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OTHERING AROUND TECHNOLOGY:

TECHNO-ORIENTALISM, TECHNO-NATIONALISM, AND

IDENTITY FORMATION OF JAPANESE COLLEGE STUDENTS IN THE

UNITED STATES

by

Shuzo Kogure

December 8, 2005

A dissertation submitted to the

Faculty of the Graduate School of the

State University of New York at Buffalo

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Educational Leadership and Policy


UMI Number: 3203922

UMI Microform 3203922


Copyright 2006 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company


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P.O. Box 1346
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Copyright

Copyright by

Shuzo Kogure

2005

ii
Acknowledgements

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I could not have completed this dissertation without the help of so

many people, especially the Japanese college students who participated in my

research and who have kindly maintained close friendships with me.

I wish to acknowledge my dissertation committee. I would like to

thank my committee chair, Dr. Greg Dimitriadis, whose intellectual

judgment and assistance have greatly helped me to complete this dissertation.

My appreciation goes to Dr. Lois Weis for her invaluable insight and

generous assistance. I am also indebted to Dr. Yoshiko Nozaki, who

encouraged and supported me with her knowledge and reflections on her

personal experiences. I am very grateful that each of these individuals was

willing to work around their busy schedules to meet my personal needs.

Additionally, I am thankful to my former academic adviser, Dr. Hank

Bromley, for his help in shaping this dissertation.

Finally, special thanks go to my parents, Yuzo and Keiko Kogure, and

my wife, Yoko Kogure, for her continuous support of my graduate studies and

her lasting impact on my life.

Thank you each and all.

iii
Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COPYRIGHT...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.. iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS.. iv

LIST OF FIGURES... x

ABSTRACT. xii

CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER OUTLINE & METHODS.... 1

Introduction. 1

Significance..... 3

Discursive Formations of Japanese..... 3

Subjective Formations of Japanese.. 6

Japanese as My Racial/Ethnic/National Identification 9

Methods and Chapter Outline 13

Part One: Dominant Discourses in the U.S. and in Japan 14

Part Two: Voices of Japanese College Students in the U.S 19

CHAPTER 2:

THEORETICAL BACKGROUNDS AND IMPLICATIONS. 23

Introduction. 23

Representation... 24

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Table of Contents

Orientalism. 29

Techno-Orientalism: Technology and Orientalism. 35

Techno-Nationalism: Technology and Nationalism 42

Theoretical Implications.. 48

CHAPTER 3:

TECHNO-ORIENTALIST DISCOURSES IN THE U.S... 50

Introduction 50

A Brief Sketch of National Geographic, Related Works, and Methods. 51

A Brief Sketch of National Geographic... 51

Related Works and Methods .. 52

Reading National Geographic Magazine and Popular Magazine

Covers.. 56

The Mimic.. 56

The Female Worker. 59

The Yellow Peril 64

The Model Minority . 67

The Geek 72

Summaries.. 78

CHAPTER 4:

TECHNO-ORIENTALIST DISCOURSES IN DAILY LIVES..... 80

Introduction. 80

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Table of Contents

Reading Techno-Orientalist Conversations. 81

Reading Techno-Orientalist Representations. 88

Reading National Geographic... 88

Reading Techno-Orientalist Caricatures on Magazine Covers. 92

Rejected Responses to Techno-Orientalist Discourses.. 97

Osamus Case.... 97

Naomis Case. 101

Summaries...... 105

CHAPTER 5:

TECHNO-NATIONALIST DISCOURSES IN JAPAN.. 108

Introduction. 108

A Brief History of Japans Techno-Nationalism since the 1980s. 109

Reading Automobile TV Advertisements in Japan 115

Worlds First, or Best.. 116

Worldwide Recognition... 121

Japaneseness 125

Japans Pride. 131

Summaries.. 135

CHAPTER 6:

TECHNO-NATIONALIST DISCOURSES IN DAILY LIVES. 137

Introduction. 137

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Table of Contents

Observed Realities. 138

New Realities 139

Renewed Realities 144

Discursive Resources. 149

Techno-Nationalist Discourses in Japan 151

TV Advertisements and Programs. 151

Social Studies.. 152

(Re)Production of Techno-Nationalist Discourses in the U.S 157

Daily Conversations at Home. 157

Techno-Nationalist Conversations with Japanese Students 159

Summaries.. 161

CHAPTER 7:

SUBJECTIVE FORMATION OF JAPANESENESS. 164

Introduction. 164

Meanings and Values of Japanese Technological Products.. 165

Compactness and Simplicity. 166

Fine Detailing and Sensitivity.. 169

Gadget-Loving and Group Consciousness.. 172

Japanese Technological Products as They Relate to Japans Pride

and Superiority over Others 175

Japanese Technological Products as the Pride of the Japanese. 175

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Table of Contents

Hostile Attitudes toward Others... 181

Hostile Attitudes toward the U.S. and American People.. 181

Hostile Attitudes toward Other Asian Countries... 185

Summaries.. 189

CHAPTER 8:

IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS & CONCLUSIONS.. 191

Introduction. 191

Theoretical Limitations and Implications of Existing Literature.. 193

Formation of, and Responses to, U.S. Techno-Orientalist and

Japanese Techno-Nationalist Discourses.... 195

Techno-Orientalist Discourses in U.S. Popular Magazines... 195

Responses to Techno-Orientalist Discourses in Daily Lives...... 196

Techno-Nationalist Discourses in Japanese TV Advertisements.. 198

Responses to Techno-Nationalist Discourses in Daily Lives.. 199

(Re)Construction of Japaneseness under the Gazes of the

Relationship between U.S. Techno-Orientalism and Japanese

Techno-Nationalism......... 201

(Re)Construction of Japaneseness... 201

The Intimate Relationship between U.S. Techno-Orientalism and

Japanese Techno-Nationalism...... 202

Conclusions. 206

viii
Table of Contents

APPENDIX.. 209

Appendix 3-1... 209

Appendix 4-1... 213

Appendix 4-2... 214

Appendix 4-3... 215

Appendix 5-1... 219

Appendix 5-2... 234

BIBLIOGRAPHY................. 236

ix
List of Figures

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3-1. Reeling Silk in Japan's Modern Mill.. 60

Figure 3-2. Japanese Factory Girls Working with Cocoons... 60

Figure 3-3. Nikon Cameras Inspected at the Tokyo Plant of Nippon

Kogaku K. K. 62

Figure 3-4. Miniature Televisions Inspected at Sony Corporation... 62

Figure 3-5. Geisha Ladies Fixing a Blowout. 63

Figure 3-6. Those Asian-American Whiz Kids.. 68

Figure 3-7. Those Successful Japanese... 69

Figure 3-8. Slow-Paced Precision and Robot Workers. 71

Figure 3-9. Insurance Policies at Shinto Shrine... 73

Figure 3-10. The Japanese Challenge. 74

Figure 3-11. How Japan Does It... 74

Figure 3-12. Altar of Imagery at Buddhist Temple.. 75

Figure 3-13. Japans High-Tech Hope. 77

Figure 3-14. Japan Rocks... 77

Figure 5-1. A Technology Powerhouse. 110

Figure 5-2. An Exciting Investment Opportunity. 110

Figure 5-3. Inspire the Next.. 114

Figure 5-4. Worlds First. 117

Figure 5-5. Worlds First, Extroid CVT Loading... 117

x
List of Figures

Figure 5-6. Worlds First from FinePix 118

Figure 5-7. Worlds Best in Car Production 119

Figure 5-8. Victory in a Rally World Championship 119

Figure 5-9. Global Standard.. 122

Figure 5-10. Western Modernity and Oriental Sensitivity. 122

Figure 5-11. West (Japan).. 124

Figure 5-12. East (Japan).. 124

Figure 5-13. Japan Original.. 126

Figure 5-14. Mikaeri-bijin.. 128

Figure 5-15. Mikaeri-bijin Stamp. 128

Figure 5-16. Japan Made 130

Figure 5-17. Japans Pride and Pleasure 131

Figure 5-18. Pride and Pleasure, Our CROWN 131

Figure 5-19. Assembly line of CROWN... 134

Figure 5-20. Toyotas Engineers in the Studio.. 134

xi
Abstract

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines how the representation of technology has

been (re)producing, and/or (re)produced by, racial, ethnic, and national

identities by drawing on Japanese as one concrete example. This

examination entails three specific questions: 1) how is Japanese

represented in connection with technology in dominant discourses both in the

United States and in Japan, 2) how do Japanese college students in the

United States interpret, or read, such dominant discourses in their daily

lives, and 3) how do they (re)construct Japaneseness as their own identity

through such readings?

My approach to these questions involves the analysis of two types of

discourses: 1) dominant discourses, particularly popular magazines in the

United States and advertisements in Japan, which have textually and

visually represented the relationship between Japanese and technology,

and 2) the voices of Japanese students attending a U.S. university as their

everyday practices. By analyzing these discourses throughout this

dissertation, I examine the representation of technology within the discursive

and subjective formations of Japanese as a racial/ethnic/national

identification.

This dissertation conceptually draws upon research in the fields of

cultural studies and post-colonial studies, especially the concept of

xii
Abstract

representation in general, and Orientalism and Nationalism as

representations of the Other and the Self in particular. I precisely focus

on the relationship between Orientalism and technology (Techno-

Orientalism), the relationship between Nationalism and technology (Techno-

Nationalism), and the relationship between Techno-Orientalism and Techno-

Nationalism. Moreover, considering how Japanese youth living in the United

States accept, negotiate with, or reject both dominant discourses, I clarify the

intimate relationship between Techno-Orientalism and Techno-Nationalism

in global relations.

Overall, I examine how the representation of technology has been

(re)producing, and/or (re)produced by, Japaneseness under the interrelated

gazes of Techno-Orientalism and Techno-Nationalism in an in-between

place, where Japanese college students in the United States have struggled

to (re)construct their own identities.

xiii
Chapter 1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER OUTLINE & METHODS

Why dont you start your journey in everyday life?


While asking it to her, I asked it to myself. 1 --- Yoko Nakamura

Introduction: Essential Concerns of This Dissertation

This dissertation examines the relationship between technology and

cultural identities, especially race, ethnicity, and nationality, in global

contexts. More precisely, it examines how the representation of technology is

(re)producing, and/or (re)produced by, racial, ethnic, and national identities by

drawing on Japanese as a racial/ethnic/national identity 2 as one concrete

example. This examination entails three specific questions: 1) how is

Japanese represented in connection with technology in dominant discourses

both in the United States and in Japan, 2) how do Japanese college students

attending a U.S. university interpret, or read, such dominant discourses in

their daily lives, and 3) how do they (re)construct Japaneseness as their own

identity through such readings?

To explore these questions, this dissertation conceptually draws upon

research in the fields of cultural studies and post-colonial studies, especially

the concept of representation in general, and Orientalism and Nationalism as

1 Yoko Nakamura, Target (Mato), While Crying, I Really Shed Tears (Naku to Honto ni
Namida ga Deru) (Tokyo: Poplar-sya, 2004), 19.
2 For most Japanese, racial/ethnic identity is considered to be synonymous with national

identity under the assumption that Japan is a single-racial/ethnic nation. For instance,
see Peter B. Oblas, Perspectives on Race and Culture in Japanese Society: The Mass
Media and Ethnicity (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1995), especially the
introductry chapter.

1
Chapter 1

representations of the Other and the Self, in particular. The concept of

representation leads us to the realization that both Japanese and technology

do not have any fixed and essential, or true, meanings and values. The

meanings and values associated with Japanese and technology are

constantly (re)produced in a system of representation, which functions in

connection with other languages, ideas, and images. Meanings and values

are, thus, continually in the process of articulation.

This concept is based on an important premise: the meanings and

values of Japanese and technology have changed and will continue to

change from one culture to another. In addition, it is only because of people

that Japanese and technology mean something and have value; people

(re)produce such meanings and values through their own discursive practices.

This concept also suggests that when people identify themselves with

any subjective positions, such as being Japanese or having other cultural

identifications, they are subjected to its meanings and values through their

own discursive practices. Yet, at the same time, discursive practices are not

themselves innocent. They function only within existing power relations

the processes in which particular meanings and values are always-already

produced, fixed, and naturalized as knowledge, or the truth, by dominant

people and institutions.

My approach to the specific questions posed in this dissertation

involves the analysis of two types of discourses: 1) dominant discourses,

2
Chapter 1

particularly popular magazines in the United States and advertisements in

Japan, which have textually and visually represented the relationship

between Japanese and technology, and 2) the voices of Japanese students

attending a U.S. university, as they interpret and (re)read such dominant

discourses in their daily lives. By examining these discourses, I will explore

the representation of technology within the discursive and subjective

formations of Japanese as a racial/ethnic/national identification.

Significance: Why Japanese?

While my essential concern is the relationship between cultural

identities and technology in global contexts, what is the significance of

exploring the discursive and subjective formations of Japanese identity, or

Japaneseness, in connection with technology? I address this question using

three distinct but interrelated perspectives, each of which is noteworthy in

their own right: the importance of the discursive formations of Japanese, the

importance of the subjective formations of Japanese, and as my

racial/ethnic/national identification.

Discursive Formations of Japanese

In clarifying the particular roles that representations of technology

play in the United States and in Japan, we can understand how

representations of technology have functioned in the power relations of each

country and can consider such functions more broadly in global contexts.

Some critics examine certain roles of technology representation by

3
Chapter 1

focusing on cultural identities, especially class, gender, and race/ethnicity.

For instance, Cynthia L. Selfe examines the representation of class, race, and

gender in printed U.S. advertisements for computer technologies. In U.S.

advertisements, she argues, Computers are complexly socially determined

artifacts that interact with existing social formations and tendencies...

including sexism, classism, and racism. 3 In short, she points out that the

representation of computers functions to reproduce existing power relations.

Although some other critics also declare that the representation of

technology has reproduced existing power relations in the United States, 4

their analyses are only limited to U.S. power relations due to their specific

focus on such discourses as printed advertisements in the United States.

However, given the existing racial and ethnic identifications in the United

States, they are, in many cases, regarded as being associated with continuous

and essential roots, such as regions and nations, but not their disjunctive and

hybrid routes, along the way, where such roots inevitably become mixed and

hybridized. 5

3 Cynthia L. Selfe, Lest We Think the Revolution is a Revolution: Images of Technology


and the Nature of Change, in Gail E. Hawisher and Cynthia L. Selfe eds., Passions,
Pedagogy, and 21st Century Technologies (Logan, Utah: Utah State University Press,
1999), 306.
4 For more information on the representation of gender in particular, see Matthew

Weinstein, Computer Advertising and the Construction of Gender, in Hank Bromley


and Michael W. Apple, eds., Education/ Technology/ Power (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1998), 85-100. Also, for more information on the representation of race
and ethnicity, see Lisa Nakamura, Where Do You Want to Go Today: Cybernetic Tourism,
the Internet, and Transnationality, in Beth E. Kolko, Lisa Nakamura, and Gilbert B.
Rodman eds., Race in Cyberspace (New York and London: Routledge, 2000), 15-26.
5 The word route comes from James Clifford, who notes, Twentieth-century identities

no longer presuppose continuous cultures or traditions because the roots of tradition

4
Chapter 1

In fact, Homi K. Bhabha criticizes the essentialist readings of

nationality that try to define and naturalize nations based on the imagined

homogeneity of a community and continuity of traditions, pointing out that

nations are narratives that arise from hybrid interactions in culturally

contested terrains. 6 Racial and ethnic identities should, therefore, be

examined in broader contexts. Since the word Japanese clearly shows the

national route, we can consider the formation of ethno-national

identification not only in U.S. discourses but also in global contexts.

Moreover, in the United States, Japan is culturally represented as

part of the Orient, which can lead to othering by the West. 7 Indeed,

following Saids Orientalism, some critics argue that Japan has been

represented as the Other in relation to the Western Self in Orientalist

discourses. 8 Using the Euro-American-centric criteria of human values,

around which the meanings of Japanese cluster, this otherness has

are cut and retied, collective symbols appropriated from external influences. James
Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-century Ethnography, Literature, and
Art (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 14-15.
6 Homi K. Bhabha, Introduction: Narrating the Nation, in Homi K. Bhabha ed., Nation

and Narration (New York: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1990), 1-7. In addition, for more
details about the nature of the imagined homogeneity of a community, see Benedict
Andersons prominent work, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism (Revised Edition) (London and New York: Verso, 1991).
7 For instance, Edward Said points out that Americans tend to associate the Orient with

the Far East, particularly China and Japan. Edward Said, Orientalism (New York:
Vintage Books, 1979), 1.
8 For instance, see Richard H. Minear, Orientalism and the study of Japan, Journal of

Asian Studies 39:3 (1980), 507-517; and Michael Dalby, Nocturnal Labors in the Light of
Day, Journal of Asian Studies 39:3 (1980), 485-493. Since then, there have been some
prominent works about the Orientalist gaze toward Asians in general, and the Japanese
in particular. For the most recent work on Orientalist gazes in U.S. popular discourses,
see Robert G. Lee, Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1998).

5
Chapter 1

ideologically functioned within the framework of the binary opposition

between the Orient and the West, or under the gaze of Orientalism.

Yet, at the same time, this otherness can be ambiguous within a

clear-cut binarism. Japan may be economically and politically regarded now

as part of the West, but Japanese is synonymous not only with cultural

otherness in the West but also with colonial and economic otherness in the

Orient. This is because of its current status in the global economy and its

former status as a colonialist country in East-Southeast Asia. The word

Japanese is a signifier of the difference that is almost the same, but not

quite and not white. 9 Thus, by focusing on Japanese, we may also learn

about how the representation of technology ambivalently and contradictorily

functions in global contexts, especially in relations between Japan and the

United States.

Subjective Formations of Japanese

By examining the voices of Japanese college students attending at a

U.S. university, we can begin to understand how they (re)construct

Japaneseness as their own racial/ethnic/national identity through their

interpretations of the imaginary connection between Japanese and

technology and through their readings of Orientalist discourses in connection

9Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 89.
Bhabha defines a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite and not
white as mimicry. His notion of mimicry has been crucial to analyzing colonial
discourses, which force the colonized people to adopt the colonizers habitus, resulting in
the mimicry of the colonizer. Even though the colonial Other has adapted to the
colonizing culture, it is simultaneously expected to remain the subject of the colonizer.

6
Chapter 1

with technology. This (re)construction occurs in an in-between place the

location not simply of transnationality, but of cultural struggles to (re)define,

(re)arrange, and (re)map the meanings and values of technology and their

own racial/ethnic/national identity.

In the United States, the Japanese college students share not only

their educational experiences but also a wide variety of consumer and cultural

products, such as technological and entertainment products, with their

American counterparts. Yet, the meanings and values of such products are

different in different locations. 10 Moreover, unlike travelers, these Japanese

students go about their daily lives in the United States conscious of their

taken-for-granted meanings and values, including their own Japaneseness,

which is completely different from dominant racial, ethnic, and national

identities in the U.S. cultural hierarchy.

Indeed, Japanese people are racially and ethnically dominant in

Japan, and politico-economically dominant in global contexts. However,

Japanese youth living in the United States are racially and ethnically

subordinate. In other words, after entering different cultural power relations,

they lose their racial, ethnic, and national privileges in Japan. As a result, to

identify their subjective position in the United States, they need to

(re)construct their Japaneseness without (re)constructing their dominant

identities, such as class identity. In this sense, Japaneseness itself entails an

10For instance, Arjun Appadurai argues that people re-signify any cultural products in
their specific local contexts. See Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the
Global Cultural Economy, Public Culture 2:2 (1990), 1-24.

7
Chapter 1

ambivalence that disrupts the clear-cut relationship between the dominant

and the subordinate in global contexts, particularly in the United States.

While cultural identities have been increasingly regarded as political

sites around which people are struggling to change existing power relations,

some struggles have been criticized as reproducing the relations in domestic

and global contexts. These criticisms are particularly visible when

examining the movements of Third World Women. 11 Acknowledging the

viewpoints of such criticisms influenced by feminist, critical race, and

post-colonial studies, we already know that struggles to change gender power

relations, for instance, are not necessarily changing racial/ethnic power

relations. In short, struggles over cultural identities can no longer ignore the

differences both within and between cultural identifications in broader

contexts.

By exploring the cultural struggles that the Japanese college students

encounter while (re)constructing their racial/ethnic/national identity in an

in-between place, we can understand how they are struggling to (re)produce

the meanings and values of their own cultural identities in connection with

technology.

11 See, for instance, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Introduction: Categraphies of Struggle,

in Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo and Lourdes Torres eds., Third World Women
and the Politics of Feminism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
1991), 1-47. Also, see Trinh T. Minh-ha, Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality
and Feminism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989),
especially chapter three, 79-116.

8
Chapter 1

Japanese as My Racial/Ethnic/National Identification

So far, I have outlined the conceptual reasons why I am focusing on

Japanese among many other cultural identifications. Such explanations

have, however, resulted from my personal experiences in the United States.

In clarifying them more concretely, I now mention my experiences, which have

led me to explore the discursive and subjective formations of Japanese in

connection with technology.

However, prior to discussing any experiences, I should explain my

political position: who can or should talk about this topic? An

autobiographical/political standpoint is important not only to the significance

of this dissertation but also to critical theory. This is because such a

standpoint often has its routes in lived experiences especially oppressive

experiences as already seen in feminist, critical racial, and post-colonial

studies. 12

I was born in Japan to parents of Japanese nationality, and naturally

was given Japanese citizenship. I have not changed the citizenship; so, I am

Japanese. In this sense, the word Japanese refers to the political status of

belonging to a particular state. At the same time, it also connotes the

cultural identity of Japans racially/ethnically dominant people, who do not

have to be identified, or identify themselves, as racially/ethnically

subordinated people in Japan. This is because Japanese is generally

12For instance, see bell hooks, Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics (Boston:
South End Press, 1990), especially chapter fifteen, Choosing the Margin as a Space of
Radical Openness, 145-153.

9
Chapter 1

regarded as an unmarked racial/ethnic trait and a natural form of

identification in Japan.

Japanese as a dominant racial/ethnic/national identification is

constructed by Japans racial/ethnic power relations and continually

reproduced through the myth of Japans racial/ethnic homogeneity, 13 which

ignores or assimilates racially and ethnically marginalized people (e.g.,

indigenous peoples) within Japanese society, 14 as well as naturalizes and fixes

binary oppositions between the Japanese and non-Japanese, or foreigners. 15

Since I am interested in the issues of racial, ethnic, and national

minorities in Japan and concerned about their social inequalities and

discriminations, I am sensitive to the racial, ethnic, and national

identifications of non-Japanese people. However, as a member of the

racially/ethnically/nationally dominant people in Japan, I was not so sensitive

to the meaning of being Japanese. Like a member of the dominant White

in the United States, I unintentionally and unconsciously regarded

Japanese as an unmarked racial/ethnic identity and as a national or natural

13 For more about social aspects that have guaranteed Japanese as an invisible
racial/ethnic identification, see David L. Howell, Ethnicity and Culture in Contemporary
Japan, Journal of Contemporary History 31:1 (1996), 171-90.
14 As Mike Douglass suggests, [I]ndigenous peoples and long-term foreign communities

are often systematically made invisible in public discourse, education, and policy.
Though he does not show any concrete data, his suggestion is useful for understanding
why Japanese is generally regarded as an unmarked racial/ethnic trait and a natural
identification in Japan. Mike Douglass, Unbundling National Identity: Global
Migration and the Advent of Multicultural Societies in East Asia, Asian Perspective 23:3
(1999), 97.
15 For instance, John Lie mentions that this political construction of non-Japanese has

guaranteed that the Japanese people are seen not as a race/ethnicity, but as a national or
natural identity because no one would question their distinctiveness. John Lie,
Multiethnic Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 3.

10
Chapter 1

form of identification.

Like any other racial identification, White as the dominant racial

identification in the United States is, of course, a social construction. For

instance, Noel Ignatiev examines the historical processes by which Irish

immigrants in the United States became members of the dominant White

group by distinguishing themselves from Blacks in order to guarantee the

political, economic and cultural privileges of dominant citizens. 16 Moreover,

White has been (re)produced as an unmarked or natural category, which

enables Whites to not see their privileges. As Martha R. Mahoney puts it,

Privileged identity requires... protection against seeing the mechanisms that

socially reproduce and maintain privilege. 17

At the same time, White and its privileges belong not only to Whites,

but to any other people in racially dominant positions in a particular culture.

This is because, as John Solomos and Les Back state, whiteness is a political

definition that regulates the consent of white subjects within the context of

white supremacy. 18 In short, I was not able to see my own Japanese

16 Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (London and New York: Routledge, 1995).
17
Martha R. Mahoney, The Social Construction of Whiteness, in Richard Delgado and
Jean Stefancic, eds., Critical White Studies (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1997), 331. For more details about the representation of Whites in the dominant
Western culture, see Richard Dyers book White (London and New York: Routledge, 1997).
Also, for prominent ethnographic analysis on how Whites construct their racial
identification as an unmarked or natural category, see Ruth Frankenberg, The Social
Construction of Whiteness: White Women, Race Matters (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1993).
18 John Solomos and Les Back, Marxism, Racism, and Ethnicity, American Behavioral

Scientist 38:3 (1995), 418.

11
Chapter 1

privileges, or an invisible weightless knapsack 19 on my back, until I came to

the United States.

In the United States, my national identification became plainly visible

to me in the different system of representation due to the different

racial/ethnic power relations. In other words, as I entered different

racial/ethnic power relations, my invisible weightless knapsack became

dramatically visible, and I became more and more sensitive to the meaning of

Japanese as a racial/ethnic identification. Due to my sensitivity to racial

and ethnic identifications, whenever I introduced myself as Japanese to

people, I found myself silently considering these questions: What are the

connotations of Japanese? How is the concept represented in U.S.

discourses? What is the position of the Japanese in U.S. racial and ethnic

power relations?

Meanwhile, I also found that the word Japanese often seemed to be

associated with global conglomerates that originated in Japan, such as Sony,

Panasonic, Toyota, and Honda, and their technological products, such as

electronic appliances and automobiles. More interestingly, the word

Japanese often seemed to be associated with high technology, such as

computer technology, though I assumed that it was more advanced in the

United States than in Japan. For instance, a colleague, who had no

19 Peggy McIntosh calls the White privileges an invisible weightless knapsack. Peggy

McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See
Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, in Margaret Andersen and Patricia
Hill Collins, eds., Race, Class, and Gender: An Anthology (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth,
1992), 71.

12
Chapter 1

knowledge of my comfort level with computers, asked me about computer

operations, as if I was a computer expert. In questioning his assumption, I

found out that it was based on my Japanese origins.

I did not realize that his assumption was based on a familiar, if not too

aggressive, stereotypical perception of Asian people in the United States. 20

Gradually, through these experiences, I began to consider the meaning of

Japanese in connection with technology. At the same time, my associations

made the meanings and values of both Japanese and technology much more

complex, which is, indeed, why I needed to develop research methods and

theoretical frameworks to explore them.

Methods and Chapter Outline

My approach to this dissertation involves analyzing the dominant

discourses both in the United States and Japan as well as the interviews with

Japanese youth living in the United States. While my approach is

two-dimensional, it is based on the analysis of representations the broad

definition of narrative analysis, which comes from Catherine Kohler

Riessmans phrase, narratives are representations. 21

In this sense, narrative includes any forms of representation, such as

20 For instance, though without any concrete data, Alondra Nelson, et. al. notes,
Techno-savvy Asian whiz kids... have always had a place in the high-tech hierarchy.
Nelson, Alondra, Thuy Linh N. Tu and Alicia Headlam Hines, Introduction: Hidden
Circuits, in Alondra Nelson, Thuy Linh N. Tu and Alicia Headlam Hines eds.,
Technicolor: Race, Technology, and Everyday Life (New York and London: New York
University Press, 2001), 5.
21 Catherine Kohler Riessman, Narrative Analysis (London and Newbury Park, CA:

SAGE Publications, 1993).

13
Chapter 1

academic writings, photographs in popular magazines, and personal talks, in

which [h]uman agency and imagination determine what gets included and

excluded in narrativization, how events are plotted, and what they are

supposed to mean. 22 My attempt to examine two types of representation

methodologically divides this dissertation into two parts.

Before I explore these two parts, I identify key theoretical perspectives

involved in the issue of representation, Orientalism, Nationalism, technology,

and their interrelations in chapter two. After summarizing both the concept

of representation and Orientalism as a form of a system of representation, I

survey current literature to present my views on the relationship between

technology and Orientalism, referred to as Techno-Orientalism, and the

relationship between technology and Nationalism, which I define as

Techno-Nationalism. At the end of chapter two, I clarify some limitations of

the existing literature. In doing so, I provide conceptual implications about

the intimate relationship between Techno-Orientalism and

Techno-Nationalism, which I concretely make clear throughout this

dissertation. 23

Part One: Dominant Discourses in the United States and in Japan

In chapters three and five, which comprise the analysis of dominant

22Ibid, 2.
23As Yoshiko Nozaki and Hiromitsu Inokuchi have mentioned, when considering
Orientalist discourses in a Western country, we more profoundly need to understand the
socio-historical, economic, and political relations between society and a particular Asian
country Japan in the case of this dissertation. See Yoshiko Nozaki and Hiromitsu
Inokuchi, On Critical Asian Literacy, Curriculum Perspectives 6:3 (1996), 72-76.

14
Chapter 1

discourses both in the United States and in Japan, 24 I examine U.S.

Techno-Orientalist discourses and Japanese Techno-Nationalist discourses

respectively. This discourse analysis part addresses a specific question: how

is Japanese represented in connection with technology in dominant

discourses, both in the United States and in Japan? The meanings and

values of Japanese and technology are different in different systems of

representation; they serve specific functions in the existing power relations of

each country.

In chapter three, among the omnipresent popular discourses in the

United States, I selected the textual and visual representations in National

Geographic, linking some of these representations with the cover images of

several other popular magazines, such as Time, New Yorker, New York Times

Magazine, and Wired Magazine.

To analyze Techno-Orientalist representations, I examined all articles

of National Geographic during the last century, especially focusing on the

photographs published since the end of the Second World War. While

Japan-related articles have regularly appeared in the magazine during the

last century, I selected particular texts and photographs from among 114

articles, which accurately represent the relationship between technology and

Japan and/or the Japanese. 25

As described more detail in chapter three, National Geographic

24 Chapter four is methodologically categorized into the second part of this dissertation.
25 For information on the 114 articles, see Appendix 3-1.

15
Chapter 1

identifies itself as both a scientific and an educational magazine, and its

mother organization runs a powerful educational institution in an effort to

exert its influence on the various fields of education. Moreover, as a cultural

symbol of the United States, National Geographic has not only been used by

teachers as an educational text, but also been subscribed to by white

middle-class parents who wish to provide their children with a window to the

world. It has provided the American people with certain key images by

mapping the world and categorizing peoples and cultures of the world,

including Japanese people and culture. National Geographic, in this sense,

functions to generate influential popular discourses in the United States.

This popular discourse has affected American peoples views of Japan and may

have day-to-day consequences for Japanese students attending a U.S.

university.

In chapter five, to analyze Techno-Nationalist discourses in Japan, I

examine how Japanese advertisements for technological products products

made by manufacturers of Japanese origin, or Japanese manufacturers

represent nationalistic sentiments, such as Japanese identity, uniqueness,

and pride. I first present a brief history of Japans scientific and

technological policies since the 1980s, and its related Techno-Nationalist

discourses in the private sector. Afterwards, I pay particular attention to

Japanese advertisements for technological products made by Japanese

manufacturers.

16
Chapter 1

At the core of chapter four, I examine 1,340 television advertisements

for automobiles made by Japanese companies, such as Honda, Toyota,

Nissan, and Mazda, which have appeared since the 1980s. 26 Based on

personal VCR collections by Mr. Suzuki, 27 I have collected many TV

advertisements for Japanese automobiles and their necessary information

such as car names and their on-air years from auto-makers official websites,

booklets, and telephone inquiries to their advertising departments.

From among the 1,340 television advertisements, I select 55 ads by

focusing on their on-screen captions and the settings and characters, which

are related to Japanese traditional cultures, such as temples, old cityscapes,

and persons wearing kimonos (Japanese traditional clothes). In addition, I

link them with printed advertisements for other technological products, such

as digital cameras and watches produced by Japanese makers, to clarify the

formation of the nationalist discourse in Japanese advertising as a whole.

Needless to say, television advertising is a central vehicle used by its

providers not only to sell their products but also to popularize their particular

images of the world, people, desire, and pleasure, which they aim to convert

into the selling of their products. Although TV audiences may not so easily

convert such images into determining factors when buying particular products,

TV advertisements, and thus advertising providers, have strong ideological

26For the list of 1,340 advertisements, see Appendix 5-1.


27Mr. Suzuki is a car-advertisements collector, commonly called Bluebird G6 in that field.
Parts of his collections are open to the public and available at http://car-cm.zdap.jp/ [Only
Japanese].

17
Chapter 1

influences on them.

In the case of Japan, the automobile industry is the biggest advertiser

among all kinds of industries and technological manufacturers. 28 Moreover,

Japanese automobile manufacturers have become global companies, whose

products are increasingly shared among people around the world, including

the United States. Regarding the possible influences of Japanese

automobile advertisements on the Japanese college students I interview in

the second part of this dissertation, the analysis of their nationalist

representations is crucial for considering not only Techno-Nationalist

formations in Japan, but also the voices of Japanese students who may have

consciously or unconsciously read such advertising as their discursive

resources.

In the analysis of dominant discourses, I intentionally select

Techno-Orientalist representations from National Geographic as well as

various magazine covers, and nationalist representations from TV

advertisements for Japanese automobiles and other technological products.

In other words, I intentionally ignore representations that could show us

counter-examples of Techno-Orientalist and Techno-Nationalist discourses.

This is because particular images cannot be erased by counter-representations,

28For instance, in 2004, Toyota was at the top of the advertising providers list in
Japanese ad expenditures. Following Toyota, other Japanese automobile makers also
ranked in its top 10, such as Honda (third) and Nissan (sixth). See, Nikkei Advertising
Research Institute, Advertising Expenditures Top 200 in 2004 FY (koukoku-senden hi
toppu 200, 2004 nendo), (2005) [Online]. Available at
http://www.nikkei-koken.gr.jp/study/01.html [Only Japanese].

18
Chapter 1

which could be complimentarily interpreted, once they appeared in popular

magazines or on TV screens. As Linda Steet mentions in her research on

Orientalist and patriarchal representations in National Geographic,

[r]epresentations do not cancel one another out like a math equation. 29 In

short, the first part of this dissertation is based not on quantitative but on

qualitative methods, and focuses on modality rather than difference in

relation to modality.

These analyses are not concerned with the quantity, but rather the

ideology of visual and textual representations that appear in popular

discourses. This is, again, because particular images and their ideological

effects on people are not erased by their counter-images. When only one

image has a great impact on people, even a large number of its counter-images

cannot forgive such an impact. Moreover, this discourse analysis part leads

us to an understanding of not only the formations of U.S. Techno-Orientalism

and of Japanese Techno-Nationalism, but also the discursive resources, which

Japanese students attending a U. S. university may accept, negotiate with, or

reject.

Part Two: Voices of Japanese College Students in the United States

In chapters four, six, and seven, which comprise the second part of this

dissertation, I use in-depth interviews to analyze personal voices. These

chapters address three specific questions: 1) how do Japanese youth living in

29Linda Steet, Veils and Daggers: A Century of National Geographics Representation of


the Arab World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), 10.

19
Chapter 1

the United States encounter and read U.S. Techno-Orientalist discourses

(chapter four), 2) how do they reflect and (re)read Japanese

Techno-Nationalist discourses in their everyday lives (chapter six), and 3) how

do they (re)construct their Japaneseness through their readings of such

discourses (chapter seven) ?

In order to examine these questions, I interviewed eight female and

eight male students of Japanese nationality. 30 All of them were

undergraduate students at the Western New York University. 31 I first

contacted my Japanese friends, who studied at the university, to select

potential participants for my interview research. Using snowballing, I

asked them to introduce me to their Japanese friends, who in turn introduced

me to their Japanese friends. I also selected participants through personal

meetings and email correspondences.

I obtained their consent immediately before the interview, informing

them that they could refuse to answer particular questions, ask me to stop

tape-recording at any point during the interview, or withdraw their data at

the end of the interview or later, if they pleased. 32 I realized that the

methods for obtaining informed consent typically include the use of the

primary language of the interviewees, which is Japanese in this case. Since

they were international students at the Western New York University, where

the language of instruction was English, their English language proficiency

30 For more details about the interviewees, see Appendix 4-1.


31 This university name is a pseudonym.
32 For information about the consent form, see Appendix 4-2.

20
Chapter 1

was sufficient whereby they were able to comprehend the English-language

consent form. Nevertheless, I conducted interviews in Japanese to ensure

the collection of more reliable data.

I engaged in two or three interviews with each participant, each

ranging from 90 to 120 minutes in length. The interviews were conducted at

a public place, such as a coffee shop or a university lounge. I asked them

open-ended questions about their imaginary connections between Japan and

technology, starting with the question: what do you imagine when you connect

the two words Japan and technology? All of their voices were

tape-recorded, transcribed in Japanese, and partially translated into English.

In this ethnographic interview part, moreover, I focus on the identity

formation of Japanese youth in an in-between place, a location of cultural

struggles to (re)define, (re)arrange and (re)map the meanings of Japanese in

different racial and ethnic power relations. By focusing on their identity

formations, or the cultural struggles to (re)construct their own cultural

identities in an in-between place, I explore not only the representations of

technology in connection with Japanese, which may affect them, but also

how these representations are (re)defined, (re)arranged and (re)mapped by

them in their everyday life.

In particular, in chapter four, I analyze how the Japanese students

encounter and read Techno-Orientalist discourses in the United States. In

21
Chapter 1

chapter six, 33 I then analyze how they reflect Techno-Nationalist discourses in

Japan and (re)produce them in the United States. Finally, in chapter seven,

through their responses to Techno-Orientalist discourses and their reflections

of Techno-Nationalist discourses, I examine how they (re)construct

Japaneseness as their racial/ethnic/national identity in connection with

technology. This examination also helps us to understand the intimate

relationship between Techno-Orientalism and Techno-Nationalism as a

concrete case.

In chapter eight, the concluding chapter of this dissertation, I first

clarify a particular relationship between U.S. Techno-Orientalism and

Japanese Techno-Nationalism. Then, summarizing how Japanese youth

living in the United States accept, negotiate with, or reject both dominant

discourses, I concretely clarify the intimate interrelationship between

Techno-Orientalism and Techno-Nationalism in global relations. Therefore,

by drawing on Japanese as a racial/ethnic/national identity as one concrete

example, this dissertation examines how the representation of technology is

(re)producing, and/or (re)produced by, racial, ethnic, and national identities in

global contexts.

33As seen in the last section, chapter five is methodologically categorized into the first
part of this dissertation.

22
Chapter 2

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUNDS AND IMPLICATIONS

Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which mislead theory to


mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the
comprehension of this practice. 1 --- Karl Marx

Practice is active, rather than being a passive observation, and is


directed at changing something. Practice differs from activity in general,
because practice is connected with theory, which gives its means and end.
Practice is only enacted through theory and theory is formulated based
on practice. So long as theory and practice are separated then they fall
into a distorted one-sidedness; theory and practice can only fully develop
in connection with one another. 2 --- Brian Basgen and Andy Blunden

Introduction

This dissertation conceptually draws upon research in the fields of

cultural studies and post-colonial studies, especially as it relates to the

concepts of representation and Orientalism. In this chapter, after

summarizing the concepts, I briefly examine some studies on the relationship

between Orientalism and technology recognized by some critics as

Techno-Orientalism. Then, I examine the relationship between Nationalism

and technology, known as Techno-Nationalism, and conceptually clarify the

intimate relationship between Techno-Orientalism and Techno-Nationalism.

Finally, I suggest some limitations and implications of the existing literature

that examines such relationships.

1 Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in Robert C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels Reader
(New York: Norton, 1978), 145. (emphasis original)
2 Brian Basgen and Andy Blunden eds., Practice & Theory, Encyclopedia of Marxism

(Marxists Internet Archive, 1999-2005) [Online]. Available at


http://www.marxists.org/glossary/frame.htm

23
Chapter 2

Representation

Stuart Hall states that the concept of representation has come to

occupy an important place in cultural studies. 3 He broadly defines

representation as the process by which members of a culture use a signifying

system to (re)produce meaning and value. 4 This definition, though

seemingly quite simple, carries two important premises. On one hand, the

meanings and values of technology and Japanese are different within

different systems of representation. Moreover, they have changed and thus,

will continue to change from one historical period to another, as they are

different in each culture.

On the other hand, it is people who have made technology and

Japanese mean something and have value and who have (re)produced

these meanings and values through their own discursive practices, which

function within existing power relations, such as within economic, political,

and cultural contexts. People have always-already engaged in a process

where certain meanings and values are produced, fixed and naturalized as

knowledge, or the truth, by dominant people and institutions. Moreover,

when people identify themselves with a particular subjective position, such as

being Japanese or having any other cultural identification, they are subjected

to its meanings and values through their discursive practices, though only

3 Stuart Hall, The Work of Representation, in Stuart Hall ed., Representation: Cultural
Representations and Signify Practices (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE
Publications, 1997), 15.
4 Ibid, 61.

24
Chapter 2

within existing power relations.

Although these premises are essential to this dissertation, they are

still too abstract. In order to clarify the concept of representation, I explore

two approaches to the concept of representation: the discursive approach

associated with Michel Foucault and the neo-Gramscian approach associated

with Stuart Hall.

According to Foucault, discourse is a system of representation, not

only within which people can learn and talk about things, events and people,

including themselves, in the world, but also and more importantly within

which people are controlled by certain meanings, values, and rules of

dominant people and institutions. Discourse enables the dominant to classify,

control, and naturalize certain knowledge as the truth, and at the same time,

grants the dominant power over the subordinated, who do not possess such

knowledge. Foucault has historically examined discourses on sexuality,

which create meanings about the human body, sex, desires and the world, and

whose certain rules and values have encompassed the ordering of peoples

relationships with the world. 5

Foucault believes that power and knowledge have an inevitable

connection: knowledge is producing, and at the same time, being produced by

power. Moreover, power/knowledge functions through peoples own practices,

5See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction (New York:
Vintage Books, 1978/1990). For Foucault, medicine is also a good example of discourse,
which can make meanings about the human body, illness, and the world. Also, see
Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (New
York: Vintage Books, 1973/1994).

25
Chapter 2

including subjective formation. Through such discursive practices, people

understand the world and construct subjective positions based on this

understanding, while at the same time, people become bearers of

power/knowledge. In other words, through practices by which people talk

and learn about things, events and people, including themselves, in the world,

power/knowledge determines peoples ways of talking, thinking, and

behaving.

Although Foucault seems to neglect the possibility of resistance,

especially in his earlier works, 6 his notion of discourse has indeed contributed

to developing the concept of representation in at least two ways. He sees

discourse as the relationship between the dominant and the subordinated.

In these relationships or power relations, however, people actively engage in

constructing discourse, which then produces power/knowledge. It is in the

process of such relationships that Stuart Hall has found the possibility of

resistance.

Using Antonio Gramscis concept of hegemony, Hall has conceptually

developed the concept of representation as a site of hegemonic struggles

between the dominant and subordinated. For Gramsci, a hegemonic struggle

is the process by which the dominant try to incorporate their world images

6 For instance, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison
(1977/1995), especially 27-28. However, he subsequently discusses a common
misperception about such his neglect and the possibility of resistance in more details.
Also, see Michel Foucault, Powers and Strategies, in Colin Gordon ed.,
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1980), 134-145, especially 141-142.

26
Chapter 2

into the subordinateds way of thinking to guarantee their own benefits, and

at the same time, the subordinated resist being incorporated. 7 He regards

representation not only as the relationship between the dominant and the

subordinated, but also as a contested terrain without any guarantees of power.

He stresses human agency, which may allow resistance from the margins in

existing power relations. He observes that people decode, or read,

representation through their own knowledge and values, which do not

necessarily correspond to those of the dominant. 8 While focusing on non

necessary correspondence between the encoding and decoding of

representation, he argues that representation is more or less interpreted

through peoples particular ways of life, and thus, their own cultures, which

do not necessarily correspond to the dominant culture. 9

While recognizing some of the correlations between the encoding and

decoding of representation, Hall constructs three hypothetical positions:

dominant-hegemonic, negotiated, and oppositional. Tania Modleski nicely

summarizes these three positions: the dominant response to the reading of

text accepts its message at face value; the negotiated response may

dispute a particular claim, but accepts its overall interpretation; and the

7 See Antonio Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence & Wishart,
1971), especially 181-182.
8 Stuart Hall, Encoding/decoding, in Stuart Hall et. al., eds., Culture, Media, Language

(London and Hutchinson: Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of


Birmingham, 1980), 128-138.
9 Also, for more details on the definition of culture and categories of cultures, see

Raymond Williams, Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory, in Roger Dale,
Geoff Esland and Madeleine MacDonald, eds., Schooling and Capitalism: A Sociological
Reader (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 202-210.

27
Chapter 2

oppositional response rejects the dominant interpretations in the interest

of the oppressed. 10 In short, while reading representations, people do not

necessarily accept the dominant interpretations (the dominant-hegemonic

responses) that benefit the dominant, but can negotiate with them

(negotiated responses) or reject them (oppositional responses). Even

though the system of representation enables the dominant to classify, control,

and naturalize certain knowledge as the truth, people do not necessarily

accept such knowledge, nor do they necessarily become bearers of

power/knowledge, though they can become agents of resistance.

Here, representation becomes a site of hegemonic struggles between

the dominant and the subordinated. In this regard, representations of

technology and Japanese ultimately become political. Of course, peoples

reading positions become contradictory and complex forms because they

are constructed through multiple social relations, such as class, gender, race,

ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, and religion, which produce their subjective

positions in the world. However, the Neo-Gramscian concept of

representation allows us to see representations of technology and the

Japanese as sites not only in which the dominant try to classify, control, and

naturalize certain knowledge and values about them, but also in which the

subordinated try to reject or change such knowledge and values through their

own discursive practices.

10Tania Modleski, Introduction, in Tania Modleski ed., Studies in Entertainment:


Critical Approaches to Mass Culture (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986),
ix-xix, especially xi.

28
Chapter 2

Moreover, the concept of representation leads us to understand a

more concrete and particular form of representation, known as Orientalism,

which is elaborated on by Edward Said. The notion of Orientalism helps us

understand how colonial discourses have functioned to (re)produce certain

meanings and values of the Other and the Self and their certain

relationships as the truth in colonial power relations.

Orientalism

Saids Orientalism pioneers the critique on the Western colonialist

representation of the Orient as the other culture and people or the Other

and the economic, political, and cultural processes that legitimatized Western

imperialism during the period of colonial expansion, and whose dynamics are

still active in the post-colonial era. 11 He examines the processes by which

the concept of the Orient was (re)produced within the Western system of

representation. For Said, Orientalism is a style of thought based upon the

ontological and epistemological distinction between the Orient and

Occident. 12 Moreover, he sees Orientalism as the corporate institution for

dealing with the Orient by making statements about it, authorizing views of

it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and

having authority over the Orient. 13 In this sense, as defined by Said,

Orientalism is a concrete example of Foucaults notion of discourse as the

11 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).


12 Ibid, 2.
13 Ibid, 3.

29
Chapter 2

production of power/knowledge.

Said postulates that the power to examine the Orient as the will to

truth enabled the production of a range of knowledge; this knowledge

enabled and legitimatized Western colonial control over the Orient, which

again enabled the production of such knowledge. Orientalism, as the

production of power/knowledge, established its own categories of truth,

encouraged the production of certain knowledge, and rejected other discourses,

especially native discourses that distorted the truth. Moreover, though a

number of colonialist discourses might have contradicted one another, such

inevitable contradictions also encouraged the production of a more valid

Orient in the name of the truth, as evidenced in the statement, We know the

real Orient.

The Orient, in colonial discourses, was generally characterized as

negative, irrational, immoral and barbarous. Moreover, Orientals were

usually viewed according to Eurocentric assumptions and stereotypes about

native peoples, which legitimatized Western colonial control. However,

Said argues that the images of the Orient were not the truth, but rather,

narratives produced by the naturalization of such Eurocentric assumptions

and stereotypes. The relationship between the Orient and the West was one

of power and domination, which was exerted by the West over the Orient.

Saids concept of Orientalism contributes not only to our

understanding of how Orientalist discourses have functioned to (re)produce

30
Chapter 2

certain meanings and values of the Oriental Other and the Western Self,

but to their fixed relationship as it concerns the truth in colonial power

relations. Yet, at the same time, his concept has been criticized by some

scholars, who point out such problems as the static binary opposition between

the Orient and the West, the theoretical ambiguity surrounding the real

Orient, and the universalistic or humanistic principles. 14 Among such

crucial problems of Orientalism, what I want to particularly point out here is

its static binary opposition and little attention to hegemonic struggles

between the Orient and the West.

In Orientalism, Said stresses the dominance of the colonizer as a

single character, as if total colonial power only lies with the colonizer. As a

result, according to Said, every European was consequently a racist, an

imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric, 15 and even in his

reconsideration of Orientalism, he regards the Orient as not Europes

interlocutor, but its silent Other. 16 In this regard, as Homi K. Bhabha notes,

There is always, in Said, the suggestion that colonial power and discourse is

possessed entirely by the colonizer, which is an historical and theoretical

14 Lata Mani and Ruth Frankenberg nicely summarize some reviews of Saids
Orientalism. See Lata Mani and Ruth Frankenberg, The Challenge of Orientalism,
Economy and Society 14:2 (1985), 174-192. Also, for more details on the problems of
Orientalism, see Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West
(London and New York: Routledge, 1990), chapter seven, 119-140. In addition, Said
himself responded to some reviews of Orientalism, which criticized its problems. See
Edward Said, Orientalism Reconsidered, Race and Class 27:2 (1985), 1-15.
15 Orientalism, 204.
16 Orientalism Reconsidered, 4-5.

31
Chapter 2

simplification. 17

At least in Orientalism, because of Saids emphasis on the one-sided

character of the West the so-called master/slave binarism he pays little

attention to intimate interactions and/or hegemonic struggles between the

Orient and the West in the development of Orientalism. For instance, Mani

and Frankenberg criticize Saids tendency to see the colonized only as the

victim by briefly pointing out the crucial role of native elites as producers of

colonial discourses during the colonial period in India. Using India as an

example, they suggest complex and interactive processes through which

Orientalism was produced. 18

In addition, Said pays little attention to resistance and contradictions

within the Orient as well as the West. For instance, Dennis Porter argues

that Said, though following Gramscis hegemony theory, overlooks its

oppositional potential by having no counter-hegemonic voices. 19 Yet, in the

introduction of Culture and Imperialism, Said himself acknowledges his little

attention to resistance. 20 Moreover, he elaborates on the notion of resistance

and the contradictions within the colonized in chapter three of his book.

When Orientalism is analyzed not from Euro-centric viewpoints but

17 Homi K. Bhabha, Difference, Discrimination, and the Discourse of Colonialism, in


Francis Barker, et. al., eds., Literature, Politics, and Theory: Papers from the Essex
Conference, 1976-84 (London and New York: Methuen, 1986), 158.
18 Mani and Frankenberg, The Challenge of Orientalism.
19 Dennis Porter, Orientalism and Its Problems, in Patrick Williams and Laura

Chrisman eds., Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994), 150-61.
20 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), especially

Introduction, pp. xi-xxviii, and chapter three, 191-281.

32
Chapter 2

from Oriental perspectives, Orientals may not only accept but also negotiate,

reject, and interact with the Orientalist discourse for their own interest.

These responses to the Orientalist discourse are represented by the concepts

of Self-Orientalism, a process in which Orientals accept the Orientalist

discourse and (re)construct their own identities as Oriental under the gaze

of the West, and Occidentalism (or Reverse-Orientalism), a reversed response

to Orientalism that allows Orientals to regenerate their self-respect within

the context of Orientalism.

In terms of Self-Orientalism, on one hand, Gayatri Chakravorty

Spivak precisely regards this response, or process, as Self-Othering, where

the colonized subject accepts the imperial views of the world constructed by

Euro-centrism and reconstructs their subject positions as the other, or the

mastered subject produced by the discursive practices of power. 21 On the

other hand, for instance, Xiao-Mei Chen sees Occidentalism as a form of

strategic counter-discourse to the West, defining it as a discursive practice

that, by constructing its Western Other, has allowed the Orient to participate

actively and with indigenous creativity in the process of self-appropriation,

even after being appropriated and constructed by the Western Other.22

In the case of Japan, it is still regarded as the Orient in U.S.

21 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the Archives,
History and Theory 24:3 (1985), 247-272.
22 Xiao-Mei Chen, Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4-5.

33
Chapter 2

Orientalist discourses, 23 and cultural discussions are crucial to acknowledging

the nationalistic discourses about Japan and the West, such as Nihonjinron

Japans popular non-fiction genre of literature dealing with theories on

Japaneseness. However, most works are based on the dichotomy between

Japan and the West, particularly the United States. Anthony D. Smith, for

instance, regards Nihonjinron as a vital element of any cultural nationalism

concerned with redefining a national cultural identity. 24

Moreover, Sakai Naoki declares Nihonjinron as Self- and/or

Reversed-Orientalist discourses: Japan becomes endowed with and aware of

its own self only when it is recognized by the West.25 Yet, as he continues,

this is nothing but the positing of Japan's identity in Western terms which in

return establishes the centrality of the West as the universal point of

reference. 26 In short, he clarifies that Japans nationalistic discourses

interact with the Orientalist discourses in the West. Although I do not

explain Nihonjinron in more detail here, many excellent works in English

have been written that examine its historical contexts from critical

viewpoints. 27

23 For instance, Said mentions that American people tend to associate the Orient with the
Far East, particularly China and Japan. Orientalism, 1.
24 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1991),
106. (emphasis original)
25 Naoki Sakai, Modernity and Its Critique: The Problem of Universalism and

Particularism, South Atlantic Quarterly 87:3 (1988), 487.


26 Ibid, 487.
27
See, for instance, Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness. (New York: St.
Martins Press, 1986); Kosaku Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A
Sociological Enquiry (London and New York: Routledge, 1992); and Harumi Befu,
Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron (Melbourne:

34
Chapter 2

Despite some of Saids theoretical shortcomings in Orientalism, his

notions on Orientalism and its succeeding concepts are crucial to

understanding how the imaginary connection between technology and Japan

has functioned under the gaze of Orientalism. Explained in-depth in the

next section, technology has functioned as one of the powerful indexes of

modernization, which has been associated with the West. In addition, the

word Japanese is still culturally represented as the Orient. While Japan is

currently included in the West economically and politically, it is still

differentiated by the simple binary opposition between the Orient and the

West under the gaze of Orientalism.

Techno-Orientalism: Technology and Orientalism

I have briefly explained the concept of representation in general, and

Orientalism in particular. However, an important question still remains:

How has technology functioned under the gaze of Orientalism? Before

discussing the relationship between Orientalism and technology, I briefly

explain how people tend to think about technology.

People may generally see technology as a prime determinant in our

societies, especially industrial societies. Donald MacKenzie and Judy

Wajcman mention that the dominant common-sense way of thinking about

technology remains technological determinism, the mode of understanding

Trans Pacific Press, 2001).

35
Chapter 2

that technology changes people and, thus, changes society. 28 According to

technological determinism, technology shapes social relations and our ways

of thinking and acting.

However, when we closely look at the processes involved in the

invention, development, production, consumption and use of a particular

technology, we know that technology is indeed influenced by broader social

relations. For instance, Ruth Schwartz Cowan examines the processes used

in the invention, development, advertisement and consumption of the

refrigerator, as a particular technology, by focusing on why the electric

refrigerator, rather than the gas refrigerator, spread throughout U.S.

households. She argues that technology is fundamentally influenced by the

economic decisions made by complex social operations. 29

All technology is shaped by social relations and peoples ways of

thinking and acting, which does not mean that technology itself is value-free

or neutral. Once people reject technological determinism, they tend to deny

its biases under the assumption, known as technological neutralism, that

technology carries no bias at all. However, technology is shaping, and at the

same time, being shaped by social relations and peoples ways of thinking and

acting. This is partially because once technology is shaped by human

28 Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, Introductory Essay: The Social Shaping of

Technology, in Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman eds., The Social Shaping of
Technology (Second Edition) (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999), 3-27.
29 See Ruth Schwartz Cowan, How the Refrigerator Got its Hum, in Donald MacKenzie

and Judy Wajcman eds., The Social Shaping of Technology (First Edition) (Buckingham:
Open University Press, 1985), 202-218.

36
Chapter 2

individuals and institutions, it can influence social relations and our ways of

thinking and acting; and at the same time, technology is shaped by our

societies and our thinking and acting, which are influenced by previous social

relations and technology. 30 In sum, technology is not neutral but carries

certain meanings and values, some of which are directly related to

Orientalism.

A prominent historian, Michael Adas, examines Western developing

thought about technology by stating that technology functioned as the prime

determinant in the Wests material and cultural superiority over non-Western

cultures and peoples. 31 According to him, technology functioned as one of the

most powerful indexes of modernization in Western thought. Technological

measures of human worth provided key components of the civilizing-mission

ideology that both justified Europe's global hegemony and vitally influenced

the ways in which European power was exercised.32

Moreover, according to Adas, the Western classification of

technological progress preceded racial categorization as a mode for the

ranking of civilizations. Then, with the emergence of biological or racial

determinants in the late nineteenth century, Westerners reinforced their own

technological and racial superiority over Orientals. However, in the

30 For more details about how people think about technology, see MacKenzie and

Wajcman, Introductory Essay. Also, see Hank Bromley, The Social Chicken and the
Technological Egg, Educational Theory 47:1 (1997), 51-65.
31 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of

Western Dominance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).


32 Ibid, 3-4.

37
Chapter 2

beginning of the twentieth century, such superiority was challenged by

Japans industrial development, which called into question the widespread

assumption that lower races were inherently incapable of matching

European inventiveness and material prowess.33

Nevertheless, according to Adas, Western colonialists dismissed the

Japanese counter-example as an exception by claiming that the Japanese

were different both from other non-Westerners as well as Westerners. In

addition, they thought of Japans industrial development as the imitation of

Western manufacturing techniques, which was hardly proof that the Japanese

could think scientifically or invent new technology. They claimed that

Western people retained a unique capacity for invention and scientific

discovery and remained morally superior to mere imitators like the

Japanese. 34

In this regard, Adas argues that technology has functioned to

(re)produce Western superiority over the Orient, including Japan, under the

gaze of Orientalism. Although his notion of the West, like Saids, seems to

be so monolithic that he ignores the historical, cultural and national

differences of technological developments in the West, he precisely declares

that technology has functioned under the gaze of Orientalism and points out

an intimate relationship between technology and Orientalism what David

33 Ibid, 357.
34 Ibid, 365.

38
Chapter 2

Morley and Kevin Robins call Techno-Orientalism.35

Like Adas, Morley and Robins also argue that technology has played a

very important role in the Wests modernity and superiority over the Orient.

From this viewpoint, they summarize the Euro-American journalistic

discourses about Japan panic in the 1980s, a time when Japan apparently

became the model of economic and technological progress, which led to a fear

of Japanese Otherness in Europe and in the United States. The authors

state that Japan blurred the distinction between the pre-modern Orient and

the modern West by surpassing the West in technological advancement.

Despite the intention of the Orientalist, who viewed technological

advancement as the gauge of Western superiority over the Orient, Japan has

increasingly been considered to be the most high-tech country in the world.

According to Morley and Robins, even if technology is no longer

associated with Western identity and is now more closely connected with

Japan, it does not necessarily mean that technology is not fulfilling its original

function to secure Western identity and to differentiate the Orient from the

West. Although Japans high-tech image creates some fluctuation in Western

identity formation, technology has recently come to represent the Other in

the West while securing a Western sense of superiority to the Orient. They

point out that Japans high-tech image is consequently contrasted with

Western human nature.

35David Morley and Kevin Robins, Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic
Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries (London and New York: Routledge, 1995),
particularly chapter eight, Techno-Orientalism: Japan Panic, 147-173.

39
Chapter 2

In securing Western superiority over the Orient, according to Morley

and Robins, the Techno-Orientalist does not claim that Westerners have a

unique capacity for technological invention or feel superior to Orientals,

particularly Japanese people. However, the Techno-Orientalist continues to

differentiate the Japanese from Westerners by disdaining their robot-like and

machine-loving nature. For instance, Mark Gilson argues that Japanese

people generally have a penchant for robots. He tries to explain the origins of

this penchant by analyzing characters in Japans popular culture. 36 As a

result, Western stereotypes of the Japanese hold them to be sub-human, as if

they have no feeling, no emotion, no humanity.37

Moreover, some literature critics assert that such Techno-Orientalist

stereotypes have prevailed in U.S. mass media since the 1980s, especially in

novels, such as cyberpunk fiction by William Gibson, and in Hollywood films,

such as Bladerunner and Black Rain. Indeed, in an article criticizing

Nihonjinron, Koichi Iwabuchi briefly mentions that Bladerunner and Black

Rain portray the most well-known image of Japan, which paradoxically

combines traditionalism, such as samurai and geisha, with high-technology.

He argues that this paradoxical image of Japanese Otherness has a long

history and suggests that the Western desire to enclose its otherness stems

from its desire to control it. 38

36 Mark Gilson, A Brief History of Japanese Robophilia, LEONARDO 31:5 (1998),


367-369.
37 Morley and Robins, Spaces of Identity, 172.
38 Koichi Iwabuchi, Complicit Exoticism: Japan and Its Other, The Australian Journal

40
Chapter 2

In addition, adopting the notion of Techno-Orientalism from Morley

and Robins, Toshiya Ueno analyzes the cultural position of Japanese

animation (or Japanimation) within Western discourses. 39 Under the gaze of

Techno-Orientalism, according to Ueno, Japan is located in the Orient

geographically, but in the technological future chronologically. Japan is not

only considered to be the most high-tech country in the world, but also

connected with the image of future technology. He argues that Japanimation

represents a stereotype of Japan as the technological image of the future.

At the same time, Ueno argues that Japans high-tech image is

imaginarily separated from both the Orient and the West by being reproduced

again and again in Japanimation. In the world of Japanimation, animated

characters are depicted as being non-Oriental and non-Western. In other

words, these characters are representations of people who bear no relation to

any reality and its own pure simulacra, or copies of which there is no original

at all. 40 Although created by Japanese animators, Japanimation functions

as an ideological apparatus to conceal the real situation of Japan from the

West and to mask the absence of stereotypical Techno-Oriental Japan.

of Media & Culture 8:2 (1994) [Online]. Available at


http://wwwmcc.murdoch.edu.au/ReadingRoom/8.2/Iwabuchi.html
39 Toshiya Ueno, Japanimation and Techno-Orientalism, Documentary Box 9 (1996)

[Online]. Available at
http://www.city.yamagata.yamagata.jp/yidff/docbox/9/box9-1-e.html
40 The notion of simulacra is, of course, borrowed by Jean Baudrillard. He explains the
successive phases of the representation as following four stages: 1) the representation is
the reflection of a basic reality; 2) it masks and perverts a basic reality; 3) it masks the
absence of a basic reality; and 4) it bears no relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its
own pure simulacrum. See Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, in Mark
Poster, ed., Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1988), 166-184.

41
Chapter 2

Although Uenos concept lacks in-depth analysis, the most important

point of his analysis is that Techno-Oriental Japan is not only a stereotypical

representation, which the West sees as its own technological fantasies, but

also Japans self-representation, which conforms to the same representation

as the West. In other words, Japanimation is a site of intimate interaction

between the Wests technological fantasies and Japans technological

self-representation. For Ueno, it functions as both a Techno-Orientalist

discourse in the West and a Self Techno-Orientalist discourse in Japan.

In order to theorize this complex Self Techno-Orientalism more

thoroughly, I consider a particular formation of national identity that is

connected to technology, what I define as Techno-Nationalism.

Techno-Nationalism: Technology and Nationalism

Techno-Nationalism has been generally described as Nationalism

intertwined with the promotion of technology, which is contrasted not with

Techno-Orientalism but with Techno-Globalism. 41 Despite no standard

definition and usage of the word, Techno-Nationalism is often associated with

governmental policies that promote technological research and development

to support domestic technological industries especially contemporary

high-tech firms which gives them governmental support and strengthens

their competitiveness against foreign counterparts in the global market.

In this regard, Techno-Nationalism is defined as the collaborative

41See Sylvia Ostry and Richard R. Nelson, Techno-nationalism and Techno-globalism:


Conflict and Cooperation (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).

42
Chapter 2

interaction between the government and domestic businesses, and is used to

enhance the domestic economy by pushing various policies, including

government-funded research and development projects, import restrictions,

export subsidies, and the protection of intellectual properties. Considering

the word Techno-Nationalism, Simon Partner observes that Japans

government played a crucial role in developing Japans electronic technology

and catching up with Western counterparts in both the prewar and postwar

era. 42 However, this definition of Techno-Nationalism is too narrow to

analyze when we consider the broader meanings of Nationalism.

The meaning of Nationalism itself has been a broad concept associated

with much controversy since the 1980s, when an array of prominent work was

published on the topic. 43 Before the emergence of such work, theorists

examining Nationalism regarded a nation as a natural unity and consequence

of geography and ethnicity. However, especially since the 1980s, critics have

argued that the notion of a nation and Nationalism are social constructions.

42Simon Partner, Assembled in Japan: Electrical Goods and the Making of the Japanese
Consumer (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), especially
chapter one. Electrifying Japan: Techno-Nationalism and the Rise of the Mass Society,
1-43.
43 For instance, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London and New York: Verso, 1983); Ernest Gellner,
Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric E. Hobsbawm and
Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1983); and Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford
and New York: Blackwell, 1986).
Also, for more details on the theories and approaches of Nationalism since the 1980s,
especially Andersons imagined community and Hobsbawms invention of tradition,
see Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories
of Nations and Nationalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), chapter six,
117-142.

43
Chapter 2

For instance, Ernest Gellner rejects any idea that Nationalism is natural, as

stated in his famous phrase: Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to

self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist. 44

Gellner stresses that a nation is a social construction of Nationalism

in modern societies, created as confined language communities. Moreover,

his notion has been moved into the realm of discourse by Benedict Andersons

imagined communities and Eric E. Hobsbawm and Terence Rangers

invention of tradition. 45 A common thread among these theorists is an

emphasis on the idea that a nation is constructed, imagined, or invented

through Nationalism. In addition, they observe that Nationalism has

functioned to (re)produce certain meanings and values of the Self and the

Other as well as their certain relationships, which essentially implies that

the Self is better than the Other. This is because Nationalism always gives

people the binary decision of who belongs to a nation, or who is we, and who

does not, or who is they.

From this viewpoint, Nationalism may be more broadly defined as a

discursive formation of nationhood, or national identity. Here, like

Orientalism, Nationalism is also positioned as a particular form of discourse

and as a site of hegemonic struggles between the dominant and the

subordinated over the meanings and values of nations and national

identities. Thus, Techno-Nationalism can be broadly defined as a discursive

44Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 169.
45Anderson, Imagined Communities, and Hobsbawm and Ranger, The Invention of
Tradition.

44
Chapter 2

formation of a particular relationship between technology and national

identity, including any forms of movements, ideas, policies, and projects.

In addition, Techno-Nationalism, as a part of Nationalism, may

function to (re)produce particular meanings and values of the national Self

and the foreign Other in association with technology. For Japan,

technology has indeed played a very important role in forming not only its

modernity but also its Nationalism and ambivalent sense of superiority to

Others, including the West. Although few in number, some critics have

examined Japans Techno-Nationalism.

For instance, Shunya Yoshimi examines the images used in appliance

advertisements from the 1950s to the 1980s in Japan by focusing on their

nationalistic sentiments. 46 In this analysis, he states that starting in the

mid-1950s, printed advertisements for electric appliances were designed and

used to promote consumers connections to Japans national identity,

uniqueness, and pride. According to him, although appliance makers

originated in Japan or were made by Japanese appliance makers, such as

Sony and Matsushita they began to export their products to Western

markets around the mid-1950s and strategically advertised their exports as

the international recognition not only of their products but of Japan. He

regards their nationalistic discourse as a part of the discursive formation of

national identity, or Nationalism particularly as a form of

46Shunya Yoshimi, Made in Japan: The Cultural Politics of 'Home Electrification' in


Postwar Japan, Media, Culture and Society 21:2 (1999), 149-171.

45
Chapter 2

Techno-Nationalism.

Moreover, though without any concrete data, Yoshimi sheds light on

the collusive ties between Japans Techno-Nationalism and the Wests

Techno-Orientalism: As the exchange value of Japanese technology rose

higher within the international market, more and more [Western] people

became eager to explain the origin of Japanese technological ability with the

inherent qualities of Japanese culture. 47 In other words, because the West

interpellates 48 Japan to position the origin of such technological ability

within the context of Japanese culture from an essentialist viewpoint, Japans

Techno-Nationalism inevitably depends on the gaze of Techno-Orientalism.

While seeing Techno-Nationalism as a marketing strategy of Japanese

appliance makers, he also regards it as a kind of Self or Reverse

Techno-Orientalism.

This kind of intimate interaction between Techno-Nationalism and

Techno-Orientalism is also argued by Koichi Iwabuchi, who particularly

focuses on Japans Soft (Techno-)Nationalism, represented by nationalist

discourses not on hardware, such as electric appliances, but on software,

such as video games and animations. In addition to Toshiya Ueno, who sees

47Ibid, 163.
48The term interpellate that I use here comes from the usage of Louis Althusser. He
focuses on the subjectivity of ideological or interpellated individuals by claiming that
Ideological State Apparatuses impose the subjectivity that people internalize as
self-definitions. In his view, people are always-already subjects who believe that they
are free individuals but who, in reality, are unconsciously subjected to power and
authority. See Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological Apparatuses, in Lenin and
Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review, 1971), 127-186, especially
170-177.

46
Chapter 2

Japanimation as a site of intimate interaction between Western technological

fantasies and Japans technological self-representation, Iwabuchi argues that

Japanimation functions as a vehicle for a narcissistic discourse that

celebrates the global dissemination of Japanese popular software within

Japan. 49

He considers Japans narcissistic and nationalistic discourse

associated with technology to be Soft Nationalism, which pays attention to

Japans ambivalent sense of superiority over the West even in global cultural

flows, and has caused Japanese popular culture, such as video games and

Japanimation, to increase in influence. In addition, he regards Soft

Nationalism as Japans self-Orientalising strategy, which is not based

upon Japans dominant position vis--vis the West, but is nevertheless one of a

few tactics available to the dominated. 50 Like Yoshimi, he regards

Techno-Nationalism as a kind of Reverse Techno-Orientalism, or strategic Self

Techno-Orientalism.

Although both Yoshimi and Iwabuchi argue the intimate interaction

between Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Orientalism without any concrete

data, they clearly suggest that such an intimate interaction facilitates the

(re)production of the essential differences between Japan and the West and

the construction of their national, ethnic, racial, and/or cultural identities.

49 Koichi Iwabuchi, Soft Nationalism and Narcissism: Japanese Popular Culture Goes
Global, Asian Studies Review 26:4 (2002), 448.
50 Ibid, 461.

47
Chapter 2

Theoretical Implications

By using technology as an Othering representation, Euro-American

Techno-Orientalism and Japanese Techno-Nationalism stress the essential

differences between Japan and the West in order to (re)produce their national,

ethnic, racial, and/or cultural identities. In other words, through

Euro-American Techno-Orientalism and Japanese Techno-Nationalism, both

Western and Japanese dominant peoples and institutions may continue to

stress the essential differences between Japan and the West. Moreover,

people continue to engage in the processes by which the meanings and values

of technology are produced, fixed, and naturalized as knowledge or the truth

by powerful people and institutions.

Nevertheless, Western Techno-Orientalist and Japanese

Techno-Nationalist discourses also function as sites not only in which the

dominant try to classify, control, and naturalize certain knowledge and values

about technology, but also in which the subordinated try to reject or change

such knowledge and values through their own discursive practices.

Moreover, the meanings and values of technology and Japanese are

changing from one historical period to the next. In order to fully understand

Techno-Orientalism, Techno-Nationalism, and their intimate relationship, I

analyze the discursive formations and discursive practices of people in

everyday life.

As a result, I need to ask several interrelated questions: How do the

48
Chapter 2

dominant classify, control, and naturalize certain knowledge and values about

technology? How do the subordinated accept, negotiate, or reject such

knowledge and values through their own discursive practices? Moreover, as

briefly explained in the introductory chapter, in global locations associated not

simply with transnationality but with cultural struggles to (re)produce the

meanings and values of peoples cultural identities, how does technology

function to facilitate the essential differences between Japan and the West

and (re)produce their national, ethnic, racial, and/or cultural identities? In

such global locations, how do people construct their national identities by

using technology as an Othering representation?

These questions have been clustered together into three essential

questions of this dissertation: 1) how is Japanese represented in connection

with technology in dominant discourses both in the United States and in

Japan, 2) how do Japanese youth living in the United States read these

discourses in their daily lives, and 3) how do they (re)construct

Japaneseness as their own identity through their readings of these

discourses?

In the following chapters, by employing the prominent theoretical

works examined in this chapter, and by using sociological and ethnographic

research methods, I consider these three questions as the theme of this

dissertation.

49
Chapter 3

CHAPTER 3

TECHNO-ORIENTALIST DISCOURSES IN THE UNITED STATES

How Have U.S. Popular Magazines Represented Japan and the Japanese in

Connection with Technology?

[T]he real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of


anything, or whether any and all representations, because they are
representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the
culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer. If the
latter alternative is the correct one (as I believe it is), then we must be
prepared to accept the fact that a representation is eo ipso implicated,
interwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other things
besides the truth, which is itself a representation. 1 --- Edward Said

Introduction

As seen in the last chapter, especially in the section on

Techno-Orientalism, some critics have pointed out that Japan is often

represented as the Other in connection with technology. However, their

criticisms are theoretically oriented, and thus, tend to avoid analyzing

Techno-Orientalist representations of Japan in the popular media. In other

words, their works focus on the theoretical analysis of Techno-Orientalism,

but not on the discursive analysis of concrete materials.

Drawing on the theoretical works of some critics, in this chapter I

show how Japan and the Japanese have been visually and textually

represented in connection with technology or technological products in U.S.

popular magazines. Specifically, I focus on National Geographic, which has

not only been regarded as a popular magazine, but also as scientific and

1 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 272. (emphasis original)

50
Chapter 3

educational. Beginning with a brief explanation about the magazine and a

short review of books discussing its ideology especially the prominent work

of Catherine A. Lutz and Jane L. Collins I attempt to show images of five

different phases during the last century, especially after the Second World

War, in relation with other popular magazine covers.

Moreover, this chapter aims to show how the textual and visual

representation of Japan and the Japanese in the United States has functioned

as one of the Orientalist discourses in connection with technology. Thus,

articles and photographs selected in this chapter are only focusing on Japan

as it relates to technology.

A Brief Sketch of National Geographic, Related Works, and Methods

A Brief Sketch of National Geographic

National Geographic identifies itself as both a scientific and an

educational magazine. Its parent organization runs the National Geographic

Society Education Foundation in an effort to exert its influence not only on

geographic education but also on the various fields of education. In fact, the

foundation has a considerable influence on geographic education in the United

States. It manages more than seventy million dollars and grants three

million dollars annually to help finance the Geographic Alliance Network,

composed of professional geographers, officials at state departments of

education, and a large number of K-12 teachers in the United States, Puerto

Rico and Canada. In addition, it has enrolled 150,000 members across the

51
Chapter 3

United States, eighty-five to ninety percent of whom are teachers. 2

Moreover, National Geographic functions as a cultural symbol of the

United States. Since its foundation in 1888, the magazine has not only been

used by teachers as an educational text, but also been subscribed to by white

middle-class parents who wish to provide their children with a window to the

world. Though the number of subscribers was only 250,000 in 1914, it

passed the million mark in the 1920s, reached two million in 1952, and neared

eleven million in 1984. 3

While National Geographic has brought peoples and cultures from

around the world into American living rooms, it has also provided the

American people with certain key images by mapping the world and

categorizing peoples and cultures of the world. What kinds of world images

does the magazine provide for its readers? How does it map the world and

categorize peoples and cultures of the world? These questions are profoundly

examined by Catherine A. Lutz and Jane L. Collins.

Related Works and Methods

In their analysis of National Geographic, Lutz and Collins argue that

the magazine represents non-Western peoples and cultures as exotic,

idealized, naturalized, and sexualized through its photographs. 4 They point

2 C. D. B. Bryan, The National Geographic Society: 100 Years of Adventure and


Discovery (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1997), 489.
3 John Tebbel and Mary Ellen Zuckerman, The Magazine in America, 1741-1990 (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 86.


4 Catherine A. Lutz and Jane L. Collins, Reading National Geographic (Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), especially, chapter four.

52
Chapter 3

out that its photographs illustrate to Western people particularly white,

male and middle-class Americans how the Western culture is different from

other cultures by describing non-Western peoples engaging in rituals or

wearing tribal dress that seems not only exotic but also strange. National

Geographic is, in short, the product of a society deeply permeated with

racism as a social practice and with racial understandings as ways of viewing

the world. 5 Through reinforcing the Self-Other binary, the magazine has

facilitated Western people maintaining existing racial understandings that

differentiate and marginalize other peoples and cultures from Westerners and

Western culture.

Moreover, and more importantly for this chapter, Lutz and Collins

argue that National Geographic often uses technology or technological

products as an index of modernity, displaying photographs of technology in

non-Western worlds and creating the contrast between Western progress and

Oriental backwardness. 6 Western and non-Western photographs are often

shown side-by-side in the magazine in an effort to show how the West is

advanced in technology. For instance, while white people are shown working

with machines, people of color are shown working with simple manufactured

tools. As a result, such a combination enables racially dominant American

readers to compare themselves to non-Western peoples in the photographs,

who are described as poor, irrational, or technologically backward. The

5 Ibid., 157.
6 Ibid., 236-41.

53
Chapter 3

photographs of National Geographic, thus, function as Techno-Orientalist

discourse.

Following the analysis of Lutz and Collins, Linda Steet specifically

examines the representation of the Arabs in the one hundred plus years of the

magazines existence and points out that its representation of the Arabs has

functioned to (re)produce, maintain and reinforce Orientalism and

masculinist discourses. 7 In addition, though more abstractly, Donna

Haraway also points out that the magazine has stressed the benefits of

colonialism, geography, and the commercial possibilities of Americas new

possessions, and its initial policies have essentially remained unchanged. 8

Lutz and Collins, along with several other authors, indeed elaborate

on the issue of Orientalist representation by pointing out that the magazine

defines us as the Western Self and differentiates them, or the

non-Western Other, from the Western Self. Even though National

Geographic defines itself as scientific and educational, the authors disclose

the fact that the magazine is shaped by, and at the same time shaping, a

society under the gaze of Orientalism, using discursive practices and

Orientalist understandings as a way of viewing and mapping people, events,

and things in the world.

However, as we will see later on, their analysis cannot easily apply to

7 Linda Steet, Veils and Daggers: A Century of National Geographic's Representation of


the Arab World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000).
8 Donna J. Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern

Science (NewYork: Routledge, 1989), 157.

54
Chapter 3

the representation of Japan especially current Japan which is

economically and politically regarded as a part of the West. Then,

considering the visual and textual representations of Japanese in

association with technology, I examined all articles of the magazine since the

first issue in 1888, especially focusing on the photographs published since the

end of the Second World War.

Initially, using the index of National Geographic published in 1989 9

and checking out all issues from 1989 to 2000, I find 119 Japan-related

articles since the first issue of the magazine. 10 Secondly, I read all the

articles to select particular texts that connect technology and/or technological

products with Japan and/or the Japanese, especially paying attention to

Orientalist viewpoints of the authors. In addition, from among 119 articles, I

selected 65 photographs by focusing on Japanese people shown seeing, using,

or working with machines and any technological products.

Finally, based on chronological tendencies among those textual and

visual representations, I categorize them into five images: the mimic, the

female worker, the yellow peril, the model minority, and the geek. 11

Moreover, following these five images, I link them with the cover images of

several other popular magazines, such as Time, New Yorker, New York Times

9 National Geographic Society, National Geographic Index 1888-1988 (Washington:


National Geographic Society, 1989).
10 For information on the 119 articles, see Appendix 3-1.
11 These five images are partially attributed to the five images of Asian/Asian-Americans

in the United States categorized by Robert G. Lee, who examines Orientalist discourses
in U.S. popular media. See Robert G. Lee, Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998).

55
Chapter 3

Magazine, and Wired Magazine, which I examine all covers since their first

issues.

As mentioned in the introductory chapter (chapter one) of this

dissertation, I intentionally ignore visual and textual representations that

could show us counter-examples of Techno-Orientalist discourses. This is

because particular images cannot be erased by counter-representations, which

could be complimentarily interpreted, once they appeared in such an

educational and scientific magazine as National Geographic.

Reading National Geographic Magazine and Popular Magazine Covers

During the twentieth century, National Geographic has represented

Japan and Japanese people in five images connected with technology: the

mimic, the female worker, the yellow peril, the model minority, and the geek.

Although these five images originated during particular historical periods

marked by shifts in the political relationship between Japan and the United

States, they have more or less overlapped in the magazine throughout the

twentieth century. I will show these particular images chronologically and

read them as Techno-Orientalist representations from the viewpoints of the

Japanese, whom I have identified as one of my own identities.

The Mimic: Since 1890

At the very end of the nineteenth century, National Geographic began

describing Japanese people as the mimic, by regarding Japan as the chief

56
Chapter 3

medium in the union and reconciliation of the Orient and the Occident. 12 It

portrayed Japan as not only the Orient but also the chief medium of the

Orientalist dichotomy because of Japans vigorous adoption of Western

technology, such as steamships, railways, automobiles, telegraphs and

electricity. In addition, the magazine saw the key factor in Japans industrial

development as a combination of modern manufacturing developments with

the cheap labor of the Orient. 13

As discussed in the last chapter, Michael Adas argues that technology

functioned as the prime determinant in Western civilizations material and

cultural superiority over non-Western peoples and cultures. The magazine

also used technology as an index of modernity and machines as the measure

of men. However, as he points out, Japans technological development called

into question the Western assumption that lower races inherently lacked the

ability to match Western creativity and inventiveness. Although Adas

mentions that Japans technological advancement ought to have put an end to

the illusion of Western superiority over the Orient, 14 the magazine tried to

compliment this disillusion with a clear division between that of Western

technology and that of a modern Japan which embraced its own Oriental

(Japanese) people as laborers to operate such Western technology.

12 William Elliot Griffis, The Empire of the Risen Sun, National Geographic 44:4
(October 1923), 443.
13 O. P. Austin, The Commercial Development of Japan, National Geographic 10:9

(September 1899), 337.


14 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of

Western Dominance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 363.

57
Chapter 3

From this viewpoint, the magazine labeled the Japanese as the

imitator, the copycat, or the mimic of Western technology. While the

magazine did not directly attach such labels to the Japanese except during the

Second World War, National Geographics portrayal of the Japanese as the

mimic continued through indirect means: by citing the viewpoints of American

readers, certain Japanese voices that agreed with such labeling, and past

Japanese stereotypes in their articles. For instance, the magazine allowed for

such labeling by quoting one Japanese person as follows: We have been often

called a race of imitators or race of copyists. To be sure, we have copied many

things entirely foreign to our own institutions.15

Even if the magazine did not directly call the Japanese the mimic, in

reality, it made the Japanese call themselves imitators. In other words, the

magazine differentiated the Japanese by making them recognize their

differences from Westerners. In this sense, by using technology as an index

of modernity, the magazine dealt with the Japanese, in the phrase of Homi K.

Bhabha, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. 16

15 Kentaro Kaneko, The Characteristics of the Japanese People, National Geographic


16:3 (March 1905), 93.
16 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994),

86 (emphasis original). Bhabhas notion of mimicry has been crucial to analyzing


colonial discourses, which force the colonized to adopt the colonizers habitus, resulting in
the mimicry of the colonizer. According to Bhabha, mimicry is the ambivalent
relationship between the colonizer and the colonized, and reveals the limitation in the
authority of colonial discourses, as if the authority inevitably embodies its own conflicts
and contradictions. In his analysis of colonial discourse, he has tried to disclose the
conflicts and contradictions inherent in colonial discourses by using the concept of
mimicry, which produces almost the same, but not quite the otherness of the colonized.
Yet at the same time, even though he tries to see such otherness as a process of disavowal
of the colonized, the magazine also tries to categorize Japans otherness within almost

58
Chapter 3

Although it was only up until the end of the Second World War that

the magazine consistently represented the Japanese as the mimic, it

sometimes returned to this same point of view in the 1960s and 1970s. In an

article in 1964, for instance, National Geographic referred to Japanese

mimicry in association with technological development by asking Japanese

businessmen, What about Japanese genius for imitation? 17 Also, in 1974,

though the magazine regarded the mimic as a Japanese stereotype used in the

past and admitted to admiring Japans technological advancement, it referred

to Japanese mimicry as the common knowledge of American readers by saying,

in case anyone still calls them [Japanese people] copycats. 18

However, as we will see later on, the mimic disappeared in the

magazine around the 1980s when the magazine began to represent the

Japanese as the geek.

The Female Worker: Since 1920 and Since 1960

Before the Second World War, National Geographic often used the

Japanese female worker as a theme for Japans industrial development. At

first, in the 1920s, the magazine simply described women as the cheap labor

of the Orient. Most notably, Japanese women were associated with Japans

cotton and silk industries, which led the countrys industrial revolution and

became the main source of foreign reserve revenue by selling primarily to the

the same, but not quite forms of the binary opposition between the West and the Orient.
17 William Graves, Tokyo: the Peaceful Explosion, National Geographic 126:4 (October

1964), 451.
18 Bart McDowell, Those Successful Japanese, National Geographic 145:3 (March 1974),

326.

59
Chapter 3

North American market (see Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2).

Figure 3-1 Figure 3-2


Reeling Silk in Japan's Modern Mill Japanese Factory Girls Working with Cocoons

Source: The Geography of Japan, Source: The Empire of the Risen Sun, National
National Geographic 40:1 (July Geographic 44:4 (October 1923), 430
1921), 59.

Indeed, in the spinning and weaving industry, a large majority of workers

were women, and most of them were unmarried and less than twenty years

old. Many of them were the daughters of poor peasants, who came to the

cities from rural areas to find seasonal jobs, and were forced to work long

hours an average of thirteen to fourteen hours a day but received low

wages based on a specially graded wage system. 19 Moreover, female mill

workers, for instance, were forced to work for lower wages than their

counterparts in colonial India at that time. 20

19 Yutaka Nishinarita, Introduction: Types of Female Labor and Changes in the


Workforce, 1890-1945, in Masanori Nakamura ed., Technology Change and Female
Labor in Japan (Tokyo and New York: United Nations University Press, 1994), 1-24.
20 Takamura Naosuke, Introduction to the History of the Japanese Spinning Industry,

Vol. 1 (Nihon Bosekigyoshi Jyosetsu, Jyo) (Tokyo: Hanawa Shobo, 1971), 339. For more
details about the day-to-day inhumanities in their lives, also see, Yamamoto Shigemi, Ah,
Nomugi Pass, New Edition (Aha, Nomugi Toge, Shinban) (Tokyo, Asahi Shinbun-Sha,
1972). This prominent work is made up of interviews with over 300 elderly women who

60
Chapter 3

The female workforce gradually changed with the introduction of labor

protection laws, the adaptation of new technologies, and labor demand for the

metalworking and machinery industry during the First World War. However,

even after the War, the number of female workers under the age of twenty

increased in the spinning and weaving industry, and they were also the

daughters of poor farmers. 21 Since the majority of young female workers

were concentrated in the leading export industries, receiving long working

hours and low wages, they played a crucial role in the reproductive cycle of

early industrial capitalism in Japan.

Nevertheless, National Geographic not only ignored their exploitative

working conditions in Japan and throughout the colonial world, but also

began to differentiate Japanese women from their Western counterparts by

distinguishing their differences in gender roles. In other words, the

magazine tried to extract racial, ethnic, and national otherness from economic

relations between Japan and the West.

In an article published in 1938, for instance, the author mentioned,

Everywhere I was confronted with women working at all manner of jobs. 22

In the article, which emphasized the difference between Western and

Japanese gender roles, the author admired omnipresent modern female

workers in Japan such as an attendant of a gas station, a flight attendant,

had once worked in the spinning mills.


21 Nishinarita, Introduction, 1-24.
22 Mary A. Nourse, Womens Work in Japan, National Geographic 73:1 (January 1938),

99.

61
Chapter 3

bus girls, and toothpaste factory workers without considering their

exploitative working conditions and their class relations in Japan. 23

Although the magazine discontinued reporting on female workers

around the beginning of the Second World War, it resumed the representation

of the female worker again in the 1960s in connection with large global

companies such as Nikon (Figure 3-3) and SONY (Figure 3-4). As was the

case for female workers in the 1920s, female workers in the 1960s were simply

represented as laborers in association with Japans industries, especially

consumer-electronics manufacturers, which led Japans postwar recovery and

became the main earner of foreign reserve revenue.

Figure 3-3 Figure 3-4


Nikon Cameras Inspected at the Miniature Televisions Inspected at Sony Corporation
Tokyo Plant of Nippon Kogaku K.K.

Source: Franc Shor, Japan: the Source: William Graves, Tokyo: the Peaceful Explosion,
Exquisite Enigma, National National Geographic 118:6 (October 1964), 457.
Geographic 118:6 (December 1960),
749.

23For more details about the class relations of modern female workers in Japan, see,
Minako Saito, On Modern Girls (Modan Gaaru Ron) (Tokyo: Magazine House, 2000),
especially chapter two.

62
Chapter 3

In addition, on a 1989 cover of New Yorker, Japanese women were satirically

represented as laborers in association with the automobile industry, which

threatened its domestic counterpart in the United States (see Figure 3-5).

Figure 3-5
Geisha Ladies Fixing a Blowout

Source: New Yorker (February 6, 1989)

Moreover, in 1990, the article in National Geographic titled Japanese

Women resumed the magazines use of Japanese women as a theme for

Japans Americanization in the 1980s in similar ways to that of Japans

modernization in the 1920s. Unlike the article titled Womens Work in

Japan in 1938, which admired modern female workers in Japan and

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Chapter 3

emphasized the difference between Japanese and Western gender roles,

Japanese Women admired the new, modern women who were beginning to

challenge tradition by taking advantage of opportunities unheard of a

generation ago. 24

Despite the articles admiration of their existence in Japans society,

the magazine also contrasted their Americanized lifestyles with their

traditional counterparts. In other words, it also described Japanese

tradition by comparing Japanese women to their American counterparts,

and differentiated not only traditional Japanese women (or a large majority

of Japanese women) from their American counterparts, but also Japanese

society (which generated their traditional lifestyles) from American society

by contrasting old to new Americanized Japanese women.

Although the magazine admired Japanese women from slightly

different viewpoints, it indeed differentiated them from American women by

using technological products. Moreover, its representation of the Japanese

as the female worker was shared with other printed media, and thus, has

formed a certain Orientalist discourse in the United States.

The Yellow Peril: During the Second World War

During the Second World War, National Geographic described the

Japanese as the yellow peril, as a threat not only to the United States but also

to the racial hierarchy in the Euro-American-centric colonial world. 25 As

24 Deborah Fallows, Japanese Women, National Geographic 177:4 (April 1990), 52.
25 See, for instance, Gerald Horne, Race War: White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack

64
Chapter 3

mentioned before, since the end of the nineteenth century, the magazine had

described the Japanese as the mimic. However, with the outbreak of war,

which pitted Japan against the United States, the magazine began to change

its image of the Japanese. At first, it saw Japans imitation of our ways as

seemingly harmless:

We were flattered. We were entertained by the mistakes of the


funny little Japan. When they boarded the first train they left
their shoes on the platform because they had been taught never
to enter a house with their shoes on They blundered when
they tried to copy our machines. 26

The magazine clearly defined We as the Western Self, differentiated

They as the Japanese Other from the Self within the context of

Orientalism, and reproduced Orientalist understandings as a way of viewing

and mapping Japan and Japanese people. Based on such Orientalist

dichotomy, it cited their ignorance about our machines as a justification for

a funny little Japan. It used technology, a train in this case, to show

Japanese otherness and backwardness.

As seen in the last chapter, Michael Adas mentions that Western

colonial theorists regarded Japans technological development as the imitation

of European techniques, and held the assumption that the Japanese could

on the British Empire (New York: New York University Press, 2004). In this book, Horne
reveals how Euro-American colonialism and racism functioned during Japanese colonial
times to justify the Pacific War through a racial and ethnic defense against white
domination in Asia.
26 Willard Price, Unknown Japan: A Portrait of the People Who Make up One of the Two

Most Fanatical Nations in the World, National Geographic 82:2 (August 1942), 230-232
(emphasis added).

65
Chapter 3

hardly think scientifically or invent new technology. They claimed that

Westerners retained a unique capacity for invention and scientific discovery

and remained morally superior to mere imitators like the Japanese. 27

However, as the magazine continued:

[F]ew people yet realize how this early picture of childlike,


imitative Japanese has changedThe Japanese copy
everything, invent nothing. This familiar comment is only half
true. The Japanese do copy everything. But they invent as
well. 28

In short, the magazine argued that the Japanese had changed from the mimic

to the yellow peril they not only copied everything, but became a menace to

us as well. Despite the magazines transformation of Japanese otherness

following the shift of colonial power relations at that time, it continued

regarding the Japanese as the Other by asserting their wartime acts of

cruelty.

Moreover, the magazine unquestionably regarded modern machines

and weapons as a Western heritage in order to make a clear division between

the Western Self and Japanese Other as follows:

Japan adopted our machinery and our weapons so rapidly To


call a Japanese worker or soldier a coolie is to forget the most
dangerous thing about him: the fact that he, no less than you or
I, is a man of the twentieth century and can fight, and with
some of our own weapons. 29

27 Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 365.


28 Price, Unknown Japan, 232-234 (emphasis added).
29 Joseph C. Grew, Japan and the Pacific, National Geographic 85:4 (April 1944), 396.

66
Chapter 3

Just like the portrayal of the Japanese as cheap laborers who operated

Western technology at the very end of the nineteenth century, the magazine

described the Japanese as men who used our own weapons.

However, following Japans defeat in the war, the magazine changed

its image of the Japanese from men of the twentieth century with Western

technology to women working with Western technology, as seen earlier in this

chapter. Then, in the 1970s, it began to describe the successful Japanese,

who accomplished a postwar reconstruction, as the model minority in the

Western world.

The Model Minority: Since the 1970s

Since the 1970s in the United States, Asian Americans have often

been described as a successful case of ethnic assimilation, especially in

association with the model minority myth in the educational field. 30

Although they are simply regarded as the model minority from racially and

ethnically essentialist viewpoints, such a description creates a very common

image of Asian Americans in U.S. popular media. In 1987, for instance,

Asian-American children made the cover of Time in an article titled Those

30 The phrase model minority was coined by William Peterson in an article titled
Success Story: Japanese American Style in New York Times Magazine in January 1966.
He argued that Japanese culture (for example, family values and strong work ethic)
enabled Japanese Americans to overcome racial prejudice unlike the problem minority,
which implied African Americans. Indeed, the academic success of Asian students has
been quantitatively reported in national surveys. However, for instance, Stacey J. Lee
documents that Asian-identified students experienced anxiety upholding the
expectations of the model minority stereotypes and points out that the model minority
myth has functioned as a hegemonic device to maintain and reinforce White dominance
in the United States. See, Stacey J. Lee, Unraveling the Model Minority Stereotype:
Listening to Asian American Youth (New York: Teachers College Press, 1996).

67
Chapter 3

Asian-American Whiz Kids, who were setting the educational pace for the

rest of America and cutting a dazzling figure at the countrys finest schools

(see Figure 3-6). 31

Figure 3-6
Those Asian-American Whiz Kids

Source: Time (August 31, 1987)

In addition, as seen in the above picture, among the six kids on the cover, one

female child with glasses uses a computer. Such depiction also leads to a

stereotypical image of Asian-Americans as the geek, as we will see later on.

David Brand, The New Whiz Kids: Why Asian Americans Are Doing So Well, And
31

What It Costs Them, The Time. 130:9 (August 31, 1987), 42-51.

68
Chapter 3

While U.S. popular media described Asian Americans as the model

minority in the United States, National Geographic also portrayed the

Japanese as the model minority in the Western world amid the Cold War era.

In an article in 1974, the magazine described factory workers of Matsushita as

Those Successful Japanese similar to Those Asian-American Whiz Kids

in the United States as if they were the model minority in the Western

world (see Figure 3-7). 32

Figure 3-7
Those Successful Japanese

Source: Bart McDowell, Those Successful Japanese, National Geographic 145:3 (March 1974),
322-23.

32Bart McDowell, Those Successful Japanese, National Geographic 145:3 (March 1974),
322-59.

69
Chapter 3

This article admired Japanese workers, especially those in technological

industries, and regarded them as the main driving force behind Japans

economic recovery from the ashes of the Second World War. Yet, at the same

time, it also described them as inhuman workers, robots, who began to sing

company songs such as Grow, industry, grow, grow, grow! when signaled

during the morning assembly.

Even though the magazine admired Japanese workers, it indeed tried

to distinguish them as being different from American readers by emphasizing

their robotic behaviors. Moreover, as Lutz and Collins argue, National

Geographic often puts Western and non-Western (or Japanese in this case)

photographs side-by-side in order to show certain differences between the

West and the Orient, or Japan. However, since the 1980s, contrary to the

authors argument, photographs of technology in Japan have brought about a

contrast between Western humanity and Japanese inhumanity, instead of the

simple Orientalist dichotomy of Western progress versus Oriental

backwardness. 33

33 Noel Grove, The Automobile And the American Way: Swing Low, Sweet Chariot!,
National Geographic 164:1 (July 1983), 10-11.

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-8
Slow-Paced Precision and Robot Workers

Source: Noel Grove, The Automobile And the American Way: Swing Low, Sweet Chariot!, National
Geographic 164:1 (July 1983), 10-11.

In the above picture, the magazine placed two photographs of automobile

manufacturing processes side-by-side in order to show the contrast between

Western humanity and Japanese inhumanity (see Figure 3-8). On one page,

images taken of the manufacturing process in a Rolls-Royce Motors factory in

London were used to portray European work as hands-on craftsmanship,

and a matter of pride. 34 Conversely, on the facing page, images taken from

a giant Nissan plant near Tokyo were used to portray Japanese work as

robotic.

As seen in the previous chapter, David Morley and Kevin Robins argue

that since the 1980s, technology has symbolically become a part of the Other

for the West within the context of Western human nature, which has

34 Ibid, 11.

71
Chapter 3

differentiated the Japanese from Euro-Americans. 35 Although the image of

the Japanese as the robot may have created some contradictions and conflicts

in the identity formation of the Western Self, Western superiority became

ensured by a new type of Techno-Orientalist discourse. Then, the magazine

gradually changed the Japanese image from that of the model minority to

that of the geek during the 1980s.

The Geek: Since the 1980s

Until the 1990s, the model minority image of the Japanese coexisted

with the representation of the Japanese as the geek in U.S. popular media. 36

While National Geographic demonstrated the contrast between Western

humanity and Japanese inhumanity, it also began to show the coexistence of

Japans representative technological products and its traditional culture; for

example, the magazine published a photograph that depicted the latest car

made in Japan alongside the performance of a ritual of Shinto, the oldest

religion in Japan (see Figure 3-9).

35See David Morley and Kevin Robins, Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic
Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries (London and New York: Routledge, 1995),
particularly chapter eight, Techno-Orientalism: Japan Panic, 147-173.
36 In his book Orientals, Robert G. Lee also points out that the model minority was

gradually represented as the agents of foreign capital and as the replicant in sci-fi books
and films, like Blade Runner, the cyborg who perfectly, efficiently, and inhumanly worked
in the United States. See, Robert G. Lee, Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular
Culture (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), especially chapter six.

72
Chapter 3

Figure 3-9
Insurance Policies at Shinto Shrine

Source: Arthur Zich, Japan's Sun Rise Over the Pacific, National Geographic 180:5 (November 1991),
46-47.

Although the composition was very similar to the magazines representation of

Japan with Western technological products before the Second World War,

National Geographic described the latest car as Japans representative

technological product instead of as a Western counterpart. Moreover, other

magazine covers during the 1980s similarly portrayed the coexistence of

Japans representative technological products and traditional culture (see

Figure 3-10 and Figure 3-11).

73
Chapter 3

Figure 3-10 Figure 3-11


The Japanese Challenge How Japan Does It

Source: The New York Times Magazine (July 8, Source: Time (March 30, 1981)
1984)

Although the above two magazines were issued by different publishers in the

1980s, their representation of the Japanese showed an amazing similarity.

On each magazine cover, the Japanese portrait was caricaturized as a kabuki

actor equipped not only with Japans representative traditional goods, such

as an oiled-paper umbrella and a sword, but with its representative

technological products as well, such as a watch, camera, and pocket calculator.

During the 1980s, Japanese people were portrayed as the embodiment of the

ambivalent coexistence of Japans representative technological products and

traditional cultures.

Moreover, starting around 1990, National Geographic simply

74
Chapter 3

represented the Japanese as people in virtual reality, or geeks who loved

technology.

Figure 3-12
Altar of Imagery at Buddhist Temple

Source: Fred Ward, Images for the Computer Age, National Geographic 175:6 (June 1989), 748-49.

In the caption of the above picture, the magazine explained that Japanese

people contemplated the harmony between man and nature in a program of

computer graphics at the altar of imagery in a Buddhist temple (see Figure

3-12). 37 This picture tried to show neither the simple Orientalist dichotomy

between Western progress and Oriental backwardness nor the contrast

between Western humanity and Japanese inhumanity, but simply aimed to

show the geeky harmony between Japans traditional views and futuristic

virtual reality. In short, the magazine began to describe the Japanese as the

37Fred Ward, Images for the Computer Age, National Geographic 175:6 (June 1989),
748.

75
Chapter 3

geek in virtual technology.

In addition to the above photograph, the magazine published

photographs that introduced the Japaneses virtual reality lives to American

readers, photographs such as mind gyms, in which some Tokyoites seek

relief, 38 and a video trailto ride on an electric horse. 39 Furthermore, the

magazine explained them as follows: Short on space and time, the Japanese

pursue their leisure with the same ingenuity they apply to their work. 40

Although the magazine might, in fact, have taken some snapshots of Japanese

life, the magazine essentialized it from many different facets of Japanese

living and rationalized it by placing emphasis on Japans land shortage and

their peoples lack of time, possibly due to their overwork. Because of Japans

notoriety for having limited space and being overworked, the magazine may

have negatively indicated Japans postmodern conditions, such as they did

in describing Japanese lives with virtual reality.

Furthermore, since the end of the 1990s, on other magazine covers, the

representation of the Japanese has gone beyond the geek and into the realm of

the robot (see Figure 3-13) or the cyborg (see Figure 3-14).

38 Arthur Zich, Japan's Sun Rise Over the Pacific, National Geographic 180:5
(November 1991), 39.
39 Ibid, 40.
40 Ibid, 40.

76
Chapter 3

Figure 3-13 Figure 3-14


Japans High-Tech Hope Japan Rocks

Source: BusinessWeek (May 31, 1999) Source: Wired Magazine (September 2001)

A Japanese girl is caricaturized as a robot or an animated cyborg rather than

a kabuki actress and an ukiyoe lady holding Japans representative

technological products. In other words, the Japanese began to be portrayed

as the embodiment of a geeky harmony between Japans traditional people

and futuristic virtual reality, instead of as an ambivalent coexistence between

representative technological products and traditional culture.

In the case of the animated cyborg girl, Japaneseness was represented

by using an animated figure, portraying advanced technological products

(such as the cell phone held in her hand), and emphasizing her skin color, or

racial characteristic. On the magazine cover, the Japanese were portrayed

77
Chapter 3

as the embodiment of a geeky, animated harmony between Japans

traditional racial characteristics and advanced technological products.

Moreover, on another magazine cover, Japan was simply portrayed as a robot

in the motif of Kinkakuji, or the Golden Pavilion, which is well-known as

Japans traditional temple in Kyoto. Here again, the Japanese were

portrayed as the embodiment of a geeky harmony between Japans

traditional architecture and an advanced technological product. In both

cases, the Japanese were no longer represented as human beings at all.

Summaries

I have shown how Japan and the Japanese have been visually and

textually represented in connection with technology or technological products

in National Geographic during the last century. Moreover, I have looked

upon National Geographics representation as being connected to Japanese

images portrayed on other magazine covers in order to show how it has

functioned as a Techno-Orientalist discourse, which differentiated Japan and

the Japanese from the West and Euro-Americans, respectively.

First, National Geographic chronologically overlapped five images of

the Japanese in connection with technology: the mimic, the female worker, the

yellow peril, the model minority, and the geek. Since the very end of the

nineteenth century, the magazine has used the five images of the Japanese,

along with the representation of technology as an index of cultural

otherness, to (re)produce, (re)fix, and/or (re)naturalize Techno-Orientalist

78
Chapter 3

images of Japan and the Japanese.

Furthermore, National Geographic has been reflecting and/or

absorbing Techno-Orientalist images of Asians in the United States and

facilitating the formation of a discourse which produces, fixes, and naturalizes

Japan as the Other in connection with technology (that is,

Techno-Orientalism). In other words, under the gaze of Techno-Orientalism,

the Japanese have been represented as the Other and differentiated from the

Western Self.

While we have concretely seen U.S. Techno-Orientalism in this chapter,

we also bring up an important question about how people interpret, or read,

Techno-Orientalist discourses. This is because, as Stuart Hall and other

critics have pointed out, people actively interpret or read discourses through

their own knowledge and values, which do not necessarily correspond to those

of the dominant people and institutions. In the next chapter, therefore, I

analyze how Japanese youth living in the United States read U.S.

Techno-Orientalist discourses in their daily conversations about Japan and

the Japanese in connection with technology, and how they read U.S.

Techno-Orientalist representations examined in this chapter.

79
Chapter 4

CHAPTER 4

TECHNO-ORIENTALIST DISCOURSES IN DAILY LIVES

How Do Japanese Students in the United States Encounter and Read

Techno-Orientalist Discourses in Their Daily Lives?

[T]he issue of race and representation is not just a question of critiquing


the status quo. It is also about transforming the image, creating
alternatives, asking ourselves questions about what types of images
subvert, pose critical alternatives, and transform our worldviews and
move us away from dualistic thinking about good and bad. 1 --- bell hooks

Introduction

In the last chapter, I have examined the formations of U.S.

Techno-Orientalism. However, as I mentioned in chapter two, Stuart Hall

and other critics argue that subordinated people interpret or read dominant

discourses through their own knowledge and values, which do not necessarily

correspond to those of the dominant people and institutions. In addition,

some ethnographic researchers document that the responses of the

subordinated contain possibilities of resistance against the dominant.

Even if the subordinated people are strongly affected by dominant

discourses, they can also affect such discourses through their own knowledge

and values, supported by their everyday experiences. In short, according to

the Neo-Gramscian approach to the concept of representation, the

subordinated are not merely passive bearers, but active readers of dominant

1bell hooks, Black Looks: Race and Representation (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1992),
4. (emphasis original)

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discourses.

In order to examine the active responses of Japanese youth living in

the United States to Techno-Orientalist discourses, I interviewed Japanese

undergraduate students attending the Western New York University. As

seen in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, my interviewees

consisted of eight female and eight male students of Japanese nationality, who

also grew up in Japan at least until completing Japans compulsory education.

Employing ethnographic interview research methods, in this chapter, I

analyze how Japanese students have encountered and read

Techno-Orientalist conversations in their daily lives and how they read

Techno-Orientalist representations in U.S. popular media. Moreover,

through their responses to the discourses, I show the limitation of analyzing

their voices through only one system of representation, that being the

perspectives of Techno-Orientalism, which also means the need of analyzing

their voices through another system of representation Techno-Nationalism.

Reading Techno-Orientalist Conversations

My interviewees social activities and conversations with American

people were highly limited on campus due to their international student

status. Moreover, according to them, their conversation partners were

mostly racially dominant Americans, or European-Americans. As a result,

their daily conversations with American people were mostly limited to their

European-American roommates, classmates, and professors.

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My interviewees mentioned that they often discussed Japan and

Japanese culture with their European-American friends. In addition,

whenever they referred to the topic of Japan, their friends usually discussed

Japanese technological products or technology in general as follows:

When I asked Americans, What do you know about Japan?,


they just answered, electric goods, SONY, Nintendo,
something like that. (Kei: Female)

I took a communication class, whose name was


Information, I forgot, something like that. And when,
like, this topic [Japan and technology] came up in that class,
when I said at that time, Americans have big cell phones,
one student asked me, Really? Where [do you come] from?
As I answered, Japan, then, he said, Oh, Japan! More
hi-tech, right? You know. (Chie: Female)

[When I talk with American friends about Japan,] Im often


told that the Japanese are famous for tech-head, for high
quality tech-head, and I remember, for high-tech products as
well. Im often told something like, The Japanese craze for
quality, something like that. (Ken: Male)

With these voices, most of my interviewees argued that their

European-American friends only recalled technological products such as

specific cars, computers, Walkman stereos, Playstations, and Nintendo.

Moreover, their friends tended to consider Japan to be a more technologically

advanced country than the United States, and often associated Japans

national images with technological innovations.

Of course, their friends responses do not necessarily mean that all

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Americans associate Japans national images with technology and particular

technological products. Some Americans may recall traditional images of

Japan, such as kabuki, Zen, and a tea-ceremony, instead of technological

products, while others might not have any images about Japan. However,

my interviewees conveyed that most Americans encountered on campus

associated Japanese images with technological products, just like the

Techno-Orientalist discourses in U.S. popular media examined in chapter

three. Regardless of whether their American friends were strongly

influenced by Techno-Orientalist discourses or not, they, in fact, tended to

assume that all Japanese students were techno-savvy-people, as seen in the

following example:

Americans, who like Japan, always ask me about computer


stuffs because they know Japan is advanced in technology.
But, because I dont know them [computer stuffs] so much, I
cant say anything They seemed to think I know something
more because Im Japanese. They say, Japan is great!, like
that To me, to ordinary Japanese people, they know too
much about Japanese [technological] stuffs, and technology
Ive lived in such an advanced country, but I dont know them
so much. (Yoko: Female)

Yoko was an art-history senior, who was neither a computer science major nor

interested in computer technology. Yet, according to her, Americans always

asked her about computer operations simply due to her Japanese nationality.

She was seen as a high-tech-savvy person through a particular stereotype that

all Japanese people are computer-literate.

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Nevertheless, Yoko did not feel discriminated against or stereotyped.

She also regarded Japan as a technologically advanced country, just like her

European-American friends, and accepted the Techno-Orientalist

conversation based on her lack of knowledge about computer technology. In

other words, she shared an imaginary connection between Japan and

advanced technology with European-American students.

Yoko primarily concerned herself not with the stereotype but with the

computer knowledge she lacked as a Japanese person who grew up in a

technologically advanced country like Japan. In accepting such a stereotype,

she did not care about her differentiation from racially dominant Americans.

As was the case with Yoko, Aiko, an art major student, was also

differentiated from European-Americans in her class under the gaze of

Techno-Orientalism. During my interview with her, I saw some photographs

of her class projects, and among them, I found a clay motif of Tamagotchi, the

first-generation virtual pet produced by a toy maker that originated in

Japan. 2 When I asked her why she selected it as the motif, she answered:

2 Tamagotchi was introduced in 1996 by Bandai. According to its website, 40 million


Tamagotchi pieces have been sold internationally. On the small LCD screen of the toy,
users hatch an egg and take care of the pet by feeding it, training it, and cleaning up after
it. In addition, it grows up in different forms or dies according to the care. Tamagotchi
triggered a social controversy about whether such a virtual pet was good for children or
not in Japans media. For more details about the process of its development and the
social controversy, see Akihiro Yokoi, The Birth of Tamagotch (Tamagotchi Tanjyo-ki)
(Tokyo: KK Bestsellers, 1997).

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Because I wanted to make something for children. So, I first


thought to do it in the motif of the movie Sen to Chihiro no
Kamikakushi (Spirited Away), or a character by Studio
Ghibli. 3 But, in that class, nobody knew it except one
student. So, my professor said [to] me, As nobody knows it,
you should change the motif, you know. Then, when I asked
him advices on the motif, he said, Well Do you
remember? Do you remember something like odd, egg shape,
which brings up something, you know? Other students also
said, What? Yes, Yes, that! Whats its name? he
asked me. I thought it was Tamagotchi, so answered, We
call it Tamagotchi. Yes, Yes, thats what I know,
Tamagotchi others said. So, I chose it. (Aiko: Female)

When Aiko tried to decide on a motif for her clay work, she was restricted to

selecting only what most of her classmates already knew that being an odd,

egg shape virtual toy. Moreover, her motif had to be limited to the popular

themes among European-Americans, who composed a majority in the

classroom. In fact, according to her, only one of her classmates, an Asian (or

Asian-American) student, paid attention to the movie Sen to Chihiro no

Kamikakushi.

Aikos instructor and most of her classmates merely recommended

that she choose a more popular motif for American children, rather than the

movie. However, their recommendation made her change her topic only in

the name of U.S. popularity and passed over the meanings of Tamagotchi in

the United States.

Tamagotchi is often cited not only as Japans popular virtual toy but

also as a Japanese cultural symbol, similar to Japanimation and video games.

3Studio Ghibli is an animation studio led by Hayao Miyazaki, known as the director of
the movies Princess Mononoke and Spirited Away.

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In comparison, Euro-American cultural symbols include things such as

Disneyland and McDonalds. 4 While seen as a popular virtual toy in Japan,

Tamagotchi is thought of as a representation of Japanese cultural products in

the United States. Moreover, it is regarded as the embodiment of Japanese

traditional culture. For instance, Machiko Kusahara argues that the

popularity of Tamagotchi in the United States comes from a Japanese

traditional sense of reality, which allows people to treat animals on an equal

basis with human beings. 5 In short, as Arjun Appadurai argues that people

re-signify any cultural products in their specific local contexts, 6 Tamagotchi is

re-signified in a specific U.S. context, or U.S. system of representation.

While Techno-Orientalist discourses are widespread in popular

media, as seen in chapter three, their justification for popularity itself

functions to (re)produce such discourses. In Aikos case, not only were

popular national images about Japan associated with technological products,

especially the so-called high-tech gadgets, but her instructor and classmates

maintained the images under the name of U.S. popularity. Consequently,

due to her Japanese nationality, she chose Tamagotchi as the motif and

unconsciously ignored its particular meanings and values in the United

States.

4 See Anne Allison, A Challenge to Hollywood? Japanese Character Goods Hit the US,
Japanese Studies, 20:1 (2000), 67-87.
5 Machiko Kusahara, The Art of Creating Subjective Reality: An Analysis of Japanese
Digital Pets, LEONARDO 34:4 (2001), 299302.
6 See Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,

Public Culture 2:2 (1990), 1-24.

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Moreover, her own choice could also have helped her instructor and

classmates to reproduce their stereotypes of the Japanese. This is because

they might have believed her choice in motifs was made based on her

nationality, not due to their recommendations. As a result, she functioned as

a bearer of Techno-Orientalist discourse. Even though such discourses are

constructed by the dominant people and institutions, they are, in fact,

(re)produced in everyday life.

This episode reveals how Aiko was differentiated from her instructor

and classmates in the gaze of Techno-Orientalism; yet, a more important

problem here is how she read such a conversation. After listening to this

episode, I asked her how she felt about their recommendations and reactions.

She immediately answered, I just thought, Oh, even in the United States,

Tamagotchi is popular! She did not care about her choice.

Just like Aiko, most interviewees accepted Techno-Orientalist

conversations at face value, though they could be differentiated from racially

dominant Americans in their daily lives. In addition, they shared

Techno-Orientalist stereotypes about Japan and the Japanese with racially

dominant Americans. As my own interview project progressed, their

uncritical responses to Techno-Orientalist conversations raised fundamental

questions over the theme of this project and my interview methods. Their

responses forced me to ask myself these questions: Did they straightforwardly

accept Techno-Orientalist conversations without any criticism? Did they

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already internalize Techno-Orientalism? Or, did I ask them the wrong

questions?

In order to clarify my own doubts, I decided to show them three

photographs from National Geographic magazine and six popular magazine

covers, most of which I have already examined in chapter three.7

Reading Techno-Orientalist Representations

Considering the potential influences on my interviewees, I

intentionally showed them the magazine photographs and covers near the end

of each series of interviews. Since they had never seen these particular

images before my interview, I could listen to their first impressions without

worrying about the impact of outside stimuli upon them.

Reading National Geographic

When I showed my interviewees the four photographs from National

Geographic magazine, most of them showed little interest in the images. The

most general response was represented by Chie:

Something new, and something old something new and


something traditional, all appear here [in pictures], maybe.
Theyre nice introductions [to Americans]. Theyve only nice
stuffs, say, nice technologies Only nice stuffs appear here,
right? (Chie: Female)

Chie mentioned that the photographs properly presented information, which

7 Two of the three photographs from National Geographic magazine are shown in Figure
3-9 and Figure 3-12. Four of the six magazine covers are displayed in Figure 3-5, Figure
3-10, Figure 3-11, and Figure 3-14. The other photograph and magazine cover appears
in Appendix 4-3.

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showed an eclectic mix of the older and the newer Japan. She did not read

them as Techno-Orientalist representations that differentiated Japan and the

Japanese from the United States and European-Americans, respectively.

Instead, she read them only as facts she already knew, and regarded

technological products in the photographs as nice stuffs, representing

todays Japan. Moreover, she saw them as nice introductions to American

people who had little knowledge of Japan.

Although she felt uncritically about the photographs, her response

may be different from a possible dominant reading that the publisher

intended to popularize by using strange contrasts between Japanese

traditions, such as a Shinto ritual, tea ceremony, and habit of bowing, on one

hand, and new technologies, such as a new car and virtual reality, on the other.

She read the photographs from the viewpoint of a mediator who tried to

introduce Japan to Americans while accepting Techno-Orientalist

representations. Despite the publishers possible intention, she did not read

them as cultural otherness, but instead accepted them as facts about Japan,

which the magazine officially tried to project to American readers.

While most of the interviewees read the photographs uncritically, just

like Chie, a few students responded to them with relatively critical feelings.

For instance, Osamu, an architecture sophomore, had the following to say:

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They [pictures] are relatively correct, correct, just about


right. Im really interested in them, so I wanna know more
about them. Of course, they dont explain everything, but
like these introductions trigger for knowing more about
Japan. If they become trigger for knowing more about
Japanese stuffs, theyll be nice, you know. But, I think,
many people [Americans] may follow only from them. Its not
so good, you know. (Osamu: Male)

Osamu worried that the information in the photographs was insufficient for

American readers to learn about Japan properly, and was concerned about the

impact on the readers that could only follow such insufficient information.

Yet, at the same time, looking at the images from the viewpoint of a mediator,

like Chie did, he also considered that the photographs functioned as good

introductions to American readers.

Although his reading was seemingly critical, or negotiated in the

words of Stuart Hall, he also positioned himself as a mediator. He criticized

possible American readers, who might not try to know more about Japan, but

not the meanings and values of Techno-Orientalist representation. Even

though Osamus reading was apparently more critical than Chies, the

difference in the two responses referred to the amount of information given,

not ideology of the representation.

This mediator viewpoint was the same as that of Tomoko, who pointed

out the lack of accuracy of the photographs more critically. Tomoko was a

business major junior, who came to the United States three years ago after

quitting college in Japan. She was different from the other students in a

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way: her previous college major was computer engineering, which female

students rarely selected as a college major in Japan. 8

Although it was unclear whether or not her response was different

from that of other students due to her previous college major, she criticized the

photographs as follows:

Well, its not like this, really. This [virtual reality] hasnt
been popular currently, you know. Once this is brought up in
the magazine, Americans may fix such an image, Japan is
like that. This leads to a wrong image, actually not wrong, a
misunderstanding misunderstanding that Japan is much
more advanced [in technology than the United States].
(Tomoko: Female)

She believed that the photographs did not represent todays Japan, and

regarded them as false images that led American readers to misunderstand

Japan and the Japanese. 9 Her response indeed rejected the dominant

readings, given her own knowledge about technological progress in Japan.

However, she also shared an implicit viewpoint with other students,

8 While the number of women in Japan majoring in engineering has increased recently,
the percentage of women in engineering departments in 2004 was still ten percent in
comparison with humanities (more than sixty-five percent), education (more than sixty
percent), and social science (more than thirty percent). Minister of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology, Japan (MEXT), The Number of Undergraduate
Students by Field of Study in Universities and Four Year Colleges, Report on Fiscal 2003
School Basic Survey (2004). Available at
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/toukei/001/05011201/index.htm [Japanese Only]
9 The word false here comes from the notion of ideology as false consciousness by the

so-called traditional Marxists. One of the problems of the notion is that they set it over
and against true consciousness as if people will have true consciousness and social
relations, in which there is no ideology at all. For more details about the notion of
ideology as false consciousness and its problems, see Raymond Williams, Marxism and
Literature (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), particularly chapter
four, Ideology, 55-71.

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whose views were relatively uncritical, by taking up the viewpoint of the

mediator, who attempts to introduce accurate information, or true images,

about current Japan to American readers. From her viewpoint, the problem

was the accuracy of the information, not the way Japan and the Japanese

were represented. Indeed, my interviewees main concerns were whether or

not the photographs presented accurate and sufficient information, not how

they ideologically represented Japan and the Japanese. In other words, they

were not concerned about Techno-Orientalist ideology that the publisher may

have intended to popularize.

Before I showed my interviewees the photographs in National

Geographic magazine, their responses to Techno-Orientalist conversations

forced me to ask myself the question: did my interviewees accept

Techno-Orientalist representation without any criticism? Although I showed

them the photographs, their responses did not help me to answer this

question. Yet, at least I knew their general ways of reading the photographs

and their unconscious standpoint as the mediator, who tried to introduce

accurate information about todays Japan to American readers.

Reading Techno-Orientalist Caricatures on Magazine Covers

After showing my interviewees the four photographs in National

Geographic, I also showed them five magazine covers, most of which I

examined in chapter three. Despite their little interest and general

acceptance of the photographs in National Geographic, they expressed

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definitive interest for the magazine covers whose caricatures represented

Techno-Orientalist stereotypes more straightforwardly.

Nevertheless, their most general comment was just Interesting!

without any signs of distaste. Moreover, most of them uncritically accepted

these caricatures as good introductions for American readers who did not

know much of anything about Japan, as follows:

I think they are not so bad. For example, if Japanese


magazines feature America, say MTV, they would put it as a
part of their contents, but wouldnt put it on the front, you
know. They [caricatures] would be better if Americans are
getting interest in Japan They dont put The Third World
on the front like that, maybe. Because theyre actually
interested in Japan, they put Japan on the front like that.
Its not so bad. (Osamu: Male)

Osamu read the caricatures not as representations of Japan and the Japanese

but as representations of a politically, economically, and culturally higher

society, which enabled Japan to make the covers of U.S. popular magazines

more often than the so-called Third World. In addition, he appreciated that

Japan was of particular interest to American people and not treated as an

undeveloped country by U.S. popular magazines.

When Osamu saw the photographs in National Geographic as seen in

the last section, he was only concerned about insufficient information and

positioned himself as a mediator. However, because he assumed that nobody

thought of the caricatures as real Japanese people, he hardly cared about

Techno-Orientalist representations on the covers, which pointedly provided

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exaggerated images to American readers. As a result, he uncritically

accepted the caricatures and regarded them as good introductions for

Americans who had no interest in Japan.

Although Osamu read the caricatures based on his own values, by

which he appreciated Japans popularity in the United States, he did not care

about how they were interpreted by American readers. For him, unlike the

pictures in National Geographic magazine, the caricatures did not present

any information about Japan and the Japanese, but represented Japans

high status in the United States.

Reading the images differently than the possible dominant

interpretations of American readers, he neither accepted nor rejected the

possible dominant meanings and values of Techno-Orientalist representation

at all. In other words, he accepted the magazine covers within his own

contexts or within a different system of representation from U.S.

counterparts.

While Osamu regarded the caricatures as good introductions for

American readers, he assumed that most Americans do not know much about

Japan and the Japanese. Moreover, his assumption was shared by most of

my interviewees, who positioned themselves as mediators. This was clearly

mentioned by Taro, who was also pleased that Japan was on the covers of U.S.

popular magazines, as follows:

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I'm pleased about it [the fact that Japan was on the front of
U.S. magazines], you know. When I was a kid, I heard
Americans still thought of Japan as an undeveloped country,
in which people still wore chonmage [Japanese topknot].
Because they may still have such images, I think, they
[magazine covers] are good for them to know more about
Japan (Taro: Male)

Taro believed that American people still had old and false Orientalist images

about Japan and the Japanese. Based on this assumption, he considered

that the caricatures were better than such false images and would help to

change readers views of Japan. Moreover, he wanted American people to

know the true images of Japan as technologically more advanced than the

United States:

I want them [American people] to know more about Japan


because they dont know about Japan correctly. Ive a sense
of, like frustration, well, a kind of disappointment, like, Oh,
no, again? Theyve wrong images about Japan, something
like that. I dont want Americans to believe Japan is still
backwards They believe America is the most advanced
country, but its not true, you know. I want them to know,
Japan is [technologically] more advanced and more
convenient country than the United States... (Taro: Male)

Taro claimed that the caricatures were not only better than old and false

images, but also better for showing Japans technological excellence to

American people, who had frustrated and disappointed him in his everyday

life. He regarded the caricatures as vehicles for conveying that Japan was

technologically more advanced than the United States.

He did not realize that Techno-Orientalist representations, which he

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assumed as better than old and false Orientalist counterparts, functioned to

differentiate himself from racially dominant Americans in the same way as

such Orientalist stereotypes. Yet, at the same time, his uncritical readings

resulted from Americans Orientalist stereotypes about Japan.

Taro may have unconsciously regarded the caricatures as

Reversed-Orientalist representations the reversed response to Orientalism

that allowed him to regenerate his self-respect within the context of

Orientalism. In other words, only given the gaze of Orientalism, he can

uncritically accept Techno-Orientalist discourses.

Taros voice was not common among the other interviewees, who

mentioned that American people focused on technological products whenever

the topic of Japan came up. Yet, it helps me consider why most other

students did not care about Techno-Orientalist conversations and

representations and why they saw the photographs and caricatures from the

viewpoint of mediators who attempted to introduce Japan to American people.

While some students considered that Techno-Orientalist discourses

were based on true understandings of Japans technological excellence,

others regarded such discourses as better than old and false Orientalist

counterparts. In both cases, they accepted Techno-Orientalist discourses

without any criticism.

Moreover, only when they positioned themselves as mediators and

focused on the accuracy of information, they could also accept a

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Techno-Orientalist discourse as a representation of the U.S. recognition of

Japans technological excellence. Consequently, they neither realized U.S.

Techno-Orientalist gaze, which differentiated them from racially dominant

Americans, nor rejected such gaze.

However, this consideration does not necessarily mean that none of my

interviewees felt Techno-Orientalist alienation from racially dominant

Americans. One male student, in fact, referred to feeling alienated by

racially dominant Americans, who associated him with Techno-Orientalist

images of the Japanese. In addition, though this is more directly related to

gender stereotypes rather than Techno-Orientalist counterparts, one female

student clearly rejected one of the caricatures on a magazine cover by pointing

out its sexism.

Rejected Responses to Techno-Orientalist Discourses: The Cases of Osamu

and Naomi

Osamus Case

While almost all of my interviewees accepted Techno-Orientalist

discourses, one student, Osamu, expressed his feelings of alienation from

European-Americans, who associated him with Techno-Orientalist images of

the Japanese. When I asked him about his daily conversations with

European-Americans, he first voiced views similar to those of my other

interviewees as follows:

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Well my [European-American] friends told me that my


digital camera was so small, like a credit card. They said,
like, I came from the future, something like that Their
images about Japan may be a technologically advanced
country, the future, I think (Osamu: Male)

After listening to the above voice, I continued to ask him about his images of

the future. At first, he began to talk about the contents of the movie 2001: A

Space Odyssey, but he suddenly recalled his word future by spurts.

Ah, you can't think of the future without thinking of space,


right? They [his American friends] think of Japan as the
other planet, something like that, maybe. Simply, future
means space, and then, space means Japan, right? Japanese
are like aliens, who make unknown, cutting-edge stuffs I
think, Im tired of [being] seen as an alien. Actually,
Japanese are different race, and dont belong to this country,
but Ive actually lived here... (Osamu: Male)

Unlike the other interviewees, Osamu referred to his feelings of alienation

from European-Americans, who associated Japan with their world images of

the future. Even though he had lived in the United States for two years, he

always felt as if he was an alien due to his Asian race and Japanese

nationality. Moreover, he was reminded of this feeling with the use of the

word future and clearly connected it with the Techno-Orientalist gaze.

His imaginative train of association future, space, aliens, and Japan

was not an outrageous idea. As seen in chapter two, David Morley and

Kevin Robins argue, Western stereotypes of the Japanese hold them to be

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sub-human, as if they have no feeling, no emotion, no humanity. 10 In

addition, as seen in chapter three, the Japanese people are associated with the

robot, geek, and cyborg in U.S. popular media.

Although he might have ambiguously felt alienated, he could not

clarify his feelings of being differentiated from European-Americans until he

associated the word future with Japan. During this interview, he, in fact,

began to realize the Techno-Orientalism in his daily life.

Nevertheless, after voicing his feelings of alienation, when he saw the

photographs in National Geographic magazine, he also mentioned that the

photographs properly presented information about Japan and functioned as

good introductions for American readers. In addition, when he saw the

magazine covers, his first response, like most other interviewees, was just

Interesting! He did not appear to care about the caricatures. His

contradictory responses to those representations raised an important

question: why didnt he read Techno-Orientalist representations in association

with his feelings of alienation?

As the series of interviews progressed, he began to answer this

question, which helped me to understand a possible reason why other

students did not care about Techno-Orientalist discourses. When I asked

him how he wanted to be seen by American people, he answered:

10David Morley and Kevin Robins, Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic
Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 172.

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Im Japanese, and of course, Asian as well. Its true, but


when Americans call me Asian, I feel something different
about it. Actually, after I came here, I felt Im Asian, but Ive
still a feeling that Japan isnt related to Asia. So, when they
call me Japanese, I dont have any negative feeling because
its true, but when they call me Asian, I feel bad, to be seen as
Asian And, as they often mistake me as Chinese, I feel so
bad. I think Japan is different from China, and I may look
down on China. Of course, its bad, but I think Japan is
different from Asia, I think. (Osamu: Male)

Osamu wanted European-Americans to distinguish the Japanese, including

himself, not only from themselves but also from other Asian peoples. At the

very least, he wanted them to see him as Japanese, not as Asian.

Even though Osamu began to realize U.S. Techno-Orientalist gaze in

his daily conversations, he did not care about Techno-Orientalist

representations. If such representations were clearly identified as those of

Japan or the Japanese, it was not a cause for his concern. Given his

undesirable situation, where European-Americans mistook him as Asian,

especially Chinese, he indeed rejoiced over the representations, which clearly

distinguished Japan and the Japanese from other Asian countries and Asian

peoples respectively.

Osamu accepted Orientalist representations only when they allowed

him to regenerate his self-respect as a Japanese person, as someone who grew

up in an economically and technologically advanced country like other

Western nations. In other words, he accepted them based on an irregular

kind of Orientalism, in which the Japanese differentiate themselves from

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other Orientals in the same way as they are differentiated from

Westerners. For him, Techno-Orientalism served not only to transform

existing Orientalist discourses, but also to (re)produce Orientalism itself

contradictorily.

Naomis Case

Naomi rejected the message presented in one of the magazine covers

by criticizing its sexist gaze rather than its Techno-Orientalist ideology. As

some critics have already pointed out, gender issues are very important

themes related to the representation of technology. 11 While interpreting the

positions of my interviewees, I cannot, of course, ignore their multiple social

relations, such as class, gender, sexual preference, and religion. However,

because this dissertation particularly focuses on Japaneseness as a

racial/ethnic/national identity, and because gender issues are too large to

discuss at length in this chapter, I deal with her voice here only as one of the

contradictory responses, which happened to reject masculinist representation

but accepted its Techno-Orientalist counterpart.

Naomi was a media-study major sophomore, who came to the United

States after graduating from high-school in Japan two years ago. When I

showed her the first magazine cover, her response, like many other

11 See Cynthia L. Selfe, Lest We Think the Revolution is a Revolution: Images of

Technology and the Nature of Change, in Gail E. Hawisher and Cynthia L. Selfe eds.,
Passions, Pedagogy, and 21st Century Technologies (Logan, Utah: Utah State University
Press, 1999), 293-322, and Matthew Weinstein, Computer Advertising and the
Construction of Gender, in Hank Bromley and Michael W. Apple, eds., Education/
Technology/ Power (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 85-100.

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interviewee responses, was just funny! However, after looking at the cover of

Wired Magazine, 12 she immediately expressed abhorrence of the animated

character of a cyborg girl, as follows:

Disgusting! Not really, its not Japanese, not an Asian girl.


This makes me think of Asian [instead of Japanese]. Of
course, the problem depends on people who see this, but
Most men often see a girl character in the high-school
uniform, say, as a sexual object, you know. I think some men
actually see like that I hate it. They see women, you know,
like that, you know. (Naomi: Female)

Naomi read the animated cyborg girl on the magazine cover as portraying

masculinist messages rather than Techno-Orientalist representations. As

some critics point out, Asian women in popular media are often associated

with sexual images under the gaze of white masculinity. For instance, Renee

E. Tajima points out that Hollywood films have dominated two types of sexist

representations of Asian women: the Lotus Blossom Baby, such as China Doll,

Geisha Girl, and shy Polynesian beauty, on one hand, and the Dragon Lady,

such as Fu Manchus various female relations, prostitutes, and devious

madams, on the other hand. 13

Naomi also mentioned that Asian girls were often seen as sexual

objects, criticizing the cover girl as a sexist representation. In addition, she

12See Figure 3-14 in chapter three.


13Renee E. Tajima, Lotus Blossoms Dont Bleed: Images of Asian Women, in Asian
Women United of California ed., Making Waves: An Anthology of Writings by and about
Asian American Women (Boston: Beacon, 1989), 308-317. Also, see Gina Marchetti,
Romance and the Yellow Peril: Race, Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood
Fiction (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).

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identified herself as an Asian rather than a Japanese woman. Although she

could not offer any reasons, except for the skin color of the character, she was

vividly aware not of nationality but of race and gender. Her response

complexly embodied her multiple social relations, race, gender, and

nationality in this case.

Although Naomi could not also explain why she particularly hated the

animated character rather than the female caricatures, such as geisha or

ukiyoe ladies, on the other magazine covers, she had certain images of men

who loved animated girl characters and technological products in Japan

animation geeks known as otaku in Japanese. 14 After seeing the animated

cyborg girl, she continued to talk about how she hated otaku. She also read

the animated character, considering not the gaze of white masculinity but the

gaze of otaku in Japans particular context. In other words, within Japans

system of representation, she rejected otaku interpretations in the interest of

Asian women.

Yet, at the same time, Naomi focused only on how Asian women were

represented under the masculinist gaze, not on how Japanese women were

represented under the gaze of Techno-Orientalism. Even though, by

identifying herself as an Asian woman, she saw the cyborg girl as a sexist

representation, she did not care that the caricature was represented as a

14 Otaku generally mean people who are completely obsessed on one thing, such as video
games, computers, science fiction, and animations, and who may be called geek or nerd in
English. For more details about otaku, see Frederik L. Schodt, Dreamland Japan:
Writings on Modern Manga (Berkeley, CA: Stone Bridge Press, 1996), especially, 43-48.

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Japanese girl with high-tech gadgets, instead of an Asian girl. When I asked

her how she considered that a Japanese girl, not an Asian girl, was drawn as a

cyborg with a cell phone on the magazine cover, she confusingly answered:

Of course, Manga [Japanese comic books] and Anime


[Japanese animations] are great, but they are only a part,
really a part of [Japanese] culture, you know. Actually, this
[an animated cyborg girl] is also a part of culture, but I hate
this. Actually, Anime becomes popular culture in the world,
but (Naomi: Female)

While Naomi thought of the cover as a sexist representation, she also

regarded it as a part of Japanese culture, especially a part of Japanese

popular culture, which enjoyed worldwide fame. Even though she hated the

sexist representation, she accepted the Techno-Orientalist ideology itself.

As I referred to in the introductory chapter, while cultural identities

have been increasingly regarded as political sites around which people are

struggling to change existing power relations, some struggles have been

criticized as reproducing the relations in domestic and global contexts. 15

From the viewpoints of such criticisms, struggles over cultural identities can

no longer ignore the differences both within and between cultural

identifications in larger power relations. Naomis response to the animated

15These criticisms are represented by the movements of Third World Women. See, for
instance, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Introduction: Categraphies of Struggle, in
Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo and Lourdes Torres eds., Third World Women and
the Politics of Feminism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991),
1-47. Also, see Trinh T. Minh-ha, Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and
Feminism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), especially
chapter three, 79-116.

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cyborg girl suggested not only the possibility of the resistance against sexism

but also the limitation of rejecting Techno-Orientalism.

In the above voices of the two students, while Osamu rejected

Techno-Orientalist conversations with European-Americans, Naomi rejected

masculinist and otaku interpretations of the animated Japanese girl on the

magazine cover. However, both of them also accepted Techno-Orientalist

representations, like other students.

Summaries

In this chapter, I have first shown how Japanese youth living in the

United States encountered and read Techno-Orientalist discourses in their

daily conversations with American people, who might also read such

discourses. Although most interviewees tended to be differentiated from

racially dominant Americans in their daily lives, they apparently accepted

Techno-Orientalist conversations about Japan at face value and shared

Techno-Orientalist images about Japan and the Japanese with racially

dominant Americans.

As my interview project progressed, most of my interviewees

acceptance of Techno-Orientalist conversations raised fundamental questions

about the theme of this dissertation and the method of my interviews. As a

result, I showed them the photographs in National Geographic magazine and

popular magazine covers, some of which I have examined in chapter three.

First, though their responses apparently ranged from dominant to rejected,

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most of my interviewees were concerned only with the accuracy and amount of

information presented about Japan, not the Techno-Orientalist representation

itself. Yet, at the same time, I understood their unconscious standpoint as

the mediator, who introduced accurate information about modern Japan to

American people, unlike the possible standpoint of dominant American

readers.

Second, my interviewees also uncritically accepted the

Techno-Orientalist caricatures on the magazine covers as good sources of

information for Americans, who did not know much of anything about Japan.

Nevertheless, on the one hand, I believe that they possibly accepted the

Techno-Orientalist discourses as providing more correct or better

information about modern Japan than the old and wrong Orientalist

discourses. On the other hand, I believe that they saw such discourses as a

representation of the U.S. recognition of Japans technological excellence.

Finally, unlike other interviewees, two students rejected

Techno-Orientalist conversations and sexist representations on a magazine

cover. On the one hand, by analyzing Osamus complex responses to such

conversations and his antipathy to being seen as Asian, I found one possible

reason why almost all of my interviewees accepted Techno-Orientalist

discourses even though they were differentiated from racially dominant

Americans. As Japanese nationals, some of my interviewees might have

wanted Americans to differentiate them from other Asian nationals, with the

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assumption that Japan was a technologically more advanced country than the

United States and other Asian countries. On the other hand, Naomis

response to the magazine cover suggested not only the possibility of the

resistance against sexism but also the limitation of rejecting

Techno-Orientalism.

From these analyses, I recognized that my interviewees might accept

such dominant discourses within a different system of representation, and

saw a certain limitation in analyzing their responses only within one system

of representation Techno-Orientalism. This is because their acceptances

were different from the possible dominant responses of European-American

readers. The question then is: within what kind of system of representation

did they read U.S. Techno-Orientalist discourses? This question leads me to

consider a system of representation in Japan that is different from the United

States, and which may construct another type of discourse concerning Japan

and technology that is, Japanese Techno-Nationalism.

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CHAPTER 5

TECHNO-NATIONALIST DISCOURSES IN JAPAN

How Have Japans Advertisements Represented National Identity in

Connection with Technology?

Nations are a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent


though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which
sometimes takes preexisting cultures and turns them into nations,
sometimes invents them, and often obliterates preexisting cultures: that
is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one... 1 ---
Ernest Gellner

Introduction

As seen in chapter two, especially the discussion on

Techno-Nationalism, some critics have analyzed Techno-Nationalist

discourses, especially printed advertisements for consumer electronics, in

Japan. Indeed, they have examined how Japans nationalistic sentiment has

been visually and textually represented in connection with technology or

technological products in domestic advertisements. However, their discourse

analyses have been based on advertisements appearing before and during the

1980s and need to be expanded and deepened to reflect Japans current

situation.

In this chapter, I first take a brief look at the history of Japans

scientific and technological policies since the 1980s and their relationship to

Techno-Nationalist discourses in the private sector. I then focus on Japans

1 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983),
48-49.

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advertisements for technological products created by domestic

manufacturers. 2 As the main topic of this chapter, I particularly examine

how Techno-Nationalist discourses pervade Japanese advertisements for

technological products, with a central focus on television advertisements that

have appeared since the 1980s by Japanese automobile makers, such as

Honda, Toyota, Nissan, and Mazda.

Moreover, this chapter aims to examine Techno-Nationalist discourses

as a context and background that may affect Japanese undergraduate

students, whose voices are analyzed in the next two chapters. The discussion

of their Techno-Nationalist discursive practices is examined in chapters six

and seven.

A Brief History of Japans Techno-Nationalism since the 1980s

During the Sea Island Summit, which took place in the United States

in 2004, Japans Government ran a sixty second television spot titled Invest

Japan! on CNN Headline News for its foreign direct investment promotion. 3

The TV spot showcased Japans representative technological products, such

as the Shinkansen bullet train, TVs, computers, cell phones, automobiles, and

Hondas ASIMO (a two-legged walking robot) in order to present Japan as the

2 I place domestic in quotation marks here because of the multinational nature of


powerful manufacturers. As powerful manufacturers in highly industrial countries
have further promoted their transnational coalitions and international divisions of labor,
they can no longer be regarded as domestic corporations. See, for instance, David
Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1989), chapter nine; Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World
Economy, Second Edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2000), chapter two.
3 This spot was run from June 6 to June 10, 2004.

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smartest place to invest.

I happened to watch this TV spot and videotaped it the next day,

though later I found it on a government website. 4 It was a commonplace

juxtaposition with familiar technological products and stereotypically

presented Japan as a technological powerhouse (see Figure 5-1) with an

exciting investment opportunity (see Figure 5-2). Of course, it might have

been designed to appeal to the American audience by using Japans advanced

technological products and stressing its status as a technological powerhouse

in the world, yet I simply felt the phrase a technological powerhouse to be a

clich because of my Japanese background, where I have heard this clich for

as long as I can remember.

Figure 5-1 Figure 5-2


A Technology Powerhouse An Exciting Investment Opportunity

Source: Invest Japan! (Investment Group, Economic Policy Division, Economic Affairs Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004)

Around the mid-1970s, Japans Ministry of International Trade and Industry,

4 As a digital video clip, this TV spot can be watched. Available at


http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/japan/invest/index.html

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or the MITI, began to position Japan as a technological powerhouse, stressing

science and technology policies. For instance, in 1976, as a

Government-sponsored industrial research and development program, the

Very Large Scale Integrated Circuit (VLSI) project encouraged domestic

semiconductor manufacturers, such as Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and Toshiba, to

catch up with and overtake U.S. counterparts such as IBM and Motorola. This

VLSI project is said to be one of the most successful projects co-funded by the

MITI and private sections and is a stereotypical Techno-National project. 5 In

addition, it was later featured in a series of TV programs by NHK (Japan

Broadcasting Corporation), Japans national broadcasting station of reality

television. 6

In 1980, Japans Science and Technology Agency first used the phrase

Kagaku Gijyutsu Rikkoku, or a powerhouse in science and technology, in its

White Paper. 7 Moreover, during the mid-1990s, the Japanese Government

announced its new goal for science and technology policies for the twenty-first

century: to establish Japan as Kagaku Gijyutsu Sozo Rikkoku, or a creative

powerhouse in science and technology. 8 Although these policies targeted

5 For more details about the VLSI project, see, Sigeru Nakayama, Postwar History of
Science and Technology (Kagaku Gijyutu no Sengosi) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996),
127-130.
6 See, Hiroshi Aida, Electric Powerhouse: Self-Portrait of Japan (Denshi Rikkoku:

Nippon no Jijyoden), Vol. 1-4 (Tokyo: Nihon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai, 1991-92).
7 Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, White Paper on

Science and Technology in Japan 1980 [Online]. Available at


http://wwwwp.mext.go.jp/hakusyo/book/hpaa198001/hpaa198001_1_001.html [Japanese
only]
8 Based on the Science and Technology Basic Law of 1995, the Japanese government

made the Science and Technology Basic Plan its fundamental framework to promote

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different research and development programs in science and technology

during this time period, their essential view is representatively stated as

follows:

For Japan, which has narrow land with a lack of mineral


resources, it is essential to promote technological innovations
and seek a powerhouse in science and technology in order to
contribute to the economic stability and growth in Japan and
to improve the welfare of the nation. 9

In short, Japans Techno-National policies have fundamentally rationalized

themselves as the inevitability of Japans natural and national environment

to maintain Japans economic growth. The Government defines the

importance and value of technology for Japan and Japanese people by

mapping it in Japans natural and national context.

Since the 1980s, the Government has adopted a series of

Techno-National policies by defining Japan as a technological powerhouse.

Yet at the same time, the essential vision of these policies has, in fact, been far

from new and tracked back to the beginning of Japans modern history, 10 or at

least to the very beginning of the post-World War II era. 11 Also,

Techno-National policies have generally been implemented by other industrial

various science and technology policies. For more details about the Basic Plan, see On the
Science and Technology Basic Plan [Online]. Available at
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/kagaku/kihon/honbun.htm [Japanese only]
9 Japan Science and Technology Agency, Annual Report of the Science and Technology

Agency (Kagaku Gijutsucho Nenpo), 28 (Tokyo: Printing Bureau, Ministry of Finance,


1984), i.
10 See, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The Technological Transformation of Japan: From the

Seventeenth to the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge


University Press, 1994), especially Part II.
11 See, Sigeru Nakayama, Postwar History of Science and Technology.

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countries, especially the United States and some European countries. 12

Furthermore, as Tessa Morris-Suzuki points out, Techno-National

policies have not been based on the monolithic bureaucracy; some policies

have not only coexisted and overlapped, but also sometimes conflicted with

other policies implemented by different governmental agencies. 13 In

addition, they have sometimes conflicted with business strategies in private

sectors. In other words, Techno-National policies have not been

monolithically carried out by the so-called Japan Inc. 14

Nevertheless, the clich technological powerhouse came into

widespread use as a national narrative in Japan. Technological

manufacturers have positioned their business activities within this narrative

and have tried to make effective use of it as a popular catchphrase to promote

their brand images and new products in the domestic market. As a result,

for the manufacturers, the governmental policies have functioned to promote

not only their research and development but also their products in the

domestic market.

For instance, as seen in Hitachis corporate advertisement titled

12 See, Sylvia Ostry and Richard R. Nelson, Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism:

Conflict and Cooperation (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995).


13 See, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The Technological Transformation of Japan, especially

chapter seven.
14 In 1971, the so-called Japan Inc. was first popularized by a special report in Time
magazine titled Japan, Inc.: Winning the Most Important Battle and whose cover
pictured the face of Sonys then CEO Akio Morita within the screen of Sonys portable TV.
This article simply insisted on a cozy relationship between politics and business,
especially technological industries. However, in the same year, a U.S. governmental
report more precisely analyzed such a relationship as a hegemonic interaction between
the two. See, Eugene J. Kaplan, Japan: the Government-Business Relationship
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, l972).

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Inspire the Next: opening the way for this country by intelligence and IT

[Information Technology] (Figure 5-3), the electronics maker states, The

brand MADE IN JAPAN was created by Japanese intelligence and technology,

and it should remain unchanged in the future. While the advertisement

asserts that electronic products made in Japan embody Japanese

intelligence and technology, especially information technology, it also declares

that such products will open the way for Japan as a technological powerhouse.

Moreover, the advertisements design consists of a red disk on a white

background, partially resembling Hinomaru, Japans national flag.

Figure 5-3
Inspire the Next

Source: Nikkei Shinbun (May 30, 2003).

This electronics maker clearly has tried to show its self-confidence as a

Japanese company and has tried to position itself in Japans Techno-National

narrative by identifying itself as Japanese and promoting its products by

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boasting Japans economic success. Moreover, the maker may have caused

Japanese people to construct their own national identity by connecting not

only its own products but also Japanese technological products or MADE

IN JAPAN per se to their nationalistic sentiment.

The popular image of MADE IN JAPAN, or Japanese technology, is

indeed one of the most important symbols for confirming not only Japans

technological excellence but also its status as a technological powerhouse

and its reputation for achieving economic success in the world. Such

symbolism also came into widespread use in TV advertisements. In order to

see such usage in more detail, I examine how Techno-Nationalist discourses

are formed in Japans advertisements for technological products, focusing

specifically on TV advertisements for new automobiles produced by

manufacturers of Japanese origin.

Reading Automobile TV Advertisements in Japan

Since the beginning of television advertising in Japan, automobile

manufacturers have intensely publicized new automobiles through the use of

TV advertisements. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, of the thousands of

commercials that have aired for Japanese automobiles since the 1980s, I have

examined 1,340 such ads, which have been presented by Japanese domestic

manufacturers such as Honda, Toyota, Nissan, and Mazda. 15

From among the 1,340 television advertisements, I selected fifty five

15 For the detailed list of all TV advertisements I examined, see, Appendix 5-1.

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ads by focusing on their captions put on screen and their settings and

characters on screen, which are related to Japanese traditional cultures,

such as temples, old cityscapes, and persons wearing kimono (Japanese

traditional clothes). In addition, I link them with printed advertisements for

other technological products, such as digital cameras and watches, produced

by Japanese makers to clarify the formation of the nationalist discourse in

Japanese advertising as a whole.

Since the 1980s, such TV advertisements have been designed to show

Japanese consumers the manufacturers cutting-edge technologies and related

nationalistic sentiments by broadly using four expressions: Worlds First, or

Best, the worldwide recognition, Japaneseness, and Japans pride.

Although these expressions may have begun to appear with regularity during

a particular time period marked by a shift in the technological advancement of

domestic automobile makers and in the global economic status of Japan

during the 1960s and 1970s, they have overlapped in the advertisements since

the 1980s.

Worlds First, or Best

For more than two decades, Japanese automobile makers have shown

TV audiences their worlds first technologies, such as Mazdas rotary turbo

engine in 1982 (see Figure 5-4), Mitsubishis DOHC (double overhead

camshaft) 5 valve engine in 1989, Nissans Extroid (semi-toroidal variator)

CVT (continuously variable transmission) in 1999 (see Figure 5-5), and

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Hondas Navigator device to forecast traffic jams in 2004. 16 The TV

advertisements and printed media as well for Japanese automobiles have

repeated the phrase Worlds First over and over again. Moreover, as seen

in the below TV advertisement captures, they always stress the phrase by

adding such an extra caption as Worlds First.

Figure 5-4 Figure 5-5


Worlds First Worlds First, Extroid CVT Loading

Mazda COSMO, 1982 Nissan GLORIA, 1999

The viewing audience may be disinterested in such specific technologies

themselves. Yet, the makers have tried to show consumers that their

automobiles adopt the first, and implicitly the most advanced, technologies in

the world. Moreover, by using the phrase Worlds First, they position their

advanced technologies not only in the domestic field, but also in the global

field of technological research and development.

In addition to the automobile manufacturers, home appliance makers

16For more details about the list of TV advertisements related to Worlds First, see
Appendix 5-2.

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have also used the same phrase in their advertisements to show their

cutting-edge technologies. In a newspaper advertisement for the latest

digital camera in the FinePix line, for instance, FUJIFILM listed its worlds

first technologies created from 1988 to 2001 (see Figure 5-6). This maker

emphasized the continuity of its cutting-edge technologies in the field of

digital cameras.

Figure 5-6
Worlds First from FinePix

Source: Nikkei Shinbun (July 5, 2001).

In much the same way as the use of the phrase Worlds First, automobile

manufacturers have also used a variety of expressions that praise their

products as Worlds Best such phrases as Worlds Top Sales, The Worlds

Fastest Record, and Win a World Championship. For instance, an

advertisement for SUNNY by Nissan in 1984 said, SUNNY is the worlds best

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in car production, with the caption placed in the center of the TV (see Figure

5-7). In the case of the GALANT by Mitsubishi, in 1989, the following

caption appeared in the center of the screen: GALANT won the overall

victory in a rally world championship (see Figure 5-8). In 1993, Subaru had

an advertisement for its LEGACY model with the caption, The achievement

of the worlds fastest record on a wagon. Moreover, a Nissan advertisement

in 2002 boasted that it established the worlds most stringent emissions gas

standards for its new BLUEBIRD.

Figure 5-7 Figure 5-8


Worlds Best in Car Production Victory in a Rally World Championship

Nissan SUNNY, 1984 Mitsubishi GALANT, 1989

In addition, home electronics manufactures have also used a variety of

expressions to praise their products as worlds best such phrases as

World's Smallest, World's Thinnest, and Worlds Ultra-lightest. For

instance, a Panasonic advertisement in 2004 praised its 3CCD digital video

camera as the worlds smallest. In 2004, Tu-Kas advertisement for a new

cell phone described it as the worlds thinnest and ultra-lightest.

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In the case of Toshiba, an advertisement for its new notebook

computer in 1996 described it as the worlds smallest and ultra-lightest.

This advertisement also boasted the computer maker itself with the following

statement: One-fifth of notebook computers in the world are already

produced by Toshiba. This advertisement clearly used the phrase Worlds

Best to highlight the worldwide recognition of the maker as the worlds top

selling brand, even if it was only designed to target consumers in Japan. By

using such phrases in their advertisements, technological manufacturers have

implied that the high quality of their products inevitably correlates with a

distinguished reputation for their products worldwide.

When considering the Worlds First or the variety of Worlds Best

phrases from the position of market strategy, those technological makers have

regarded the phrases as more appealing to Japans consumers. In other

words, the makers have seen them as catchphrases driving Japans consumers

to buy their products. Although they have become more and more of a clich,

the makers have aired such advertisements for more than two decades, which

may attest to their certain influence on the buying criteria of Japans

customers.

Even though the Worlds First and variety of Worlds Best phrases

do not directly connect the advanced technologies of the manufacturers with

their national origin and nationalistic sentiments, the continually

omnipresent advertisements for Japanese technological products may have

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functioned to make Japans consumers believe that Japanese technology,

rather than each makers technologies, is far ahead of the rest of the world,

particularly the Western world.

Worldwide Recognition: Global Standard and Oriental Sensitivity

In addition to the use of the Worlds First and variety of Worlds

Best phrases, Japanese automobile manufacturers have been able to

emphasize the worldwide reputations of their products without using such

phrases, especially since the end of the 1980s when Japan was internationally

regarded as an economic superpower and when automobile makers created an

environment conducive to foreign direct investment.

For instance, Nissans TV advertisement for the CEFIRO in 1998 said,

Do you know? CEFIRO is loved in 129 countries all over the world. In

2004, Isuzu had a TV advertisement for its ELF model, which narrated, ELF

enjoys the continued confidence across national borders. These

advertisements have claimed that their automobiles are highly praised by the

international community not only in technological quality but also in

marketing quantity. Moreover, considering the emphasis on worldwide

recognition, the advertisements have defined their automobiles as Japanese

rather than created by multinational manufacturers.

In the case of Hondas ACCORD, the following copy appeared in 1990:

Your ACCORD is the Worlds ACCORD. In order to stress its worldwide

reputation, the TV advertisement also displayed the caption Global

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Standard in the center of the screen and proceeded to scroll the names of the

countries in which it had a relatively larger market share (see Figure 5-9).

In this case, because it was designed to target Japans consumers, the

personal pronoun Your clearly implies Japanese people as a whole. In a

very real sense, it claimed that the Japanese ACCORD became the worlds

brand-name automobile and set a global standard as a result of its worldwide

recognition.

Figure 5-9 Figure 5-10


Global Standard Western Modernity and Oriental Sensitivity

Honda ACCORD, 1990 Mazda SENTIA, 1991

Moreover, while some advertisements have asserted the worldwide

recognition of their products based on their market share in the world, others

have highlighted such recognition as the result of Oriental characteristics.

Mazdas 1991 TV advertisement for the SENTIA narrated, While Japanese

people feel its [SENTIAs] form as modernity, Western people feel it as

Oriental beauty, with the caption Western Modernity, Oriental Sensitivity

centered on the screen (see Figure 5-10).

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This advertisement clearly positioned the marketing concept of the

automobile in the context of Orientalism. Based on the Western reputation

of Japanese automobiles, the commercial tried to make Japans consumers

connect Oriental sensitivity and beauty with Japanese characteristics,

which were (re)defined as essential, unique, and excellent.

This (re)definition of the Oriental characteristic is regarded as a

form of Self-Orientalism, a process in which non-Western people accept an

Orientalist view of the world and (re)construct their own identities as

Oriental under the gaze of the West. This Self-Orientalizing process is

indeed common in Japans advertising as well as in Japans Westernization,

and occurs when Japanese people consciously or unconsciously regard

themselves as the objects of Western desire and imagination. For instance,

Joseph J. Tobin points out that the process of Self-Orientalizing is one of the

dominant tendencies in the introduction of Western culture into Japan what

he calls the domestication of the West and has been happening since the

beginning of Japans modernization. 17

Under the gaze of the West, Self-Orientalism often becomes less

problematic, but more self-flagellating when it is shown as the

self-representation of Japan in TV advertisements. An advertisement for

Toyotas STARLET in 1991 illustrated a Self-Orientalized Japan, as seen in

Figures 5-11 and 5-12.

17Joseph J. Tobin, ed., Re-made in Japan: Everyday Life and Consumer Taste in a
Changing Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), especially his Introduction:
Domesticating the West.

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Figure 5-11 Figure 5-12


West (Japan) East (Japan)

Toyota STARLET, 1991 Toyota STARLET, 1991

This advertisement represented western Japan by using the images of a

Geisha girl and the tower of Osaka Castle, with the Chinese character West

displayed in the upper right corner of the screen (see Figure 5-11). Conversely,

it represented eastern Japan through images such as a Kabuki actor with an

oiled-paper umbrella, Mt. Fuji, and the Rising Sun (known to be a flag design

of Japans navy before the end of the Second World War), with the Chinese

character East (see Figure 5-12).

These images have clearly been Orientalized as caricaturized

elements of Japanese traditional cultures, deeply conscious of the gaze of the

West. Moreover, they are very similar to the Techno-Orientalist images on

some magazine covers, as seen in chapter three. 18 Although they might be

intentionally caricaturized as if they have been produced through Orientalist

views, the Western gaze indeed plays a crucial role in the process of

18 See, Figure 3-5, 3-10, and 3-11 in chapter three.

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Self-Orientalism.

Self-Orientalized advertisements are less common among TV

advertisements for Japanese automobiles I examined. However, when

Japanese automobile makers are strongly conscious of the worldwide

recognition of their products, regardless of whether they use the phrases

Worlds First and Worlds Best or not, they are more or less conscious of the

gaze of the world in general, and the West in particular. In this sense, the

maker may use the word World under the gaze of the West. Moreover, if

it functions as the buying criteria for Japans customers, Japans consumers

may also be conscious of the Western gaze.

Japanese automobile makers have used the worldwide recognition of

their products to prove the excellence not only of their automobiles but also of

Japanese automobiles as a whole, and have tried to essentialize the cultural

difference between Japan and the rest of the world, particularly the West, by

using a form of Self-Orientalism.

Japaneseness: Japans Originality and Traditional Culture

Under the gaze of the West, some TV advertisements for Japanese

automobiles have more or less used Self-Orientalist views to show Japans

consumers the worldwide, or Western, recognition of their cutting-edge

technologies. They have also used more nationalistic views, emphasizing

that their automobiles embody Japans originality instead of each makers

conceptual, aesthetic, and technological orientation. In other words, some

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advertisements have intentionally connected such worldwide reputations with

Japans originality and traditional cultures.

For instance, Nissans TV advertisement for the INFINITI Q45 in

1989 identified itself as Japan Original (see Figure 5-13). This automobile

made its debut in the United States by stressing Japan[s] Original

technologies and designs. In the United States, it was indeed promoted as

one of Japans traditional craftworks, offering items such as an Urushi

(Japanese-lacquered) dashboard and a Sippoyaki (cloisonne ware) plate as

interior options. Yet at the same time, in Japan, the advertisement

emphasized the fact that Japan[s] Original automobile was released in the

United States before it was released in Japan as if Japans originality itself

had already gained the automobile a superior reputation in the U.S. It tried

to show Japans customers the U.S. recognition of Japan[s] Original

automobile and Japans originality, such as uniqueness and sensitivity.

Figure 5-13
Japan Original

Nissan INFINITI Q45, 1989

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This advertisement asserted the connection between Nissans conceptual,

aesthetic, and technological orientation and Japaneseness in order to promote

the automobile not only for U.S. consumers, but also for Japans counterparts.

While Nissan tried to promote the automobile in the United States by

Self-Orientalizing its own orientation as Japaneseness, the maker promoted

its automobile in Japan by emphasizing the U.S. recognition of such

Japaneseness. Indeed, as a global marketing strategy, Nissan set one of its

basic concepts as Japan Original. 19 Moreover, it intentionally stressed

Japans traditional cultures in TV advertisements for its other automobile

brands.

In order to stress Japans traditional cultures, a 1990 advertisement

for Nissans PRESEA used the motif of an Ukiyoe (Japanese wood block print),

called Mikaeri-bijin (Beauty Looking over Her Shoulder), by Moronobu

Hishikawa (see Figure 5-14). Mikaeri-bijin is one of the most popular Ukiyoe

and was also used as the design of Japans postage stamp in 1991, which

symbolically means its national recognition as Japanese traditional culture

(see Figure 5-15).

Although it is unclear why the advertisement adopted an Ukiyoe as its

motif, it may have used this particular Ukiyoe as a symbol of not only Japans

traditional beauty, but also its originality, which has had a greater impact on

the West. Ukiyoe has indeed been one of the most influential Japanese arts,

19See, Yoji Katsuragi, The Century of the Automobile in Japan: Focusing on Toyota and
Nissan (Nihon ni okeru Jidosha no Seiki: Toyota to Nissan wo chusinn ni) (Tokyo:
GrandPrix Shuppan), 619-624.

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inspiring Western artists like Vincent van Gogh and many French

Impressionists, such as Edgar Degas, Edouard Manet, and Claude Monet. In

fact, the 1992 advertisement for the PRESEA used the motif of Woman with a

Parasol by Claude Monet.

Figure 5-14 Figure 5-15


Mikaeri-bijin Mikaeri-bijin Stamp

Nissan PRESEA, 1990 Japans postage stamp in 1991

This advertisement may have tried to identify the automobile with an Ukiyoe,

whose originality had a great impact on the West. Moreover, it tried to

claim that the worldwide reputation of its automobiles resulted from Japans

traditional culture. In addition, electronics manufacturers have also used a

similar concept to create a strong trend in the advertisements for Japanese

technological products.

Since the 1980s, multinational technological manufacturers

originating in Japan have popularized the essentialist view that Japanese

technological products are closely related to Japans traditional beauty,

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craftsmanship, and/or nature. In fact, multinational companies like Sony

have made many efforts to develop Japans originality throughout the world.

Sonys former CEO Morita Akio also intentionally explained Sonys products

in association with Japans cultural essence. For instance, he claimed that

the simple and miniature style of the Walkman has an essential connection to

Japanese traditional culture. 20

It is possible that international communities have also wanted

Japanese manufacturers to explain the originality of Japanese technological

products by using the inherent qualities of Japans traditional culture in the

context of Orientalism. Yet, at the same time, the makers have used the

Japaneseness of their products as ideological practice in the global market.

Moreover, some manufacturers advertisements have intentionally stressed

that their advanced technologies are based on Japans traditional cultures in

an effort to target not international customers, but customers in Japan.

In 2004, a magazine advertisement for a new watch by Citizen clearly

summarized the essentialist view of Japanese technological products since the

1980s, as seen in Figure 5-16 and the statement which appeared within the

advertisement:

20 For more details about his essentialist viewpoints, see, Akio Morita, Made in Japan:
Akio Morita and Sony (New York: Dutton, 1986).

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Figure 5-16
Japan Made

The uninterrupted inheritance of


aesthetics and craftsmanship, and
high technology. The DNA of
Japanese culture lives a life of
high-quality, which others can never
imitate. This is the watch that can
be made only in Japan.

This advertisement, titled JAPAN MADE, used

the word DNA to assert the inherent qualities

of Japans traditional culture, such as

aesthetics and craftsmanship, embodied by

Japanese technology, particularly Citizens

watch in this case. Moreover, it featured a

famous Kabuki actor, sitting in front of a gilded

folding screen with paintings, who came from a

Kabuki family with origins dating back to the

Source: Weekly Bunshun (May, middle of the seventeenth century.


2004)

From the essentialist viewpoint of Japanese technology, the

advertisement indeed emphasized the Japaneseness of the watch and

connected its technologies to Japans traditional cultures. Here again, this

emphasis is also considered a form of Occidentalism, or Reverse Orientalism

a reversed response to Orientalism that allows Oriental people to

regenerate their self-respect under the gaze of the West.

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Japans Pride: Techno-Nationalist Narrative

In addition to Nissan, Toyota has also shared the same, or even more

pronounced, nationalistic view toward its automobiles, and has regarded

Japans originality as Japans Pride in TV advertisements since the

beginning of the 1980s. In 1987, Toyota had a TV advertisement for its new

CROWN model, which was titled Japans Pride and Pleasure (see Figure

5-17). The advertisement claimed Toyotas CROWN as Japans Pride,

instead of Toyotas Pride, thereby identifying Toyota as Japan. Moreover,

in that next year, it also had a TV advertisement for CROWN, which was

titled Pride and Pleasure, Our CROWN, and identified us as the Japanese

(see Figure 5-18).

Figure 5-17 Figure 5-18


Japans Pride and Pleasure Pride and Pleasure, Our CROWN

Toyota CROWN, 1987 Toyota CROWN, 1988

According to Toyotas website, the first line of the CROWN was Toyotas first

exported automobile and Japan's first domestic automobile, or all-Japanese

automobile. The following statement, taken from its website, clearly

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explained the ideology behind this advertisement:

The tradition of CROWN is the spirit of challenge that we


produce the worlds best automobile by Japans original
technology It is CROWN that people enjoy driving in every
single corner of the world. It proves that a new luxury car
produced by Japanese unique ideas and sensitivity can
become the global brand-name. 21

In the above statement, Toyota asserted that the CROWN is a Japanese

automobile made by Japans original technology, which embodies Japanese

unique ideas and sensitivity. Here, it intentionally connected Toyotas

conceptual, aesthetic, and technological products with Japanese uniqueness

and sensitivity. Moreover, Toyota identifies itself with Japan and identifies

its CROWN as a Japanese automobile. In other words, based on the

quantitative global reputation of its products, Toyota has created a reputation

through the use of Japans traditional cultures, or Japaneseness. From this

essentially nationalistic viewpoint, the maker regarded Toyotas CROWN not

as Toyotas Pride but as Japans Pride.

This nationalistic essentialism indeed functions as a form of Reverse

Orientalism, which allows Japanese people to regenerate their self-respect as

the Japanese under the gaze of the West. In the advertisements, Toyota

proudly declared that we the Japanese made Japans original automobile,

and received the accolades of Westerners, who regard the automobile as their

own cultural heritage. This declaration was also popularized through TV

21 This statement is available at http://toyota.jp/crownroyal/concept/concept/index.html


[Japanese Only].

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documentary programs, such as Project X: The Challengers, produced by NHK

(Japan Broadcasting Corporation) which is known as Japans national

broadcasting station.

Since 2000, Project X has weekly featured the so-called nameless

Japanese, who have worked hard and succeeded in their specialized fields,

especially in the technological fields, to make Japan an advanced and

successful country. 22 Moreover, unlike other TV documentary programs by

NHK, Project X has consistently achieved high ratings. The 137th episode of

Project X in 2004 featured Toyotas engineers, who claimed the CROWN as

Japan's first all-Japanese automobile. This episode traced the history of

the development, the engineers countless hardships, and the completion of

the CROWN by using documentary photographs (see Figure 5-19) and having

the engineers share their experiences in the studio (see Figure 5-20).

22 Project X also began to be broadcasted within the context of Techno-Nationalist


documentary programs. In addition, it was nominated as one of the Hit Products in
Japan by Japans consumers in 2001, which was reported by the advertising company
Dentsu Inc. See Dentsu Inc. 2001 Hit Products in Japan [Online]. Available at
http://www.dentsu.com/marketing/pdf/hitProducts_2001.pdf. Also, it was selected by
parents as the best TV program in 2005, according to a survey conducted by the national
PTA conference. See, Japan PTA Conference, Annual Survey of the Best and Worst TV
Programs for Children [Online]. Available at
http://www.nippon-pta.or.jp/oshirase040730/oshirase_21.html [Japanese Only].

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Figure 5-19 Figure 5-20


Assembly line of CROWN Toyotas Engineers in the Studio

Source: Project X, NHK 23 Source: Project X, NHK

Like the statement displayed on Toyotas website, this program also shared

the same nationalistic sentiments, identifying Toyotas engineers as

nameless Japanese, who have worked hard since the end of the Second

World War to make Japan an economically successful country. In addition,

because it was composed to be a documentary of the Japanese, the program

functioned as a national narrative, especially a Techno-National narrative, in

Japan.

Here, the TV program intentionally, but imaginatively, integrates

omnipresent advertisements for Japanese technological products in general,

and automobiles in particular, into a Techno-National narrative by identifying

their manufacturers with Japan and the promotion of their products with

Japans economic success. Through this imaginary integration between

private companies and the nation, TV advertisements for Japanese

23 These pictures were taken from NHKs website. Available at


http://www.nhk.or.jp/projectx/137/index.htm [Japanese Only].

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automobiles have indeed functioned as a crucial part of Techno-Nationalism.

Yet at the same time, Japanese automobile makers need to use the Western

recognition of their products to prove the excellence of their automobiles and

Japanese automobiles as a whole, while essentializing the cultural differences

between Japan and the West. Regardless of whether they have used it as a

global marketing strategy or not, such strategy itself requires Reverse

Orientalist viewpoints under the gaze of the West.

In other words, from the Techno-Nationalist viewpoint, Japanese

automobile manufacturers have stressed the Japaneseness of their products,

connected their conceptual, aesthetic, and technological orientation with

Japans traditional cultures, and regarded their products as Japans Pride.

However, this Techno-Nationalist process should also be considered a form of

Reverse Orientalism that allows them to regenerate their self-respect under

the gaze of the West.

Summaries

Since the 1980s, TV advertisements for Japanese automobiles have

been designed to show Japans consumers their cutting-edge technologies and

related nationalistic sentiments. As seen in this chapter, they have broadly

used four expressions: Worlds First, or Best, the worldwide recognition,

Japaneseness, and Japans pride. In addition, since the 1980s, these

expressions have been used in the advertisements over and over again.

In TV advertisements that use such expressions, the manufacturers

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confidence in their advanced technologies has been closely connected with an

imaginary sense of national identity, or Japaneseness. What permeates

these advertisements is an emphasis that Japanese technologies have a

good reputation in the World, particularly in the West, due to Japans

originality, such as its uniqueness and sensitivity, which is backed by Japans

traditional cultures.

Yet, at the same time, the very nationalistic image of Japanese

technologies requires that Reverse Orientalist viewpoints be used under the

gaze of the West. The essentialist view of Japanese technology is indeed

stressed in international discourses, particularly in U.S. popular discourses,

about Japan and its technology, as seen in chapter three. Here,

Techno-Nationalist discourses in the private, the national, and the global

spheres are complicatedly entangled with each other.

Here again, however, people interpret or read dominant discourses

through their own knowledge and values, which do not necessarily correspond

to those of the dominant people and institutions. Thus, we need to explore

how Japans technological excellence, with which Japanese people connect

their own national identity, has been worked ideologically into their everyday

lives. In other words, we have to analyze how Japanese people see and talk

about their country and nationals in connection with technology on a

day-to-day basis. In chapters six and seven, I explore the Techno-Nationalist

discursive practices of Japanese students in the United States.

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CHAPTER 6

TECHNO-NATIONALIST DISCOURSES IN DAILY LIVES

How Do Japanese Students Encounter and Read Techno-Nationalist

Discourses in Japan and (Re)Produce Them in the United States?

It is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny... What I am


proposing is that nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not
with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural
systems that preceded it, out of which as well as against which it
came into being. 1 --- Benedict Anderson

Introduction

As I have examined in chapter four, almost all of my interviewees

accepted Techno-Orientalist discourses and shared Techno-Orientalist

stereotypes about Japan and the Japanese with their European-American

friends. Although they were racially, ethnically, and nationally

differentiated in their daily lives, they did not feel alienated by white

Americans.

However, in analyzing their ways of reading Techno-Orientalist

representations in U.S. popular media, I discovered that a few of them

accepted Techno-Orientalist representations as better than old and false

Orientalist discourses, and regarded them as the U.S. recognition of Japans

technological excellence. Moreover, after analyzing the rejected responses to

Techno-Orientalist conversations, I also determined one possible reason for

1Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of


Nationalism (Revised Edition) (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 12.

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why most students did not care about Techno-Orientalist discourses. Some

students might have wanted European-Americans to distinguish Japanese

people from other Asian nationals because they felt that Japan was

technologically more advanced than other Asian countries as well as the

United States. Most students might have so highly estimated

Techno-Orientalist discourses that they couldnt see their differentiation from

European-Americans, given their own knowledge and values within a system

of representation different from the U.S. dominant system.

In this chapter, to clarify the different system of representation within

which my interviewees accepted U.S. Techno-Orientalist discourses, I first

document how they connected Japans images with technology, and then

examine how they (re)produced such connections in the United States. In

analyzing these students voices and practices, I clarify a particular discursive

formation what I have called Techno-Nationalism within which they

consequently accepted U.S. Techno-Orientalism and racial/ethnic/national

differentiation from European-Americans.

Observed Realities: How Did Japanese Students in the United States

(Re)Connect Japan with Technology?

During my interviews, when asked about images of Japan in

connection with technology, almost all of my interviewees began to talk about

Japans technological excellence and cited their observed realities in the

United States as concrete evidence. While some students mainly focused on

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new findings, or new realities, which made them realize the backwardness of

American technological products, others emphasized on renewed realities,

which enabled them to maintain and reinforce their preexisting ideas of

Japans technological excellence.

Although most of them more or less referred to both types of observed

realities, their focus was categorized into two main groups: the inferiority of

American technological products to Japanese counterparts, and the

superiority of Japanese technological products to Other or American

counterparts in the U.S. market.

New Realities: Inferiority of American Technologies

When I asked my interviewees to offer some concrete examples of

Japans technological excellence, some students cited the backwardness of

American technological products, especially cell phones, audio-equipment,

and automobiles. As Naomi mentioned:

When I came to America, I found that a lot of things, say, CD


players and cell phones were so out of date. They were
bizarrely big, awkward, too expensive, and American cell
phones arent sophisticated, I think. Japanese stuffs have
a built-in camera with many million pixels, has [access to] the
Internet at a high speed, has a lot of stuffs, and, you know.
Actually, Americans were copying Japanese cell phones
America copies Japan! like that. So, I found that Japan
is so advanced country in precision equipment and machines.
(Naomi: Female)

In order to prove Japans technological excellence, she asserted that

American consumer appliances, such as audio-equipment and cell phones,

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were inferior to their Japanese counterparts. Interestingly, she regarded

consumer appliances used in the United States as American and those in

Japan as Japanese. She classified them according to the countries in which

they were used, as if there was a national boundary between American and

Japanese products.

Moreover, based on such a national distinction, she confirmed her

belief in the inferiority of the United States to Japan with the phrase,

America copies Japan! She consciously referred to this phrase in its

reversed form, which often appeared in Techno-Orientalist discourses to

condemn Japans mimicry of Western technological products, as seen in

chapter three. She clearly assumed that Japan was regarded as a mimic of

Western technology. However, according to her, she found concrete

evidence that revised her assumption of Japans inferiority to the West,

particularly to the United States.

Of course, her evidence is too ambiguous to insist upon Japans

technological excellence because her rationalization is based only on the

presence of less sophisticated consumer appliances in the United States as

compared to Japan, which might also be explained by other reasons, say, a

marketing strategy in the United States. However, her voice is very common

among other interviewees, who cited the inferiority of American

technological products to their Japanese counterparts as evidence of

Japans technological excellence.

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In addition to cell phones, Aiko compared automobiles in the United

States with those in Japan, as follows:

[In addition to cell phones,] Cars [in the United States] are
also backwards, right? The door locks of mine are manual,
not automatic, you know. And, a lot of people [in the United
States] still generally use a cassette tape, a cassette player
and a radio [as a car-audio system], right? And oddly, Ive
got to feel a CD car-audio as cool, but, in Japan, its nothing
special, right? Auto-locks are pretty natural, too, right? As
I was surprised at this in Japan, as I went back to Japan on
this December, I saw a car closing its doors automatically!
Can you believe it? (Aiko: Female)

Like Naomi, Aiko also categorized technological products based only on the

countries in which they were used, drawing a national boundary between U.S.

products and their Japanese counterparts. She rationalized American

technological backwardness by citing the omnipresence of old automobiles in

the United States.

Although Aikos observation, just like Naomis, does not provide a

credible reason for Japans technological excellence, her recognition depends

upon the degree of popularity of new technological products in a given country.

However, she used both American and Japanese inconsistently during this

interview.

In fact, Aiko cited the popularization of Japanese cars, such as

Nissan, Toyota, and Honda, in the United States as further evidence of

Japans technological excellence. She naturally thought of such automobiles

as Japanese even though they were used in the United States. Despite

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acknowledging her own automobile as an example of U.S. technological

backwardness, her car was, in fact, a Honda, which she regarded as

Japanese in another context.

Both Naomi and Aiko merely tried to insist on the United States

inferiority to Japan by showing the backwardness of American consumer

products, though Japans technological excellence cannot be attributed to the

backwardness that they mentioned. However, the more important question

here is: why is it possible for them to cite such backwardness as evidence to

rationalize Japans technological excellence?

A possible answer could be closely related to their preexisting idea

that the United States was technologically more advanced than Japan, which

they may have taken for granted before coming to the United States and

before finding the backwardness of American technological products. Their

preexisting idea was clearly mentioned by Naomi, who had assumed that

Japan was the mimic and that the images of American technologies used in

Hollywood movies were real:

In [Hollywood] movies, amazing high-techs are used as


gadgets, right? I think, Ive basically imagined Americans
[American technological products] as those in such movies, in
such biases. But, I think, everybody imagines so, right?
Because I watched lots of movies, I loved, liked America
But, on coming to America, they [her image of American
technological products] were quite different, you know. Ive
not realized what degree America is advanced in technology
until I came here. (Naomi: Female)

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Although she imagined omnipresent high-techs in the United States, like in

the world of Hollywood films, she found that the United States was not as

highly advanced in technology as she expected. At the same time, she might

have realized that Japan was more advanced in technology than the United

States. In her context, however, she practically compared American

technological products not with their Japanese counterparts, but with

high-techs in the world of Hollywood.

Nevertheless, through her high expectations of American

technological products and through her observed realities in the United States,

she came to connect the backwardness of American technological products

with Japans technological excellence. Moreover, because she took Japans

mimicry for granted and drew a territorial boundary, her disappointment

gratuitously enabled her to associate the backwardness of American

consumer appliances with the national inferiority of the United States to

Japan. Other students who stressed such backwardness also associated it,

with conviction with Japans technological excellence, because of their high

expectations of American technological products.

However, this analysis is not enough to explain why they could connect

their observed realities not only with their disappointment of real American

technologies, but also with Japans technological excellence. When I

analyzed some of their voices, citing the popularity of Japanese products in

the U.S. market as evidence of Japans technological excellence, their

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explanations became clearer.

Renewed Realities: Superiority of Japanese to Other Technologies

While some interviewees, such as the above two students, mainly

focused on new realities that failed to meet their expectations of the United

States in general and American technological products in particular, the

other students emphasized their renewed realities, which enabled them to

maintain and reinforce the idea of Japans technological excellence. For

example, Kei states:

Japans image is, how can I say, ahead, mechanically


ahead After I came here [the United States], I found,
America had many kinds of home appliances, but in electric
stores, a large majority of goods were Made in Japan, you
know. And, as seeing them, I found, Japanese stuffs were,
and their designs were, better than others. (Kei: Female)

Kei mentioned that the appliances labeled Made in Japan exceeded those

manufactured by Others in both quality and quantity. During my

interview with her, however, she defined Made in Japan not as products

literally made in Japan but as those produced by makers that originated in

Japan, or that were created by Japanese makers. She categorized

appliances based on their makers and the countries in which the makers

originated.

She distinguished consumer appliances more clearly than other

students, who categorized them based only on the countries where they were

used. Yet, she also distinguished Japanese from Other origins, and used

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the word Japanese under the assumption that companies originating in

Japan represented Japan, and therefore, their products were Japanese.

Based on such an assumption, she confirmed the superiority of Japanese to

Other products in the U.S. market. Nevertheless, her categorization of the

makers, based on nationality, no longer applies to current conditions in the

global economy.

As powerful domestic manufacturers in highly industrial countries

have further promoted their transnational coalitions and international

divisions of labor, they can no longer be regarded as domestic corporations. 2

In addition, because each appliance generally contains intellectual property

rights, which can be shared by many manufacturers across national borders,

it cannot be simply regarded as a domestic product.

Despite the global politico-economic events taking place within

multinational companies, Kei and other interviewees still distinguished

technology-related makers and their products by their national origins.

Among them, for instance, Emi highly appreciated VAIO computers, produced

by SONY, as Japanese products.

2For instance, see David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the
Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1989), chapter nine; Saskia
Sassen, Cities in a World Economy, Second Edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge
Press, 2000), chapter two.

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As I often saw Americans having their computers on campus,


I first thought, because they were Americans, they might use
IBM, Apple, or Dell [computers]. Actually, Dell is around
every corner here [on campus] but I saw some [American]
people using quite expensive VAIO, or Toshiba [computers].
Actually, my [American] friend has used Toshiba, too. I
thought, because they thought of Japanese products as
excellent, they might buy VAIO, VAIO notes even if they were
expensive. (Emi: Female)

She categorized computers by distinguishing between American computer

makers and their Japanese counterparts. Based on such a nation-based

categorization scheme, she first assumed that American people wanted to use

American computers due to their nationality. More generally, she took it

for granted that people wanted to buy products made by domestic

manufacturers. However, unlike her first assumption, she saw American

people using Japanese computers on campus. As a result, she rationalized

that Japanese computers were chosen because of Japans reputation for

creating excellent products and cited it as evidence of Japans technological

excellence.

Her observation does not contribute to Japans technological

excellence because she not only ignored current global politico-economic

events, like Kei, but she also took it for granted that people bought domestic

products. In addition, she associated the excellence of Japanese products

with the reason why American people owned Japanese computers and didnt

consider any other reasons.

An important idea here is not whether her assumptions are rational

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but the fact that she took it for granted that nationality was a determining

factor in buying consumer products. In addition, she might have believed in

the excellence of Japanese products even before observing Americans who

had Japanese products. In other words, she seemed to have made these

assumptions, even before coming to the United States.

The above two students, Kei and Emi, naturally distinguished

Japanese appliances from their American counterparts based on the

assumption that Japan was technologically superior. Indeed, they felt far

more confident that Japan was more technologically advanced after coming to

the United States, yet they took it for granted when they were in Japan.

This was precisely mentioned by Mari, who confirmed the superiority of

Japanese cars in the U.S. automobile market and cited it as evidence of

Japans technological excellence, as follows:

I already knew it [good opinions of Japanese cars in the


United States] by watching TV and reading something, but in
my daily lives, I didnt realize it [in Japan]. You cant see
anything inside without going outside, right? Of course, I
already knew such opinions, and I knew, Japanese cars were
selling very well [in the United States]. I knew it, but after I
came here, I realized it in reality. (Mari: Female)

Mari already had the idea that Japanese automobiles were highly regarded

in foreign countries, especially in the United States, through discourses in TV

and printed media.

After coming to the United States, according to her, she found

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concrete evidence of Japans technological excellence and realized it in her

everyday life. However, her observed realties were merely used to make

apparent what she already knew through Techno-Nationalist discourses in

Japan. In other words, she merely selected her observation to confirm her

preexisting ideas and to (re)produce Techno-Nationalism.

Like Mari, most students already had the idea that Japanese

technological products were very popular in the United States as well as all

over the world. However, contrary to their beliefs about their popularity, one

statistical survey revealed that Japanese people have a higher expectation of

Japanese technological products than do people from other countries. This

survey compared the recognition of brand-name Made in Japan products,

such as cameras, audio equipment, and cars, made by twenty to thirty-five

year-old men and women in the United States, England, and Japan. 3 It

interestingly suggested that Japanese people rated Japanese technological

products much higher than American and British peoples. In analogy with

this survey, my interviewees might also have rated Japanese technological

products relatively higher than their American counterparts.

Although most of my interviewees mentioned that they became

convinced of Japans technological excellence through their observed realities,

they were merely (re)producing what they already assumed through their

3 For more details, see Hakuhodo Inc., Survey of the Brand Power of the "Made in
Japan" Label: What Young Businesspeople in Japan, the US & the UK Think, Hakuhodo
News (2002). Available at http://www.hakuhodo.co.jp/english/news/e/20020605.html

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selective observations. 4 In other words, their scope of observations was

limited to what they had already learned in Japan, rather than what they

really saw in the United States.

Their preexisting ideas also led me to answer why some students, who

had high expectations for American technologies, could connect their

observed realities not only with their disappointment for real American

technological products but also with Japans technological excellence. While

they had high expectations for American products, they also had the strong

idea of Japans technological excellence.

However, there still remain these key questions regarding their voices:

How did they produce the idea of Japans technological excellence? How did

they (re)produce it in the United States? How did they (re)construct the idea

of Japans technological excellence in the United States?

Discursive Resources: How Did Japanese Students Encounter and Read

Techno-Nationalist Discourses in Japan and (Re)Produce Them in the United

States?

In the previous section, Mari mentioned that she came to believe in

Japans technological excellence by watching TV programs and reading

printed materials, which she used as her discursive resources. However,

4 I use the word selective based on part of Raymond Williams theory of culture, in
which he explains the selective tradition, described in his book The Long Revolution
(Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1961). Here, the word implies that their observed
realities were more or less supported by certain views that made them select something
regardless of their own intentions.

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most my interviewees did not clearly remember such resources, as Kei

mentioned:

When I was in Japan, I heard about Japanese cars, about how


Japanese cars were better. Im not sure if I heard about how
they were better in performance, but I heard about how
Japanese cars were better than American cars. And, I heard,
Toyota was well known here [in the United States] I
would've thought so without concerning who said so. I
thought so not because I realized so, but because everybody
said so. (Kei: Female)

Although Kei could not recall any particular discursive resources that made

her realize the superiority of Japanese automobiles to their American

counterparts, she naturally came to believe it. In addition, by using the word

everybody, she suggested that Japanese cars and Japanese technological

products were regarded very highly by many people in Japan.

While most students did not remember the discursive resources that

led them to believe that Japanese products were superior to their American

counterparts, some students did recall TV advertisements, TV programs, and

topics in social studies classes. As seen in chapter five, Japans technological

excellence has been admired in popular discourses under the gaze of

Techno-Nationalism. Through such Techno-Nationalist discourses, in short,

most of my interviewees constructed the idea of Japans technological

excellence, accepted such discourses, and (re)produced Techno-Nationalism

even in the United States.

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Techno-Nationalist Discourses in Japan

TV Advertisements and Programs

Among some students, who recalled the discursive resources that

made them insist on Japans technological excellence, Hiroshi referred to TV

advertisements and programs as follows:

I think, I knew it [Japans technological excellence] in


newspapers or magazines. There were also TV
advertisements, like Global Market-share Number One!
So, I may believe so Come to think of it, in TV
documentary programs, I knew about Casio G-Shock [watch],
about how it was made and it [Casio] became a worldwide
company. I sometimes watched such stuffs. (Hiroshi: Male)

As I mentioned in chapter five, Japanese manufacturers have advertised

their products in TV and printed media by using the phrase Worlds Best.

In fact, such advertisements functioned as discursive resources and helped

Hiroshi to confirm Japans technological superiority in the world. Although

he did not remember the names of particular magazines, newspaper articles,

and TV advertisements, he could somehow recall a TV documentary program

about Casio and its G-Shock watch. 5

Like Hiroshi, I also knew that Casio G-Shock first gained fame in the

United States rather than in Japan. The company then went on to become a

global name. Yet, unlike him, I still do not recall the source of my knowledge.

5 According to Casios web site, in 1983, Casio released a new watch called G-Shock,
based on the concept that a watch could be dropped from the top of a building and still not
break. When it was first introduced, the G-Shock was only popular in the U.S. market.
Yet, ten years later, it became an instant hit worldwide. Available at
http://world.casio.com/corporate/history/

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Nevertheless, I accepted his voice without ever being explicitly conscious of

such a fact, even though he did not explain how G-Shock was made and how

Casio became a worldwide company.

He possibly assumed that I knew this fact as common knowledge

among Japanese people. I indeed matched his assumption, and therefore, I

could not verify his knowledge about it. This episode implies not only that I,

myself, shared this knowledge with him, but also the strong impact of

Techno-Nationalist discourses on Japanese people. However, an important

point here is not to what degree I am influenced by Techno-Nationalist

discourses, but how such knowledge is, or is assumed to be, common among

Japanese nationals, including myself.

As I also mentioned in the last chapter, Japans public TV station,

NHK, has broadcasted a documentary program called Project X, which lauds

the efforts of Japanese people to create world-class technologies, as a national

narrative. TV documentary programs heralding the success stories of

Japanese companies and their technological products in the global market

particularly functioned as Hiroshis discursive resources, and (re)defined,

(re)arranged, and (re)mapped his fragmentary knowledge about Japans

technological excellence.

Social Studies

As another national narrative, the truth learned in social studies

classes also functioned as discursive resources that helped a few students to

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confirm Japans technological excellence. In the case of Japan, all K-12

textbooks are censored by Japans Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,

Science and Technology; thus, all textbook content is nationally authorized as

the truth.

Moreover, as I consider their national identity construction in more

detail in the next chapter, a shared sense of national identity is constructed

through school knowledge as well. For instance, by regarding textbooks as

national narratives, Yoshiko Nozaki and Hiromitsu Inokuchi point out that

narratives of nation are powerful tools that can involve people in a shared

sense of identity, clarifying who we are.6

Among those who recalled their discursive resources, two students,

Mari and Ken, mentioned that they learned about Japans technological

excellence through their social studies classes. In the case of Mari, she first

mentioned that she came to know about it by watching TV programs and

reading printed materials, though she did not recall any particular TV

programs, newspapers, or magazines. However, since I persisted on asking

her about such discursive resources, she suddenly recalled a social studies

class that led her to form her opinion:

6 Yoshiko Nozaki and Hiromitsu Inokuchi, Japanese Education, Nationalism, and


Ienaga Saburo's Textbook Lawsuits, in Laura Hein and Mark Selden eds., Censoring
History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States (New York:
M. E. Sharpe, 2000), 119.

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Not specially Ah, social studies in junior high school. In


eighties maybe, Japanese cars got bashings in America, and
there were demonstrations saying not to buy Japanese cars,
right? Something, like a boycott, right? I learned
something like that. Japanese cars became [bashing]
targets, right? To put it the other way around, it proved that
they [Japanese cars] were thought of as excellent, right?
Such things stand in my memory I learned it as a part of
Japans [economic] development, something like the other
side of the fact [Japans economic development]. (Mari:
Female)

Mari referred to the bashing of Japanese cars in the United States, which

she learned about in a social studies class. In short, according to her, she

learned that Japans economic success resulted from its technological

excellence, which consequently brought about the bashing. In a social

studies class, she learned, or believed that she learned, not only three

phenomena Japan bashing in the United States, Japans economic success,

and Japans technological excellence but also the authorized connection

among the three as a national narrative. In other words, she learned of a

particular way to unite the three phenomena together.

In this sense, the social studies class (re)defined and (re)arranged the

three phenomena in a Techno-Nationalist map, which caused her to regard

the map not as one of many maps, in which the three were connected together,

but as the official or national map. Following this conceptual map, she

regarded the connection among these phenomena not just as a way to

understand them, but as the truth. Moreover, for her, this map might have

been maintained and reinforced by watching TV programs and reading

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printed materials, which admired Japans technological excellence, as she

mentioned.

When Mari came to the United States, she might have brought this

map with her and located her observed realities on the map, as she said, I

knew it, but after I came here, I realized it in reality. Or, she might have

selected her observed realities to locate them on the map and to (re)produce it

as her own conceptual map. Moreover, she might have gained her

fragmental knowledge from several other discursive resources in her daily life,

which caused her to believe the national narrative of Japans technological

excellence as the truth.

Ken referred not to particular technological products or historical

events, but to Japans industrial foundation and how it was connected to

Japans technological excellence, which he learned about in elementary school

and junior-high school social studies classes:

Well, weve taken social studies since elementary school ages,


right? I learned that Japan had a very limited number of
raw materials, like [mineral] resources. I first wondered
how people could live in Japan. But, I studied something
like, Japan imported such resources and exported processed
goods made from them. Then, I thought, Aha! Japan had
not only something to import but also something to export.
Then, I thought, if Japan didnt have high processing
technology, such goods wouldnt be accepted in the outside
world, you know. Because I thought so, I naturally hit on the
idea of Japans technological excellence, probably. (Ken: Male)

Although Ken did not learn about Japans technological excellence itself in the

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classes, he connected Japans lack of mineral resources to its technological

excellence through the knowledge he gained in his classes.

By learning about such a connection in his social studies classes, he

came to regard Japans technological excellence as essential to its industrial

development because Japan had a very small amount of mineral resources.

This rationalization for Japans technological development is stressed not only

in national white papers, as seen in chapter five, but also in other powerful

discourses. For instance, the founder of Sony, Akio Morita, mentions,

Japanese industrial companies must export goods in order to survive. With

no natural resources except labor forces, Japan had no alternative. 7

Here again, the social studies classes (re)defined and (re)arranged

three phenomena Japans industrial development, Japans lack of mineral

resources, and Japans technological excellence into a certain conceptual

map, that is, Techno-Nationalism. While I can neither say that Japans

technological excellence is a false image, nor point out that such a conceptual

map is misunderstood, I do want to say that the map is just one of many maps

which can connect these phenomena. Nevertheless, Ken believed that the

Techno-Nationalist discourse was the truth.

Although seen only in the above two voices, social studies, in fact,

functioned to locate their fragmental knowledge, which they might have

already had and/or later acquired through omnipresent discourses, on a

Techno-Nationalist map legitimated as the national map. Moreover, they

7 Akio Morita, Made in Japan: Akio Morita and Sony (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1986), 74.

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accepted such conceptual maps at face value and insisted on Japans

technological excellence by following the maps given in social studies classes

in Japan.

(Re)Production of Techno-Nationalist Discourses in the United States

In addition to popular media and social studies classes, daily

conversations also functioned as discursive resources that helped some

students to confirm Japans technological excellence. Moreover, through

their daily conversations with Japanese people, such as conversations with

other family members and with other Japanese students in the United States,

and through their own discursive practices, they not only encountered

Techno-Nationalist discourses but also reproduced them among Japanese

people.

Daily Conversations at Home

Jun was a freshman, but unlike other interviewees, he had already

been living in the United States for four years with his family after his

fathers job transfer from Japan to the United States and after graduating

from his junior-high school in Japan. Since his living conditions were

different from those of my other interviewees, who lived in Japan before

attending a U.S. university, his discursive resources were mainly derived from

his family conversations. Despite his limited information about technological

products in Japan, he admired them as follows:

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After all, Japanese products have much confidence. Theyre


very user-friendly, break-proof, and durable, and they give me
a sense of ease Everybody knows it, you know. About cars,
for example, my family has hung up Japanese cars, say,
Toyota and Nissan, instead of Ford. My father often says,
Japanese goods are better, but I havent wondered why
[they are]. (Jun: Male)

According to Jun, his father often insisted on the superiority of Japanese

technological products to their American counterparts. Like some of my

interviewees, who similarly insisted on this superiority, his father

distinguished auto makers and their products by their national origins, even

though Fords engines were produced by Suzuki, which originated in Japan

and then became Fords subsidiary, in this case. Even though specific

accounts of Juns daily conversations with his father were not mentioned

during his interview, such conversations indeed functioned as one of his

discursive resources.

Yet, at the same time, Jun himself had no doubt that everyone knew

of Japans technological excellence, and had never even wondered why

Japanese technological products were better than their American

counterparts. Because of his restricted information about Japan and

Japanese technological products, according to him, during high school he

sometimes, albeit eagerly, talked with his friends in Japan about his favorite

consumer goods, such as Portable MD [Mini Disk] players, cell phones, and

digital cameras. In addition, after attending a U.S. university, he continued

to ask Japanese international students about his favorite consumer goods.

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Among his Japanese friends, according to him, everybody mentioned that

Japanese consumer goods were better than their American counterparts.

In Juns case, his daily conversations with Japanese people functioned

as the discursive resource that led him to insist on Japans technological

excellence. Moreover, his example showed that, through the discursive

practices of Japanese people, the idea of the superiority of Japanese

technological products was widespread even in the United States, whether

due to Techno-Nationalist discourses in Japan and/or through daily

conversations like in Juns family.

Through such daily discursive practices, while Jun (re)produced the

idea of Japans technological excellence, most students also (re)produced it

more firmly. Moreover, they consequently became bearers of

Techno-Nationalist discourses through their own discursive practices, and

their conversations turned out to be discursive resources themselves, as some

students, in fact, mentioned.

Techno-Nationalist Conversations with Japanese Students

According to some of my interviewees, they began to realize the

superiority of Japanese technological products to their American

counterparts through their daily conversations with Japanese people in the

United States. In particular, the superiority of Japanese cars was brought

up in such conversations, as mentioned by Aiko:

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When I was in Japan, rather than Japanese cars, Amesya


[American cars] looked a treat, you know, but when I
wanted to buy a car, because I had no idea about what a car
was better and I havent a car, I asked it to a Japanese friend,
who lived here [the United States] for long time, who I met
here. So, [he recommended me to buy] Japanese car, or at
least Asian car, you know. (Aiko: Female)

Despite her friends recommendation, she first bought a used Chevrolet

because of her longing for an American car, something Japanese youth often

called Amesya. But unfortunately, it kept breaking down. As a result,

following her friends advice, she traded it in for a used Honda, which she

called a Japanese car. Although she was attracted to American cars

before coming to the United States, after her bitter experience with her used

Chevrolet, she realized that Japanese automobiles were better than

American cars.

Through her observed realities, including this experience, she insisted

on the backwardness of American automobiles and connected such

backwardness with Japans technological excellence, as mentioned in the last

section. Her bitter experience cannot be generalized to all American

automobiles, of course. However, she used her experience to support her idea

of the backwardness of American automobiles by recalling the

recommendation from her friend, who distinguished automobiles based on the

countries or regions where the auto makers originated.

Had she not received advice from her friend, would she have

associated her experience with the superiority of Japanese automobiles to

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American cars? Her friends advice functioned as a rationalization for the

breaking down of her used car and as a discursive resource to promote the

idea of Japans technological excellence.

Just like Jun and Aiko, other students also talked with Japanese

people about the superiority of Japanese technological products in their U.S.

lives. Such peoples discourses had, in fact, functioned as discursive

resources for other students, like Jun and Aiko, and helped to (re)produce the

idea of Japans technological excellence.

Summaries

First, most of my interviewees mentioned that they came to realize

Japans technological excellence through their observed realities in the United

States. However, as my interviews progressed, I recognized that their

observed realities might have been supported by certain discourses

Techno-Nationalist discourses that admired Japans technological excellence

and the technological products made by Japanese makers.

At the same time, I began to realize that their observed realities might

have functioned to maintain and reinforce such discourses. In other words,

through my interviews with them, I found mutually complementary

relationships between their observed realities and Techno-Nationalist

discourses.

My interviewees selected their observed realities and then cited

selective observations as concrete evidence of Japans technological

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excellence. Some students insisted on the backwardness of American

technological products and the United States itself with their biased images of

American high-techs. Moreover, while they associated such backwardness

with the superiority of Japanese technological products to American

counterparts, the other students directly associated their high expectations

for the popularity of Japanese technological products in the United States

with the idea of Japans technological excellence.

Even though their expectations are different in both cases, most

students tended to select observations that maintained and reinforced

Techno-Nationalist discourses based only on the imaginary boundary between

Japanese technological products and their American counterparts.

Through their active, daily discursive practices, moreover, they (re)produced

the fragmental narratives of Techno-Nationalist discourses. As a result,

most of my interviewees naturally, but on no factual grounds, connected their

selective realities to Japans technological excellence based not on their

observations in the United States, but on Techno-Nationalist discourses

themselves.

Although I have come to understand how my interviewees

encountered, read, and (re)produced Techno-Nationalist discourses in their

everyday lives in the United States, there still remain questions which should

be examined in this dissertation. Through such discursive practices, how did

they associate Japanese technology with their own racial/ethnic/national

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identity? How did they (re)construct their Japaneseness in connection with

technology? These questions are the main topic of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 7

SUBJECTIVE FORMATION OF JAPANESENESS

How Do Japanese Students in the United States (Re)Construct Japaneseness

as their Racial/Ethnic/National Identity under the Gaze of

Techno-Nationalism?

There is always a good and a bad nationalism. There is... the one
which tolerates other nationalisms and which may even argue in their
defense and include them within a single historical perspective and
the one which radically excludes them from love in an imperialist and
racist perspective. There is the one which derives from love (even
excessive love) and the one which derives from hate. In short, the
internal split within nationalism seems as essential. 1 --- Etienne Balibar

Introduction

In the last chapter, I examined how my interviewees (re)mapped their

fragmental narratives about Japanese technological products into

Techno-Nationalism through their daily discursive practices. Most of them

mentioned that they came to realize Japans technological excellence through

their observed realities in the United States. However, their selective

realities might have been supported by both Japans Techno-Nationalist

discourses, which admired Japanese technological products, and their

discursive practices, which functioned to (re)produce such discourses in the

United States.

In this dissertation, two important questions still need to be answered:

how did my interviewees connect the meanings and values of Japanese

1Etienne Balibar, Racism and Nationalism in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel


Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (New York: Verso, 1991), 47.

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technological products with Japaneseness as their own racial/ethnic/national

identity, and through such discursive practices, how did they (re)construct

Japaneseness in their U.S. daily lives? To answer these questions, in this

chapter, I first document how my interviewees connected what they called

Japanese technological products with some characteristics of Japanese

traditional culture and some traits of Japanese people. Then, I examine

how they (re)constructed their Japaneseness by acknowledging such

Japanese products and by (re)producing their shared sense of national

Self.

Meanings and Values of Japanese Technological Products: How Did

Japanese Students Associate the Characteristics of Japanese Traditional

Culture with Technological Products?

As seen in the last chapter, when my interviewees called particular

technological products Japanese, they regarded such products as those that

were used in Japan, made by companies that originated in Japan, or labeled

Made in Japan. Moreover, they categorized technological products based

on the countries where they were made and used, and where the product

manufacturers originated from.

Most of my interviewees, however, used the word Japanese not only

to draw a national boundary, but to give technological products certain

characteristics of Japanese traditional culture such as compactness,

simplicity, fine detailing, and sensitivity and certain traits of the Japanese

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people such as being gadget-loving and group conscious.

Compactness and Simplicity: Japanese Virtue and Sense of Beauty

Some students characterized Japanese technological products as

compact and simple, which they felt were traits of Japanese traditional

culture. Moreover, by comparing Japanese traditional culture to its

Western counterpart, they regarded compactness and simplicity as essential

parts of the Japanese virtue, or sense of beauty. For instance, Osamu, a

student majoring in architecture, mentioned:

After all, Japanese technology is compact. Say, a new digital


camera looks like a credit card, right? Thats Japanese
technology. Japanese people dont like gaudiness, and many
decorations, right? As seeing architecture, like Gothic and
Roman architectures, have a lot of decorations, you know.
Its [Western] churches and stained glasses are awesome, of
course, but Japanese temples and shrines are very simple,
right? Even a very big one is simple, too. Simplicity is
virtue [for the Japanese], I strongly think so. Japanese
technology is something getting rid of decorations, you know?
(Osamu: Male)

Osamu regarded compactness and simplicity as characteristics of

Japanese technological products, and supported his views by stressing the

essential difference between Japanese traditional architecture and its

Western counterpart. In addition, he associated Japanese traditional

architecture with the aesthetic taste and virtue of the Japanese people.

Likewise, he saw Japanese technological products as the embodiment of

national aesthetic taste.

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Although he assumed that all Japanese people disliked architectural

lavishness, not all Japanese temples and shrines are necessarily simple, and

some have a lot of decorations. 2 Similarly, not all Japanese technological

products are necessarily compact and simple. Nevertheless, he doubtlessly

believed that they were determining factors that distinguished Japanese

products from Others, particularly their Western counterparts.

Popular discourses and even academic articles have also stressed the

compactness and simplicity of Japanese technological products. For

instance, Paul Du Gay and his co-authors mentioned, Compactness,

simplicity and fine detailing have been consistently represented as central

features of Japanese design [r]ooted in particular practices and expressed in

particular material cultural artifacts. 3 They also regarded compactness and

simplicity as consistent characteristics used in all types of Japanese design,

including technological products.

Like Osamu, Kei also regarded Japanese appliances as the

embodiment of Japanese traditional beauty. In this instance, she makes

her point by comparing the Japanese garden to its Western counterpart:

2 Kinkakuji, or the Golden Pavilion, for instance, is covered in gold leaf and is famous for
its great splendor. Also, one of the gate buildings in Nikko Toshogu, Yomeimon is
decorated by countless wood carvings and large amounts of gold leaf. The buildings
were designated as UNESCO World Heritage Sites in 1994 and in 1999, respectively.
Although being labeled a UNESCO World Heritage Site does not mean anything except
that Japan wields power in global politico-economics, I mention it here to point out that
these buildings also represent Japanese traditional culture.
3 Paul du Gay, Stuart Hall, Linda Janes, Hugh Macky and Keith Negus, Doing Cultural

Studies: The Story of the Sony Walkman. (Sage Publications, 1997), 70 (emphasis added).

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My taste [for appliances] may be similar to that for something


like traditional Japanese, Japanese sense of beauty. As
seeing Japanese garden, its not pell-mell but like neat,
something like that... The Japanese design I like isnt just
simple, but also beautiful. My taste is actually similar to
such a trait [of the Japanese design] Japanese people make
a garden naturally and dont value artificial beauty, while
Western people make it artificially, as trimming trees in
various forms, as planting trees symmetrically, and they feel
it beautiful. Such differences [between Japanese and
Western ways of making a garden] may be apparent in such
designs [as Japanese electric appliances]. (Kei: Female)

Here, Kei tried to explain that her preference for Japanese appliances was

due to her fondness for Japanese traditional beauty. To illustrate her

thoughts, she stressed the simplicity of Japanese design by comparing the

Japanese garden to its Western counterpart.

Moreover, she seemed to assert that her preference was highly related

to her nationality. Although her nationality was, in fact, one of many factors

that constructed her preferences, she thought of her nationality as

determining factor of her habitus the term defined by Pierre Bourdieu as

systems of durable, transposable dispositions as principles which generate

and organize practices and representations.4

According to Bourdieu, habitus is dependent upon many external

conditions, such as economic, political, and cultural factors. In this sense,

Keis habitus depended not only on her nationality, but on the diverse

4Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 53.
Also, for his more practical analysis in French society while using the concept of habitus,
see Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).

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conditions surrounding her, even though she tried to explain her taste for

Japanese appliances as linked to her preference for Japanese traditional

beauty.

Both Osamu and Kei attributed the compactness and simplicity of

Japanese technological products to Japanese traditional culture, and

backed up their thoughts by comparing Japanese products to their

Western counterparts and by stressing the essential differences between

Japan and the West.

Fine Detailing and Sensitivity: Japanese Traditional Craftsmanship

In addition to compactness and simplicity, Kei claimed that fine

detailing was yet another characteristic of Japanese technological products:

Japanese people, say, Japanese craftsmen make detailed


drawings of small parts, say, well, a handle of urushi-nuri
[Japanese lacquer craft], right? Its not only good-looking on
the whole, but also good-looking and nice-jobs in detail.
Thats Japanese tradition after all, I believe Say, about
computers, as looking at a keyboard, Japanese stuffs have a
nice-looking keyboard unlike others, whose total looking is
nice to the eye, but whose keyboard is bad, like that. They
[Japanese computers] have not only good parts, good designed
parts, but also good total coordination. Its similar to
something like traditional Japanese. (Kei: Female)

Kei regarded the fine detailing of Japanese traditional craftsmanship as a

common thread among Japanese technological products. Moreover, she

mentioned that she did not realize such a particular connection between fine

detailing and Japanese technological products until she came to the United

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States. Although she believed that she made this connection on her own

after coming to the United States, this association is, in fact, popularly

asserted in such books as English/Japanese bilingual guides, which are

compiled for international businessmen and students and used to explain

Japan to foreigners.

For instance, one book explains the fine detailing used to create a

maku-no-uchi boxed lunch as the embodiment of Japanese tradition. It

asserts, The same spirit which creates this elegantly compact maku-no-uchi

boxed lunch also produces the home electronic appliances, automobiles, and

other Japanese products that have proven so popular in the international

marketplace. 5 In short, the book claims that Japanese traditional beauty

is responsible for the worldwide popularity of Japanese technological

products.

Although it was unclear through what discursive resources Kei

learned of the connection, she regarded the fine detailing as a common thread

among Japanese products. Similar to Kei, Mari also believed that the fine

detailing and sensitivity of Japanese technological products was related to

the traits of Japanese people.

By comparing popular music players in Japan with those in the

United States, Mari cited the following observation as concrete evidence of

the excellence of Japanese technological products as well as of Japanese

people:

5 Yoshio Tanaka ed., Japan As It Is (Tokyo: Gakken, 1985), 35.

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Japanese people arrange something small neatly, of course in


a good sense, like sensitively. We are particular about
details, right? Americans bring CD players like this [big]
size with them, but Japanese people have MD [Mini Disk]
players. Actually, when I came here, I didnt see any MD
[players], you know. Japanese stuffs are small and thin, and
I believe Japanese people pay careful attention to details.
They [Japanese stuffs] are awesome. (Mari: Female)

Some students often cited the backwardness of American technological

products as evidence of Japans technological excellence, as seen in the last

chapter. From the same viewpoint, Mari ascribed Japans technological

excellence to the sensitivity and fine detailing of its products, which she

believed were two particular traits of Japanese people.

In Japans TV advertisements (examined in chapter four), sensitivity

has also been stressed as an Oriental characteristic of Japanese automobiles

through a simple binary distinction between the Orient and the West, or

under the gaze of Orientalism. 6 Similarly, through her own observations of

American backwardness, Mari regarded sensitivity as a crucial trait of the

Japanese people, but did not consider any other possible reasons for why MD

players were not popular in the United States.

By observing consumer appliances in the U.S. market selectively, she

regarded sensitivity and fine detailing as common threads among Japanese

technological products and (re)produced their nationalistic meanings and

values.

6For instance, see Mazdas 1991 TV advertisement for SENTIA (see Figure 4-10). The
ads caption reads, Western Modernity and Oriental Sensitivity.

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Gadget-Loving and Group Consciousness

While some students associated Japanese technological products

with characteristics of Japanese traditional culture such as compactness,

simplicity, fine detailing, and sensitivity, other students associated them with

the gadget-loving and group conscious traits of the Japanese people.

Although these characteristics overlapped considerably, the latter students

regarded such Japanese traits as essential and determining factors in the

popularity of particular technological products in Japan. For instance, Yoko

mentioned:

Japanese people love technology and gadgets so much, you


know. So, the cell phone is getting more and more pretty
good, you know Japanese people put a great deal of efforts
in such a matter [improvement of the cell phone], right? As
taking a sober look at it, Japan goes to the point of, like, No
need to go that far. I feel it like that, like a Japanese nature,
which goes all the way, technology is too, which follows
technology out to the bitter end. (Yoko: Female)

Yoko criticized the gadget-loving nature of Japanese people, stating that

such a trait caused Japanese people to place too much effort on improving

technological products. Yet, at the same time, from a nationally essentialist

viewpoint, she assumed that all Japanese people love technology and

gadgets. Moreover, she recognized Japanese cell phones, which were

continuously improved upon, as pretty good, and thus, ironically, admired

the gadget-loving Japanese nature itself.

Like Yoko, Japanese discourses have argued from ethnically and

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nationally essentialist viewpoints that the gadget-loving trait is a Japanese

characteristic. For instance, Masanori Moritani cites the gadget-loving

nature of Japanese consumers as one of the factors in Japans high-tech

market development. 7 In addition, their gadget-loving nature has been

taken for granted even in U.S. popular media. In journalistic articles, there

are omnipresent expressions connecting gadget-loving with Japan and the

Japanese people such phrases as the gadget-loving Japanese, Japan's

gadget-loving culture, in gadget-loving Japan, and Japan a gadget-loving

nation. 8

Yoko regarded the gadget-loving nature of the Japanese as an

essential and determining factor in the improvement of Japanese

technological products from a nationally essentialist viewpoint. Moreover,

she distinguished Japanese people from Others under the gaze of

Techno-Nationalism, and at the same time, shared a Techno-Orientalist

stereotype with U.S. popular discourses. Consequently, through her

discursive practices, Yoko (re)produced both Techno-Nationalist and

Techno-Orientalist discourses. I explain this intimate relationship between

Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Orientalism in more detail in the next

chapter.

While Yoko connected the excellence of the Japanese cell phone with

7 Masanori Moritani, Japans Development of Technologies and Industries (Nohon no


Gijyutsu to Sangyo no Hatten) (Tokyo: The Society for the Promotion of the University of
the Air, 1996), especially 73-75.
8 In a recent example, USA TODAY had an article titled In Gadget-loving Japan, Robots

Get Hugs in Therapy Sessions (April 11, 2004).

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Japanese gadget-loving nature, Satoshi associated the widespread use of cell

phones in Japan with the group consciousness of the Japanese:

The cell phone is Japanese taste technology, I believe. Its


portable, so that everybody can bring it. Japanese people,
all do the same thing, right? Everybody has a cell phone,
right? As seeing fads, say Tamagotchi, all of them are
portable. You can always bring them with you, right? I
believe, the Japanese have like group consciousness, like
desire to communicate with someone. To do that, the cell
phone is best. (Satoshi: Male)

Satoshi saw group consciousness as a common trait among the Japanese,

which led to the popularization of cell phones in Japan. Like the Japanese

trait of gadget-loving, the Japanese trait of group consciousness is also

maintained through culturally essentialist viewpoints in U.S. discourses.

For instance, Edwin O. Reisechauer made a correlation between Japanese

group consciousness and Japans history of rice cultivation, which made it

necessary to work in groups and cooperate with one another. 9

In addition to cell phones, Satoshi tried to explain that the

popularization of Tamagotchi in Japan was also a result of Japanese group

consciousness. 10 He assumed that the popularization of particular

technological products was based on the fact that all Japanese people were

group conscious. Although he seemed to avoid expressing any value

judgment about such popularization, he regarded it as a corollary of Japanese

9 Edwin O. Reisechauer and Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese Today: Change and
Continuity (Enlarged Edition) (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1995), chapter thirteen, The Group, 128-139.
10 For more details about Tamagotchi, see footnote 2 in chapter four.

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group consciousness and ignored other factors, such as economic, political, and

social issues.

Most of my interviewees, in fact, assigned the characteristics of

Japanese traditional culture and the traits of Japanese people to what they

called Japanese technological products, and did so through nationally

essentialist viewpoints.

Japanese Technological Products as They Relate to Japans Pride and

Superiority over Others: How Did Japanese Youth in the United States

(Re)Construct Their Japaneseness under the Gaze of Techno-Nationalism?

Japanese Technological Products as the Pride of the Japanese

Almost all of my interviewees believed in Japans technological

excellence and believed that Japanese technological products were highly

recognized all over the world, as seen in the last chapter. While their

opinions tended to be supported by Techno-Nationalist discourses, the most

general response to the worldwide recognition of Japanese technological

products was best stated by Kei:

I admire Japanese [technological] products for getting high


praise internationally. In a sort, it's a pride for me as
Japanese because their [Japanese technological products]
designs are to my taste, I like Japanese products. (Kei:
Female)

Kei was pleased with the worldwide recognition of Japanese technological

products because of her own habitus, which she consciously associated with

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some of the previously mentioned characteristics of Japanese traditional

culture. She believed that she favored Japanese technological products

because they were the embodiment of Japanese traditional beauty.

Regardless of whether or not Japanese product designs were, in

reality, recognized worldwide, Kei believed that her taste was supported by

the worldwide popularity of Japanese technological products. In this sense,

she offered a relatively logical rationale for her praise for Japanese

technological products, but only if all Japanese technological products

indeed embodied what she called Japanese traditional beauty. By

associating her own taste with Japanese beauty, she identified her habitus

with her nationality, was conscious of being Japanese, and (re)constructed her

own Japaneseness.

Unlike Kei, however, most of my interviewees did not offer logical

rationale for why they so strongly approved of the worldwide recognition of

Japanese products. They were pleased with the recognition almost as if it

affected them personally, even though they had little relation to the products

or the companies except from the standpoint of a consumer. In other words,

they regarded the worldwide recognition of Japanese technological products

as a victory for all Japanese people. Yet, at the same time, their praises were

more complex than Keis.

When some students talked about Japans technological excellence,

they more or less shared a kind of antipathy toward the United States and

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American people. For instance, Naomi was pleased with the adoption of

Japanese digital technology in Hollywood films, almost as if she had made a

personal contribution to it herself:

Japanese digital standard was used in Hollywood movies, you


know. I read it in Internet news. Its amazing! Its
cutting-edge technology. Japanese technology got a global
standard, you know Its pretty nice news to me because Im
Japanese. (Naomi: Female)

With the assumption that Hollywood set the global standard for digital

technology, Naomi rejoiced at the fact that Japanese technology was a de

facto global standard. In addition, as a media studies student who loved

Hollywood movies, she was very pleased that Hollywood primarily used

Japanese digital technology.

Naomi later expressed that she disliked her media study classes,

which focused only on Western movies and ignored Japanese films, and her

American classmates, who did not know and did not want to know about

Japanese films and Japan in general. Before coming to the United States,

according to her, she imagined that American people would ask her about

Japanese culture, including films. She had believed that Japanese films

were relatively popular even in the United States. In reality, however,

nobody in any of her classes asked her about them. As she said, To my

surprise, they [Americans] arent interested in Japan at all!

Naomi expressed concern and frustration over the disinterest of her

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American classmates in regards to Japan, Japanese films, and Japanese

people, including herself. Of course, her frustration may have been

attributed to her personal character and her expectations for the popularity of

Japanese films in the United States. However, in fact, she was frustrated by

the Euro-American-centric courses, which seemed to ignore Japanese films

and disappointed her. Moreover, she felt alienated by her classmates

because of her nationality.

In order to relieve the frustration brought about by such

Euro-American-centric conditions, Naomi identified herself with the

Japanese digital technology used in Hollywood, regenerated her self-respect

as a non-Western person, and (re)constructed her own racial/ethnic/national

identity. Yet, at the same time, her self-respect complexly required American

people to recognize the superiority of Japanese digital technology and

acknowledge her nationality.

While she raised a nationalistic sentiment through her antipathy

toward her courses and classmates, other students simply, but more

nationalistically, rejoiced at the worldwide recognition of Japanese

technological products. Some students expressed a more direct sense of

rivalry between Japan and the United States. When they talked about

Japanese technology, instead of comparing Japanese technology to its

American counterpart, or Japanese technological makers to their

American counterparts, they unconsciously compared Japan to the United

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States, nation-to-nation. In Hiroshis words:

I believe Japanese technology is on the cutting edge, one of


the cutting edges Of course, about computer software,
America has Microsoft and Apple, but technology in general,
Japan isnt behind [the United States] Im pleased at, be
proud of Japan, Ive something like that feeling. (Hiroshi:
Male)

Unlike Naomi, Hiroshi was not frustrated with American people, nor did he

require that Japanese products be recognized by Americans in order for him to

(re)construct his own national pride. Rather, he had a simple sense of rivalry

with the United States by identifying himself with Japan.

As a business major student, according to Hiroshi, he learned of the

success stories of Japanese manufacturing models, such as Toyotaism, in

his courses. Although he did not specifically mention how he learned of the

models, he saw them as comparable to U.S. models, such as Fordism. In

other words, he understood manufacturing models based on the dichotomy

between Japan and the United States, not according to management

differences among multinational manufacturing companies. He thought of

the United States as Japans competitor in the manufacturing industries.

Yet, at the same time, he used the phrase Japan isnt behind to

explain Japans technological excellence, possibly assuming that Japan was

generally seen as technologically less advanced than the United States, or

that the United States was popularly seen as the most technologically

advanced country in the world. He also regarded the United States as the

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standard by which the technological excellence of Japan was measured.

He was proud of Japan not only as a country where technology was

advanced, but also as a country that was not technologically behind the

United States. While he shared a sense of rivalry with the United States, he

also felt inferior to the United States and regarded the country as a

competitor that Japan should catch up to and overtake.

Like Hiroshi, other students also shared a sense of rivalry with the

United States. For instance, Ryo, a business major student, expressed more

nationalistic sentiments, as follows:

Of course, I shouldnt take a hostile attitude to America, but


Microsoft has actually dominated the computer [market], you
know. I think, itll do nothing, but, rather than America,
Japan has kept working in the fields of cell phones and digital
cameras. Japan has always tried to do something new, you
know. So, I dont want Japan to cede its top position to
America in those fields. Of course, I know exclusive thought
is wrong, but I want Japan to lead those fields, as Japanese,
with national pride as Japanese. (Ryo: Male)

In many cases, hostile attitudes toward Others were apparent in my

interviewees statements, such as, I know that its wrong, but Although

Ryo repeated similar phrases, he had a sense of rivalry with the United States

without feeling inferior to them. Because he assumed that Japan was the

world leader in digital camera and cell phone technology, he was proud of

these Japanese technological products and did not want Japan to cede the

top position to the United States. Moreover, he justified his sense of rivalry

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by stressing his national pride.

As a business major student, Ryo basically assumed that the United

States tried to challenge the preeminence of Japan in the fields of digital

camera and cell phone technology. Based on such an assumption, regardless

of whether it was true or not, he believed that he had no other choice but to

develop a sense of rivalry with the United States because of his nationality

and his national pride.

In addition, like Hiroshi, he equated the companies that originated in

the United States with the United States itself, and felt a sense of rivalry by

identifying himself with Japan. Even though he thought of his exclusive

thought as wrong, he believed that he had to have a sense of rivalry with the

United States to uphold his national pride. Consequently, through his

inevitable nationalistic sentiments in this case, his pride of Japanese

technological products he was able to (re)construct his own Japaneseness.

Hostile Attitudes toward Others

Hostile Attitudes toward the United States and American People

While some students had a sense of antipathy toward, or rivalry with,

the United States, a few students had more hostile attitudes toward American

people, like Emi:

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I wanna show them [Americans] Japans excellence because


Im Japanese. To make them aware of Japans technological
excellence, Im not sure but, SONYs excellence, if I can, I
wanna change my computer [made by Hewlett-Packard] to a
VAIO [made by SONY] and decorate myself with SONYs
electric products because Im Japanese, Im from the
country they were made. (Emi: Female)

Although Emi was not exactly sure what Japans technological excellence

entailed, she was firmly convinced of the excellence of SONY products.

Assuming that Americans did not comprehend the excellence of SONY

products and Japan in general, she wanted to make American people aware of

it by buying Japanese products. Her desire to make them aware of Japans

excellence might be rooted in her hostile attitudes toward American people in

general, and those Americans who were unaware of such excellence, in

particular.

Emi tried to justify her hostility only on the grounds of her nationality.

In her above voice, she tried to (re)construct her Japaneseness by immersing

herself in SONYs consumer appliances. In addition, as she continued to talk,

she also (re)constructed her Japaneseness by looking down on American

products and people as well as by stressing the essential differences between

Japanese and American people:

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After I came here, I felt, American people were so lazy..., lazy


on the job. In Japan, while people are behind cash registers,
they cant work with drinking something, you know, and cant
sit down in chairs, you know. But they [Americans] are
different. While they are behind cash registers, they are
getting on cell phones, drinking something, talking with
someone, going on talking with friends, and, you know
Japanese people work in good manners, but of course, I cant
say its necessarily good, but its actually related to Made in
Japan, I think. After all, because of it, Made in Japan has
won peoples esteem, but Made in USA was made by those
people, lazy people, you know. (Emi: Female)

Emi merely tried to justify the excellence of Made in Japan products by

looking down on Made in USA products, which she thought of as made by

lazy people. In her context, Made in Japan was better than Made in

USA because the products were made by Japanese people, who were not as

lazy as Americans.

In fact, Emi believed that Made in USA products embodied American

traits in the same way that Japanese technological products embodied traits

of the Japanese. Moreover, by comparing the working ethics in the United

States with those in Japan, she also seemed to (re)construct her identity as a

Japanese person, who worked hard and had good manners, as opposed to the

lazy Americans.

Based on the assumption that most American people were unaware of

the excellence of Made in Japan products and the Japanese people, Emi

simply wanted to show the superiority of her own nationality by using SONY

products. In other words, she used SONY products to represent the

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excellence of Japanese technological products, Japan, and Japanese people,

including herself. 11 Why did she want to make Americans aware of such

excellence when her attitude toward Americans was condescending? Her

only answer was: Because Im Japanese. However, another student

explained a feeling relatively similar to that of Emis in better terms:

I want them [American people] to know more about Japan


because they dont know about Japan correctly After I came
here, I found, Americans are proud of America, have
American national pride, like, We are number one! We have
power! They believe America is the most [technologically]
advanced country, but its not true, you know. I make them
aware of Japan is more [technologically] advanced and better
country than the United States. (Taro: Male)

Taro criticized those Americans who thought of the United States as the most

technologically advanced country in the world, when the fact was that Japan

was technologically more advanced than the United States. As I cited his

voices in chapter five, he was frustrated and disappointed by his daily

conversations with American people, who did not know about Japans

technological excellence and who had old and false Orientalist images about

Japan and the Japanese. In addition to such Orientalist images, the

Americans misplaced sense of national pride might also have provoked his

consciousness of being Japanese and roused his nationalistic sentiments,

which, consequently, stimulated his antipathy toward American people. At

11Not only Emi, but popular discourses in English language areas have also
acknowledged that SONY products are distinctly seen as Japanese. See, for instance,
Paul Du Gay, Stuart Hall, Linda Janes, Hugh Mackay and Keith Negus, Doing Cultural
Studies: The Story of the Sony Walkman (London: Sage, 1997), 48-50.

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the same time, his antipathy might have stimulated his nationalistic

sentiments.

However, Taro also required that Americans recognize Japans

technological excellence. He unconsciously regarded their recognition as a

measure of the excellence of Japans technological products and the Japanese

people. Even though he roused his nationalistic sentiments and

(re)constructed his Japaneseness by taking pride in the high praise of

Japanese products, he contradictorily required such recognition from

American people, whom he wanted to criticize. Only when American people

recognized the excellence of Japanese technology, Japan, and the Japanese,

could he have pride and confidence in his nationality and himself.

Although both Emi and Taro displayed antipathy toward American

people, they shared ambivalent feelings and attitudes toward them. Moreover,

by talking about Japanese technological products, their own narratives also

functioned as vehicles to clarify their Others, or who They were, and

involved them in a shared sense of We as being Japanese.

Hostile Attitudes toward Other Asian Countries

While some of my interviewees had a sense of rivalry with the United

States, or hostile attitudes toward American people, a few students expressed

their national pride by ridiculing or having a sense of rivalry with other Asian

countries.

For instance, Emi tried to justify the excellence of Made in Japan

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products by looking down not only on Made in USA products, but also on

Made in Taiwan and Made in China products, as follows:

Because they [SONY products] are Japan made, Made in


Japan, which Ive trust in. I think of Made in Taiwan as
something thats gonna be broken soon, Made in China as
something cheap, like a pen, a ruler, and stationery Of
course, its not so simple, but Japan doesnt put something
less than ten bucks Made in Japan, you know. (Emi:
Female)

Although Emi recognized her stereotypical images about Made in Taiwan

and Made in China, she discriminated against the two countries based on

the economic disparities between them and Japan. Of course, she ignored

the omnipresent inexpensive products labeled Made in Japan and the more

complex activities of global business. In fact, the SONY products she

admired were not necessarily Made in Japan, in which she trusted. She did

not know, for example, that my micro-cassette recorder, which I used to record

her interview and which I had bought in the United States, was produced by

SONY, but labeled Made in China.

Emi merely tried to assert the excellence of Japanese technological

products and the Japanese, regardless of whether her stereotypical images

were true or not. While she looked down on Made in USA products by

citing the lazy working attitudes and ethics of American people, she put

down products made by other Asian countries, especially Made in China, by

citing their economic poorness. According to her, Made in Japan was not

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only better but also more expensive than Made in China. Consequently, by

looking down on products labeled Made in Taiwan and Made in China, she

was showing pride for her nationality because of her personal trust in

Japanese products and people.

Unlike Emi, who only looked down on other countries, Chie felt a

sense of rivalry with Korean technological products in the U.S. consumer

market. Although she did not apparently discriminate against Korea, her

rivalry was based on her national pride and belief that Japan should be

economically and technologically the most advanced country in Asia:

If Japan were to lag [technologically] behind other Asian


countries, Im gonna feel so bad, you know. Japanese
[technological] goods are selling well, right? We should sell
them more and more. America is a big and powerful country,
right? So, in such a country, we should win, we should sell
Japanese goods more and more. We cant lose to Korea,
though its working very hard. Korean goods become better
and better, and they are inexpensive, right? We should
make something that Korea cant make, and value-added
something, you know. (Chie: Female)

By identifying herself with Japan, Chie had a strong sense of rivalry with

Korea, since Korea challenged the dominance of Japanese technological

products in the U.S. consumer market and threatened to steal Japans status

as the number one producer in Asia in the technological fields. Unlike some

other students, who regarded the United States as a strong competitor, she

saw it only as a big and powerful market.

In the above voice, though she did not blatantly discriminate against

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Korea, she indirectly did so on the basis of economic disparities between

Japan and Korea. When I asked her why she would feel so bad if Japan

were to lag behind other Asian countries, she answered:

In the Department of International Affairs, in Japans


university, I learned North-South problems, something like
relationships between center and periphery countries, you
know. I learned something like, Japan is one of center
countries and exploits periphery, developing countries, you
know. At that time, I wanted Japan not to fall to an
exploited country. Do you think Im little warped? I dont
know, but I wouldnt be a member of exploited people. (Chie:
Female)

Assuming that Korea was a periphery country of Japans economic block, or

an exploited country, she explained one of her reasons for why We cant lose

to Korea. According to her, the popularity of Japanese technological

products in the U.S. market was clearly associated with Japans economic

status in Asia as well as in the world. She believed that Japanese

technological products played a crucial role in maintaining Japans high

economic status in Asia and in the world, just like a governmental report,

cited in chapter four, which emphasized the role of technological innovations

to maintain Japans economic growth.

Chie had a sense of national superiority to Korea, based on the

economic disparities between Japan and Korea. By looking down on Korea,

she maintained and reinforced her national pride as the top country in Asia.

Moreover, in the above voice, she clearly expressed her shared sense of

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nationality as We. Here, narratives about technology and technological

products clearly functioned as vehicles to clarify who We are and involve her

in Techno-Nationalism.

Summaries

When my interviewees labeled certain technological products

Japanese, they regarded such products as the embodiment of the

characteristics of Japanese culture (such as simplicity, compactness, fine

detailing, and sensitivity) and the traits of Japanese people (such as

gadget-loving and group consciousness). Moreover, most of them took pride

in the praise of such Japanese technological products because of their

nationalistic sentiments, which appeared in their antipathy toward the

United States and in their hostile attitudes toward American people and other

Asian countries. By expressing such nationalistic sentiments, they

(re)produced a shared sense of the Japanese as We and (re)constructed their

Japaneseness as a racial/ethnic/national identity.

By using a particular representation of Japanese technological

products, some of my interviewees took pride in Japan and the Japanese

based on the dichotomy between They American or other Asian people

and We, the Japanese people. When some of them expressed their

antipathy toward the United States and American people, however, they

shared ambivalent feelings that required the recognition of Japans

technological excellence and the Japanese people by American people, who did

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not correctly understand Japan, and whom my interviewees wanted to

criticize.

On the other hand, without any ambivalent feelings, some other

students directly expressed their hostile attitudes toward other Asian

countries based on the economic disparities between Japan and these other

countries. In short, by expressing their feelings of inferiority to the United

States and superiority to other Asian countries, they (re)constructed their

Japaneseness.

However, my interviewees could not (re)construct their Japaneseness

by using the meanings and values of Japanese technological products unless

they were given Techno-Nationalist discourses that enabled them to connect

their nationality with such products. Moreover, such (re)construction may be

also complexly maintained and reinforced by Techno-Orientalism. Since this

complexity needs theoretical explication, I dedicate the concluding chapter of

this dissertation to summarizing the results of previous chapters and offering

a complete theory for my narrative analyses.

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CHAPTER 8

IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS & CONCLUSIONS

Intimate Relationships between U.S. Techno-Orientalism and Japanese

Techno-Nationalism in Global Relations

I would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others can rummage


through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own
area... I would like the little volume that I want to write on disciplinary
systems to be useful to an educator, a warden, a magistrate, a
conscientious objector. I don't write for an audience, I write for users, not
readers. 1 --- Michel Foucault

Introduction: Essential Concerns of This Dissertation

So far, this dissertation has focused on the relationship between

technology and cultural identities in global contexts by drawing on Japanese

as a racial/ethnic/national identity as one concrete example. In this

dissertation, I have particularly examined how the representation of

technology has (re)produced Japaneseness under the gazes of Orientalism and

Nationalism.

This examination entails three specific questions: 1) how is Japanese

represented in connection with technology in dominant discourses both in the

United States and in Japan, 2) how do Japanese college students in the

United States read these discourses in their daily lives, and 3) how do they

(re)construct Japaneseness as their own identity through their readings of

these discourses? To explore these questions, this dissertation has drawn

1Michel Foucault, Prisons et asiles dans le mcanisme du pouvoir, in Dits et Ecrits, t. II.
(Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 523-4, quoted in the web index page of Foucault Studies.
Available at http://www.foucault-studies.com/index1.html

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upon the concept of representation in general, and Techno-Orientalism and

Techno-Nationalism as representations of the Other and the Self in

particular, and has employed sociological and ethnographic methods.

This dissertation has involved the analysis of two types of discourses:

1) dominant discourses, particularly popular magazines in the United States

and advertisements in Japan, which have textually and visually represented

the relationship between technology and Japan and/or the Japanese, and 2)

voices of Japanese college students in the United States, who interpret and

(re)read such dominant discourses in their daily lives. By examining these

discourses throughout this dissertation, I have explored the representation of

technology within the discursive and subjective formations of Japanese as a

racial/ethnic/national identification.

As the concluding section of this dissertation, this chapter first

summarizes the theoretical limitations and implications reviewed in chapter

two by re-clarifying the outline of this dissertation. Then, by organizing

chapters three to six, I clarify both the formations of, and responses to,

Techno-Orientalist and Techno-Nationalist discourses. Finally, by

summarizing the identity formations of Japanese students (examined in

chapter seven), I consider the construction of their Japanese identity under

the interrelated gazes of Techno-Orientalism and Techno-Nationalism in an

in-between place, where they have struggled to (re)construct their own

identities. Moreover, in this consideration, I clarify the intimate

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relationships between Techno-Orientalism and Techno-Nationalism as well as

the limitations and implications of this dissertation.

Theoretical Limitations and Implications of Existing Literature

As seen in chapter two, existing literature suggests that Western

Techno-Orientalism and Japanese Techno-Nationalism stress exclusive

differences between the West and Japan in order to (re)produce their racial,

ethnic, and national identities in their own contexts. 2 In other words,

according to the literature, both Western and Japanese dominant peoples and

institutions attempt to stress racial, ethnic, and/or national differences

between the Self and the Other.

Considering the discursive approach to the concept of representation,

Western Techno-Orientalist and Japanese Techno-Nationalist discourses may

be regarded as being produced, fixed and naturalized as knowledge or the

truth by the dominant and through the active practices of the subordinated

as bearers of power/knowledge. However, neither discourse has been

concretely examined by existing literature except for one article related to the

formation of Japanese Techno-Nationalism. 3

In order to examine the formations of U.S. Techno-Orientalism and

Japanese Techno-Nationalism, I have explored the question: how have U.S.

Techno-Orientalist and Japanese Techno-Nationalist discourses been

2 See the chapter two of this dissertation, especially the section Theoretical
Implications.
3 See Shunya Yoshimi, Made in Japan: The Cultural Politics of 'Home Electrification' in

Postwar Japan, Media, Culture and Society 21:2 (1999), 149-171.

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classified, controlled, and naturalized by dominant people and institutions?

By analyzing popular discourses, particularly U.S. magazines and Japanese

advertisements, I have clarified each discursive formation in chapters three

and five respectively.

From the viewpoint of the neo-Gramscian approach, these discourses

may also be regarded as sites in which the subordinated people accept,

negotiate with, or attempt to reject such discourses through their daily

practices. However, discursive practices related to Techno-Orientalism and

Techno-Nationalism have not been examined yet in existing literature.

Therefore, in order to understand peoples daily conversations about,

and their responses to, both Techno-Orientalist and Techno-Nationalist

discourses, I have explored the question: how do racially, ethnically, and

nationally subordinated Japanese youth in the United States accept,

negotiate with, or attempt to reject such discourses in everyday life? In

chapters four and six, I have explored this question by clarifying and

analyzing their daily discursive practices. Moreover, in chapter seven, I have

examined how Japanese youth (re)construct their Japaneseness by using the

representation of technology in a site of cultural struggles to (re)construct

their racial/ethnic/national identity.

In addition, some critics have suggested intimate relationships

between Western Techno-Orientalism and Japanese Techno-Nationalism by

regarding Japanese Techno-Nationalism as a form of Self- and/or

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Reverse-Orientalism. 4 Yet, at the same time, they have done so without

concrete data. Throughout the ethnographic interview portions of this

dissertation, I have also considered the intimate relationships between U.S.

Techno-Orientalism and Japanese Techno-Nationalism, which I suggest more

concretely in this chapter after summarizing the formations of U.S.

Techno-Orientalist and Japanese Techno-Nationalist discourses as well as the

responses of Japanese youth to both discourses.

Formation of, and Responses to, U.S. Techno-Orientalist and Japanese

Techno-Nationalist Discourses

Techno-Orientalist Discourses in U.S. Popular Magazines

As can be seen from the existing literature examined in chapter three,

since the very end of the nineteenth century, National Geographic has used

the representation of technology as an index of cultural otherness. 5 The

magazine has also represented Japan and the Japanese people with five

overlapping images in connection with technology: the mimic, the female

worker, the yellow peril, the model minority, and the geek. In other words,

the magazine has used the five images to (re)produce, (re)fix, and

(re)naturalize the otherness of Japan and the Japanese. Moreover, it has

4 See, Koichi Iwabuchi, Soft Nationalism and Narcissism: Japanese Popular Culture
Goes Global, Asian Studies Review 26:4 (2002), 447-469; Yoshimi, Made in Japan: The
Cultural Politics of 'Home Electrification' in Postwar Japan.
5 See Catherine A. Lutz and Jane L. Collins, Reading National Geographic (Chicago and

London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); Linda Steet, Veils and Daggers: A
Century of National Geographic's Representation of the Arab World (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2000).

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Chapter 8

been reflecting, and is reflected by, Techno-Orientalist images of Asians in

the United States, represented Japan and the Japanese as the Other, and

differentiated the Other from the Western Self.

While I have concretely clarified the formation of U.S.

Techno-Orientalist discourses in chapter three, I have also raised an

important question about how racially, ethnically, and nationally

subordinated Japanese people in the United States read such discourses.

This is because, as Stuart Hall mentioned, people actively interpret or read

discourses through their own knowledge and values, which do not necessarily

correspond to those of the dominant. 6

Responses to Techno-Orientalist Discourses in Daily Lives

In chapter four, I have first presented how Japanese youth in the

United States encountered and read Techno-Orientalist discourses in their

daily conversations with racially dominant Americans. Although a few

students felt alienated from European-Americans in their daily lives, most of

my interviewees indeed accepted U.S. Techno-Orientalist conversations at

face value and shared its images with their American friends.

As my interview project progressed, their acceptance of

Techno-Orientalist conversations raised fundamental questions about the

theme of this dissertation and my interview methods, which led me to show

them pictures displayed in National Geographic magazine and on popular

6Stuart Hall, Encoding/decoding, in Stuart Hall et. al., eds., Culture, Media, Language
(London and Hutchinson: Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of
Birmingham, 1980), 128-138.

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Chapter 8

magazine covers, some of which I have examined in chapter three.

Although students responses to the photographs in National

Geographic ranged from dominant to rejected, most of them were concerned

only with the accuracy of the photographs and the information presented, not

the Techno-Orientalist representation itself. Moreover, some of them

accepted Techno-Orientalist photographs as more correct or as presenting

better information about todays Japan than old and false Orientalist images.

From their responses to the photographs, I realized their unconscious

standpoint as mediators, who attempted to introduce Japans accurate

information to American people, who did not exactly know about todays

Japan and the Japanese people.

My interviewees also uncritically accepted the Techno-Orientalist

caricatures on magazine covers as a good source of information for Americans.

Moreover, some of them regarded the caricatures not as representations of

U.S. Techno-Orientalism, but as the U.S. recognition of Japans technological

excellence. Yet, at the same time, two students attempted to reject U.S.

Techno-Orientalist discourses. While one male student felt differentiated

from racially dominant Americans in Techno-Orientalist conversations,

another female student rejected the sexist representation of one of the

magazine covers.

On one hand, through his complex responses to Techno-Orientalist

conversations and his antipathy to being seen as Asian, the male student

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Chapter 8

suggested a possible reason for why most students accepted

Techno-Orientalist discourses. From his perspective, I realized that most of

my interviewees might have wanted Americans to differentiate them from

other Asian peoples based on the assumption that Japan was technologically

more advanced than other Asian countries as well as the United States. On

the other hand, through her rejected response to one of the magazine covers,

the female student suggested not only the possibility of the resistance against

sexism, but also the limitation of the resistance against Orientalism from

feminist perspectives.

From these analyses, I realized that my interviewees might have

accepted Techno-Orientalist discourses within a different system of

representation and, therefore, I found a limitation in analyzing their

responses only from U.S. Techno-Orientalist viewpoints, or only within one

system of representation. This led me to examine the formation of Japanese

Techno-Nationalism in chapter five.

Techno-Nationalist Discourses in Japanese TV Advertisements

Along with national technology policies, since the 1980s, TV

advertisements for Japanese technological products, especially for

Japanese automobiles, have been designed to show Japanese consumers

their cutting-edge technologies by using four expressions: Worlds First, or

Best, worldwide recognition, Japaneseness, and Japans pride.

In the TV advertisements, the manufacturers confidence in their

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advanced technologies has been closely connected with an imaginary sense of

Japaneseness. They have stressed that Japanese technological products

have a good reputation in the world, particularly in the West, because of

Japans originality, such as its uniqueness and sensitivity, which is backed by

Japans traditional cultures. Yet, at the same time, the very nationalistic

image of Japanese technology requires the utilization of Reverse

Orientalist viewpoints under the gaze of Orientalism. As seen in chapter

three, the essentialist view of Japanese technology is indeed stressed in U.S.

popular discourses about Japan and its technology.

While I have clarified the formation of Japanese Techno-Nationalist

discourses in chapter five, I have also raised an important question about how

Japans technological excellence, with which Japanese people connect their

own national identity, has been worked ideologically into their everyday lives.

Then, by analyzing how Japanese students saw and talked about Japan and

the Japanese in connection with technology on a day-to-day basis, I have

explored the discursive practices of Japanese students in chapters six and

seven.

Responses to Techno-Nationalist Discourses in Daily Lives

Most of my interviewees mentioned that they came to realize Japans

technological excellence through their observed realities in the United States.

However, their observed realities tended to be supported by Japanese

Techno-Nationalist discourses and functioned to maintain and reinforce such

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discourses. In other words, through my interviews with them, I found

mutually complementary relationships between their observed realities and

Techno-Nationalist discourses.

Some students insisted on the backwardness of American

technological products and the United States in general, given their biased

images of American high-techs. While they associated such backwardness

with the superiority of Japanese technological products over their

American counterparts, other students directly associated their high

expectations for the popularity of Japanese technological products in the

United States with the idea of Japans technological excellence.

Even though their expectations were different in both cases, most

students tended to select observations that maintained and reinforced

Techno-Nationalist discourses based only on the imaginary boundary between

Japanese technological products and their American counterparts.

Through their active and daily discursive practices, moreover, they

(re)produced the fragmental narratives of Japanese Techno-Nationalist

discourses even in the United States. As a result, most of my interviewees

read U.S. Techno-Orientalist discourses under the gaze of Japanese

Techno-Nationalism and (re)produced dominant discourses in Japan as its

bearers.

Although I have come to understand how my interviewees

encountered, read, and (re)produced Techno-Nationalist discourses in their

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everyday lives, there still remained one final question to examine in this

dissertation. Through such discursive practices, how did Japanese students

(re)construct their racial/ethnic/national identity in connection with

Japanese technology? This question was the main topic of chapter seven.

(Re)Construction of Japaneseness under the Gazes of the Relationship

between U.S. Techno-Orientalism and Japanese Techno-Nationalism

(Re)Construction of Japaneseness

When my interviewees called particular technological products

Japanese, they regarded such products as the embodiment of characteristics

of Japanese culture, such as simplicity, compactness, fine detailing, and

sensitivity, on one hand, and the traits of Japanese people, such as loving

gadgets and being group conscious, on the other. Moreover, most of them

took pride in the praise of such Japanese products because of their

nationalistic sentiments, which appeared in their antipathy toward the

United States and in their hostile attitudes toward American people and other

Asian countries. By expressing such nationalistic sentiments, they

(re)produced a shared sense of the Japanese as We and (re)constructed their

Japaneseness as a racial/ethnic/national identity.

However, when some of them expressed their antipathy toward the

United States and American people, they shared ambivalent feelings that

required the recognition of Japans technological excellence and the Japanese

people by Americans, who did not correctly understand Japan. On the other

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hand, without any ambivalent feelings, a few students directly expressed their

hostile attitudes toward other Asian countries based on economic disparities

between Japan and these other countries.

In short, by expressing their feelings of inferiority to the United States

and superiority to other Asian countries, my interviewees (re)constructed

their Japaneseness. At the same time, they could not (re)construct their

Japaneseness by using the meanings and values of Japanese technological

products unless they were given Techno-Nationalist discourses that enabled

them to connect their nationality with such products. Moreover, such

(re)construction is also complexly maintained or reinforced by

Techno-Orientalism.

The Intimate Relationship between U.S. Techno-Orientalism and Japanese

Techno-Nationalism

In chapter five, I have briefly referred to the similarities between U.S.

Techno-Orientalist and Japanese Techno-Nationalist representations by

pointing out that Japanese Techno-Nationalist representations functioned as

forms of Self- and Reverse-Orientalist discourses. As seen in the three

pictures below, examined in chapters three and five, the Techno-Orientalist

caricature on the cover of the New Yoker (Figure 3-5) ukiyoe ladies and

automobiles is very similar to the Techno-Nationalist advertisements for

Japanese automobiles (Figure 5-11 and 5-14).

While the magazine cover stresses Japanese otherness by

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differentiating the Japanese Other from the Western Self, the

advertisements emphasize Japanese originality by distinguishing the

Japanese Self from the Western Other.

Figure 3-5 Figure 5-11

Figure 5-14

Just like the motif of the ukiyoe ladies and automobiles, that of the

kabuki-actor and hi-tech gadgets is also represented both on U.S.

Techno-Orientalist magazine covers (Figure 3-11) and in Japanese

Techno-Nationalist advertisements (Figure 5-12 and 5-16).

So far as both representations are concerned, U.S. Techno-Orientalist

representations have strongly influenced Japanese Techno-Nationalist

counterparts. In other words, Japanese Techno-Nationalist representations

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cannot escape the gaze of Techno-Orientalism when they attempt to show

Japans originality. As a result, Japanese Techno-Nationalist

representation functions as a form of Self- and Reverse-Orientalism.

Figure 3-11 Figure 5-12 Figure 5-16

Moreover, throughout the ethnographic part of this dissertation, particularly

chapters four, six, and seven, I have also considered the intimate relationships

between Western Techno-Orientalism and Japanese Techno-Nationalism by

analyzing the daily discursive practices of Japanese youth in the United

States.

On the one hand, because some of my interviewees required the

acknowledgment of Japans technological excellence by American people, they

positively accepted Techno-Orientalist discourses as good sources of

information for American people, who had little knowledge about todays

Japan. On the other hand, because some other students tried to criticize

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American people, who did not correctly know about Japans technological

excellence due to old and false Orientalist ideas, they tended to connect their

selective realities with Japans technological excellence based not on their

observations in the United States, but on Techno-Nationalist discourses.

Moreover, most of my interviewees might have read

Techno-Orientalist conversations within the context of Techno-Nationalism

and (re)produced Techno-Nationalist discourses even under the gaze of

Techno-Orientalism. As seen in the discussion in chapter four, one student

wanted European-Americans to differentiate the Japanese from other Asian

nationals based on the assumption that Japan was technologically more

advanced than other Asian countries. For some students, Techno-Orientalist

discourses indeed functioned to (re)produce their preexisting idea of Japans

technological excellence. In this sense, the Techno-Orientalist discourses in

their daily lives served to reinforce their preexisting ideas of Japans

technological excellence and were supported by Japanese Techno-Nationalist

discourses.

In addition, as seen in chapter seven, Japanese Techno-Nationalist

discourses may be supported by U.S. Techno-Orientalist discourses, which

have argued the characteristics of the Japanese people from ethnically and

nationally essentialist viewpoints. Some students indeed regarded some

characteristics of the Japanese as an essential and determining factor in the

improvement of Japanese technological products from a nationally

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essentialist viewpoint. Thus, I can gain some understanding of the possible

reasons for my interviewees natural acceptance of Techno-Orientalist

discourses and their differentiation from American people, and the

relationship between Techno-Orientalism and Techno-Nationalism. They

might have unconsciously translated Techno-Nationalist discourses into their

own experiences through their observed realities in the United States, read

Techno-Orientalist discourses within the context of Techno-Nationalism,

which was supported by U.S. Techno-Orientalist discourses, and (re)produced

Techno-Nationalist discourses through the discursive practices in their daily

lives.

In an in-between place not simply composed of transnationality but

of cultural struggles to (re)produce the meanings and values of cultural

identities of Japanese youth, the representation of technology has indeed

functioned to (re)produce the essential differences between the West and

Japan and to (re)construct their Japaneseness as a racial/ethnic/national

identity. Technology has, in fact, functioned as a vehicle that can clarify their

Other, or who They are, and their Self, or who We are, and thus, has

involved them in a shared sense of Japanese.

Conclusions: Limitations and Implications of This Dissertation

In this dissertation, I have considered how the representation of

technology has (re)produced Japaneseness under the gazes of both U.S.

Orientalism and Japanese Nationalism in a global location by analyzing the

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discursive and subjective formations of Japanese in connection with the

representation of technology. Although I have clarified this consideration

throughout the chapters of this dissertation, there still remain many

important questions, which mean there are limitations to this dissertation.

These limitations are categorized into three fields, which will be addressed in

my future studies: the formations of U.S. Techno-Orientalism and Japanese

Techno-Nationalism, their intimate relationship, and the construction of

Japanese identity within this relationship.

First, though I clarify the formations of U.S. Techno-Orientalism and

Japanese Techno-Nationalism by analyzing popular discourses in both

countries, these analyses are, in fact, very limited within specific discourses

U.S. magazine photographs and covers, on one hand, and Japanese TV and

printed advertisements, on the other. When I examine the formations of

both discourses, however, I should cover a broad range of popular discourses,

such as literature, news articles, TV programs, and films.

Secondly, when examining the relationship between U.S.

Techno-Orientalism and Japanese Techno-Nationalism, I should have

considered political, economic, and social relationships between the two

countries as cultural backgrounds of the international relationship. In

addition, future studies need to focus more on the specific socio-historical

contexts, in which these discourses were (re)produced, following the analyses

of the chronological transformations of U.S.-Japan relations. Moreover, I

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have to deepen the theoretical analysis of the intimate discursive

relationships by examining not only their similarities but also their

differences, which may clarify particular meanings and values of each

discursive formation.

Finally, in terms of the construction of Japaneseness as a

racial/ethnic/national identity, I cannot ignore other cultural identities,

especially class and gender. As I briefly mentioned in the introductory

chapter of this dissertation, while cultural identities have been increasingly

regarded as political sites around which people are struggling to change

existing power relations, some struggles have been criticized as reproducing

other power relations. Thus, even though I have clarified the cultural

struggles of Japanese youth to (re)construct their Japaneseness, struggles

over cultural identities themselves can no longer ignore the differences both

within and between cultural identifications in larger power relations.

Indeed, these limitations of my dissertation analyses are crucial to

accomplishing my future academic work. In this sense, I believe this

dissertation is merely the beginning of my academic journey.

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Appendix

Appendix 3-1: All Articles of National Geographic Related to Japan (1894-


1999)

Date Title Pages Author


1990s
1999 10 Last Dive 114-135 Vesilind, Priit J.
1997 07 Sumo 42-57 Reid, T.R.
1997 06 Okinawa: Claiming Its Birthright 86-105 Zich, Arthur
1996 10 Storm Watch Over the Kurils: Russia and Japan Contest 48-67 Cobb, Charles E., Jr.
a Wild Island Chain
1995 11 Great Tokyo Fish Market: Tsukiji 38-55 Reid, T.R.
1995 10 Geisha 99-113 Cobb, Jodi
1995 08 Up From Ground Zero: Hiroshima 78-101 Gup, Ted
1995 07 Kobe Wakes to a Nightmare 112-136 Reid, T.R.
1994 09 Inner Japan 65-95 Smith, Patrick
1994 01 Kyushu: Japan's Southern Gateway 88-117 Dahlby, Tracy
1991 11 Japan's Sun Rises Over the Pacific 36-67 Zich, Arthur
1990 10 Suruga Bay: In the Shadow of Mount Fuji 2-39 Doubilet, David
1990 04 Japanese Women 52-83 Fallows, Deborah

1980s
1989 11 In a Japanese Garden 638-663 Coats, Bruce A.
1989 06 Image for the Computer Age 718-751 Ward, Fred
1987 07 Prodigious Soybean 67-91 Hapgood, Fred
1986 11 Tokyo, A Profile of Success 606-645 Graves, William
1985 08 Pearl 193-223 Ward, Fred
1984 08 Japan Alps 238-259 McCarry, Charles
1984 08 Preposterous Puffer 260-270 Vietmeyer, Noel D.
1984 06 Hagi: Where Japan's Revolution Began 751-773 Gregg, N. Taylor
1984 04 Japan's Izu Oceanic Park 465-491 Clark, Eugenie
1984 01 Silk: The Queen of Textiles 2-49 Hyde, Nina
1983 10 Japanese Crane, Bird of Happiness 542-556 Hayashida, Tsuneo
1983 07 Swing Low, Sweet Chariot!: The Automobile and the 2-35 Grove, Noel
American Way
1982 11 Lost Fleet of Kublai Khan 634-649 Mozai, Torao
1982 10 Chip: Electronic Mini-marvel That is Changing Your 421-457 Boraiko, Allen A.
Life
1982 08 Plight of the Bluefin Tuna 220-239 Butler, Michael J. A.
1981 03 Bonanza Bean: Coffee 388-405 Starbird, Ethel A.
1980 10 Bamboo, the Giant Grass 502-529 Marden, Luis
1980 01 Hokkaido: Japan's Last Frontier 62-93 Lee, Douglas B.

1970s
1978 07 Day of the Rice God: A Folk Festival in Rural Japan 78-85 Lee, Douglas B.
1977 12 Japan's Amazing Inland Sea 830-863 Ellis, William S.
1977 04 Japan's Warriors of the Wind 551-561 Eliot, John L.
1976 06 Kyoto and Nara: Keepers of Japan's Past 836-859 McCarry, Charles
1974 06 Oil, the Dwindling Treasure 792-825 Grove, Noel
1974 03 Those Successful Japanese 323-359 McDowell, Bart
1972 10 Quicksilver and Slow Death 507-527 Putman, John J.
1972 09 Human Treasures of Japan 370-379 Graves, William

209
Appendix

1972 05 Living in a Japanese Village 668-693 Graves, William


1971 07 Nature's Night Lights: Probing the Secrets of 45-69 Zahl, Paul A.
Bioluminescence
1971 07 Ama, Sea Nymphs of Japan 122-135 Marden, Luis
1970 12 Scientist Studies Japan's Fantastic Long-tailed Fowl 844-855 Ogasawara, Frank X.
1970 03 Kansai, Japan's Historic Heartland 295-339 Abercrombie, Thomas J.

1960s
1969 09 Okinawa, the Island Without a Country 422-448 Billard, Jules B.
1968 12 Snow Festival in Japan's Far North 824-833
1968 07 Bonins and Iwo Jima Go Back to Japan: An Era Ends 128-144 Sampson, Paul
For the "Yankee" Isles
1967 09 Kayak Odyssey: From the Inland Sea to Tokyo 295-337 Dimancescu, Dan
1967 02 Japan's "Sky People," the Vanishing Ainu 268-296 Hilger, Mary Inez
1965 05 Shrimp Nursery: Science Explores New Ways to Farm 636-659 Idyll, Clarence P.
the Sea
1964 10 Tokyo, the Peaceful Explosion 445-487 Graves, William
1963 12 YWCA: International Success Story 904-933 Rockefeller, Mary French
1962 07 Round the World School 96-127 Antze, Paul
1960 12 Japan, the Exquisite Enigma 733-777 Shor, Franc
1960 12 Map Supplement: JAPAN AND KOREA
1960 01 Deep Diving off Japan 138-150 Houot, Georges S.

1950s
1959 12 Around the World and the Calendar with the 832-866 Grosvenor, Melville Bell
Geographic: The President's Annual Message
1955 02 Okinawa, the Island Rebuilt 265-288 Diffenderfer, Hope A.
1953 11 Cruising Japan's Inland Sea: Voyaging Americans Brave 619-650 Price, Willard
Whirlpools and Tide Rips to Explore the Secluded
Beauty of an Island World
1953 07 Yankee Sailor Who Opened Japan: Commodore Perry 85-102 Kuhn, Ferdinand
and His Black Ships Changed the Course of History by
Ending Japan's Seclusion a Century Ago This Month

1950 05 Japan Tries Freedom's Road 593-632 Vosburgh, Frederick G.


1950 04 Okinawa, Pacific Outpost 538-552 Stubenrauch, Robert

1940s
1947 07 Adventures with the Survey Navy
1947 04 Backwoods Japan During American Occupation 491-518 Huberman, M. A.
1946 06 Sunset in the East 797-812 Walliser, Blair A.
1946 05 American Pathfinders in the Pacific 617-640 Nicholas, William H.
1945 12 Face of Japan 753-768 Moore, W. Robert
1945 11 Behind the Mask of Modern Japan 513-535 Price, Willard
1945 10 Okinawa, Threshold to Japan 411-428 Duncan, David D.
1945 10 Jap Rule in the Hermit Nation 429-451 Price, Willard
1945 05 Peacetime Rambles in the Ryukyus 543-561 Schwartz, William L.
1945 04 South from Saipan 441-474 Moore, W. Robert
1944 10 Springboards to Tokyo 385-407 Price, Willard
1944 06 Manipur: Where Japan Struck at India 743-750

210
Appendix

1944 04 Japan and the Pacific 385-414 Grew, Joseph C.


1942 11 Japan Faces Russia in Manchuria 603-634 Price, Willard
1942 08 Unknown Japan: A Portrait of the People Who Make Up 225-252 Price, Willard
One of the Two Most Fanatical Nations in the World

1930s
1938 01 Women's Work in Japan 99-132 Nourse, Mary A.
1936 04 Friendly Journeys in Japan: A Young American Finds a 441-480 Patric, John
Ready Welcome in the Homes of the Japanese During
Leisurely Travels Through the Islands

1936 04 Mysterious Micronesia: Yap, Map, and Other Islands 481-510 Price, Willard
Under Japanese Mandate are Museums of Primitive
Man
1933 03 Motor Trails in Japan 303-318 Moore, W. Robert
1933 03 Japan, Child of the World's Old Age: An Empire of 257-301 Griffis, William Elliot
Mountainous Islands, Whose Alert People Constantly
Conquer Harsh Forces of Land, Sea, and Sky

1932 02 Tokyo To-day 131-162 Castle, William R.


1930 05 Some Impressions of 150,000 Miles of Travel 523-598 Taft, William H.

1920s
1924 04 Sakurajima, Japan's Greatest Volcanic Eruption: A 441-470 Jaggar, Thomas A.
Convulsion of Nature Whose Ravages Were Minimized
by Scientific Knowledge, Compared with the Terrors and
Destruction of the Recent Tokyo Earthquake

1923 10 How the Earth Telegraphed Its Tokyo Quake to 453-454 Tondorf, Francis A.
Washington
1923 10 Empire of the Risen Sun 415-443 Griffis, William E.
1922 09 Some Aspects of Rural Japan 275-301 Weston, Walter
1921 07 Geography of Japan: With Special Reference to Its 45-84 Weston, Walter
Influence on the Character of the Japanese People
1920 10 Making of a Japanese Newspaper 327-334 Green, Thomas E.
1920 04 Around the World with the Salvation Army 347-368 Booth, Evangeline

1910s
1914 10 Japan 415-420
1914 07 Young Japan 54-64 Scidmore, Eliza R.
1913 02 Do Volcanic Explosions Affect Our Climate? 181-191 Abbot, C.G.
1911 11 Glimpses of Japan 965-1002 Chapin, William W.
1910 12 Race Prejudice in the Far East 973-985 Stone, Melville E.

1900s
1908 04 Why Nik-ko Is Beautiful 300-308 De Forest, J.H.
1907 10 Koyasan, the Japanese Valhalla 640-670 Scidmore, Eliza R.
1907 04 Giant Spider Crab from Japan 280
1906 09 Cultivation of Marine and Fresh-Water Animals in 524-531 Mitsukuri, K.
Japan
1906 09 Japan, America, and the Orient 498-504 Hioki, Eki
1905 10 Population of Japan 482 B Ballard, W.

211
Appendix

1905 09 Japan and the United States 432-434


1905 07 Purpose of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 333-337 Hioki, Eki
1905 05 Chapter from Japanese History 220-228 Hioki, Eki
1905 05 Fisheries of Japan 201-220 Smith, Hugh M.
1905 03 Characteristics of the Japanese People 93-100 Kaneko, Kentaro, B.
1905 02 Observations on the Russo-Japanese War, in Japan and 80-82 Seaman, Louis L.
Manchuria
1904 11 Some Facts About Japan 446-448 Grosvenor, Gilbert H.
1904 10 Pearl and Turtle Farms in Japan 427
1904 09 Fisheries of Japan 362-364 Smith, Hugh M.
1904 08 Agriculture in Japan 323-326 Bellows, E.C.
1904 05 Lessons from Japan 221-225
1901 02 Japan and China: Some Comparisons 69-77 Webster, Harrie

1890s
1899 09 Commercial Development of Japan 329-337 Austin, O.P.
1898 12 President Alexander Graham Bell on Japan 509-512 Hyde, John
1896 09 Recent Earthquake Wave on the Coast of Japan 285-289 Scidmore, Eliza R.
1894 12 Japan 193-199

212
Appendix

Appendix 4-1: Information on Interviewees

Sex Name Major Grade Stay in the US From


M01 Hiroshi MG 4 4 Tokyo Metropolitan Area
M02 Jun GE 1 5 Western Japan
M03 Ken GE 2 5 Osaka Area
M04 Makoto MATH 3 3 Tokyo Metropolitan Area
M05 Osamu ARCH 2 2 Tokyo Metropolitan Area
M06 Satoshi MG 4 4 Tokyo Metropolitan Area
M07 Ryo MG 3 3 Eastern Japan
M08 Taro POL 3 3 Eastern Japan
F01 Aiko ART 4 4 Eastern Japan
F02 Chie COM 4 2 Osaka Area
F03 Emi MG 3 1 Tokyo Metropolitan Area
F04 Kei MG 3 1 Tokyo Metropolitan Area
F05 Mari PHY 3 3 Eastern Japan
F06 Naomi DMS 2 2 Eastern Japan
F07 Yoko ARTH 4 4 Western Japan
F08 Tomoko MG 4 4 Western Japan

213
Appendix

Appendix 4-2: Consent Form

UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK


The Representational Roles of Technology within the Subjective Formation of Identification Japanese
CONSENT FORM

This consent form explains my research study. Please read it carefully. Ask questions about anything you
do not understand. If you do not have questions now, you may ask later.

SHUZO KOGURE
Ph.D Student at the Department of Educational Leadership and Policy
Address: xxxx xxxxxxx Road #X, Amherst, NY 14228
Phone & Fax: (xxx) xxx-xxxx
E-mail: xxxxxxx@buffalo.edu

You are invited to participate in research on exploring the symbolic relationship between technology and
Japan including its culture and people. In this interview, you will be asked open-ended questions about your images
of the connection between technology and Japan, introduced with the initial question: What do you image when you
connect two words, technology and Japan? Your participation in this interview will take approximately 60-90
minutes. Additional interviews may be scheduled if necessary and with agreement between you and the researcher.
For information about this research, please contact at the information above or my faculty sponsor Dr. xxxx
xxxxxx, Graduate School of Education, Baldy Hall, North Campus, email: xxxxx@buffalo.edu or voice: xxx-xxxx
xxxxx. This research study has been reviewed by the Social and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board,
University at Buffalo. For questions regarding the rights of participants in research, the Social and Behavioral Sciences
Institutional Review Board may be contacted at (xxx) xxx-xxxx.
This interview will be recorded on audiotapes, which will not be played at any scientific meetings and will be
kept for at least 3 years until completely erased. Your data in this interview will be used primarily for doctoral
research but may also be used for educational purposes, in conferences and written publications such as articles.
Your individual privacy will be maintained. You will not be identified by name, and a pseudonym (a false name)
will be used in all written and published data resulting from this interview.
There are no known risks to participating in this research. There may be no direct benefit including
payment to you other than a sense of helping the public at large and contributing to knowledge.
Your participation is voluntary. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits.
You have the right to refuse to answer particular questions and to stop tape-recording anytime during this
interview. In addition, you have the right to withdraw your own data at the end of this interview or later.
This document is to provide the information participants need to know in order to make a good decision
about study participation. It is not to execute a waiver of liability on behalf of the researcher. By signing this form, you
are not waiving any legal rights.

I, __________________________ have read the explanation provided to me. I have had all my questions
answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study. I HAVE BEEN GIVEN A COPY OF
THIS CONSENT FORM.

________________________________________________________
Signature & Date of Participant

I certify that I obtained the consent of the subject whose signature is above. I understand that I must give a
signed copy of the informed consent form to the subject, and keep the original copy in my files for at least 3 years after
the completion of the research project.

________________________________________________________
Signature & Date of Researcher

214
Appendix

Appendix 4-3: All Photographs of National Geographic and Magazine Covers


Shown Interviewees

Ward, Images for the Computer Age, National Geographic 175:6 (June 1989),
748-49.

Arthur Zich, Japan's Sun Rise Over the Pacific, National Geographic 180:5
(November 1991), 41-42.

215
Appendix

Arthur Zich, Japan's Sun Rise Over the Pacific, National Geographic 180:5
(November 1991), 46-47.

216
Appendix

Time (March 30, 1981) The New York Times Magazine (July 8, 1984)

New Yorker (February 6, 1989) New Yorker (March 18, 2002)

217
Appendix

Time (August 1, 1983) Wired Magazine (September 2001)

218
Appendix

Appendix 5-1: All TV Advertisements Examined in Chapter 5 (by Makers)

TOYOTA

Name Type Year Name Type Year


MR2 1st (W10) 1984 Carina 4th (T150) 1984
MR2 2nd (W20) 1989 Carina 4th (T150) 1986
Isis 1st 2004 Carina 4th (T150) 1987
Isis 1st 2004 Carina 5th (T170) 1988
Allion 1st (T240) 2001 Carina 5th (T170) 1988
Allion 1st (T240) 2002 Carina 5th (T170) 1989
Allion 1st (T240) 2002 Carina 5th (T170) 1989
Allion 1st (T240) 2003 Carina 5th (T170) 1990
Allion 1st (T240) 2003 Carina 5th (T170) 1990
Allion 1st (T240) 2005 Carina 5th (T170) 1991
Aristo 1st (S140) 1991 Carina 5th (T170) 1992
Aristo 1st (S140) 1992 Carina 6th (T190) 1992
Aristo 1st (S140) 1994 Carina 6th (T190) 1992
Aristo 2nd (S160) 1997 Carina 6th (T190) 1993
Aristo 2nd (S160) 1998 Carina 6th (T190) 1994
Wish 1st 2003 Carina 7th (T210) 1996
Wish 1st 2003 Carina ED 1st (T160) 1985
Wish 1st 2003 Carina ED 1st (T160) 1987
Wish 1st 2003 Carina ED 1st (T160) 1988
Wish 1st 2003 Carina ED 2nd (T180) 1989
Wish 1st 2004 Carina ED 2nd (T180) 1991
Wish 1st 2004 Carina ED 3rd (T200) 1993
Wish 1st 2004 Carina ED 3rd (T200) 1996
Wish 1st 2004 Corolla Sedan 4th (E70) 1982
Wish 1st 2005 Corolla Sedan 5th (E80) 1983
Vitz 2nd (P90) 2005 Corolla Sedan 5th (E80) 1983
Vitz 2nd (P90) 2005 Corolla Sedan 5th (E80) 1984
Vitz 2nd (P90) 2005 Corolla Sedan 5th (E80) 1984
Windom 1st 1991 Corolla Sedan 5th (E80) 1984
Windom 1st 1991 Corolla Sedan 5th (E80) 1985
Windom 1st 1992 Corolla Sedan 5th (E80) 1985
Windom 1st 1992 Corolla Sedan 5th (E80) 1986
Windom 1st 1993 Corolla Sedan 5th (E80) 1987
Windom 1st 1995 Corolla Sedan 6th (E90) 1987
Windom 1st 1995 Corolla Sedan 6th (E90) 1989
Camry 2nd (V10) 1983 Corolla Sedan 6th (E90) 1989
Camry 2nd (V10) 1984 Corolla Sedan 6th (E90) 1991
Camry 2nd (V10) 1984 Corolla Sedan 7th (E100) 1991
Camry 2nd (V10) 1986 Corolla Sedan 7th (E100) 1993
Camry 3rd (V20) 1986 Corolla Sedan 8th (E110) 1995
Camry 3rd (V20) 1988 Corolla Wagon 7th (E100) 1995
Camry 4th (V30) 1990 Corolla Wagon 7th (E100) 1995
Camry 5th (V40) 1994 Corolla Wagon 7th (E100) 1995
Camry 5th (V40) 1994 Corolla Wagon 7th (E100) 1996
Camry 5th (V40) 1994 Corolla Wagon 7th (E100) 1997
Carina 3rd (A60) 1981 Corolla Wagon 7th (E100) 1997
Carina 3rd (A60) 1982 Corolla Wagon 7th (E100) 1997
Carina 3rd (A60) 1983 Corolla Wagon 7th (E100) 1998
Carina 4th (T150) 1984 Corolla Wagon 9th (E120) 1999
Carina 4th (T150) 1984 Corolla Wagon 9th (E120) 2000

219
Appendix

TOYOTA (Continued)

Name Type Year Name Type Year


Crown 7th (S120) 1983 Coroa EXiV 2nd (T200) 1994
Crown 7th (S120) 1984 Coroa EXiV 2nd (T200) 1996
Crown 7th (S120) 1987 Supra 2nd (A60) 1983
Crown 8th (S130) 1987 Supra 3rd (1st A70) 1986
Crown 8th (S130) 1988 Supra 3rd (1st A70) 1986
Crown 8th (S130) 1989 Supra 3rd (1st A70) 1988
Crown 8th (S130) 1990 Supra 3rd (1st A70) 1990
Crown 9th (S140) 1991 Supra 4th (2nd A80) 1993
Crown 9th (S140) 1992 Supra 4th (2nd A80) 1996
Crown 9th (S140) 1992 Starlet 2nd (P60) 1980
Crown 9th (S140) 1993 Starlet 2nd (P60) 1981
Crown 12nd (S180) 2003 Starlet 2nd (P60) 1982
Crown 12nd (S180) 2004 Starlet 2nd (P60) 1983
Crown 12nd (S180) 2004 Starlet 3rd (P70) 1984
Crown 12nd (S180) 2004 Starlet 3rd (P70) 1984
Crown 12nd (S180) 2004 Starlet 3rd (P70) 1985
Cresta 1st (X50) 1980 Starlet 3rd (P70) 1986
Cresta 1st (X50) 1980 Starlet 3rd (P70) 1987
Cresta 1st (X60) 1982 Starlet 3rd (P70) 1988
Cresta 2nd (X70) 1984 Starlet 3rd (P70) 1989
Cresta 2nd (X70) 1986 Starlet 4th (P80) 1989
Cresta 3rd (X80) 1988 Starlet 4th (P80) 1992
Cresta 3rd (X80) 1989 Starlet 4th (P80) 1994
Cresta 3rd (X80) 1990 Sprinter 5th (E80) 1984
Cresta 3rd (X80) 1991 Sprinter 5th (E80) 1984
Cresta 4th (X90) 1993 Sprinter 5th (E80) 1985
Cresta 5th (X100) 1996 Sprinter 5th (E80) 1985
Cresta 5th (X100) 1996 Sprinter 5th (E80) 1987
Cresta 5th (X100) 1998 Sprinter 6th (E90) 1987
Corona 6th (T140) 1982 Sprinter 6th (E90) 1988
Corona 6th (T140) 1982 Sprinter 6th (E90) 1989
Corona 6th (T140) 1982 Sprinter 6th (E90) 1991
Corona 7th (T150) 1983 Celica 3rd (A60) 1984
Corona 7th (T150) 1984 Celica 4th (T160) 1985
Corona 7th (T150) 1985 Celica 4th (T160) 1986
Corona 7th (T150) 1985 Celica 4th (T160) 1987
Corona 7th (T150) 1986 Celica 5th (T180) 1989
Corona 7th (T150) 1987 Celica 5th (T180) 1989
Corona 8th (T170) 1987 Celica 5th (T180) 1989
Corona 8th (T170) 1988 Celica 5th (T180) 1990
Corona 8th (T170) 1988 Celica 5th (T180) 1991
Corona 8th (T170) 1989 Celica 6th (T200) 1993
Corona 9th (T190) 1992 Celica 6th (T200) 1993
Corona 9th (T190) 1992 Celica 6th (T200) 1994
Corona 9th (T190) 1992 Celsior 1st (F10) 1989
Corona Coupe 1st (T160) 1987 Celsior 1st (F10) 1989
Coroa EXiV 1st (T180) 1989 Celsior 2nd (F20) 1994
Coroa EXiV 1st (T180) 1991 Celsior 2nd (F20) 1997
Coroa EXiV 1st (T180) 1991 Celsior 3rd (F30) 2000
Coroa EXiV 2nd (T200) 1993 Celsior 3rd (F30) 2000

220
Appendix

TOYOTA (Continued)

Name Type Year Name Type Year


Soarer 1st (Z10) 1981 Vista 1st (V10) 1983
Soarer 2nd (Z20) 1986 Vista 1st (V10) 1983
Soarer 2nd (Z20) 1988 Vista 1st (V10) 1986
Soarer 3rd (Z30) 1991 Vista 2nd (V20) 1988
Soarer 3rd (Z30) 1992 Vista 2nd (V20) 1989
Soarer 3rd (Z30) 1994 Vista 3rd (V30) 1990
Chaser 3rd (X70) 1985 Vista 3rd (V30) 1991
Chaser 3rd (X70) 1986 Vista 4th (V40) 1994
Chaser 4th (X80) 1988 Mark II 5th X70 1984
Chaser 4th (X80) 1989 Mark II 5th X70 1984
Chaser 4th (X80) 1990 Mark II 5th X70 1985
Chaser 4th (X80) 1990 Mark II 5th X70 1985
Chaser 4th (X80) 1991 Mark II 5th X70 1986
Chaser 5th (X90) 1992 Mark II 6th X80 1988
Chaser 5th (X90) 1994 Mark II 6th X80 1989
Chaser 6th (X100) 1996 Mark II 6th X80 1990
Chaser 6th (X100) 1996 Mark II 6th X80 1991
Chaser 6th (X100) 1997 Mark II 6th X80 1991
Chaser 6th (X100) 1998 Mark II 7th X90 1992
Hiace 3rd (H50) 1983 Mark II 7th X90 1992
Hiace 4th (H100) 1996 Mark II 7th X90 1992
Hiace 5th (GH) 2000 Mark II 7th X90 1994
Hiace 5th (GH) 2001 Mark II 7th X90 1995
Hilux Surf 3rd (N180) 1996 Mark II 7th X90 1995
Hilux Surf 3rd (N180) 1996 Mark II 8th X100 1996
Hilux Surf 3rd (N180) 1997 Mark II 8th X100 1996
Hilux Surf 3rd (N180) 1997 Mark II 8th X100 1998
Hilux Surf 3rd (N180) 1998 Mark II 9th X110 2000
Hilux Surf 3rd (N180) 1999 Mark II 9th X110 2000
Hilux Surf 3rd (N180) 1999 Mark II 9th X110 2001
Hilux Surf 3rd (N180) 1999 Mark II 9th X110 2001
Hilux Surf 3rd (N180) 2000 Mark II 9th X110 2001
Hilux Surf 4th (N210) 2003 Mark II 9th X110 2001
Passo 1st 2004 Mark II 9th X110 2002
Passo 1st 2004 Mark II 9th X110 2002
Passo 1st 2004 Mark 1st 2004
Harrier 1st 1997 Mark 1st 2004
Harrier 1st 1997 Mark 1st 2004
Harrier 1st 1998 Mark 1st 2005
Harrier 1st 1998 Regius 1st 1996
Harrier 1st 1999 Regius 1st 1996
Harrier 1st 2000 Regius 1st 1997
Harrier 1st 2000 Regius 1st 1999
Harrier 2nd 2000
Harrier 2nd 2001
Harrier 2nd 2001
Harrier 2nd 2003
Harrier 2nd 2003
Vista 1st (V10) 1982
Vista 1st (V10) 1982

221
Appendix

NISSAN

Name Type Year Name Type Year


Infiniti Q45 1st (G50) 1989 Sunny 6th (B12) 1987
Infiniti Q45 1st (G50) 1989 Sunny 6th (B12) 1987
X-Trail 1st (T30) 2000 Sunny 6th (B12) 1988
X-Trail 1st (T30) 2001 Sunny 6th (B12) 1989
X-Trail 1st (T30) 2001 Sunny 7th (B13) 1990
X-Trail 1st (T30) 2001 Sunny 7th (B13) 1992
X-Trail 1st (T30) 2001 Sunny 7th (B13) 1992
X-Trail 1st (T30) 2001 Sunny 7th (B13) 1992
X-Trail 1st (T30) 2001 Sunny 7th (B13) 1992
X-Trail 1st (T30) 2001 Sunny 8th (B14) 1994
X-Trail 1st (T30) 2002 Safari 3rd (Y61) 1997
X-Trail 1st (T30) 2002 Silvia 4th (S12) 1984
Elgrand 1st (E50) 1997 Silvia 4th (S12) 1986
Elgrand 1st (E50) 1999 Silvia 4th (S12) 1987
Elgrand 1st (E50) 2000 Silvia 5th (S13) 1988
Elgrand 2nd (E51) 2002 Silvia 5th (S13) 1988
Elgrand 2nd (E51) 2002 Silvia 5th (S13) 1990
Elgrand 2nd (E51) 2003 Silvia 5th (S13) 1991
Elgrand 2nd (E51) 2003 Silvia 5th (S13) 1992
Elgrand 2nd (E51) 2003 Silvia 6th (S14) 1993
Elgrand 2nd (E51) 2004 Silvia 6th (S14) 1993
Elgrand 2nd (E51) 2004 Silvia 6th (S14) 1994
Auster 3rd (T12) 1985 Silvia 6th (S14) 1995
Auster 3rd (T12) 1986 Silvia 6th (S14) 1997
Caravan 3rd (E24) 1986 Silvia 7th (S15) 1999
Caravan 3rd (E24) 1988 Silvia 7th (S15) 1999
Gloria 7th (Y30) 1984 Cima 1st (Y31) 1988
Gloria 7th (Y30) 1986 Cima 1st (Y31) 1988
Gloria 8th (Y31) 1987 Cima 1st (Y31) 1989
Gloria 8th (Y31) 1987 Cima 1st (Y31) 1990
Gloria 8th (Y31) 1988 Cima 2nd (Y32) 1991
Gloria 8th (Y31) 1989 Cima 2nd (Y32) 1992
Gloria 8th (Y31) 1990 Cima 2nd (Y32) 1992
Gloria 9th (Y32) 1991 Skyline GT-R 4th (BCNR33) 1995
Gloria 9th (Y32) 1993 Skyline GT-R 4th (BCNR33) 1997
Gloria 10th (Y33) 1995 Skyline GT-R 5th (BNR34) 1999
Gloria 10th (Y33) 1996 Skyline 5th (C210) 1980
Gloria 10th (Y33) 1997 Skyline 6th (R30) 1983
Gloria 11th (Y34) 1999 Skyline 6th (R30) 1984
Gloria 11th (Y34) 1999 Skyline 6th (R30) 1984
Gloria 11th (Y34) 2000 Skyline 7th (R31) 1985
Gloria 11th (Y34) 2000 Skyline 7th (R31) 1985
Gloria 11th (Y34) 2001 Skyline 7th (R31) 1986
Sunny 5th (B11) 1983 Skyline 7th (R31) 1986
Sunny 5th (B11) 1984 Skyline 7th (R31) 1986
Sunny 6th (B12) 1985 Skyline 7th (R31) 1987
Sunny 6th (B12) 1985 Skyline 7th (R31) 1987
Sunny 6th (B12) 1985 Skyline 7th (R31) 1988
Sunny 6th (B12) 1986 Skyline 7th (R31) 1989
Sunny 6th (B12) 1987 Skyline 8th (R32) 1989

222
Appendix

NISSAN (Continued)

Name Type Year Name Type Year


Skyline 8th (R32) 1989 Cedric 8th (Y32) 1993
Skyline 8th (R32) 1990 Cedric 9th (Y33) 1995
Skyline 8th (R32) 1991 Cedric 9th (Y33) 1996
Skyline 8th (R32) 1992 Cedric 9th (Y33) 1997
Skyline 8th (R32) 1992 Cedric 9th (Y33) 1997
Skyline 8th (R32) 1993 Cedric 9th (Y33) 1997
Skyline 9th (R33) 1993 Cedric 10th (Y34) 1999
Skyline 9th (R33) 1993 Cedric 10th (Y34) 2000
Skyline 9th (R33) 1994 Cedric 10th (Y34) 2000
Skyline 9th (R33) 1994 Cedric 10th (Y34) 2001
Skyline 9th (R33) 1995 Cefiro 1st (A31) 1988
Skyline 9th (R33) 1996 Cefiro 1st (A31) 1988
Skyline 9th (R33) 1996 Cefiro 1st (A31) 1989
Skyline 10th (R34) 1998 Cefiro 1st (A31) 1989
Skyline 10th (R34) 1998 Cefiro 1st (A31) 1990
Skyline 10th (R34) 1999 Cefiro 1st (A31) 1990
Skyline 10th (R34) 2000 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1994
Skyline 11th (V35) 2001 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1994
Skyline 11th (V35) 2001 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1994
Skyline 11th (V35) 2003 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1994
Skyline 11th (V35) 2003 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1994
Skyline 11th (V35) 2003 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1995
Stagea 1st (C34) 1996 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1995
Stagea 1st (C34) 1996 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1995
Stagea 1st (C34) 1996 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1995
Stagea 1st (C34) 1996 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1996
Stagea 1st (C34) 1996 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1996
Stagea 1st (C34) 1996 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1996
Stagea 1st (C34) 1996 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1997
Stagea 1st (C34) 1997 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1997
Stagea 1st (C34) 1997 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1997
Stagea 1st (C34) 1997 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1997
Stagea 1st (C34) 1998 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1997
Stagea 1st (C34) 1998 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1997
Stagea 2nd (M35) 2001 Cefiro 2nd (A32) 1998
Stagea 2nd (M35) 2001 Cefiro 3rd (A33) 1999
Stagea 2nd (M35) 2002 Cefiro 3rd (A33) 1999
Stagea 2nd (M35) 2002 Tiida 1st (C11) 2004
Stagea 2nd (M35) 2003 Tiida 1st (C11) 2004
Stagea 2nd (M35) 2003 Tiida 1st (C11) 2005
Stagea 2nd (M35) 2004 Tiida Latio 1st (SC11) 2004
Stagea 2nd (M35) 2004 Tiida Latio 1st (SC11) 2005
Cedric 6th (Y30) 1984 Teana 1st (J31) 2003
Cedric 6th (Y30) 1985 Teana 1st (J31) 2003
Cedric 6th (Y30) 1986 Teana 1st (J31) 2003
Cedric 7th (Y31) 1987 Teana 1st (J31) 2003
Cedric 7th (Y31) 1988 Teana 1st (J31) 2003
Cedric 7th (Y31) 1989 Teana 1st (J31) 2003
Cedric 7th (Y31) 1990 Teana 1st (J31) 2004
Cedric 8th (Y32) 1991 Teana 1st (J31) 2004

223
Appendix

NISSAN (Continued)

Name Type Year Name Type Year


Teana 1st (J31) 2005 Bluebird 8th (U12) 1987
Terrano 2nd (R50) 1995 Bluebird 8th (U12) 1987
Terrano 2nd (R50) 1996 Bluebird 8th (U12) 1988
Terrano 2nd (R50) 1996 Bluebird 8th (U12) 1989
Terrano 2nd (R50) 1996 Bluebird 8th (U12) 1989
Terrano 2nd (R50) 1997 Bluebird 8th (U12) 1990
Terrano 2nd (R50) 1997 Bluebird 9th (U13) 1991
Terrano 2nd (R50) 1999 Bluebird 9th (U13) 1992
Pulsar 1st (N10) 1980 Bluebird 9th (U13) 1992
Pulsar 2nd (N12) 1982 Bluebird 9th (U13) 1992
Pulsar 2nd (N12) 1982 Bluebird 9th (U13) 1993
Pulsar 2nd (N12) 1984 Bluebird 9th (U13) 1994
Pulsar 2nd (N12) 1984 Bluebird 11th (G10) 2000
Pulsar 2nd (N12) 1985 Bluebird 11th (G10) 2001
Pulsar 2nd (N12) 1986 Bluebird 11th (G10) 2002
Pulsar 3rd (N13) 1986 Bluebird 11th (G10) 2003
Pulsar 3rd (N13) 1986 Bluebird 11th (G10) 2004
Pulsar 3rd (N13) 1987 Presea 1st (R10) 1990
Pulsar 3rd (N13) 1988 Presea 1st (R10) 1992
Pulsar 3rd (N13) 1988 Presea 1st (R10) 1993
Pulsar 3rd (N13) 1989 Presea 2nd (R11) 1995
Pulsar 4th (N14) 1990 Presea 2nd (R11) 1995
Pulsar 4th (N14) 1990 Presea 2nd (R11) 1995
Pulsar 4th (N14) 1990 Presea 2nd (R11) 1997
Pulsar 4th (N14) 1991 March 1st (K10) 1982
Pulsar 4th (N14) 1992 March 1st (K10) 1983
Pulsar 4th (N14) 1992 March 1st (K10) 1983
Pulsar 5th (N15) 1995 March 1st (K10) 1984
Pulsar 5th (N15) 1995 March 1st (K10) 1984
Pulsar 5th (N15) 1997 March 1st (K10) 1985
Fuga 1st (Y50) 2004 March 1st (K10) 1985
Fuga 1st (Y50) 2004 March 1st (K10) 1985
Fuga 1st (Y50) 2005 March 1st (K10) 1986
Fairlady Z 3rd (Z31) 1985 March 1st (K10) 1988
Fairlady Z 3rd (Z31) 1986 March 1st (K10) 1989
Primera 1st (P10) 1990 March 1st (K10) 1990
Primera 2nd (P11) 1997 March 2nd (K11) 1993
Primera 2nd (P11) 1998 March 2nd (K11) 1995
Primera 3rd (P12) 2001 March 2nd (K11) 1997
Primera 3rd (P12) 2001 March 2nd (K11) 1999
Primera 3rd (P12) 2001 March 2nd (K11) 2000
Primera 3rd (P12) 2001 March 2nd (K11) 2000
Primera 3rd (P12) 2002 March 2nd (K11) 2000
Primera 3rd (P12) 2003 March 2nd (K11) 2001
Bluebird 6th (910) 1980 Maxima 1st (PU11) 1984
Bluebird 6th (910) 1982 Maxima 1st (PU11) 1985
Bluebird 7th (U11) 1983 Maxima 1st (PU11) 1986
Bluebird 7th (U11) 1985 Maxima 2nd (J30) 1988
Bluebird 7th (U11) 1986 Maxima 2nd (J30) 1988
Bluebird 7th (U11) 1986 Maxima 2nd (J30) 1989

224
Appendix

NISSAN (Continued) HONDA

Name Type Year Name Type Year


Maxima 2nd (J30) 1991 CR-V 1st (RD1) 1996
Murano 1st (TZ50) 2004 CR-V 1st (RD1) 1996
Murano 1st (TZ50) 2004 CR-V 1st (RD1) 1996
Lafesta 1st (B30) 2004 CR-V 1st (RD1) 1997
Lafesta 1st (B30) 2004 CR-V 1st (RD1) 1997
Largo 3rd (W30) 1997 CR-V 1st (RD1) 1998
Langley 3rd (N13) 1988 CR-V 1st (RD1) 1999
Liberta Villa 1st (N12) 1982 CR-V 1st (RD1) 2000
Liberta Villa 1st (N12) 1984 CR-V 2nd 2001
Liberta Villa 2nd (N13) 1986 CR-V 2nd 2002
Liberta Villa 2nd (N13) 1988 CR-V 2nd 2004
Leopard 1st (F30) 1984 CR-X 1st (AF) 1983
Leopard 2nd (F31) 1987 CR-X 1st (AF) 1984
Leopard 2nd (F31) 1988 CR-X 1st (AF) 1984
Leopard 3rd (JY32) 1992 CR-X 1st (AF) 1985
Leopard 4th (JY33) 1996 CR-X 2nd (EF) 1987
Laurel 4th (C31) 1982 CR-X 2nd (EF) 1988
Laurel 4th (C31) 1983 Acty 1st 1983
Laurel 5th (C32) 1984 Acty 1st 1985
Laurel 5th (C32) 1984 Acty 2nd 1988
Laurel 5th (C32) 1984 Accord 2nd (AD) 1984
Laurel 5th (C32) 1985 Accord 2nd (AD) 1984
Laurel 5th (C32) 1985 Accord 3rd (CA) 1985
Laurel 5th (C32) 1986 Accord 3rd (CA) 1985
Laurel 5th (C32) 1986 Accord 3rd (CA) 1985
Laurel 5th (C32) 1987 Accord 3rd (CA) 1985
Laurel 5th (C32) 1988 Accord 3rd (CA) 1985
Laurel 6th (C33) 1988 Accord 3rd (CA) 1986
Laurel 6th (C33) 1989 Accord 3rd (CA) 1986
Laurel 6th (C33) 1989 Accord 3rd (CA) 1987
Laurel 6th (C33) 1990 Accord 3rd (CA) 1987
Laurel 6th (C33) 1991 Accord 3rd (CA) 1987
Laurel 6th (C33) 1991 Accord 3rd (CA) 1987
Laurel 6th (C33) 1992 Accord 3rd (CA) 1987
Laurel 7th (C34) 1993 Accord 3rd (CA) 1988
Laurel 7th (C34) 1993 Accord 3rd (CA) 1988
Laurel 7th (C34) 1994 Accord 3rd (CA) 1988
Laurel 7th (C34) 1996 Accord 3rd (CA) 1988
Laurel 8th (C35) 1997 Accord 4th (CB) 1989
Laurel 8th (C35) 1998 Accord 4th (CB) 1989
Laurel 8th (C35) 1998 Accord 4th (CB) 1989
Laurel Spirit 1st (B11) 1984 Accord 4th (CB) 1990
Laurel Spirit 2nd (B12) 1986 Accord 4th (CB) 1991
Accord 4th (CB) 1992
Accord 5th 1993
Accord 5th 1994
Accord 5th 1994
Accord 5th 1996
Accord 6th 1998
Accord 6th 1998

225
Appendix

HONDA (Continued)

Name Type Year Name Type Year


Accord 6th 1999 Integra 3rd 1994
Accord 6th 2000 Integra 3rd 1995
Accord 7th 2002 Integra 3rd 1996
Accord 7th 2002 Integra 3rd 1996
Accord 7th 2004 Integra 3rd 1996
Accord Wagon 4th 1992 Integra 3rd 1997
Accord Wagon 5th 1996 Integra 3rd 1997
Accord Wagon 6th 1997 Integra 3rd 1998
Accord Wagon 6th 1998 Integra 4th 2001
Accord Wagon 6th 1998 Integra 4th 2001
Accord Wagon 6th 1999 Integra 4th 2001
Accord Wagon 7th 2003 Integra 4th 2004
Ascot 1st 1989 Edix 1st 2004
Ascot 1st 1989 Edix 1st 2004
Ascot 1st 1989 Edix 1st 2004
Ascot 1st 1990 Edix 1st 2004
Ascot 2nd 1993 Elysion 1st 2004
Inspire 1st (CB) 1989 Elysion 1st 2004
Inspire 1st (CB) 1990 Elysion 1st 2004
Inspire 1st (CB) 1990 Elysion 1st 2005
Inspire 1st (CB) 1991 Odyssey 1st 1995
Inspire 1st (CB) 1992 Odyssey 1st 1996
Inspire 1st (CB) 1992 Odyssey 1st 1997
Inspire 2nd 1995 Odyssey 1st 1997
Inspire 3rd 1998 Odyssey 1st 1998
Inspire 3rd 2000 Odyssey 1st 1999
Inspire 4th 2003 Odyssey 3rd (RB) 2003
Inspire 4th 2003 Odyssey 3rd (RB) 2003
Inspire 4th 2003 Odyssey 3rd (RB) 2003
Integra 1st (AV) 1985 Odyssey 3rd (RB) 2003
Integra 1st (AV) 1986 Odyssey 3rd (RB) 2004
Integra 1st (AV) 1986 Odyssey 3rd (RB) 2004
Integra 1st (AV) 1986 Odyssey 3rd (RB) 2004
Integra 1st (DA) 1986 Odyssey 3rd (RB) 2004
Integra 1st (DA) 1986 Odyssey 3rd (RB) 2004
Integra 1st (DA) 1987 Odyssey 3rd (RB) 2004
Integra 1st (AV) 1988 Odyssey 3rd (RB) 2005
Integra 2nd (DA) 1989 Quint 1st 1980
Integra 2nd (DA) 1989 Quint 1st 1980
Integra 2nd (DA) 1989 Concerto 1st 1988
Integra 2nd (DA) 1990 Concerto 1st 1988
Integra 2nd (DA) 1990 Concerto 1st 1989
Integra 2nd (DA) 1990 Concerto 1st 1991
Integra 2nd (DA) 1990 City 1st (AA) 1981
Integra 2nd (DA) 1991 City 1st (AA) 1981
Integra 2nd (DA) 1991 City 1st (AA) 1982
Integra 2nd (DA) 1993 City 1st (AA) 1982
Integra 3rd 1993 City 1st (AA) 1993
Integra 3rd 1993 City 1st (AA) 1984
Integra 3rd 1994 City 1st (AA) 1984

226
Appendix

HONDA (Continued)

Name Type Year Name Type Year


City 1st (AA) 1984 Today 1st 1991
City 1st (AA) 1984 Today 2nd 1993
City 1st (AA) 1985 Today 2nd 1993
City 1st (AA) 1985 Today 2nd 1994
City 2nd (GA) 1986 Today 2nd 1994
City 2nd (GA) 1987 Today 2nd 1993
City 2nd (GA) 1987 Today 2nd 1995
City 2nd (GA) 1988 Today 2nd 1996
City 2nd (GA) 1988 Domani 1st 1992
City 2nd (GA) 1989 Domani 2nd 1996
Civic 3rd (AT) 1984 Torneo 1st 1997
Civic 3rd (AT) 1984 Torneo 1st 1998
Civic 3rd (AT) 1984 Torneo 1st 1998
Civic 3rd (AT) 1984 Torneo 1st 1999
Civic 3rd (AT) 1984 Vigor 1st (AD) 1983
Civic 3rd (AT) 1984 Vigor 2nd (CA) 1988
Civic 3rd (AT) 1984 Vigor 3rd (CB) 1989
Civic 3rd (AT) 1985 Vigor 3rd (CB) 1990
Civic 3rd (AT) 1985 Vigor 3rd (CB) 1990
Civic 3rd (AT) 1985 Vigor 3rd (CB) 1991
Civic 3rd (AT) 1985 Vigor 3rd (CC) 1992
Civic 3rd (AT) 1987 Prelude 2nd 1982
Civic 4th (EF) 1987 Prelude 2nd 1982
Civic 4th (EF) 1987 Prelude 2nd 1984
Civic 4th (EF) 1987 Prelude 2nd 1984
Civic 4th (EF) 1987 Prelude 2nd 1986
Civic 7th (EF) 1988 Prelude 3rd 1987
Civic 4th (EF) 1988 Prelude 3rd 1987
Civic 4th (EF) 1989 Prelude 3rd 1987
Civic 4th (EF) 1990 Prelude 3rd 1988
Civic 4th (EF) 1990 Prelude 3rd 1988
Civic 4th (EF) 1990 Prelude 3rd 1988
Civic 5th (EG) 1991 Prelude 3rd 1988
Civic 5th (EG) 1991 Prelude 3rd 1989
Civic 5th (EG) 1992 Prelude 3rd 1989
Civic 5th (EG) 1993 Prelude 3rd 1990
Civic 5th (EG) 1995 Prelude 3rd 1990
Civic 7th (EU) 2000 Prelude 4th 1992
Civic 7th (EU) 2001 Prelude 4th 1992
Today 1st 1985 Prelude 4th 1993
Today 1st 1986 Prelude 4th 1993
Today 1st 1986 Prelude 4th 1994
Today 1st 1987 Prelude 5th 1996
Today 1st 1987 Prelude 5th 1996
Today 1st 1988 Rafaga 1st (CC) 1993
Today 1st 1988 Rafaga 1st (CC) 1995
Today 1st 1989 Legend 1st 1985
Today 1st 1990 Legend 1st 1986
Today 1st 1990 Legend 1st 1987
Today 1st 1990 Legend 1st 1987

227
Appendix

HONDA (Continued) MITSUBISHI

Name Type Year Name Type Year


Legend 1st 1987 Emeraude 1st 1982
Legend 1st 1988 Eclipse 1st 1989
Legend 1st 1989 Eclipse 1st 1990
Legend 1st 1989 Eterna 4th 1988
Legend 2nd (KA7) 1990 Eterna 4th 1989
Legend 2nd (KA8) 1991 Eterna 4th 1990
Legend 2nd (KA7) 1991 Eterna 4th 1991
Legend 2nd (KA7) 1993 Eterna 5th 1992
Legend 3rd (KA9) 1998 Eterna 5th 1993
Legend 4th (KB1) 2004 Galant 6th 1987
Legend 4th (KB1) 2004 Galant 6th 1987
Legend 4th (KB1) 2005 Galant 6th 1988
Logo 1st 1997 Galant 6th 1988
Logo 1st 1997 Galant 6th 1989
Logo 1st 1998 Galant 6th 1989
Galant 6th 1989
Galant 6th 1989
Galant 6th 1990
Galant 6th 1991
Galant 7th 1992
Galant 7th 1993
Galant 7th 1994
Galant 7th 1994
Galant 8th 1996
Galant 8th 1997
Galant 1st 1977
Galant 2nd 1982
Galant 2nd 1982
Galant 3rd 1983
Galant 3rd 1983
Galant 3rd 1984
Galant 3rd 1984
Galant 3rd 1984
Galant 3rd 1985
Galant 3rd 1985
Galant 3rd 1985
Galant 3rd 1985
Galant 3rd 1985
Galant 3rd 1985
Galant 3rd 1986
Galant 3rd 1986
Galant 3rd 1986
Grandis 1st 2003
Grandis 1st 2003
Grandis 1st 2003
Grandis 1st 2003
Grandis 1st 2003
Grandis 1st 2003
Grandis 1st 2004
Colt 1st 2002

228
Appendix

MITSUBISHI (Continued)

Name Type Year Name Type Year


Colt 1st 2002 Mirage 2nd 1986
Colt 1st 2002 Mirage 2nd 1986
Colt 1st 2002 Mirage 3rd 1987
Colt 1st 2003 Mirage 3rd 1987
Colt 1st 2003 Mirage 3rd 1988
Colt 1st 2003 Mirage 3rd 1988
Colt 1st 2003 Mirage 3rd 1988
Colt 1st 2003 Mirage 3rd 1988
Colt 1st 2004 Mirage 3rd 1988
Sigma 1st 1990 Mirage 3rd 1988
Sigma 1st 1991 Mirage 3rd 1989
Diamante 1st 1990 Mirage 3rd 1989
Diamante 1st 1990 Mirage 3rd 1990
Diamante 1st 1992 Mirage 3rd 1990
Diamante 1st 1993 Mirage 4th 1991
Diamante 2nd 1994 Mirage 4th 1992
Diamante 2nd 1995 Mirage 4th 1992
Diamante 2nd 1996 Lancer 1st 1973
Debonair 2nd 1986 Lancer 1st 1974
Delica 1st 1986 Lancer 3rd 1982
Pajero 1st 1983 Lancer 4th 1983
Pajero 1st 1984 Lancer 4th 1984
Pajero 1st 1985 Lancer 5th 1988
Pajero 2nd 1991 Lancer 5th 1989
Pajero 2nd 1994 Lancer 5th 1989
Pajero 2nd 1994 Lancer 5th 1990
Pajero 2nd 1995 Lancer 6th 1991
Pajero 2nd 1996 Lancer 6th 1992
Pajero 2nd 1996 Lancer 6th 1992
Pajero 2nd 1997 Lancer 6th 1993
Minica 4th 1984 Lancer 6th 1995
Minica 4th 1985 Lancer 7th 1995
Minica 4th 1987 Lancer 7th 1996
Minica 4th 1988 Lancer 8th 2000
Minica 5th 1989 Lancer 8th 2000
Minica 5th 1989 Lancer 8th 2003
Minica 5th 1989 Lancer Evolution 1st 2001
Minica 5th 1989 Lancer Evolution 1st 2002
Minica 5th 1990 Lancer Evolution 1st 2003
Minica 5th 1991 Legnum 1st 1996
Mirage 1st 1978 Legnum 1st 1997
Mirage 1st 1983 Legnum 1st 1997
Mirage 2nd 1983
Mirage 2nd 1983
Mirage 2nd 1984
Mirage 2nd 1984
Mirage 2nd 1985
Mirage 2nd 1985
Mirage 2nd 1985
Mirage 2nd 1986

229
Appendix

MAZDA

Name Type Year Name Type Year


AZ-3 1st 1991 Capella Wagon 4th 1994
MPV 2nd 1999 Capella Wagon 4th 1995
MPV 2nd 2000 Capella Wagon 4th 1995
MPV 2nd 2001 Capella Wagon 4th 1996
MPV 2nd 2001 Capella Wagon 6th 1997
MPV 2nd 2002 Capella Wagon 6th 1999
MPV 2nd 2002 Cronos 1st 1991
MS-6 1st 1991 Cosmo 1st (CD) 1979
MS-6 1st 1992 Cosmo 2nd (HB) 1982
MS-8 1st 1992 Cosmo 2nd (HB) 1983
MX-8 1st 1993 Cosmo 2nd (HB) 1985
RX-7 2nd (FC) 1985 Cosmo 3rd (JC) 1990
RX-7 2nd (FC) 1985 Cosmo 3rd (JC) 1990
RX-7 2nd (FC) 1986 Sentia 1st (HD) 1991
RX-7 2nd (FC) 1986 Sentia 1st (HD) 1991
RX-7 3rd (FC) 1987 Sentia 1st (HD) 1994
RX-7 3rd (FC) 1988 Sentia 2nd (HE) 1995
RX-7 3rd (FC) 1988 Familia 5th (BD) 1982
RX-7 3rd (FC) 1991 Familia 5th (BD) 1983
RX-7 3rd (FC) 1991 Familia 5th (BD) 1983
RX-7 3rd (FC) 2000 Familia 5th (BD) 1983
RX-8 1st 2003 Familia 5th (BD) 1983
RX-8 1st 2003 Familia 5th (BD) 1984
RX-8 1st 2003 Familia 5th (BD) 1984
RX-8 1st 2003 Familia 6th (BF) 1985
RX-8 1st 2003 Familia 6th (BF) 1985
RX-8 1st 2004 Familia 6th (BF) 1985
Axela 1st 2003 Familia 6th (BF) 1985
Axela 1st 2004 Familia 6th (BF) 1985
Axela 1st 2004 Familia 6th (BF) 1986
Atenza 1st 2002 Familia 6th (BF) 1987
Atenza 1st 2002 Familia 6th (BF) 1987
Atenza 1st 2003 Familia 6th (BF) 1987
Atenza 1st 2003 Familia 6th (BF) 1987
Atenza 1st 2003 Familia 7th (BG) 1989
Atenza 1st 2004 Familia 7th (BG) 1990
Etude 1st (BF) 1987 Familia 7th (BG) 1990
Etude 1st (BF) 1987 Familia 7th (BG) 1990
Etude 1st (BF) 1987 Familia 7th (BG) 1992
Capella 3rd 1983 Familia 7th (BG) 1993
Capella 3rd 1983 Presso 1st 1991
Capella 3rd 1984 Premacy 2nd 2005
Capella 3rd 1985 Verisa 1st 2004
Capella 3rd 1985 Verisa 1st 2004
Capella 3rd 1986 Persona 1st 1988
Capella 4th 1987 Persona 1st 1989
Capella 4th 1990 Persona 1st 1990
Capella 6th 1998 Persona 1st 1991
Capella 6th 1998 Lantis 1st 1993
Capella Wagon 4th 1990 Lantis 1st 1993

230
Appendix

MAZDA (Continued) SUBARU

Name Type Year Name Type Year


Lantis 1st 1994 R1 1st 2005
Lantis 1st 1994 R1 1st 2005
Lantis 1st 1994 R1 1st 2005
Lantis 1st 1994 R2 1st 2004
Lantis 1st 1994 R2 1st 2004
Lantis 1st 1994 R2 1st 2004
Luce 4th (HB) 1984 R2 1st 2004
Luce 5th (HC) 1986 R2 1st 2004
Luce 5th (HC) 1988 Impreza 1st (GC) 1992
Luce 5th (HC) 1990 Impreza 1st (GC) 1992
Roadster 1st (NA) 1989 Impreza 1st (GC) 1993
Roadster 1st (NA) 1993 Impreza 1st (GC) 1994
Roadster 2nd (NB) 1998 Impreza 1st (GC) 1994
Roadster 2nd (NB) 2001 Impreza 1st (GC) 1995
Impreza 2nd (GD) 2000
Vivio 1st 1992
Vivio 1st 1993
Vivio 1st 1993
Vivio 1st 1994
Leone 2nd 1980
Leone 2nd 1982
Leone 3rd 1983
Leone 3rd 1985
Leone 3rd 1986
Leone 3rd 1988
Legacy Sedan 1st (BC) 1989
Legacy Sedan 1st (BC) 1989
Legacy Sedan 1st (BC) 1989
Legacy Sedan 2nd (BC) 1991
Legacy Sedan 2nd (BC) 1991
Legacy Sedan 2nd (BD) 1993
Legacy Sedan 3rd (BE) 1999
Legacy Sedan 3rd (BE) 2000
Legacy Sedan 3rd (BE) 2000
Legacy Sedan 3rd (BE) 2001
Legacy Sedan 3rd (BE) 2002
Legacy Sedan 3rd (BE) 2002
Legacy Sedan 4th (BL) 2003
Legacy Sedan 4th (BL) 2003
Legacy Sedan 4th (BL) 2003
Legacy Touring Wagon 1st (BF) 1989
Legacy Touring Wagon 1st (BF) 1990
Legacy Touring Wagon 1st (BF) 1991
Legacy Touring Wagon 1st (BF) 1991
Legacy Touring Wagon 1st (BF) 1992
Legacy Touring Wagon 1st (BF) 1992
Legacy Touring Wagon 1st (BF) 1993
Legacy Touring Wagon 2nd (BG) 1993
Legacy Touring Wagon 2nd (BG) 1994
Legacy Touring Wagon 2nd (BG) 1994

231
Appendix

SUBARU (Continued) ISUZU

Name Type Year Name Type Year


Legacy Touring Wagon 2nd (BG) 1995 Aska 1st (JJ120) 1983
Legacy Touring Wagon 2nd (BG) 1996 Aska 1st (JJ120) 1983
Legacy Touring Wagon 2nd (BG) 1998 Aska 1st (JJ120) 1983
Legacy Touring Wagon 3rd (BH) 1998 Aska 1st (JJ120) 1984
Legacy Touring Wagon 3rd (BH) 1998 Aska 1st (JJ120) 1984
Legacy Touring Wagon 3rd (BH) 1999 Aska 1st (JJ120) 1984
Legacy Touring Wagon 3rd (BH) 2000 Aska 1st (JJ120) 1985
Legacy Touring Wagon 3rd (BH) 2001 Elf 5th 1994
Legacy Touring Wagon 3rd (BE) 2002 Elf 5th 2004
Legacy Touring Wagon 3rd (BH) 2002 Gemini 2nd (JT150) 1985
Legacy Touring Wagon 4th (BP) 2003 Gemini 2nd (JT150) 1985
Legacy Touring Wagon 4th (BP) 2003 Gemini 2nd (JT150) 1985
Legacy Touring Wagon 4th (BP) 2003 Gemini 2nd (JT150) 1985
Legacy Touring Wagon 4th (BP) 2003 Gemini 2nd (JT150) 1986
Legacy Touring Wagon 4th (BP) 2003 Gemini 2nd (JT150) 1985
Legacy Touring Wagon 4th (BP) 2003 Gemini 2nd (JT150) 1987
Legacy Touring Wagon 4th (BP) 2004 Gemini 2nd (JT150) 1987
Legacy Touring Wagon 4th (BP) 2004 Gemini 2nd (JT150) 1987
Grand Wagon 1st (BG) 1995 Gemini 2nd (JT150) 1989
Lancaster 1st (BG) 1997 Gemini 2nd (JT150) 1990
Lancaster 2nd (BH) 1998 Gemini 2nd (JT150) 1990
Lancaster 2nd (BH) 2000 Gemini 3rd (JT151) 1990
Lancaster 2nd (BH) 2001 Gemini 3rd (JT151) 1990
Legacy Outback 1st (BP) 2003 Gemini 3rd (JT151) 1990
Legacy Outback 1st (BP) 2004 Gemini 3rd (JT151) 1991
Legacy Outback 1st (BP) 2004 Piazza 1st 1982
Rex 3rd 1986 Piazza 1st 1985
Rex 3rd 1987 Piazza 2nd 1991
Rex 3rd 1987 Bighorn 2nd (UBS) 1991
Rex 3rd 1988 Bighorn 2nd (UBS) 1992
Rex 3rd 1989 Bighorn 2nd (UBS) 1993
Rex 3rd 1990 Bighorn 2nd (UBS) 1993
Bighorn 2nd (UBS) 1994
Bighorn 2nd (UBS) 1995
Bighorn 2nd (UBS) 1998
Forward 1st 1984
Forward 1st 1986

232
Appendix

SUZUKI

Name Type Year Name Type Year


Alto 1st 1983 Cultus 2nd 1990
Alto 2nd 1984 Cultus 2nd 1990
Alto 2nd 1985 Cultus 2nd 1991
Alto 2nd 1985 Cultus 2nd 1992
Alto 2nd 1985 Cultus 2nd 1993
Alto 2nd 1986 Cultus 2nd 1993
Alto 2nd 1987 Wagon R 1st 1993
Alto 2nd 1987 Wagon R 3rd 2003
Alto 2nd 1987
Alto 2nd 1987
Alto 2nd 1988
Alto 3rd 1989
Alto 3rd 1990
Alto 3rd 1990
Alto 3rd 1991
Alto 3rd 1992
Alto 3rd 1994
Alto 4th 1995
Alto 4th 1996
Alto 4th 1997
Alto 5th 1998
Alto 5th 1999
Alto 6th 2004
Alto 6th 2005
Escudo 1st 1988
Escudo 1st 1992
Escudo 1st 1993
Escudo 1st 1995
Escudo 1st 1996
Escudo 1st 1996
Escudo 2nd 1998
Escudo 2nd 2001
Escudo 2nd 2002
Escudo 2nd 2003
Cultus 1st 1984
Cultus 1st 1984
Cultus 1st 1984
Cultus 1st 1985
Cultus 1st 1985
Cultus 1st 1985
Cultus 1st 1985
Cultus 1st 1986
Cultus 1st 1986
Cultus 1st 1986
Cultus 1st 1986
Cultus 1st 1987
Cultus 2nd 1989
Cultus 2nd 1989
Cultus 2nd 1990
Cultus 2nd 1990

233
Appendix

Appendix 5-2: All Advertisements Related to Worlds First / Best

Worlds First

Maker Name Type Year Caption (World first equipment)


Mazda Cosmo 1st (HB) 1982 Rotary turbo engine
Toyota Crown 7th (S120) 1983 Full floating body
Subaru Leone 3rd 1983 Automatically controlled 4WD
Nissan Laurel 4th (C31) 1983 Super torque converter
Nissan Laurel 5th (C32) 1984 Powered door mirror
Nissan Cedric 6th (Y30) 1985 Jet turbo engine2000cc
Nissan Fairlady Z 3rd (Z31) 1985 Ceramic turbo engine
Nissan Maxima 1st (PU11) 1985 Super sonic suspension system
Mazda Capella 4th 1987 Speed reaction type 4WS
Nissan Pulsar 3rd (N13) 1987 Triple viscous 4WD
Mitsubishi Minica 5th 1989 DOHC 5-valve
Nissan Cedric 7th (Y31) 1989 New 5-speed AT cruising system
Mitsubishi Pajero 2nd 1991 SUPER SELECT 4WD & Multimode ABS
Mitsubishi Lancer 6th 1992 V6
Mazda Capella 6th 1998 Side air bag system with overhead protection
Nissan Gloria 11th (Y34) 1999 EXTROID CVT
Nissan Cedric 10th (Y34) 2000 New 6-speed AT cruising system
Honda Odyssey 3rd (RB) 2004 Traffic prediction information system
Honda Legend 4th (KB1) 2004 Intelligent Night Vision system

World's Records

Maker Name Type Year Caption (World records)


Mazda Familia 5th (BD) 1982 1 million unit produciton record per month for 27
consecutive months. FF new world record
Nissan Sunny 5th (B11) 1984 World's best production volume
Subaru Legacy Sedan 1st (BC) 1989 World speed record in the continuous 100,000-
kilometer drive
Subaru Legacy Wagon 2nd (BG) 1993 World's best speed-record wagon

World's Championships

Maker Name Type Year Caption (Title of championships)


Mitsubishi Pajero 1st 1984 The Champion of Paris-Dakar Rally
Toyota Celica 3rd (A60) 1984 The Over-all Vitory in its first entry in the East
African Safari Rally
Subaru Leone 3rd 1986 The Over-all Victory of the Group A in the 34th
Safari Rally
Mitsubishi Galant 6th 1989 The Over-all Victory of the FIA World Rally
Championship (WRC)
Mitsubishi Galant 6th 1989 The first Japanese Over-all Victory in the 1989 WRC
and the RAC Rallly
Subaru Legacy Wagon 2nd (BG) 1996 World Champion of the WRC Rally for two
consecutive years

234
Appendix

World's Awards

Maker Name Type Year Caption (Title of Awards)


Mazda Capella 3rd 1983 1983 Import Car of the Year
Honda CR-X 3rd (AF) 1984 1984 USA Import Car of the Year
Mitsubishi Galant 3rd 1985 The Champioon of the Golden Steering Wheel (West
Germany)
Mitsubishi Mirage 3rd 1988 Awarded the Golden Steering Wheel (West Germany)
Honda CR-X 2nd (EF) 1988 1988 USA Import Car of the Year
Mazda RX-8 1st 2003 2003 International Engine of the Year
Mazda Axela 1st 2004 The runner-up of the 2004 European Car of the Year

235
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