Intestate Estate of Petra Rosales vs. Rosales (G.R. No. L-40789, abide by the terms of the agreement.

the agreement. Maximo filed a Motion for New Trial

February 27, 1987) but was denied. Hence, this appeal.

FACTS: ISSUE:
Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband
Fortunato and their 2 children Magna and Antonio. Another child, Whether or not, Gertrudes de los Santos, a grandniece of the
Carterio, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox, and decedent, is an heir of the latter.
his widow Irenea, the petitioner. The estate of the deceased has an
estimated gross value of about P30,000. RULING:

In the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order declaring the Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz,
could not inherit from the latter by right of representation.
following individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their
respective share of the estate: Fortunato (husband), 1/4; Magna
Article 972. The right of
(daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox (grandson), 1/4; and Antonio (son), 1/4.
representation takes place in
the direct descending line, but
Irenea insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the never in the ascending.
surviving spouse of the late Carterio, son of the deceased, claiming that
she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, In the collateral line, it takes
Macikequerox. The trial court denied her plea. Hence, this petition. place only in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters,
ISSUE: Whether or not the widow whose husband predeceased his whether they be of the full or
mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law. half blood.

RULING: Much less could plaintiff-appelle inherit in her own right.

No. A surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his/her parent-in-law.
Article 962. In every
inheritance, the relative
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into 2 groups, namely, those who
nearest in degree excludes the
inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of more distant ones, saving the
representation. Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his right of representation when it
own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the CC properly takes place.
or by the right of representation provided for in Art 981 of the same law.
In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia de
The relevant provisions of the CC are Arts. 980, 981, 982 and 999. There la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-
is no provision which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any law from the inheritance.
provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by
her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the TEOTICO v DEL VAL
Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to
1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a Facts:
decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. If the legislature
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the
intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-
City of Manila with no ascendants or descendants. She left properties
law, it would have so provided in the Code.
worth P600,000.00 and a will written in Spanish which she executed at
her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her
Irenea argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the
signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and
provisions of Art. 887. The provision refers to the estate of the deceased
every page thereof in the presence of three witnesses who in turn
spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a
affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix
and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before a Notary
By the same token, the provision of Art 999 does not support Irenea's
Public by the testatrix and her witnesses.
claim. The estate contemplated in the article is the estate of the
deceased spouse. The subject matter of the intestate estate
In said will Maria stated among others that she was possessed of the
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra Rosales, the
full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or
mother-in-law of Irenea. It is from the estate of Petra that Macikequerox
influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any
draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as
influence of fear or threat and that she freely and spontaneously
provided by Art 981.- Art 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox is
executed said will.
called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does
not succeed his father, Carterio (the person represented) who
She left P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to her niece named
predeceased his grandmother, Petra, but the latter whom his father
Josefina Mortera; and the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building
would have succeeded. Irenea cannot assert the same right of
to the said spouses. However, the naked ownership of the building was
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
left in equal parts to the legitimate children of said spouses. She also
instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the
Irenea also contends that at the time of the death of her husband, he
remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as
compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was
Thereafter, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will
extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox who
before the Court of First Instance of Manila. However, Ana del Val Chan,
succeeded from Petra by right of representation. He did not succeed
claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister
from his deceased father Carterio.
of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose
Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix.
Gertrudes De Los SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Maximo De La CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-29192, February 22, 1971
Issues:
FACTS:
(1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this
proceeding?;
Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue. She had a
niece named Marciana who is the mother of herein defendant, Maximo.
Gertrudes, who is Pelagias grandniece, and several co-heirs including (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?;
Maximo, entered into an Extrajudicial Partition Agreement purposely for
the distribution of Pelagias estate. They agreed to adjudicate three (3) (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic
lots to Maximo, in addition to his share, on condition that the latter would validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit
undertake the development and subdivision of the estate which was the the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor
subject matter of the agreement. Due to Maximos failure to comply with
of Dr. Rene Teotico?
his obligation, Gertrudes filed a complaint for specific performance. In
Maximos answer, he stated that Gertrudes had no cause of action
against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her,
for the reason that she was not an heir of Pelagia and was included in
the agreement by mistake. The lower court held that Maximo, being a Held:
party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising
in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from Pelagia, hence, he must
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because
she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or
administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by
the will, because nowhere in the will was any provision designating her
as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no
interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she
any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-
owner thereof.
Additionally, if the will is denied probate, she would not acquire any
interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix. She would
acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she
is not under our Civil Code. It is true that she claims to be an
acknowledged natural child of Jose and also an adopted daughter of
Francisca. But the law does not give her any right to succeed to the
estate of Maria because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by
law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father.
Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: An illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother; .
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as
testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the
ruling of the court a quo.
On the secon issue, the claim that the will was not properly attested to
is contradicted by the evidence of record. The will was duly executed
because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses
and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence
is also belied by the evidence.
Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina and her husband Rene had the
opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived
in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she
was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated
from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to
disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified in court. The
exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported
by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and
subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and
make her express the will of another rather than her own
On the third issue, the question of whether the probate court could
determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been
decided by this Court in a long line of decisions. In Castaeda v.
Alemany, the Court had stated, thus:
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts
that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. The judgment
in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In
them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions
made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is
void and another one is valid.
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the
court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the
will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its
jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set
aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the
validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this
proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the
disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased
should also be set aside for the same reason.
Anselma Diaz v. IAC and Felisa Pamuti Jardin
Doctrine: Right of Representation is admitted only within the legitimate
family
Facts:
Felisa is a niece of Simona who together with Felisas mother
Juliana were the only legitimate children of spouses Felipe
and Petronilla;
Juliana married Simon and out of their union were born Felisa
and another child who died during infancy;
Simona is the widow of Pascual and mother of Pablo;
Pablo was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual and
Simona;
Pascual died in 1970; Pablo in 1973 and Simona in 1976;
Pablo at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona and six minor natural children: four minor children with
Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta.
1976 Judge Jose Raval declared Felisa as the sole
legitimate heir of Simona
Petitioners Anselma and Felixberta as guardians of their
minor children file for opposition and motion to exclude Felisa
from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona
1980 Judge Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa from
further taking part or intervening and declared her to be not an
heir of Simona
Felisas motion for recon was denied, and she filed her appeal
to the Intermediate Appellate Court declaring her as the sole
heir of Simona
Issue: Who are the legal heirs of Simona, her niece Felisa or her
grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo)? Felisa
Ruling:
The 6 minor children cannot represent their father Pablo in the
succession of the latter to the intestate estate of his legitimate
mother Simona because of the barrier provided for under Art.
992 of the Civil Code
o Art 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child.
Pablo is a legitimate child. However, his 6 minor children are
illegitimate.
Art 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestate between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art.
992.
JBL Reyes reflections on this which also finds full support
from other civilists:
o In the Spanish Civil Code of 1989, the right of
representation was admitted only within the
legitimate family.
o An illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestate from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father
and mother.
o The Civil Code of the Philippines adhered to this
principle since it reproduced Art 943 in its own Art
992, but with fine inconsistency in subsequent
articles (990, 995, 998) which allows the hereditary
portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
DELOS SANTOS v FERRARIS- BORROMEO (read full text)
Doctrine: Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation unless concurring with the brothers or sisters of the
deceased which is provided in article 975 when children of one or more
brothers or sisters of the deceased survive with their uncles and aunts
but if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
TOMAS Corpus vs. RAFAEL Corpus
85 SCRA 567
AQUINO, October 23, 1978
FACTS:
RAMONA ARGUELLES and TOMAS CORPUS were married, blessed
with 5 children: PABLO CORPUS, JOSE CORPUS and 3 others. When
TOMAS CORPUS DIED, RAMONA wed LUIS RAFAEL YANGCO and
had 4 recognized acknowledged natural children, one of them was the
decedent TEORORO YANGCO.
-TEODORO Yangco died on April 20, 1939. His will was dated August 29,
1934 and was probated 1941. At the time of his death, he had no forced heirs.
He only had his half brother (LUIS YANGCO), half sister (PAZ YANGCO),
wife of Miguel Ossorio (AMALIA CORPUS), the children of his half brother
Pablo Corpus (JOSE and RAMON) and the daughter of his half brother Jose
Corpus (JUANA/JUANITA CORPUS). Juanita died in 1944.
-Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated
November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees
named in the will. The said project was contested by the following, on
the following grounds (oppositors):
 > Estate of LUIS YANGCO: intestacy should be declared because
the will does not contain an institution of heir
> JUANITA Corpus, PEDRO MARTINEZ and JULIANA DE CASTO,
through ATTY. CRUZ: the proposed partition was not in
conformity with the will as the testator intended that the estate
should be CONSERVED and not physically parititoned.
-Nevertheless, the project of partition was approved by the Probate
court, in essence holding that the testator did not really intend to a
perpetual prohibition against alienation when he stated that some of his
estate be conserved.
-oppositors appealed to SC but appeal dismissed after the legatees and
the appellants entered into compromise agreements wherein the
legatees agreed to pay P35k to PEDRO MARTINEZ, the heirs of PIO
CORPUS, the heirs of ISABEL CORPUS, and the heir of JUANITA
CORPUS her son TOMAS CORPUS. For the estate of Luis Yangco,
a similar compromise agreement was entered. The dismissal of the
appeal became final and executory.
-Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a
receipt acknowledging that he received from the Yangco estate P2k as
settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per
understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case. The
legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical
partition of the Yangco estate which was approved by the probate court
in 1949. 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified.
-TOMAS CORPUS still filed action to recover JUANITAs supposed
share in Yangcos intestate estate, alleging that the dispositions in
Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation which rendered
it void under A785, OCC and that 1949 partition is invalid. The
decedents estate should have been distributed according to the rules
on intestacy.
-TC: DISMISS: Res Judicata and laches.
-directly appealed to SC
-Petitioners contention: trial court erred in holding (1) Teodoro Yangco
was a natural child; (2) Teodoro Yangcos will had been duly legalized;
(3) Plaintiffs action is barred by res judicata and laches.
ISSUE:
WON JUANITA CORPUS, TOMAS CORPUS mom, was a legal heir of
TEODORO YANGCO so that his mom would have a cause of action to
recover a supposed intestate share in the estate.
(the court deemed it unnecessary to determine if the will has been duly
legalized and whether his action has already been barred by laches)
HELD: NO. JUANITA CORPUS, the petitioners mother, was NOT A
LEGAL HEIR of Yangco because there is NO RECIPROCAL
SUCCESSION between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.
NCC: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the legitimate child.
A992 is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn,
hated by the legitimate child. The Law does not recognize blood tie and
seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment.
TEODORO YANGCO, and 3 other children, was ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD and NOT A LEGITIMATE CHILD, of LUIS RAFAEL
YANGCO and RAMONA ARGUELLES. JOSE CORPUSwas the
presumed legitimate child of TOMAS CORPUS and RAMONA
ARGUELLES. Therefore, TOMAS CORPUS (Petitioner) had no cause
of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother,
JUANITA CORPUS, as legal heir in YANGCOs estate.
-Legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child.
-The natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession
to the estate of the legitimate grandparent.
-The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased
uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother.
Disposition. WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
Leonardo v.CA
G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983
FACTS:
Francisca Reyes died intestate on July 12, 1942 and was survived by
two daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero
Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased
her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949
without any issue. On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano
Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a
complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared
one of the lawful heirs of the deceasedFrancisca Reyes, entitled to one-
half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private
respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by
said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint, partitioned between
him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all
the income derived from said properties from the time defendants took
possession thereof until said accounting shall have been made,
delivering to him his share therein with legal interest. Answering the
complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive
ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an
illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation. For his
part, the other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed
that said properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of
sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor. These
properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of
Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes,
has legal right to inherit by representation.
RULING:
No. Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still
he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by
the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the
Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that
when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father
and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged
fathers first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be
an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father, like
the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the
Philippines.)
SANTILLON v MIRANDA
FACTS:
Pedro Santillon died without testament leaving his wife, Perfecta
Miranda and one son, Claro. Four years after Pedros death, Claro filed
a petition for letters of administration which was opposed by his mother
and spouses Benito Miranda and Rosario Corrales. The court appointed
commissioners to draft a project of partition and distribution of all
properties of Pedro. Claro then filed a motion to declare share of heirs
and to resolve conflicting claims of the parties invoking Art. 892 of the
New Civil Code insisting that after deducting from the conjugal
properties (conjugal share of Perfecta), the remaining must be divided
as follows: for her and for him. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed
besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the NCC to
another of the remaining half. After due notice and hearing, the court
held that Perfecta is entitled to share and the remaining share for
Claro after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal
properties. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
The manner of division of share of the estate of an intestate decedent
when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child.
RULING:
Intestate proceedings in the New Civil Codes chapter on legal or
intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996.
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the
circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code form
which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two
contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with
legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or
widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to
provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislators desire
to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.
Bicomong vs. Almanza
(G.R. No. L-37365, November 29, 1977)
FACTS:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda and they had 3 children
(Perpetua, Igmedia and Ignacio). When Sisenanda died, Simeon
remarried to Silvestra and they had 2 children (Felipa and Maura). The
plaintiffs are the grandchildren of Simeon with his children in his first
marriage. Respondents are the heirs of the children of Simeon in his
second marriage.
The subject matter is the half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in 5
parcels of land which she inherited from Silvestra Glorioso.
There are 3 sets of plaintiffs: the Bicomongs, the Tolentinos, and
Francisca Bagsic, for their shares in the properties of Maura Bagsic.
When Maura Bagsic died, the properties passed on to Cristeta Almanza,
who also died without division of the properties.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The Almanzas
appealed to CA. It was contended that since Maura died ahead of Felipa,
the latter succeeded to Mauras estate, to the exclusion of the plaintiffs.
They said the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant
ones. The plaintiffs claim that Felipa died ahead of Maura.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maura is succeeded by Felipa to the
exclusion of nephews and nieces of half blood.
RULING:
No. In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
surviving spouse, collateral relatives succeed to the entire estate of
deceased.
It appearing that Maura Bagsic, child of the 2nd marriage in which her
share is in dispute, died intestate without an issue, and her husband and
all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the
surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full
blood and the 10 children of her brother and 2 sisters of half blood in
accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are
entitled to inherit in their own right. Nephews and nieces alone do not
inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring
with brothers or sisters of the deceased.
Article 975 makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces
are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether
their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole
niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews
and 2 sisters of half blood.
BACAYO V. BORROMEO
G.R. No. L-19382 | August 31, 1965 | J. JBL Reyes
Petitioner: Filomena Abellana De Bacayo
Respondents: Gaudencia Ferraris De Borromeo, Catalina Feraris De
Villegas, Juanito Ferraris & Conchita Ferraris
Summary:
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City consisting of 1/3 share in
the estate of her aunt Rosa Ferraris. Ten years have elapsed since the
last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively
dead for purposes of opening her succession and distribute her estate
among heirs. Hence, a petition for the summary settlement of her estate
was filed. Melodia left no surviving descendant, ascendant or spouse,
but was survived only by collateral relatives: 1) Filomena, an aunt and
half-sister of her father; and 2) her nieces and nephews who were
children of her only brother of full blood who predeceased her. In the
settlement proceeding, Filomena was excluded as an heir pursuant to a
resolution issued by the CFI of Cebu. MR was also denied hence this
action.
The SC held that the trial court was correct in ruling that under articles
1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code, in case of intestacy,
nephews and nieces exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first
cousins, etc.) from the succession. Thus, it is the nieces and nephews
of Melodia, not Filomena, who should inherit the intestate estate of
Melodia.
FACTS:
Refer to the family tree:
1
ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if
Gaudenci
Melodia
Ferraris
Anacleto
Catalina
Ferraris
Arturo Ferraris
Grandfather/Gr
Rosa Ferraris Conchita
andmother
Filomena
Abellana de Juanito
Bacayo
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she
transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided
there continuously until 1944. Up to the filing on December 22,
1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she
has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More
than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was
known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for
purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate
among her heirs.
Melodia left properties in Cebu City, consisting of 1/3 share in the
estate of her aunt, Rosa, valued at P6,000.
Melodia left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse,
but was survived only by collateral relatives, Filomena Abellana de
Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of her father, Anacleto Ferraris; and
by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed
Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of
Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo, who pre-deceased her.
These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs
and seek to participate in her estate.
CFI Cebu: in favor of the nieces and nephew. They are nearer in
degree (two degrees) than Filomena since nieces and nephews
succeed by right of representation, while Filomena is three degrees
distant from Melodia, and that other collateral relatives are
excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of
the decedent in accordance with Art. 1009 of the NCC.
Melodias contention: Under Art. 9751 of the NCC, no right of
representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of
the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt, but rather the
former succeed in their own right.
ISSUE: WON the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother
in the inheritance. NO. The aunt will be excluded.
RATIO
Filomena is correct in her contention that nephews and nieces
alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes)
unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as
provided expressly by Article 975. Nevertheless, in case of
intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other
collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005,
and 1009 of the Civil Code.
o ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled
to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or
their children to the other half.
o ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters
of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
o ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with
nephews and nieces, who are the children of the decedent's
brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit
per capita, and the latter per stripes.
o ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate. The latter shall succeed without
distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood.
Note that under Art. 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other
collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.
Moreover, Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 expressly
states that:
o The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or
children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to
relatives within the fifth degree Article 1009 does not state
any order of preference. However, this article should be
understood in connection with the general rule that the
nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same
degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of
representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them on account of the whole blood
relationship.
they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they
shall inherit in equal portions.
Title: RE: CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS OF THE HEIRS OF
THE LATE MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO, FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO,
MARIO B. CHANLIONGCO II, MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA
and MARIO C. CHANLIONGCO, JR.
Facts:
This matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits filed by
the heirs of the late ATTY. MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO an
attorney of the Court, it is in the records that at the time of his
death, Atty. Chanliongco was more than 63 years of age, with
more than 38 years of service in the government. He did not
have any pending criminal administrative or not case against
him, neither did he have any money or property accountability.
The highest salary he received was P18,700.00 per annum.
Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an only
Intimate Mario it appears that there are other deceased to
namely, Mrs. Angelina C. , Jr., both born out of wedlock to
Angelina R Crespo, and duly recognized by the deceased.
Except Mario, Jr., who is only 17 years of age, all the
claimants are of legal age.
According to law, the benefits accruing to the deceased
consist of: (1) retirement benefits; (2) money value of terminal
leave; (3) life insurance and (4) refund of retirement premium.
From the records now before US, it appears that the GSIS had
already the release the life insurance proceeds; and the
refund of rent to the claimants.
RULING:
The record also shows that the late Atty. Chanliongco died ab
intestato and that he filed or over to state in his application for
membership with the GSIS the beneficiary or benefits of his
retirement benefits, should he die before retirement. Hence,
the retirement benefits shall accrue to his estate and will be
distributed among his Legal heirs in with the benefits on
intestate s , as in the caw of a fife if no benefit is named in the
policy (Vda. de vs. GSIS, L-28093, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA
315, 325).
AQUINO, J., concurring:
There may be instances, like the instant case, where in legal
succession the estate is distributed according to the rules on
legitime without applying the rules on intestate ion. The
reason is that sometimes the estate is not even sufficient to
satisfy the legitimes. The legitimes of the primary compulsory
heirs, like a child or descendant, should first be satisfied.
In this case the decedent's legal heirs are his legitimate child,
his widow and two intimate children. His estate is partitioned
among those heirs by giving them their respective time.
The legitimate child gets one-half of the estate as his legitime
which is regarded as his share as a legal heir Art 888, Civil
Code).
The widow's legitime is one-fourth of the estate. That
represents also her share as a legal heir. The remaining one-
fourth of the estate, which is the free portion, goes to the
illegitimate children in equal shares, as their legitime,
Pursuant to the provision that 'the legitimate of the illegitimate
children shall be taken from the portion of the estate at the
free disposal of the testator, provoked that in no case shall the
total legitime of such illegitimate children exceed that free
portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse must first
be fully satisfied.
The rule in Santillon vs. Miranda, L-19281, June 30, 1965, 14
SCRA 563, that when the surviving spouse concurs with only
one legitimate child, the spouse is entitled to one-half of the
estate and the gets the other half, t to article 996 of the Civil
Code, does not apply to the case because here intimate
children concur with the surviving spouse and the intimate
child.
In this case, to divide the estate between the surviving spouse
and the ligitemate child that deprive the illegitimate children of
their legitime. So, the decendent's estate is distributed in the
proportion of 1/2 for the legitimate child, 1/4 for the widow and
1/8 each for the two illegitimate children.
Also not of possible application to this case is the rule that the
legal of an acknowledge natural child is 1/2 of the legitime of
the legitimate child of that the of the spurious child is 2/5 of
that of the of the intimate child or 4/5 of that of that of the
acknowledged natural child.
The rule be applied because the estate is not sufficient to
cover legitimes of all compulsory heirs. That is one of the flaws
of the law of succession. A situation as in the instant case may
arise where the illegitimate children get less than their
legitime. With respect to the decendant's unpaid salary and
the money value of his leave, the same are conjugal
properties because of the rule that property "obtained by the
or work, or as salary of the spouses, or either of them", is
conjugal in character.
ALSUA-BETTS VS CA
FACTS: (1)Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa Tinay, together with all
their living children, entered into a duly notarized agreement, (escritura
de particion extrajudicial/extra judicial partition) for the inventory and
partition of all the spouses present and existing properties. In the
provision of said extra judicial partition, each of the four children was
allotted with the properties considered as their share in the estate or as
inheritance left by the deceased where they will be the absolute owner
of the properties assigned in case of death of one of the spouses. (2)Don
Jesus and Doa Tinay also separately executed holographic will with
exactly the same terms and conditions in conformity with the executed
extra judicial partition naming each other as an executor without having
to post any bond. That in case new properties be acquired same shall
be partitioned one half to the surviving spouse and the other half to
children of equal parts.
(3).Spouses subsequently executed separately a codicil of exactly the
same terms and conditions, amending and supplementing their
holographic wills stating that they reserved for themselves the other half
not disposed of to their legitimate heirs under the agreement of partition
and mutually and reciprocally bequeathed each other their participation
as well all properties which might be acquired subsequently. Doa Tinay
died in effect Don Jesus by order of the probate court was name as
executor.
Before Don Jesus died he cancelled his holographic will in the presence
of his bookkeeper and secretary and instructed his lawyer to draft a new
will. This was a notarial will and testament of 3 essential features as
follows;
1. It expressly cancelled revoked and annulled all the provisions of his
holographic will and codicil.
2. It provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his four
living children by virtue of the Escritura de Partition Extra judicial.
3. It instituted his children as legatees / devisees of specific properties,
and as to the rest of the properties and whatever may be subsequently
acquired in the future, before his death, were to be given to Francisca
and Pablo naming Francisca as executor to serve without a bond.
ISSUE:
1.W/N oppositors to the probate of the will, are in estoppel to question
the competence of testator Don Jesus Alsua.
2.Whether testator Don Jesus can or cannot revoke his previous will.
HELD: 1.The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate
proceedings ( case of Testate Estate of the Late Procopia Apostol
Benedicta Obispo, et al vs. Remedios Obispo, Probate proceedings
involve public interest, and the application therein of the rule of estoppel,
when it will block the ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances
surrounding the execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public
policy. Over and above the interest of private parties is that of the state
to see that testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if,
executed conformably to law.
2. We rule that Don Jesus was not forever bound of his previous
holographic will and codicil as such, would remain revokable at his
discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: "A will may be revoked
by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of
this right is void." There can be no restriction that may be made on his
absolute freedom to revoke his holographic will and codicil previously
made. This would still hold true even if such previous will had as in the
case at bar already been probated (Palacios v. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739).
For in the first place, probate only authenticates the will and does not
pass upon the efficacy of the dispositions therein. And secondly, the
rights to the succession are transmitted only from the moment of the
death of the decedent (Article 777, New Civil Code). In fine, Don Jesus
retained the liberty of disposing of his property before his death to
whomsoever he chose, provided the legitime of the forced heirs are not
prejudiced, which is not herein claimed for it is undisputed that only the
free portion of the whole Alsua estate is being contested.
Doromal vs CA
66 SCRA 575 (1975)
BARREDO, J.:
FACTS:
Lot 3504 of the cadastral survey of Iloilo, situated in the
poblacion of La Paz, one of its districts, with an area of a little
more than 2-1/2 hectares was originally decreed in the name
of the late Justice Antonio Horilleno, in 1916, under Original
Certificate of Title No. 1314, Exh. A
but before he died, he executed a last will and testament
attesting to the fact that it was a co-ownership between
himself and his brothers and sisters,
the co-owners were: beside 1. Justice Horilleno (daughter
Mary as heir), 2. Luis,3. Soledad, 4. Fe, 5. Rosita, 6. Carlos
and 7. Esperanza,' all surnamed Horilleno, and since
Esperanza had already died, she was succeeded by her only
daughter and heir herein plaintiff, Filomena Javellana, in the
proportion of 1/7 undivided ownership each;
even though their right had not as yet been annotated in the
title, the co-owners led by Carlos, had wanted to sell their
shares, or if possible if plaintiff Filomena Javellana were
 agreeable, wanted to sell the entire property, and they hired
an acquaintance Cresencia Harder, to look for buyers, and the
latter came to interest defendants, the father and son, named
Ramon Doromal, Sr. and Jr., and
in preparation for the execution of the sale, since the brothers
and sisters Horilleno were scattered in various parts of the
country, 1. Carlos in Ilocos Sur, 2. Mary in Baguio, 3. Soledad
and 4. Fe, in Mandaluyong, Rizal, and 5. Rosita in Basilan
City, they all executed various powers of attorney in favor of
their niece, Mary H. Jimenez
they also caused preparation of a power of attorney of
identical tenor for signature by plaintiff, Filomena Javellana,
and sent it with a letter of Carlos, dated 18 January, 1968
Carlos informed Filomina that the price was P4.00 a square
meter,-although it now turns out according to Exh. 3 that as
early as 22 October, 1967, Carlos had received in check as
earnest money from defendant Ramon Doromal, Jr., the sum
of P5,000.00 and the price therein agreed upon was five
(P5.00) pesos a square meter
in another letter also of Carlos to Plaintiff Filomina in 5
November, 1967, Exh. 6, he had told her that the Doromals
had given the earnest money of P5,000.00 at P6.00 a square
meter
At any rate, Plaintiff Filomina not being agreeable, did not sign
the power of attorney, and the rest of the co-owners went
ahead with their sale of their 6/7, Carlos first seeing to it that
the deed of sale by their common attorney in fact, Mary H.
Jimenez be signed and ratified as it was signed and ratified in
Candon, Ilocos Sur, on 15 January, 1968, Exh; 2, then
brought to Iloilo by Carlos in the same month,
and because the Register of Deeds of Iloilo refused to register
right away, since the original registered owner, Justice
Antonio Horilleno was already dead, Carlos had to ask as he
did, hire Atty. Teotimo Arandela to file a petition within the
cadastral case, on 26 February, 1968, for the purpose, after
which Carlos returned to Luzon, and after compliance with the
requisites of publication, hearing and notice, the petition was
approved,
on 29 April, 1968, Carlos already back in Iloilo went to the
Register of Deeds and caused the registration of the order of
the cadastral court approving the issuance of a new title in the
name of the co-owners, as well as of the deed of sale to the
Doromals,
as a result of which on that same date, a new title was issued
TCT No. 23152, in the name of the Horillenos to 6/7 and
plaintiff Filomena Javellana to 1/7,
the Doromals paid unto Carlos by check, the sum of
P97,000,00 of Chartered Bank which was later substituted by
check of Phil. National Bank, because there was no Chartered
Bank Branch in Ilocos Sur, but besides this amount paid in
check, the Doromals according to their evidence still paid an
additional amount in cash of P18,250.00 since the agreed
price was P5.00 a square meter and thus was consummated
the transaction.
On 10 June, 1968, there came to the residence of the
Doromals in Dumangas, Iloilo, plaintiff Filomenas lawyer,
Atty. Arturo H. Villanueva, bringing with him her letter of that
date, making a formal offer to repurchase or redeem the 6/7
undivided share in Lot 3504 for P30,000 in cash which will be
delivered as soon as the contract of sale is executed in favor
of Filomena.
the Doromals were aghast, and refused
the next day, 11 June, 1968, plaintiff Filomena filed this
case, and in the trial, thru oral and documentary proofs,
sought to show that as co-owner, she had the right to redeem
at the price stated in the deed of sale of P30,000.00
but defendants Sps Doromals in answer, and in their
evidence, oral and documentary sought to show that plaintiff
had no more right to redeem, and that if ever she should have,
that it should be at the true and real price paid by them which
amounts to P115,250.00
trial judge : plaintiff had no more right, to redeem, because 'Plaintiff
was informed of the intended sale of the 6/7 share belonging to the
Horillenos.'
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and held that
although respondent Filomena Javellana was informed of her coowners'
Proposal to sell the land in question to petitioners she was, however,
"never notified... least of all, in writing", of the actual execution and
registration of the corresponding deed of sale, hence, said respondent's
right to redeem had not yet expired at the time she made her offer for
that purpose thru her letter of June 10, 1968 delivered to petitioners on
even date. The intermediate court further held that the redemption price
to be paid by respondent should be that stated in the deed of sale which
is P30,000 notwithstanding that the preponderance of the evidence
proves that the actual price paid by petitioners was P115,250.
ISSUE: WON Filomenas right to redeem had expired?
HELD: NO. There is No showing that Filomena was notified.
The letters sent by Carlos Horilleno to respondent and dated January
18, 1968, Exhibit 7, and November 5, 1967, Exhibit 6, constituted the
required notice in writing from which the 30-day day period fixed in said
provision should be computed. But to start with, there is no showing
that said letters were in fact received by respondent Filomena and
when they were actually received. Besides, petitioners do not pinpoint
which of these two letters, their dates being more than two months apart,
is the required notice. In any event, as found by the appellate court,
neither of said letters referred to a consummated sale
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the letters
aforementioned sufficed to comply with the requirement of notice of a
sale by co-owners under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. We are of the
considered opinion and so hold that for purposes of the co-owner's right
of redemption granted by Article 1620 of the Civil Code, the notice in
writing which Article 1623 requires to be made to the other co-owners
and from receipt of which the 30-day period to redeem should be
counted is a notice not only of a perfected sale but of the actual
execution and delivery of the deed of sale. This is implied from the latter
portion of Article 1623 which requires that before a register of deeds can
record a sale by a co-owner, there must be presented to him, an affidavit
to the effect that the notice of the sale had been sent in writing to the
other co-owners. A sale may not be presented to the register of deeds
for registration unless it be in the form of a duly executed public
instrument.
RATIO:
Petitioners do not question respondent's right to redeem, she being
admittedly a 1/7 co-owner of the property in dispute. The thrust of their
first assignment of error is that for purposes of Article 1623 of the Civil
Code which provides that:
"ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners."
while the letters relied upon by petitioners could convey the
idea that more or less some kind of consensus had been
arrived at among the other Homeowners to sell the property
in dispute to petitioners, it cannot be said definitely that such
a sale had even been actually perfected. The fact alone that
in the later letter of January 18, 1968 the price indicated was
P4.00 per square meter while in that of November 5, 1967,
what was stated was P5.00 per square meter negatives the
possibility that a "price definite" had already been agreed
upon.
While P5,000 might have indeed been paid to Carlos in
October, 1967, there is nothing to show that the same was in
the concept of the earnest money contemplated in Article
1482 of the Civil Code, invoked by petitioner, as signifying
perfection of the sale. Viewed in the backdrop of the factual
milieu thereof extant in the record, We are more inclined to
believe that the said P5,000 were paid in the concept of
earnest money as the term was understood under the Old
Civil Code, that is, as a guarantee that the buyer would not
back out, considering that it is not clear that there was already
a definite agreement as to the price then and that petitioners
were decided to buy 6/7 only of the property should
respondent Javellana refuse to agree to part with her 1/7
share.
the law prefers that all the terms and conditions of the sale
should be definite and in writing. As aptly observed by Justice
Gatmaitan in the decision under review, Article 1619 of the
Civil Code bestows unto a co-owner the right to redeem and
"to be subrogated under the same terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract", and to avoid any controversy as to
the terms and conditions under which the right to redeem may
be exercised, it is beat that the period therefor should not be
deemed to have commenced unless the notice of the
disposition is made after the formal deed of disposal has been
duly executed. And it being beyond dispute that respondent
herein has never been notified in writing of the execution of
the deed of sale by which petitioners acquired the subject
property, it necessarily follows that her tender to redeem the
same made on June 10, 1968 was well within the period
prescribed by law. Indeed, it is immaterial when she might
 have actually come to know about said deed, it appearing she
has never been shown a copy thereof through a written
communication by either any of the petitionerspurchasers or
any of her co-owners-vendees. (Cornejo et al. vs. CA et al.,
16 SCRA 775.)

other issue: REDEMPTION PRICE

from the decision of the Court of Appeals, We gather that there is

"decisive preponderance of evidence" establishing "that the price paid
by defendants was not that stated in the document, Exhibit 2, of P30,000
but much more, at least P97,000, according to the check if not a total of
P115,250.00 because another amount in cash of P18,250 was paid
afterwards."

the contention of petitioners here that considering said finding of fact of

the intermediate court, it erred in holding nevertheless that "the
redemption price should be that stated in the deed of sale."

Again, petitioners' contention cannot be sustained.

it is impossible for the Supreme Court to sanction petitioners'

pragmatic but immoral posture. Being patently violative of public
policy and injurious to public interest, the seemingly wide practice
of understating considerations of transactions for the purpose of
evading taxes and fees due to the government must be condemned
and all parties guilty thereof must be made to suffer the
consequences of their ill-advised agreement to defraud the state.

Verily, the trial court fell short of its devotion and loyalty to the Republic
in officially giving its stamp of approval to the stand of petitioners and
even berating respondent Javellana as wanting to enrich herself "at the
expense of her own blood relatives who are her aunts, uncles and
cousins."

On the contrary. said "blood relatives" should have been sternly told, as
We here hold, that they are in pari-delicto with petitioners in committing
tax evasion and should not receive any consideration from any court in
respect to the money paid for the sale in dispute. Their situation is similar
to that of parties to an illegal contract.

Of course, the Court of Appeals was also eminently correct in its

considerations supporting the conclusion that the redemption in
controversy should be only for the price stipulated in the deed,
regardless of what might have been actually paid by petitioners.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE the decision of the Court of Appeals is

affirmed, with costs against Petitioners.
ALONZO v IAC
DOCTRINE: Statutory Construction: Legislative Intent: The spirit,
rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence,
a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is
within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter
thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is
not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the
intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the
letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within
the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.
FACTS:
1. 5 Brothers and Sisters inherited qual pro indiviso shares a
parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased
parents.
2. One of them, through an absolute deed of sale, transferred
to petitioners, his undivided share of the land. A year later,
his sister sold her share in a Con Pacto de Retro Sale.
3. Petitioners occupied the two fifths of the land representing
the portions sold to them and thereafter enclosed it with a
fence.
4. The son of the petitioners, Eduaro Alonzo and his wife,
then built a semi-concrete house with the consent of the
petitioners.
5. One of the heirs to the land sought to redeem the portions
that were sold but was subsequently denied due to him
being an American citizen.
6. Another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same
right of redemption claimed by her brother.
7. The trial court also dismiss this complaint, now on the
ground that the right had lapsed, not having been
exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales.
Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual
knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the
requirement of the law.
8. IAC, in reversing the trial court, the respondent court
declared that the notice required by the said article was
written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a
substitute.
ISSUES:
1. WoN actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Article
1088 of the Civil Code.
PROVISIONS:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
RULING + RATIO:
1. Yes.
a. While we admittedly may not legislate, we
nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in
such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature.
While we may not read into the law a purpose that is
not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out
of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer
not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that
vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.
b. Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law
requires the notice to be written, would such notice be
necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid
notice although it was not in writing. would there be
any question that the 30-day period for redemption
had expired long before the complaint was filed in
1977? In the face of the established facts, we cannot
accept the private respondents' pretense that they
were unaware of the sales made by their brother and
sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of
such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the
obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of
ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its
purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure
that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are
satisfied that in this case the other brothers and
sisters were actually informed, although not in writing,
of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such
notice was sufficient.
c. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of
the sales although no notice in writing was given
them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day
period began and ended during the 14 years between
the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising
their right of redemption. These are the justifications
for this exception.
DISPOSITION
1. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the
respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court
is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is
so ordered.
BAUTISTA v. GRINO-AQUINO (read full text)
CHAVEZ v. IAC
The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner
Manuela Buenavista who
had six (6) children, named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel,
Presentacion and
Floserpina. The first three were the plaintiffs and the last three, with
their mother, were
the defendants in this case.
Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel, with the conformity of their
mother, sold
their 1/6 undivided share of the same land to their sister who became
the owner of 4/6
share of the subject land.
In all the deeds of sale, there was the stipulation wherein the owner
, Manuela
Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to her children, in equal pro-
indiviso shares, her
paraphernal property.
Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed with
her
conformity ten years earlier, Manuela Buenavista, sold the entire
property in favor of her
daughter, Raquel Chavez, and her husband, Gerardo Jimenez. On
October 7, 1968,
Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed a civil case against their
mother Manuela and
their sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela sold the entire property to doctrine that no person
Pepito Ferrer, on should be allowed to unjustly enrich herself at the expense of
February 4, 1969 with right to repurchase. another.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deeds of sale were considered as a HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI VS CA, GR No. 118464, December
partition by an act inter 1998
vivos
Facts:
YES. Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti were the co-owners
partition of
of property located in Lucena City. Lourdes died intestate
his estate either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall
without issue.
be respected
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitimate of the compulsory heirs. Subsequently, private respondents, all claiming to be
While the law correlative relatives of the deceased Lourdes, filed an
prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the action for partition and damages before the RTC-Lucena
parent, as provided in City.
Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law. Ignacio Conti refused the partition on the ground that
private respondents failed to produce any document to
prove that they were the rightful heirs of Lourdes. Ignacio
Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in died and was substituted as party-defendants by his
making a children.
partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by WILL. When To prove their filiation to Lourdes, private respondents
a person makes a presented Lydia Sampayo-Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo.
partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed Lydia testified that she was one of the nieces of Lourdes,
in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when being the daughter of Josefina Sanpayo, the only living
a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such sibling of Lourdes. They presented her original copy of
partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of certificate of live birth showing that her parents are
a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of Inocentes Reyes and Josefina Sampayo.
compulsory heirs. Lydia also testified that the other siblings of Lourdes who
were already dead were Remedios, Luis, and Manuel. To
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions prove that Josefina, Remedios, Manuel, and Luis were
may be siblings of Lourdes, their baptismal certificate together with
sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights a photocopy of the birth certificate of Manuel were offered
of a tenant in as evidence to show that their parents, like Lourdes, were
common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which Antonio Sampayo and Brigida Jaraza.
possession in The baptismal certificates were presented in lieu of the
severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. birth certificates because the office of the civil registrar
were burned on two separate occasions, thus all civil
registration records were totally burned.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties Adelaida Sampayo testified that she was the spouse of
thereto Manuel, the brother of the deceased Lourdes.
have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in To rebut the claim of the private respondents, petitioner
severalty, claimed that the late Ignacio Conti paid for the real taxes
exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise of the subject property and spent for the necessary repairs
recognizing the and improvements thereon because by agreement
existence of the partition. Lourdes would leave her share of the property them.
However, the trial court found no will, either testamentary
In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the or holographic, was presented to substantiate their claim.
Deeds of Sale So it declared that the private respondents are the rightful
executed by Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed heirs of Lourdes. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Chavez in favor of The CA also declared that a prior and separate judicial
Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in declaration of heirship was not necessary and that private
question by and respondents became the co-owners of the portions of the
between Manuela Buenavista and her children as she not only gave property owned and registered in the name of Lourdes
her authority upon her death and, consequently, entitled to the
thereto but also signed the sales. The Deeds of Sale are not immediate possession thereof and all other incidents/right
contracts entered into with of ownership as provided by law including the right to
respect to feature inheritance but a contract perfected and demand partition under Art. 777 of the civil code.
consummated during the Hence, petitioner pursued the case arguing that a
lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her complaint for partition to claim a supposed share of the
consent thereto. deceased co-owner cannot prosper without prior
Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is settlement of the latters estate and compliance with the
valid. legal requirements, especially publication, and private
respondents failed to prove by competent evidence their
relationship with the deceased.
Thus, it would be unjust and inequitable to allow
Manuela Buenavista Vda. de
Issue:
Chavez to revoke the sales she herself authorized as well as the sale
she herself
Whether or not the argument of the petitioner is correct?
executed in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor
of her daughter
Ruling:
Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of the
property she had The Petitioner is wrong. A prior settlement of estate is
received in the partition inter vivos; it would run counter to the not essential before the heirs can commence any
action originally pertaining to the deceased.
 Conformably with Articles 777 and 494 of the civil
code, from the death of Lourdes her rights as co-
owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for
partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership,
were transmitted to her rightful heirs. So, in
demanding partition, private respondent merely
exercised the right originally pertaining to the
decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners theory of publication is also wrong
because the action is not for the partition of the state
of Lourdes but only for the segregation of Lourdes
one-half share to the subject property which they
inherited from her through intestate succession. This
is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-
owners over which publication is not required.
MALOLES II VS. PHILIPS (G.R. No. 129505, January 31, 2000)
FACTS:
In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his
will. He declared that he has no compulsory heirs and that he is
naming as sole devisee and legatee the Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes
Phillips. The petition was granted. Shortly after, he died.
Octavio, his nephew, filed a Motion for Intervention. He argued that
as the nearest of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the
matter is material and direct.
ISSUE: Whether or not Octavio Maloles II has the right to
intervene in the probate proceeding.
RULING:
No. In order for a person to be allowed to intervene in a proceeding,
he must have an interest in the estate or in the will or in the property
to be affected by it. He must be an interested party or one who would
be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim
against the estate like a creditor, and whose interest is material and
direct.
Octavio is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent.
Neither is he a compulsory heir of the decedent. As the only and
nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the
latter only in case of intestacy. He can only inherit if the will is
annulled. His interest is therefore not direct or immediate.
His claim to being a creditor is belated as it has been raised for the
first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene
and is not supported by evidence.
A probate proceeding is terminated upon the issuance of the order
allowing the probate of a will.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of
the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e.,
whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of
the testator. However, Article 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the
filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself.
ROMERO v CA
G.R. No. 188921; April 18, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioners allege that upon their fathers death, their mother,
respondent Aurora, was appointed as legal guardian who held
several real and personal properties in trust for her children
comprising the estate of her late husband. Petitioners Leo and
Amando discovered that several Deeds of Sale in favor of their
brother, Vittorio, were registered over parcels of land that are
purportedly conjugal properties of their parents.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of
Title, and Conveyance of Title (Amended) against private
respondents Aurora and Vittorio. Respondents filed their Answer,
arguing that the properties in question were acquired long after the
death of their father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties
cannot be considered conjugal, that they were paraphernal
properties of Aurora which she had mortgaged. Vittorio purportedly
had to shell out substantial amounts in order to redeem them. The
lots covered by TCT Nos. 77223, 77224, and 77225 were sold by
Aurora herself as attorney-in-fact of her children on 23 November
2006, since her authority to do so had never been revoked or
modified.
The RTC dismissed the petitioners complaint since the case under
Special Proceedings for the intestate distribution and partition of the
estate of their deceased father is still pending. The RTC denied their
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule
65 with the CA but was dismissed. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners in this case may file a separate civil action
for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title, despite the pendency
of the settlement proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante
Y. Romero.
HELD:
NO. In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the
question of ownership of certain of the properties involved whether
they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively.
This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court
which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order
to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings.
In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of
the allegedly illegal sale are conjugal and constitute part of their
share in the estate. To date, there has been no final inventory of the
estate or final order adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus, only
the probate court can competently rule on whether the properties are
conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the probate court that
can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the same to the
heirs, after the debts of the estate have been paid.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. As the properties
herein are already subject of an intestate proceeding.