VIII.

THE DECISION AND THE DISSENT

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS (Pasomanero)

293 SCRA 26 (Basis of Decisions)
Ponente: MARTINEZ

FACTS:

This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of
Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT
COMPANY, INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the
Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines.

The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from the failure of the
respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it had already
received payment and despite petitioners several demands. The petitioner then informed the
private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their
contract which stipulates that he venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner
setting forth the arbitral award. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a
Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the
arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the respondent but foreign
court refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the required filing
fees. Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands
by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount
adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City
for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private
respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause
of action. The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling
that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the
foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed this petition for
review on certiorari

ISSUE:

WON a foreign judgment is enforceable in this jurisdiction

RULING:
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the
validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by

the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered
differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure
in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon
failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the
order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint
before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS (A. Basa)

315 SCRA 296 (Basis of Decisions)
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: The case is the continuation of OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v. COURT OF
APPEALS 293 SCRA 26 (1998)
Petitioners brought a petition for review on certiorari to this Court wherein the threshold
issue raised was the enforceability of the foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra
Dun, India in favor of petitioner and against private respondent --- the resolution of which hinges
on whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the said two parties
under Clause 16 of the contract.
Private respondent alleges that the foreign courts judgment is not enforceable in this jurisdiction
because it failed to contain a statement of the facts and the law upon which the award in favor
of petitioner was based. The foreign judgment sought to be enforced reads:

[ORDER

Since objections filed by defendant have been rejected through Misc. Suit No. 5 on 7.2.90,
therefore, award should be made Rule of the Court.

ORDER

Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1 is made Rule of the Court. On the basis of conditions of
award decree is passed. Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree. The plaintiff shall
also be entitled to get from defendant ( US$ 899, 603.77 (US$ Eight Lakhs ninety nine thousand
six hundred and three point seventy seven only) along with 9% interest per annum till the last
date of realisation. (Emphasis supplied)]
ISSUE: W/N Foreign courts have jurisdiction

Held: The foreign court explicitly declared in its Order that Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be part
of the decree. This court ruling of the foreign court may be categorized in the nature of
memorandum decisions or those which adopt by reference the findings of facts and conclusions
of law of inferior tribunals. In this jurisdiction, it has been held that memorandum decisions do
not transgress the constitutional requirement in Article VIII, Section 14, on clearly and distinctly
stating the facts and the law on which the decision is based.

Nonetheless, it would be more prudent for a memorandum decision not to be simply

limited to the dispositive portion but to state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with
references to the record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and
the tribunals assessments and conclusions on the case. This practice would better enable a court
to make an appropriate consideration of whether the dispositive portion of the judgment sought
to be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts and conclusions of law made by the tribunal
that rendered the decision. This is particularly true where the decisions, orders, or resolutions
came from a court in another jurisdiction. Otherwise, the enforcement of the decisions would be
based on presumptions that laws in other jurisdictions are similar to our laws, at the expense of
justice based on the merits.

Moreover, the constitutional guideline set forth in Article VIII, Section 14 cannot prevail
over the fundamental elements of due process. Matters of procedure even if laid down in the
Constitution must be tempered by substantial justice provided it has factual and legal basis.
Considering that the case involves significant properties, the overriding consideration of a
judgment based on the merits should prevail over the primordial interests of strict enforcement
on matters of technicalities. Procedural lapses, absent any collusion or intent to defraud the
parties or mislead the tribunals, should not be allowed to defeat the claim of a party who is not
well-informed in the technical aspects of the case but whose interest is merely to enforce what
he believes to be his rightful claim.

In this case, considering that petitioner simply prayed for the remand of the case to the
lower court, the outright ruling and adherence to the foreign courts order adopting by reference
another entitys findings and conclusion was misplaced. The adjudication of this case demands a
full ventilation of the facts and issues and the presentation of their respective arguments in
support and in rebuttal of the claims of the contending parties. This is all the more applicable
herein since the Court is not a trier of facts,[17] but oftentimes simply relies on the cold pages of
the silent records of the case.
ACCORDINGLY, in the interest of due process, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
of Surigao City for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
 VELARDE v. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (Limjoco)
489 SCRA 283 (Decision)
Ponente: Panganiban

FACTS:
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila against
Velarde and his co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the ff:

interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church

and state; and
a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a
candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote
for a specified candidate.

The trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because in praying for a
determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II,
Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the petition has raised only a question of law.

It then proceeded to a discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church
and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle.

Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at some point that the endorsement of specific
candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion
in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration
which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court. Hence, this Petition for Review.
They alleged that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a
dispositive portion.

On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.

ISSUE: What is the standard form of a Decision? Did the challenge Decision comply with the
aforesaid form?

HELD:
The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and
filed with the clerk of court. In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the
following: (1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors;
(4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and,
finally, (5) dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a
prologue as well as an epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are
involved.

No. Counsel for SJS has utterly failed to convince the Court that there are enough factual and
legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and
the assailed Decision. The Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon
for its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no
factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual findings in
the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical
question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the
courts constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.

Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it
made no findings of facts and final disposition.

REYES v. REYES (Bercasio)

600 SCRA 345 (Decision)
Ponente: per curiam

FACTS:
It is a consolidated case against Former Judge Julia Reyes, a former judge in Pasig City.
The First case began when the Julia Reyes instructed Romana Reyes to conduct a
preliminary investigation on Migrio who was arrested earlier for allegedly violating the
PD 1602 or the Anti-Gambling Law but was released by a court order of Judge Jose
Morallos. Romana did not follow the order because this was against criminal procedure.
Judge Reyes was insistent and proceeded to scold the Prosecutor in front of the officers
in the precinct. Judge Reyes said that the Prosecutor Reyes was disobeying a lawful order
of a judicial officer.
Because of the said incident complainant has been a recipient of series of harassment
charges by the respondent such as being cited for contempt during a court hearing for
disobedience to alleged lawful order of a judicial officer of the court in relation to the
order to conduct a preliminary investigation, misbehavior of an officer of the Court in the
performance of her official duties as well as for improper conduct tending directly or
indirectly to impede, obstruct, and degrade the administration of justice which the
respondent issued a warrant of arrest for the complainant and set the bail at P119K due
to alleged 119 cases delayed. Fortunately, the complainant was able to secure an
injunction against her arrest from another judge but despite the issued injunction
respondent still pursued for the arrest of the complaint to the point that she ordered the
guards to arrest the complainant to her embarrassment.
IMOTEO A. MIGRIO is a Branch Clerk of Court earns the ire of the respondent judge.
Sometime during lunch break complainant and his co-employees were playing game of
cards or tong-its and while playing respondent judge ordered their warrantless arrest, by
 her police escort, alleging that complainant was caught inflagrante delicto. The
complainant was detained for two days and was released on the order of Judge Morallos
thru the counsel of the complainant. Respondent judge insisted that complainant Migrio
must not be released as the case is covered by the rule on warrantless arrest. Because of
the release respondent charged the complainant with an additional complaint of illegal
gambling during office hours, infidelity in the custody of documents, qualified theft
and/or malversation for misappropriation of the amount of PHP10,000.00 entrusted to
him for "deposit, for violation of R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
among others.
In verified letter-complaint Judge Reyes was charged by complainants Armi M. Flordelisa
et al. who are court employees at Branch 69, with the following acts: (1) residing in
chambers; (2) borrowing money from staff; (3) instructing the stenographer to collect a
minimum amount for ex-parte cases; (4) frequently bringing some of her staff to her
nighttime gimmick; (5) unethical conduct; (6) conduct unbecoming a lady judge; (7)
unfriendliness to litigants; (8) anti-public service; (9) inability to control emotions during
hearing; (10) uttering invectives in front of staff and lawyers; (11) conducting staff
meeting in an unsightly attire; and (12) gross inefficiency/laziness. Respondent upon
learning of these complaints against her, suspected that the source of information came
from the complainant, thus, as retaliatory act, respondent filed ten (10) counts of Indirect
Contempt of Court charges against complainant for gross misconduct in office and
insubordination then issued an arrest warrant for the complainant which causes
complainants detention in jail for three days until she was able to post a bail of P50K of
the total P250K amount of bail set by the respondent judge.
Florencio Sebastian, Jr. (Sebastian) charged Judge Reyes with Grave Misconduct, Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Incompetence and Inefficiency arising from the procedings in
Criminal Case No. 19110, "People v. Florencio Sebastian, Jr., Alicia Ty Sebastian and Justo
Uy," for falsification of public document pending before Branch 69. Because of the
criminal case mentioned the complainant and his wife were arrested on the basis of
unsigned order of the respondent. Moreover, on the day of the hearing of the
abovementioned case, Judge Reyes read the judgment from a computer screen without
giving the couple a written copy or computer print-out while inside her chamber. The
couple raised on appeal that the trial court failed to comply with the mandate of Rule 120
of the Rules of Court and Section 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that the
decision must be written and signed by the judge with a clear statement of the facts and
the law on which the decision is based.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Julia Reyes should be dismissed from service?
If Julia Reyes violated due process when she failed to put into writing her judgment?
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, the court found that Julia Reyes should be removed from service.
o When judges are appointed, they are expected to be mentally and morally fit to
pass upon the merits of the varied contentions. They are also expected to be
fearless in their pursuit to render justice to be unafraid to displease any person,
interest or power, and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist
 the temptation lurking in their office. Julia Reyes failed to resist the temptations
of power that led her to violate the laws she swore to protect and uphold.
o To constitute gross ignorance of the law or procedure, the decision, order or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties should be contrary to
the existing law and jurisprudence, and most importantly, the judge must be
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. It is evident in the
consolidated cases that Julia Reyes was in bad faith when this acts were
committed. This Court cannot shrug off her failure to exercise that degree of care
and temperance required of a judge in the correct and prompt administration of
justice, more so in these cases where her exercise of the power of contempt
resulted in the detention and deprivation of liberty of Migrio, Andree, Sebastian
and Alicia, and endangered the freedom of the other complainants. Tiongco v.
Salao.
Yes.Respecting Judge Reyes failure to put into writing her judgment, she having merely
required the accused to read it from the computer screen in camera without the presence
of counsel, she violated the Constitution. She could have simply printed and signed the
decision. Offering to a partys counsel a diskette containing the decision when such
counsel demands a written copy thereof is unheard of in the judiciary. A verbal judgment
is, in contemplation of law, in esse, ineffective. If Judge Reyes was not yet prepared to
promulgate the decision as it was not yet printed, she could have called the case later and
have it printed first. A party should not be left in the dark on what issues to raise before
the appellate court.
o It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of
how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led
to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is
rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he
lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the
decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how
it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to in
point the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
Sec. 1. Judgment; definition and form. Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the
accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on him of the
proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly
and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it it is based.
Sec. 2. Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the
participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the
 offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate
civil action has been reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS (Gordon)

416 SCRA 65 (Decision)
Ponente: CARPIO, J.

FACTS:
Potenciano Galanida (respondent) was an assistant manager in Allied Banking
Corporation (petitioner)
His appointment was covered by a "Notice of Personnel Action" which provides
petitioner's right to transfer employees as the need arises and for maintaining a smooth
and uninterrupted service
Galanida was promoted several times and was transferred to several branches within
Cebu City
Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in the Cebu homebase, petitioner
listed respondent to be assigned outside of Cebu City having been stationed in Cebu for
seven years already.
Galanida refused to be transferred to Bacolod citing as reason parental obligations,
expenses, and anguish that would result if he is away from his family
He filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for constructive dismissal. LA held that Allied
Bank abused its management in ordering the transfer of Galanida. His transfer was
inconvenient because he would have to incur additional expenses for board, lodging, and
travel. Also, Allied Bank failed to show any business urgency that would justify the transfer
On appeal, NLRC likewise ruled that Allied Bank terminated Galanida without just cause
. Galanida's termination was illegal for lack of due process. Allied Bank did not conduct
any hearing and failed to send a termination notice
CA held that Galanida's refusal to comply with the transfer orders did not warrant his
dismissal. It ruled that the transfer from a regional office to the smaller Bacolod or
Tagbilaran branches was effectively a demotion.
Allied Bank argues that the transfer of Galanida was a valid exercise of its management
prerogative. Allied Bank contends that Galanida's continued refusal to obey the transfer
orders constituted willful disobedience or insubordination, which is a just cause for
termination under the Labor Code
ISSUE: W/N there is legal basis in petitioner's exercise of its management prerogative
HELD: Yes.
 The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful order
of an employer. Employees may object to, negotiate and seek redress against employers
for rules or orders that they regard as unjust or illegal.
For Galanida's continued refusal to obey Allied Bank's transfer orders, we hold that the
bank dismissed Galanida for just cause in accordance with Article 282(a) of the Labor
Code. Galanida is thus not entitled to reinstatement or to separation pay.
Preliminary Matter: Misquoting Decisions of SC
Memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter,
both misquoted the Supreme Court's ruling in Dosch v. NLRC. They deliberately made the
quote from the SCRA syllabus appear as the words of the Supreme Court.||VNVN
The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court decisions or
resolutions is not the work of the Court, nor does it state this Court's decision. The
syllabus is simply the work of the reporter who gives his understanding of the decision.
The reporter writes the syllabus for the convenience of lawyers in reading the reports. A
syllabus is not a part of the court's decision. A counsel should not cite a syllabus in place
of the carefully considered text in the decision of the Court.
Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer
shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision for authority. It is the
duty of all officers of the court to cite the rulings and decisions of the Supreme Court
accurately.

ONG CHING KIAN CHUNG v. CHINA NATIONAL CEREALS OIL AND FOODSTUFFS IMPORT AND
EXPORT CORP. (Cantolino)
333 SCRA 390 (Decision)
Ponente: BUENA, J.

FACTS:
Wilson Ong Ching Kian Chung is selling vermicelli (sotanghon) using his copyrighted
cellophane wrapper with the two-dragons designed label. In 1993, Wilson Ong sued
Lorenzo Tan for infringing upon his copyrighted cellophanes. Wilson Ong alleged that Tan
was importing sotanghon from China National Cereals Oils and Foodstuffs Import and
Export Corporation and then Tan would use Wilson Ongs copyrighted cellophanes to sell
the sotanghon.

While the case was pending before the Quezon City RTC, China National Cereals filed
another complaint to cancel the copyright of Wilson Ong before the Manila RTC. Judge
Palattao of the Manila RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Wilson Ong
from using his copyrighted cellophanes.

Eventually, Wilson Ong appealed before the Court of Appeals questioning the TRO. The
Court of Appeals in the body of its decision cited that the case before the Manila RTC
should have been dismissed because of litis pendentia and forum shopping, there being
an existing case before the QC RTC which is a co-equal court of the Manila RTC. But in the
 dispositive portion of the CA decision, it said that the Manila RTC has the discretion to
dismiss the case. Manila RTC did not dismiss the case but rather it ordered the
cancellation of Wilson Ongs copyright. The Manila RTC invoked that though the CA cited
forum shopping and litis pendentia as grounds for dismissing the case the CA did not order
Manila RTC to actually dismiss the case but rather it gave the Manila RTC the discretion
to continue hearing the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Manila RTC is correct.

RULING:
No. The general rule states that the dispositive portion of a Judgment becomes the
subject of execution. However, there are exceptions to this rule and one of the exceptions
is that if the dispositive portion differs with the discussion in the body of the decision such
as in the case at bar. This is because the dispositive portion finds support from the
decisions ratio decidendi.

The Quezon City court and the Manila court have concurrent jurisdiction over the case.
However, when the Quezon City court acquired jurisdiction over the case, it excluded all
other courts of concurrent jurisdiction from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. The
Manila court is, therefore, devoid of jurisdiction over the complaint filed resulting in the
assailed decision which must perforce be declared null and void. To hold otherwise would
be to risk instances where courts of concurrent jurisdiction might have conflicting orders.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. CASTRO-BARTOLOME (Gomez)

114 SCRA 799 (Dissenting Opinion)
Ponente: Aquino, J.

FACTS:
The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) at Tanay, Rizal on August 13,
1976 from Piguing spouses. After acquisition, they subsequently filed for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title on Dec. 1, 1976. However, the court denied the petition and the corresponding
appeal was likewise rejected. It elevates its appeal with the following arguments; firstly, the land
in question had essentially been converted to private land by virtue of acquisitive prescription as
a result of open continuous and notorious possession and occupation for more than thirty years
by the original owner, Olimpia Ramos and his predecessor in interest, Piguing spouses, whom
Meralco acquired the disputed land, and finally, the substantial rights acquired by Ramos spouses
and Peguing spouses for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, extend to Meralco by virtue of
the provision of the Public Land Law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Meralco as a juridical person, allowed under the law to hold lands of
public domain and apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
 Does the possession tacked to predecessor Private Corporation automatically guarantee
its rights to possession and title of the land.
Whether or not it is contingent for a judicial confirmation of title before any grant would
be extended to a juridical person.

RULING:
No. Private corporation or juridical person is prohibited and not allowed under the law to
hold land of public domain. Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private
corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except for lease of lands
not exceeding one thousand hectares.
No. The presumption that since they bought the property from the person who occupied
the land in open, continuous and notorious possession of the public land for more than
thirty years, does not automatically amount to rights and possession. It would cease to
be public only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming
it under the law. This conclusion is anchored on the principle that "all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. The exception to the rule is only when the occupant and his predecessors-in-
interest possess and occupied the same since time immemorial. Such possessions justify
the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had
been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
Yes. In this case, the court declared that it is contingent upon the issuance of title before
juridical entity may have acquired possession over the property. That means that until
the certificate of title is issued, a piece of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to
be confirmed, remains public land. Thus, any levy and execution were void. As between
the State and the Meralco, the land in question remains a public land. The court also took
notice that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on one hand)
alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on
the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an
imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not
distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (De Jesus)

146 SCRA 509 (Dissenting Opinion)
Ponente: NARVASA, J.

FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired
5 parcels of land from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe
Possession of the Infiels over the land dates back before the Philippines was discovered
by Magellan
Land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute
ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public
domain
 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of
improvements
Ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
Donated part of the land as the town site of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
1. W/N the ruling in the case, Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome (114 SRC 799) should be
overturned in light of jurisprudence, YES
2. W/N the conversion of the land from public domain to private property is valid and
recognized, YES
3. W/N the Art XIV, Sec 11 of the Constitution (barring private companies and associations
from purchasing public alienable lands in 1973 Constitution) is applicable retroactively,
NO
RULING:
1. Citing the jurisprudence in Carino v. Insular Govt, Susi v. Razon, and Herico v. DAR, The
court overturned the decision on Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, stating that a possession
is said to be prescriptively acquired by the operation of the Public Lands Act, upon
conclusively presumed fulfillment of all the necessary conditions for a Government Grant.
a. Thus, the land in question effectively ceased to be of the public domain and was
therefore classified as private property at the moment of the sale through the continuous and
unchallenged possession of the bona fide right to ownership from Meralcos predecessors-
interest. There being no law prohibiting the sale of private lands to privately held corporations,
the court thus overturned the decision.
b. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent.
2. Referring to the ruling in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, the land held by the Infiels since
time immemorial was effectively deemed as private land, by the operation of the law,
ipso jure. Thus, at the moment of the sale, ACME Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., Etc.
therefore, purchased private property. There being no ruling in the 1935 Constitution
prohibiting this sale, this was held to be valid.
3. Acme had already obtained vested rights under the 1935 Constitution when it
purchased the land from the Infiels. The provision in the 1973 Constitution prohibiting
the purchase of alienable public lands by private corporations or associations cannot be
retroactively applied.

MELENCIO, J. Dissenting:
1. Art XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution must be upheld in this case.
o It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision
prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of
Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain.
2. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply
 for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity
of court actions
o The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that
only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section
11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain.
o That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified.
"A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the
intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino)

IX. RATIO DECIDENDI, FALLO, AND OBITER DICTUM

MERCADO v. PEOPLE (Matienzo)

392 SCRA 687
Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J

FACTS:
Petition for review of accused Marvin Mercado in the Supreme Court pursuant to the last
par. Of Sec 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Marvin Mercado with Rommel Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques, Enrile
Bertumencarnapping (RA 6538- Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972)
Sentence of RTC: 12 yrs. and 1 day minimum17 yrs and 4 months of reclusion temporal
maximum
In the Court of Appeals, sentence increased to 17 years and 4 months30 yrs.
Court of Appeals relying on People vs. Omotoy (charged with arson, sentenced to
reclusion perpetua as maximum- case taken directly to Supreme Court)
Carnapping of the Isuzu Trooper- joyride, no intention of stealing
Car: quarter window broken
Carnapping- special law (Anti-carnapping Act of 1972) not under Revised Penal Code
ISSUE:
Whether the maximum sentence of 30 years given by the Court of Appeals is considered
to be within the range of reclusion perpetua which will enable the case to be certified in
the Supreme Court for a reevaluation of the facts and evidence.
HELD:
The petition of Marvin Mercado for review in the Supreme Court is denied. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with a modification that the penalty to be imposed is reduced
to indeterminate prison term of 17 years and 4 months to 22 years, no costs.

There is no basis for the trial courts decision of 12 years and 1 day since RA 6538 sets minimum
penalty for carnapping at 14 years and 8 months. The crime committed is penalized by a special
law and not under The Revised Penal Code. Though the 30-yr period falls within the range,
reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty which cannot be divided into different periods.
Relying on the Omotoy case may not be ratio decidendi but it enunciates fundamental
procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. When the Court of Appeals imposes penalties less
than reclusion perpetua, a review of the case may only be had by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 where only errors or questions of law may be raised. The petition was a review on
certiorari and not questions of fact. The findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals are binding upon the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals decision of 17 yrs
and 4 months applies only to carnapping committed by means of violence against or intimidation
of any person of force upon things. Evidence shows that there was force upon the vehicle but
does not merit the imposition of full penalty. Thus, penalty was reduced.

VILLANUEVA v. COURT OF APPEALS (E. Del Rosario)

379 SCRA 463
Ponente: Villanueva vs CA
FACTS:

Petitioner Villanueva, Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the Intercontinental
Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) where the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner. IBC
then appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission with an appeal bond issued
by the BF General Insurance Company Inc. BFs vice president supposedly confirmed the
surety bond, but the documents of the surety bond were subsequently found to be
falsified.
Petitioner then filed a complaint of two (2) counts of falsification of public document
against respondent Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz III but was dismissed by the city
prosecutors office of Manila. The department of Justice affirmed the dismissal against
Diaz but ordered the inclusion of Villadores as an accused in the two criminal cases. The
original informations were amended to include Villadores among those charges.
Respondent Villadores filed a petition for the disqualification of Rico and Associates as
private prosecutor for petitioner for he contended that the petitioner is not the party in
these cases and that it was IBC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in failing to consider Francisco Villanueva Jr., as
not party to the case, as a mere obiter dictum.

HELD:
No, the pronouncement of the appellate court in the falsification of public document
cases is not an obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised the admission of
the Amended Information. Argument on whether petitioner Villanueva, Jr. was the
offended party was, thus clearly raised by respondent Villadores. An obiter dictum has
been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law, which is not
necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed
by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, by the way such are not binding as precedent.
Thus the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
 SUNTAY v. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY (De Leon)
300 SCRA 760
Ponente: MARTINEZ

FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabels Petition for Letters of
Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will.
The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabels father Emilio,
had predeceased his mother Cristina.

The marriage of Isabels parents had previously been declared by the CFI as null and
void. Federico anchors his opposition on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC,
that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child.
The trial court had denied Federicos Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari.
Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the the decision
declaring the marriage of Isabels parents null and void be upheld.
ISSUE/S:
In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive portion thereof,
which should prevail?
Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabels parents a case of a void or voidable
marriage?

Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?

HELD:
Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application
of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the
dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be declared null and
void, the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which
was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be
annulled. As such, the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the
decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental
distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never
to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations
of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such
marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or
not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand,
a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside
by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.
 Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never
been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the
marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages
is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that: Children conceived
of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and
children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In
view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89
of the Civil Code which provides that children conceived of voidable marriages before
the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.

GONZALES v. SOLID CEMENT CORPORATION (Bordado)

684 SCRA 344
Ponente:

FACTS:

PEOPLE v. MACADAEG, ET. AL. (K. Cruz)

91 Phil. 410
Ponente: LABRADOR, J.
*obiter dictum- passing or incidental statements; statements made or decisions reached in a
court opinion which were not
necessary to the disposition of the case; uttered by way, not upon the point or question pending,
as if turning aside from the
main topic of the case to collateral subjects; opinion of the court upon any point or principle
which it is not required to decide.

FACTS:
Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission- Hons. Macadaeg, Potenciano Pecson, Ramon R. San Jose
Antonio Guillermo- convicted and sentenced for murder
July 15, 1947- case filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos NorteMar. 29, 1948- judgment.
Appeal to the Supreme Court- judgment on May 19, 1950expressly ruled in the judgment of
conviction that
Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty because the murders which he was convicted
were committed not
in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a fratricidal strife between two
rival guerrilla units.
Motion for reconsideration- June 5, 1950- denied July 13, 1950
June 20, 1950- filed for suspension of the proceedings and reference of the case to the Seventh
Guerilla Amnesty
Commission- denied July 13, 1950
Petition for amnesty- July 8, 1950

Issue
Whether the pronouncement of the Court is obiter dictum and if the Commission has jurisdiction
over the petition for amnesty of the convicted.

Ruling
The petition for prohibition was granted and the preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme
Court on Nov. 24, 1950 made
absolute with costs against Guillermo. He may not raise again the issue in any tribunal, judicial or
administrative and is now
estopped from contesting the judgment, of the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
adverse ruling.

Ratio
Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission can take cognizance only of cases pending appeal in the
Supreme Court on October 2,
1946, at that time, during which date the Guillermo criminal case was still pending in the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte. Guillermos case was assigned to the Second GAC. Seventh GACs claim of jurisdiction of
the application was merely
based on administrative Order no. 217 which expressly states in view of the appointments of
new Judges of First Instances
and not for the purpose of setting forth cases cognizable by each of the different commissions.
The courts are not excluded in deciding any claim for amnesty, thus the Court has jurisdiction
over the amnesty petition of
Guillermo. It was also found that the petition was an ill-advised attempt to delay execution of the
judgment of conviction which
no court of justice will countenance. The finding of the Court that Guillermo is not entitled to the
benefits of amnesty is final
and conclusive, not an obiter dictum, under the principle of res judicata

LEDESMA v. COURT OF APPEALS (Bayona)

465 SCRA 437
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA is the Chairman of the 1st Division of the Board of Special
Inquiry (BSI) of the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (BID). In a letter-complaint
filed by AUGUSTO SOMALIO with the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of
the Ombudsman, an investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the
extension of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of 2 foreign nationals. As a result, the FIIB, as
nominal complainant, filed before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN a formal complaint against herein petitioner. With respect to petitioner,
the complaint was treated as both a criminal and an administrative charge for (9) counts of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of public documents,
and (administrative aspect), for (9) counts of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Falsification of
Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty.
Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn M. Reyes: Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma SUSPENDED from the
service for one (1) year for Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service; Assistant
Ombudsman reviewed the Joint Resolution which was approved by respondent Ombudsman
Desierto. However, respondent Ombudsman approved a Resolution of Graft Investigation Officer
Marilou B. Ancheta-Mejica dismissing the criminal charges against petitioner for insufficiency of
evidence.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the ADMINISTRATIVE case. In an Order11 dated
February 8, 2000, Graft Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the motion for reconsideration
which was approved by respondent Ombudsman.
The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners suspension. Ledesma alleges that the CA erred and
that contrary to the CA finding, the ombudsman is merely advisory on the Bureau of Immigration
(BI). Petitioner argues that to uphold the appellate courts ruling expands the authority granted
by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman and runs counter to prevailing jurisprudence
on the matter, particularly Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner submits that the
Ombudsmans findings that the TRV applications were illegal constitutes an indirect interference
by the Ombudsman into the powers of the BOC over immigration matters.
ISSUE:
WON the pronouncement in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman is an obiter dictum that should
not be cited as a doctrinal declaration of the Supreme Court.

HELD:
Petitioner insists that the word recommend be given its literal meaning; that is, that the
Ombudsmans action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect, citing
Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman: Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were
administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from
the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13,
subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend
the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official
concerned. For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that the
word recommend must be taken in conjunction with the phrase and ensure compliance
therewith.
The PROPER INTERPRETATION of the Courts statement in Tapiador should be that the
Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or
employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to
implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the
Ombudsmans functions and not its jurisdiction. We agree with the ratiocination of public
respondents. Several reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the
subject constitutional provision.
Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of
the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the
administrative case.
The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an
OBITER DICTUM and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying
interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal
declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.

MAMACARIOLA v. ASUNCION (Baclao)

114 SCRA 77
Ponente:

FACTS:

CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (Lanzon)

676 SCRA 579
Ponente:

FACTS:

BELGICA v. OCHOA Jr. (Hung)

710 SCRA 1 (Co-Equal Branches of Govt & Separation of Powers)
Ponente:

FACTS:
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922.
Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of
the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel
to the latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork
barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for
hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30
million for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
 b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects,
P100 million for soft projects.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that
the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel The president does have his own source of fund albeit not
included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since
1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR
this has been around since about 1983

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July
2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the
corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles
had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus
NGOs (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government
funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An
audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred
with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions
before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because
it violates the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers

As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of
the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to
which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork
barrel system, whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the
legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to
a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of separation
of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel,
then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).

This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to
get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does
grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and
initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for
it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.

Exceptions to the rule are:

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local
matters;

(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to
which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative
power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the
exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member
of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto
items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being
undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now
identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the
president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively
renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.

d. Local Autonomy

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their
Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the
house of representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the
national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of
the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution
on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but
worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as
well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for
the appropriation, to wit:

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain
energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall
be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the
President may direct;

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall
be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the
 Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869

MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS (B. Cruz)

177 SCRA 668
Ponente Cortes, J.

FACTS:
After the People Power Revolution, the Presidency of Cory Aquino was met with problems
that besieged her such as the failed Manila Hotel Coup by political leaders of Mr. Marcos
in 1986; takeover of Channel 7 by Marcos loyalist; military coup attempt by Col. Gregorio
Honasan; and the communist insurgency.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to
die. But Mrs. Aquino has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and
his family.
Petitioners:
Petitioners believed that the right of Marcos to return is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights:
o Section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
o Section 6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and
his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed. According to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, it provides:
o Article 13:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state:
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country
Likewise, the international Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified
by the Philippines, provides:
o Article 12:
(1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence.
(2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country including his own
(3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to restrictions except
those, which are provided by law, necessary to protect national security,
public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others,
and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant.
 (4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country.
The petitioners finally contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty
of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by
law.
Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to
do so.
They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority
or agency of government, the must be legislation to that effect.
Respondents:
They argued that the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual
rights. As support, they cited Article II section 4-5 of the Constitution.
o Section 4: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal military or civil service.
o Section 5: The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Also, respondents pointed out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from
returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has
international precedents:
o Dictators such as Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr.
of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, etc.
Finally, the respondents believe that the right to return to ones country is not among the
rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights which treats only of liberty of abode and
the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our
Constitution, is part of the law of the law (Sec. 2 Article II of the 1987 Constitution).
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoy is a different
protection under the international Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e against being
arbitrarily deprived thereof (Art. 12 (4))

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and
Family to the Philippines?

HELD:
Yes.
The right to return and right to travel is two separate and distinct things.
o The right to return is covered by territorial rules of the countrys respective border
laws and is bound to limitations of national security.
o The right to travel is one that pertains to freedom of movement.
 In this case, Marcos has the right to travel to any country however his right to return to
the Philippines is prohibited.
The residual power of the President is embodied in Article VII section 1 of the 1987
Constitution.
o Section 1: The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
However, it does not define what is meant by executive power. Although in other Articles
it is admitted that there are samples of what the President power is, it seems that the
Constitution did not specify what the powers of the President are.
The court believes that we could not narrowly construed the President to someone who
simply executes the laws and neither can we also limit his power to the ones enumerated
within the Constitution.
In other words, the executive power is more that the sum of specific powers so
enumerated by the Constitution.
In addition, it seems that whatever the power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive. In the case of Springer vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, when the issue of determining the members of the legislature who
constitute a majority of the board and committee but are not doing their legislative
performance it was held that:
o It is clear that they are not legislative in character, and still clearer that they are
not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the authority of either of these
two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the
remaining one among which the powers of the government are divided.
In exercising executive power, the President is guided by the Constitution.
In the case, Article 4 and 5 seem applicable wherein it collectively states that:
o the prime duty of the government is to serve and protect the people and that
the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy
The issue at hand requires that the President balance the general welfare and common
good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the
Presidents residual power to protect the general welfare of the people.
It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. It could also be
construed to mean the Presidents duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.
Also, as the Commander-in-Chief, the President is bestowed with the duty to protect the
peace.
The power of the President is to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against
external and internal threats to its existence.
The President is not only clothes with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is
also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order.
The President has indeed the power to bar the Marcoses from returning the Philippines.
This was exemplified even further by the fact that despite the Congress did not insisted
to pass its resolution, which was signed by 103 of its members, to allow the Marcoses to
 return to the Philippines in order to exemplify Philippiness collective adherence to
uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and laws
The resolution does not question the Presidents power to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines; rather, it appeals to the Presidents sense of compassion to
allow a man to come home to die in his country.
The power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines should be treated as
a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual powers of the President,
which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the Part of the President.
SC DECISION: WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not
act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President
Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat
to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED.

MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS (Miranda)

178 SCRA 760
Ponente: (not stated)
FACTS:
After the death of former President Marcos in Honolulu, Hawaii, his family petitioned to
return to the Philippines which was dismissed by the Court and denied by then President
Aquino.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating the following:
o 1. To bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines
is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of
birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed
to Filipinos under the Constitution;
o 2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has,
she had exercised it arbitrarily; and
o 3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.
The Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot and academic
as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. He believes that the true intent of the Marcoses
argument of right to return really means a right to destabilize the country.

ISSUE: WON the President has the power to bar a Filipino from his own country

RULING: Yes.

The President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are
implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her
duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly
enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the
Constitution.
Among the duties of the President under the Constitution is to protect and promote the
interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and
subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present circumstances is in compliance with
this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or
with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the
implementation of this decision.

UNITED STATES v. NIXON (Abrigo)

418 US 683
Brief Background:
In 1972, President Richard Nixon, a Republican, was running for re-election against Senator
George McGovern, a Democrat. Five months before the election, an alert security guard found
burglars in the Democratic Party headquarters, which was located in Washington's Watergate
apartment complex. Reporters following the story connected the burglars to high-ranking
officials in the White House. Nixon denied any connection to the break-in. However, an
independent congressional investigation revealed the existence of audiotapes of the President
discussing the break-in with its organizers.

FACTS:
On March 1, 1974, a grand jury of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
returned an indictment charging seven named individuals with various offenses, including
conspiracy to defraud the United States and to obstruct justice. Although he was not designated
as such in the indictment, the grand jury named the President, among others, as an unindicted
co-conspirator.

On April 18, 1974, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum was issued
pursuant to Rule 17 (c) to the President by the United States District Court and made returnable
on May 2, 1974. The subpoena required the production of certain tapes, memoranda, papers,
transcripts, or other writings relating to certain precisely identified meetings between the
President and others.

On April 30, the President publicly released edited transcripts of 43 conversations; portions of 20
conversations subject to subpoena in the present case were included. On May 1, 1974, the
President's counsel filed a "special appearance" and a motion to quash the subpoena under Rule
17 (c). This motion was accompanied by a formal claim of privilege.

On May 20, 1974, the District Court denied the motion to quash and the motions to expunge and
for protective orders., it further ordered to deliver to the District Court, on or before May 31,
1974, the originals of all subpoenaed items, as well as an index and analysis of those items,
together with tape copies of those portions of the subpoenaed recordings for which transcripts
had been released to the public by the President on April 30. The District Court rejected
jurisdictional challenges based on a contention that the dispute was non justiciable because it
was between the Special Prosecutor and the Chief Executive and hence "intra-executive" in
character.

The District Court held that the judiciary, not the President, was the final arbiter of a claim of
executive privilege. The court concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, the
presumptive privilege was overcome by the Special Prosecutor's prima facie "demonstration of
need sufficiently compelling to warrant judicial examination in chambers . . . ."

On May 24, 1974, the President filed a timely notice of appeal from the District Court order, and
the certified record from the District Court. On May 31, the petition was granted with an
expedited briefing schedule. On June 6, the President filed, under seal, a cross-petition for writ
of certiorari before judgment. This cross-petition was granted June 15, 1974, and the case was
set for argument on July 8, 1974.

Issue:
Is the Presidents Article II constitutional privilege absolute?

Ruling:

The Presidents executive privilege is not absolute and must bend to Amendment 4 and
Amendment 5 requirements of speedy and fair trials and of the ability of defendants to face their
accusers.
Courts are not required to proceed against the President as if the President was any other
individual. Courts should review communications claimed to be privileged in camera (by the
judge only in chambers).

The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) had to balance the executive privilege
against the rights of citizens to face their accusers and to have a speedy and fair trial. The Court
made the point that the President is not a normal citizen, and therefore should receive great
deference regarding executive claims of privilege. However, executive privilege is not absolute
and must be balanced against the right of the accused in criminal proceedings. The Court took
great care to limit its opinion because it was delving into a political dispute between the President
and Congress, something the Supreme Court is loath to do.
NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS
(Andal)
549 SCRA 77
Leonardo-De Castro, J.:

FACTS:
On 21 April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and
services for the NBN Project in the amount of nearly Php6B and was to be financed by the
Republic of China.
Several Resolutions regarding the investigation and implications on regarding the NBN
Project were introduced in Senate.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain
personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project.
Petitioner was summoned to appear and he testified to the Committees for eleven (11)
hours, but refused to answer three important questions, invoking his right to executive
privilege. For failing to appear in the other days that he was summoned, Neri was held in
contempt.
3 Important questions which Neri refused to answer:
a. Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b. Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c. Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being
told about the alleged bribe?
Neri sought executive privilege.

ISSUE:
W/N Neri can invoke executive privilege?
Ruling:
Yes
The Presidential Communications Privilege, which pertains to communications,
documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations
and that the President believes should remain confidential.
SC gives 3 reasons:
First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence
of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudencec.
Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member
of President Arroyos cabinet.
Third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation
of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
 SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERMITA (J. Del Rosario)
488 SCRA 1
Ponente:

FACTS:

SOLIVEN v. MAKASIAR (Briones)

167 SCRA 393
Ponente: (per curiam)

FACTS:
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel
by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and
others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat
her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be
sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed
under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also,
considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be
a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the
president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring
all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf.
Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant
cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against
such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.
 DAVID v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (Igot)
489 SCRA 160
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:

FACTS:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a
plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented
by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head
Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the
CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another
known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran
of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest
issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in
jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the
president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated
in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth.
Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected
and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The
Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power
and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned
PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation
of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The
SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO
5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports
forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines,
and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus,
absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing
PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not
stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their
faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom
of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech
or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity
of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and
rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of
facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct,
not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the
Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed
that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-
out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however
violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such
power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to
all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC
noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative
powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can
only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as
the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes
rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency
but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise
needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid
exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

ESTRADA v. DESIERTO (Bacani)

353 SCRA 452
Ponente: PUNO, J.

FACTS:
After the May 1998 elections, Joseph Ejercito Estrada & Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo were
elected as the President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines respectively.
From the beginning of Estradas term, however, he was plagued by a plethora of problems
that slowly but surely eroded his popularity.
On October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the Estrada,
alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a
bank account known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based numbers game.
Singsons allegation caused controversy around the nation, which culminated the House
of Representatives filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000.
 House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment
suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, 2001, a crowd
continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing
organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of
protesters.
The following day, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm of January 19, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the
beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted
the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him
from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election
to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added
that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying
that Estrada constructively resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th
president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, but saying he would give
up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later
left Malacaang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing
a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases
filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only
in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Estrada is deemed to have resigned or is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an Acting President

HELD/RATIO:
He is deemed to have resigned.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and
the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the
succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the
quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied
 resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement
of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his
emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that
petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous
and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

ESTRADA v. DESIERTO (Espiritu)

356 SCRA 108
Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS:
(same as above)
ISSUE:
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the
criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that
petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
RATIO:
No
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court
licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from
liability for unlawful acts and omissions. As for civil immunity, it means immunity from
civil damages only covers official acts

BELGICA v. OCHOA Jr. (Caminong)

710 SCRA 1 (Improper delegation of legislative power)
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel
is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It
underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority
Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).

FACTS:
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for
hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30
 million for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects,
P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of fundswhereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that
the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-
called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from
the Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential
Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since
about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July
2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the
corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles
had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus
NGOs (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government
funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An
audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred
with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions
before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional. (PERTINENT TO TOPIC)
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the
purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which
the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel
system, whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note
in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or
the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get
the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant
the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are
concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate
further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local
matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to
which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative
power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising
it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions
does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items
in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined
because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to
which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA
again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning
their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of
representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project
by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government
(note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and
this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if
thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of
a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya
and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well
as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the
appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-
related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to
further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may
direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be
allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution.
The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can
be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

PEOPLE v. MARTI (Benitez)

193 SCRA 57
Ponente: Bidin

FACTS:
The appellant and his common law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing
and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Filipino Complex Ermita, Manila carrying with them four
gift wrapped packages to be sent in Zurich Switzerland. The proprietress, Anita Reyes (not related
to Shirley Reyes) then asked the appellant if he could examine and expect the packages however
appellant refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and
were just gifts to a friend. Anita no longer insisted. Before delivery of appellants box to the
bureau of Customs and or bureau of Post, Mr. Job Reyes, proprietor and husband of Anita,
following standard procedure opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened a peculiar
odor emitted therefrom. He squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt
dried leaves inside. Job prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting
laboratory examination sample he extracted from the cellophane. Therefore, job and three NBI
agents and a photographer went to the Reyes office at Ermita. Job brought out the box in which
 appellants packages were places and in the presence of the NBI agents, open the top flaps,
removed the Styrofoam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried
marijuana leaves are found inside the cellophane.

Issue:
Whether or not there is violation of appellants constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that it is not the NBI who made the search. Records of the case clearly
indicate that it was Mr. Job who made search and inspection of the said packages. Said inspection
was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Job as a precautionary
measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Custom or Post. If the search is made upon
the request of law enforces, a warrant must generally must be secured first if it to pass the test
of constitutionality. However, if the search is made in the behest or initiative of the proprietor of
a private establishment for its own and private purpose, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of the police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot
be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcer, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individual as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
the government.

The alleged violation against unreasonable search and seizure may only invoked against the State
by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise by the sovereign authority.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, Inc. v. CABILES (Nuez)

732 SCRA 22
Ponente: LEONEN
FACTS:
- Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a
quality control job in Taiwan. Joys application was accepted. Joy was later asked to sign a one-
year employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. She alleged that Sameer
Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee of P70,000.00 when she signed the
employment contract.
- Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged
that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year, but in
Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
- Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from
Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that she should
immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport. She was asked to prepare for
immediate repatriation.
- Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
- On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission
against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed. She asked for the
return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary
for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages.19 She identified Wacoal as Sameer
Overseas Placement Agencys foreign principal.
- The petitioner alleged that respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency, negligence in
her duties, and her failure to comply with the work requirements of her foreign employer.
Moreover, it also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of P70,000.00. Furthermore,
petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to the
Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6, 1997. Thus, petitioner
asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.
- Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of the complaint, claiming that there was no
employer-employee relationship between them. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. Joy
then appealed to National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which then declared that Joy was
indeed illegally dismissed, not ruling, however, on the placement fees for lack of jurisdiction.
Upon the petitioners appeal, the CA affirmed the NLRCs decision. Petitioner reiterates that
there was just cause for termination because there was a finding of Wacoal that respondent was
inefficient in her work. Therefore, it claims that respondents dismissal was valid. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: W/N Joy Cabiles was validly dismissed from her job.
HELD: NO
The SC is in favour of the respondent. The burden of proving that there is just cause for
termination is on the employer. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there
was just cause for causing Joys dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due
process of law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work.
They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these
standards. Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal.
This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is tempered with the employees right to
security of tenure. Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before
termination. They may not be removed from employment without a valid or just cause as
determined by law and without going through the proper procedure.
Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a different
jurisdiction. With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the principle of lex
loci contractus - the law of the place where the contract is made. Security of tenure for labor is
guaranteed by our Constitution.
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign
employers work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to
support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not
met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted
inefficiency.
There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards against
which her work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties conflict as to the position
held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was not clear.
The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that there is just cause for
termination. There is no proof that respondent was legally terminated.
Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special protection. Overseas workers regardless of their
classifications are entitled to security of tenure, at least for the period agreed upon in their
contracts. This means that they cannot be dismissed before the end of their contract terms
without due process. If they were illegally dismissed, the workers right to security of tenure is
violated.
Overseas Filipino workers brave alien cultures and the heartbreak of families left behind daily.
They would count the minutes, hours, days, months, and years yearning to see their sons and
daughters. We all know of the joy and sadness when they come home to see them all grown up
and, being so, they remember what their work has cost them. Unknown to them, they keep our
economy afloat through the ebb and flow of political and economic crises. They are our true
diplomats, they who show the world the resilience, patience, and creativity of our people.
Indeed, we are a people who contribute much to the provision of material creations of this world.
This government loses its soul if we fail to ensure decent treatment for all Filipinos. We default
by limiting the contractual wages that should be paid to our workers when their contracts are
breached by the foreign employers. While we sit, this court will ensure that our laws will reward
our overseas workers with what they deserve: their dignity.
Inevitably, their dignity is ours as well.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. COURT OF APPEALS (Eulogio)

219 SCRA 115
Ponente: DAVIDE JR, J.

FACTS:
A. Initial Filing of Case

On October 27, 1987, Marilou Gonzales, 22, single, a Filipino, and a woman with good
moral character filed to the Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan
a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married.
The petitioner is an Iranian national, residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan
City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City
Baksh already came with Gonzales parents to get their approval and they immediately
set out to find sponsors. Meanwhile, the petitioner forced Gonzales to live with him
sometime in August 20, 1987. It was important to note that she was still a virgin up to
that point.
A week before the filing of the complaint, the petitioner's attitude towards her started to
change for the worse, leading to maltreatment, infliction of injuries, and grave threats.
Baksh then repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
anymore and confessed that he was already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
The complainant then demanded payment for damages in the amount of not less than
P45, 000 with reimbursements amounting to P600.
 After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered
on 16 October 1989 a decision favoring the private respondent. Baksh was then ordered
to pay P20,000 for moral damages plus P5,000 for attorney fees and litigation costs
B. 1st appeal
After the decision of the Lingayen Branch of the Pangasinan RTC, the defendant filed an
appeal, citing an error of the court to (1) dismiss the case for lack of factual legal basis
and (2) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorneys fees, and other costs
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court on the basis of Article 21
of the Civil Code.
C. 2nd appeal (Current Case)
Baksh then filed an appeal by certiorari against CA and Marilou Gonzales seeking to
review and set aside the Decision 1 of the CA
The petitioner said that the Article 21 of the Civil Code does not apply to him, claiming
that:He did not violate any good custom, or public policy He has not professed love or
proposed marriage to the Gonzales and He has not maltreated her
He claimed that the court overlooked the fact that he was a foreigner and was not familiar
with Filipino customs. He argued that his failed promise to marry was admissible because
of his Moslem upbringing.
ISSUE :
1. Whether or not the Court should take cognizance of the case having already been
looked into by the lower courts (question of facts and substance)? - Procedural
2. Whether or not Art 21 NCC applies to recovery damages in re breach of promise to
marry? - Substiantial

RULING/HELD
1.NO. .It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's
findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having
had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the
trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case.
Rule 45 Exceptions as cited in the case of Medina v Asistio:(1) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna (3) Where there is a grave abuse
of discretion (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When
the findings of fact are conflicting) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellate and appellee (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well
as the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents and (10) The
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record
2. YES.
his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe,
entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would
want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a
Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she
would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.

Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and defied the traditional
respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed
such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every
person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
A man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by
a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality,
no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act,
could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise
to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS (E. Basa)

267 SCRA 408
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.

FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program
of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila
Hotel (MHC).
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and
the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price
of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September
1995.
 Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which
GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition
and mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony

HELD/RATIO: Yes.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila
Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively
an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.

Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of
the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual
control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES Vda. DE CARUNGCONG v. PEOPLE (Espiritu)

612 SCRA 272
Ponente: Corona, J.
Pro reo: Whenever a penal law is to be construed or applied and the law admits of two
interpretations one lenient to the offender and one strict to the offender that interpretation
which is lenient or favorable to the offender will be adopted

FACTS:
Mediatrix Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of petitioner
intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. De Carungcong, filed a
complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese
national.
It was alleged that the said accused feloniously induced Manolita Gonzales, the owner of
the estate and herein deceased, to sign and thumb mark a special power of attorney (in
the pretense of presenting a document pertaining to taxes) which authorized the sale,
assignment, transfer and disposition of the latters properties.
In relation to this, the accused moved for the dismissal of the case.
 As a defense against his arrant prosecution, the accused here applies Art 332 of the
Revised Penal Code. He cites that he falls under the enumeration of those relatives who
shall be exempt from criminal prosecution. Being a relative by affinity, he cannot be held
liable for the crime of estafa as stated in the law.
He further counters that the same law makes no distinction that the relationship may not
be invoked in case of death of spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed.
Thus, the death of his spouse Zenaida Carungcong Sato though dissolved the marriage
with the accused, did not on the other hand dissolve the mother in-law and son-law
relationship between Sato and his wifes mother, Manolita. He then cannot be removed
from the protective mantle of Art 332.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the death of Williams wife and Manolitas daughter, Zenaida,
extinguished the relationship by affinity between William and Manolita.
2. Whether or not William should be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his
relationship to Manolita.
RATIO:
1. No. Relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased
spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the
marriage produced children or not.
2. No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the
felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State
condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender
for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the
offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein.
The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies
exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not
apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another
crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.
Sato, the accused, could not avail of the beneficial application of ART 332 considering that
the crime he committed falls under the nature of a complex crime which is the crime
estafa through falsification of public document and does not anymore concern private
relations of family members. He then can be held criminally liable.

ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (Lanzon)

301 SCRA 96
Ponente:
FACTS: