is (merely) entertaining the thought
that man is an animal, since the subject cannot entertain this thought without
270 [] sicut ista est necessaria si homo est, animal rationale est [], et similiter ista omnis
homo potest esse animal rationale []. SL I, 26 (OP I, 87).
271 Ockhams semantic of universal quantification differs enormously from the semantic of
Frege or Russell. See Knne, Die Philosophische Logik Gottlob Freges, 222225; Knne,
Propositions in Bolzano and Frege, Grazer Philosophische Studien 53 (1997), 203240. It is
also against Aristotles view that propositions such as man is a living thing are necessary.
See Aristotle, Analytica Priora I, c. 15 (34b16-17).
272 It can be held that this case is somewhat special: whenever a human subject thinks that
man is an animal, this proposition is true, since at least the thinker actually exists. Thus
perhaps a lion is an animal or a rose is a flower would be better examples here.
273 In the terminology used above: an act of apprehension1 is further required, since every act
of judgement presupposed an act of apprehension.
274 Quo exsistente in anima [animal] potest intellectus componere istum conceptum cum
conceptu priori [homo], quibus compositis ad invicem mediante hoc verbo est, statim
intellectus assentit illi complexo, sine syllogismo. SL III-2, 29 (OP I, 557) (Italics mine).
being committed to its truth.275 To put it differently, the subject cannot refuse
to give his assent2 to the proposition. Ockham states in the Quaestiones Variae:
And in no way will the will be able to impede this assent, if this pro
position is apprehended, not any more than it can impede assent with
respect to a proposition which is known by itself, if it was apprehended
earlier.276
A modal proposition can also be evidently assented to, as Ockham remarks

with respect to the proposition lions can be animals (leo potest esse ani-
mal).277 The truth of this proposition does not require the actual existence of
a lion. Therefore, giving ones assent evidently does not require the intuition of
a lion in this case. The subject must only be in possession of the intuition-
based concepts of lion and animal. Being in possession of such a species-
concept implies that there have been things within the concepts extension:
otherwise, the subject could not have acquired a concept on the basis of his
intuition of one of them. If a subject possesses this intuition-based concept, he
knows that it is possible that lions exist, since by virtue of his (fomer) intuition
of a lion at T1 he knows that is, he is able to judge at T2 that a lion existed at
T1. And since what is can be, from the (former) actual existence of a lion the
possible present existence of lions follows.278 Therefore, the subject can know
from the actual existence of a lion at some past point of time T1 that it is pos-
sible that lions exist at some later time T2 or T3.279
What is special about this kind of modal general proposition involving a
species term and/or a genus term is that it is not about mere logical possibility,
but about the real or physical possibility of things in this world. In my view,
275 Interestingly, Ockham gives the same example (man is an animal) when discussing first
assent. ([] unus, quo aliquid scitur esse vel non esse; [] similiter assentio quod homo
est animal.) Quodl. III, q. 8 (OT IX, 233). A subject merely acknowledges that man is an
animal if for instance he does not possess the truth-concept. If, however, he possesses the
truth-concept and entertains this thought (man is animal) while intuiting some man,
then he cannot refuse to give his assent2 to it.
276 Nec erit aliquo modo in potestate voluntatis impedire illum assensum, facta apprehen-
sione illius complexi, non plus quam potest impedire assensum respectu propositionis
per se notae, facta prius eius apprehensione. Quaest. Var., q. 5 (OT VIII, 185).
277 SL III-2, 29 (OP I, 559).
278 Ab esse ad posse valet consequentia. See Geach, Mental Acts, 15.
279 For the notion of physical possibility see Adams; Kretzmann, William of Ockham:
Predestination, Gods Foreknowledge, and Future Contingent, 5 ff. and McCord Adams,
William Ockham, 11161117; 1127, 1134, 11481150.
220 Chapter 3
the most important function of intuition-based concepts is to inform the sub-

ject about what kinds of things there are and can be in this world.280 And they
have this epistemological function because they are at least mediately, that
is, via intuition causally related to one of the things they signify1/2. In the
Introduction I stated that by ascribing signification to concepts Ockham con-
ceives of tokens of concepts as (possible) parts of propositional acts of thought,
just as spoken terms are conceived as parts of spoken propositions, since signi-
fication implies the possibility of personal supposition.281 It is for this reason,
I think, that according to Ockham the possession of an intuition-based concept
such as cat implies the subjects ability to form a general proposition about the
(possible) existence of cats.282 (In other words, it implies the subjects ability to
entertain thoughts about the (possible) existence of cats.) Thus the following
is a minimal requirement for the possession of a specific intuition-based
concept:
(Cspec) A subject S possesses an intuition-based specific concept Cspec

only if S is able to form a true mental proposition where Cspec is
subject or predicate.
Again, what is special is that if the subject has an intuition-based concept of a

certain kind of thing, he cannot form a mental proposition about its (possible)
existence without simultaneously giving his assent. For instance, if the subject
has acquired the concept man due to the intuitive cognition of a man, he can-
not merely entertain the thought that men exist. In Ockhams words, [] the
intellect knows immediately that man is something, without inference.283
And if he has acquired both a specific concept (man) and the matching generic
concept (animal), then he can predicate animal of man.284 Ockham modifies
280 See above 3.2.1 The Three Steps of Concept Acquisition.

281 See above 3.1 Introduction.
282 Of course, a token of this concept can also be part of other propositions. The point is that
if the concept of cat would be the only concept possessed by a subject, then the subject
could at least form mental propositions about the (possible) existence of cats.
283 [] statim intellectus scit quod homo est aliquid, sine discursu []. SL III-2, 29 (OP I,
557). Note that aliquid implies the (possible) existence of a thing. In this sense, the chi-
mera is not something (aliquid), because it cannot exist. See 1.4 The Narrow and the
Wider Sense of Signify (significare).
284 That is, he can connect animal as a predicate with man. For the notion of predicate see
1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of Signify (significare).
the object of this kind of assent2 by saying that a proposition which is assented2
to in this way is known by itself. He writes:
[] any mental proposition in which such absolute concepts are subject

and predicate is known by itself, because they are known immediately
as soon as the terms are cognized.285
The condition of knowing the terms is qualified further:
And this is generally true of every genus with respect to a species which
is absolute, because such a proposition is known immediately when the
terms are known perfectly.286
What does the perfect knowledge of the terms amount to here? I claim that
according to Ockham, the perfect knowledge of the terms here is nothing
but the intuition-based possession of the specific and generic concepts
involved in the mental proposition. How is this to be taken? Recall that
intuition-based concepts are simple insofar as they do not include other
concepts as their parts. To know something perfectly means in one sense
that nothing of what is cognized escapes the cognizers notice or lies hidden
to the cognizing subject.287 It will become clear in a moment that there are
different ways of acquiring species- or genus-concepts which result in differ-
ent kinds of concepts. Another way of acquiring a species-concept is to learn
what a spoken term such as cat signifies that is, by being given a linguistic
description of cats, while not having an intuition of a cat. It shall become
clear that the resulting concept is complex, since it contains different con-
cepts as its parts. Now to have perfect knowledge of the terms of a proposi-
tion such as cats are animals means to have the intuition-based concepts of
cat and of animal, since due to the fact that they lack any conceptual struc-
ture it is just not possible that the subject does not take notice of all of their
parts; there simply is nothing that could escape the subjects notice. However,
this does not mean that by possessing the intuition-based concept of cat, one
would know everything there is to know about both the accidental and
285 [] quaelibet talis propositio mentalis in qua subiciuntur et praedicantur tales con
ceptus mere absoluti est per se nota, quia statim sciuntur cognitis terminis. SL III-2, 29
(OP I, 558).
286 Et hoc est universaliter verum de omni genere respectu speciei quae est mere absoluta,
quia talis propositio statim scitur cognitis terminis perfecte. SL III-2, 29 (OP I, 557558).
287 [] quando scilicet nihil cogniti latet cognoscentem, []. SL III-2, 30 (OP I, 561).
222 Chapter 3
essential properties of cats. Recall that there is no direct cognitive access to

the substantial forms of things. It only means that if one has such an intu-
ition-based concept, one can know that there are or can be such things. The
epithet of being known by itself applies to mental propositions containing
intuition-based (absolute) specific and generic concepts as their constitu-
ent parts (as subject and predicate). One should not be misled by Ockhams
talk of the knowledge of the terms here since by terms he refers exclusively
to intuition-based concepts as constituent parts of mental propositions.
The subject does not have to know what spoken terms signify by virtue of the
concepts he possesses.
What does it mean when we say that a general mental proposition in which
an intuition-based generic concept is predicated (modally or not) of an intu-
ition-based specific concept is known by itself? Why can a subject come to
accept such a mental proposition as true by forming it? The role of intuitive
cognition on the level of general thought is twofold, just as the intuitive cogni-
tion of particular things is: on the one hand, intuition plays a semantic role
insofar as the extension of simple absolute concepts is partly determined by
intuitive cognition. And on the other hand, intuition is epistemologically rele-
vant, since it explains how a subject can non-inferentially acquire a special
kind of true general belief about natural species and genera. Ockham here
describes a case of belief acquisition, just as in the case of evident judgements
about singular contingent truths. According to Ockham we acquire (true)
beliefs both singular and general about what there is and about what there
can be due to intuitive cognition. Thus with respect to general contingent prop-
ositions of this kind:
(assentev)2 A subject S judges2 evidently that F is G at T1 where F is

a (mental) species-term and G is a (mental) genus-term
if and only if (a) S has acquired F and G on the basis of
intuitive cognition at some earlier point of time T0 and
(b) S intuits an F at T1 and (c) it is true that F is G at T1.
And analogously with respect to general necessary (or more generally, modal)
propositions:
(assentev)3 A subject S judges2 evidently at T1 that it is possible that F is

G where F is a (mental) species-term and G is a (mental)
genus-term if and only if (a) S has acquired F and G on the
basis of intuitive cognition at some earlier point of time
T0 and (b) it is true that it is possible that F is G at T1.
According to Ockham, a subject can entertain the thought that lions are ani-
mals without being committed to its truth if he lacks the intuition-based con-
cept of lion, just as in the absence of Socrates a subject can think that Socrates
is white without giving his assent.288
Now I turn to the alternative way of acquiring species- or genus-concepts
alluded to above. At this point, the difference between knowing the significa-
tion of spoken terms by virtue of having some mental terms and merely pos-
sessing mental terms (due to intuitive cognition) becomes crucial. Ockham
makes use of subordination and imposition to suggest a kind of language-
based acquisition of concepts: if a spoken term such as lion signifies1/2 lions in
virtue of being subordinated to some mental term lion, it is possible for a
speaker who has never met with a lion to learn what the spoken term lion
signifies1/2 simply by being given some linguistic description. Ockham writes:
Nevertheless, not any spoken proposition of this kind is known by itself,

since due to the fact that spoken words are conventional, absolute
spoken terms can be imposed upon the very same things of which we
have or others have such absolute concepts. Thus it is possible that
someone who does not possess such a mental term still knows what the
terms signify while at the same time he does not know this (mental)
proposition because he does not have some of the mental terms; but he
does have several mental terms, and if in turn some of them are com-
posed, the resulting whole of them will be convertible with this spoken
term.289
This language-based account of concept acquisition can be rendered as fol-

lows: (1) as Ockham points out in the first few lines, the possibility of learning
the signification of spoken terms (significata vocabulorum) presupposes that
there are some established spoken terms whose signification is determined by
their being subordinated to mental terms. And in the case of absolute terms it
is necessary that the spoken term be subordinated to some simple absolute
288 See 3.4 Intuitive Cognition and Evident Judgement.

289 Tamen non quaelibet propositio talis vocalis est per se nota, nam ex quo voces sunt ad
placitum, voces mere absolutae possunt imponi eisdem de quibus habemus, vel alii
habent tales conceptus. Et tunc aliquis, qui talem conceptum mentalem non habet,
potest scire significata vocabulorum et simul cum hoc potest nescire eam, eo quod ali-
quos conceptus mentales non habet; sed habet conceptus mentales plures, quorum
aliqui, si componantur ad invicem, totum resultans ex eis erit convertibile cum illa voce.
SL III-2, 29 (OP I, 558) (Italics mine).
224 Chapter 3
mental term, that is, to an intuition-based mental term. As Ockham states,

absolute spoken terms can be imposed upon the very same things of which we
have or others have such absolute concepts.
(2) It is further required that the learning subject has some mental terms by
virtue of which he knows the signification1/2 of some spoken terms. Otherwise
he will not be able to understand a linguistic description such as the following:
a lion is a large, fierce, tawny, loud-roaring animal of the cat family, the male
having a shaggy mane.290 (3) Now understanding this description implies a
compositional act just as understanding a spoken proposition implies the
forming of a corresponding mental proposition.291 If the subject understands
the description, then he should at least have acquired a composite mental
term that looks something like the following:
lioncomp={large, fierce, tawny, loud-roaring animal of the cat family, the

male having a shaggy mane}292
(4) The resulting composite mental term must meet a semantic criterion,
namely that of being convertible with the spoken term. The Latin expression
convertibile is a technical term used in the context of descriptions and defini-
tions and in the context of the inter-derivability of sentences. Now the definien-
dum and the definiens are convertibile if they signify the same (idem significant).
Ockham writes:
The defined is taken for that which is convertible with the definition, and
of which the definition is adequately predicated [of the defined]. And in
this way, the defined is a phrase which is convertible with the definition
and which signifies precisely the same as the definition.293
Ockham does not speak about sameness of signification simpliciter but says
that the defined signifies precisely (praecise) the same as the definition. This
restriction is especially crucial with respect to nominal definitions of connota-
tive and relative terms, since these terms signify something primarily and
something the same or something different secondarily.
290 The Chambers Dictionary, Edinburgh, 1993 (lion ad loc.).

291 See 3.3.2 Propositional Acts of Apprehension: Spoken Propositions.
292 The index lioncomp indicates the composite concept lion.
293 [] accipitur definitum pro aliquo convertibili cum definitione, de quo definitio adae-
quate praedicatur. Et sic definitum est una dictio convertibilis cum definitione, signifi-
cans illud idem praecise quod significat definitio. SL I, 29 (OP I, 91).
However, we are dealing here only with absolute terms: an absolute term
signifies exclusively, and in one and the same way, one kind of thing.
Signification, in a previous chapter, was conceived as correct applicability to
things.294 That an absolute composite mental term and a spoken absolute term
signify the same means that they are both correctly applicable to the same
things, and conversely, are verified by the same things. Recall that the two
predicates is (correctly) applicable to and verifies express two con-
verse relations.295 Since convertibility is sameness of signification and same-
ness of signification is correct applicability to the same things, in the case of
absolute terms it follows that an absolute composite mental term is convertible
with an absolute spoken term if and only if they are both correctly applicable
to the same things (and are verified by the same things). Thus:
(Conv)296 A composite absolute mental term tmcomp is convertible with

an absolute spoken term ts if and only if tmcomp and ts are
correctly applicable to the same things (and are verified by
the same things).
The extension of the spoken term is determined in quite another way as the
extension of the composite mental term. The extension of lion is exclusively
determined by subordination to some intuition-based mental term lion, while
the extension of lioncomp is specified by the intensional features of the concept,
since lioncomp should contain the characteristics which all and only lions are
supposed to exhibit.
It is possible now to explain why a subject possessing the composite mental
term lion can entertain the thought that lions can be animals without being
able to assent2 to this evidently, although as Ockham says he might take it
to be true.297 Intuition-based concepts inform the subject about what kinds of
things there are and can be in this world, since intuition is causally related to
its object. By contrast, this composite mental term provides the subject in the
optimal case only with the intensional features of the concept lion, but it
294 See 1.4, The Narrow and the Wider Sense of Signify (significare).
295 See 1.5 The Property of Supposition.
296 (Conv) abbreviates Minimal requirement for convertibility.
297 [] ego modo de facto scio quid significat hoc nomen leo et scio quid significat hoc
nomen animal et tamen ignoro istam propositionem leo potest esse animal, quamvis
credam esse veram. SL III-2, 29 (OP I, 559) (Italics mine). Does this kind of believing or
perhaps better taking to be true presuppose an act of judgement? The answer should
be yes. But in this case, the assent is not given evidently, but for other reasons.
226 Chapter 3
does not inform him about the physical possibility of lions existing in this world.
To put it crudely, lioncomp does not make known to the subject what a real lion is,
since the subject has not been acquainted with a particular lion; it only provides
him with the characteristic features of lions. Thereby the subject does not know
whether there are or at least have been any particular lions in the world.
Conversely, the intuition-based concept lion does not necessarily provide the
subject with all the intensional features of the concept. Recall that the extension
of such a concept is causally determined by intuition and real similarity.
Note that the intuition-based concept is said to be simple, while the lan-
guage-based concept was described as composite.298 As stated above, this
means that the former as opposed to the latter does not contain parts. The
structural difference between the intuition-based and the language-based
concepts involved in the thought that a lion can be an animal can be rendered
respectively as follows:
(7)a lionsimp can be an animal.

(8)a lioncomp can be an animal.299
Although (7) and (8) differ with respect to the structure of at least some of
their conceptual components, it is not the case that (7) and (8) differ with
respect to their import, since lionsimp and lioncomp are verified by the same
things. (7) and (8) differ epistemically: lionsimp provides the subject with the
information about the possible existence of lions required for evident assent,
whereas lioncomp does not. One could also say that the reason is that the
subject who has intuited a lion thereby has the evidence that there have been
particular lions while the subject who has never had the occasion to find
himself in the very presence of a lion does not have such evidence of the exis-
tence of lions. The only evidence he might possess to come to believe
that there might be lions is that he was told by others that there were such
animals. Ockham himself characterizes this difference in epistemological
terms. He writes:
[] the proposition formed by someone who is colour blind from birth,

saying that white is a colour, is different from the proposition which
298 Ockham characterizes the intuition-based concept as simple (simplex) and proper (pro-
pria). He writes: []; sed propositionem mentalem cuius subiectum sit aliquod simplex
mere absolutum proprium leonibus non habeo, []. SL III-2, 29 (OP I, 559).
299 What is crucial here is the structure of the species, not of the genera. Therefore I do not
specify their structure.
I form in mind, saying that white is a colour; the latter is simply indemon-
strable and the former is demonstrable, taking demonstration broadly.300
A proposition such as
(9)Whitesimp is a colour
is indemonstrable insofar as someone cannot entertain this thought without

thereby acknowledging its truth. By contrast, someone thinking that
(10)Whitecomp is a colour
is not committed to its truth; that is (10) can be demonstrated, because it can
be made known by a demonstration if demonstration is taken broadly.
Ockham explains:
It can be said that taking demonstration broadly, these [kind of pro

positions] are demonstrable. And this because the conclusion can
be unknown and doubted and then later, when the major premise is
known the one in which the same predicate is predicated of that men-
tal concept acquired by intuitive cognition of a thing and when the
minor premise is known the one in which the same concept is predi-
cated of the subject of the conclusion then the conclusion can be made
known [by demonstration].301
In my view, demonstrability here boils down to something like the following:

a subject first acquires the concepts white and colour such that he is able to
entertain (10), but then he acquires the concept white due to the intuition of a
white thing such that he is able to evidently assent to (9). In this (improper)
sense, (10) is demonstrable, because it can be made evident provided the
300 [] illa propositio quam format caecus a nativitate de coloribus, dicendo quod albedo
est color, est distincta propositio ab illa quam ego formo in mente, dicendo quod albedo
est color; et una est simpliciter indemonstrabilis et alia forte est demonstrabilis, large
accipiendo demonstrationem. SL III-2, 29 (OP I, 560).
301 Potest dici quod large accipiendo demonstrationem, tales sunt demonstrabiles. Et hoc,
quia conclusio potest esse ignota et dubia et postea, scita propositione maiore in qua
praedicatur idem praedicatum de conceptu mentali adquisito per notitiam intuitivam rei
et scita minore in qua praedicatur idem conceptus de subiecto conclusionis, potest con-
clusio fieri nota. SL III-2, 29 (OP I, 559).
228 Chapter 3
concept white is acquired later on the basis of intuition.302 That (9) is inde-
monstrable simply means that it cannot be demonstrated, because it is not
possible for it to be first ignored or doubted and then made known. The epis-
temic difference between general thoughts of a special kind can be explained
in terms of intuitive cognition and intuition-based concepts: thoughts such as
(7) and (8) or (9) and (10) can have the same content because the concepts
involved signify the same.
Non-propositional acts of cognition have both semantic and epistemologi-
cal functions. The content of propositional thought can be derived from
the content of its non-propositional parts. Further, the extension of simple
absolute concepts corresponding largely to natural-kind terms is partly deter-
mined by intuitive cognition. At the same time, intuitive acts of cognition and
intuition-based general concepts have an important epistemological function:
they provide the subject with the epistemic evidence either that there are
things or that there have been things that verify the concepts in question.
Ockham can account for the acquisition of knowledge about what there is in
a world of particular things by means of this double role of non-propositional
acts: a subject can have singular and general true beliefs about what there actu-
ally is and what there can be because the intellect has the disposition to com-
pose concepts to form syntactically structured acts of thought. And general
concepts of the things populating the world are not learned, but merely
acquired by direct encounter. To put it differently, a condition of the posses-
sion of simply absolute concepts is that they be part of true mental proposi-
tions: a subject has acquired the concept fly if and only if he is able to think
that there are flies or that there can be flies. Due to the epistemological function
of intuitive cognition, the subject cannot entertain this thought without being
committed to its truth.
3.5 Summary
In the Introduction I claimed that Ockham attempts to explain how it is pos-

sible to (truly) think that p in a world of particulars by means of the mental-
speech assumption. By claiming that occurrences of thoughts are not merely
described analogously to overt speech, but in fact are structured analogously to
spoken propositions, Ockham explains how something propositional, and
hence something susceptible of being true or false, comes into this world of
302 Ockham accounts for demonstrability in a similar way in the Ordinatio. See Ord. I, dist. 3,
q. IV (OT II, 441).
particulars at all, if other thinkers such as God or angels are left aside. According
to Ockhams model of hierarchically ordered non-propositional and proposi-
tional acts of thought, the human intellect simply is designed to compose
mental propositions (propositional acts of thought) which can be true or false.
The human intellect is cognitively related to particular things by non-
propositional intuitive cognition. The subject is acquainted with things present
to him by intuition. Intuitive acts have a semantic as well as an epistemological
function: as the intuitive act can supposit (naturally) for its object, a subject
can form a mental proposition about the thing he actually intuits; once he
entertains such a thought he cannot but acknowledge it as true. Intuition also
sets general thought into operation, since simple absolute concepts corre-
sponding largely to natural kind concepts are acquired by the intuition of par-
ticular things.
It is one of the conditions of the possession of an intuition-based concept
that the subject can evidently judge that there are things or that that there can
be things which verify his intuition-based concept: having the concept fly
implies that the subject is able to form mental propositions such as there are
flies or that there can be flies; however, due to the double role of intuition a
subject cannot merely entertain the thought that that there can be flies if he
possesses the intuition-based concept and actually entertains this thought.
The most important function of intuition-based concepts is to inform the sub-
ject about what kinds of things there are and can be in this world. Intuition
provides the subject with epistemic evidence of there at least having been
things falling under his concept, since intuition is causally related to its object.
It is not necessary for the subject to be able to reflect on his concept as being
based on intuition. The latter requires cognitive access to the fact that the con-
cept is actually based on intuition.303 It is sufficient that the subject has
acquired such an intuition-based concept in order to evidently assent to a cer-
tain kind of general proposition. These are known by themselves (per se notae)
because they presuppose only the possession of the intuition-based concepts
involved. These propositions can serve as premises of demonstrations.
Knowledge starts with evident acts of judgement about singular and general
contingent and necessary truths, because only something true is known in the
strict sense. Since only propositions can be true, it follows that propositions
are the objects of knowledge in the strict sense, although what is known relates
the intellect to things in the world. For example, if a subject acknowledges the
proposition flies are animals as true, he truly believes that flies are animals.
303 As Panaccio points out, this kind of reflexive cognitive access is not required by Ockhams
conception of intuition. (Private communication).
230 Chapter 3
I argued that to acknowledge the truth of a proposition is by definition a sec-

ond-order act, although it does not involve predicating true of it. Rather, it
involves the activation of the truth-concept: according to my interpretation, a
subject activates his truth-concept when he accepts that things are thus as
they are said to be by the proposition. Ockham relies heavily on the nominal
definition of truth to account for acts of assent of the second kind. By assent-
ing2 to a proposition the subject explicitly accepts a proposition as true.304
This implies the second-order act of taking notice of the thought that the sub-
ject actually entertains. What is special about evident acts of judgement is that
these are by definition acts of the second kind, since a proposition is explicitly
acknowledged as true, although they presuppose only the forming of a mental
proposition, that is, a first-order act of apprehension.
I conclude that although propositional acts of thought, mental propositions
in Ockhams terminology, are syntactically structured, it does not follow that
an act of assenting to such a mental proposition is syntactically structured,
simply because an act of assenting is not identical to the mental proposition,
although, as in the case of evident acts, it occurs simultaneously with the form-
ing of a mental proposition. Neither does it follow that the consequent state of
believing is syntactically structured, as will become clear in the following sec-
tion. If it is objected that the assumption of mental speech implies some rather
strong presuppositions about the workings of the intellect, it must not be over-
looked that thereby Ockham attempts to construct the human intellect as the
factory of propositions in this world of (non-propositional) particulars. To
conceive of thought in terms of syntactically structured mental acts simply
implies the rather strong assumption that the intellect is disposed to form
mental propositions whose content is derived from the content of their parts.
Ockhams mental-speech assumption has a compensating function within the
ontological constraints of his nominalist framework: his ontological parsi-
mony is compensated by the rich equipment of the human intellect.
304 See above 3.3.3 Acts of Judgement.

Chapter 4
Why Ockham Is Not Fodor
In the Introduction of this work it was held that the interpretation of Ockhams
mental-speech assumption (ams) as an ideal language in some Fregean sense
was seriously challenged by Panaccio and others who attempted to show that
mental speech is not entirely devoid of equivocation and synonymy.1 In turn
they offered the alternative reading of ams as an ancestor of Fodors Language
of Thought Hypothesis (loth). According to this reading, loth and ams are
alike insofar as both imply an asymmetrical relation between thought and lan-
guage, since thought is conceived as having semantic and syntactic priority
over language. For instance, in a 2009 paper Calvin Normore takes Ockhams
mental speech to share five basic features with Fodors Language of Thought.
Normore writes:
First, it must be a medium in which thinking is carried on. Second it must

have a syntax which is similar for all thinkers and which makes it possible to
combine elements of thought so as to form other items which are capable
of representing and bearing truth-values. Third it must be expressively
complete in the sense that anything which can be expressed in any natural
language could in principle be expressed in it. Fourth it must be prior to natu-
ral language in the sense that one does not need already to have a natural
language in order to have (or to acquire) it. Fifth it must be such that elements
of natural languages have their meaning in virtue of relations they bear to its
elements so that if its elements were to behave differently semantically the
corresponding elements of each natural language would also behave differ-
ently. Both the oratio mentalis of Ockhams Summa Logicae and Fodors
Language of Thought are mental languages in this sense.2
Do the results of this work support Normores characterization of Ockhams

mental speech? Let us review the five characteristics one by one. As we saw in
1 David Chalmers, Is There Synonymy in Ockhams Mental Language? in P.V. Spade (ed.),
The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, New York, 1999, 7699; Claude Panaccio, Connotative
Terms in Ockhams Mental Language, Cahiers dpistmologie, no. 9016, 1990, Montral; id.,
Ockham on Concepts; Martin M. Tweedale, Ockhams Supposed Elimination of Connotative
Terms and His Ontological Parsimony, Dialogue, 31 (1992), 431444.
2 Normore, The End of Mental Language, 294.

232 Chapter 4
the third chapter, thinking that p involves the occurrence of a propositional act
importing that p.3 Perhaps it can be held that (1) mental speech is a kind of
medium in which thinking is carried on insofar as thinking implies the occur-
rence of mental acts which are real qualities of the intellect. A subject can
think that p by means of a mental act importing that p. The next point, how-
ever, is of greater importance: in the second chapter of this work I argued that
the two functions Ockham ascribes to mental items in the Summa Logicae
make it necessary to conceive of mental speech as involving the use of a kind
of language which is semantically and syntactically prior to natural language.
It is at least implied (2a) that this language has a semantics and a syntax, since
a spoken term has the same signification as a given mental term to which it is
subordinated, whereas a spoken proposition imports the same as some corre-
sponding mental proposition. Thereby it is also implied (2b) that mental terms
can be combined so as to form propositional items which are capable of
representing and bearing truth-values. It is perhaps less obvious (2c) that
the syntax is similar for all thinkers. But the priority of the syntax of mental
speech over the syntax of natural languages strongly suggests a uniform syntax
of mental speech.
Normores next point, that (3) mental speech must be expressively
complete in the sense that anything which can be expressed in any natural
language could in principle be expressed in it is implied by the principle of
correspondence. And the discussion of general propositions containing intu-
ition-based concepts showed that according to Ockham it is possible to have at
least one kind of propositional thought without having learned a natural lan-
guage such as English.4 Thus there is at least one case in which (4) mental
speech is indeed prior to natural language in the sense that one does not need
already to have a natural language in order to have (or to acquire) it. Lastly,
(5) it is implied by the identity-preserving relation of subordination that if a
mental term were to change its signification, then the spoken term would
change its signification in the same way due to its being subordinated to the
mental term.
In general, Ockhams approach to the problem of the semantic analysis of
spoken (and written) propositions in the Summa Logicae implies the semantic
and syntactic priority of mental speech. Thus Normores similarity-claim with
respect to the dependence of language on thought is supported by the results
3 See 3.3 Ockhams Model of Non-Propositional and Propositional Acts and 3.3.1 Propositional
Acts of Apprehension: Mental Propositions.
4 See 3.4.1 General Propositions and Evident Judgement: propositiones per se notae.
Why Ockham Is Not Fodor 233
of this work. Note that Normore also restricts his discussion of ams to Ockhams
account in the Summa Logicae.
However, one should be aware of the limits of this similarity: I claim that
the similarity of Ockhams to Fodors assumption is restricted to the rela-
tion between thought and language. As I want to show, the two assump-
tions differ crucially with respect to their implications for the structure of
mental acts and states in general. I claim that Ockham does not want to
account for the structure of mental acts such as acts of judging or of men-
tal states such as states of believing in terms of ams. The latter, however, is
clearly Fodors intention. (This will be discussed in some detail in the next
section). Fodor leaves no doubt that it is not sufficient for his systematic
purposes to claim that the intentional object of thought is syntactically
structured. It is further required that believing and desiring are typically
structured states. As Fodor states, its here that lot ventures beyond mere
Intentional Realism, [].5 According to Fodors classification, Ockham
would perhaps be an intentional realist, but not a defender of the Language
of Thought. The interpretation suggested by Normore does not take
into account the function of lot within Fodors conception of proposi-
tional attitudes. The structural differences between Ockhams and Fodors
conceptions, however, become apparent on the level of propositional
attitudes. Further, these structural differences are connected with onto-
logical differences in a non-arbitrary way. It should be clear from the begin-
ning that in what follows I merely wish to reconstruct Fodors conception
clearly enough to compare it to Ockhams ams as it has been reconstructed
in this work. However I do not thereby mean to make judgement upon
the explanatory power of Fodors approach or its place in contemporary
philosophy of mind. I now turn to Fodors loth in more detail, first giving
a rough sketch of the relevant theoretical background within which lot
appeared.
4.1 Behaviorism vs. Cognitive Science
As Fodor states in his recent lot 2 from 2008, one of the main motivations
for writing the by now seminal book The Language of Thought which
appeared in 1975 was to provide an alternative to the behaviourist model of
5 Fodor, Psychosemantics, 136.

234 Chapter 4
the mind that dominated the discussion both in philosophy and psychology
at that time.6,7
Psychology was first revolutionized by behaviourism after World War II in
the United States, influenced by, inter alia, experimental psychologists like
Pavlov. It promised to make psychology an objective science. The underlying
assumption was that psychology can only become an objective science like
physics or chemistry if it studies what is observable, since, so it was held, only
the observable can be verifiable. And since mental events and states such as
thinking, willing, or desiring are not overtly observable, psychologists should
turn to behaviour for what is observable. The goal of an objective psychology
should be to discover and formulate the laws of behaviour. The consequences
of this behaviourist revolution for experimental psychology in the u.s. can be
described in the following way: Perception became discrimination, memory
became learning, language became verbal behavior, intelligence became what
intelligence tests test.8
Although the simple behaviourist stimulusresponse-model was replaced
by more sophisticated models such as B.F. Skinners, the explanatory power of
his so-called radical behaviourism9 was seriously called into question for
6 [] I was writing an exposition of what I took to be an emerging, interdisciplinary consen-

sus about how the mind works; the theory that was then just beginning to be called cognitive
science. I thought that, with luck, cognitive science might offer a serious alternative to the
moribund behaviorism that was, at the time, the mainstream of thinking about the mind in
both psychology and philosophy. A consummation devoutly to be wished that seemed to me,
because, impressive though the methodological and ontological credentials of behaviorism
might have appeared at the time, in practice it had made the study of the mind surprisingly
boring. If only one didnt have to be a behaviorist, [], one might be able to think of some
quite interesting questions to ask about the mind; some of which might even turn out to have
quite interesting answers. Jerry Fodor, LOT 2, Oxford, 2008, 4.
7 For a critical review of Fodors LOT 2 see Hans-Johann Glock, LOT 2: the Language of Thought
Revisited, Philosophy The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, vol. 85, n. 331 (January
2010), 164167; Jesse Prinz, Has Mentalese Earned Its Keep? On Jerry Fodors LOT 2, Mind,
vol. 120, nr. 478, April 2011, 485501.
8 George A. Miller, The cognitive revolution: a historical perspective, Trends in Cognitive
Science, vol. 7, 3 (March 2003).
9 Skinners radical behaviourism roughly amounts to the following: Skinner realized that
simple conditioning in terms of the simple stimulusresponse model cannot satisfactorily
account for more complex behaviour such as playing the piano or writing a poem. He there-
fore suggested an alternative account of these kinds of behaviours which he called operants.
That is, such an operant behavior is not merely a response to a stimulus, but it is emitted
actively and brings about changes in the environment. In turn, these changes in the environ-
ment determine how likely it is that the behaviour will be emitted in the future. Thus it can
instance by Chomskys devastating review of Skinners Verbal Behavior at the

end of the 1950s.10 Chomsky claimed that the behaviourist fails to explain vari-
ous facts about language acquisition, such as the rapid acquisition of language
by young children. He also argued that it simply seems not to be true that
learning a language depends on the application of reinforcement.11 But there
is more at stake than just the issue of language acquisition or linguistic behav-
iour. According to Chomsky, the behaviourist fails to account for the general
problem that the range of human behaviour and behavioural capacities is not
sufficiently determined by the history of individual reinforcement or individ-
ual operant conditioning. In general, it seems that learning, as one kind of
mental process, further requires that there be representational structures in
which the learning occurs. Supposedly, these representational structures are
pre-existent or innate.12
Here Fodor joins Chomskys critique. Fodor accounts for these presupposed
representational structures in terms of what he calls the Language of Thought
(lot). lot is part and parcel of Fodors alternative to the behaviourist
model of the mind, because computation presupposes a medium of computa-
tion: a representational system.13 By reviewing different cognitive processes
such as considered action and language acquisition Fodor argues in The
Language of Thought that a psychological model should represent cognitive
processes as computational, if it wants to stand any chance of plausibility
be held that operant conditioning has two basic purposes, that is, increasing or decreas-
ing the probability that a specific behaviour will occur in the future, which is accom-
plished by adding or removing one of two basic types of stimuli, positive or negative. See
George Graham, Behaviorism, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/
behaviorism/, last access March 7th 2014. See also B.F. Skinner, Science and human behav-
ior, New York (et al.), 1953.
10 See Noam Chomsky, A Review of B.F. Skinners Verbal Behavior, Language 35, no. 1, 1959,
2658.
11 See Graham, Behaviorism, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition),
7. Why Be Anti-Behaviorist.
12 The problem to which Chomsky refers, the problem of behavioural competence and thus
performance outstripping individual learning histories, goes beyond merely the issue of
linguistic behaviour in young children. It appears to be a fundamental fact about human
beings that our behaviour and behavioural capacities often surpass the limitations of
individual reinforcement histories. Our history of reinforcement is often too impover-
ished to determine uniquely what we do or how we do it. Much learning, therefore, seems
to require pre-existing or innate representational structures or principled constraints
within which learning occurs. Graham, Behaviorism.
236 Chapter 4
whatsoever.14 He argues that one cannot learn a language unless one already
has a language which in turn is not learned. The underlying assumption is
that the semantics of this unlearned language is prior to the semantics of any
other language. As Fodor stated about thirty years later in lot 2, [] the
semantics of thought is prior to the semantics of language. [] The [] impli-
cation is that semantics is essentially a theory of thoughts, the contents of
which are, [], not determined by norms and conventions.15 Technical and
terminological details aside, Ockham could agree with this. It should prove
useful to present the argument for lot that Fodor derives from language
acquisition to show that, at least in one respect, Ockham and Fodor conceive
of the relation between thought and language in a remarkably similar way.
4.2 Fodor on Language Acquisition
Fodor argues in The Language of Thought that one cannot learn a language
unless one already has a kind of language which and there is danger of regress
here is not learned, but merely acquired or rather innate.16 The underlying
idea is that learning the meaning of a predicate requires at least understanding
how the extension of the predicate is determined. Understanding how the
extension of a predicate such as is a dog or is a table is determined
requires understanding some general truth rule.17 A substitution instance of
such a general rule could be x is a dog is true if and only if y is a dog for the
predicate is a dog. Fodor points out that one can only understand this
instance if one is able to represent both the predicate and its truth rule.
However, the language in which they are represented cannot be identical to the
language one is supposed to learn; hence, one must already possess a language-like
system whose predicates have the same semantic properties as the predicates
which are learned (since otherwise, they could not be adequately represented).
As Fodor states: You cannot learn a language whose terms express semantic prop-
erties not expressed by the terms of some language you are already able to use.18
His argumentation in The Language of Thought runs as follows:19
14 Fodor, ibid.
15 Fodor, LOT 2, 198.
16 See Fodor, Representations: philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science,
Cambr., Mass., 1982, 257316.
17 For the formulation and notation of these truth rules see The Language of Thought, 59,
fn. 5.
19 I reconstruct this argument from The Language of Thought, 64.
(a) Learning a language whether first or second involves learning what

the predicates of the language mean.
(b) Learning what the predicates of a language mean involves learning a
determination of the extension of these predicates.
(c) Learning a determination of the extension of the predicates involves
learning that they fall under certain rules (i.e., truth rules).
(d) However, as one cannot learn that P falls under R unless one has a lan-
guage in which P and R can be represented, one cannot therefore learn a
language unless one has a language.
(e) In particular, one cannot learn a first language unless one already has a
system capable of representing the predicates in that language and their
extensions.
(f) That system cannot be the language that is being learned.
(g) But first languages are learned.
(h) Hence, at least some cognitive operations are carried out in languages
other than natural languages.
The crucial assumption is (d) that learning the meaning of a predicate

requires a representation of both the (linguistic) expression and, in Fodors
terms, of the determination of the predicates extension within a language-like
system which is different from and prior to the language learned.20 My aim in
this section is not to evaluate this assumption. Rather, it should become clear
that there is a strikingly similar idea in Ockham, namely that understanding
spoken expressions implies the apprehension of mental expressions that have
the same semantic properties as the spoken expressions; these mental expres-
sions are prior to the spoken expressions insofar as the subject understands
(the signification of) spoken expressions by means of (the signification of)
mental expressions, but not vice versa. That is, the individual speaker learns
the signification of a spoken term only by identifying a mental term signifying
the same as the spoken term.
Note, however, that the spoken term is not thereby imposed to signify. It
would be incorrect to say that the spoken term is subordinated to the mental
term of the speaker, since the speaker does not establish the signification of the
spoken term. Rather, by relating the spoken term to one of his own mental
20 The view that all mental states are representational, or rather, that something is a mental
state only if it represents things as being thus-and-so, is embraced by supporters of an
representational externalism. See Thomas Grundmann, Warum ich wei, da ich kein
Zombie bin, in A. Newen (ed.), Den eigenen Geist kennen, 135; see also Fred Dretske, How
Do You Know You are Not a Zombie? in B. Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access, Madison, 2003,
113.
238 Chapter 4
terms, the speaker makes the spoken term usable for himself.21 That is, the
speaker learns a determination of the spoken terms extension which amounts
to something like the following:
(Determ) The spoken term ts signifies the same as my mental term tm.
For instance, a speaker has successfully learned the signification of dog if he

understands that dog signifies the same as (his mental term) dog.22 And
according to Ockham, mental terms such as dog are usually not learned, but
merely acquired via intuition. Note that Fodor, unlike Ockham, appears to con-
ceive of concepts as being innate. Fodor argues that (all) lexical concepts as
parts of lot are not learned, but merely triggered. And which concepts can be
triggered is determined innately. Fodor writes:
No simple concept is available unless it is triggered, and while the

function from triggers onto the concepts they release is innately speci-
fied, it is the way the world is that determines which triggers we in fact
encounter. Our innate endowment determines which words we can,
in principle, understand; but only the interaction of that endowment
with the stimulations we receive determines which science we actually
develop.23
According to this picture, a subject can acquire the concept doorknob if it is

triggered in the right way, for instance, by encountering a doorknob. But Fodor
argues that it is only possible to acquire the concept of doorknob by encounter-
ing doorknobs because there is a functional relation of the trigger (doorknobs)
to the concept (doorknob): this functional relation is innate. That is, if there
were no such innate function, then encountering doorknobs would not lead to
the acquisition of the concept doorknob.24 By contrast, Ockham does not claim
that the possible conceptual repertoire of a subject is innately determined:
21 Recall that in order to use a spoken term intentionally, a speaker must, according to
Ockham, have a mental term.
22 Although somewhat redundant, I stress that the speaker has to relate the spoken term to
one of his own mental terms that has the same signification as the spoken term.
23 Fodor, Representations: philosophiscal essays on the foundations of cognitive science, 314.
24 For a critical discussion of Fodors strong claim of conceptual nativism see for instance
Andy Clark, Language of Thought (2), in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the
Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, 1994; Patricia Smith Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a
Unified Science of Mind-Brain, Cambridge, Mass., 1986; Hilary Putnam, Representation and
Reality, Cambridge, Mass., 1988.
on the one hand, a subject can intuitively grasp any particular thing he encoun-
ters so that the intuition of the thing leads to the acquisition of a general con-
cept of the kind of thing, and on the other hand, he can acquire more complex
concepts, for instance by learning the signification of spoken terms, provided
he is in possession of at least some simple (intuition-based) concepts.
However, there are different ways of learning the signification of a spoken
term according to Ockham, namely ostensively and non-ostensively. Recall that
Ockham exemplifies the non-ostensive learning of spoken terms on the basis of
absolute spoken terms.25 In order to learn non-ostensively what a spoken term
such as lion signifies, the speaker must compose some of his mental terms in
such a way that the resulting mental term meets the semantic criterion of
being verified by the same things as the spoken term. As Ockham says, the
composite mental term must be convertible with the spoken term.26 Learning
the determination of the extension of lion in this way does not require learn-
ing a general truth rule; rather, the subject learns to determine the extension of
lion by means of the intensional features of lion: the subject identifies his
composite mental term lioncomp as signifying the same as lion. By contrast,
learning ostensively what lion signifies, that is, by being told thats a lion in
the very presence of a lion does not require the specification of the intensional
features of lion, since the extension of the intuition-based concept lion is
determined causally.
According to Ockham learning the signification of a spoken term generally
requires the identification of a mental term that has the same signification as
the spoken term. This corresponds largely to Fodors assumption that learning
the meaning of a predicate requires a language-like system of representations
whose predicates have the same semantic properties as the predicates which
are learned. Ockham and Fodor paint indeed a similar picture of the relation
between language and thought insofar as they both hold that linguistic expres-
sions have their semantic properties by virtue of being related to certain men-
tal items that have the same semantic properties. Ockham and Fodor agree
that it is possible to acquire (at least some) concepts without learning the
meaning of linguistic expressions.
However, Fodor claims that it is innately determined which concepts can be
acquired, whereas Ockham holds that anything which can cause an act of intu-
ition can lead to the acquisition of a concept of that kind of thing. Intuition is
25 See above 3.4.1 General Propositions and Evident Judgement: propositiones per se notae.
26 (Conv) A composite absolute mental term tmcomp is convertible with an absolute spoken
term ts if and only if tmcomp and ts are correctly applicable to the same things (and are
verified by the same things).
240 Chapter 4
the power of being actualized by any particular.27 For reasons that will become
apparent, they also disagree about what is syntactically structured. According
to Ockham, a spoken proposition inherits its syntactic structure from the
syntactic structure of the corresponding mental proposition. However, Fodor
further presupposes that tokens of propositional attitudes such as believing or
hoping that p are also syntactically structured, in much the same way as the
mental representation meaning that p.28 In my view, this is something Ockham
would reject. It is time now to take a closer look on Fodors lot, especially with
respect to its syntax.
4.3 Fodors Language of Thought (lot)
Fodor turns to those unobservable entities such as beliefs and desires in

order to explain action or behaviour where these unobservable entities are
not conceived as irreducibly mental.29 As Fodor notes, people usually
explain the actions of their fellow-creatures by ascribing propositional
attitudes to them. For instance, if Peter asks Anne to meet him at four
oclock in his office and Anne agrees and shows up at that time, then her
appearance can be explained by anyone who knows about this appoint-
ment by ascribing to Anne the intention to be there and the (true) belief
that she had an appointment. In Fodors view, a scientific psychological
explanation of action should largely respect this common sense explana-
tion. In fact, he repeatedly emphasizes his attempt to vindicate folk
psychology.30 According to this common sense psychology, people usu-
ally take mental states (beliefs and desires) to have causal powers: the
because she was there because she intended to be there and (truly)
believed that she had an appointment is taken causally. Further, causal
powers of propositional attitudes are commonsensically explained in
terms of their content. Mental states have the causal powers they do in
27 The following question arises: if the world were different, for instance, if it contained
another kind of thing, for instance, relations, would it then be possible to intuit relations?
The answer should be yes.
28 See Bob Hale, Crispin Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 679.
29 Fodor claims that these states supervene on physical states. See Fodor, Psychosemantics,
135.
30 We have, in practice, no alternative to the vocabulary of common-sense psychological
explanation; we have no other way of describing our behaviors and their causes if we
want our behaviors and their causes to be subsumed by any counterfactual-supporting
generalizations that we know about. Ibid., 10.
virtue of the propositional content they have.31 The causal powers of two
states of belief differ because they have different contents. For instance,
the causal power of the belief that she had an appointment is different from
the causal power of the belief that she had no appointment, simply because
the content of the one differs from the content of the other.
As Fodor claims, there is a non-arbitrary relation between the propositional
content of a mental state and its causal power.32 If there were no such relation,
then it would be difficult to explain why the belief that she had an appointment
at the office (together with the intention to be at the office) caused Anne to be
at the office at four and not at home. A vindication of this folk psychology-
view must account for this relation between the propositional content of men-
tal states and their causal powers, if it is to scientifically explain actions in
terms of beliefs and desires. Therefore, Fodor turns to the mind as a computer
metaphor, since [c]omputers show us how to connect semantical with causal
properties for symbols. So, if having a propositional attitude involves tokening
a symbol, then we can get some leverage on connecting semantical properties
with causal ones for thoughts.33
As Fodor explains, computers are machines whose operations consist
entirely in the transformation of symbols. These transformations are deter-
mined only by the syntactic structure of the symbols. It is pivotal that the syn-
tactic structure of symbols (sentences) determines the causal role of the
symbol within these transformations in a way that respects the content of the
symbols. At this point, Fodor postulates lot. It is required because marrying
causal powers with syntactic form involves the manipulation of symbols or
signs. And tokens of these symbols must be physical, since only something
physical can exhibit causal roles according to Fodor.34 Thus Fodor needs men-
tal symbols that can be manipulated whose tokens are physical. Only then is it
possible to describe mental processes as computations, that is, causal chains
of (typically inferential) operations which are carried out on physical tokens
of mental symbols.35 Mental processes are then determined by the syntactic
31 See Murat Aydede, The Language of Thought Hypothesis, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2010/entries/language-thought/. Last access March 7th 2014.
32 Or as Fodor claims, there is a striking parallelism between the causal relations among
mental states, [], and the semantic relations that hold among their propositional
objects, []. Fodor, Psychosemantics, 10.
33 Ibid., 18.
34 [] qua physical, symbol tokens are the right sorts of things to exhibit causal roles.
Ibid., 135.
35 Fodor, LOT 2, 5.
242 Chapter 4
forms of the mental representations, in such a way that their semantically eval-
uable content is preserved. These mental representations, Fodor claims, form a
language different from and prior to natural language insofar as they are both
semantically evaluable and syntactically structured.36
Fodor postulates lot in order to reconcile the causal powers of mental
states with the semantic relations among their propositional contents. He is
committed to lot because it is required in order to account for mental pro-
cesses as computations.37 Fodor explicitly and repeatedly acknowledges that a
computational theory of mental processes simply presupposes a system of
mental representations on which these operations are carried out.38 I think
it indispensable to bear this in mind if one compares Fodors loth with
Ockhams ams. Ockham does not introduce mental speech as a system of
mental representations that is required to account for thought as mental pro-
cesses, since he can account for mental processes in terms of his model of hier-
archically ordered mental acts.39 Fodor conceives of mental states (and of
mental acts) as mere relations to (tokens of) mental symbols. Let us now
explore this in further detail.
4.4 Fodor on Mental States and Acts
To illuminate Fodors model of the mind further, it will be worthwhile explain-

ing first what it means to believe or desire something if lot is presupposed,
36 Ibid., 2021.
37 Moreover, the language-of-thought hypothesis endorsed in LOT 1 wasnt just any old
hyper-realism about the mental; it was, in particular, a species of rtm (that is, of the rep-
resentational theory of mind). Roughly, [], rtm is a claim about the metaphysics of
cognitive mental states and processes: Tokens of cognitive mental states are tokens of
relations between creatures and their mental representations. Tokens of mental pro-
cesses are computations; that is, causal chains of (typically inferential) operations on
mental representations. There is no tokening of a (cognitive) mental state or process (by
a creature, at a time) unless there is a corresponding tokening of a mental representation
(by that creature, at that time). Ibid., 56.
38 1. The only psychological models of cognitive processes that seem even remotely plausi-
ble represent such processes as computational. 2. Computation presupposes a medium of
computation: a representational system. 3. Remotely plausible theories are better than no
theories at all. 4. We are thus provisionally committed to attributing a representational
system to organisms. Provisionally committed means: committed insofar as we attribute
cognitive processes to organisms and insofar as we take seriously such theories of these
processes as are currently available. Fodor, The Language of Thought, 27.
39 See above 3.3 Ockhams Model of Non-Propositional and Propositional Acts.
and second, what it means to conceive of mental processes as computational.

Fodor sometimes uses propositional attitude for a mental act, that is, an epi-
sode of thinking; he also refers to episodes of thinking as tokens of proposi-
tional attitudes. As Knne notes, Fodor tends to blur the distinction between
propositional states and acts [].40 Fodor is not interested in propositional
attitudes as dispositional states, but in the actualization of these dispositions.
To turn to the first point, Fodor conceives of propositional attitudes or states
as relations to (tokens of) mental representations, where the different states
correspond to different kinds of relations. For instance, if Anne believes that it
is already four oclock, this can be described as involving a certain relation to a
token of a mental representation that means that it is already four oclock. On
the contrary, if Anne doubts whether it is already four oclock, this involves a
different relation to a token of the same type of mental representation. To illus-
trate this difference Fodor introduces the metaphor of attitude boxes. He
writes:
To believe that such and such is to have a mental symbol that means that
such and such tokened in your head in a certain way; its to have such a token
in your belief box, as Ill sometimes say. Correspondingly, to hope that such
and such is to have a token of that same mental symbol tokened in your head,
but in a rather different way; its to have it tokened in your hope box. (The
difference between having the token in one box or the other corresponds to
the difference between the causal roles of beliefs and desires. Talking about
belief boxes and such as a short-hand for representing the attitudes as func-
tional states is an idea due to Steve Schiffer. [].)41
Fodor maintains that mental states such as believing or hoping can have the
same content by being related to tokens of the same type of mental symbol,
whereas differences in the causal roles of mental states are explained in terms
of different functional or computational relations toward the same content.
In this way it becomes possible for Fodor to conceive of propositional attitudes
as relations to (tokens of) mental representations.42 In general, a human
40 Knne, Some Varieties of Thinking, 385.

42 [], LOT wants to construe propositional-attitude tokens as relations to symbol tokens.
According to standard formulations, to believe that P is to bear a certain relation to a
token of a symbol which means that P. [] Now, symbols have intentional contents and
their tokens are physical in all the known cases. And qua physical symbol tokens are
the right sorts of things to exhibit causal roles. Ibid., 135136.
244 Chapter 4
subject can rightly be said to think that p or to doubt whether p if and only if
there is a physically implemented token of a mental representation that means
that p for the subject, and if he bears a certain relation the believe or doubt-
relation to the token of this mental representation. Schematically put, this
amounts to something like the following:
(Fod) A human subject S -s43 that p if and only if there is a

(computational/functional) relation R and a token of a mental
sentence ms meaning that p for S and S bears R to the token of
ms or a trace of a token of ms is stored within the brain of S in the
way appropriate to -ing.44
According to Fodor, a mental process is nothing but a sequence of tokens of

mental sentences which are causally connected.45 Supposedly, this implies
that there are physically implemented tokens of different mental sentences
meaning different things so that one token of a mental sentence meaning that
p causes a token of a mental sentence meaning that q. The following, very sim-
ple example is inspired by one of Fodors own. If Peter is thinking Anne is late;
so Id better call her, this episode of thinking can be described as involving the
token of a mental sentence meaning Anne is late which causes a token of a
mental sentence meaning Id better call her.46 Trains of thoughts are mental
processes: thinking that p causes the subject to think that q. The causal power
of a propositional attitude is always determined by its content (the mental sen-
tence) and by its kind.
What about mental processes involving different kinds of propositional atti-
tudes with different contents? Recall that the goal of the computational model
is to explain the doings of a subject by identifying the relevant beliefs and
desires as links in a chain of causally efficient mental states. We must explain
how different kinds of mental states with different contents are causally linked
so that they might lead to a certain action. Again, Fodor turns to the metaphor
of attitude boxes for the purpose of illustration. He writes:
43 is a place-holder for a propositional act or state verb. See the following footnote.
44 Here I rely heavily both on Fodor, Psychosemantics, 17 and Knne, Some Varieties of
Thinking. Knne writes: Schematically put LOT seems to amount to something like this
(where is a place-holder for a propositional act/state verb): It is nomologically true
that a human thinker x -s that p iff (E) ( is a token of a sentence-analogue & occurs,
or a trace of is stored, within xs brain in the way appropriate to -ing & for x means
that p). Knne, ibid., 380.
45 See Fodor, LOT 2, 15.
46 See Fodor, Psychosemantics, 17.
Consider a schematic formulation of LOT thats owing to Stephen Schiffer.

There is, in your head, a certain mechanism, an intention box. To make
the exposition clearer, Ill assume that every intention is the intention to
make some proposition true. So then, heres how it goes in your head,
according to this version of LOT, when you intend to make it true that P.
What you do is, you put into the intention box a token of a mental symbol
that means that P. And what the box does is, it churns and gurgles and
computes and causes and the outcome is that you behave in a way that
(ceteris paribus) makes it true that P. So, for example, suppose I intend to
raise my left hand (I intend to make true the proposition that I raise my
left hand). Then what I do is, I put in my intention box a token of a mental
symbol that means I raise my left hand. And then, after suitable churn-
ing and gurgling and computing and causing, my left hand goes up. (Or it
doesnt, in which case the ceteris paribus condition must somehow not
have been satisfied.) []47
The upshot is that a mental state such as wanting that p is described as a mech-
anism which is triggered by a token of a mental sentence meaning that p. If a
token of a mental sentence meaning that p enters the mechanism of wanting,
then wanting p if successful has the result that the subject brings it about
that p actually obtains. For instance, if I want to get up, then a token of a men-
tal sentence meaning I get up comes into the wanting-box, that is, it gets
tokened in the wanting-kind of way; and this causes me ultimately to get up.
Unfortunately, Fodor is silent about the details.48 Also, it is somewhat strange
that he speaks as if the (thinking and acting) subject would intentionally put a
token of a mental sentence in some intention box. But perhaps this is rather
petty. The decisive point is that the intention to make it true that p is described
as a certain relation that the subject bears to a token of a mental sentence
meaning that p, which brings it about that p obtains.
Fodor claims that the causal power of a propositional attitude is always
determined by its content (the mental sentence) and by its very kind. Fodor
47 Ibid., 136.
48 Note that the mental token does not mean I want to get up, but merely I get up. I think this
is a result of Fodors view that a propositional attitude is nothing but a relation to a token
of a mental sentence. It is due also, I think, to his rather schematic way of presentation:
Fodor claims that for ease of exposition he assumes only the intentional state of mak-
ing a proposition p true. But if, according to Fodor p is made true by an action, then it
would be unhappy if the proposition that is to be made true by the action contains a
propositional attitude verb, such as wanting, since making the proposition I want to get
up true does not imply the action of actually getting up.
246 Chapter 4
finds a way to reconcile the content with the kind by claiming that (a token of)
the propositional attitude in question is itself syntactically structured in a way
that respects the content of the mental sentence. In this matter, he has not
changed his view over the years. Fodor writes:
What makes the story a Language of Thought story, and not just
an Intentional Realist story, is the idea that these mental states that
have content also have syntactic structure constituent structure in
particular thats appropriate to the content they have. For example, its
compatible with the story I told above [see preceding quote, S.S.] that
what I put in the intention box when I intend to raise my left hand is a
rock; so long as its a rock thats semantically evaluable. Whereas accord-
ing to the LOT story, what I put in the intention box has to be something
like a sentence; in the present case, it has to be a formula which contains,
inter alia, an expression that denotes me and an expression that denotes
my left hand.49
Why should it matter that the mental state (or act) be syntactically structured
and not merely the content of such a state (or act)? Fodors answer is that it is
required by the computational model of mental processes. As he states, he
does not hold that contents per se determine causal roles.50 It is not sufficient
that the content of a state (or act) syntactically account for mental processes
as computational, since the causal role of mental states (or acts) is married
with their content only via syntactic structure. Thus, it is necessary to posit
that the mental state (or act) itself be syntactically structured.
How could a mental process leading to a certain action be characterized
according to Ockham? To use another example, if Peters picking an apple can
be described as an intentional action, then how is this action brought about?
Ockhams answer is that acts of the intellect and acts of the will are required to
lead to an action. In Ockhams Aristotelian picture, the intellect and the will
are the two faculties of the rational soul. Now acts of volition presuppose acts
of cognition, since, [] the will can only want something if something is cog-
nized [].51 Acts of the intellect are caused merely naturally on the non-prop-
ositional level, just as smoke is caused naturally by a fire. For instance, an
intuitive act of cognition is naturally caused by a particular thing. By contrast,
propositional acts of thought can involve an act of the will even when the

50 Ibid., 139.
51 [] voluntas non potest aliquid velle nisi cognitum []. Quodl. III, q.20 (OT IX, 284).
forming of the mental proposition and the act of giving ones assent occur
simultaneously. Above I held that it is plausible that the mental proposition
ultimately formed by the subject depends or at least, can depend on his
(voluntary) focusing on certain aspects of what he intuits.52 Volitional acts are
not merely produced by something extraneous to the will. In Ockhams terms,
the will is the only free cause in the world.53 In the Quodlibeta, he states:
[] I call liberty the faculty by which I can indifferently and contingently

posit different things, such that I can cause and not cause the same effect,
where there are no diverse alternatives beyond that faculty.54
What does it mean that the will is a free cause?55 Let us return to the above
example. The mental process leading to Peters picking an apple can be
described in the following way: first, Peter perceives and hence intuits an
apple. This act is naturally caused by the apple. Then due to the intuition of the
apple, Peter can form a mental proposition such as this apple is red or the apple
is ripe. Which of them he forms can depend on the aspect he focuses on.
However, once he forms such a mental proposition, he gives his assent at the
same time. However, wanting to pick the apple does not presuppose the form-
ing of a further proposition, such as I pick the apple, since wanting to pick the
apple is not a relation of the will to the mental proposition I pick the apple. In
general, willing is not conceived by Ockham as a mere functional relation to a
mental proposition. Acts of the will presuppose acts of the intellect insofar as
a subject can only want to pick a certain apple if he is cognitively related to it,
but wanting to pick the apple is not merely caused by a cognition of it.
Although a thing might be judged as desirable, the subject is not thereby forced
to want it, since the will cannot be forced by anything to produce a certain
act.56 Peter picks the apple because he wants to pick it. But he does not merely
52 See above 3.4. Intuitive Cognition and Evident Judgement.

53 See Quodl. I, q.16 (OT IX, 87); Quodl. I, q.17 (OT IX, 9093); Quodl. II, q.2 (OT IX, 116); Quodl.
II, q.8 (OT IX, 146).
54 [] voco libertatem potestatem qua possum indifferenter et contingenter diversa
ponere, ita quod possum eundem effectum causare et non causare, nulla diversitate exis-
tente alibi extra illam potentiam. Quodl. I, q.16 (OT IX, 87).
55 For a discussion of Ockhams conception of the will see Perler, Die kognitive Struktur von
Hoffnung Zwei mittelalterliche Erklrungsmodelle, esp. 9 ff.
56 To avoid misunderstandings: acts of the intellect do play a role in deciding how to act.
As Perler writes: Im Gegensatz zu einer natrlichen Ursache, die immer von etwas
anderem bewegt und auf ein Ziel festgelegt wird, ist der Wille ein sich selbst bewegender
Beweger. Das heit aber nicht, dass der Wille eine isolierte Ursache ist und auerhalb
248 Chapter 4
want it because he judged it to be ripe and juicy, although without this judge-
ment he would not have wanted it. In short, being cognitively related to x is
necessary, but not sufficient for wanting x. To want x requires both the cogni-
tion of x and an act of the will. And a volitional act is not causally efficient due
to its structure, but because the will is a free cause. In Fodors account of action,
the function of acts of the will corresponds to the function of computational or
functional relations.
In Fodors conception, willing is just one of many functional relations such
as doubting, believing, fearing etc. By contrast, in Ockhams picture, the will is
an outstanding faculty. Here the structural differences between the two theo-
ries can be connected to ontological differences. lot is an important element
of a project to naturalize the mind. Aydede states:
One of the most attractive features of LOTH is that it is a central compo-

nent of an ongoing research program in philosophy of psychology to
naturalize the mind, to give a theoretical framework in which the mind
could naturally be seen as part of the physical world without postulating
irreducibly psychic entities, events, processes or properties.57
That is, the major explanatory goal of lot is the reduction of the mental to the
physical: according to this view, only something physical can be causally
efficient. By contrast, Ockham embraces the view that the rational soul is
immaterial, whereas the sensitive soul is material.58 In Ockhams view, percep-
tual states are physical states of the corresponding sense-organs.59 Acts of the
jeder Ursachenkette steht. Ockham weist immer wieder darauf hin, dass die sinnlichen
Zustnde und die Urteile einen Einfluss auf den Willen ausben. Er hlt sogar fest, dass
der Wille im Normalfall dem folgt, was vom Intellekt vorgegeben wird. Der entscheidende
Punkt ist aber, dass er nicht dazu gentigt wird. Es besteht nur eine Neigung (inclinatio),
aber kein Zwang, das zu whlen, was durch Urteile und berlegungen als das bestmgli-
che Ziel prsentiert wird. Perler, Die kognitive Struktur von Hoffnung Zwei mittelal-
terliche Erklrungsmodelle, 12.
57 Aydede, The Language of Thought Hypothesis, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Fall 2010 Edition).
58 In the Quodlibeta, Ockham states: [] sed anima sensitiva in homine est extensa et
materialis, anima intellectiva non, quia est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte; [].
Quodl. II, q.10 (OT IX, 159). For Ockhams conception of the soul and its parts see Dominik
Perler, Ockham ber die Seele und ihre Teile, in Recherches de thologie et philosophie
mdivales 77, 2010, 329366.
59 In the Quodlibeta, Ockham states that a sensually perceivable thing causes a bodily
quality (qualitas corporalis) which is a physical state of the body. He writes: [] quod a
intellect, however, are irreducibly immaterial. Ockham is a dualist: there are

material things (bodies, stones) and immaterial things (rational souls, angels).
According to Ockham, the will is free because it is not material, since material
things can only be natural causes. Deliberate action presupposes that the will
cannot be forced by anything to produce or sustain a certain act.60 In this sense
then, animals such as dogs or horses do not act freely, since their doings are
wholly determined by things extraneous to their faculties. As Ockham holds,
they cannot choose or choose not to set something into operation, even if
everything required for setting it into operation is posited.61 Ockham accounts
for propositional thought and for free human action by means of the two facul-
ties of the rational soul.62 Of course, it would be interesting to ask how a volun-
tarist theory of rational action should be conceived according to Ockham. But
this clearly goes beyond the scope of the present work.
4.5 Why Ockham Is Not Fodor (Summary)
The likeness of Ockhams mental-speech assumption to Fodors loth is con-

fined to the relation between thought and language. Both Ockham and Fodor
can be taken to hold that spoken language owes both its semantics and its
syntax to thought, which itself has a semantics and a syntax. However, they
conceive of thought itself in rather different ways. In Fodors view, proposi-
tional attitudes are functional relations to mental sentences, whereas in
Ockhams view acts of the will occur freely: although they presuppose proposi-
tional acts of thought volitional acts are not mere links in a causally related
chain of mental acts. The structural differences are related to ontological dif-
ferences: Fodor wants to reduce mental states to physical states. By contrast,
sensibili quod natum est sentiri, puta mediante percussione et vulneratione, causatur
aliqua qualitas corporalis, quae post corruptionem sensibilis sentitur; et ex illa sensatione
causatur dolor immediate. Quodl. III, q.17 (OT IX, 271).
60 Even in the Middle Ages, this is not an uncontroversial claim. For instance, Aquinas
claims that if something is believed as being intrinsically good, then it is not possible for
the subject not to will it. See Summa Theologiae I, q.82, art. 2, ad 1.
61 Ockham characterizes the difference between free subjects and others in the following
way: [] agens liberum potest in operationem et potest cessare ab operatione positis
omnibus requisitis, et aliud non. Brev. Summa Physic., lib.VIII, cap.1 (OP VI, 118).
62 [] dico quod contingentia est in rebus propter libertatem voluntatis creatae. [] Sicut
actus intelligendi naturaliter et necessario causat volitionem, et tamen volitio libere
causatur, quia voluntas est causa partialis illius et contingens, cuius contingentia sufficit
ad hoc quod effectus sit contingens. Quodl. II, q.3 (OT IX, 116).
250 Chapter 4
the will is not material in Ockhams view, since only something immaterial can
be a free cause. In order to account for deliberate human action Ockham
claims that the will cannot be forced by anything to produce an act. Ultimately
then, it appears that the fact that Ockham, in the Summa Logicae, and Fodor
both conceive of the relation between thought and language in a similar way is
rendered rather uninteresting by the fact that they conceive of thought itself in
rather different ways.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The relation between thought and language has been a fundamental problem
in its own right for philosophers since Plato. Ockhams mental-speech assump-
tion and Fodors loth could be considered to provide a solution to this funda-
mental problem, and as such they are in fact similar, since both explain the
semantics and syntax of language in terms of the semantics and syntax
of thought. If the problem of the relation between thought and language is
considered in isolation, then Fodors loth appears to be a direct descendant
of the mental-speech assumption in Ockhams Summa Logicae.
I argued that Ockhams project in the Summa Logicae is semantic insofar as
he attempts to account for the possible import and truth conditions of spoken
(and written) propositions by means of the import and truth conditions of
mental propositions. According to 14th-century logicians, signification and
supposition are the basic properties of non-propositional linguistic expres-
sions. The fundamental semantic relation is that of signification: as we saw in
the first chapter, the deictic applicability of a term at T to a thing or things
existing at T serves as the basic model of signification. The signification of a
term implies its applicability to things while the supposition of a term implies
its possible use for something within a proposition, whether or not there is
something the term applies to. That is, by transferring these basic properties of
linguistic expressions to mental items, Ockham conceives of non-propositional
mental items as potential parts of propositional acts of thought in a systematic
way: a human subject can have true or false thoughts about dogs because dog
applies to all dogs and can be used within a propositional act of thought for
dogs whether there are actually dogs or not.
Such an argument implies conceiving of mental speech as involving the use
of a kind of language, since it derives its explanatory power from the assump-
tion of the semantic and syntactic priority of mental speech. Ockhams aim in
the Summa Logicae is not to account for epistemological questions such as the
acquisition of mental terms. I emphasize this because critics of the similarity-
claim concerning ams and loth usually hold that Ockham is not able to give
a satisfactory explanation of the acquisition of syncategorematic and connota-
tive mental terms, arguing that it is not easy to see how a mental term such as
and or not can be acquired solely due to the intuition of a particular thing
(Recall that Ockham accounts for the acquisition of specific and generic gen-
eral terms of kind of things on the basis of intuition).

252 Chapter 5
Fodors meets this challenge by embracing a strong nativism. According to

him, all concepts are innate.1 However, this view cannot be plausibly ascribed
to the Franciscan.2 At this point, critics of the similarity-claim turn to Ockhams
early works. For instance, Martin Lenz argues that in the Liber Sententiarum
Ockham favours the view that human subjects acquire syncategorematic and
connotative mental terms by learning a natural language such as English.
According to Lenz, speakers can somehow abstract syncategorematic con-
cepts from spoken syncategorematic terms because, according to Ockhams
early conception, mental language derives its syntax and semantics from natu-
ral language.3
Even if this interpretation of Ockhams account of ams in the Liber
Sententiarum is adequate, it seems to me that it does not concern the same
problems as Ockhams account of ams in the Summa Logicae. One should dis-
tinguish carefully between the problems of semantics and the problems of
epistemology. It is one thing to account for the meaning of linguistic expres-
sions, but is quite another to explain how concepts are acquired by speakers. I
do not mean that these problems are not related, but I wish only to point out
that it is highly desirable to treat problems of semantics and epistemological
problems of concept acquisition apart.
It might be plausible, for instance, from the point of view of developmental
psychology or epistemology to argue that individuals learn to think in a sys-
tematic way by learning a language. Thus, no one can be expected to prove the
soundness of an argument by using first-order predicate logic if he has not
learned this formal language. But it is not possible to account for the semantics
of natural languages by claiming mental speech to be asymmetrically depen-
dent on natural language. Strictly speaking, the two accounts of ams in the
early Liber Sententiarum and the later Summa Logicae are only incompatible if
they are taken as addressing the same problem. But this is not an assumption
one is compelled to make.
The two claims that (a) linguistic expressions have their semantic proper-
ties by virtue of being subordinated to mental expressions and that (b) indi-
vidual speakers can acquire mental terms by learning the meaning of spoken
terms are not incompatible. In the third chapter I showed that Ockham
exemplifies two means of concept acquisition, that is, an ostensive and a non-
ostensive way, where the latter presupposes that the speaker has already
1 See Fodor, LOT 2, 131.

2 See 4.2 Fodor on Language Acquisition, 211.
3 See Martin Lenz, Why Is Thought Linguistic? Ockhams Two Conceptions of the Intellect,
309.
Conclusion 253
acquired some mental terms.4 Learning the signification of a spoken term by

means of acquiring a mental term presupposes an existing relation of subordi-
nation within a speech community, but it does not establish a relation of
subordination.
As I also argued in the third chapter, Ockham suggests that it is possible to
gain true beliefs about what there is and what there can be due to the intuition
of particular things and the intellects ability to form mental propositions. So,
by ascribing signification, and hence the possibility of supposition, to con-
cepts, Ockham is able to explain the possibility of having (true and false)
thoughts about particular things. It can be held that the two possibilities of
concept acquisition by intuition and by learning the meaning of spoken
terms are not mutually exclusive; rather, they complement one another: a
subject can learn the signification of terms, whether absolute or connotative,
only if he is already in possession of some mental terms. And these mental
terms, given the causal mechanism of intuition, are not learned, but merely
acquired due to the cognition of particular things.5
Although, in considering philosophical questions, it might be useful and
even indispensable to focus on certain specific aspects of historical positions
in order to obtain any sort of answer at all, one should be aware of the general
theoretical framework involved. Quite trivially, the same answer can have very
different implications within different theoretical frames. As it was shown, the
similarity of Ockham to Fodor is considerably relativized if their larger philo-
sophical projects are taken into account: although both hold that language is
semantically and syntactically dependent on thought, Fodor attempts to
reduce mental states to physical states by postulating lot, whereas Ockham
attempts to meet at least, in my view the ontological constraints of his
nominalist view by positing a richly endowed intellect which is able to form
syntactically structured mental propositions. In Ockhams conception, how-
ever, the intellect is not reducible to something physical.
Were it argued that Ockhams talk of the immaterial rational soul is just
some Aristotelian remnant and only of interest if any to the historian,
I would plead that present-day philosophys overriding concern with the
4 See 3.4.1 General Propositions and Evident Judgement: propositiones per se notae.
5 It is implied by Ockhams account of evident judgements that the intellect just has the ability
to syntactically connect two mental terms where the copula corresponds to another mental
act. In the Quodlibeta Ockham writes: [] dico quod unio extremorum propositionis in
mente est conceptus syncategorematicus verbi copulativi sive copulantis subiectum cum
praedicato [] quod est conceptus copulae, quae est qualitas quaedam mentis, puta actus
intelligendi. Quodl. VI, q.29, (OT IX, 695).
254 Chapter 5
naturalization of the mind makes plain the need for a certain amount of meth-
odological awareness. It might sound nave to ask this question, but why should
one be a physicalist or naturalist today? A contemporary naturalist might
answer that, all told, the results of the natural sciences seem to give us strong
evidence that there is simply nothing mental that is irreducible.
It appears that the project of the naturalization of the mind is intimately
connected with a mechanistic view of rational thought. To look at this project
from a view as distant as Ockhams, who is committed to the assumption of
mental speech in the sense explained, helps us to realize that there are alterna-
tives to the view of causally determined mental processes carried out on physi-
cally implemented tokens of mental symbols. Ockhams claim that the content
of thought is syntactically structured due to both the semantic properties of
non-propositional mental acts and the compositional ability of the intellect
does not imply a mechanized view of rational thought. That is, although
Ockham is committed to ams, he is not committed to the view that mental
processes are merely causally determined chains of mental acts. In Ockhams
model, the intellect and the will are two different, but related faculties. The will
is a free cause. This means that nothing, taken alone, can cause the occurrence
of an act of the will. In general then, Ockham offers the alternative picture of
the mind as two faculties which are actualized in different ways: whereas (non-
propositional) acts of the intellect are indeed brought about naturally, in the
same way that a fire is fed or a brick falls due to a gust of wind, acts of the will
are never (completely) determined by something extraneous to the faculty.
One objection to Ockhams conception could be that the alleged contin-
gency of acts of the will seems to threaten or undermine the rationality of both
propositional thought and action: if a subject acts merely arbitrarily, that is,
simply because he wants to act in this way, then what should the rationality of
thought and action amount to? To this it can be answered provisionally that
Ockhams conception of the will does not imply that acts of the will occur arbi-
trarily. This would indeed be an awkward conception of the will as a faculty of
the rational soul. Mental acts such as correct judgements play a role in the
making of decisions. But by defining the will as the power to bring about an act
or not to bring it about Ockham seeks to stress that the will cannot be forced to
produce an act by something distinct from itself.6
In this respect, then, Ockhams and Fodors conceptions differ crucially,
since in Fodors view the will is just another functional relation to physically
implemented tokens of mental representations. Recall that according to Fodor,
6 See Quodl. I, q.16 (OT IX, 87). See also Perler, Die kognitive Struktur von Hoffnung Zwei mit-
telalterliche Erklrungsmodelle, 12.
Conclusion 255
only something physical can be causally efficient. Reducing the mental to the
physical implies the elimination of the will as another free kind of cause.
There is no room in this picture for causally efficient acts of the will which in
turn are not (entirely) caused by something physical.
I would like to conclude by looking ahead to what remains to be done: fur-
ther research is needed in order to account for a nominalist and voluntarist
theory of action of which ams is part. One task would be to determine the
exact role of ams within such a theory, in view of the central function Ockham
ascribes to the will: it seems that ams is a necessary condition of an Ockhamist
theory of action just as loth is a necessary condition for Fodors naturalized
theory of propositional attitudes. How can rational action be plausibly
explained within such a nominalist and voluntarist frame?7
I do not wish to plead for dualism; nevertheless, though, adopting a
perspective on todays project of the naturalization of the mind that is both
dualist and nominalist might help us to determine the price, ontological and
systematic, of endorsing a reductionist view of the mental. Ockham, at least,
has strong reasons not to apply the principle of parsimony at this point.
7 Critics of a voluntarist theory of action who take an Ockhamist voluntarism as paradigmatic

claim that Ockham fails to explain rational intentional action, since he subscribes to a form
of what they call the indifference principle of the will: according to one version of this
principle, the will is not naturally moved to choose an object due to the comparative degree
of goodness apprehended therein. Mark Nowacki and Jared Poon, Against Voluntarism; or,
Why Ockham Cant Tell You Why the Chicken Crossed the Road, Research Collection School of
Social Sciences, 2005, Paper 68, 3.
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Index of Names
Adams, M. & N. Kretzmann37n79, Graham, G.235n9&11&12

219n279 Grundmann, Th.237n20
Aquinas, Th.39n92, 107n55, 249n60
Aristotle2, 13, 30, 39, 40, 55n147, 88, 94, Husserl, E.153n27
97n38, 103, 112n74, 148n8, 155, 162n60,
174n108, 178n122, 210, 218n271 King, P.1, 167n81
Ashworth, J.33n73, 97n38 Klima, G.53n140
Augustine2, 13, 159n48, 210n242 Knne, W.1n5, 2n6, 3n11, 5n19&21, 12,
Aydede, M.241n31, 248 13n4, 17n19, 25n49, 28n59, 33n71, 39, 40,
60n161, 68n185, 71n194&196, 72n200,
Bacon, R.86, 87n13, 97n37 115n87, 117n92, 122n108, 126n122, 131n134,
Baudry, L.45n112, 56n150, 59n158, 153n28, 147n2&5, 151n22, 157n41, 159n46, 168n82,
179n126 178n123, 180n135, 185, 190n166, 191n170&171,
Bednarowski, W.F.46n112 204n222, 218n271, 243, 244n44
Biard, J.52n138
Boehner, Ph.40n96, 112n74, 204n221 Laurence, St. & E. Margolis165n69&71
Boethius2, 13, 70n193, 94 Lausberg, H.108n62
Boler, J.175n112 Leff, G.71n196
Brower-Toland, S.3n12, 5n23, 165n70, 190n167 Lenz, M.2n9, 7, 8, 252
Burge, T.69
McCord Adams, M.6n26, 15, 16n16,
Chalmers, D.3n14, 231n1 18n23&24&26, 19n32, 23n43, 76n213,
Chatton, W.25n50, 162n62, 190n167, 77n215, 118n97, 153n28, 160n53, 167n80,
199n204 207n235, 219n279
Chomsky, N.235 Michon, C.1n4
Churchland, P. Smith238n24 Miller, G.A.234n8
Clark, A.238n24 Moody, E.A.15n11, 147n3
Davidson, D.68n186 Normore, C.1n1, 2, 4, 8n30, 12n1, 80,

Day, S.204n221 147n1, 168n84&87&88, 231233
Dretske, F.237n20 Nowacki, M. & J. Poon255n7
Dutilh Novaes, C.15n11 Nuchelmans, G.15n7
Fodor, J.4, 9, 11, 80n3, 149, 231, 233, 234n6, Panaccio, C.1n1&3&4, 35, 10,
235255 16n13&16, 17n18, 22n41, 26n53, 77, 90,
Freddoso, A. J.1n2, 15n12, 16n14, 29n63, 107n56, 127n124, 128n125, 129n127,
32, 42, 51n136, 53n141, 60n170, 62n169, 148n7&8, 150n20, 162n60, 163n66, 165n70,
71n198, 111, 112n72, 121, 206, 207n234 167, 171n100, 172n104, 174n107, 181n138,
Frege, G.13, 19n32, 72n200, 131n134, 147n5, 182n141, 201n211, 208n236, 211n247,
157n41, 218n271 229n303, 231
Perini-Santos, E.16n16, 17n18, 77
Geach, P. Th.7, 46n112, 161, 170n97, 172, Perler, D.50n131, 84n11, 149n16, 150n18,
180n135, 219n278 188n159, 247n55&56&58, 254n6
Glock, H-J.234n7 Prinz, J.234n7
Goddu, A.30n66 Putnam, H.238n24
index of Names 265
Russell, B.25n50, 26n52, 39n92, 218n271 Trentman, J.3

Tweedale, M.1n5, 4n14, 231n1
Schroeder, S.68n185
Skinner, B. F.234, 235 Weidemann, H.15n10
Spade, P.V.1n3, 4n15, 76n213
Strawson, P.135n140, 163n65 Yrjnsuuri, M.15n9
Index of Subjects
abstraction concepts (conceptus, intentio, notitia

process of161170 generalis)
accidents2, 30n65, 124, 126, 168, 221 acquisition of150, 152174, 212n248,
see also quality 217219, 222, 224, 227229, 238, 239,
act (actus) 251253
of knowing (actus sciendi)191193 actus-theory of6, 148, 150, 153n28,
angels2, 3, 48n122, 54n145, 147, 163n64, 174n107, 178n122
168, 229, 249 composite or complex18, 224226,
apprehension 239
acts of6, 149151, 154, 155n35, fictum-theory of153n28, 178n121,
174190, 194196, 199, 200, 202, 208, 182n141, 208n236
218, 219, 230, 237 simple152174, 222, 223, 226229,
assent 238, 239
evident207, 214, 219, 226, 227, 229 possession of86n12, 118, 119, 148, 170,
first kind of86n12, 151, 184, 190n167, 173, 174, 189, 197, 211n247, 217, 219223,
191199, 202, 205, 208 225, 228, 229, 239, 253
object of7, 175, 190n167, 197, 221 content
second kind of199202, 215, of thought3n11&n12, 4, 6, 7, 10,
218221, 225, 230 11, 46n112, 146, 147, 149, 182, 183,
see also judgement 191n171, 200, 204, 228, 230, 236,
Assumption of Mental Speech 240246, 254
(ams)24, 6, 711, 80, 143, 146, representational165167, 169173, 211,
147149, 150, 228, 230, 231, 233, 242, 249, 212, 235, 237n20
251, 252, 254, 255 see also mental repesentation
contingent / contingency60, 64, 84, 89,
behaviorism233236 91, 117, 118, 164, 190, 204, 205, 207, 208, 213,
by linguistic convention (de virtute sermonis) 217, 218, 222, 229, 247, 254
/ linguistic conventions43, 58, 66, convertible (convertibile)223225, 239
130, 131, 134, 135, 187, 188 correspond /correspondence102111,
123144, 146, 151, 175, 185, 186, 188, 224,
cause 232, 240
efficient87, 115, 116, 148n6, 149, 150,
153n27, 158n44, 159166, 180, 203, 204, definition
209212, 239, 240n30, 241, 244247, nominal22, 23, 33n73, 77n214,
248n59, 249, 255 112116, 170n92, 196, 200, 213214,
free149, 150, 247250, 254, 255 224, 230
see also will (voluntas) real215, 216
cognition (cognitio, notitia) demonstration215, 216, 227229
abstractive (cognitio abstractiva)148, demonstratives2628, 37, 39, 41, 48, 49,
156n40, 162, 165, 166, 212, 213 51n136, 59n159, 82, 134144, 165n69
intuitive (cognitio intuitiva)5, 11, 33n73, dispositions5, 178n123, 191, 228, 243
141n158, 148, 151174, 177, 190, 202229, see also habits (habitus)
238, 239, 240n27, 246, 247, 251, 253 dissent
computational model of mental acts of175, 176, 182n141, 185, 187n157,
processes149, 235, 242244, 246, 248 190, 191, 202n216
Index of Subjects 267
entertain (a thought)140n155, 141, 151, judgement

173, 178, 179, 182184, 195, 197, 199, 207n234, acts of5, 7, 122, 135, 136, 149, 151, 174,
208, 209, 213, 214, 218, 219n275, 220, 223, 175n112, 176, 178, 180n135, 181, 185187,
225, 227230 189194, 197199, 218n273, 229, 247,
equivocation / equivocal3, 10, 11, 14, 42, 248, 254
64n173, 65, 66n180, 69n187, 79, 81, 82, 89, evident11, 148, 151, 158160, 170n95,
92, 93102, 129134, 142144, 185, 231 174, 202230, 253n5
equivocal by chance93, 94, 96, 100 see also assent
c-equivocal / equivocal by consider-
ation95101, 130, 131, 144, 170 knowledge
exponible (as regards propositions)206 object of192, 193
extension (of a term, of a concept)6, 16, see also act of knowing (actus sciendi)
18, 32, 35, 36, 43, 47, 52, 5355, 62n165, 78,
90, 93, 97n39, 102n43, 150, 167, 169, 170n97, Language of Thought Hypothesis
171, 173, 212n248, 219, 222, 225, 226, 228, (loth)4, 7, 9, 80, 150, 231, 233, 242,
236239 248, 249, 251, 255
externalism / externalist1, 3n12, 163n66, layman (laicus)185, 188, 192, 194, 196, 197
165n70, 237n20
misrepresentation /misrepresent167, 171
false / falsity
conception of111122 naturalization (of the mind)9, 10, 248,
254, 255
genus52, 118, 119, 154, 155, 156n40, 167, nominalism / nominalist13, 6, 10, 11, 22,
168, 173n106, 216, 217, 219, 221223 27n58, 71, 124n119, 147, 152, 155n34, 230,
God33n73, 40n92, 87, 147, 150, 158n44, 253, 255
160, 180n136, 229 see also particularistic
habit (habitus)5, 6, 159, 176, 191, ornament of speech (ornatum sermo-

199n203 nis)106, 108, 110, 124
identification parsimony, principle of110n66,

demonstrative163164 230, 255
import (of a proposition) / import (impor- particularistic1, 126128, 168, 169
tari)111123, 125129, 132134, 136, 138, perceive / perception5, 152, 153,
142144, 146, 176, 185n151, 187190, 197, 199, 155161n55, 162, 163, 165, 166, 167n77&n78,
200, 202, 214, 216, 226, 232, 251 185, 188, 194, 196, 197, 198n203, 211, 212, 234,
identity or sameness of66n178, 123, 247, 248
125128, 134, 138, 143, 144, 146, permanent thing (res permanens)140,
228, 232 180, 184
imposition (impositio)71n195, 81101, process, mental9, 149, 152, 190, 235,
103, 105108, 129, 130, 131, 174, 210, 223, 241244, 246, 247, 254
224, 237 proposition
inhere / inherence115, 204206, dictum of121, 201n214
212 first contingent207
innate235, 235n12, 236, 238, 239, 252 form (formare) a mental proposi-
intention of the speaker26, 43, 44, 82, 95, tion62n167, 86n12, 91, 137, 139142,
133, 134136, 144, 148 147151, 173, 178186, 189, 194197, 199,
in the same respect (sub eadem rati- 200, 207212, 215, 218, 220, 222, 224,
one)156, 157n42, 212 226230, 247, 253
268 Index of Subjects
proposition (cont.) substance1, 2, 20n36, 22, 23, 30, 67,

known by itself (propositio per se 68, 73, 115, 126, 138, 140n156, 141, 147, 166,
nota)209, 215228 167n80, 168, 169, 171, 172, 205, 206n233,
propositional attitude5, 46n112, 60, 233, 207, 215
240, 241, 243246, 249, 255 supposition
improper6470, 78, 79
quality2224, 30, 32, 113, 115n84, 168, 184, material16, 17, 18, 57, 65, 67, 7079,
205, 208, 210, 215, 248n59 126n121
personal21, 22, 2426, 29, 32, 37, 38, 41,
regress, infinite85, 126, 201, 236 42, 43, 44, 4764, 78, 79, 81, 109111, 123,
relation 126, 135, 136, 138, 139, 142146, 148, 220
of the mind (relatio rationis) 95, 118 simple7079
real (relatio realis)95, 118 synonymy /synonymous3, 10, 11, 38n84,
representation / represent (repraesentare) 82, 106110, 123129, 143, 231
mental165167, 169, 170173, 211, 231,
232, 236, 237, 239, 240, 242244, 254 terms
absolute20n36, 2124, 34, 78, 81n5,
signification / signify (significare) 98, 99, 102n43, 107n56&n58, 113, 150,
change or loss of35, 36, 62n165, 82, 152, 167n77, 215, 217, 221225, 228, 229,
84, 85, 8791, 100, 110, 138, 139, 141, 232 239, 253
conventional7n28, 13, 44, 81, 85, 89, connotative20n36, 2124, 30, 33, 34,
91101, 123, 129n127 36, 78, 81n5, 107n56&n58, 113115, 205,
identity of50, 83, 87, 88, 90, 91, 128, 206, 224, 251253
134, 144 relative40n96, 113119, 122, 224
natural13, 44n109, 81, 82, 85, 89, 91, 92, syncategorematic18, 19, 81n5, 135, 136,
102n43, 107, 123, 126n121, 138, 139, 141, 251, 252, 253n5
143146, 150, 173, 174, 177 true / truth
necessity or need of103, 105108, conception of111122
110, 124 truth conditions (of propositions)10, 14, 15,
primary14, 2124, 30, 77, 107n58, 113, 16n14, 19, 20, 30, 32n70, 36, 37, 46, 47, 48n122,
117, 214, 224 51, 53, 58, 66, 78, 79, 111, 112, 123, 139, 251
secondary14, 2124, 30, 77, 82, 107n58, truth value
113, 116, 117, 119, 122, 131, 189, 214, 224 change of119121
see also connotative terms
similarity / likeness (similitudo) understand a spoken proposition / an
intentional97, 131, 170 utterance151, 185190, 237
real118, 161, 162, 164, 165, 167, 169, universals1, 2, 71n196, 127, 168, 169
171, 173, 226 use (of a term)
soul metaphorical14, 6470, 79, 142
rational or intellective6, 13n5, 112n75, significative14, 16, 38, 42n102, 43,
148, 149, 246, 248, 249, 253, 254 48, 5565, 67, 68, 70, 71n195, 7779,
sensitive248 113, 114n81, 126n121, 136, 141143, 146
species2n6, 33n73, 52, 7074, 76, 77n214,
90n23, 119, 154, 155n34, 156n40, 161, 167, 168, verify (verificari)38, 39, 41, 48, 56, 57,
172, 173n106, 216, 217, 219, 221223, 226n299 77n215, 115117, 121, 122, 149, 225, 226, 228,
subordinated / subordination (subordina- 229, 234, 239
tio)13n5, 8094, 96, 98102, 104,
105, 106, 110, 111, 116n88, 125, 126, 129, 132, will (voluntas)16n16, 74, 75, 112n75, 149,
134, 138, 143, 144, 146, 152, 223, 225, 232, 237, 150, 157n42, 159, 161n55, 209, 210212, 219,
252, 253 246250, 254, 255

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Ockhams Assumption of Mental Speech

Investigating Medieval Philosophy

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/imp

Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

1 The Basic Characteristics of Language: Signification

2 Ockhams Semantic Model: Subordination, Correspondence,

3 Ockhams Model of Thought146

3.2.1 The Three Steps of Concept Acquisition155

4 Why Ockham Is Not Fodor231

The present work is a revised version of my doctoral thesis, which I defended

Brev. Summa Physic. Brevis Summa Libri Physicorum

At least four assumptions appear to be part of the common ground of inter

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014|doi 10.1163/9789004277625_002

related to every particular whale.6 Ockham calls this a relation of signification.

view this language as a kind of ideal language.15 Panaccios alternative inter

actualization of the intellectual or volitional powers of the rational soul; it

It should be noted that Lenzs interpretation is based on Ockhams early

of a kind of Language of Thought, conceiving of the operation of thinking as

occurring within propositional contexts; that is, a spoken expression such as

The Basic Characteristics of Language

1 See Normore, The End of Mental Language, 294.

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014|doi 10.1163/9789004277625_003

following the traditions of both Boethius and of Augustine.3 Ockham literally

1.2 Signification and Supposition of Terms: First Approximation

In accordance with the Aristotelian tradition of taking terms as the basic

form propositions, where a written propositio is nothing but an inscription and

The difference between signification and personal supposition can be stated

(1) Socrates is wise

(2) Socrates was wise

(3) The sun is larger than the moon or a unicorn is an animal

1.3 Absolute vs. Connotative Terms

Absolute nouns or adjectives are those which do not signify something

What does it mean for a term to be absolute if everything it signifies is signified

(5) Donkeys and men are animals

(6) Bucephalus is an animal

animal supposits personally for a particular horse. It is important to note that

A connotative noun or adjective is a term which signifies something pri-

It is possible to render explicit what a connotative term signifies primarily and

[] since white has a nominal definition in which one part is posited in

(7) This wall is white

1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of Signify (significare)

In a chapter dedicated to the explanation of the expression signify (signifi

(1)In one sense a sign is said to signify something when it supposits or

[] and [the intellect] does not compose extramental things; otherwise,

discussion to spoken terms.56 That a term signifies something according to the

(A) A spoken term A signifies1 a thing a at time T if and only if a exists

(B) A spoken term A signifies1 a thing a at time T if and only if a speaker

(B1) A spoken term A signifies1 a thing a at time T if and only if a speaker

(2)signify is taken in a different sense when a sign can supposit in

59 I thank Wolfgang Knne for drawing my attention to these cases.

proposition and Ockham states the truth conditions of propositions with

64 See above 1.3 Absolute vs. Connotative Terms.

(8) A white thing was in the garden

(9) But the wall was white.

69 I discuss the case of terms losing their significates below.

is suggested [] by the essential role that Ockham assigns to present-tense propositions

(10) This man will be pale. (Pointing at a sun-tanned man).

(C) A spoken term ts signifies2 a thing a if and only if ts can correctly be

Correct applicability of a term is necessary and sufficient for signification2 in

(12) Our first born child will be named Peter

76 See above 1.2 Signification and Supposition of Terms: First Approximation.

1.5 The Property of Supposition

(1)In one sense a sign is said to signify something when it supposits or

(A) A spoken term A signifies1 a thing a at time T if and only if a exists

(B) A spoken term A signifies1 a thing a at time T if and only if a speaker

(B1) A spoken term A signifies1 a thing a at time T if and only if a speaker

(2)signify is taken in a different sense when a sign can supposit in

(C) A spoken term ts signifies2 a thing a if and only if ts can correctly be

(D) For every spoken term ts contained in a spoken proposition ps: ts

(ps)weak For all spoken propositions ps: ps is a spoken proposition if

(E) A proposition of the form This S is P is true if and only if there is

(F) A universal affirmative proposition Every S is P is true if and only if

(G) A proposition of the form This S is P is false if and only if there is

(H) A spoken term ts supposits personally for something in a true