DAVID, Ma.

Yvone Lomibao
Persons and Family Relations
PT&T V. NLRC
May 23, 1997
G.R. No. 118978
Petitioner: Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company
Respondents: National Labor Relations Commission, and Grace De Guzman
Ponente: J. Regalado

FACTS:
Respondent Grace De Guzman was hired by petitioner Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company as a reliever from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to
August 8, 1991, without stating that she had contracted marriage on May 26, 1991.

Petitioners branch supervisor in Baguio City sent to private respondent a memorandum

dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Petitioner, unconvinced of
private respondents explanation, dismissed the latter from the company on January 29, 1992.
Private respondent initiated a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim of non-
payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.

The special civil action, as petitioned by PT&T, assailed the following decisions of the
labor arbiter and respondent NLRC:

(a) On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco Rimando handed down a decision
declaring that private respondent was illegally dismissed by petitioner, and ordering the
formers reinstatement plus payment of back wages and COLA; and

(b) On April 29, 1994, public respondent upheld the labor arbiters decision with
modification stating that private respondent deserved to be suspended for three months
because of her dishonest acts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and NLRC erred in their decisions that private
respondent was illegally dismissed.

HELD:
No. Section 14 of Article XIII of the Constitution mandates that the State shall protect
working women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full
potential. Also, Article 136 of the Labor Code prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the
marriage of a female employee. Petitioner PT&Ts policy against marriage strikes the ideals
and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution, and of the family as the foundation of
the nation. However, the three-month suspension imposed by NLRC must be upheld to obviate
the impression that such dishonest act should be condoned.
Hence, PT&Ts petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs
against petitioner.
ZULUETA V. CA
February 20, 1996
G.R. No. 107383
Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta
Respondents: Court of Appeals, and Alfredo Martin
Ponente: J. Mendoza

FACTS:
The petition, filed before the Supreme Court, alleged the following:
(a) On March 26, 1982, petitioner Cecilia Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor
of medicine, in the presence of her mother, a driver, and private respondents secretary;
(b) On the same day, she forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic,
and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and
photographs;
(c) The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband;
(d) The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment for private respondent Alfredo Martin,
declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the said properties, and ordering petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties
to Dr. Martin; and
(e) The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Courts decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by
her from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and consent.

HELD:
No. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other, and in ransacking them for any tell-tale evidence
of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual, and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.
Hence, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
DUNCAN V. GLAXO
September 17, 2004
G.R. No. 162994
Petitioners: Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO, and Pedro A. Tecson
Respondent: Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.
Ponente: J. Tinga

FACTS:
The petition, filed before the Supreme Court, alleged the following:
(a) Petitioner Pedro Tecson signed a contract of employment by which he agreed to disclose to
management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies, and should management find that
such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company;
(b) In September 1998, Tecson married Betsy, a branch coordinator of Astra Pharmaceuticals
(Glaxos competitor) in Albay;
(c) In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del
Sur sales area due to conflict of interest;
(d) On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board rendered
its Decision declaring Glaxos policy as valid on relationships between its employees and
persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to transfer Tecson
to another sales territory; and
(e) On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for
Review on the ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision stating that
Glaxos policy is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxos Policy against its employees
marrying employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; and
(2) Whether Tecson was constructively dismissed.
HELD:
(1) No. No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals ruling stating that Glaxos
policy is a valid exercise of management prerogative. The prohibition against personal or
marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise
the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to
protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its
secrets and procedures.
(2) No. The Court finds no merit in petitioners contention that Tecson was constructively
dismissed. The record does not show that Tecson was demoted or unduly discriminated upon
by reason of such transfer. As found by the appellate court, Glaxo properly exercised its
management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area. In this case,
petitioners transfer to another place of assignment was merely in keeping with the policy of
the company in avoidance of conflict of interest.

Hence, the petition id DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC
October 22, 2007
G.R. No. 174689
Petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Corona
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in
his birth certificate. The petition, which was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
8, alleged the following:
(a) Petitioners name, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, was registered in his birth certificate;
(b) Petitioners sex was registered as male in his birth certificate;
(c) On January 27, 2001, petitioner underwent a sex reassignment surgery in Thailand; and
(d) Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines,
issued a medical certificate attesting that petitioner had undergone the said surgery.
The trial court rendered a decision in favour of the petitioner. However, the Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of the Republic, stating that there is no law allowing the change of either name or sex
in the birth certificate on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not a persons first name can be changed on the ground of sex reassignment;
(2) Whether or not there is a law which allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to
sex on the ground of sex reassignment; and
(3) Whether or not the entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the
ground of equity.
HELD:
(1) No. Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that No person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority. Also, according to RA 9048, only in cases of clerical and
typographical errors that change of first name be allowed. Before a person can legally
change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his
true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
(2) No. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that No entry in the civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order. While petitioner may have succeeded in
altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no
legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
(3) No. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man
who has undergone sex reassignment. Also, There are various laws which apply
particularly to women. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which
could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be granted.

Hence, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

STAR PAPER CORPORATION V. SIMBOL
April 12, 2006
G.R. No. 164774
Petitioners: Star Paper Corporation, Josephine Ongsitco, and Sebastian Chua
Respondents: Ronaldo D. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia, and Lorna E. Estrella
Ponente: J. Puno
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 3, 2004, reversing the National Labor Relations Commissions decision which affirmed the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The petition alleged the following facts:
(a) Respondents Ronaldo Simbol and Wilfreda Comia were compelled to resign by Petitioner
Star Paper Corporation pursuant to company policy that married spouses, both working under
the said company, should decide which one of them would resign; and
(b) Respondent Lorna Estrella was dismissed by Petitioner for immoral conduct after having
been impregnated by a married co-employee.
Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal,
separation pay, and attorneys fees, which was subsequently dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack
of merit. The NLRC also later affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision, which stated that the company
policy was decreed pursuant to what the respondent corporation perceived as management
prerogative.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the 1995 policy/regulation is violative of the constitutional rights towards
marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code; and
(2) Whether or not respondents resignations were far from voluntary.
HELD:
(1) Yes. Article II, Section 18, and Article XIII, Section 3 of the1987 Philippine Constitution, as
well as Article 136 of the Labor Code, state our policy towards the protection of labor. The
requirement of reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the questioned
employment policy. Respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were
asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the
marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of
the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did
petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a
Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper
in the cutter-machine. For failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable
business necessity, we (the Court) rule[d] that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of
management prerogative.
(2) Yes. Respondents Simbol and Comias voluntary resignation has become moot and
academic. As to respondent Estrella, her claim that she was pressured to submit a resignation
letter because she was in dire need of money was found to be more in accord with the
evidence. It was also illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a complaint for illegal
dismissal.

Hence, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 dated August 3, 2004,
is AFFIRMED.
REPUBLIC V. CAGANDAHAN
September 12, 2008
G.R. No. 166676
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Jennifer B. Cagandahan
Ponente: J. Quisumbing

FACTS:
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction
of Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
The said petition alleged the following:
(a) Respondent was registered as female in the birth certificate;
(b) While growing up, respondent had no menstruation, and developed no breasts, instead,
she developed secondary male characteristics;
(c) Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, issued a medical certificate stating
that respondents condition is known as Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a
condition by which a person possesses both male and female characteristics;
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005. The
Decision ordered the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna to correct the respondents first name and
gender in her birth certificate. That is, from Jennifer Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan, and from
female to male.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.

HELD:
No. The Court found that that there was substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
In deciding this case, we (the Court) consider the compassionate calls for recognition of
the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. As
for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not
a matter of right but of judicial discretion. Considering the consequence that respondents change
of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.
Hence, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
MARTINEZ V. TAN
February 5, 1909
G.R. No. L-4904
Plaintiff-Apellant: Rosalia Martinez
Defendant-Appellee: Angel Tan
Ponente: J. Willard

FACTS:
The appeal, filed before the Supreme Court, alleged the following:
(a) Written evidences, such as the expediente de matrimonio civil (marriage contract), a
document containing signatures of witnesses, and a certificate of marriage, all signed on
September 25, 1907, are present;
(b) Plaintiff Rosalia Martinez was in the town of Palompon at the time of the said date of
marriage;
(c) Plaintiff, through a letter sent to defendant Angel Tan, requested the latter to arrange
everything, and let Pacita Ballori to fetch her at the Chinese store, Veles, about 5 or 6 oclock
in the afternoon of September 25, 1907; and
(d) Pacita Ballori fetched her from Veles on the said date, and they both went directly to the
office of the justice of the peace where the ceremony took place.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff, and the defendant were married on September 25, 1907, before
the justice of peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.

HELD:
Yes. As stated in General orders, No. 68, section 6, No particular form from the ceremony of
marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife. The marriage certificate gives rise to the
presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form. The document signed by the
plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the
justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. When the parties
appeared and signed the said document before the justice of the peace, it only meant that they mutually
agreed to unite in marriage.

It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish
language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed. Thus, the Court held
that what took place before the justice of the peace on the said occasion amounted to a legal marriage.

Hence, the judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is
AFFIRMED, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
COSCA V. PALAYPAYON
September 30, 1994
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721
Complainants: Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo A. Villamora
Respondents: Hon. Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr., and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy
Ponente: J. Per Curiam

FACTS:
On October 5, 1992, complainants, Juvy Cosca, Edmundo Peralta, Ramon Sambo, and
Apollo Villamora, filed an administrative complaint against the respondents. The complaint, which
was filed with the Office of the Court Administrator, charged respondents, Hon. Lucio Palaypayon,
Jr. and Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, with the following offenses: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage;
(2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the
court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained
prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities. The said administrative
complaint alleged the following:
(a) Respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license;
(b) Respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of
July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that
respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July,
1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113)
documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial
fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and
failed to account for the difference; and
(c) Respondent Baroy was the one appointed clerk of court because she she gave a brand-new
air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents, Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, are responsible for the offenses charged.
HELD:
Yes. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility. The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those
affected by the illegal marriages, and what we (the Court) are providing for herein pertains to the
administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility.
Hence, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future
will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED
from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any
branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
NAVARRO V. DOMAGTOY
July 19, 1996
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088
Complainant: Rodolfo G. Navarro
Respondent: Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy
Ponente: J. Romero

FACTS:
Complainant Dapa, Surigao del Norte Municipal Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed a case
against Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy for gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. The complaint alleged the following:

(a) On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar
Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated
from his first wife; and
(b) On October 27, 1994, respondent judge, who has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, performed a marriage ceremony
between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario in the municipality of Dapa,
an area outside his jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy
exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

HELD:
Yes. Having solemnized a marriage without considering the subsisting marriage of the other
spouse, and having solemnized a marriage outside his jurisdiction, the Court finds respondent to
have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to
our (the Courts) attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us (the Court) to
conclude that respondents failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
Hence, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six
(6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
CORPUZ V. STO. TOMAS
August 11, 2010
G.R. No. 186571
Petitioner: Gerbert R. Corpuz
Respondents: Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas, and The Solicitor General
Ponente: J. Brion

FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having
an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for
divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to marry. Since the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine Law, he filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the
Regional Trial Court. However, the RTC denied Gerberts petition, stating that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in
order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

HELD:
No. As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
Hence, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October
30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. The Court orders the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
PILAPIL V. SOMERA
June 30, 1989
G.R. No. 80116
Petitioner: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil
Respondents: Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera, Hon. Luis C. Victor, and Erich Ekkehard Geiling
Ponente: J. Regalado

FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila and had one child. After about
three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner
in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. On January 15, 1986, the
Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany promulgated a divorce decree.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery against petitioner
before the City Fiscal of Manila. He alleged that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner
"had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983."

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the
marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former against the latter.
HELD:
Yes. In cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case
must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the
time of the filing of the complaint. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no
longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Hence, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another
one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

CONCURRING OPINION:
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute
divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act
of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in
case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others.
REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO
October 5, 2005
G.R. No. 154380
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Cipriano Orbecido III
Ponente: J. Quisumbing

FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a
son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,
Ciprianos wife, bringing along their son Kristoffer, left for the United States. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in
2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married
a certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent, Cipriano Orbecido III, can remarry under Article 26 of the
Family Code.

HELD:
The Court is unanimous in its holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen,
who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry.
For respondents plea to prosper, he must herein prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
Hence, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
VAN DORN V. ROMILLO
October 8, 1985
G.R. No. L-68470
Petitioner: Alice Reyes Van Dorn
Respondents: Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr., and Richard Upton
Ponente: J. Melencio-Herrera

FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines, while private respondent
Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972. After their
marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines, and had two children. In 1982, the
parties were divorced in Nevada, United States. Petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
On June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P
before the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business (the Galleon Shop) in
Ermita, Manila, is a conjugal property of the parties. In the said suit, private respondent is asking
petitioner to render an accounting of that business, and that the former be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of
action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. In the
said proceeding, the respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case
on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has
no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the divorce decree affect the parties alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines; and
(2) Whether or not the divorce decree of the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
HELD:
(1) No. Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
(2) No. To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.

Hence, the petition is GRANTED, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to DISMISS the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court. Without costs.