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ROMULO MACALINTAL V COMELEC

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act
of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in
absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void
because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates
insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-
president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to
do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.


HELD: No.

1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines
within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and
resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is
concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who
executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines
for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute
the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to
include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way
would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the
presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the
COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
Cong. Ruy Elias C. Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, House of Representatives,
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,

JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A. BERNAS, Petitioners-in-
Intervention,

vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts:

Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712,
which provides for the electronic transmission of advanced result of unofficial count. Petitioners claimed that the
resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for
President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens accredited
arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the
resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial determination.

Issue:

Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified.

Ruling:

The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712.
The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court.

Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive
authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No.
7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL,
the duly-accredited citizens arm to conduct the unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections. The
quick count under the guise of an unofficial tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and
NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution
likewise contravened the constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law." It being unofficial, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act.

The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission subjects the same to certain
conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, to wit: (1) consideration of the
area and available funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were
found to have not been substantially met.

Resolution 6712 was null and void.

PIMENTEL V JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS

Congress may continue the canvass even after the final adjournment of its session. The final adjournment of Congress
does not terminate an unfinished presidential canvass. Adjournment terminates legislation but not the non-legislative
functions of Congress such as canvassing of votes. (Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress, 2004)
OSMENA V COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates the Constitution:

1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local
elections on the second Monday of May 1992;

2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all incumbent provincial, city
and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly
elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution;

3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local
officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;

4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial
elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under the title Commission on Elections of the Constitution;

5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national
and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid
justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the
Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to
eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the self-correcting
mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision.

On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this petition arguing that the question is
political in nature and that the petitioners lack legal standing to file the petition and what they are asking for is an
advisory opinion from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to resolve. On the merits, the SolGen contends
that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending process
prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.

MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides
for the synchronization of national and local elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the de-
synchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of synchronization in
the mentioned constitutional provision was used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will
synchronize future elections to once every three years.R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987
Constitution which provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30,
1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve
until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus Juris Secundum,
states that it is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over
until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the
term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to
continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.

R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the term of office of all
elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the second
Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two years and seven months,
that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years.

The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the campaign period. RA 7056
provides for a different campaign period, as follows:

a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before the day of election.

b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective provincial, city and municipal officials
forty-five (45) days before the day of the elections.
FORBES V CHUOCO TIACO

FACTS:

Defendant Chinese national was deported to China and was allegedly threatened to be deported again when he came
back to the Philippines. He filed for a preliminary injunction prohibiting plaintiffs from deporting him. Said injunction
was issued by the Court of First Instance.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the political rights of aliens are protected by due process of law.

RULING:

NO. The political rights of aliens is not governed by that due process of law which governs in dealing with their civil
rights. The certificate of admission is a mere license and may be revoked at any time. An aliens right to remain in the
territory of a foreign government is purely a political one and may be terminated at the will of such government. No
cases have been found, and it is confidently asserted that there are none, which establish a contrary doctrine.
IN RE: BERMUDEZ

Facts:
In a petition for declaratory relief with no respondents, petitioner asked the court if the
provision of the Section 5 Article XVIII of the 1986 Constitution, to wit: The six-year term
of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,
for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992,
refers to the then-incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador
Laurel or the previously-elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo
M. Tolentino.
After the election of February 7, 1986 where Marcos and Tolentino were declared the
winners, Aquino and Laurel were installed into the position last February 25, 1986 after
the infamous People Power Revolution. The next regular election for the President and
Vice-President was held last May 2, 1992.

Issue:
Whether the aforecited article applies to the then-incumbent President and Vice-President,
or the previously elected President and Vice-President.
Held:
The petition was hereby dismissed outright for:
1. Lack of jurisdiction. Court has no jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief. Rules of
Court states that it is the RTC (Regional Trial Courts) who has the jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief. Also, incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.

2. Lack of cause of action on the part of petitioner. Petitioner had no personality to use,
and his allegation was manifestly gratuitous. The legitimacy of the Aquino government
was not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge, and the people have made judgment.
SOLIVEN V MAKASIAR

Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel by the
then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar
averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He
grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue
then the president would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would
be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be
able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being
the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also
demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like
Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if
so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative.
It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
ESTRADA V DESIERTO
FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he had
personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as Jose Velarde a
grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated
in the House of Representatives filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House
Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and
an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not
guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by
students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as
lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support
for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he
will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove
him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively
resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality
of her proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the
nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any
further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable
to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office
of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was
a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure.
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that
while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to
the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand
was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was
affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned
subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his
leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied
resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo
as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of
peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous
and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer
entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life
to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive
immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent
of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term
during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold
the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).
GLORIA V COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:

Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City
in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned
as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created
by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.

Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the implementation of his reassignment.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasianos
right to security of tenure.

The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same attacks an act of the
President, in violation of the doctrine of presidentialimmunity from suit.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit.

2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his security of tenure.

Held:

1. Petitioners contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners
and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President.
Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of
discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of
petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary
Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit
hisqualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be
gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been described
as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum
to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of
petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the
reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held
in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):

"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of ourcivil service.


The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of
unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture and
Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra,
27 SCRA 138).

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employees
prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme
to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office
of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."

Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security of tenure,
the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced. (Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000)
SENATE V ERMITA

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes
surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies
particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to
certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita
submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters
that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate
president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made
and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered
by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or
higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered
by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing
in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO
464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts
and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged
that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO
464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although
there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others
who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The
appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check
and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas,
Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may
be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made
between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22,
therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining
to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains
to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress
oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress
to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official
may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official
of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section
1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article
VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their
part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear
in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by
the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes
which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In
such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may
only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance
is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.
NERI V SENATE COMMITTEE

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide
by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of
Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does
not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the
area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of
the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
operational proximity with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be


overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely
contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on
the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under
conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in
her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to
be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and
executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e.
the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational
proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President
Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did
not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the
September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the
exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of
Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.
REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery of the unexplained or ill-
gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and
business associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her
assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting the President in the
"recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration
of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections
or relationship."

In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and
formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on
the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere
legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since
the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on
the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit
conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and
resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.

Issue:

Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and inhibited acts as a president during his term of office

Held:

Yes. It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the
trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-
trial of the case.[82] Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions of
petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position
contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions.[83]

The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they did not file any
Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides,
under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive any other emolument from the
Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities.[84] Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E.
Marcos as President could not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other
source.[85] In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was
expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:

Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office except
when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or indirectly in
the management of any business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government owned or controlled corporation.

Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court with
appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof
including any government owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any
matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of Section 11, Article
VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or practice
any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as may be provided by law.

Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the
existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.

Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds since
it failed to prove the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal
statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally in favor of
respondent Marcoses.

We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income or income from legitimately
acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a
better position to know if there were such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was such other lawful
income, respondents should have specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was
concerned, it was enough to specify the known lawful income of respondents.

Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the
value of the accumulated assets, properties and other material possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1
and 2 must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The respondent Marcos couple did not file
any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could be determined. Their failure to file their
SAL was in itself a violation of law and to allow them to successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL
would reward them for their violation of the law.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNIONN V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law
is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in
any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is
an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in
the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts
held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and
deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO
284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
FUNA V ERMITA
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation of
respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry
Authority (MARINA).
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as
Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista
was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as
DOTC Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant
petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautistas appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any
other office or employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the
MARINA and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
Petitioner argues that Bautistas concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution .
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in this case. In fact,
there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the appointment of respondent Bautista
as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport, which rendered the present petition moot and academic. Petitioners prayer for a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is likewise moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there
is nothing left to enjoin.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against
dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.

Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his
tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry
Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and
VOID.

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is
to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results
in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his
office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are
designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said
that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a
particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the
person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person
named.
FUNA V AGRA

Facts:

Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in
place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who has been appointed as the Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra was designated as
the Acting Secretary in place of Secretary Devanadera when the latter resigned. Agra then relinquished his position as
Corporate Counsel and continued to perform the duties of an Acting Solicitor General.

Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his concurrent designations were merely in a
temporary capacity. Even assuming that he was holding multiple offices at the same time, his designation as an Acting
Sol Gen is merely akin to a hold-over, so that he never received salaries and emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen
when he was appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.

Issue 1: W/N Agras designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid

No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General
violates the constitutional prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.

It is immaterial that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in
so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against
dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations,
whether permanent or temporary, because the objective of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in the
Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and their deputies
and assistants.

Issue 2: W/N Agra may concurrently hold the positions by virtue of the hold-over principle

No. Agras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been
validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the consequence of
holding the other.

Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad
exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the Constitution to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show that his
holding of the other office was allowed by law or the primary functions of his position. To claim the exemption of his
concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under Section 13, he needed to establish that his
concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution.

Issue 3: W/N the offices of the Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice is in an ex officio capacity in relation to the
other

No. The powers and functions of the Solicitor General are neither required by the primary functions nor included in the
powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent of the latter, as in fact, the
Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous. With the enactment of RA 9417, the
Solicitor General is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment, rank, prerogatives,
allowances, benefits and privileges as those of Presiding Judges of the Court of Appeals.
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
BITONIO V COMISSION ON AUDIT

Facts: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in
the Department of Labor and Employment. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA Board, he was
receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.

After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to Mr. Bitonio
pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling declaring unconstitutional the holding of other offices by the cabinet members,
their deputies and assistants in addition to their primary office and the receipt of compensation therefore, and, to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997, implementing Senate Committee Reports No. 509.

In his motion for reconsideration to the COA, he contended that the Supreme Court modified its earlier ruling in the Civil
Liberties Union case which limits the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their Assistants. Officials
given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other appointive officials below the
rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition.

He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four years after the Civil Liberties Union case became final,
authorized the payment of per diems; in expressly authorizing per diems, Congress should be conclusively presumed to
have been aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case.

COA rendered the assailed decision denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board
of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.

Held: The assailed decision of the COA is affirmed.

The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receive per diem for his board meetings sitting as representative of the
Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA.

The petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary
of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment,
such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. The
Supreme Court cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to
have a better right than his principal.

Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the Constitution. No law can
render it nugatory because the Constitution is more superior to a statute. The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have
realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748 to cure such defect.
The option of designating representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the
paragraph as to payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that such
stipulation was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution.
ESTRADA V MACAPAGAL ARROYO

FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he had personally
given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based
numbers game. Singsons allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of
Representatives filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-
tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was
formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty.

The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by
students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as
lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for
Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he
will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove
him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.

OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively
resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd
at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
her proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation.
Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any
further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.

RULING

SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.

The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner
had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.

The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the
second envelop to clear his name.

"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

"The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy,
intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the
intrigue.)

"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.


The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said x
x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.

During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that
time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after transition period.

His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was
going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for
the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of
our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has
given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did
not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now
in the past tense.

THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.

Section 11 of Article VII provides that Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether
the President is incapable of performing his functions. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as
the President.

The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states: RESOLUTION
EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS
AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATIONS GOALS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: RESOLUTION
CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress
has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That
claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-
equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.

The Supreme Court rejected petitioners argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of
the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate
Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the Impeachment Court is now
functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he
can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.

The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought
to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that
the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner
cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in
the impeachment proceedings.
Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with
post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant
was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the
trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual
bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality
of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial
publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove
this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

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