1) Aisporna v CA (1982)

Aisporna v CA (1982)
Facts

Mapalad Aisporna, the wife of one Rodolfo Aisporna, an insurance agent, Commented [1]:

solicited the application of Eugenio Isidro in behalf of Perla Compana de

Seguros without the certificate of authority to act from the insurance
commissioner. Isidro passed away while his wife was issued Php 5000 Commented [2]:

from the insurance policy. After the death, the fiscal instigated criminal
action against Mapalad for violating sec 189 of the Insurance code for
feloniously acting as agent when she solicited the application form. Commented [3]:

In the trial court, she claimed that she helped Rodolfo as clerk and that
she solicited a renewal, not a new policy from Isidro through the phone.
She did this because her husband was absent when he called. She only
left a note on top of her husbands desk to inform him of what transpired.
(She did not accept compensation from Isidro for her services)
Aisporna was sentenced to pay Php 500 with subsidiary costs in case of
insolvency in 1971 in the Cabanatuan city court. Commented [4]:

In the appellate court, she was found guilty of having violating par 1 of sec Commented [5]:

189 of the insurance code.

The OSG kept on repeating that she didnt violate sec 189 of the
insurance code.
In seeking reversal of the judgment, Aisporna assigned errors of the
appellate court:
1. the receipt of compensation was not a necessary element of the crime
in par 1 of sec 189 of the insurance code Commented [6]:

2. CA erred in giving due weight to exhibits F, F1, F17 inclusive sufficient

to establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
3. The CA erred in not acquitting the petitioner

Issues: Won a person can be convicted of having violated the 1st par of
the sec 189 of the IC without reference to the 2nd paragraph of the said
section. Or Commented [7]:

Is it necessary to determine WON the agent mentioned in the 1st

paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an
insurance agent found on its second paragraph Commented [8]:

Decision: Aisporna acquitted

Ruling:
Sect 189 of the I.C., par 1 states that No insurance company doing
business with the Philippine Islands nor l any agent thereof shall pay any
commission or other compensation to any person for services in obtaining
new insurance unless such person shall have first procured from the
Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of
such company as herein after provided.
No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of
procurement of applications for insurance without obtaining a certificate
from the Insurance Commissioner.
Par2 Any person who for COMPENSATION solicits or obtains insurance
for any for any insurance compna or offers or assumes to act in the
negotiating of such insurance shall be an insurance agent in the intent of
this section and shall thereby become liable to all liabilities to which an
insurance agent is subject.
Par 3 500 pseo fine for person or company violating the provisions of the
section.

The court held that the 1st par prohibited a person to act as agent without
certificate of authority from the commissioner
In the 2nd par, the definition of an insurance agent is stipulated
The third paragraph provided the penalty for violating the 1st 2 rules
The appellate court said that the petitioner was penalized under the1st
paragraph and not the 1nd. The fact that she didnt receive compensation
wasnt an excuse for her acquittal because she was actually punished
separately under sec 1 because she did not have a certificate of authority
as under par 1. Commented [9]:

The SC held that the definition of an insurance agent was made by CA to

be limited to paragraph 2 and not applicable to the 1st paragraph. Commented [10]:

The appellate court said that a person was an insurance agent under par
2 if she solicits insurance for compensation, but in the 1st paragraph,
there was no necessity that a person solicits an insurance compensation
in order to be called an agent. Commented [11]:

The SC said that this was a reversible error.

The CA said that Aisporna didnt receive compensation.

The SC said that the definition of an insurance agent was found in the
2nd par of Sec 189 (check the law) The definition in the 2nd paragraph
qualified the definition of an agent used in the 1st and third paragraphs. Commented [12]:

DOCTRINE: The court held that legislative intent must be ascertained

from the consideration of the statute as a whole. The words shouldnt be
studied in isolated explanations but the whole and every part of the statute
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to
pronounce the harmonious whole.
Noscitur a sociis provides that where a particular word or phrase in a
statement is ambiguous in itself, the true meaning may be made clear in
the company it is fixed in. In applying this, the court held that the definition
of an insurance agent in the 2nd paragraph was applicable in the 1st
paragraph.
To receive compensation be the agent is an essential element for violation
of the 1st paragraph.
The appellate court said that she didnt receive compensation by the
receipt of compensation wasnt an essential element for violation of the
1st paragraph.
The SC said that this view wasnt correct owing to the American insurance
laws which qualified compensation as a qualifying factor in penalizing
unauthorized persons who solicited insurance (Texas code and snyders
law) Commented [13]:

SCRA
The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of
Section 189 is intended to define the word agent mentioned in the first
and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its
second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an
insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189. HenceAny person
who for compensation x x x shall be an insurance agent within the intent
of this section, x x x. Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under
the second paragraph holds true with respect to the agent mentioned in
the other two paragraphs of the said section. The second paragraph of
Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify the
term agent mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the
aforesaid section. Commented [14]:
Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislative intent must be ascertained from
a consideration of the whole statute; Words and phrases and clauses
should not be studied in isolation or detached from the rest.Applying Commented [15]:

the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent

mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the
aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular Commented [16]:

words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and

isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and
give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. The meaning of the law,
it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part,
portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or
sentences but from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole.
Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context.

2) Dai-Chi v Villarama (RTC judge) and

Limjuco
On July 29, 1993, the petitioner Daichi electronics filed a complaint for Commented [17]:

damages with RTC branch 156 for an employees (Limjuco) violation of

their contract in 1990 which stipulated that the termination of service of
an employee restricted him from working in a company which has a similar
set of products or ventures for a span of 2 years following the termination
of service. Commented [18]:

The petitioner claimed that respondent became an employee of such a

company called Angel Sound with the same position as head of material
management control before the 2 years was up.
The petitioner sought to claim 100k in damages and prevent the former
employee from working in the rival business within the 1 year timespan. Commented [19]:

The respondent court under villarama claimed that it had no jurisdiction

because the complaint was for damages from labor-employee relations
and should be adjudicated under the Labor Arbiter under Art 217 s 4 of
the LC.
The petitioner asked for reversal because the case was recognizable
under the regular courts and that the cause of action didnt arise from
employee-employer relationships even if the claim was in the employees
contract.

Issue: Is the petitioners claim for damages one arising from employee-
employer relations? Commented [20]:

Decision: No, petition granted

1. Art 217 s4 of the LC stipulated that Labor Arbiters have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases for workers with claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-
employee relations.

The court held that the cuase of action was under Civil Law, not the labor
code. Why? Commented [21]:

The petitioner sought to recover damages agreed upon in the contract as

redress for respondents breach of his contractual obligation to its damage
and prejudice. He also didnt ask for relief under the Labor Code. Commented [22]:

The applicable case law was Singapore airlines v Pano where the
employers claim for damages was based on wanton failure and refusal
without just cause to report to duty coupled with the averment that the
employee maliciously and with bad faith violated the contract. The
employee didnt report for duty as a course of convention training- quasi-
delict diba!
There must be a causal connection for claims provided in the RT217 S4
OF THE LC. Only when there is such a connection with other claims can
damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations.
2. In SMC v NLRC, the interpretation of Art 217 then was focused on in
the phrase all money claims of workers in par 3.
There was no phrase arising from employer-employee relations at that
time (art 217 amended by bp blg 227, not yet the present labor code)

DOCTRINE: The use of noscitur a sociis wherein the entire universe of

family claims asserted by workers has been observed into the exclusive
jurisdiction of labor arbiters. Commented [23]:

Nos a soc was also used to limit par 3 (par 4 in the present labor code) of
art 217 wherein it was read in relation to par 1 (unfair labor practices), par
2 (terms and conditions of employment), par 4 (household services) and
par 5 (restrictions on activities of employees and employers)
There was a unifying element which referred to cases out of employer-
employee relations.
Money claims that didnt arise out of such relations was to be taken in by
regular courts. The claims should have a causal connection with
employer-employee relations
In Ocheda, the action based on tort or quasi-delict with no such causal
connection was in the juris of the regular courts.
In pepsi-cola, the action by employees against the malicious filing of the
employer of a criminal complaint against them was with the regular courts.

The rationale for the Dai-chi case was that the complaint for damages
wasnt anchored on term of employees service but the effects of such
term. Commented [24]:

Cases decided under the earlier version of Art 217 was also consistent in
allocating civil disputes bet employers and employes to the realm of the
regular courts. In Medina (1929), the civil complaint for damagaes against
the employer for slanderous remarks against the employtess were tried
in the civil courts. In Laron (1984), the court held that the Labor Arbiters
have no jurisdiction if the labor code wasnt involved.

3) Magtajas (mayorof cdo)v. Pryce

Properties Corp. (G.R. No. 111097)
Facts:

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It Commented [25]:

leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations,

Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its
casino during the Christmas season. Commented [26]:

Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the

casinos opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the
issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit to the
establishment for the operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-
93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its
violation. Commented [27]:
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that
they both violated Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that,
pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power
authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.

Issue:
Whether the Ordinances are valid.

Ruling:

No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is

empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local
Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what
is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as
follows:Sec. 16. Commented [28]:

General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the

powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of
the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to

prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited
games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. Commented [29]:

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions
has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following
substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not

contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D.
1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils exercise only delegated
legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or Commented [30]:

exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest

that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which
they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.Hence, it was not competent for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No.
3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the
public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

SCRA

Same; Gambling; Statutory Construction; Local Government Code; Under

the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in
relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is
associated, and, since the word gambling is associated with and other
prohibited games of chance, under Sec. 458 of the Local Government
Code, the word should be read as referring only to illegal gambling.We Commented [31]:

begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code,
local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among
others, gambling and other prohibited games of chance. Obviously, this
provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in
fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming
that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In
fact it does. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under
the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in
relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is
associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word gambling is
associated with and other prohibited games of chance, the word should
be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited
games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed. Magtajas vs. Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

4) PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL
ASSOCIATION v. COURT OF APPEALS,
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE. G.R. No. 119122. August 8,
2000
FACTS:

The PBA received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue (CIR) for the payment of deficiency amusement tax. Commented [32]:

The PBA contested the assessment by filing a protest with the CIR who
denied the same. The PBA then filed a petition for review with the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA), in which they held against the PBA.

The PBA filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which was also denied.

ISSUES:

Whether the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games is a

national tax. Commented [33]:

Whether the cession of advertising and streamer spaces to Vintage

Enterprises, Inc. subject to amusement tax.
RULING:

YES. The Local Tax Code does not provide for professional basketball
games but rather in PD 1959. It is clear that the "proprietor, lessee or
operator of professional basketball games" is required to pay an
amusement tax of 15% of their gross receipts to the BIR, which payment
is a national tax.

YES. The definition of gross receipts is broad enough to embrace the

cession of advertising and streamer spaces as the same embraces all the
receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. The
law being clear, there is no need for an extended interpretation.

SCRA

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Ejusdem

Generis; While Section 13 of the Local Tax Code mentions other places
of amusement, professional basketball games are definitely not within its
scopeunder the principle of ejusdem generis, where general words
follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of
the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.While Section Commented [34]:

13 of the Local Tax Code mentions other places of amusement,

professional basketball games are definitely not within its scope. Under Commented [35]:

the principle of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an

enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same
kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Thus, in determining the
meaning of the phrase other places of amusement, one must refer to
the prior enumeration of theaters, cinema-tographs, concert halls and
circuses with artistic expression as their common characteristic.
Professional basketball games do not fall under the same category as
theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as the latter
basically belong to artistic forms of entertainment while the former caters
to sports and gaming. Commented [36]:
5) REPUBLIC VS SANTUA

A petitioners documentary evidence should be able to establish that the

lost or destroyed certificate of title has, in fact, been issued to the
petitioner or his predecessor-in-interest and such title was in force at the
time it was lost or destroyed.The Court has already settled in a number
of cases that, following the principle of ejusdem generis in statutory
construction, any document mentioned in Section 3 should be
interpreted to refer to documents similar to those previously enumerated
therein. As aptly observed by the petitioner, the documents enumerated
in Section 3(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are documents that had been issued
or are on file with the Register of Deeds, thus, highly credible. Moreover, Commented [37]:

they are documents from which the particulars of the certificate of title or
the circumstances which brought about its issuance could readily be
ascertained. After all, the purpose of reconstitution proceedings under RA
No. 26 is the restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or
destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land.
Consequently, a petitioners documentary evidence should be able to
establish that the lost or destroyed certificate of title has, in fact, been
issued to the petitioner or his predecessor-in-interest and such title was
in force at the time it was lost or destroyed.

6) Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos G.R. No.

113092 September 1, 1994
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994
KTA: Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper
regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. The State has
authority under the exercise of its police power to determine whether or
not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for
unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. Certainly the solicitation of
contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but
somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable
limits the worthy from the unworthy.

Facts:

This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting

Centeno and Yco for violating P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit
Law when they both solicited money for the renovation of their chapel
without a permit from the DSWD. Commented [38]:

In 1985, the petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng

Tikay, launched a fund drive for the renovation of their chapel in Bulacan. Commented [39]:

The petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G.

Angeles, a resident of Tikay, a contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation
was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the
petitioners for violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation Permit Law.

P.D. 1564 provides as follows:

Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to
solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes
shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of
Social Services and Development as provided in the Integrated
Reorganization Plan. Commented [40]:
In 1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the
Solicitation Permit Law. Commented [41]:

In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term
religious purpose is not expressly included in the provisions of the
statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes.

Issue: Whether or not the phrase charitable purposes should be

construed in the broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. Commented [42]:

Held/Ratio:

The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words charitable and
religious separately and independently of each other.

In P.D. 1564, it merely stated charitable or public welfare purposes

which means that it was not the intention of the framers of the law to
include solicitations for religious purposes. The world religious purpose
is not interchangeable with the expression charitable purpose.

The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished under the said law
because the law does not contemplate solicitation for religious purposes.

The solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation

by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar,
considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not
within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.

The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and petitioner
Martin Centeno is acquitted of the offense charged. Commented [43]:

SCRA
It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention
of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.Indeed, it Commented [44]:

is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of

one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is
expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it
may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict
its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Commented [45]:

7 ) SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner, vs. THE

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO
CORPUZ, ANACLETO TANGILAG and
VICTOR DOMINGUEZ, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the Resolutions of the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC for brevity) en banc[2] dated June
10, 1999 and October 26, 2000. The assailed Resolutions dismissed the
complaint[3] filed by petitioner Sario Malinias (Malinias for brevity) and
Roy S. Pilando (Pilando for brevity) for insufficiency of evidence to
establish probable cause for violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No.
6646[4] and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.[5]

The Facts

Petitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor whereas Pilando was a

candidate for congressional representative of Mountain Province in the
May 11, 1998 elections.[6] Commented [46]:
The Provincial Board of Canvassers held the canvassing of election
returns at the second floor of the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc,
Mountain Province from May 11, 1998 to May 15, 1998.[7]

On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint with the
COMELECs Law Department for violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646,
and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881, against Victor Dominguez,
Teofilo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose Bagwan who
was then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers. Victor Dominguez (Dominguez for Commented [47]:

brevity) was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan,

Mountain Province. Teofilo Corpuz (Corpuz for brevity) was then the
Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province
while Anacleto Tangilag (Tangilag for brevity) was then the Chief of Police
of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province.

Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police checkpoint at
Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province blocked their supporters who
were on their way to Bontoc, and prevented them from proceeding to the
Provincial Capitol Building. Malinias and Pilando further alleged that
policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented their
supporters, who nevertheless eventually reached the Provincial Capitol
Building, from entering the capitol grounds. Commented [48]:

In their complaint, Malinias and Pilando requested the COMELEC and its
Law Department to investigate and prosecute private respondents for the
following alleged unlawful acts.

3. That on May 15, 1998 at the site of the canvassing of election returns
for congressional and provincial returns located at the second floor of the
Provincial Capitol Building the public and particularly the designated
representatives/watchers of both affiants were prevented from attending
the canvassing. Commented [49]:

xxx

4. That the aforementioned Mass-affidavits support our allegations in this

affidavit-complaint that we and our supporters were prevented from
attending the provincial canvassing because of the illegal
checkpoint/blockade set-up by policemen in Nakagang, Tambingan,
Sabangan, Mt. Province and as an evidence to these allegations,
Certification of the Police Station is hereto attached as Annex D and
affidavits of supporters hereto attached as Annex E, both made an
integral part of this affidavit-complaint; and that said mass-affidavits show
that the Provincial canvassing were not made public or (sic) candidates
and their representatives/watchers prevented because of barricade,
closure of canvassing rooms, blockade by armed policemen that coerce
or threaten the people, the candidates or their representatives from
attending the canvassing;[8]

In support of the complaint, several supporters of Malinias and Pilando

executed so-called mass affidavits uniformly asserting that private
respondents, among others, (1) prevented them from attending the
provincial canvassing, (2) padlocked the canvassing area, and (3)
threatened the people who wanted to enter the canvassing room. They
likewise alleged that the Provincial Board of Canvassers never allowed
the canvassing to be made public and consented to the exclusion of the
public or representatives of other candidates except those of
Dominguez.[9]

Consequently, the COMELECs Law Department conducted a preliminary

investigation during which only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint
Counter-Affidavit.

In their Counter-Affidavit, Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the

setting up of a checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province
and securing the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building, to wit:

3. We admit having ordered the setting up of check points in Nakagang,

Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province; as in fact, this is not the only
checkpoint set up in the province. There are other checkpoints
established in other parts of the province, to enforce the COMELEC gun
ban and other pertinent rules issued by the Commission on Election
during the election period.

4. Policemen were posted within the vicinity of the capitol grounds in

response to earlier information that some groups were out to disrupt the
canvass proceedings which were being conducted in the second floor of
the Provincial Capitol Building. This is not remote considering that this
had happened in the past elections. In fact, during the canvass
proceeding on May 15, 1998 a large group of individuals identified with
no less than affiants-complainants Roy S. Pilando and Sario Malinias was
conducting a rally just in front of the capitol, shouting invectives at certain
candidates and their leaders. This group likewise were holding placards
and posted some in front of the capitol building.

x x x[10]

After the investigation, in a study dated May 26, 1999, the COMELECs
Law Department recommended to the COMELEC en banc the dismissal
of the complaint for lack of probable cause.[11]

In a Resolution dated June 10, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed

the complaint of Malinias and Pilando for insufficiency of evidence to
establish probable cause against private respondents. On October 26,
2000, the COMELEC dismissed Malinias Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, Malinias filed the instant petition.

The Comelecs Ruling

In dismissing the complaint against private respondents, the COMELEC

ruled as follows:

As appearing in the Minutes of Provincial Canvass, complainant Roy

Pilando was present during the May 15, 1998 Provincial Canvass. He
even participated actively in a discussion with the members of the Board
and the counsel of Congressman Dominguez. The minutes also disclosed
that the lawyers of LAMMP, the watchers, supporters of other candidates
and representatives of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines were present
at one time or another during the canvass proceedings. The minutes does
not indicate any charges of irregularities inside and within the vicinity of
the canvassing room.

Pursuant to Comelec Res. No. 2968 promulgated on January 7, 1998,

checkpoints were established in the entire country to effectively
implement the firearms ban during the election period from January 11,
1998 to June 10, 1998. In Mountain Province, there were fourteen (14)
checkpoints established by the Philippine National Police way before the
start of the campaign period for the May 11, 1998 elections including the
subject checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain
Province. Thus, the checkpoint at Sabangan, Mountain Province was not
established as alleged only upon request of Congressman Dominguez on
May 15, 1998 but way before the commencement of the campaign period.
Granting arguendo that the Congressman did make a request for a
checkpoint at Sitio Nacagang, it would be a mere surplusage as the same
was already existing.

Furthermore, an alleged text of a radio message requesting advice from

the PNP Provincial Director at Bontoc, Mt. Province was attached to
complainants affidavit-complaint. However, said person by the name of
Mr. Palicos was never presented to affirm the truth of the contents and
the signature appearing therein.[12]

Finding that Malinias failed to adduce new evidence, the COMELEC

dismissed Malinias Motion for Reconsideration.[13] Commented [50]:

The Courts Ruling

The sole issue for resolution is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing Malinias and Pilandos complaint for insufficiency
of evidence to establish probable cause for alleged violation of Section 25 Commented [51]:

of R.A. No. 6646 and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. 881.

We rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Commented [52]:

For this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the tribunal or
administrative body must have issued the assailed decision, order or
resolution in a capricious and despotic manner.

There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of

certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.[14]

Such is not the situation in the instant case. The COMELEC dismissed
properly the complaint of Malinias and Pilando for insufficient evidence,
and committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

First, Malinias charged private respondents with alleged violation of

Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6646, quoted, as follows:

Sec. 25. Right to be Present and to Counsel During the Canvass. Any
registered political party, coalition of parties, through their
representatives, and any candidate has the right to be present and to
counsel during the canvass of the election returns; Provided, That only
one counsel may argue for each political party or candidate. They shall
have the right to examine the returns being canvassed without touching
them, make their observations thereon, and file their challenge in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the Commission. No dilatory
action shall be allowed by the board of canvassers.

In the present case, Malinias miserably failed to substantiate his claim

that private respondents denied him his right to be present during the
canvassing. There was even no showing that Malinias was within the
vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building or that private respondents
prevented him from entering the canvassing room.

As found by the COMELEC and admitted by Malinias, Pilando was

present and even participated actively in the canvassing.[15] Malinias
failed to show that his rights as a gubernatorial candidate were prejudiced
by the alleged failure of his supporters to attend the canvassing. Malinias
claimed that even though Pilando was present during the canvassing, the
latter was only able to enter the room after eluding the policemen and
passing through the rear entrance of the Provincial Capitol Building.[16]
This allegation, however, is not supported by any clear and convincing
evidence. Pilando himself, who was purportedly prevented by policemen
from entering the canvassing room, failed to attest to the veracity of this
statement rendering the same self-serving and baseless. Commented [53]:

In an analogous case where a political candidates watcher failed to attend

the canvass proceedings, this Court held:

Another matter which militates against the cause of petitioner is that he

has not shown that he suffered prejudice because of the failure of his
watcher to attend the canvassing. Had the watcher been present, what
substantive issues would he have raised? Petitioner does not disclose.
Could it be that even if the watcher was present, the result of the
canvassing would have been the same?

There is therefore no merit in petitioners claim that respondent

Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion in issuing its
questioned decision. And, as emphatically stated in Sidro v. Comelec, 102
SCRA 853, this Court has invariably followed the principle that in the
absence of any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of the utmost
gravity, the conclusion reached by the respondent Commission on a
matter that falls within its competence is entitled to the utmost respect,
xxx. There is justification in this case to reiterate this principle.[17]

Assuming that Pilando in fact entered the canvassing room only after
successfully evading the policemen surrounding the Provincial Capitol
grounds, Pilando could have easily complained of this alleged unlawful
act during the canvass proceedings. He could have immediately reported
the matter to the Provincial Board of Canvassers as a violation of Section
25 of R.A. No. 6646. However, Pilando opted simply to raise questions on
alleged irregularities in the municipal canvassing.[18] While he had the
opportunity to protest the alleged intimidation committed by policemen
against his person, it is quite surprising that he never mentioned anything
about it to the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

Surprisingly, the COMELEC and private respondents apparently

overlooked that R.A. No. 6646 does not punish a violation of Section 25
of the law as a criminal election offense. Section 25 merely highlights one
of the recognized rights of a political party or candidate during elections,
aimed at providing an effective safeguard against fraud or irregularities in
the canvassing of election returns. Section 27[19] of R.A. No. 6646, which
specifies the election offenses punishable under this law, does not include
Section 25.

Malinias further claims that, in violation of this right, his supporters were
blocked by a checkpoint set-up at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain
Province. This allegation is devoid of any basis to merit a reversal of the
COMELECs ruling. Malinias supporters who were purportedly blocked by
the checkpoint did not confirm or corroborate this allegation of Malinias.

Moreover, the police established checkpoints in the entire country to

implement the firearms ban during the election period. Clearly, this is in
consonance with the constitutionally ordained power of the COMELEC to
deputize government agencies and instrumentalities of the Government
for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.[20]

Second, Malinias maintains that Corpuz and Tangilag entered the

canvassing room in blatant violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881. His
sole basis for this allegation is the affidavit of his supporters who
expressly stated that they saw Dominguez and Corpuz (only) enter the
canvassing room.[21] Malinias likewise contends that Corpuz and
Tangilag impliedly admitted that they were inside or at least within the fifty
(50) meter radius of the canvassing room as they were able to mention
the names of the persons who were inside the canvassing room in their
Counter-Affidavit.[22]

The provision of law which Corpuz and Tangilag allegedly violated is

quoted as follows:

Sec. 232. Persons not allowed inside the canvassing room. It shall be
unlawful for any officer or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
including the Philippine Constabulary, or the Integrated National Police or
any peace officer or any armed or unarmed persons belonging to an
extra-legal police agency, special forces, reaction forces, strike forces,
home defense forces, barangay self-defense units, barangay tanod, or of
any member of the security or police organizations or government
ministries, commissions, councils, bureaus, offices, instrumentalities, or
government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries or of any
member of a privately owned or operated security, investigative,
protective or intelligence agency performing identical or similar functions
to enter the room where the canvassing of the election returns are held
by the board of canvassers and within a radius of fifty meters from such
room: Provided, however, That the board of canvassers by a majority
vote, if it deems necessary, may make a call in writing for the detail of
policemen or any peace officers for their protection or for the protection of
the election documents and paraphernalia in the possession of the board,
or for the maintenance of peace and order, in which case said policemen
or peace officers, who shall be in proper uniform, shall stay outside the
room within a radius of thirty meters near enough to be easily called by
the board of canvassers at any time.

Again, the COMELEC and private respondents overlooked that Section

232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not one of the election offenses explicitly
enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232
categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to
enter the canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses
criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus,
the act involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a
criminal election offense. Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the
penalty for an election offense under Sections 261 and 262 is
imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years.

Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio

alterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private
respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely
because this is a non-criminal act.

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one

person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule
is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number

of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed
puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum.
Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters,
it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.

xxx

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are
canons of restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic
and the natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated upon
ones own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from
the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning
and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.[23]

Also, since private respondents are being charged with a criminal offense,
a strict interpretation in favor of private respondents is required in
determining whether the acts mentioned in Section 232 are criminally
punishable under Sections 261[24] and 262[25] of B.P. Blg. 881. Since
Sections 261 and 262, which lists the election offenses punishable as
crimes, do not include Section 232, a strict interpretation means that
private respondents cannot be held criminally liable for violation of Section
232.
This is not to say that a violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is without
any sanction. Though not a criminal election offense, a violation of Section
232 certainly warrants, after proper hearing, the imposition of
administrative penalties. Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
the COMELEC may recommend to the President the imposition of
disciplinary action on any officer or employee the COMELEC has
deputized for violation of its directive, order or decision.[26] Also, under
the Revised Administrative Code,[27] the COMELEC may recommend to
the proper authority the suspension or removal of any government official
or employee found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply
with COMELEC orders or rulings.

In addition, a careful examination of the evidence presented by Malinias

shows that the same are insufficient to justify a finding of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC. Obviously, the evidence relied
upon by Malinias to support his charges consisted mainly of affidavits
prepared by his own supporters. The affidavits of Malinias own
supporters, being self-serving, cannot be accepted at face value under
the circumstances. As this Court has often stated, reliance should not be
placed on mere affidavits.[28]

Besides, if Corpuz really entered the canvassing room, then why did
Pilando and the representatives of other candidates, who were inside the
room, fail to question this alleged wrongful act during the canvassing?
Malinias contention that Corpuz and Tangilag impliedly admitted they
were inside the canvassing room because they mentioned the names of
the persons present during the canvassing deserves scant consideration
as the same is not supported by any evidence.

Finally, Malinias asserts that private respondents should be held liable for
allegedly violating Section 261 (i) of B. P. Blg. 881 because the latter
engaged in partisan political activity. This provision states:

Sec. 261 (i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or
employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices; any
officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or
any police force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-
defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may
hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any
election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to
vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.
Section 79, Article X of B.P. Blg. 881 defines the term partisan political
activity as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to a public office.[29] Malinias asserts that, in
setting up a checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain
Province and in closing the canvassing room, Corpuz and Tangilag
unduly interfered with his right to be present and to counsel during the
canvassing. This interference allegedly favored the other candidate.

While Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting up of the

checkpoint, they did so to enforce the COMELECs firearms ban, pursuant
to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968, among others.[30] There was no clear
indication that these police officers, in ordering the setting up of
checkpoint, intended to favor the other candidates. Neither was there
proof to show that Corpuz and Tangilag unreasonably exceeded their
authority in implementing the COMELEC rules. Further, there is no basis
to rule that private respondents arbitrarily deprived Malinias of his right to
be present and to counsel during the canvassing.

The act of Corpuz and Tangilag in setting up the checkpoint was plainly
in accordance with their avowed duty to maintain effectively peace and
order within the vicinity of the canvassing site. Thus, the act is untainted
with any color of political activity. There was also no showing that the
alleged closure of the provincial capitol grounds favored the election of
the other candidates.

In summary, we find that there is no proof that the COMELEC issued the
assailed resolutions with grave abuse of discretion. We add that this Court
has limited power to review findings of fact made by the COMELEC
pursuant to its constitutional authority to investigate and prosecute actions
for election offenses.[31] Thus, where there is no proof of grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law, this Court may not review
the factual findings of the COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on
the sufficiency of evidence.[32]

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The assailed

Resolutions of public respondent COMELEC are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

SCRA
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Expressio unius est exclusio al-
terius; Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters,
it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters.Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute
private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881
precisely because this is a non-criminal act. It is a settled rule of statutory
construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in
the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The rule of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways.
One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an
end to that which is implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus,
where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. x x x
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are
canons of restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic
and the natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated upon
ones own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from
the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning
and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Malinias vs. Commented [54]:

Commission on Elections, 390 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 146943 October 4,

2002

8) San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation

vs. CIR [G.R. No. 147749. June 22, 2006]

15
AUG
Ponente: CORONA, J.
FACTS:

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) is a domestic corporation

engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of
coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed and ordered to pay Commented [55]:

by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue millers tax and manufacturers

sales tax, among other deficiency taxes, for taxable year 1987 particularly
on SPMCs sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc.
(UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn
and edible oil as manufactured products. SPMC opposed the Commented [56]:

assessments. The Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC appealed the

denial of its protest to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by way of a petition
for review. docketed as CTA Case No. 5423. It insists on the liberal
application of the rules because, on the merits of the petition, SPMC was
not liable for the 3% millers tax. It maintains that the crude oil which it
sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM as an ingredient
of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to millers tax pursuant to
Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMCs
milled products, subsequently exported said products, SPMC should be
exempted from the millers tax. Commented [57]:

ISSUE:

Whether or not SPMCs sale of crude coconut oil to UNICHEM was

subject to the 3% millers task. Commented [58]:

HELD:

NO. Petition was denied.

RATIO:

The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax
Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of
rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts,
whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any
manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the
factory or by the miller himself. Commented [59]:

Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies,
it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly
mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not
included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that
does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the
statute cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that
the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if
it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned. Commented [60]:

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive

interpretation. Its application in this case is consistent with the
construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. To
allow SPMCs claim for tax exemption will violate these established
principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.

9) Lynette Garvida Petitioner

Vs.
Floencio Sales Jr., COMELEC, Election
Officer Dionisio Rios & Provincial
Supervisor Noli Pipo Respondents

Facts: On March 16, 1996, Lynette Garvida applied for registration as

member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. However, her application was denied by Commented [61]:

the Board of Election Tellers since she exceeded the age limit. She then Commented [62]:

filed a Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataan Member and Voter Commented [63]:

with the Municipal Trial Court which was granted by the said court. Then,
on April 23, 1996, Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the position
of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo,
Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. On the same date, Commented [64]:

Election Officer Dionisio Rios, per advise of Provincial Election Supervisor

Noli Pipo, disapproved petitioners certificate of candidacy again due to
her age. Petitioner then appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Commented [65]:

Filemon Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed
petitioner to run. Earlier and without knowledge of COMELEC officials, Commented [66]:

private respondent and petitioners rival Florencio Sales Jr. filed with the
COMELEC en banc a Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate
of Candidacy via facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996. And, on
May 2, 1996 respondent Riso issued a memorandum to petitioner
informing her of her ineligibility and giving hr 24 hours why her certificate
of candidacy should not be disapproved. Also on the same date, the Commented [67]:

COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board Election Tellers

and Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the
event she won in the election. This is why on May 6, 1996, Election Day,
Garvida was not proclaimed the winner. She was only proclaimed on June
2, 1996. Said proclamation was without prejudice to any further action by
the Commission on Elections or any other interested parties.

Issues: Whether or not COMELEC erred in the cancellation of

her candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age limit.
Whether or not COMELEC en banc acted within its
jurisdiction in cancelling her certificate of candidacy.

Ruling: Petition dismissed. Lynette Garvida is declared ineligible

for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996
elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan. The general rule is that an
elective official of the SAngguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21
years old on the day of his election. The only exception is when the official
reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Commented [68]:

SCRA
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The
Local Government Code provides for more qualifications for an elective
SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan; The courts
may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the
legislature intended a distinction or qualificationdissimilum dissimilis est
ratio.A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a Commented [69]:

distinction between the maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng

Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official. Section 424 of
the Code sets a members maximum age at 21 years only. There is no
further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of
age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of
an elective SK official is 21 years old on the day of his election. The
addition of the phrase on the day of his election is an additional
qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election
day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan.
The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the
day of election. The distinction is understandable considering that the
Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than for
a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio.
The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances
showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification. Commented [70]:

The phrase not more than 21 years of age means not over 21 years, not
beyond 21 years.The phrase not more than 21 years of age means
not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It
does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year
because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. Not more than 21
years old is not equivalent to less than 22 years old, contrary to
petitioners claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than
22 years on election day. Garvida vs. Sales, Jr., 271 SCRA 767, G.R. No.
124893 April 18, 1997

10) COA v. Province of Cebu

G.R. No. 141386. November 29, 2001;
FACTS:
In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of
the Province of Cebu, it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related
benefits of the teachers appointed by the province for the extension
classes were charged against the provincial SEF. Likewise charged to
the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the province.
Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of
Cebu, saying that disbursements for the salaries of teachers and
scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF. Commented [71]:

ISSUE:
Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public
school teachers appointed by local chief executives in connection with the
establishment and maintenance of extension classes; as well as the
expenses for college scholarship grants, may be charged to the Special
Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit concerned. Commented [72]:

HELD:
Undoubtedly, the legislature intended the SEF to answer for the
compensation of teachers handling extension classes. Under the doctrine
of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment
and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of
teachers who should, as a matter of course be compensated for their
services. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or
to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,
including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly
and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the Commented [73]:

services and the corresponding compensation of these teachers are

necessary and indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of
extension classes.
Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is lodged
principally with the DECS. The SEF may be expended only for the salaries
and personnel-related benefits of teachers appointed by the local school
boards in connection with the establishment and maintenance of
extension classes. With respect, however, to college scholarship grants,
a reading of the pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that
said grants are not among the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF
may be appropriated. Commented [74]:

SCRA

Same; Same; A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a

statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally.But, unlike
payment of salaries of teachers which falls within the ambit of
establishment and maintenance of extension classes and operation
and maintenance of public schools, the granting of government
scholarship to poor but deserving students was omitted in Sections 100
(c) and 272 of the Local Government Code. Casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in
a statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally. It is not for this
Court to supply such grant of scholarship where the legislature has
omitted it. Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu vs. Province of
Cebu, 371 SCRA 196, G.R. No. 141386 November 29, 2001 Commented [75]:

G.R. No. 166735 November 23,

2007

SPS. NEREO & NIEVA DELFINO,

Petitioners,
vs.
ST. JAMES HOSPITAL, INC., and THE
HONORABLE RONALDO ZAMORA,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT. Respondents.
RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us for Resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of private

respondent St. James Hospital, Inc., seeking the reversal of Our Decision
dated 5 September 2006. Respondent assails the Decision on the ground
that the Court had erroneously interpreted the 1991 Comprehensive Land
Use Plan (CLUP) or the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of the
Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna, in ruling that the St. James Hospital
is a non-conforming structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance and that
the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed
capacity medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision is
prohibited under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. Moreover,
respondent now contends that the case must now be decided in
accordance with the latest Zoning Ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa
Rosa Zoning Ordinance which was only submitted as evidence in the
instant Motion for Reconsideration.

Respondent now claims that the legislative history of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance shows that commercial and institutional uses were expressly
allowed in Sec. 2, par. 1 of said Ordinance as it retained uses that are
commercial and institutional as well as recreational in character and those
for the maintenance of ecological balance. Thus, respondent postulates
that even if parks, playgrounds and recreation centers which were
expressly provided for in the 1981 Zoning Ordinance under letters (h) and
(k) were excluded in the enumeration in the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, the
same cannot, by any stretch of logic, be interpreted to mean that they are
no longer allowed. On the contrary, respondent explains that what
appears is the fact that parks, playgrounds, and recreation centers are
deemed to have been covered by Sec. 2, par. 1 of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance which speaks of "x x x other spaces designed for recreational
pursuit and maintenance of ecological balance x x x." Hence, respondent
concludes that the same reading applies in the non-inclusion of the words
hospitals, clinics, school, churches and other places of worship, and
drugstores which cannot be interpreted to mean that the aforesaid uses
are to be deemed non-conforming under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance as
these uses are allegedly covered by the clause allowing for institutional
and commercial uses.

Arising from this interpretation, respondent maintains that the Court erred
in applying Sec. 1 of Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance which
pertains only to existing non-conforming uses and buildings, since,
according to respondent, the St. James Hospital and its expansion are
consistent with the uses allowed under the zoning ordinance.

To address this matter, we deem it necessary to reiterate our discussion

in our Decision dated 5 September 2006, wherein we have thoroughly
examined the pertinent provisions of the 1981 and 1991 Zoning
Ordinances, to wit:

Likewise, it must be stressed at this juncture that a comprehensive

scrutiny of both Ordinances will disclose that the uses formerly allowed
within a residential zone under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance such as
schools, religious facilities and places of worship, and clinics and
hospitals have now been transferred to the institutional zone under the
1991 Zoning Ordinance1 . This clearly demonstrates the intention of the
Sangguniang Bayan to delimit the allowable uses in the residential zone
only to those expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991
Zoning Ordinance, which no longer includes hospitals.

It is lamentable that both the Office of the President and the Court of
Appeals gave undue emphasis to the word "institutional" as mentioned in
Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance and even went through
great lengths to define said term in order to include hospitals under the
ambit of said provision. However, they neglected the fact that under
Section 4, Article VI of said Ordinance2 , there is now another zone,
separate and distinct from a residential zone, which is classified as
"institutional", wherein health facilities, such as hospitals, are expressly
enumerated among those structures allowed within said zone.

Moreover, both the Office of the President and the appellate court failed
to consider that any meaning or interpretation to be given to the term
"institutional" as used in Section 2, Article VI must be correspondingly
limited by the explicit enumeration of allowable uses contained in the
same section. Whatever meaning the legislative body had intended in
employing the word "institutional" must be discerned in light of the
restrictive enumeration in the said article. Under the legal maxim
expression unius est exclusion alterius, the express mention of one thing
in a law, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned3 . Thus,
in interpreting the whole of Section 2, Article VI, it must be understood
that in expressly enumerating the allowable uses within a residential zone,
those not included in the enumeration are deemed excluded. Hence,
since hospitals, among other things, are not among those enumerated as
allowable uses within the residential zone, the only inference to be
deduced from said exclusion is that said hospitals have been deliberately
eliminated from those structures permitted to be constructed within a
residential area in Santa Rosa, Laguna.
Furthermore, according to the rule of casus omissus in statutory
construction, a thing omitted must be considered to have been omitted
intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of the phrase "hospital with not
more than ten capacity" in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the
corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another zone
classification, the only logical conclusion is that the legislative body had
intended that said use be removed from those allowed within a residential
zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St. James
Hospital, within a residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991
Zoning Ordinance.

xxxx

Having concluded that the St. James Hospital is now considered a non-
conforming structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, we now come to
the issue of the legality of the proposed expansion of said hospital into a
four-storey, forty-bed medical institution. We shall decide this said issue
in accordance with the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance relating
to non-conforming buildings, the applicable law at the time of the
proposal. As stated in Section 1 of Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance:

Section 1. EXISTING NON-CONFORMING USES AND BUILDINGS. The

lawful uses of any building, structure or land at the point of adoption or
amendment of this Ordinance may be continued, although such does not
conform with the provisions of this Ordinance.

1. That no non-conforming use shall be enlarged or increased or extended

to occupy a greater area or land that has already been occupied by such
use at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance, or moved in whole or in
part to any other portion of the lot parcel of land where such non-
conforming use exist at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance.4
(Emphasis ours.)

It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance

that the expansion of a non-conforming building is prohibited. Hence, we
accordingly resolve that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a
four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution within the Mariquita
Pueblo Subdivision as prohibited under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance.

From our discussion above, it is clear that the position of respondent is

erroneous.1awp++i1 As stated in our Decision, a comprehensive scrutiny
of both zoning ordinances will disclose that the uses formerly allowed
within a residential zone under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance such as
schools, religious facilities and places of worship, and clinics and
hospitals have been transferred to the institutional zone under the 1991
Zoning Ordinance. This clearly indicates that the allowable uses in the
residential zone have been delimited only to those expressly enumerated
under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, which no longer
includes hospitals.

With respect to respondents claim that the controversy must now be

decided in light of latest Zoning Ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa
Rosa Zoning Ordinance, it must be stressed at this point that the present
case arose in 1994 when respondent St. James Hospital, Inc., applied for
a permit with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to
expand its hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical
institution, at which time, the zoning ordinance in effect was the 1991
Zoning Ordinance. It is a well-settled rule that the law in force at the time
of the occurrence of the cause of action is the applicable law
notwithstanding its subsequent amendment or repeal.5 Hence, in
resolving the instant case, the zoning ordinance to be used in interpreting
the legality or illegality of said expansion is that which was in full force and
effect at the time of the application for expansion which is the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance, regardless of its subsequent amendment or repeal by the
passage of the 1999 Zoning Ordinance.

Moreover, pleadings, arguments and evidence were submitted by both

parties as regards the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance only.
Apparently, the 1999 Zoning Ordinance was already enacted and in effect
by the time the petitioners appealed their case to this Court on 7 February
2005. Petitioners, however, in their appeal, consistently maintained their
argument that the expansion undertaken by the respondent in 1994
violated the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, and respondent likewise limited itself
to the defense that it had complied therewith. It bears to emphasize that
respondent called the attention of this Court to the enactment of the 1999
Zoning Ordinance and asserted its compliance with this latest zoning
ordinance only in its Motion for Reconsideration before this Court. Points
of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process.6 This rule holds even more true when the points
of law, theories, issues and arguments are belatedly raised for the first
time in the motion for reconsideration of this Courts decision.

Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent St. James

Hospital, Inc., is hereby DENIED. However, this is without prejudice to
respondent St. James Hospital, Inc.s reapplication for expansion in
accordance with the requirements under zoning ordinances now in effect.

SO ORDERED.

SCRA

Same; According to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a

thing omitted must be considered to have been omitted intentionally.
According to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a thing
omitted must be considered to have been omit-
100

100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Delfino vs. St. James Hospital, Inc.
ted intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of the phrase hospital with
not more than ten capacity in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the
corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another zone
classification, the only logical conclusion is that the legislative body had
intended that said use be removed from those allowed within a residential
zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St. James
Hospital, within a residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991
Zoning Ordinance. Delfino vs. St. James Hospital, Inc., 501 SCRA 97,
G.R. No. 166735 September 5, 2006