Republic v.
Sandiganbayan guaranteed private respondents exclusionary
Facts:
President Corazon C. Aquino issued EO No. 1 creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates.
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated
various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Ramas. On 27 July 1987, the
AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and
recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of
Ramas.
Evidence showing that respondent is the owner of
a house and lot located at Quezon City worth 700k
He is also the owner of a house and lot located in
Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square
meters.
Communication equipment and facilities are found
in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano, a
Confidential Agent of the Military Security Unit,
and are confiscated by elements of the PC
Command of Batangas.
These items could not have been in the possession
of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by
respondent Commanding General of the
Philippine Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items and
communications equipment, the raiding team was
also able to confiscate money in the amount of
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the
house of Elizabeth Dimaano.
Elizabeth Dimaano is allegedly Major General Q.
Josephus Ramas mistress. She does not have any means
to acquire the communications equipment as well as the
aforementioned money.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team
served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant
captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the
raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The
raiding team seized the items detailed in the
seizure receipt together with other items not
included in the search warrant.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice
that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure five days after the successful EDSA
revolution. Petitioner argues that a During the interregnum, the government in power
revolutionary government was operative at that
time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel
were taking power in the name and by the will of
the Filipino people. Petitioner asserts that the
revolutionary government effectively withheld
the operation of the 1973 Constitution which
right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary
right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification
of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that
all rights under the Bill of Rights had already
reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the
search. Therefore, the government may confiscate
the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use
the same in evidence against her since at the time
of their seizure; private respondents did not enjoy
any constitutional right.
Issue:
WON the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill
of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum.
WON the protection accorded to individuals under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the
interregnum.
RULING:
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the
protection accorded to individuals under the
Covenant and the Declaration remained in
effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders
of the revolutionary government were the supreme
law because no constitution limited the extent and
scope of such directives and orders. With the
abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the
successful revolution, there was no municipal law
higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the
interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because
there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of
Rights during the interregnum.
As the Court explained in Letter of Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno: A revolution has been
defined as the complete overthrow of the
established government in any country or state by
those who were previously subject to it or as a
sudden, radical and fundamental change in the
government or political system, usually effected
with violence or at least some acts of violence.
was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly
question the sequestration orders as violative of
the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of
Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the
sequestered companies assailed the sequestration
 orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the
Freedom Constitution.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate
the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary
government could have repudiated all its
obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration
is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice
it to say that the Court considers the Declaration
as part of customary international law, and that
Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of
the rules of international law laid down in the
Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration in the same way it repudiated the
1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the States good faith compliance
with its treaty obligations under international law.
During the interregnum when no constitution
or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders
issued by government officers were valid so
long as these officers did not exceed the
authority granted them by the revolutionary
government. The directives and orders should not
have also violated the Covenant or the
Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary
government presumptively sanctioned the warrant
since the revolutionary government did not
repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge
upon proper application, specified the items to
be searched and seized. The warrant is thus
valid with respect to the items specifically
described in the warrant.
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that
the warrant did not include the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team
confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly
describe these items and the raiding team confiscated
them on its own authority. The raiding team had no
legal basis to seize these items without showing that
these items could be the subject of warrantless search
and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its
authority when it seized these items. The seizure of
these items was therefore void, and unless these items are
contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned
to the person from whom the raiding seized
them. However, we do not declare that such person is the
lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and
seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and
withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that
these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
ROE V. WADE (DUE PROCESS)
FACTS: Jane Roe was pregnant(through rape) and
unmarried, yet she was unable to receive a legal abortion
in Texas by a licensed physician because her life was not
threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and she
was unable to travel somewhere else to have a legal
abortion. She filed a suit against the defendant, District
Attorney Henry Wade questioning Texas State Laws,
which proscribe attempting an abortion except on medica
advice for the purpose of saving the mothers life. She
argues that said laws are unconstitutionally vague and that
they abridge her right of personal privacy as guaranteed
and protected. Later, she amended her complaint as to
represent or sue on behalf of herself and all other women
similarly situated; thereby becoming a class suit. James
Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, also alleged that
statues were vague and uncertain, for he had been
previously arrested for violations of the Texas abortion
statute. He described conditions of patients who came to
him seeking abortions, and he claimed that for many cases
he, as a physician, was unable to determine whether they
fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article
1196 John and Mary Doe were a childless couple. Mary
was suffering from "neural-chemical"and physician
advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition
improved She discontinued using birth control pills
because of her condition but if she should become
pregnant, she would want to terminate the pregnancy by
an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician
under safe, clinical conditions.
District Court held that the "fundamental right of single
women and married persons to choose whether to have
children is protected by the Ninth Amendment, through
the
Fourteenth Amendment," and that the Texas criminal
abortion statutes were void on their face because they were
both unconstitutionally vague and constituted an
overbroad infringement of the plaintiffs' Ninth
Amendment rights.
Court declared the abortion statutes void
Issue: WON the Texas abortion law improperly invade a
right possessed by the appellant to terminate her
pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty
contained in the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process
Clause
HELD: YES The right to personal privacy includes the
abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and must
be considered against important state interests in
regulation.
"Due process of law is a legal concept that ensures the
government will respect all of a person's legal rights
instead of just some or most of those legal rights, when the
government deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.
Due process has also been interpreted as placing
limitations on laws and legal proceedings in order to
guarantee fundamental fairness, justice and liberty" to all
citizens
The Supreme Court has determined that the due process
clause implies that governments cannot pass legislation
that intrudes too deeply into the personal life of its
citizens. There are limits to the ability of states to control
personal behavior.
Section 1 of the 14th Amendment states:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
The Supreme Court justices determined that, anywhere in
the U.S.:(LIMITATIONS NG ABORTION)
During the first three months of pregnancy, a
woman and her physician may jointly decide to
terminate a pregnancy. No significant state
interference is allowed.
Later in pregnancy, states can restrict abortion
access with laws but only if they are intended to
protect the woman's health.
Once the fetus is viable(third trimester), an abortion must
still be available if the woman's health or life are at risk.
State governments are free to pass legislation that will
allow or prohibit late-term abortions -- those on a viable
fetus -- for other reasons.
Republic v Cagandahan
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not
dictate on a person concerning a matter so innately
private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences.
Facts: Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in
her Birth Certificate. During her childhood, she suffered
from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that
her ovarian structures had minimized. She had no breast
or menstruation. She was diagnosed of having Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia, a condition where a person suffering
from such possesses secondary male characteristics
because of too much secretion of male hormones.
According to her, for all interests and appearances as well
as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.
She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of
Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex
be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.
Issue: Whether Cagandahan can change her gender to
male and change her name to Jeff.
Ruling: YES. Respondent here has simply let nature take
its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he
has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent
could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like
taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the
categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not
to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondents development to reveal more fully his male
characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not
dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately
private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much
less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to
reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to
undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a
female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo
treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of
a female, as society commonly currently knows this
gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who
has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the
human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health.
Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence
that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the absence of
evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male
will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as
valid and justified the respondents position and his
personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling the Court does no more than give respect to
(1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals
with what nature has handed out. In other words, we
respect respondents congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the
ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent
deals with his unordinary state and thus helps make his life
easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, the
Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of
right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light
of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will
follow.
UNITED STATES VS WINDSOR
FACTS:
Two women, resident in New York were married in a
lawful ceremony in Canada in 2007. Edith Windsor and
Thea Spyer returned to their home in New York City (In
New York, same sex marriages are allowed). When Spyer
died in 2009, she left her entire estate to Windsor.
Windsor sought to claim the estate tax exemption for
surviving spouses. She was barred from doing so by a
federal law, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which
excludes a same-sex partner from the definition of
spouse as that term is used in federal statutes. DOMA
(Sec. 2) being challenged because of its definition of
marriage a legal union between a man and a woman, and
the spouse refers only to a husband and a wife.
Windsor paid the taxes but filed suit to challenge the
constitutionality of this provision.
US District Court and CA: this portion of the statute is
unconstitutional and ordered the US to pay Windsor a
refund.
Windsor contended that DOMA violates the guarantee of
equal protection, as applied to the Federal Government
through the Fifth Amendment.
ISSUE: WON DOMA violates the liberty as guaranteed
by equal protection clause as applied to the Federal
Government through the Fifth Amendment.
RULING: YES. DOMA is unconstitutional on that part
(Sec. 2).
DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty
of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution. The liberty protected by the Fifth
Amendments Due Process Clause contains within it the
prohibition against denying to any person the equal
protection of the laws. It is in violation of equal
protection of laws because heterosexual couples can
claim tax exemption, but the homosexual couples
cannot.
The class to which DOMA directs its restrictions and
restraints are those persons who are joined in same-sex
marriages made lawful by the State. DOMA singles out
a class of persons deemed by a State entitled to
recognition and protection to enhance their own
liberty.
The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to
injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought
to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to
displace this protection and treating those persons as living
in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute
is in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
DOMAs unusual deviation from the usual tradition of
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage
here operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits
and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition
of their marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having
the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class. The
avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here are to
impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma
upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful
by the unquestioned authority of the States.
In the history of DOMA, as the title and dynamics of the
bill indicate, its purpose is to discourage enactment of
state same-sex marriage laws and to restrict the freedom
and choice of couples married under those laws if they are
enacted. DOMA forces same-sex couples to live as
married for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the
purpose of federal law.
Quiao v. Quiao
FACTS: Rita filed a complaint for legal separation against
petitioner Brigido. RTC rendered a decision declaring the
legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3
minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining
properties shall be divided equally between the spouses
subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the
payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children because Brigido is the offending spouse.
Petitioner and respondent tied the marital knot on January
6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital
vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of
the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not
agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations
between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.
Under this property relation, the husband and the wife
place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
property and the income from their work or industry. The
husband and wife also own in common all the property of
the conjugal partnership of gains.
At the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the
respondent's marriage the operative law is already the
Family Code, the same applies in the instant case, and the
applicable law, in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liabilities is concerned, is Article
129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because
according to Article 256 of the Family Code this Code
shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other law.
Issue:
WON Brigidos vested right over half of the common
properties of the conjugal partnership was violated when
the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children
pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code.

Ruling: NO
In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, we define and explained
vested right in the following manner:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and
extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the
holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and
which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent
upon a contingency. The term vested right expresses the
concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and
natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State
action, or an innately just and imperative right which
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
October 18, 2005 ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer
Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita:
The concept of vested right is a consequence of
the constitutional guaranty of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason
and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state
action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new
obligations created after the right has become
vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional,
and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be
deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if
there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law
and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his
right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the
respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal
properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the
petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community
assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting
and inventory of all the community properties of the
parties. Second, when the Decision dated October 10,
2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the
trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as
net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family
Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of
his right to due process.
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of
the petitioner's vested right is one founded, not only in
the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of
the old Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and
129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty
spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said
provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse
shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal partnership
profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and
the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior
marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property
came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from
the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate
property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not
apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be
entitled to all the net profits.
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right
has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the
Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits
may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal
separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner
was given the chance to present his evidence, the
petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside
under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the
guilty party.
TERMINAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES CORP V.
PH PORTS AUTHORITTY
FACTS:
TEFASCO submitted to PPA a proposal for the
construction of a specialized terminal complex with port
facilities and a provision for port services in Davao City.
To ease the acute congestion in the government ports at
Sasa and Sta. Ana, Davao City, PPA welcomed the
proposal and organized an inter-agency committee to
study the plan. The committee recommended approval
Under the foregoing terms and conditions, TEFASCO
contracted dollar loans from private commercial
institutions abroad to construct its specialized terminal
complex with port facilities and thereafter poured millions
worth of investments in the process of building the port.
Long after TEFASCO broke ground with massive
infrastructure work, the PPA Board curiously passed on
October 1, 1976 Resolution No. 50 under which
TEFASCO, without asking for one, was compelled to
submit an application for construction permit. Without the
consent of TEFASCO, the application imposed additional
significant conditions.
The series of PPA impositions did not stop there. They
included provisions for ten percent (10%) government
share out of arrastre and stevedoring gross income and one
hundred percent (100%) wharfage and berthing charges In
return PPA promised to issue the necessary permits for
TEFASCOs port activities. TEFASCO complied with the
MOA and paid the accrued and current government share.
TEFASCO sued PPA for refund of government share it
had paid and for damages as a result of alleged illegal
exaction from its clients of one hundred percent (100%)
berthing and wharfage fees.
RTC: In favor of TEFASCO
CA: Reversed in toto the RTC
ISSUE: (a) the character of the obligations between
TEFASCO and PPA; (b) the validity of the collection by
PPA of one hundred percent (100%) wharfage fees and
berthing charges; (c) the propriety of the award of fifty
percent (50%) wharfage fees and thirty percent (30%)
berthing charges as actual damages in favor of TEFASCO
for the period from 1977 to 1991
HELD: Firstly, it was not a mere privilege that PPA
bestowed upon TEFASCO to construct a specialized
terminal complex with port facilities and provide port
services in Davao City under PPA Resolution No. 7 and
the terms and conditions thereof. Rather, the arrangement
was envisioned to be mutually beneficial, on one hand, to
obtain business opportunities for TEFASCO, and on the
other, enhance PPA's services
even assuming arguendo that TEFASCO relied upon a
mere privilege granted by PPA, still the terms and
conditions between them as written in the documents
approving TEFASCO's project proposal should
indubitably remain the same. Under traditional form of
property ownership, recipients of privileges or largesses
from the government could be said to have no property
rights because they possessed no traditionally recognized
proprietary interest therein. holding that a license to
operate cockpits would be a mere privilege belonged to
this vintage. But the right-privilege dichotomy came to an
end when courts realized that individuals should not be
subjected to the unfettered whims of government officials
to withhold privileges previously given them.[if Indeed to
perpetuate such distinction would leave the citizens at the
mercy of State functionaries, and worse, threaten the
liberties protected by the Bill of Rights.
Even if PPA granted TEFASCO only a license to
construct and operate a specialized complex terminal with
port facilities, the fact remains that PPA cannot
unilaterally impose conditions that find no basis in the
inter-agency committee report
Secondly, we hold that PPA's imposition of one hundred
percent (100%) wharfage fees and berthing charges is
void. It is very clear from P.D. No. 857 as amended that
wharfage and berthing rates collectible by PPA are subject
to The Tariff and Customs Code. That states that those
that are not considered as national port shall charge only
50%.
The PPA not cited - nor have we found - any law creating
the TEFASCO Port as a national port or converting it into
one. Hence, following case law, we rule that PPA erred in
collecting berthing fees from vessels that berthed at the
privately funded port of petitioner TEFASCO
Board of Medicine v Ota
Facts: Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national,
married to a Filipina, who has continuously resided in the
Philippines for more than 10 years.
He graduated from Bicol Christian College of Medicine
on April 21, 1991 with a degree of Doctor of Medicine.
After successfully completing a one-year post graduate
internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical
Center, he filed an application to take the medical board
examinations in order to obtain a medical license. He was
required by the (PRC) to submit an affidavit of
undertaking, stating among others that should he
successfully pass the same, he would not practice
medicine until he submits proof that reciprocity exists
between Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners
into the practice of medicine.
Respondent submitted a duly notarized English translation
of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan duly
authenticated by the Consul General of the Philippine
Embassy to Japan, Jesus I. Yabes; thus, he was allowed to
take the Medical Board Examinations in August 1992,
which he subsequently passed.
In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine (Board) of the
PRC, in a letter dated March 8, 1993, denied respondent's
request for a license to practice medicine in the Philippines
on the ground that the Boardbelieves that no genuine
reciprocity can be found in the law of Japan as there is no
Filipino or foreigner who can possibly practice there.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus against the Board before the RTC of Manila.
RTC ruled for the Yasuki.
The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to
the CA, stating that while respondent submitted
documents showing that foreigners are allowed to practice
medicine in Japan, it was not shown that the conditions for
the practice of medicine there are practical and attainable
by a foreign applicant, hence, reciprocity was not
established; also, the power of the PRC and the Board to
regulate and control the practice of medicine is
discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable
by a writ of mandamus.
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the
RTC.
ISSUES: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT HAD ESTABLISHED THE
EXISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY IN THE PRACTICE
OF MEDICINE BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND
JAPAN.
RULING: The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.
There is no question that a license to practice medicine is a
privilege or franchise granted by the government. It is a
right that is earned through years of education and
training, and which requires that one must first secure a
license from the state through professional board
examinations.
[T]he regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method
of protecting the health and safety of the public.
That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the
ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also
well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine
first to take and pass medical board examinations have
long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power.
As required by the said laws, respondent submitted a copy
of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan, duly
authenticated by the Consul General of the Embassy of the
Philippines in Japan, which provides in Articles 2 and 11,
thus: Article 2. Anyone who wants to be medical
practitioner must pass the national examination for
medical practitioner and get license from the Minister of
Health and Welfare. x x x Article 11. No one can take the
National Medical Examination except persons who
conform to one of the following items: 1. Persons who
finished regular medical courses at a university based on
the School Education Laws (December 26, 1947) and
graduated from said university. 2. Persons who passed the
preparatory test for the National Medical Examination and
practiced clinics and public sanitation more than one year
after passing the said test. 3. Persons who graduated from
a foreign medical school or acquired medical practitioner
license in a foreign country, and also are recognized to
have the same or more academic ability and techniques as
persons stated in item 1 and item 2 of this article. R.A. No.
2382, which provides who may be candidates for the
medical board examinations, merely requires a foreign
citizen to submit competent and conclusive documentary
evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA), showing that his countrys existing laws permit
citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under the
same rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.
PRC is authorized to prescribe additional requirements or
grant certain privileges to foreigners seeking registration
in the Philippines if the same privileges are granted to or
some additional requirements are required of citizens of
the Philippines in acquiring the same certificates in his
country.
Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the foreign
applicant must show that the conditions for the practice of
medicine in said country are practical and attainable by
Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it must first be proven
that a Filipino has been granted license and allowed to
practice his profession in said country before a foreign
applicant may be given license to practice in the
Philippines.
It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a
Filipino to get license and practice therein
. Requiring respondent to prove first that a Filipino has
already been granted license and is actually practicing
therein unduly expands the requirements provided for
under R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223.
Indeed, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine,
the applicant must show that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. It must
also appear that he has fully complied with all the
conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the
licensing authority.
In this case, there is no doubt as to the competence and
qualifications of respondent. He finished his medical
degree from Bicol Christian College of Medicine. He
completed a one-year post graduate internship training at
the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, a government
hospital. Then he passed the Medical Board Examinations
which was given on August 8, 1992 with a general
average of 81.83, with scores higher than 80 in 9 of the 12
subjects.
HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS AND THE STANDARDS
OF REVIEW OR LEVELS OF SCRUTINY
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION VS PHILIPPINE BLOOMING
MILLS CO. INC.
FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a
legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the
respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
Petitioners claim that they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged
abuses of the Pasig police and that they informed the
respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
That Management, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice
the normal operation of the Company. For which reason,
the Company, warned the PBMEO representatives that
workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, who shall fail to report for work the following
morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike;
Because the petitioners and their members proceeded with
the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent
Company, they charged them with violations of CBA
agreement and RA 875.
Petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing
CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior
notice of the mass demonstration and that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional
freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was
not a declaration of strike because it was not directed
against the respondent firm
ISSUE: WON property rights is supreme to human rights
RULING: NO. Human rights is supreme to property
rights. The primacy of human rightsfreedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievancesover property rights has been
sustained.
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition,
are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to
man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full
and complete fulfillment. While the Bill of Rights also
protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. In the hierarchy of civil
liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions;
The mass demonstration, to regard the demonstration
against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a
cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, inflicts a moral as well as
mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
Demonstration against police abuses not a violation of
collective bargaining agreement.
While the respondent Court found that the demonstration
"paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
complainant company," the court found that the
respondent company did not sustain any loss or damage.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ in its application.
Facts: Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is
assailing the constitutionality of RA 7080 also known as
An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder
because the assailed law is said to be vague, it dispenses
the reasonable doubt standards in criminal prosecution
and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
punishable under the Revised Penal Code which he claims
to be violative of the due process clause of our
Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being
vague.
Ruling:
NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them; much less do
we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it
violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the
doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are
merely couched in imprecise language but which
nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased;
or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly
applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be
"saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be
mounted as against the second whenever directed against
such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be
invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute
is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice. It
must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute
are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where,
because of the nature of the act it will be impossible to
provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
WHITE LIGHT CORP V. CITY OF MANILA
FACTS: City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law
Ordinance No. 7774 An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-
Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and
Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in
the City of Manila.The ordinance sanctions any person or
corporation who will allow the admission and charging of
room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms
more than twice a day.
Petitioners who own and operate several hotels and motels
in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit
attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that is it
unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to
privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise
of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC: Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at
the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and
jealously guarded by the Constitution.
CA: reversed the decision of RTC
First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to
privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes
the owners or operators of establishments that admit
individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually
limitless reach of police power is only constrained by
having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method.
The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it
aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method
since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third,
the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the
well-being of its constituents in general.
ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid or not
HELD: No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as
a valid
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on
substantive due process grounds is best tested when
assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the
U.S. Supreme Court
Consequently, two standards of judicial review were
established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom
of the mind or restricting the political process, and the
rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.
Rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld
if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
interest, governmental interest is extensively examined
and the availability of less restrictive measures is
considered.
Strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling,
rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the
absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest. It is standard for determining the quality and the
amount of governmental interest brought to justify the
regulation of fundamental freedoms.Used today to test the
validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,
gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.
The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope
of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as
suffrage, judicial access and interstate travel.
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance
should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint
imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon
is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an
injury that would warrant the application of the most
deferential standard the rational basis test. Yet as earlier
stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to
invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons
those persons who would be deprived of availing short
time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments
in question.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate
depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police
power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights
and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
of private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment,
for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded
Secretary of Justice v Lantion
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of
administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and
shelved aside.
Facts: The Philippines and USA signed in Manila an
extradition treaty between the two countries. The
Department of Justice recieved from the DFA a request for
the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. On
the same day, the petitioner designated authorized lawyers
to handle the case. Pending the evaluation of the request,
Mark Jimenez wrote a letter to the Secretary of Justice to
be furnished copies of the extradition request and he be
given ample time to comment on the same. The Secretary
of Justice denied the request stating that Article 7 of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty where it states that the
Philippines must present the interests of the US in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
Issue: Whether a citizens basic right to due process must
prevail over the governments duties on honoring a treaty.
Ruling: YES. In the absence of a law or principle of law,
the rules of fair play must be applied. An application of
the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will
not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither
the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights
from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no
proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings
as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even
request for copies of the extradition documents from the
governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be
supplied the same becomes a demandable right
We have ruled time and again that the Court's equity
jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside
legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements
(Smith Bell & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530
[1997]; David-Chan v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677
[1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does
not even call for "justice outside legality," since private
respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed
by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional
guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the
land if we choose strict construction over guarantees
against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in
keeping with the principles of democracy on which our
Constitution is premised. Verily, as one traverses
treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of
liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the
oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and
wayward course be laid.
Due process is comprised of two components
substantive due process which requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due
process which consists of the two basic rights of notice
and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an
impartial and competent tribunal. True to the mandate of
the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and
hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings,
but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance
of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals
are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting
their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to
appear therein and present their side and to refute the
position of the opposing party.
RELATIVITY OF DUE PROCESS
CUDIA VS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY
FACTS: Six days prior to the graduation ceremonies of
the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), petitioner filed a
petition for violation his rights to due process, education,
and privacy of communication against respondent PMA.
Petitioner was supposed to graduate with honors as the
class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the
top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an
ensign of the Philippine Navy.
Suddenly, a professor issued a delinquency report (DR)
because they were late in their classes. the DRs reached
the Department of Tactical Officers. They were logged
and transmitted to the Company Tactical Officers (CTO)
for explanation of the concerned cadets. The petitioner in
his answer alleged that he went straightly in his class and
they were dismissed late. He was punished with a penalty
of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. the basis of the
punishment was the result of his conversation with the
professor, who responded that she never dismissed her
class late.
Col. Briguez, the Commandant of Cadets, recommended
to Vice Admiral Abogado the separation from the PMA of
Cadet 1CL Cudia for violation of the First Tenet of the
Honor Code. n the same date, Special Orders No. 26 was
issued by the PMA Headquarters placing Cadet 1CL
Cudia on indefinite leave of absence without pay and
allowances effective February 10, 2014 pending approval
of his separation by the AFP-GHQ, barring him from
future appointment and/or admission as cadet, and not
permitting him to qualify for any entrance requirements to
the PMA. Vice admiral abogado approved the
recommendation to dismiss the petitioner.
The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals
Board (CRAB) and the Philippine Military Academy
decided to dismiss the petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the disciplinary proceedings conducted
within the bounds of procedural due process
RULING:
YES. The PMA has regulatory authority to
administratively terminate cadets despite the absence of
statutory authority. Violation of the Honor Code warrants
the administrative dismissal of a guilty cadet.Cadet
Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by
providing untruthful statements in the explanation for his
tardiness.
The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt
the findings of the Honor Committee. The procedural
safeguards in a student disciplinary case were properly
accorded to Cadet Cudia. The subtle evolution in the
voting process of the Honor Committee, by incorporating
executive session/chambering, was adopted to further
strengthen the voting procedure of the Honor Committee.
Cadet Lagura voluntarily changed his vote without any
pressure from the other voting members of the Honor
Committee. Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the
PMA. Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his
future when he was dismissed from the PMA
PMA is an institution that enjoys academic freedom
guaranteed by Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution. In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 348 SCRA 265 (2000), it was held that
concomitant with such freedom is the right and duty to
instill and impose discipline upon its students. The PMA
has the freedom on who to admit (and, conversely, to
expel) given the high degree of discipline and honor
expected from its students who are to form part of the
AFP. For respondents, Cadet 1CL Cudia cannot, therefore,
belatedly assail the Honor Code as basis of the HCs
decision to recommend his dismissal from the PMA.
When he enlisted for enrolment and studied in the PMA
for four years, he knew or should have been fully aware of
the standards of discipline imposed on all cadets and the
corresponding penalty for failing to abide by these
standards.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
Facts. Appellee, Central Hanover Bank & Trust, set up
common fund pursuant to a New York statute allowing the
creation of common funds for distribution of judicial
settlement trusts. There were 113 participating trusts.
Appellee petitioned for settlement of its first account as
common trustee. Some of the beneficiaries were not
residents of New York. Notice was by publication for
four weeks in a local newspaper. Appellee had notified
those people by mail that were of full age and sound mind
who would be entitled to share in the principal if the
interest they held became distributable. Appellant was
appointed as special guardian and attorney for all persons
known or unknown not otherwise appearing who had or
might thereafter have any interest in the income of the
common trust fund. Appellee was appointed to represent
those interested in the principal. Appellant appeared
specially, objecting that notice by publication, permitted
under the applicable statute was inadequate to afford the
beneficiaries due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment and that therefore jurisdiction was lacking.
Issue
Whether or not publication is sufficient notice under due
process.
Held No. Notice by publication is not adequate notice in
the present case. The means used in the service of notice
must be reasonably certain to actually inform the
affected parties. The means used in the service of notice
must be reasonably certain to inform those who are
affected. If such means are not possible, then the alternate
means adopted must not be substantially less likely to
inform the concerned parties. A large number of cases
brought before the court on the issue of notice involves
those served by publication. In any, case, the bank has a
record of the names and addresses of the income
beneficiaries. It has not been shown that the bank has
made any serious effort to inform the said beneficiaries
personally of the settlement proceedings through the said
addresses.
Whether or not the action is in personam or in rem, the
court can determine the interests of all claimants as long as
there is a procedure allowing for notice and an opportunity
to be heard.
There has to be notice and opportunity for a hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case. The claimants at
issue could potentially be deprived of property here, as the
proposed disposition cuts off their rights to sue for
negligent or illegal impairments of their interests. In
addition, the courts decision appoints someone who,
without their knowledge, could use the trust to obtain the
fees and expenses necessary for a sham proceeding.
There need not be personal service because the state has
an interest in settling trusts. Notice has to be reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pending action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections. You do not have
to notify all the beneficiaries when the trust concerns
many small interests. Sending notice to most of them will
protect their interests sufficiently.
LACHANCE V. ERICKSON
FACTS: Federal employees subject to adverse actions by
their respective agencies, each made false statements to
agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with
which they were charged. In each case, the agency
additionally charged the false statement as a ground for
adverse action. Separately, each employee appealed the
actions taken against him or her to the Merit Systems
Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld the portion of
each penalty that was based on the underlying charge. The
Board overturned each false statement charge. The Board
held that an employee's false statements could not be used
for purposes of impeaching the employee's credibility, nor
could they be considered in setting the appropriate
punishment for the employee's underlying misconduct.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
agreed with the Board and held that no penalty could be
based on a false denial of the underlying claim
ISSUE: WON Due Process Clause preclude a federal
agency from sanctioning an employee for making false
statements to the agency regarding alleged employment-
related misconduct on the part of the employee
HELD: No. the Court held that neither the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause precludes a federal
agency from sanctioning an employee for making false
statements to the agency regarding his alleged
employment-related misconduct. "The core of due process
is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard,"
But we reject the view expressed by the Court of Appeals
in this case that a 'meaningful opportunity to be heard'
includes a right to make false statements with respect to
the charged conduct."
PEFIANCO V. MORAL
FACTS: DECS Secretary Gloria filed a complaint against
respondent Moral, then Chief Librarian, for pilferage of
some historical documents from the vaults of the
Filipiniana and Asian Division (FAD) of the National
Library which were under her control and supervision as
Division Chief.
And soon found guilty of the administrative offenses.She
was ordered dismissed from the government service with
prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture of all her
retirement benefits and other remunerations.
respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report purportedly to "guide her
on whatever action would be most appropriate to take
under the circumstances. Her petition was, however,
denied.
Respondent instituted an action for mandamus and
injunction before the regular courts against Secretary
Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS
Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of
dismissal until she received a copy of the said report.
Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case at RTC but
denied and so she went to the CA filed a petition for
certiorari but denied by CA stating that she must have first
filed a motion for reconsideration. Hence there is a
procedural infirmity.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition of
Gloria
HELD: YES
Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court,
through a motion for reconsideration, has been given an
opportunity to correct the imputed errors on its act or
order. However, this rule is not absolute and is subject to
well-recognized exceptions. Thus, when the act or order of
the lower court is a patent nullity for failure to comply
with a mandatory provision of the Rules, as in this case, a
motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with and the
aggrieved party may assail the act or order of the lower
court directly on certiorari.
Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal
duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the
investigation report.
Civil Service Commission v Lucas
Facts: On May 26, 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant
information officer at the Agricultural Information
Division, Department of Agriculture (DA for brevity),
filed with the office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavit-
complaint against respondent Jose J. Lucas, a
photographer of the same agency, for misconduct. Based
on the description of the petitioner, while she was standing
before a mirror ,near the office door of Jose Lucas, she
noticed a chair at her right side which Mr. Lucas sit at that
very instant. Thereafter, Mr. Lucas bent to reach for his
shoe, and at that moment she felt Mr. Lucas hand touching
her thigh and running down his palm up to her ankle. She
was shocked and suddenly faced Mr. Lucas and
admonished him not to do it again or she will kick him.
But Mr. Lucas touched her again and so she hit him. A
verbal exchange then ensued; she was thrown out of the
door, and was told never to enter the office again. On June
8, 1992, the Board of Personnel Inquiry of DA issued a
summons requiring the respondent to answer the
complaint. According to Lucas, he did not touch the thigh
of the complainant and what happened was that he
accidentally brushed complainants leg while reaching for
his shoe. After a formal investigation, respondent was
found guilty of simple misconduct with a penalty of
suspension for 1 month and 1 day. In due time, respondent
brought his case to the Civil Service Commission.
Thereafter, the CSC issued a resolution finding the
respondent guilty of grave misconduct and imposing on
him a penalty of dismissal from the service. Respondent
moved for reconsideration, but was denied. Then,
respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA set
aside the resolution of the CSC and reinstated the
resolution of BOPI of DA. The CA further assailed that
the respondent was not given due process as he was not
informed of the modification of the charge against him,
the distinctions of simple and grave misconduct. He only
came to know of the changes when he received the notice
of the resolution dismissing him from service.
Issues: 1. WON respondent Lucas was denied due process
when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct on a
charge of simple misconduct.
2.WON the act complained of constitutes grave
misconduct.
Held:
1.The SC sustained the ruling of the CA that the basic
requirement of due process is that a person must be duly
informed of the charges against him, and that a person
cannot be convicted of a crime which he was not charged.
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due
process in investigations andhearings.2.Under the
circumstances, the act of the respondent is not constitutive
of grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that
respondent was maliciously motivated. It has also been
noted that the respondent has been in the service for 20
years and this is his first offense.
Ylaya v Gacott
Facts:
Fe Ylaya filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. GacOt
t. According to her, Atty. Gacott deceived her and her late
husband, Laurentino, into signing a preparatory deed of sal
e which they thought would be used in the sale of the prop
erties to the City Government of Puerto Prinsesa because a
t that time the said properties were subject to expropriation
proceedings. But to their dismay, according to her, it was
converted into a deed of absolute sale in favor of Atty. Ga
cotts uncle Reynolds So.
Atty. Gacott denied these and claimed that Laurentino and
Reynold had originally purchased the properties, that they
were co owners and that Laurentino subsequently sold his
share to Reynold under the deed of absolute sale. He also a
rgued that it was clear from the document that the intended
buyer was a natural person, not juridical. because there w
ere spaces for the buyers legal age, marital status, and citi
zenship. Also, he claimed that he was even constrained to
file a subsequent motion to intervene on behalf of Reynold
because the complainant maliciously retained the TCTs to
 the subject properties after borrowing them from his offic
e.
Then, after some time, Fe Ylaya submitted a motion to wit
hdraw and executed an affidavit affirming and confirming
the existence, genuineness, and due execution of the deed
of aabsolute sale.
The IBP governor resolved to suspend Atty. Gacott to 2 ye
ars, finding him guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 and canon
16 of the code of professional responsibility
Issue:
1. whether or not Atty. Gacott indeed deceived the sp
ouses and should be suspended.
2. whether or not the motion to withdraw and affidav
it affirming and confirming the existence, genuine
ss, and due execution will affect the disbarment pr
oceedings.
Held:
1. Yes but not because of violation of Rule 1.01. Att
y. Gacotts failure to prove the existence of co ow
nership does not lead to the conclusion that the de
ed of aabsolute sale is spurious and he was respon
sible for creating the spurious documents.
However, he is liable for violating canon 16, rule 15.03, an
d rule 18.03. Canon 16, he was remiss in his obligation to
hold in trust his clients properties. he lost certificates of la
nd titles that were entrusted to his care by Reynold. Rule 1
5.03, he admitted to be a acting as legal counsel for the for
mer owner of the subject properties, spouses Ylaya, and R
eynold So. There was no written consent from any of the p
arties involved. Rule 18.03, he neglected legal matters entr
usted to him. Records show that he never filed motion for l
eave to intervene on behalf of the spouses in the expropriat
ion proceedings, contrary to what he claimed.
2. No. While Fe Ylaya submitted the motion to withd
raw the verified complaint and the affidavit appear
to exonerate Atty. Gacott, complete exoneration i
s not the necessary legal effect as they are immater
ial for purposes of the disbarment proceedings. Ac
cording to Sec 5 Rule 139-
B of the rules of Court, no investigation shall be i
nterrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, s
ettlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of
charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute
the same.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and af
ford no redress for private grievances. They are undertake
n and prosecutes solely for the public welfare.
Atty. Gacott was suspended from practice of law for one y
ear.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
CSC VS LEDESMA
FACTS:
Respondent Ledesma is a Clerk III at the Records Section
of the Bureau of Immigration (BIR), the complainants, the
Tsai siblings are Taiwanese nationals who were studying
in the country at the time. Steve Tsai attested that on 15
March 1999 he went to the Bureau to seek Ledesmas
assistance in securing Emigrant Certificate Clearances
(ECCs) for him and Ching Tsai. He gave their passports
and P3,000 to Ledesma. Steve Tsai claimed that Ledesma
has helped him obtain ECCs for the previous three years.
He usually paid P1,500 for each ECC. He knew that out of
the amount Ledesma kept P200 to P300 as a service
charge.
According to Steve Tsai, Ledesma instructed him to return
for the ECCs on a certain date but Ledesma did not give
him the ECCs on that date. Steve Tsai informed Ledesma
that he and his sister were leaving for a vacation that
Friday. Ledesma replied that he should return the next
day, but still unable to produce the requested documents.
On Friday, Ledesma gave Steve Tsai the ECCs but did not
return their passports and were not able to leave the
country for their planned vacation.
An administrative case was filed against Ledesma based
on complainants affidavits. She requested that the
Department of Justice (DOJ) investigate her case.
(Bureaus Decision) finding Ledesma guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The Bureaus Decision meted
Ledesma with the penalties of dismissal, disqualification
from re-entry into the service, and forfeiture of all benefits
and emoluments. Ledesma assailed the Bureaus Decision
before the DOJ. On 16 August 1999, the DOJ dismissed
the appeal and affirmed the Bureaus Decision.
Bureaus Decision: finding Ledesma guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service with the penalties of dismissal, disqualification
from re-entry into the service, and forfeiture of all benefits
and emoluments.
Ledesma assailed the Bureaus Decision before the DOJ.
The DOJ dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Bureaus
Decision. She appealed to CSC and it dismissed her
appeal. She appealed to CA, found her guilty of simple
misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether the Decision of the Court of
AppealsViolated Ledesmas Constitutional Right to
Due Process
RULING:
NO. The Court does not see how a verdict of simple
misconduct can violate Ledesmas right to due process.
The Court has, on several instances, overturned charges of
grave misconduct where the circumstances showed that
the respondent only committed simple misconduct
CA did not simply ignore the charge of dishonesty, rather,
the appellate court found that the evidence did not support
the charges enumerated, including that of dishonesty. The
appellate court appreciated the evidence presented and the
facts of the case differently from the CSC. The Court of
Appeals discussed the factual and legal basis for its verdict
of simple misconduct. The appellate court Decision thus
sufficiently complied with Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which requires only that a courts decision
be clear on why either party prevailed under the law
applicable to the facts as proved. The constitutional
provision does not require a point-by-point refutation of
the CSCs Resolutions so long as the basis for the Court of
Appeals decision modifying the former is clear.
Anonymous v. Radam
FACTS
In an anonymous letter-complaint, Ma. Victoria
Radam, utility worker in the Office of the Clerk of
Court of RTC of Alaminos, was charged with
immorality.
The unnamed complainant alleged that respondent
was unmarried but got pregnant and gave birth
sometime in October 2005 and that her behavior
tainted the image of the judiciary.
Judge Abella conducted a discreet investigation to
verify the allegations. In his report 6 months after,
Judge Abella made the following findings:
o She was unmarried and gave birth
o She refused to marry the father because
they planned to migrate to Canada
o She expressed remorse and promised not
to commit the same mistake
o The father of the child is unknown as seen
in the birth cert
o She gave birth to 2 other babies while she
worked abroad and before she was
employed by the RTC
o Recommendation: Such conduct fell short
of the strict standards of Court personnel
and contrary to the Code of Judicial Ethics
and the Civil Service Rules. A place in the
judiciary demands upright men and
women. She is guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct which cannot be
countenanced by the Court. GUILTY of
IMMORAL CONDUCT or ACT
UNBECOMING A COURT
EMPLOYEE. 1 month suspension or 5k
fine
After reviewing the findings of Judge Abella, the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended that:
o She be absolved of the charge of
immorality because her alleged
misconduct (that is, giving birth out of
wedlock) did not affect the character and
nature of her position as a utility worker.
o She be held liable for conduct
unbecoming a court employee and
imposed a fine of P5,000 for stating in the
birth certificate that the father was
"unknown" to her
SC: The OCA correctly exonerated respondent from the
charge of immorality. However, it is wrong to hold her
liable for a charge of which she was not previously
informed.
ISSUES
1. W/N giving birth out of wedlock is an immoral
and disgraceful conduct that would make Radam
administratively liable - NO
For purposes of determining administrative
responsibility, giving birth out of wedlock is not
per se immoral. To warrant disciplinary action, the
same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must
be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree.
(Estrada v. Escritor): theres a distinction between
public and secular morality on the one hand, and
religious morality. This is important because the
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public
and secular morality.
For a particular conduct to constitute "disgraceful
and immoral" behavior under civil service laws, it
must be regulated on account of the concerns of
public and secular morality. It cannot be judged
based on personal bias, specifically those colored
by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on
"cultural" values not convincingly demonstrated to
have been recognized in the realm of public policy
expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the
same time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights
(such as the right to privacy) should be observed
to the extent that they protect behavior that may be
frowned upon by the majority.
Under these tests, two things may be concluded:
o (1) If the father of the child is himself
unmarried: the woman is not ordinarily
administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct.
There is no law which penalizes
an unmarried mother under those
circumstances by reason of her
sexual conduct or proscribes the
consensual sexual activity
between two unmarried persons.
The situation contravene any
fundamental state policy as
expressed in the Constitution
o (2) If the father of the child is himself
married to another woman: there is a
cause for administrative sanction against
either the father or the mother.
The "disgraceful and immoral
conduct" consists of having
extramarital relations with a
married person. The sanctity of
marriage is constitutionally
recognized
In this case, she and the father of her child were
unmarried. Therefore, respondent cannot be held
liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct simply
because she gave birth to the child out of wedlock.
2. W/N Radam should be administratively liable for
the incorrect entry in the birth certificate that the
father of the child is unknown - NO
Radam was charged only for giving birth out of
wedlock. It was the only charge of which she was
informed.
The recommendation of the OCA that she be held
administratively liable in connection with an entry
in the birth certificate came like a thief in the
night. It was unwarranted. She was neither
confronted with it nor given the chance to explain
it. To hold her liable for a totally different charge
of which she was totally unaware will violate her
right to due process.
The essence of due process in an administrative
proceeding is the opportunity to explain ones
side, whether written or verbal
Radam was deprived of due process with regard to
her alleged unbecoming conduct in relation to a
certain statement in the birth certificate of her
child.
An employee must be informed of the charges
against him, and the normal to do so is by
furnishing him with a copy of the charges against
 him. This is a basic procedural requirement that
cannot be dispensed with. The second minimum
requirement is that the employee must have a
reasonable opportunity to present his side of the
matter
Ones employment is not merely a species of
property rights. It is also the means by which he
and those who depend on him live. It is therefore
protected by the guarantee of security of tenure.
And in the civil service, this means that no
government employee may be removed,
suspended or disciplined unless for cause provided
by law and after due process.
INGRAHAM V. WRIGHT
FACTS: James Ingraham was a junior high student in a
Florida public school. After failing to respond quickly to a
teachers instructions, Ingraham was brought to Principal
Willie Wrights office where he refused to admit the
infraction. Ingraham was then subjected to corporal
punishment by Principal Wright, with the help of the
Assistant Principal and his personal assistant. According
to the record, Ingrahams spanking was particularly harsh
as he was subjected to twenty separate strokes from the
wooden paddle. Ingrahams doctors ordered him to remain
out of school to recover from injuries sustained during his
paddling. Ingraham and another student brought suit
alleging that Florida law allowing corporal punishment
violated the Eighth Amendment, violated their due process
rights, and sought damages in addition to declaratory and
injunctive relief.
DISTRICT COURT: Granted Wrights motion to
dismiss
CA: AFFIRMED
ISSUE:WON the Eighth Amendment bar corporal
punishment in public schools
WON Does due process require notice to parents
before corporal punishment is imposed
HELD: NO
Eighth Amendment has no application to corporal
punishment in public schools. No, notice is not required
before administering punishing as the Florida statutory
scheme contains adequate safeguards to prevent wrongful
punishment, and affords adequate remedies in the event a
student is deprived of his rights.
It only is applied to those convicted of crimes rather than
to the disciplining of school children. There was no basis
for extending the Eighth Amendment beyond that
historical context, particularly as applied to schools that
are already carefully monitored by local communities.
Furthermore, aggrieved students and parents can seek
criminal and civil remedies in the event punishments
exceed what is necessary to enforce rules and impose
discipline within the school environment.
Next, the Court turned to the Due Process issue,
explaining that both physical restraint and infliction of
pain are within the historical meaning of liberty interest
protected by guarantees of due process of law. Children
obviously have a strong and legitimate interest in avoiding
unwarranted punishments or being unnecessarily deprived
of their liberty. However, the Court here concluded
Florida law already contained adequate protections, with
teachers and principals alike required to exercise prudence
in applying punishments, subject to the watchful eye of the
community and the possibility of subsequent civil or
criminal liability for wrongful behavior. The Court saw no
need to add pre-punishment notifications, as school
discipline has always been handled without the need for
prior notification or hearings. Finally, the Court explained
that imposing additional requirements on schools seeking
to impose punishments would intrude state authority to
regulate schools.
Guzman v National University
Facts: Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo
and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National
University, have come to this Court to seek relief from
what they describe as their school's "continued and
persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition
"for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated
August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due
process due to the fact that they were active participants in
peaceful mass actions within the premises of the
University.
The respondents on the other hand claimed that the
petitioners failure to enroll for the first semester of the
school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not
because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and
human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic
showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts
of classes. That Guzman is facing criminal charges for
malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of
respondent University. The petitioners have failures in
their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.
Issue: WON the petitioners were denied due process.
Held: Immediately apparent from a reading of
respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that
they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to
determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed
led or participated "in activities within the university
premises, conducted without prior permit from school
authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or
perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation,
slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for
and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically,
the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal
case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman,
cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his
expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent
is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any
duly published rule of theirs by which students may be
expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic
standing.
The school had violated the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools that no penalty shall be imposed upon
any student except for cause as defined in the manual
and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have
been conducted.
There are standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
MACIAS VS MACIAS
FACTS:
This involves an administrative complaint filed by
complainant Margie C. Macias charging her husband,
Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with
immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. The complaint was filed when respondent was
still sitting as the presiding judge of Branch 28 of RTC of
Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in an illicit
liaison and immoral relationship with a certain Judilyn
Seranillos (Seranillos). The relationship continued until
the time of the filing of the complaint.
Said Judilyn Seranillos, respondents lover, has been
brought many times by respondent to his court in
Zamboanga del Norte, scandalizing court personnel and
lawyers, who sometimes must wait for the session to start
because respondent and his mistress are not yet through
with each other; That the scandalous relations of
respondent with his mistress is an open secret among
lawyers, court personnel and litigants.
This Court issued a Resolution referring the complaint to
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation. The Investigating Justice submitted his
Report and he recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against Judge Macias. The Investigating Justice
reasoned that complainant failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that respondent committed acts of
immorality, or that his conduct was prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. He recommended that Judge Macias
be reprimanded for failing to exercise great care and
circumspection in his actions.
ISSUE: WON administrative proceedings against judges
are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal
cases
RULING. YES. Impeachment proceedings before courts
have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be in their
nature highly penal in character and to be governed by the
rules of law applicable to criminal cases. The charges
must, therefore, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
With Horilleno case, it became necessary for every
complainant to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt
despite the fact that the case will only involve an
administrative, and not a criminal, complaint.
The procedure for the impeachment of judges of first
instance has not been well defined. The Supreme Court
has not yet adopted rules of procedure, as it is
authorized to do by law. In practice, it is usual for the
court to require that charges made against a judge of first
instance shall be presented in due form and sworn to;
thereafter, to give the respondent judge an opportunity to
answer; thereafter, if the explanation of the respondent be
deemed satisfactory, to file the charges without further
annoyance for the judge; while if the charges establish a
prima facie case, they are referred to the Attorney-
General who acts for the court in conducting an inquiry
into the conduct of the respondent judge.
On the conclusion of the AttorneyGenerals investigation,
a hearing is had before the court en banc and it sits in
judgment to determine if sufficient cause exists involving
the serious misconduct or inefficiency of the respondent
judge as warrants the court in r ecommending his removal
to the Governor-General.
OCA v. Indar
Facts: This is an administrative complaint for gross
misconduct and dishonesty against respondent Judge
Cader P. Indar. Upon investigation it was found that judge
Indar who have sworn to faithfully uphold the law had
issued decisions in the questioned annulment of marriage
cases without showing that such cases underwent trial and
complied with the statutory and jurisprudential
requirements for voiding marriages. In his Report dated 2
September 2011, Justice Borreta first determined whether
the requirements of due process had been complied with
since there was no proof that Judge Indar personally and
actually received any of the notices sent to him in the
course of the investigation.
Justice Borreta differentiated administrative due process
with judicial due process. He stated that while a day in
court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is
otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest
upon different principles.
Justice Borreta noted that all possible means to locate
Judge Indar and to personally serve the court notices to
him were resorted to. The notices of hearing were sent to
Judge Indars known addresses, namely, his sala in RTC-
Cotabato Branch 14 and RTC-Shariff Aguak Branch 15,
and at his residence address. However, none of the notices
appeared to have been personally received by Judge Indar.
ISSUE: WON due process was afforde to Justice Indar
Ruling: The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service, which govern the conduct of
disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in
administrative cases, clearly provide that technical rules of
procedure and evidence do not strictly apply to
administrative proceedings. Section 3, Rule I of the
Uniform Rules states: Section 3. Technical Rules in
Administrative Investigations. Administrative
investigations shall be conducted without necessarily
adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and
evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.
The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing
with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial
proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer
on constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is
not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by
means of which the Government is carried on, and the
order of society maintained, is purely executive or
administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is
judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of
right in judicial proceedings, in administrative
proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon
different principles. In certain proceedings, therefore,
of an administrative character, it may be stated,
without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice
and hearing are not essential to due process of law. It is
settled that technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus,
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense.12 It is enough that
the party is given the chance to be heard before the case
against him is decided.13 Otherwise stated, in the
application of the principle of due process, what is sought
to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the
denial of the opportunity to be heard.14
Again, for this petition to come under the due process of
law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an
office as property. It is, however, well settled in the United
States, that a public office is not property within the
sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of
law, but is a public trust or agency.17 (Emphasis
supplied)
In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to
controvert the charges against him. While there is no proof
that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing
issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two notices of
hearing were received by one Mustapha Randang of the
Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the notices
was received by a certain Mrs. Asok, who were
presumably authorized and capable to receive notices on
behalf of Judge Indar.
Further, Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the
administrative investigation against him because aside
from the fact that the Courts Resolution suspending him
was mailed to him, his preventive suspension was reported
in major national newspapers.18 Moreover, Judge Indar
was repeatedly sent notices of hearings to his known
addresses. Thus, there was due notice on Judge Indar of
the charges against him. However, Judge Indar still failed
to file his explanation and appear at the scheduled
hearings. Consequently, the investigation proceeded ex
parte in accordance with Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court.19
Public office is a public trust.20 This constitutional
principle requires a judge, like any other public servant
and more so because of his exalted position in the
Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of
honesty and integrity.21 As the visible representation of the
law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct
himself at all times in a manner that would merit the
respect and confidence of the people.22
MACALINTAL V. TECH
FACTS: Respondent Judge Teh issued a resolution
adverse to the client of Macalintal. The latter questioned
the resolution via petition for certiorari, before the
Comelec. While the case was pending at the Comelec,
respondent actively participated in the proceedings by
filing his comment on the petition. Complainant filed a
motion for respondent's inhibition in the election case.
And was also asked by the court to comment on such.
Instead of acting on the motion, respondent hired his own
lawyer, filed his answer to the motion before his own
court, and forthwith denied the same.
ISSUE: WON Judge Teh is guilty of Gross ignorance of
the law
HELD: YES( dismissed from service)
Respondent's active participation in the certiorari
proceedings, being merely a nominal or formal party, is
not called for. Respondent Judge acted both as a party
litigant and as a judge before his own court. Respondent's
gross deviation from the acceptable norm for judges is
clearly manifest.
Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a judge whose
order is challenged in an appellate court does not have to
file any answer or take active part in the proceeding unless
expressly directed by order of this Court.
When complainant filed a motion for respondent's
inhibition the latter, instead of acting thereon, hired his
own lawyer, filed his answer to the motion and forthwith
denied the same, ordering, at the same. Respondent Judge,
in fine, acted both as a party litigant and as a judge before
his own court. Respondent was directed to act on the
motion for inhibition in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in Rules of Court. Respondent Judge either
misunderstood or chose to misunderstand the directive for,
in his order, he granted the motion for inhibition "in
compliance with the resolution" of the Court. Clearly, the
Court, merely required respondent Judge to act on the
motion for inhibition in accordance with the Rules, i.e., "to
either proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom.
Office of the Court Administrator v Floro, Jr.
Facts: Judge Florentino V. Floro of Branch 73, Malabon
City faced a total of 13 charges calling for his disbarment
and removal from his office as a judge. Some of the
charges against him were the act of circulating calling
cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding
qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons
of Judicial Conduct; for rendering resolutions without
written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997
Rules of Procedures; his alleged partiality in criminal
cases where he declares that he is pro-accused which is
contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial
Conduct; for appearing in personal cases without prior
authority from the Supreme Court and without filing the
corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the
scheduled dates of hearing; for violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized
the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system; for
the use of highly improper and intemperate language
during court proceedings; for violation of Circular No. 135
dated 1 July 1987. Judge Floro also claimed that he has
certain psychic powers such as the power to see the future,
the power of bilocation, the power to type letters while he
is in a trance and the power to see and consult with his
little friends or the duwendes.
Issue/s: Whether or not Judge Floro is unfit to serve as a
judge
Held: Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as
Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to a medically
disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to
discharge the functions of his office. With the foregoing,
we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards
containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple
misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct. Judge Floro also violated the Code of
Judicial Ethics when he declared that he was pro-accused.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A
judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply
the law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial,
independent and honest but should be believed and
perceived to be impartial, independent and honest" as well.
He is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading
wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of
RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the
pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-
taking. The only logical explanation we can reach for such
acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence
or put pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he
himself is a judge and is thus in the right. Verily, Canon 2,
Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a
"judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another
court or administrative agency." By doing what he did,
Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very
awkward position. A judge should avoid being queer in
his behavior, appearance and movements. He must always
keep in mind that he is the visible representative of the
law. Judge Floro, Jr.s claims that he is endowed with
psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to
people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen
"little friends" are manifestations of his psychological
instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to
carry out the functions and responsibilities of a judge. The
findings of mental and psychological incapacity are thus
substantially supported by evidence. Based on the three[3]
psychological tests and evaluation of the two[2]
psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other recourse but to
recommend that Judge Florentino Floro be declared unfit
to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective immediately.
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC VS CA
FACTS: Private respondents are members of Tau Gamma
Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle
University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)
Joint Discipline Board and charged with Direct Assault
because of their involvement in an offensive action
causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other
student members of Domino Lux Fraternity.
As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB were
involved in the mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB
Discipline Board was formed to investigate the incidents.
It issued a Resolution finding private respondents guilty.
They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic
expulsion, pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.
Respondents filed certiorari and injunction with TRO to
RTC. RTC issued a TRO directing DLSU, to immediately
desist from barring the enrollment of petitioners.
CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96,
summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for
all private respondents. Despite the directive of CHED,
petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent from
enrolling and/or attending his classes.
Petitioners requested transfer of case records to the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
from the CHED. Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS,
not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases.
Private respondent was allowed to conditionally enroll in
petitioner DLSU. However, despite having completed all
the academic requirements for his course, DLSU has not
issued a certificate of completion/ graduation in his favor.
ISSUE: WON private respondents accorded due process
of law
RULING: YES, THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
EMBODIED IN THE CONSTITUTION WAS
SATISFIED.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students
found violating school discipline, [t]here are withal
minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy
the demands of procedural due process and these are: that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall
have the right to answer the charges against them and with
the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5)
the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities
to hear and decide the case.
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate
in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain
of deprivation of due process. Notice and hearing is the
bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which
is among the primary rights that must be respected even in
administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the
charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline
Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the
opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in
fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also
informed of the evidence presented against them as they
attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover,
private respondents were given the right to adduce
evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the
Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence
submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its
resolution in Discipline Case.
Tumey vs. Ohio
Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought
before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North College Hill,
charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor.
He moved for his dismissal because of the disqualification
of the mayor to try him under the 14th Amendment. The
mayor denied the motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted
Tumey of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within
Hamilton county as charged, fined him $100, and ordered
that he be imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid.
Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case
on error to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county.
That court heard the case and reversed the judgment, on
the ground that the mayor was disqualified as claimed.
The state sought review by the Court of Appeals of the
First Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed the
common pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor.
On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme Court refused Tumey's
application to require the Court of Appeals to certify its
record in the case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in
that court as of right, asking that the judgment of the
mayor's court and of the appellate court be reversed on
constitutional grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme
Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed for the
reason that no debatable constitutional question was
involved in the cause. The judgment was then brought to
the US Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the
Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court, to which it was
rightly directed.
Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and
his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting
violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor
disqualified from hearing the case.
Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not
involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship,
personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would
seem generally to be matters merely of legislative
discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th Amendment
and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process
of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of
a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against him in his case. Herein, the mayor has authority,
which he exercised in the case, to order that the person
sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine
and costs are paid. The mayor thus has a direct personal
pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant who came
before him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his
behalf, which he would not have received if the defendant
had been acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the
result of the normal operation of the law and the
ordinance. The system by which an inferior judge is paid
for his service only when he convicts the defendant has
not become so embedded by custom in the general
practice, either at common law or in this country, that it
can be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs
usually imposed are so small that they may be properly
ignored as within the maxim "de minimis non curat lex."
The Court cannot regard the prospect of receipt or loss of
such an emolument in each case as a minute, remote,
trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to
each defendant brought before the mayor for the careful
and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the
prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor should
weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest of
the mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only
reason for holding that due process of law is denied to the
defendant here. The statutes were drawn to stimulate small
municipalities, in the country part of counties in which
there are large cities, to organize and maintain courts to try
persons accused of violations of the Prohibition Act
everywhere in the county. The inducement is offered of
dividing between the state and the village the large fines
provided by the law for its violations. The trial is to be had
before a mayor without a jury, without opportunity for
retrial, and with a review confined to questions of law
presented by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity by
the reviewing court to set aside the judgment on the
weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be so
manifestly against the evidence as to indicate mistake,
bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial court. Thus,
no matter what the evidence was against him, the
defendant had the right to have an impartial judge. He
seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt
the trial because of the disqualification of the judge, which
existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the
outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and
to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the
village. There were thus presented at the outset both
features of the disqualification. The judgment of the
Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the
present opinion.
TEJANO V. OMBUDSMAN
FACTS: Desierto then the special prosecutor, concurred
in the approval of his subordinates in the filling of the
information for the violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019 against petitioners. The case was filled in the
Sandiganbayan, which led the petitioners to file for an
urgent motion for a period of time to file motion for
reinvestigation. Sandiganbayan granted the motion and
requested for a reinvestigation from the office of Special
Prosecutor Micael. The result was that there was no
probable cause to indict the petitioners and recommended
for the dismissal of the case.
The now Ombudsman Desierto, who participated earlier
with the preliminary investigation as special prosecutor
disapproved the recommendation and therein attached a
note stating:
assign to another prosecutor and investigate
aggressively
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman is justified in
disapproving the recommendation for dismissal of the
case.
HELD: NO
Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a
dispute may not review his decision on appeal. Having
participated in the preliminary investigation of the case
and having recommended the proper information to be
filled, it behooved Desierto from rescuing him from
participating in the review of the same during there
investigation.
Office of the Ombudsman v Quimbo
Facts: Even if the Ombudsman is not impleaded as a party
in the proceedings, part of its broad powers include
defending its decisions before the Court of Appeals.
Gilda D. Daradal, a clerk in the Provincial Engineering
Office of Catbalogan, Samar filed a complaint for Sexual
Harassment and Oppression against Engr. Prudencio C.
Quimbo (Quimbo), Provincial Engineer of Samar with the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas alleging that, Quimbo
asked her to massage his forehead and nape and, in the
course thereof, he said, You had been lying to me you
have already seen my manhood. When shall I have to see
yours? Also, Quimbo ordered her detail to the Civil
Service Commission in Catbalogan, Samar, to perform the
tasks of a male utility personnel. Her name was removed
from the payroll of the personnel of the Provincial
Engineering Office because of her refusal to submit to his
sexual advances. Daradal filed a motion for withdrawal of
the complaint but was denied by the Ombudsman-Visayas.
The Ombudsman-Visayas dismissed the case of sexual
harassment against Quimbo but finding him guilty of
oppression. When the case reached the Court of Appeals,
it reversed the ruling of the Ombudsman-Visayas and
denied the motion for intervention of the latter.
ISSUE: Does the Ombudsman possess the requisite legal
interest to intervene in the proceedings where its decision
is in question?
RULING: Yes. Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may validly intervene in
the said proceedings as its legal interest on the matter is
beyond cavil. The Court elucidated in Ombudsman v. De
Chavez , thus: The Office of the Ombudsman had a clear
legal interest in the inquiry into whether respondent
committed acts constituting grave misconduct, an offense
punishable under the Uniform Rules in Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service. It was in keeping with its duty
to act as a champion of the people and preserve the
integrity of public service that petitioner had to be given
the opportunity to act fully within the parameters of its
authority. The Office of the Ombudsman cannot be
detached, disinterested and neutral specially when
defending its decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases
against government personnel, the offense is committed
against the government and public interest. What further
proof of a direct constitutional and legal interest in the
accountability of public officers is necessary?
As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, the
CA, in the present case, gravely erred in disallowing the
Ombudsmans motion to intervene. It failed to consider
the essence of the Ombudsmans constitutionally and
statutorily conferred powers establishing its clear legal
interest in ensuring that its directive be implemented.
ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO VS CA
FACTS: This is a mining case. The petitioners appealed
from the second decision of the Court of Appeals,
reversing its first decision and holding that it was
improper from Benjamin M. Gozon, as Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, to affirm his own
decision as Director of Mines.
The petitioners filed a complaint in the CFI of Zambales,
assailing Secretary Gozons decision and praying that they
be declared the prior locators and possessors of the sixty-
nine mineral claims in question. the lower court sustained
Secretary Gozons decision and dismissed the case. It held
that the disqualification of a judge to review his own
decision or ruling (does not apply to administrative bodies;
that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from
deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as
Director of Mines.)
CA:
1ST DECISION: the petitioners were the rightful locators
and possessors of the said sixty-nine mining claims and
held as invalid the mining claims overlapping the same.
2ND DECISION: remanded the case to the Minister of
Natural Resources for another review of Director Gozons
decision.
The petitioners appealed from the second decision of the
Court of Appeals. There is an arresting and noteworthy
peculiarity in the present posture of this case now on
appeal to this Court (as arresting and noteworthy as the
peculiarity that Secretary Gozon reviewed his own
decision as Director of Mines).
The provision of section 61, CA 137, that the decision of
the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources contemplates that the
Secretary should be a person different from the Director of
Mines.
ISSUE: WON private respondents accorded due process
of law
RULING: NO, Petitioners-appellants were deprived of
due process, meaning fundamental fairness, when
Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of
Mines.
Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in
reviewing his decision as Director of Mines. The palpably
flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of
Mines is a mockery of administrative justice.
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate
officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing
officer must perforce be other than the officer whose
decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no
different view or there would be no real review of the
case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a
biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since
being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in
his first view of the case. He should have asked his
Undersecretary to undertake the review.
Singson vs. NLRC
Miguel Singson was an employee of the Philippine Air
Lines (PAL). In 1991, a Japanese national alleged that
Singson extorted money from her ($200.00) by accusing
her of having excess baggage; and that to settle the issue,
she needs to pay said amount to him. Singson was later
investigated and the investigating committee found him
guilty. PAL then dismissed Singson from employment.
Singson then filed a case before NLRC against PAL for
illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino ruled in favor
of Singson as he found PALs side insufficient to dismiss
Singson. PAL appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and his case was raffled to the 2nd
Division thereof.
The 2nd Division, however, was composed of
Commissioners Victoriano Calaycay, Rogelio Rayala, and
former Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino same arbiter which
decided Singsons case. The commissioners deliberated on
the case and thereafter reversed the decision of Aquino.
Singson moved for reconsideration. This time, only
Commissioners Calaycay and Rayala deliberated on the
motion. The motion was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due
process.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Singson was
denied due process. The SC held that Singson was denied
due process when Aquino participated, as presiding
commissioner of the 2nd Division of the NLRC, in
reviewing PALs appeal. He was reviewing his own
decision as a former labor arbiter.
Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, each Division shall consist of one
member from the public sector who shall act as the
Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the
workers and employers sectors, respectively. The
composition of the Division guarantees equal
representation and impartiality among its members. Thus,
litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners
who are impartial right from the start of the process of
review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial
since he was the arbiter who decided the case under
review. He should have inhibited himself from any
participation in this case. The infirmity of the resolution
was not cured by the fact that the motion for
reconsideration of Singson was denied by two
commissioners and without the participation of Aquino.
The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal
starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only
entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his
motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an
impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of
Singsons right to an impartial review of his appeal is not
an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.
Miguel Singson was an employee of the Philippine Air
Lines (PAL). In 1991, a Japanese national alleged that
Singson extorted money from her ($200.00) by accusing
her of having excess baggage; and that to settle the issue,
she needs to pay said amount to him. Singson was later
investigated and the investigating committee found him
guilty. PAL then dismissed Singson from employment.
Singson then filed a case before NLRC against PAL for
illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino ruled in favor
of Singson as he found PALs side insufficient to dismiss
Singson. PAL appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and his case was raffled to the 2nd
Division thereof.
The 2nd Division, however, was composed of
Commissioners Victoriano Calaycay, Rogelio Rayala, and
former Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino same arbiter which
decided Singsons case. The commissioners deliberated on
the case and thereafter reversed the decision of Aquino.
Singson moved for reconsideration. This time, only
Commissioners Calaycay and Rayala deliberated on the
motion. The motion was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due
process.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Singson was
denied due process. The SC held that Singson was denied
due process when Aquino participated, as presiding
commissioner of the 2nd Division of the NLRC, in
reviewing PALs appeal. He was reviewing his own
decision as a former labor arbiter.
Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, each Division shall consist of one
member from the public sector who shall act as the
Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the
workers and employers sectors, respectively. The
composition of the Division guarantees equal
representation and impartiality among its members. Thus,
litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners
who are impartial right from the start of the process of
review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial
since he was the arbiter who decided the case under
review. He should have inhibited himself from any
participation in this case. The infirmity of the resolution
was not cured by the fact that the motion for
reconsideration of Singson was denied by two
commissioners and without the participation of Aquino.
The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal
starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only
entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his
motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an
impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of
Singsons right to an impartial review of his appeal is not
an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.
MICHAEL H. vs. GERALD D
FACTS: Carole D. and Gerald D. were married and
established a home in California. Carole became involved
in an adulterous affair with Michael H. She conceived a
child, Victoria,with Gerald listed as father on the birth
certificate. Gerald has always held the child out to be his
daughter, but soon after delivery Carole informed Michael
she believed he might be the father. In 1981 Gerald moved
to New York.Carole, Michael, and Victoria had blood
tests revealing a 98.07% probability that Michael was the
father. Carole visited with Michael for several months,
were he held Victoria out as his daughter.
The next month Carole left Michael and reconciled with
Gerald and they lived together with two more children
being born.
Michael and Victoria, through guardian ad litem, sought
visitation rights for Michael pendente lite. A court
appointed psychologist recommended that Carole retain
sole custody, but Michael be allowed continued contact
with Victoria pursuant to a restricted visitation schedule.
The court concurred.
Gerald moved for summary judgment on the ground that
under California law there were no triable issues of fact as
to Victorias paternity. The law provides that the issue of
a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent
or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the
marriage.
The presumption may only be rebutted by blood tests, and
a motion for such tests must be made within two years of
the birth by the husband, or by the wife if the natural
father has filed an affidavit acknowledging paternity.
In 1985 the Superior Court granted the motion for
summary judgment, finding that Carole and Gerald were
cohabiting at the time of conception and birth and that
Gerald was neither sterile nor impotent.
Issue: WON the presumption established by the law
infringe upon the due process rights of a man who wishes
to establish his paternity of a child born to the wife of
another man.
HELD: Michael contends as a matter of substantive due
process that because he has established a parental
relationship with Victoria, protection of Gerald and
Caroles marital union is an insufficient state interest to
support termination of the relationship. However,
Michaels interest must be a fundamental liberty to be
constitutionally protected.
Historically, the marital family has been protected rather
than the potential father outside of the marriage. The
presumption of legitimacy was fundamental at common
law, and could be rebutted only by a husband who was
incapable of procreation or had no access to his wife
during the relative period. The policy rationales were the
aversion to declaring children illegitimate and the peace
and tranquility of the States and families. No modern or
historical precedent similarly recognizes the power of the
natural father to assert parental rights.
Michael must establish not that society has traditionally
allowed a natural father in his circumstances to establish
paternity, but that it has traditionally accorded such a
father parental rights. To provide protection to an
adulterous natural father is to deny protection to a marital
father.
Kansas v Hendricks
Facts: Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act establishes
procedures for the civil commitment of persons who, due
to a "mental abnormality" or a "personality disorder," are
likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence."
Kansas filed a petition under the Act in state court to
commit respondent (and cross petitioner) Hendricks, who
had a long history of sexually molesting children and was
scheduled for release from prison. The court reserved
ruling on Hendricks' challenge to the Act's
constitutionality, but granted his request for a jury trial.
After Hendricks testified that he agreed with the state
physician's diagnosis that he suffers from pedophilia and is
not cured and that he continues to harbor sexual desires for
children that he cannot control when he gets "stressed
out," the jury determined that he was a sexually violent
predator. Finding that pedophilia qualifies as a mental
abnormality under the Act, the court ordered him
committed. On appeal, the State Supreme Court
invalidated the Act on the ground that the precommitment
condition of a "mental abnormality" did not satisfy what it
perceived to be the "substantive" due process requirement
that involuntary civil commitment must be predicated on a
"mental illness" finding. It did not address Hendricks' ex
post-facto and double jeopardy claims.
Held: 1. The Act's definition of "mental abnormality"
satisfies "substantive" due process requirements. An
individual's constitutionally protected liberty interest in
avoiding physical restraint may be overridden even in the
civil context. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 .
This Court has consistently upheld involuntary
commitment statutes that detain people who are unable to
control their behavior and thereby pose a danger to the
public health and safety, provided the confinement takes
place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary
standards. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 . The Act
unambiguously requires a precommitment finding of
dangerousness either to one's self or to others, and links
that finding to a determination that the person suffers from
a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder."
Generally, this Court has sustained a commitment statute
if it couples proof of dangerousness with proof of some
additional factor, such as a "mental illness" or "mental
abnormality," see, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314 -
315, for these additional requirements serve to limit
confinement to those who suffer from a volitional
impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their
control. The Act sets forth comparable criteria with its
precommitment requirement of "mental abnormality" or
"personality disorder." Contrary to Hendricks' argument,
this Court has never required States to adopt any particular
nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes and
leaves to the States the task of defining terms of a medical
nature that have legal significance. Cf. Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 , n. 13. The legislature is
therefore not required to use the specific term "mental
illness" and is free to adopt any similar term. Pp. 8-13.
2. The Act does not violate the Constitution's double
jeopardy prohibition or its ban on ex post-facto
lawmaking. Pp. 13-24.
(a) The Act does not establish criminal proceedings, and
involuntary confinement under it is not punishment. The
categorization of a particular proceeding as civil or
criminal is a question of statutory construction. Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 . Nothing on the face of the Act
suggests that the Kansas Legislature sought to create
anything other than a civil commitment scheme. That
manifest intent will be rejected only if Hendricks provides
the clearest proof that the scheme is so punitive in purpose
or effect as to negate Kansas' intention to deem it civil.
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 -249. He has
failed to satisfy this heavy burden. Commitment under the
Act does not implicate either of the two primary objectives
of criminal punishment: retribution or deterrence. Its
purpose is not retributive: It does not affix culpability for
prior criminal conduct, but uses such conduct solely for
evidentiary purposes; it does not make criminal conviction
a prerequisite for commitment; and it lacks a scienter
requirement, an important element in distinguishing
criminal and civil statutes. Nor can the Act be said to act
as a deterrent, since persons with a mental abnormality or
personality disorder are unlikely to be deterred by the
threat of confinement. The conditions surrounding
confinement--essentially the same as conditions for any
civilly committed patient--do not suggest a punitive
purpose. Although the commitment scheme here involves
an affirmative restraint, such restraint of the dangerously
mentally ill has been historically regarded as a legitimate
non punitive objective. Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 747 . The confinement's potentially indefinite
duration is linked, not to any punitive objective, but to the
purpose of holding a person until his mental abnormality
no longer causes him to be a threat to others. He is thus
permitted immediate release upon a showing that he is no
longer dangerous, and the longest he can be detained
pursuant to a single judicial proceeding is one year. The
State's use of procedural safeguards applicable in criminal
trials does not itself turn the proceedings into criminal
prosecutions. Allen, supra, at 372. Finally, the Act is not
necessarily punitive if it fails to offer treatment where
treatment for a condition is not possible, or if treatment,
though possible, is merely an ancillary, rather than an
overriding, state concern. The conclusion that the Act is
non punitive removes an essential prerequisite for both
Hendricks' double jeopardy and ex post-facto claims. Pp.
13-21.
(b) Hendricks' confinement does not amount to a second
prosecution and punishment for the offense for which he
was convicted. Because the Act is civil in nature, its
commitment proceedings do not constitute a second
prosecution. Cf. Jones, supra. As this commitment is not
tantamount to punishment, the detention does not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause, even though it follows a
prison term. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 .
Hendricks' argument that, even if the Act survives the
"multiple punishments" test, it fails the "same elements"
test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , is
rejected, since that test does not apply outside of the
successive prosecution context. Pp. 22-23.
(c) Hendricks' ex post-facto claim is similarly flawed. The
Ex Post-Facto Clause pertains exclusively to penal
statutes. California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514
U.S. 499, 505 . Since the Act is not punishment, its
application does not raise ex post-facto concerns.
Moreover, the Act clearly does not have retroactive effect.
It does not criminalize conduct legal before its enactment
or deprive Hendricks of any defense that was available to
him at the time of his crimes. Pp. 23-24.
LEGASPI VS CITY OF CEBU
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted
Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of
Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the
parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in Ordinance
No. 801 which states that any vehicle found violating any
provision of any existing ordinance of the City of Cebu
which prohibits, regulates or restricts the parking of
vehicles shall be immobilized by clamping any tire of the
said violating vehicle with the use of a denver boot vehicle
immobilizer or any other special gadget designed to
immobilize motor vehicles.
The violating vehicle is immobilized, thus, depriving its
owner of the use thereof at the sole determination of any
traffic enforcer or regular PNP personnel or Cebu City
Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel. The vehicle
immobilizer cannot be removed or released without the
owner or driver paying first to the City Treasurer of Cebu
through the Traffic Violations Bureau all the accumulated
penalties of all unpaid or unsettled traffic law violations,
plus the administrative penalty of P500.00 and, further, the
immobilized vehicle shall be released only upon
presentation of the receipt of said payments and upon
release order by the Chairman and other officers
authorized under the said law. the owner of the
immobilized motor vehicle is deprived of his right to the
use of his/her vehicle and penalized without a hearing by a
person who is not legally or duly vested with such rights,
power or authority
Petitioners brought a suit seeking the declaration of
Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in
violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and
damages.
RTC: ordinance is unconstitutional
CA: ordinance is valid
ISSUE: WON ordinance constituted a contravention of
the guaranty of due process under the Constitution by
authorizing the immobilization of offending vehicles
through the clamping of tires
RULING: NO. Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive
tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity
with the limitations under the Constitution and the
statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and
reason, and its consistency with public policy.
The immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by
clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors
were not around at the time of apprehension. The
clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and
reasonable way to enforce the ordinance against its
transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade
liability by simply driving away. Under such
circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous.
Nor should the lack of a trial-type hearing prior to the
clamping constitute a breach of procedural due process,
for giving the transgressors the chance to reverse the
apprehensions through a timely protest could equally
satisfy the need for a hearing.
Buck v. Bell
FACTS: Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman
who was committed to the State Colony Epileptics and
Feeble Minded. She is the daughter of a feeble minded
mother in the same institution, and the mother of an
illegitimate feeble-minded child. She was eighteen years
old at the time of the trial of her case in the latter part of
1924. An Act of Virginia, approved March 20, 1924,
recites that the health of the patient and the welfare of
society may be promoted in certain cases by the
sterilization of mental defectives, under careful safeguard,
that the sterilization may be effected in males by
vasectomy and in females by salpingectomy, without
serious pain or substantial danger to life; that the
Commonwealth is supporting in various institutions many
defective persons who, if now discharged, would become
a menace, but, if incapable of procreating, might be
discharged with safety and become self-supporting with
benefit to themselves and to society, and that experience
has shown that heredity plays an important part in the
transmission of insanity, imbecility, etc. The statute then
enacts that, whenever the superintendent of certain
institutions, including the above-named State Colony,
shall be of opinion that it is for the best interests of the
patients and of society that an inmate under his care
should be sexually sterilized, he may have the operation
performed upon any patient afflicted with hereditary forms
of insanity, imbecility, etc., on complying with the very
careful provisions by which the act protects the patients regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs,
from possible abuse. has been transferred to the Department of Tourism.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said statute authorizing Judge Paras sided with the petitioner and issued a TRO on
compulsory sterilization of the mentally retarded denies the ordinance but he eventually lifted such TRO.
the due process and equal protection of the laws. Declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to
RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING
Ruling: The procedure can be no doubt had the due MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS
process of law. Carrie Buck is the probable potential THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
the she may be sexually sterilized without detriment to her OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
general health, and that her welfare and that of society AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
will be promoted by her sterilization. We have seen more TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the
than once that the public welfare may call upon the best prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote
citizens for their lives. It is better for all the world if, general welfare
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing due process.
their kind.
ISSUE: WON a municipal corporation can, prohibit the
The Court found that the statute did not violate the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and
Constitution. Justice Holmes made clear that Buck's the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing
challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant
but on the process of the substantive law. Since to RA 938.
sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had
occurred (at which the patient and a guardian could be HELD: NO
present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and the
Supreme Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if so The SC held that municipal corporations cannot prohibit
requested by the patient. Only after "months of the operation of night clubs. They may be
observation" could the operation take place. That was
enough to satisfy the Court that there was no regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
Constitutional violation. Citing the best interests of the their business. Ordinance declared void and
state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law like unconstitutional.
Virginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being
swamped with incompetence . . . Three generations of It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a
imbeciles are enough." lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a
DELA CRUZ VS PARAS worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that
does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
FACTS: Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The
operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bulacan on reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
the grounds that: prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue
should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of
1. Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has cabarets.
no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or
calling.

2. Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners right to

due process and the equal protection of the law, as the
license previously given to petitioners was in effect Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Viron
withdrawn without judicial hearing. Transportation Co. Inc.

3. That under Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, by Facts: GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179
Presidential Decree No. 259, the power to license and operational, thereby creating the MMDA in 2003. Due to
traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to
decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now
located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and
providing more and convenient access to the mass
transport system. The MMC gave a go signal for the
project. Viron Transit, a bus company assailed the move.
They alleged that the MMDA didnt have the power to
direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so
they asked the court to interpret the extent and scope of
MMDAs power under RA 7924. They also asked if the
MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the
implementation in a trial court. In the Pre-Trial Order17
issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to
whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro
Manila included the power to direct provincial bus
operators to abandon and close their duly established and
existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a
common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the
Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial
bus operators would be deprived of their real properties
without due process of law should they be required to use
the common bus terminals. The trial court sustained the
constitutionality.
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on
September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision, this time
holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of
police power"; that the authority of the MMDA under
Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the
power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps
existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent
with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners
contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases
for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O.
mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus
terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter
or communication from the Executive Department
apprising them of an immediate plan to close down their
bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an
administrative directive to government agencies to
coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use
government property along EDSA and South Expressway
corridors. They add that the only relation created by the
E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the
implementing officials, but not between third persons.
Issues:
1. Is there a justiciable controversy?
2. Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional?
Held: Yes to both. Petition dismissed.
1. Requisites: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(b) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory
relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d)
the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination
It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse
effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals
would mean, among other things, the loss of income from
the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely,
respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional
right to property without due process of law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal
and substantial interest in the case such that [they have]
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the
E.O.s] enforcement." Consequently, the established rule
that the constitutionality of a law or administrative
issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a
direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been
satisfied by respondents.
2. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective
of guiding government and private investment in the
development of the countrys intermodal transportation
and communications systems. It was also tasked to
administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of
transportation and communications.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No.
125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA,
which is authorized to establish and implement a project
such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the
President, although authorized to establish or cause the
implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority
through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is
the primary implementing and administrative entity in the
promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and
implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of
the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of
the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179
ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It
was delegated only to set the policies concerning traffic in
Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all programs and projects concerning
traffic management, specifically pertaining to
enforcement, engineering and education.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and
functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement
the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not
have been validly designated by the President to undertake
the Project.
MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements
such as that (1) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the
police power legislation must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes and the means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized
that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private,
concern. The Court therein held that public welfare
underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of
Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control traffic on national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized
that public welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatory
measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which
is, to say the least, a menace to public safety." As such,
measures calculated to promote the safety and
convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the
regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for
the exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion
is a public concern that needs to be addressed
immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?
De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however,
impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the
outright proscription against the existence of all terminals,
apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered
as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this
Court has not been enlightened
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the
proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so
broad that even entities which might be able to provide
facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred
from operating at all.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals
is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the
ltfrb)was empowered to "impose such conditions as to
construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or
operation as the public interests and convenience may
reasonably require" in approving any franchise or
privilege. The law mandates the ltfrb to require any public
service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any
reasonable extension of its existing facilities.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
WASHINGTON VS GLUCKSBERG
FACTS: The States present law (Wash. Rev. Code
9A.36.060(1) (1994) makes promoting a suicide
attempt a felony, and provides: A person is guilty of
[that crime] when he knowingly causes or aids another
person to attempt suicide.
Four Washington physicians (Respondents) who
occasionally treat terminally ill, suffering patients, declare
that they would assist these patients in ending their lives if
not for the States assisted-suicide ban. They, along with
three gravely ill plaintiffs who have since died and
Compassion in Dying (nonprofit organization), that
counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide,
filed this suit against the State and its Attorney General
(Petitioners), seeking a declaration that the ban is, on its
face, unconstitutional.
They assert a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendments Due Process Clause which extends to a
personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill
adult to commit physician-assisted suicide. They
concluded that Washingtons assisted-suicide ban is
unconstitutional because it places an undue burden on the
exercise of constitutionally protected liberty interest.
ISSUE: WON Washingtons prohibition against
causing or aiding a suicide violates the Due Process
Clause
RULING: NO, it does not violate the due process clause.
Respondents asserted right to assistance in committing
suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause. liberty specially protected by
the Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so. This asserted
right has no place in our Nations traditions, given the
countrys consistent, almost universal, and continuing
rejection of the right, even for terminally ill, mentally
competent adults. To hold for respondents, the Court
would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and
practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of
almost every State.
The constitutional requirement that Washingtons assisted-
suicide ban be rationally related to legitimate government
interests is met here. These interests include prohibiting
intentional killing and preserving human life; preventing
the serious public-health problem of suicide, especially
among the young, the elderly, and those suffering from
un- treated pain or from depression or other mental
disorders; protecting the medical professions integrity and
ethics and maintaining physicians role as their patients
healers; protecting the poor, the elderly, disabled persons,
the terminally ill, and persons in other vulnerable groups
from indifference, prejudice, and psychological and
financial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a
possible slide toward voluntary and perhaps even
involuntary euthanasia. The relative strengths of these
various interests need not be weighed exactingly, since
they are unquestionably important and legitimate, and the
law at issue is at least reasonably related to their
promotion and protection.
Lawrence and Garner vs. Texas [539 US 558, 26 June
2003]
Facts: Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a
private residence, Houston police entered John Geddes
Lawrences apartment and saw him and another adult man,
Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual
act. Petitioners were arrested and convicted of deviate
sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute
forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in
certain intimate sexual conduct. The two were arrested,
held in custody over night, and charged and convicted
before a Justice of the Peace. The two exercised their right
to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. They
challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and of a like
provision of the Texas Constitution. Those contentions
were rejected. The two, having entered a plea of nolo
contendere, were each fined $200 and assessed court costs
of $141.25. The Court of Appeals for the Texas
Fourteenth District considered the two accuseds federal
constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided
opinion, rejected the constitutional arguments and
affirmed the convictions. The majority opinion indicated
that the Court of Appeals considered the US Supreme
Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick (478 US 186
[1986]), to be controlling on the federal due process aspect
of the case. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari (537
U. S. 1044 [2002], to consider 3 questions: (1) whether the
criminal convictions under the Texas Homosexual
Conduct law violate the 14th Amendment guarantee of
equal protection of laws; (2) Whether the criminal
convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the
home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy
protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment; and (3) Whether Bowers v. Hardwick (478
US 186 [1986]), should be overruled.
Issue: Whether the statute and the Bower decision denies
homosexual persons the autonomy of decisions involving
relationships available to heterosexual ones.
Ruling: The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be
sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a
particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though,
have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the
most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the
most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled
to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals.
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by
the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a
person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It
suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes
and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as
free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be
but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.
The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to make this choice. Our
laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the 14th Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define ones own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State. Persons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as
heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would
deny them this right. The case of Bowers was not correct
when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought
not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick
should be and now is overruled. Thus, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with the present opinion.
IMBONG VS OCHOA
FACTS:
From a population of 27M in 1960 to 76M in 2000 and a
total of 92M in 2010.
The Congress enacted RA 10354 which is the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act on
Dec 21, 2012.
RH Law provides Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized sector access to the full range of information
regarding family methods, products, and services. And to
ensure its effectivity, the RH law made it mandatory for
health providers to be the one provide for the full range
information regarding family planning methods, products,
and services. Also for schools to incorporate Age
Development Reproductive Health education. And to
better sink teeth into it, it criminalizes those certain acts of
refusal to carry out its mandates. It is an enhancement
measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, womens health and population control.
ISSUE/S:
I. SUBSTANTIVE: whether the RH Law is
unconstitutional:
1. Right to life
2. Right to heath
3. Freedom of religion and right to free
speech
a.) WON the RH Law violates the
guarantee of religious freedom since it
mandates the State-sponsored
procurement of contraceptives, which
contravene the religious beliefs of e.g.
the petitioners
b.) WON the RH Law violates the
guarantee of religious freedom by
compelling medical health
practitioners, hospitals, and health
care providers, under pain of penalty,
to refer patients to other institutions
despite their conscientious objections
c.) WON the RH Law violates the
guarantee of religious freedom by
requiring would-be spouses, as a
condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, to attend a seminar
on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and
autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic
freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibitions against involuntary servitude
9. Natural Law
B. WON the delegation of authority to the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
determine WON a supply or product is to
be in the Essentials Drug List is valid
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the
powers devolved the Local Government
and the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM)
HELD: II.SUBSTANTIVE
1. NO, Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution
states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning the traditional meaning
of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited
by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical
sources also support the view that conception begins at
fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for
(a) conception to refer to the moment of fertilization
and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that
kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited.
Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take
action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive,
and thus constitutionally permissible.
The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. The RH Law prohibits not only drugs
or devices that prevent implantation but also those that
induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that
the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their
office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by
using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients
only those that primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mothers womb would pave the way for
the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy
the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This
violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the
same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the
IRR which also uses the term primarily, must be struck
down.
2. NO, Petitioners claim that the right to health is
violated by the RH Law because it requires the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectable and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies in the National Drug
Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals
(Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of
getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral
contraceptive pills.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA
4729 . With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate
safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are
made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate
under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind
the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of
these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done
following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is
to be considered mandatory only after these devices and
materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the
FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are
safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective.
3. A.) NO, The State may pursue its legitimate
secular objectives without being dictated upon the
policies of any one religion. To allow religious
sects to dictate policy or restrict other
groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This
would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion, and thus, establishes a state
religion. Thus, the State can enhance its
population control program through the RH Law
even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
B.) YES, RH Law obliges a hospital or medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health
care and services under the law to another accessible
healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections
based on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions
violate the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2),
Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause,
whose basis is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service providers to
refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if
they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well
as compelling them to disseminate information and
perform RH procedures under pain of penalty Section 24
also violate the freedom of religion. While penalties may
be imposed by law to ensure compliance to
it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the
effective implementation of the law.
Under the benevolent-neutrality theory, the principle
underlying the First Amendment is that freedom to carry
out ones duties to a Supreme Being is an inalienable
right, not one dependent on the grace of legislature.
Religious freedom is seen as a substantive right and not
merely a privilege against discriminatory legislation. With
religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility,
benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion
under certain circumstances.
C.) RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and
infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power
by the government. The law does not even mandate the
type of family planning methods to be included in the
seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept
or reject information they receive and they retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without the
intervention of the State.
4.) YES, RH Law, which permits RH procedures even
with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the
provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into
martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the
constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social
institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-
making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the
family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor
undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution,
which states: The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government. In addition, the portion of
Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the
written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their
absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-
kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures
is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in
cases where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.
5.) NO, The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality
of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education. Although educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the RH education
program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual
case be filed before it. This is also brought by the fact that
the DEPED hasnt yet come up with a particular draft of
the said curriculum.
6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of
the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider
must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a public health service provider. The
private health care institution cited under Section 7
should be seen as synonymous to private health care
service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough
to include providing of information and rendering of
medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious
groups are exempted from rendering RH service and
modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH
information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used
together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice
and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to
the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
governments RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State
shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick
elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to
reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children.
In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of
children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The
RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for
private and non-government health care service providers
to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not
amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the
practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages
private and non-government RH service providers to
render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth
accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do
otherwise.
9.) With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates
natural law,suffice it to say that the Court does not duly
recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a
law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every
law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as
natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute,
executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To
begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate
body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and
notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists,
philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the
philosophical school are interested in the law as an
abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present. Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a
written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law
B.) The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power
to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be
included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA
not only has the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods
C.) The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of
local governments. There is exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has
no power over a program for which funding has been
provided by the national government under the annual
general appropriations act, even if the program involves
the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the
LGU.
Obergefell v Hodges
Facts:In this case, fourteen same-sex couples were the
plaintiffs, and James Obergefell was one of them. The
defendant is the Director of the Ohio Department of
Health named Richard Hodges. The States of Ohio,
Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee defined marriage as a
union between one man and one woman and didnot
recognize same-sex marriages. The plaintiffs confronted
these laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. They challenge the constitutionality of
those bans on same-sex marriage. They filed lawsuits in
federal district court in their home states. They argued
that:1) The States statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment;2) The Fourteenth Amendment required the
States to allow same-sex marriage;3) The Fourteenth
Amendment recognized the validity of such marriages
executed in other jurisdictions
The federal district courts ruled in favor of the plaintiffs
but the Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and
reversed the rulings consequently the plaintiffs appealed to
the Supreme Court of the United States.
Issue:Whether or not marriage licenses must be granted to
same-sexcouples in every State.
Held:Yes. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the
States must grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples
because same-sex couples have the right to marry in every
State. The Supreme Court reasoned that the history of
marriage is manifested by both continuity and change.
Changes, for instance the abandonment of the law of
coverture and the waning of arranged marriage have
affected characteristics of marriage. These new insights in
understanding marriage have fortified it, not destabilized
it. Developments and shifts in public attitudes have made
it possible for same-sex couples to enjoy more open and
public lives. In the 2003, in the case of Lawrence v. Texas,
the Supreme Court held that laws that made same-sex
intimacy a crime, were unconstitutional and it humiliated
the lives of gay people. It then overruled the 1986 case of
Bowers v. Hardwick which had sustained a Georgia law
that criminalized homosexual conduct. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
fundamental liberties including personal choices that are
essential to individual dignity and autonomy which
include an individuals identity and beliefs. The Supreme
Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the
Constitution. For example, in Loving v.Virginia, the Court
nullified bans on interracial marriage. The Court must
respect the fundamental reasons for protecting the right to
marry in determining whether the same legal reasoning
should apply to same-sex marriage. These analyses
directed to the conclusion that same-sexcouples must have
the right to marry because the right to marry is a
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person.
Same-sex couples should not be deprived of that right and
that liberty under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
DYCAICO VS SSS
FACTS:
When Bonifacio (Elena Dycaicos husband) died, she filed
with the SSS an application for survivors pension. Her
application was denied on the ground that they were not
living under the benefits of marraige when Bonifacio
became a member of the SSS using Section 12-B(d) of RA
8282 as basis.
RTC: ruled in favor of the SSS
CA: affirmed RTC
ISSUE: WON the proviso as of the date of his retirement
in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, which qualifies
the term primary beneficiaries, violates due process.
RULING: YES. The proviso "as of the date of his
retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs
afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the
surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the
retired SSS members were contracted after the latters
retirement of their survivors benefits. There is outright
confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses
without giving them an opportunity to be heard.
By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses
whose respective marriages to SSS members were
contracted after the latters retirement, the proviso "as of
the date of his retirement" qualifying the term "primary
beneficiaries" for the purpose of entitlement to survivors
pension has created the presumption that marriages
contracted after the retirement date of SSS members were
entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits under
Rep. Act No. 8282. This presumption, moreover, is
conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not
afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the
illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates this conclusive
presumption, is unconstitutional because it presumes a fact
which is not necessarily or universally true.
In this case, the petitioner was not given any opportunity
to prove her claim that she was Bonifacios bona fide legal
spouse as she was automatically disqualified from being
considered as his primary beneficiary. In effect, the
petitioner was deprived of the survivors benefits, a
property interest, accruing from the death of Bonifacio
without any opportunity to be heard. Standards of due
process require that the petitioner be allowed to present
evidence to prove that her marriage to Bonifacio was
contracted in good faith and as his bona fide spouse she is
entitled to the survivors pension accruing upon his death.
Hence, the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in
Section 12-B(d) which deprives the petitioner and those
similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSS
members this opportunity to be heard must be struck
down.
Republic v. Albios
FACTS: Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee
Fringer, an American citizen. She later on filed a petition
to nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately
after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying
with any of their essential marital obligations. She said
that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to
enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States
and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never
processed her petition for citizenship. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void
ab initio.
The RTC ruled in her favor.
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC
ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose
other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its
inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to
freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
The CA, however, upheld the RTC decision.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties
clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of
getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found
the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering
that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of
$2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or
build a family.
The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and
Fringer be declared null and void.
RULING: No, respondents marriage is not void.
The court said: Based on the above, consent was not
lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective
by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage
so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.
The court also explained that There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as
the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as
all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law
are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as
an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State. It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of
the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the
impression that marriage may easily be entered into when
it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.
SERRANO VS NLRC
FACTS: Ruben Serrano was the head of the security
checkers section of Isetann Department Store. the
management sent him a letter immediately terminating his
services as security section head, effective on the same
day. The reason given by the management was
retrenchment; they had opted to hire an independent
security agency as a cost-cutting measure. Serrano filed a
complaint for Illegal Dismissal the Labor Arbiter.
LA: in favor of Serrano. It stated that Isetann failed to
establish that it had retrenched its security division, that
the petitioner was not accorded due process
NLRC: reversed the LA but ordered Isetann to pay
separation pay equivalent to one month per year of
service, unpaid salary, et al. It held that the phase-out of
the security section was a valid exercise of management
prerogative on the part of Isetann, for which the NLRC
cannot substitute its judgment in the absence of bad faith
or abuse of discretion on the part of the latter; and that the
security and safety supervisors position was long in place
prior to Serranos separation from the company, or the
phase-out of the Security Section.
ISSUE: WON dismissal was illegal.
HELD: No (VALID but INEFFECTUAL)
The Court held that the dismissal was due to an authorized
cause under Art. 283 of the Labor Code, i.e. redundancy.
However, while an authorized cause exists, Isetann failed
to follow the procedural requirement provided by Art. 283
of Labor Code. For termination due to authorized causes,
the employer must give a written notice of termination to
the employee concerned and to the In 1989, the
termination of an employee, even for just cause but
without following the requisite procedure, renders such
dismissal illegal, and therefore null and void.
In the Wenphil doctrine-the said rule was unjust to
employers. Instead, the dismissal was held to be still valid
but the employer was sanctioned by way of the payment of
indemnity (damages) The Court held that the dismissal of
the employee is merely ineffectual, not void.
This is because of the ff reasons:
1) The due process clause is a limitation on governmental
powers,inapplicable to the exercise of private power, such
as in this case. The provision No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty and property without due process of law
pertains only to the State, as only it has the authority to do
the same.
2) The purpose of the notice and hearing under the Due
process clause is to provide an opportunity for the
employee to be heard before the power of the organized
society is brought upon the individual. Under Art. 283,
however, the purpose is to give him time to prepare for the
eventual loss of his job and for DOLE to determine
whether economic causes exist to justify termination. It is
not to give opportunity to be heard there is no charge
against the employee under Art. 283
3.) Not all notice requirements are requisites of due
process. Some are simply a part of a procedure to be
followed before a right granted to party can be exercised;
others are an application of the Justinian precept. Such is
the case here. The failure of the employer to observe a
procedure for the termination of employment which
makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual.
Art. 279 of the LC provides that only dismissal without
just or authorized cause renders such dismissal illegal.
Agabon v National Labor Relations Commission
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of
statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or
render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer
should indemnify the employee for the violation of his
statutory rights.
Facts:Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements,
Inc. [Riviera Home] is engaged in the business of selling
and installing ornamental and construction materials. It
employed Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum
board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until
February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for
abandonment of work. Virgilio and Jenny then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money
claims and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and
ordered Riviera Home to pay the monetary claims.
Issue:Whether the dismissal was proper and in
compliance with due process.
Ruling: YES. In cases involving dismissals for cause but
without observance of the twin requirements of notice and
hearing, the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine
and to follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was
for just cause but imposing sanctions on the employer.
Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed
in Wenphil.
It must be stressed that in the present case, that Virgilio
and Jenny committed a grave offense, i.e., abandonment,
which, if the requirements of due process were complied
with, would undoubtedly result in a valid dismissal.
An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of
Article 282 should not be protected by the Social Justice
Clause of the Constitution. Social justice, as the term
suggests, should be used only to correct an injustice.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant
case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify
the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However,
the employer should indemnify the employee for the
violation of his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v.
National Labor Relations Commission. The indemnity to
be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent
practice of dismiss now, pay later, which the Court sought
to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in
the nature of indemnification or penalty and should
depend on the facts of each case, taking into special
consideration the gravity of the due process violation of
the employer.
MOSQUEDA VS PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City
enacted Ordinance No. 0309, to impose a ban against
aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all
agricultural entities within Davao City.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association,
Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members filed their petition
in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the
ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs
through a temporary restraining order (TRO). They
alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable
exercise of police power; violated the equal protection
clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without
due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant to
Section 511 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government
Code)
RTC: Ordinance is valid and constitutional;
City of Davao had validly exercised police power under
the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government
Code; that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods
of pesticides application because it exposed the residents
to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift;
recognizing the impracticability of the 3-month transition
period under Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07,
recommended the parties to agree on an extended
transition period
CA: reversed the judgment of the RTC. It is
unconstitutional.
Maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone within and
around the agricultural plantations under Section 6 of
Ordinance No. 0309-07 constituted taking of property
without due process because the landowners were thereby
compelled to cede portions of their property without just
compensation; that the exercise of police power to require
the buffer zone was invalid because there was no finding
that the 30-meter surrounding belt was obnoxious to the
public welfare;
And that it was unconstitutional because of the absence of
a separability clause. It also found the three-month
transition period impractical and oppressive in view of the
engineering and technical requirements of switching from
aerial spraying to truck-mounted boom spraying
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional
on due process and equal protection grounds for being
unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of
police power:
1. in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice in Davao City under Section
5;
2. in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to
other modes of pesticide application under Section
5; and
3. in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter
buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all
agricultural lands in Davao City.
RULING: Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due
Process Clause PARTIALLY.
Issue 1 and 2 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. the proviso in
Section 5, however, compels petitioners-appellants to
abandon aerial spraying without affording them enough
time to convert and adapt other spraying practices. This
would preclude petitioners-appellants from being able to
fertilize their plantations with essential vitamins and
minerals substances, aside from applying thereon the
needed fungicides or pesticides to control, if not eliminate
the threat of, plant diseases. Such an apparent eventuality
would prejudice the operation of the plantations, and the
economic repercussions thereof would just be akin to
shutting down the venture.
Issue 3 is CONSTITUTIONAL. The establishment of the
buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the
effects of aerial spraying within and near the plantations.
Although Section 3(e) of the ordinance requires the
planting of diversified trees within the identified buffer
zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as
confiscatory requiring payment of just compensation. A
landowner may only be entitled to compensation if the
taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically
beneficial or productive uses of the land. The respondents
cannot be to be and completely deprived of their
landholdings because they can still cultivate or make other
productive uses of the areas to be identified as the buffer
zones.
ROMUALDEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts:
Spouses Romualdez allegedly made false
representations in their sworn applications for Voters
Registration. They indicated that they are residents of
Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were residents of
Quezon City. Garay charged them with violations of
Omnibus Election Code and Voters Registraion Act. The
Comelec recommended the filing of information against
the Spouses Romualdez for violation of Voters
Registration Act.
other interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision
involves no guesswork. The Court does not see herein an
uncertainty that makes the same vague.
Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in
the challenged provision, the import or meaning of which
they do not understand. This is in stark contrast to the case
of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where therein petitioner
sought for statutory definition of particular words in the
challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada
rejected the argument.

Spouses Romualdez argued that they were not

accorded due process of law when the elections offenses
for which they are charged by Garay are different from the
resolution of the Comelec.

The Spouses argue that Section 45(j) of the

Voters Registration Act is vague on the ground that it
contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987
Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1) and Section
14(2), Article III of thereof. Petitioners submit that Section
45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a
definite provision of the law, the violation of which would
constitute an election offense.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 45(j) of the Voters

Registration is vague.

Ruling:

NO. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a

law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. However, the Court has imposed certain
limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the
challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. The Court has
declared that facial invalidation or an "on-its-face"
invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate.

Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a

criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. The Court has similarly
stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld -
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. As
structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes
a recital of election offenses under the same Act. Section
45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification that a
violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No.
8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j)
is precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no