PERSONS 1st Grading Digests

Article 2 and 3, NCC Ruling: In a long line of decisions, this Court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is

Tanada v. Tuvera
necessary in those cases where the legislation
GR No. L-63915, April 24, 1985 itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for
then the date of publication is material for
Ponente: Escolin, J
determining its date of effectivity, which is the
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it
Facts: Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to
goes into effect.
compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official However, petitioners argument is correct
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
instructions, general orders, proclamations, with the fact of publication. Taking into
executive orders, letter of implementation and consideration other applicable laws, a conclusion
administrative orders. is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the
Respondents however contend that publication
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the
Section 1. There shall be published in the
presidential issuances in question contain special
Official Gazette all important legislative acts and
provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of
publication in the Official Gazette is not
the Philippines; all executive and administrative
indispensable for their effectivity, citing Article 2
orders and proclamations, except such as have no
of the New Civil Code as basis.
general applicability; decisions or abstracts of
Issue: Is the contention of the respondents decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of
tenable? Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; such
documents or classes of documents as may be
Ateneo de Davao University

Jacinto St., Davao City
required so to be published by law; and such Thus, respondents are ordered to publish in the
documents or classes of documents as the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
President of the Philippines shall determine from issuances which are of general application, and
time to time to have general applicability and unless so published, they shall have no binding
legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be force and effect.
published.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is

to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions
Article 2 and 3, NCC
and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the Tanada v. Tuvera
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
Ponente: Cruz, J
transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
The publication of all presidential issuances of a

Facts: This petition is for reconsideration/
public nature or of general applicability is
clarification of a decision. Petitioners invoke the
mandated by law as well as a requirement of due
due process of law in demanding the disclosure
process while other presidential issuances which
of a number of presidential decrees which they
apply only to particular persons or class of
claimed had not been published as required by
persons such as administrative and executive
law. The government argued that while
orders need not be published on the assumption
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
that they have been circularized to all
when it was "otherwise provided," as when the
concerned. It is a rule of law that before a person
decrees themselves declared that they were to
may be bound by law, he must first be officially
become effective immediately upon their
and specifically informed of its contents.
approval.

Issue/s: 1. W/n the clause unless it is otherwise The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not
provided found in Article 2 of NCC means only to those of general application. Thus,
publication of laws or other issuances is not all statutes, including those of local application
always imperative and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
2. What is meant by "law of public nature" or
fifteen days after publication unless a different
"general applicability"?
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
3. Must a distinction be made between laws of

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
general applicability and laws which are not?
executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the
4. What is meant by "publication"?
same are validly delegated by the legislature or,
5. Where is the publication to be made? at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be
6. When is the publication to be made? published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
Ruling: The clause unless it is otherwise
delegation.
provided found in Article 2 of NCC refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of Interpretative regulations and those merely
publication itself, which cannot in any event be internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
omitted. personnel of the administrative agency and not
the public, need not be published. Neither is
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
publication required of the so-called letters of
legislature may, in its discretion, provide that the
instructions issued by administrative superiors
usual fifteen-day period be shortened or
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
extended. An omission in the publication of laws
by their subordinates in the performance of their
would offend due process insofar as it would
duties.
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it. Ignorance of the law Even the charter of a city must be published
excuses no one from compliance therewith. notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion

of the national territory and directly affects only requirement not even a substantial compliance to
the inhabitants of that place. All presidential the requirement.
decrees must be published, including even those
naming a public place after a favored individual
or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are Article 2, NCC
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the

De Roy vs. Court of Appeals
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body
is supposed to enforce. G.R. No. 80718, January 29, 1988
However, no publication is required of the Ponente: Cortes, J

instructions issued by the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by
Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building
the head of a government agency on the
owned by the petitioners collapsed and
assignments or workload of his personnel or the
destroyed the tailoring shop owned by the
wearing of office uniforms. Municipal ordinances
private-respondents resulting to the death of
are not covered by this rule but by the Local
their daughter, Marissa Bernal. Private
Government Code.
respondents have been warned regarding the
Thus, all laws as defined above shall be published proximity of their shop to the weakened firewall
in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective but the former failed to heed the warning of the
only after fifteen days from their publication, or petitioners. On the basis of the foregoing facts,
on another date specified by the legislature, in the Regional trial Court rendered judgment
accordance with Article 2 of NCC. The mere finding the petitioners guilty of gross negligence
mention of the number of the presidential and awarding damages to the petitioners and was
decree, the title of such decree, the supposed later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On
date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day
the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion

for extension of time to file a motion for Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may
reconsideration, which was eventually denied by be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme
the appellate court in the Resolution of Court as the court of last resort, which may in its
September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their sound discretion either grant or deny the
motion for reconsideration on September 24, extension requested. (at p. 212)
1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of
In this case, petitioners motion for extension of
October 27, 1987.
time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than
Hence this petition. a year after the expiration of the grace period on
June 30, 1986.
Issue/s: W/n the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion of the The argument of the petitioners that the
petitioners rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not
be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the
Ruling: No. Applying the rule laid down in
non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the
Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No.
Official Gazette as of the time the subject
70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461], that the
decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a
must likewise be rejected. There is no law
motion for reconsideration cannot be extended,
requiring the publication of Supreme Court
thus, the CA committed no grave abuse of
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can
discretion. In the Resolution denying the motion
be binding and as a condition to their becoming
for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30,
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as
1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated
lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
and clarified the rule, to wit:
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly
Beginning one month after the where issues have been clarified, consistently
promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be reiterated, and published in the advance reports
strictly enforced that no motion for extension of of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such
time to file a motion for reconsideration may be publications as the Supreme Court Reports
filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the

The present petition must be denied for lack of with and accepted in its entirety the report of the
merit. auditor nominated by Don Jose.
On petition of Don Jose the court by

a providencia of May 7 fixed the term of fifteen
days as that within which Doa Francisca should
formulate her demand, which term was
Article 3, NCC
subsequently enlarged seven days on petition of
Jose Zulueta vs. Francisca Zulueta Doa Francisca. June 5 Doa Francisca petitioned
the court, stating that the new Code of Procedure
G.R. No. 428 April 30, 1902 enacted by the Civil Commission was soon to
become operative, and that she deemed it more
Ponente: Ladd, J
advantageous to her rights that the declarative
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion action which she had to bring should be governed
by the new Code rather than that then in force,
Facts: Don Jose Zulueta and his sister, Doa
and asking that proceedings in the action should
Francisca Zulueta, are sole heirs under the will of
be suspended till the new Code went into effect.
their father, Don Clemente Zulueta, who died in
This petition was denied by the court in
Iloilo in 1900. In the course of the voluntary
an auto rendered June 15, declaring,
testamentary proceedings instituted in the Court
furthermore, that the term fixed for the filing of
of First Instance of Iloilo by Don Jose, three
the demand having expired, and thus, Doa
auditors were appointed to make a division of the
Francisca has lost her right to institute the action.
estate under article 1053 of the Ley de
On June 22 Doa Francisca petitioned for the
Enjuiciamiento Civil, of whom Don Jose and Doa
reform of this auto. On the same day this petition
Francisca each nominated one, the third or
was denied in an auto rendered by Don Cirilo
auditor umpire being chosen by common accord
Mapa.
of the parties. The two auditors nominated by the
parties respectively failed to agree, and each Hence this recourse.
rendered a separate report. The auditor umpire,

Issue/s: W/n Doa Francisca is entitled to relief
whose report was filed March 29, 1901, agreed
against the consequences of her failure to

interpose her appeal against the auto of June 22 the petition itself why the suspension should be
within the period fixed by the law granted other than the mere convenience of the
party, and none has been suggested on the
Ruling: The mistake in this instance was her own,
argument. The petition could not, in any possible
but it was a mistake of law, and while we should
view that occurs to us, have been granted. With
be unwilling to say that special cases might not
reference to the declaration in the auto that the
occur in which relief would be afforded in such a
plaintiff had lost her right to file her demand in
proceeding as this against a mistake of law made
the declarative action, it may be said that this
by a party, we are of opinion that the present is
declaration followed as a necessary consequence
not such a case. Nothing is shown here except
from the providencia of May 7, fixing the time
the bare fact that the party acted under
within which the demand must be formulated,
ignorance or misconception of the provisions of
and the subsequent providencia enlarging the
the law in regard to the time within which the
period, from neither of which providencias had
appeal could be taken, and there is no reason
any appeal or other remedy been attempted by
why the general principle, a principle "founded
Doa Francisca. The petitioner had the benefit of
not only on expediency and policy but on
that period granted by law and was accorded
necessity," that "ignorance of the law does not
besides an extension of seven days, and has
excuse from compliance therewith" (Civil Code,
consequently had all the rights to which she was
art. 2), should be relaxed. The framers of Act No.
strictly entitled under the law and something
75 could not have intended to totally abrogate
more. Thus, she has, we think no just ground to
this principle with reference to the class of cases
complain that she has been deprived of any
covered by the act. If such were the effect of this
substantial right either by her own mistake or
legislation the court "would be involved and
that of the court below, in any possible view in
perplexed with questions incapable of any just
which the facts of the case may be regarded.
solution and embarrassed by inquiries almost
interminable."
The petition for the suspension of the declarative

action till the new Code went into effect was
totally without merit. No reason was alleged in Article 3, NCC

Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez Issue: W/n respondent judge committed gross
ignorance of the law in solemnizing the marriage
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, March 8, 2001
of Manzano and Payao
Ponente: Davide, Jr. C.J.
Ruling: Yes. In their separate affidavits executed
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before
respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and
Facts: Herminia Manzano alleged that she was
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of
the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having
their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San
marriage contract, it was indicated that both
Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
were separated.
Caloocan City. Four children were born out of
that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her Respondent Judge knew or ought to
husband contracted another marriage with one know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
Luzviminda Payao before respondent diriment impediment, which would make the
Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his
marriage, he knew or ought to know that the Comment, he stated that had he known that the
same was void and bigamous, as the marriage late Manzano was married he would have
contract clearly stated that both contracting discouraged him from contracting another
parties were separated. marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny

knowledge of Manzano and Payaos subsisting
Respondent judge however countered
previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated
that when he officiated the marriage between
in their separate affidavits which were subscribed
Manzano and Payao, he did not know that
and sworn to before him.
Manzano was legally married. What he knew was
that the two had been living together as husband Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated
and wife for seven years already without the gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint void and bigamous marriage. The maxim
affidavit. He then prayed that the complaint be ignorance of the law excuses no one has special
dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the
merely to harass him. Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the

embodiment of competence, integrity, and Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but he failed to
independence. It is highly imperative that judges do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he
be conversant with the law and basic legal had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of
principles. And when the law transgressed is Attorneys given by the Bar Office.
simple and elementary, the failure to know it Several years later, he found the Notice
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. to Sign the Roll of Attorneys and it was then that
he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and
The finding of the Court Administrator
that what he had signed at the entrance of the
that the respondent judge be found guilty of
PICC was probably just an attendance record. By
gross ignorance of law be adopted.
that time, he was already working. He stated that
he was mainly doing corporate and taxation
work, and that he was not actively involved in
litigation practice. Thus, he operated under the
Article 3, NCC mistaken belief that since he had already taken
the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was
In Re: Medado
not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a
lawyer; and the matter of signing in the Roll of
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and
Ponente: Sereno, C.J. was subsequently forgotten.

On 6 February 2012 or about 7 years
Facts: Medado graduated from the University of later, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying
the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
Laws in 1971 and passed the same years bar Attorneys.
examinations with a general weighted average of

Issue/s: W/n the petition must be granted
82.7.
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys Ruling: The petition must be denied.
Oath at the Philippine International Convention

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to
Center (PICC) and was scheduled to sign in the
excuse a person from the legal consequences of

his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a Ponente: Panganiban, J.
mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to
know the law and its consequences. Ignorantia
Facts: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married
facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived
Applying these principles to the case at bar,
together as husband and wife in Australia. On
Medado may have at first operated under an
May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly
honest mistake of fact when he thought that
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
what he had signed at the PICC entrance before
Australian family court.
the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys.
However, the moment he realized that what he On June 26, 1992, respondent became an
had signed was merely an attendance record, he Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian
as a valid justification. At that point, Medado government. Petitioner a Filipina and
should have known that he was not a full-fledged respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
member of the Philippine Bar because of his Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was City. In their application for a marriage license,
the act of signing therein that would have made respondent was declared as "single" and
him so. "Filipino."
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and

respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were
Article 3, NCC still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with
Garcia-Recio v. Recio their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001 On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the

court a quo, on the ground of bigamy Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of
respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting the divorce between respondent and Editha
marriage at the time he married her on January Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng
12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of Gee, petitioner argues that the divorce decree,
respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in like any other foreign judgment, may be given
November, 1997. recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of
the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far
absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce
back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
decree itself and respondent miserably failed to
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He
establish these elements.
contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce Hence this petition.
decree obtained in Australian in 1989; thus, he
Issue/s: W/n the mere submission of a divorce
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
decree itself issued in a foreign country is
1994.
sufficient to prove its existence and thus merits
On July 7, 1998, while the suit for the declaration recognition under our jurisdiction
of nullity was pending, respondent was able to
Ruling: The petition is partly meritorious.
secure a divorce decree from a family court in
Sydney, Australia because the "marriage had Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on
irretrievably broken down." the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the
country by either (1) an official publication or (2)
Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it
a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
stated no cause of action. The RTC declared their
custody of the document. If the record is not kept
marriage dissolved. The decision rendered was
in the Philippines, such copy must be: (a)
based on the ground that the divorce decree
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
issued in Australia is valid and recognized here in
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
the Philippines and not on Redericks lack of legal
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
capacity to marry.

which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by Article 3, NCC
the seal of his office.
Yao-Kee v. Sy-Gonzales
The divorce decree between respondent and
G.R. No. L-55960, November 24, 1988
Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court. However,
Ponente: Cortes, J.
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
demonstrated.
Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then
divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in residing, leaving behind real and personal
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to properties here in the Philippines worth
its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had P300,000.00 more or less.
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the
Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded grant of letters of administration alleging among
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure others that (a) they are the children of the
to object properly rendered the divorce decree deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not
Sydney, Australia. recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the

filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they
The case is thereby remanded to the court a quo nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as
to receive evidence proving respondents legal administratrix of the intestate estate of the
capacity to marry. deceased. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee,
Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen .
After hearing, the probate court held in favor of

the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed

Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix of the Ruling: No. To support their allegations, the
intestate estate of the deceased , finding among petitioners presented the following evidences:
others that:
First: Yao Kees testimony that she was married
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee. to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China;
that she does not have a marriage certificate
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen
because the practice during that time was for
are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy
elders to agree upon the betrothal of their
Mat and,
children, and in her case, her elder brother was
the one who contracted or entered into an
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-
agreement with the parents of her husband; that
Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged
she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of
illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion
them died; that she and her husband, Sy Mat,
Gillego.
have been living in FooKien, China before he
However, the Court of Appeals modified the went to the Philippines on several occasions; that
decision of the probate court upon appeal the practice during the time of her marriage was
declaring among others that: a written document is exchanged just between
the parents of the bride and the parents of the
(1) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China,
Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the acknowledged natural the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort
children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese of marriage broker who is known to both parties
wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the who would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be;
legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to
Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to have the groom-to-be their son in-law, then they
the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of agree on a date as an engagement day; that on
China. engagement day, the parents of the groom would
bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the
Issue/s: W/n the legality of Yao Kees marriage
bride-to-be, and then one month after that, a
with Sy Kiat was sufficiently proved
date would be set for the wedding, which in her
case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on

January 19, 1931; that during the wedding the Philippines sometime in March or April in the
bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic) where same year they were married; that she went to
the bride would ride and on that same day, the the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to
parents of the bride would give the dowry for her China; that again she went back to the Philippines
daughter and then the document would be and lived with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that
signed by the parties but there is no solemnizing she begot her children with Sy Kiat during the
officer as is known in the Philippines; that during several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China.
the wedding day, the document is signed only by
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger
the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the
brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was
parents of the bride; that the parties themselves
among the many people who attended the
do not sign the document; that the bride would
wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no
then be placed in a carriage where she would be
marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese
brought to the town of the bridegroom and
government, a document signed by the parents
before departure the bride would be covered
or elders of the parties being sufficient.
with a sort of a veil; x x x that during her wedding,
Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego
document with her mother; that as to the
when she testified before the trial court to the
whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat
effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee
were married for 46 years already and the
according to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's
document was left in China and she doubt if that
admission to her that he has a Chinese wife
document can still be found now; that it was left
whom he married according to Chinese custom
in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right
now, she does not know the whereabouts of that Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien
document because of the lapse of many years issued in Caloocan City on October 3, 1972 where
and because they left it in a certain place and it the following entries are found: "Marital status
was already eaten by the termites; that after her Married"; "If married give name of spousesYao
wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage1931";
together as husband and wife, and from then on, and "Place of marriageChina" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
they lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the

Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration proved as a fact, according to the rules of
issued in Manila on January 12, 1968 where the evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score
following entries are likewise found: "Civil the Court had occasion to state that "a local
statusMarried"; and, 'If married, state name custom as a source of right can not be considered
and address of spouseYao Kee Chingkang, by a court of justice unless such custom is
China" [Exhibit "4".] properly established by competent evidence like
any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390,
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on
395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a
October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the People's
higher degree, should be required of a foreign
Republic of China to the effect that "according to
custom.
the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy
Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui The law on foreign marriages is provided by
Yip also Chinese were married on January 19, Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:
1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of China"
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the
These evidence may very well prove the fact of Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the country where they were performed and valid
the same do not suffice to establish the validity of there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous
custom. marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied.) ***
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed
by repetition of acts, uniformly observed Construing this provision of law the Court has
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two
obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence
Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2)
"Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43,
Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, 49 (1922).]
p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be

In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided which the record is kept and authenticated by the
in the Rules of Court. With respect to seal of his office.
an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any
states that:
competent evidence relative to the law and
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.The oral custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of
testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof
admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a of China's law or custom on marriage not only
foreign country, as are also printed and published because they are
books of reports of decisions of the courts of the self-serving evidence, but more importantly,
foreign country, if proved to be commonly there is no showing that they are competent to
admitted in such courts. testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove
the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand,
validity of the marriage in accordance with said
is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:
law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee
and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official
jurisdiction.
record.An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be
Further, it is a well-established principle that
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
a copy attested by the officer having the legal
foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix,
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be Finally, in the absence of the proof of the Chinese
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular the same as ours.
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in

to prove what the Turkish laws are. He himself
recognized it when he sought to be granted the
opportunity to present evidence regarding said
laws. Thus, the refusal of the court to give
Article 3, NCC
another opportunity to the oppositor does not
Miciano v. Brimo constitute an error. There is, therefore, no

evidence on record that the national law of the
G.R. No. L-2259, November 1, 1927 testator Joseph Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not
Ponente: Romualdez, J.
being contrary to our laws in force, must be
complied with and executed.
Facts: The judicial administrator of the estate of

the deceased Joseph Brimo filed a scheme of
partition but Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of
the deceased, opposed it. He alleged that the Article 4, NCC
declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent

Juliano-Llave v. Republic
to this cause is an error on the part of the court.
G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011

The opposition is based on the fact that it puts
into effect the provision of Joseph Brimos will Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
which are not in accordance with the laws of his
Turkish nationality, which are void for violating Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
Article 10 of the Civil Code.
Facts: At about 11 months before the death of
Sen. Tamano, he married Estrellita twice-first
Issue/s: W/n Andre Brimos contention is tenable
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27,
Ruling: In the absence of evidence proving the 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a
existence foreign laws, they are presumed as civil ceremony at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on
those of the Philippines. In this case, Andre failed June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen.

Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced. Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of
Since then, Estrellita has been representing P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
himself as Sen. Tamanos wife. Muslim Personal Laws, because the marriage of
the deceased with Zorayda was never deemed,
On November 23, 1994, Haja Putri Zorayda
legally and factually, to have been one contracted
Tamano and her son Adib Ahma Tamano, in
under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2)
behalf of Sen. Tamanos other legitimate children
of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
Complainant Zorayda) did not register their
marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for
mutual desire to be thus covered by this law;
being bigamous.
After asking for extension of time,

The complainant alleged that Sen.
Estrellita later filed a Motion to Dismiss where
Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under
she alleged that Sen. Tamano and Zoryda are
civil rites and that this marriage remained
both Muslims who were married under the
subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
Muslim rites as averred in the latters disbarment
Furthermore, they averred that the marriage of
complaint against Sen. Tamano. The Trial Court
Sen. Tamano and Zorayda, having been
denied Estrellitas motion prompting her to file a
celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore
certiorari petition. The Court of Appeals however
governed by said law. Based on Article 35(4) of
resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita .
the Family Code, the subsequent marriage
Subsequent to the CAs decision, the RTC ordered
entered into by the deceased with Defendant
Estrellita to present her evidence but she again
Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the
asked for extension.
same while his prior marriage to Complainant
Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being Because of the delay, Zorayda and Adib
declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal moved to submit the case for decision.
basis, because the deceased never divorced Subsequently, the RTC declared that the
Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano still
not have validly done so because divorce is not subsists thus Sen. Tamanos marriage to Estrellita
allowed under the New Civil Code. Moreover, the is void for being bigamous and was affirmed by
deceased did not and could not have divorced the Supreme Court.

Issue/s: W/n the CA erred in affirming the any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled
decision of the RTC in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083
does not provide for a situation where the parties
Ruling: The Civil Code governs the marriage of
were married both in civil and Muslim rites."
Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage
was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on
subsequent marriage to Estrellita is thus, void ab February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
initio. retroactively override the Civil Code which
already bestowed certain rights on the marriage
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and
of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former
Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
explicitly provided for the prospective application
under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force
of its provisions unless otherwise provided:
governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts
Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall
one marriage can exist at any given time. Under be governed by the laws in force at the time of
the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce their execution, and nothing herein except as
is not recognized except during the effectivity of otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their
Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of validity or legality or operate to extinguish any
during its effectivity. right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has The foregoing provisions are consistent
been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, with the principle that all laws operate
the law that codified Muslim personal laws. prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or
Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of
applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both doubt will be resolved against the retroactive
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited
party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code
in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in to have its provisions applied prospectively, and

implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-
existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code
Article 4, NCC
in respect of civil acts that took place before the
Muslim Codes enactment.
Co vs. Court of Appeals
An instance of retroactive application of the

G.R. No. 100776; October 28, 1993
Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:
Ponente: Narvasa, C. J.
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to
the effectivity of this Code in accordance with Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
non-Muslim law shall be considered as one
contracted under Muslim law provided the Facts: In connection with an agreement to
spouses register their mutual desire to this effect. salvage and refloat a sunken vessel and in
payment of his share of the expenses of the
Even granting that there was registration of salvage operations therein stipulated
mutual consent for the marriage to be considered petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging
as one contracted under the Muslim law, the firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against
registration of mutual consent between Zorayda the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated
and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both November 30, 1983 in the sum of
are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated P361,528.00. The check was deposited on
under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days
have already settled, the Civil Code governs their later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank
personal status since this was in effect at the time being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
of the celebration of their marriage. In view of
Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at A criminal complaint for violation of Batas
the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage
marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void company against Albino Co with the Regional
ab initio. Petition is denied. Trial Court where Co was convicted of the crime
charged, and sentenced to suffer a term of
imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify

the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00. Hence this petition.
Co appealed his conviction to the CA arguing that
Issue/s: W/n the decision of the Court in the case
he must be exonerated from the charge citing the
of Que v. People be given retroactive application
decision of the Supreme Court in Que v. People
(1987)- that a check issued merely to guarantee Ruling: Article 8 of the NCC, states that Judicial
the performance of an obligation is nevertheless decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
covered by B.P. 22 as a basis. Constitution shall form a part of the legal system
of the Philippines," while Article 4 of the Code
It is because at the time of the issuance
declares that "Laws shall have no retroactive
of the check on September 1, 1983, 4 years
effect, unless the contrary is provided," which is
before the promulgation of the decision on the
echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code:
case of Que v. People, the delivery of a rubber
"Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar
or bouncing check as a guarantee for an
as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
obligation was not considered as a punishable
not a habitual criminal . . .
offense, an official pronouncement made in a
Circular of a Ministry of Justice dated December The principle of prospectivity of statutes,
15, 1981. original or amendatory, has been applied in many

cases as well as to administrative rulings and
The said Administrative Circular was circulars. The principle of prospectivity has also
subsequently reversed by another issued on been applied to judicial decisions which,
August 8, 1984 almost 1 year after Co had although in themselves not laws, are
delivered the bouncing check to the complainant nevertheless evidence of what the laws
on September 1, 1983. mean....the reason underlying Article 8 of the
NCC.
The CA affirmed his conviction by citing
Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the The ratio of this principle is found in the case of
Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did Chicot County Dainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank
not amount to the passage of new law but was (1940). The Chicot doctrine advocates the
merely a construction or interpretation of a pre- imperative necessity to take account of the actual
existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979. existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as

an operative fact negating acceptance of a Facts: On March 20, 1995, private respondent
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity. Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May
The weight of authority tilts in the proposition
8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner
that the Courts decision in Que v People should
Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a
no be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of
petition with the Comelec docketed as SPA No.
the petitioner and other persons situated, who
95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from
relied on the official opinion of the Minister of
seeking or holding any public office or position by
Justice that such a check did not fall within the
reason of not yet being a citizen of the
scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy
Everything considered, the Court sees no be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division
compelling reason why the doctrine of mala of the Comelec promulgated a
prohibita should override the principle of Resolution granting the petition.
prospectivity.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo
The criminal prosecution against the petitioner is remained unacted upon until after the May 8,
dismissed. 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and
he was voted for during the elections held on said
date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en
banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of
the Second Division.
Article 4, NCC
Frivaldo won the election but on June 9, 1995,
Frivaldo v. COMELEC
Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental)
petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-
G.R. No. 120295; June 28, 1996
elected Governor of Sorsogon which was
Ponente: Panganiban, J. subsequently granted and he was duly
proclaimed on June 30, 1995. With that, Frivaldo
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion sought the annulment of Lees proclamation
alleging that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the

afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a It is true that under the Civil Code of the
citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there
the Special Committee on Naturalization in are settled exceptions to this general rule, such
September 1994 had been granted". As such, as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in
when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
the Comelec) . . . was released and received by
According to Tolentino, curative statutes are
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the
those which are undertaken to cure errors and
evening, there was no more legal impediment to
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or
the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . .".
administrative proceedings, acts of public
On December 19, 1995, the COMELEC First officers, or private deeds and contracts which
Division rendered its decision stating that Lee, otherwise would not produce their intended
"not having garnered the highest number of consequences by reason of some statutory
votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed disability or failure to comply with some technical
as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, requirement. They operate on conditions already
"having garnered the highest number of votes, existing, and are necessarily retroactive in
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship operation. Agpalo, on the other hand, says that
by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the curative statutes are "healing acts . . . curing
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) defects and adding to the means of enforcing
qualified to hold the office of governor of existing obligations . . . (and) are intended to
Sorsogon". supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing
laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very
Hence this petition.
nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and)
Issue/s: W/n the repatriation of Frivaldo can be reach back to past events to correct errors or
given retroactive effect irregularities and to render valid and effective
attempted acts which would be otherwise
Ruling: The Court also held that the repatriation
ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of
his application on August 17, 1994.

On the other hand, remedial or procedural where the intent that it should so operate clearly
laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or appears from a consideration of the act as a
modes of procedure, which do not create new or whole, or from the terms thereof." It is obvious
take away vested rights, but only operate in to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of back" to those persons, events and transactions
such rights, ordinarily do not come within the not otherwise covered by prevailing law and
legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held
the general rule against the retrospective that citizenship is a political and civil right equally
operation of statutes. as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of
abode, the right against unreasonable searches
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it
and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in
creates a new right, and also provides for a new
the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws.
to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must
On the other hand, said statute also provided
be given the fullest effect possible.
a new remedy and a new right in favor of other
"natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Furthermore, the Court held that it is not only the
Philippine citizenship but now desire to re- law that must be given effect but also Frivaldos
acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to repatriation granted to him by said law on June
the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former 30, 1995. It must be deemed to have retroacted
Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious to the date of his application therefore, August
and cumbersome process of naturalization, but 17, 1994. In outset, the intent of the legislative
with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re- authority must be given full effect and expression
acquire their Philippine citizenship under the and with respect to the law in question, there is
simplified procedure of repatriation. more reason to have this law be made applicable
in a retroactive or retrospective manner to
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the
situations, events and transactions subsequent to
wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that
the passage of such law.There is nothing in the
the legislative intent was precisely to give the
law that would bar this or would show a contrary
statute retroactive operation. "(A) retroactive
intention on the part of the legislative authority;
operation is given to a statute or amendment
and there is no showing that damage or prejudice

to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would Facts: Noemi B. Juat, now 68 years of age,
result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. worked for almost twenty nine (29) years and
Neither has Lee shown that there will result the started as a part-time instructor of the petitioner,
impairment of any contractual obligation, Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU), from June
disturbance of any vested right or breach of some 16, 1965 until her compulsory retirement on
constitutional guaranty. March 31, 1994.
Thus, by reason of the remedial or curative On January 14, 1993, then MLQU President
nature of the law granting him a new right to Amado Dizon informed in writing private
resume his political status and the legislative respondent Juat that she was eligible for
intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of retirement under Article III, Section I of the
having been forced to give up his citizenship and MLQU Retirement Plan as cited in the Revised
political aspiration as his means of escaping a Faculty Manual of June 13, 1990. The retirement
regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be of private respondent was deferred because she
given retroactive effect as of the date of his was still given teaching load for school year 1993-
application therefor, during the pendency of 1994. On February 1, 1994 she received another
which he was stateless, he having given up his letter from President Dizon informing her that
U.S. nationality. Petition dismissed. she was considered compulsorily retired effective
at the end of second semester of school year
1993-1994 pursuant to the Retirement Plan. On
February 3, 1994, private respondent Juat
received a third letter from Dean Leticia L. Lava of
Article 4, NCC petitioner University School of Arts and Science
informing her of the approval by the Board of
MLQU v. NLRC
Regents considering her as compulsorily
G.R. No. 141673; October 17, 2001 retired. On November 17, 1992, a letter was sent
by private respondent to petitioner inquiring the
Ponente: Pardo, J. amount of retirement benefits due to her and in
response petitioner provided her with a
computation of the retirement benefits through a

letter dated July 29, 1994. On the same day from September 1969 until June 7, 1994. He
private respondent Juat received, under protest, received monthly compensation, the last and
the two installments of her retirement pay in the highest of which was P11,100.50, payable every
total amount of P71,674.91, as evidenced by the thirtieth day of every month.
general voucher, when the alleged correct
On June 7, 1994, a letter was received by private
amount should be P149, 401.62.
respondent Azurin, informing him that he was
Believing that she was entitled to a higher being retired under Article III, Section (a) of the
amount of retirement benefits, private MLQU Retirement Plan. As stated in said letter,
respondent through counsel sent a letter of he will receive the amount of P34,282.02 which
demand to MLQU President August Sunico, amount he received under protest, as evidenced
demanding the payment of the deficiency plus formally requested for reconsideration and
interest at the rate of 12% a year from the date of recomputation of his retirement gratuity, stating
retirement. On October 3, 1996, petitioner that under R.A. 7641, he should have received
replied, alleging that private respondent was not the total amount of P150,215.75 based on the
entitled to receive retirement benefits as she was last salary and benefits received by him. Despite
only a part-time employee of MLQU, much less to receipt of said demand letter, petitioner failed,
the payment of deficiency. In the same letter it refused, and continuously refused to heed
expressed its willingness to settle the matter complainants demand for the payment of his
amicably but to no avail as no amicable valid claim, prompting private respondent to
settlement was reached. On March 25, 1997, institute a complaint against petitioner asking for
private respondent filed a complaint before the the payment of deficiency of retirement benefits
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to and attorneys fee. Upon motion for
recover the balance of her retirement benefits reconsideration by herein petitioners, the
under Republic Act No. 7641. complaint was consolidated with private
respondent Juats complaint filed with the
On the other hand, Edilberto D. Azurin is a
Honorable Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday.
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and was hired
as a teacher/instructor, on a full-time basis, of Issue/s: W/n respondents are entitled to the
the petitioner (MLQU) for twenty-five (25) years, retirement benefits provided for under Republic

Act No. 7641, even if the petitioner has an A.M. No. MTJ-92-706; March 29, 1995
existing valid retirement plan
Ponente: Quiason, J.
Ruling: The law, Republic Act No. 7641,
intends to give the minimum retirement benefits Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
to employees not entitled thereto under

Facts: Complainant alleges that he has two
collective bargaining and other agreements. Its
children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living
coverage applies to establishments with existing
together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air
collective bargaining or other agreements or
Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in
voluntary retirement plans whose benefits are
said house, which he purchased in 1987,
less than those prescribed under the proviso in
whenever he is in Manila.
question.
In December 1991, he found respondent sleeping

Republic Act No. 7641 is a curative social
on his (complainant's) bed and he later learned
legislation. By their nature, curative statutes may
from the houseboy that respondent had been
be given retroactive effect, unless it will impair
cohabiting with De Castro. Thereafter,
vested rights. Republic Act No. 7641 has
respondent prevented him from visiting his
retroactive effect to include in its coverage the
children and even alienated the affection of his
employees services to an employer rendered
children for him.
prior to its effectivity. It applies to employees in
the employ of employers at the time the law took
Complainant claims that respondent is married to
effect and those who are eligible to the benefits
one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five
under that statute.
children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991
sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused
his arrest on January 13, 1992; after he had a
heated argument with De Castro inside the
Article 4, NCC latter's office.
Atienza v. Brilliantes

Petitioner then filed a complaint for Gross was impaired by the application of Article 40 to
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety his case.
against the respondent judge. Respondent
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow
however denied all the allegations and claimed
affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
that when he married De Castro in civil rites at
retroactive application to pending actions. The
Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he
retroactive application of procedural laws is not
believed in good faith and for all legal intents and
violative of any right of a person who may feel
purposes, that he was single because his
that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of
marriage was solemnized without a license.
Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that
Furthermore, he argues that the provision of
as a general rule, no vested right may attach to,
Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to
nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court
him considering that his first marriage took place
of Industrial Relations,1965).
in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place
in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Issue/s: W/n the Article 40 of the Family Code be

given prospective application Article 4, NCC
Rulings: Article 40 is applicable to remarriages Zulueta v. Asia Brewery
entered into after the effectivity of the Family

G.R. No. 138137; March 8, 2001
Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of
the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of Ponente: Panganiban, J.
the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive

effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Facts: Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc., is engaged
Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true in the manufacture, the distribution and sale of
with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. beer; while Petitioner Perla Zulueta is a dealer
Respondent has not shown any vested right that and an operator of an outlet selling the formers

beer products. A Dealership Agreement governed the effectivity of the 1997 rules was 90 days thus
their contractual relations. he 60 day period under the 1997 rules does not
apply.
On March 30, 1992, petitioner filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo, a Complaint Hence this petition.
against respondent for Breach of Contract,
Issue/s: W/n respondents contention is tenable
Specific Performance and Damages based on the
alleged violation of the Dealership Agreement. Ruling: As a general rule, laws have no
retroactive effect. But there are certain
On July 7, 1994, during the pendency of the Iloilo
recognized exceptions, such as when they are
case, respondent filed with the Makati Regional
remedial or procedural in nature. This Court
Trial Court, Complaint was for the collection of a
explained this exception in the following
sum of money in the amount of P463,107.75
language:
representing the value of beer products, which
respondent had delivered to petitioner. The Ilo- It is true that under the Civil Code of the
Ilo and Makati case was consolidated on February Philippines, (l)aws shall have no retroactive
13, 1997 and respondents Motion for effect, unless the contrary is provided. But there
Reconsideration was denied on May 19, 1997. are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as
Petitioner, however contends that the Makati when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in
RTCs February 13, 1997 and May 19, 1997 nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
Orders consolidating the two cases could no

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws,
longer be assailed. Allegedly, respondents
i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes
Petition for Certiorari was filed with the CA
of procedure, which do not create new or take
beyond the reglementary sixty-day period
away vested rights, but only operate in
prescribed in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
Procedure, which took effect on July 1,
such rights, ordinarily do not come within the
1997. Hence, the CA should have dismissed it
legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within
outright.
the general rule against the retrospective
Respondent insists that its Petition was filed operation of statutes. (Emphasis supplied)
on time because the reglementary period before

Thus, procedural laws may operate It also bears noting that the ninety-day limit
retroactively as to pending proceedings even established by jurisprudence cannot be deemed a
without express provision to that vested right. It is merely a discretionary
effect. Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply prerogative of the courts that may be exercised
to cases pending at the time of depending on the peculiar circumstances of each
their enactment. In fact, statutes regulating the case. Hence, respondent was not entitled, as a
procedure of the courts will be applied on actions matter of right, to the 90-day period for filing a
undetermined at the time of their petition for certiorari; neither can it imperiously
effectivity. Procedural laws are retrospective in demand that the same period be extended to it.
that sense and to that extent.
Upon the effectivity of the 1997 Revised
Clearly, the designation of a specific period Rules of Civil Procedure on July 1, 1997,
of sixty days for the filing of an original action for respondents lawyers still had 21 days or until July
certiorari under Rule 65 is purely remedial or 22, 1997 to file a petition for certiorari and to
procedural in nature. It does not alter or modify comply with the sixty-day reglementary
any substantive right of respondent, particularly period. Had they been more prudent and
with respect to the filing of petitions for circumspect in regard to the implications of these
certiorari. Although the period for filing the same procedural changes, respondents right of action
may have been effectively shortened, respondent would not have been foreclosed. After all, the
had not been unduly prejudiced thereby 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were
considering that he was not at all deprived of that well-publicized prior to their date of effectivity.
right.
The orders of Makati RTC are hereby reinstated.
It is a well-established doctrine that rules of
procedure may be modified at any time to
become effective at once, so long as the change
does not affect vested rights. Moreover, it is Article 4, NCC
equally axiomatic that there are no vested rights
to rules of procedure. Tan v. CA
G.R. No. 136368; January 16, 2002

Ponente: Puno, J Barely hours after the complaint was stamped
received, the Magdangals were able to have Tans
title over the lot in question canceled and to
Facts: A 34, 829 square meters lot located in secure in their names TCT No. T-134470. This
Bunawan, Davao City was registered in the Jaime development prompted the heirs of Tan, who
C. Tan married to Praxedes V. Tan. On January 22, were to be later substituted by Jaime V. Tan, Jr.
1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200.00, (Tan, Jr.) as plaintiff, to file a supplemental
executed a deed of absolute sale over the complaint. On June 4, 1991, Branch 11 of the
property in question in favor of Regional Trial Court of Davao City rendered
spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. judgment finding for Tan, Jr., as plaintiff therein.
Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the

The said judgment was affirmed by the Court and
same contracting parties entered into another
such judgment was received by the parties
agreement whereunder Tan was given one (1)
involved on October 5, 1995.
year within which to redeem or repurchase the
property. On March 21, 1996, the Magdangals filed in the
lower court a MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND
Albeit given several opportunities and/or
WRIT OF POSSESSION, therein alleging that,
extensions to exercise the option, Tan failed to
among others, the appealed judgment of the
redeem the property until his death on January 4,
Court of Appeals has become final
1988.
and executory 15 days from October 5, 1995 or
On May 2, 1988, Tans heirs filed before the up to October 20, 1995, which the 120 days
Regional Trial Court at Davao City a suit against redemption period commences. And noting that
the Magdangals for reformation of instrument the redemption period had expired without Tan,
alleging that, while Tan and Jr. exercising his option.
the Magdangals denominated their agreement as

On the other hand, Tan, Jr. alleged, among other
deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to
things, that until an entry of judgment has been
conclude an equitable mortgage.
issued by the Court of Appeals and copy thereof
furnished the parties, the appealed decision of

the court a quo in this case cannot be considered Issue/s: What rule should govern the finality of
final and executory. judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by
the petitioner?
Jointly acting on the aforementioned MOTION
FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESSION Ruling: From 1991-1996, the years relevant to
of the Magdangals, MANIFESTATION AND the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of
MOTION of Tan, Jr., the court a quo presided by judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of
the respondent judge, rendered the challenged Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:
order of June 10, 1996 which directed the

SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final
Register of Deeds of Davao City to cancel TCT No.
resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial
T-134470 in the name of
or reconsideration is filed within the time
Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal and,
provided in these Rules, the judgment or final
thereafter, to reinstate TCT No. 72067 in the
resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk
name of Jaime C. Tan and Praxedes Valles Tan
in the book of entries of judgments. The date
and to submit her compliance thereto within
when the judgment or final resolution
ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
becomes executory shall be deemed as the date
Explaining her action, the respondent judge of its entry. The record shall contain
wrote in the same order: the dispositive part of the judgment or final
resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a
Following the ruling of the Supreme Court certificate that such judgment or final resolution
in Cueto vs. Collantes, et al., 97 Phil. 325, the 120 has become final and executory. (2a, R36)
days period for plaintiff to pay the amount
of P59,200.00 plus interest x x x should be SEC. 11. Execution of judgment. Except where the
reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion
x x x which was March 13, 1996. The thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory,
plaintiff made a deposit on April 17, 1996 well the motion for its execution may only be filed in
within the 120-day period mandated by the the proper court after its entry.
decision of this Court.

In original actions in the Court of Appeals, its
Hence this petition. writ of execution shall be accompanied by a

certified true copy of the entry of judgment or If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally
final resolution and addressed to any appropriate resolved, such execution may forthwith be
officer for its enforcement. applied for in the lower court from which the
action originated, on motion of the
In appealed cases, where the motion for
judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified
execution pending appeal is filed in the Court of
true copies of the judgment or judgments or the
Appeals at a time that it is in possession of the
final order or orders sought to be enforced and of
original record or the record on appeal, the
the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse
resolution granting such motion shall be
party.
transmitted to the lower court from which the
case originated, together with a certified true
The appellate court may, on motion in the same
copy of the judgment or final order to be
case, when the interest of justice so requires,
executed, with a directive for such court of origin
direct the court of origin to issue the writ of
to issue the proper writ for its enforcement.
execution.
Accordingly, pending approval by the Court of the

This resolution shall be published in two (2)
revised rules on Civil Procedure, and to provide a
newspapers of general circulation and shall take
solution to the aforestated problems, the Court
effect on June 1, 1994.
Resolved to approve and promulgate the
following section thereof on execution of The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
judgments, amending Section 1, Rule 39 of the however, amended the rule on finality of
Rules of Court: judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as
follows:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final
orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final
on motion, upon a judgment or order that orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right,
disposes of the action or proceeding upon on motion, upon a judgment or order that
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
appeal has been duly perfected. expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally which courts applying laws of all kinds can
resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied properly administer justice. They include rules of
for in the court of origin, on motion of the pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to
judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps
true copies of the judgment or judgments or final by which one who commits a crime is to be
order or orders sought to be enforced and of the punished.
entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The general rule that statutes are prospective
The appellate court may, on motion in the same and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to
case, when the interest of justice so requires, procedural laws. It has been held that a
direct the court of origin to issue the writ of retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which
execution. takes away or impairs vested rights acquired
under laws, or creates a new obligation and
It is evident that if we apply the old rule on
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability,
finality of judgment, petitioner redeemed the
in respect of transactions or considerations
subject property within the 120-day period of
already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes
redemption reckoned from the appellate courts
relating to remedies or modes of procedure,
entry of judgment. The appellate court, however,
which do not create new or take away vested
did not apply the old rule but the 1997 Revised
rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. In fine, it applied the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing,
new rule retroactively and we hold that given the
do not come within the legal conception of a
facts of the case at bar, this is an error.
retroactive law, or the general rule against the
There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be retroactive operation of statutes. The general
given retroactive effect. This general rule, rule against giving statutes retroactive operation
however, has well-delineated exceptions. whose effect is to impair the obligations of
contract or to disturb vested rights does not
Generally, procedural laws are adjective laws prevent the application of statutes to
which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of proceedings pending at the time of their
enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their enactment where they neither create new nor
invasion; they refer to rules of procedure by take away vested rights. A new statute which

deals with procedure only is presumptively question as to whether an appeal from an
applicable to all actions those which have accrued adverse judgment should be dismissed for failure
or are pending. of appellant to file a record on appeal within
thirty days as required under the old rules, which
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts
question is pending resolution at the time
will be construed as applicable to actions pending
Batas Bilang 129 took effect, became academic
and undetermined at the time of their
upon the effectivity of said law because the law
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
no longer requires the filing of a record on appeal
sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural
and its retroactive application removed the legal
statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights
obstacle to giving due course to the appeal. A
may not preclude their retroactive application to
statute which transfers the jurisdiction to try
pending actions. The retroactive application of
certain cases from a court to a quasi-judicial
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
tribunal is a remedial statute that is applicable to
person who may feel that he is adversely
claims that accrued before its enactment but
affected. Nor is the retroactive application of
formulated and filed after it took effect, for it
procedural statutes constitutionally
does not create new nor take away vested
objectionable. The reason is that, as a general
rights. The court that has jurisdiction over a claim
rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
at the time it accrued cannot validly try the claim
from, procedural laws. It has been held that a
where, at the time the claim is formulated and
person has no vested right in any particular
filed, the jurisdiction to try it has been
remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the
transferred by law to a quasi-judicial tribunal, for
application to the trial of his case, whether civil or
even actions pending in one court may be validly
criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
taken away and transferred to another and no
procedure.
litigant can acquire a vested right to be heard by
one particular court.
Thus, the provision of Batas Bilang 129 in Section
39 thereof prescribing that no record on appeal
However, the rule that procedural laws are
shall be required to take an appeal is procedural
applicable to pending actions or proceedings
in nature and should therefore be applied
admits certain exceptions. The rule does not
retroactively to pending actions. Hence, the
apply where the statute itself expressly or by

necessary implication provides that pending faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the
actions are exempted from its period of redemption when he made the
operation, or where to apply it to pending redemption.
proceedings would impair vested rights. Under
The manner of exercising the right cannot be
appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the
changed and the change applied retroactively if
retroactive application of procedural laws in the
to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the
event that to do so would not be feasible or
petitioner which is already vested.
would work injustice. Nor may procedural laws
The assailed decision is reversed and set aside.
be applied retroactively to pending actions if to
do so would involve intricate problems of due
process or impair the independence of the
courts.
We hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Article 4, NCC
Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given

People v. Morilla
retroactive effect in this case as it would result in
great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, G.R. No. 189833; February 5, 2014
petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot
and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner Ponente: Perez, J.
followed the procedural rule then existing as well
as the decisions of this Court governing the
reckoning date of the period of redemption when Facts: On October 13, 2001, the accused, Morilla,
he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao, and Ruel Dequilla
petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 y Regodan, allegedly belongs to an organized/
Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied syndicate crime group, helped each other to
retroactively would result in his losing the right to transport shabu approximately weighing 503.68
redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile kilos, by means of 2 vehicles.
the retroactive application of this procedural rule
The RTC then convicted Morilla and Mayor Mitra
with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be
of the crime charged but absolved Dequilla and
penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he

Yang for insufficiency of evidence and was least thirty (30) years after which the convict
subsequently affirmed by the CA. becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it
accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special
Issue/s: W/n CA erred in affirming the decision of
disqualification, etc. Life imprisonment, on the
the RTC
other hand, does not appear to have any definite
Ruling: The ruling is affirmed but with extent or duration and carries no accessory
modification to the penalty imposed. penalties.
Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No.

6425, the penalty for illegal transportation of
methamphetamine hydrochloride was
imprisonment ranging from six years and one day
Article 4, NCC
to twelve years and a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to Ortega v. People
Presidential Decree No. 1683, the penalty was

G.R. No. 151085 ; August 20, 2008
amended to life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos. Ponente: Nachura, J.
The penalty was further amended in Republic Act

No. 7659, where the penalty was changed to
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging Facts: Petitioner, then 14 years old, was charged
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million with the crime of Rape in 2 two separate
pesos. informations both dated April 20, 1998, for

allegedly raping AAA, then about eight (8) years
From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed of age.
penalty of fine of P10,000,00.00 to be paid by
Both the accused and the defendant presented
each of the accused but amend the penalty to
their own version of facts. On May 13, 1999 the
reclusion perpetua following the provisions of
RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial
Republic Act No. 7659 and the principle of
cannot prevail over the positive identification of
retroactive application of lighter penalty.
petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA
Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at

and BBB, who testified with honesty and No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was
credibility and upon appeal, the CA affirmed the convicted by the RTC and the conviction was
decision in toto. affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was
passed into law in 2006, and with the petitioner
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
now approximately 25 years old, he no longer
for the decision of the Court but it was denied.
qualifies as a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344.
During the pendency of the petitioners case, RA
Moreover, the OSG claimed that the
9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344
2006, was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and
is applicable only if the child-accused is still
it took effect on May 20, 2006. The law
below 18 years old as explained under Sections
establishes a comprehensive system to manage
67 and 68 thereof. The OSG also asserted that
children in conflict with the law (CICL) and
petitioner may avail himself of the provisions of
children at risk with child-appropriate procedures
Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344 providing for
and comprehensive programs and services such
automatic suspension of sentence if finally found
as prevention, intervention, diversion,
guilty. Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a
rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care
recognized principle that laws favorable to the
programs geared towards their development.
accused may be given retroactive application,
The law also provides for, among others, the
such principle does not apply if the law itself
immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically
provides for conditions for its application.
Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344's
The Court was however not persuaded.
Transitory Provisions. Hence this petition.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly
Issue/s: W/n the pertinent provisions of R.A. No.
provides that the minimum age of criminal
9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that
responsibility is 15 years old and offenders under
at the time he committed the alleged rape, he
15 years old at the time of the commission of the
was merely 13 years old and RA 9344 was not yet
offense is deemed exempt from criminal liability.
passed
He shall merely be subjected to intervention
Ruling: In its Comment dated April 24, 2008, programs. Likewise, Section 64 of the law
the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer categorically provides that cases of children 15
covered by the provisions of Section 64 of R.A. years old and below, at the time of the

commission of the crime, shall immediately be There also have extant jurisprudence that the
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the principle has been given expanded application in
appropriate local social welfare and development certain instances involving special laws.
officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, It bears stressing that the petitioner was
with respect to the exemption from criminal only 13 years old at the time of the commission
liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the
time of the promulgation of judgment but the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own
CICL's age at the time of the commission of the testimony, and by the testimony of his
offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the mother. Furthermore, petitioners age was never
age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised assailed in any of the proceedings before
from 9 to 15 years old. the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is the time of the commission of the crime, was
imperative that this Court accord retroactive below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is
application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A. exempted from criminal liability.
No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched
principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt
amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which
Article 6, NCC
are favorable to the accused are given retroactive
effect.This principle is embodied in Article 22 of Callanta v. NLRC
the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
GR No. 105083, August 20, 1993
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they Ponente: Bidin, J
favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a
Contributor: Annalyn Fernandez
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5
of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of
Facts: Petitioner Virgilio Callanta was appointed
the publication of such laws, a final sentence has
as sub-agent by respondent company (Distelleria
been pronounced and the convict is serving the
Limtuaco, Co., Inc.) with specific assignment at
same.
Iligan and Lanao Province from June 18, 1986 to
December 31, 1986. In October of 1986, before

the expiration of his appointment, he was Ruling: We agree with public respondent NLRC
promoted as national promoter salesman. that petitioner "failed to adduce evidence that
However, on April 28, 1987, he was found to have may prove that and resignation was obtained by
a shortage of PhP49,005.59 during a spot audit means of coercion and intimidation." The letter
conducted. Thereafter, petitioner rendered his depicting the coercion allegedly imposed upon
resignation effective immediately. him as well as the reason therefore, was nothing
but a self-serving assertion which has so little or
After seven (7) months, petitioner wrote another
no value at all as evidence for the petitioner.
letter complaining his false resignation and
demanding for the refund and reinstatement to Moreover, it is a well-settled principle that for
his former position. He filed a complaint against intimidation to vitiate consent, petitioner must
respondent company before NLRC Regional have been compelled by a reasonable and well-
Arbitration for illegal dismissal, unpaid grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil
commission and receivable and/or claims due, upon his person or property, or upon the person
non-payment of vacation leaves, holiday pays, or property of his spouse, descendants or
13th month pay, COLA and other company ascendants (Article 1335, par. 2 New Civil Code).
benefits and damages. Labor Arbiter rendered in In present case, what allegedly constituted the
favor of petitioner. Aggrieved by the decision, "intimidation" was the threat by private
respondent company appealed the same to the respondent company to file a case for estafa
Fifth division of NLRC. Respondent company was against petitioner unless the latter resigns.
ordered to post a cash or surety bond. In
In asserting that the above-described
addition, pursuant to RA 6715, immediate
circumstance constituted intimidation, petitioner
reinstatement of petitioner to his former position
missed altogether the essential ingredient that
was ordered. The bond was posted; however,
would qualify the act complained of as
petitioner was not reinstated. Hence this petition.
intimidation, i.e. that the threat must be of
Issue/s: W/N the resignation by the petitioner an unjust act. In the present case, the threat to
was valid and effective. prosecute for estafa not being an unjust act (P.P.
Agustinos vs. Del Rey, 56 Phil. 512 [1932]), but
rather a valid and legal act to enforce a claim,

cannot at all be considered as intimidation. A
threat to enforce one's claim through competent
authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not
vitiate consent. (Article 1335, par. 4 New Civil
Code).
Furthermore, and on top of the absence of

evidence adduced by petitioner to the contrary,
the Court also finds it unbelievable that
petitioner was rattled and confused into signing a
resignation letter on account of a mere "spot
audit" report. It is highly unlikely and incredible
for man of petitioner's position and educational
attainment to so easily succumb to private
respondent company's alleged pressures without
even defending himself or demanding a final
audit report before signing any resignation letter.
Assuming that pressure was indeed exerted
against him, there was no urgency for petitioner
to sign the resignation letter. He knew the nature
of the letter that he was signing, for as argued by
respondent company, petitioner being "a man of
high educational attainment and qualification, . . .
he is expected to know the import of everything
that he executes, whether written or oral: (Rollo,
p. 124). In view of foregoing factual setting,
petitioner cannot now be allowed to withdraw
the resignation which, in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary; the Court believes was
tendered voluntarily by him.

Article 6, NCC ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim
was signed by Remedios, it had not been
Guy v. CA
established that she was the duly constituted
G.R. No. 163707; September 15, 2006 guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no
renunciation of right occurred.
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J
Issue/s: Whether the Release and Waiver of
Claim precludes private respondents from
claiming their successional rights
Facts: Private respondent-minors Karen Oanes
Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei represented by their
Ruling: SC finds that there was no waiver of
mother Remedios Oanes filed a petition for
hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of
letters of administration before RTC of Makati.
Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of
They alleged that they are the duly acknowledged
its execution. It merely states that Remedios
illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died
received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for
intestate leaving an estate valued at PhP10
her minor daughters "by way of financial
million. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
assistance and in full settlement of any and all
petition. In a Manifestation/Motion as
claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x
Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,
against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim."
petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private
Considering that the document did not
respondents' claim had been paid, waived,
specifically mention private respondents'
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason
hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it
of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of
cannot be construed as a waiver of successional
Claim stating that in exchange for the financial
rights.
and educational assistance received from
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children Parents and guardians may not therefore
discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all repudiate the inheritance of their wards without
liabilities. judicial approval. This is because repudiation
amounts to an alienation of property which must
RTC and CA denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as
pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the
well as the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It

interest of the ward. Not having been judicially 6713, violation of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal
authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in Code, and violation of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and
the instant case is void and will not bar private (20) of the Civil Service Law. Petitioners wife and
respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of their three sons were impleaded in the complaint
the deceased. for violation of R.A. No. 1379 insofar as they
acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver
fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating,
is the intentional relinquishment of a known
using and disposing of his ill-gotten wealth.
right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right,
there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. On 27 October 2004, the Office of the
Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and Ombudsman sought the forfeiture of unlawfully
waiver cannot be established by a consent given acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. 1379, as amended before the Sandiganbayan. It
was alleged that the Office of the Ombudsman
has determined that a prima facie case exists
against petitioner and the other respondents
therein who hold such properties for, with, or on
Article 7, NCC behalf of, petitioner, since during his incumbency
as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
amounts of money and properties manifestly out
G.R. No. 165835; June 22, 2005 of proportion to his salary as such public officer
and his other lawful income, if any.
Ponente: Tinga, J Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the
relief prayed for.
Petitioner then filed a Motion to Dismiss in Civil

Facts: Petitioner was the Deputy of Staff for the
Case No. 0193 on the ground of lack of
Comptrollership, J6, of the AFP. On September
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over forfeiture
27, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a
proceedings under R.A. No. 1379. On even date,
complaint against petitioner for violation of Sec.
petitioner filed the present Petition, raising the
8, in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.

same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the the regular courts and expanded the exclusive
Sandiganbayan. original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
the offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. No.
Issue/s: W/n the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
1606 to embrace all such offenses irrespective of
over petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379
the imposable penalty. Since this change resulted
in the proliferation of the filing of cases before
Ruling: Originally, it was the Solicitor General
the Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is
who was authorized to initiate forfeiture
punishable by a penalty not higher than prision
proceedings before the then Court of First
correccional or its equivalent, and such cases not
Instance of the city or province where the public
being of a serious nature, P.D. No. 1606 was
officer or employee resides or holds office,
again amended by P.D. No. 1860 and eventually
pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379. Upon the
by P.D. No. 1861.
creation of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to P.D.
No. 1486, original and exclusive jurisdiction over
As held in the case Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
such violations was vested in the said court. P.D.
Supreme Court deduced that jurisdiction over
No. 1606 was later issued expressly repealing
violations of R.A. No. 3019 and 1379 is lodged
P.D. No. 1486, as well as modifying the
with the Sandiganbayan. It could not have taken
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by removing its
into consideration R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No.
jurisdiction over civil actions brought in
8249 since both statutes which also amended the
connection with crimes within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan were not yet
jurisdiction of said court. Such civil actions
enacted at the time. The subsequent enactments
removed from the jurisdiction of the
only serve to buttress the conclusion that the
Sandigabayan include those for restitution or
Sandiganbayan indeed has jurisdiction over
reparation of damages, recovery of instruments
violations of R.A. No. 1379.
and effects of the crime, civil actions under
Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and forfeiture In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and
proceedings provided for under R.A. No. 1379. the present state of statutory law on the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners
Subsequently, BP Blg. 129 abolished the
argumentthat the Sandiganbayan has no
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture it

being "civil" in nature and the Sandiganbayan was given the exclusive authority to conduct
allegedly having no jurisdiction over civil preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable
actionscollapses completely. by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations
therefore and to direct and control the
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Office of the
prosecution of said cases. The power to conduct
Ombudsman, the same has been resolved in the
the necessary investigation and to file and
case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan. The rule is
prosecute the corresponding criminal and
that when a law which expressly repeals a prior
administrative cases before the Sandiganbayan or
law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall
the proper court or administrative agency against
not be thereby revived unless expressly so
any public personnel who has acted in a manner
provided. From this, it may fairly be inferred that
warranting criminal and disciplinary action or
the old rule continues in force where a law which
proceedings was also transferred from the Chief
repeals a prior law, not expressly but by
Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan.
implication, is itself repealed; and that in such
cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the Thereafter, P.D. No. 1606 was amended by P.D.
prior law, unless the language of the repealing Nos. 1860 and 1861 which granted the
statute provides otherwise. Hence, the repeal of Tanodbayan the same authority. The present
P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily Constitution was subsequently ratified and then
revived the authority of the Solicitor General to the Tanodbayan became known as the Office of
file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, the Special Prosecutor which continued to
but not the jurisdiction of the Courts of First exercise its powers except those conferred on the
Instance over the case nor the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the
Provincial or City Fiscals (now Prosecutors) to Constitution. The Office of the Ombudsman was
conduct the preliminary investigation therefore, officially created under R.A. No. 6770.
since said powers at that time remained in the
Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who should file
Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor.
the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379.
The Tanodbayans authority (PD No. 1486) was However, the Ombudsmans exercise of the
further expanded by P.D. No. 1630 issued on 18 correlative powers to investigate and initiate the
July 1990. Among other things, the Tanodbayan proper action for recovery of ill-gotten and/or

unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for products. For the privilege to participate, no fee
the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained or consideration is required to be paid, no
wealth amassed after 25 February 1986. As purchase of Caltex products required to be made.
regards such wealth accumulated on or before Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails,
said date, the Ombudsman is without authority representations were made by Caltex with the
to commence before the Sandiganbayan such postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in
forfeiture actionsince the authority to file advance for mailing. However, the then Acting
forfeiture proceedings on or before 25 February Postmaster General declined to grant the
1986 belongs to the Solicitor Generalalthough requested clearance.
he has the authority to investigate such cases for
Caltex filed a petition for declaratory relief
forfeiture even before 25 February 1986,
against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar,
pursuant to the Ombudsmans general
praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its
investigatory power under Sec. 15 (1) of R.A. No.
'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative
6770.
of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to
allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the
contest to the attention of the public."
Issue/s: W/n the scheme proposed by the

Article 8, NCC appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law
Caltex v. Palomar
Ruling: Article 8 of the Civil Code provides that;

G.R. No. L-19650; September 29, 1966
"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
Ponente: Castro, J law shall form a part of the legal system." In

effect, judicial decisions assume the same
Contributor: Apple Bernardo-Soriano authority as the statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become,
Facts: Caltex (Philippines) Inc. conceived and laid
to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria
the groundwork for a promotional scheme
which must control the actuations not only of
calculated to drum up patronage for its oil

those called upon to abide thereby but also of provisions of the Postal Law which we have
those in duty bound to enforce obedience heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar
thereto. schemes therein contemplated are condemnable
only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of
We note that in the Postal Law, the term in
consideration. Recapitulating, we hold that the
question is used in association with the word
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in
"lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled,
the rules submitted by the appellee does not
and consonant to the well-known principle of
transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis it is only
logical that the term under a construction should
be accorded no other meaning than that which is
consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it
Article 8, NCC
involves a consideration, so also must the term
"gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, GSIS v. Cadiz
there is not in the law the slightest indicium of

G.R. No. 154093. July 8, 2003
any intent to eliminate that element of
consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J
included.
Contributor: Apple Bernardo-Soriano
Since in gambling it is inherent that something of Facts: Leo L. Cadiz was appointed as a
value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger Provincial Guard of Negros He entered the police
amount, it follows ineluctably that where no service and applied for early retirement due to
consideration is paid by the contestant to "an ailment causing paralysis of the left hand and
participate, the reason behind the law can hardly slurred speech rendering him unfit to discharge
be said to obtain. further his duties and responsibilities as a police
officer." The Medical and Dental Service, PNP,
We find no obstacle in saying the same
declared him "UNFIT FOR POLICE SERVICE".
respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are
Respondent filed a disability claim with the GSIS.
persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive
Dr. Gervillana B. Estrada, Medical Officer of GSIS

approved the claim and granted respondent disability benefits. Most of all, the decision of the
permanent total disability benefits starting March PNP to retire him at the age of 55 for being unfit
19, 1999 and temporary total disability benefits for police service is a clear indication that his
from October 12, 1996 to November 22, 1996. heart ailment rendered him incapable of
Dr. Estrada modified her recommendation by effectively and competently performing his job as
retaining respondents temporary total disability a Police Chief Superintendent without serious
benefits but downgrading the permanent total discomfort or pain and without material injury or
disability benefits to compensation equivalent to danger to his life. In a number of cases, it was
8 months permanent partial disability benefits. ruled that the early retirement of an employee
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the due to a work-related ailment, as in the case at
evaluation but the same was denied. bar, proves that he was really disabled totally to
further perform his assigned task, and to deny
On appeal by respondent, the Employees
permanent total disability benefits when he was
Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the
forced to retire would render inutile and
findings of the GSIS. Hence, respondent filed a
meaningless the social justice precept guaranteed
petition with the Court of Appeals which, on June
by the Constitution.
21, 2002, rendered a decision setting aside the
decision of the ECC and granting respondents As to the decisions of the Court of Appeals cited
claim for permanent total disability. by petitioner as authorities, it must be stressed
that judicial decisions which form part of our
Issue/s: Whether or not the respondent entitled
legal system are only the decisions of the
to permanent total disability benefits?
Supreme Court. While rulings of the Court of
Appeals may serve as precedents for lower
Ruling: Yes. Respondents entitlement to
courts, they only apply to points of law not
permanent total disability was established by his
covered by any Supreme Court decision. This is
medical records and by the investigation of the
not, however, the case here, considering that the
very agency he worked for, the PNP, which found
legal issue presented is already laid to rest by
him UNFIT FOR POLICE SERVICE. Even the initial
settled jurisprudence.
findings of Dr. Gervillana B. Estrada, Medical
Officer of the GSIS, Dumaguete City evinced that
respondent is really qualified for permanent total

and assigned to MeTC-Branch 24. Remington filed
a Formal Surrender of the Leased Premises,
Article 8, NCC
opting to surrender possession of units 964 and
CYMCA v. Remmington Steel 966 and tendering two checks to cover all past
rentals due on the two units. YMCA filed a No
G.R. No. 154093. July 8, 2003
Objection to the Turn Over of the Leased
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J Premises in Binondo. MeTC- Branch 24 issued an
Order declaring the consignation case closed.
Contributor: Apple Bernardo-Soriano
Remington, however, continued to use

Facts: Remington Steel Corporation leased
ground floor units 964 and 966 as passageway to
ground floor units 964 and 966 and second floor
second floor unit 963. It kept the premises
unit 963 of a building owned by the Manila
padlocked and failed to give YMCA the keys to
Downtown YMCA (YMCA) in Benavidez St.,
the premises. RTC-Branch 30, acting as an
Binondo, Manila. Remington used the combined
appellate court, rendered a Decision in Civil
areas of ground floor units 964 and 966 as
granting Remington a longer extension period of
hardware store, offices, and display shops for its
five years for second floor unit 963 and ordering
steel products, as well as a passageway to second
YMCA to provide a two-meter passageway
floor unit 963 which was used as staff room for its
between units 964 and 966. YMCA filed an appeal
Manila sales force. YMCA formally terminated
with the CA, the CA ordered Remington to vacate
the lease over second floor unit 963 and gave
the premises, as the continuation of the lease
Remington until March 31, 1997 to vacate the
was no longer tenable after the lapse of six years,
premises. Remington filed with the MeTC, a case
since the parties' formal contract had expired. It
for the Fixing of Lease Period over unit 963 while
also noted that since Remington had already
YMCA filed in the same court an action for
transferred to its own building, there was no
Unlawful Detainer involving the same unit 963
more reason to continue the lease.
against Remington. During the pendency of Civil
Case, Remington filed a Petition for Consignation On July 29, 2003, the CA issued a
of Rentals on the ground that YMCA refused to Resolution denying YMCA's motion for
receive rentals for ground floor units 964 and 966 reconsideration.

Hence, the present petition involving only
unit 964.
Issue/s: W/n the questions in the present case

relate to the same event have been put forward Article 8, NCC
by the parties in the case involving unit 966
Lazatin v. Desierto
Ruling: Yes. The final Resolution in G.R. No.
171858 is binding and applicable to the present G.R. No. 147097; June 5, 2009
case following the salutary doctrine of stare

Ponente: Peralta, J
decisis et non quieta movere which means "to
adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things Contributor: Apple Bernardo-Soriano
which are established." The doctrine of stare
Facts:
decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity
for securing certainty and stability of judicial
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and
decisions. Where the same questions relating to
Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the
the same event have been put forward by the
Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit
parties similarly situated as in a previous case
charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of
litigated and decided by a competent court, the
Public Funds as defined and penalized under
rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code and
relitigate the same issue. It bears stressing that
violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e)
the facts of the present case and those of G.R.
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.
No. 171858 are substantially the same. The only
difference is the unit involved; G.R. No. 171858 The complaint alleged that there were
involves unit 966 while the present case involves irregularities in the use by then Congressman
unit 964. The opposing parties are likewise the Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide
same. Once a case has been decided one way, Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year
any other case involving exactly the same point at 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and
issue, as in the present case, should be decided in implementer of the projects funded from his CDF;
the same manner. he signed vouchers and supporting papers

pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling
Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen on the constitutionality of the provisions of
(18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08. Thus, R.A. No. 6770 should be revisited and the
petitioner Lazatin, with the help of petitioners principle ofstare decisis set aside. Again, this
Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and contention deserves scant consideration.
Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert
his CDF into cash. On October 27, 2000, the
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta
Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum,
movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution dated
unsettle things which are established) is
September 18, 2000 and ordering the aggressive
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were
Philippines. The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins
then returned to the Sandiganbayan for
adherence to judicial precedents. It requires
continuation of criminal proceedings.
courts in a country to follow the rule established
Hence this petition. in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That

decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
Issue/s: W/n Ombudsman acted with grave
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the
abuse of discretion
land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the
Ruling: Petitioners' attack against the principle that once a question of law has been
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has examined and decided, it should be deemed
long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. settled and closed to further argument. The
6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial
prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under system that the Court has ruled that
said office have no constitutional infirmity. The "[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on
issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the
violated the Constitution had been fully dissected becoming virtue of predictability which is
as far back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the expected from this Court would be immeasurably
Ombudsman as well as the constitutionality of affected and the public's confidence in the
Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the stability of the solemn pronouncements
OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman. diminished." Verily, only upon showing that

circumstances attendant in a particular case complaint draws attention to a decision rendered
override the great benefits derived by our judicial on September 21, 1989 by His Honor in a criminal
system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the prosecution for theft of a large cattle (Crim. Case
courts be justified in setting aside the same. No. 922-M [87]) entitled "People v. Vicente Dumo
Sr. and Vicente Dumo Jr.," in which the
In this case, petitioners have not shown any
complainant, the barangay captain in the locality,
strong, compelling reason to convince the Court
was one of the witnesses for the prosecution. The
that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be
complaint alleges that although the complainant,
applied to this case. They have not successfully
Pagasian, was "not in any manner, shape or form
demonstrated how or why it would be grave
an accused in said . . case," respondent Judge
abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has
in his decision acquitting both accused "for utter
been validly conferred by law with the power of
lack of evidence" nevertheless declared him
control and supervision over the OSP, to
guilty of "clear violations of the provisions of the
disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by
fundamental law of the land and against human
the latter.
rights," and sentenced him to pay a fine of
P200.00.
Respondent Judge, in his comment dated January

18, 1990, concedes that Pagasian was not an
Article 9, NCC accused in the case, but insists that his search of
the house of Vicente Dumo, Sr., his seizure of the
Pagasian v. Azura
latter's cart and deposit thereof in the municipal
A.M. No. RTJ-89-425; April 17, 1990 building, "without being armed with any warrant
issued by any judge," was a "violation of Sec. 2 of
Ponente: Narvasa, J
Art. III of the Constitution." He asserts that while
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion there was no "law in implementation of any
violation of the provisions of the constitution," he
Facts: Judge Cesar P. Azura is charged with having felt it to be "his solemn duty to defend and
knowingly rendered an unjust judgment against protect the Constitution," and not to "decline to
Oscar Palma Pagasian. The latter's sworn render judgment by reason of the silence,

obscurity or insufficiency of the laws" (Art. 9, Civil him from the offense which was known to
Code), and adopt "any suitable process or mode nobody except the Judge. What is worse, the
of proceeding . . which appears most complainant was punished for acts not declared
conformable to the spirit" of the Rules of Court by any law to constitute a penal offense and
(Sec. 6, Rule 135, Rules of Court). prescribing a specific penalty therefor, in
violation of another equally familiar precept,
Issue/s: W/n Judge Azura may be held liable for
which also appears to have escaped respondent
the decision he has rendered
Judge's attention, that no act may be deemed to
be, and punished as, a crime unless so declared
Ruling: Yes. Respondent Judge appears to have
by law. Under the circumstances, the Court must
regrettably lost sight of an even more
hold that the complainant was clearly denied due
fundamental and familiar constitutional precept:
process by respondent Judge. He was subjected
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
to no small injustice. He was, by a process of
property without due process of law" (Sec. 1, Art.
specious, sophistical reasoning on the part of the
III, Constitution). This safeguard, the first listed in
respondent Judge, sentenced to a penalty
the Bill of Rights, includes what is known as
without justification whatever, in infringement of
procedural due process that guarantees a
basic principles of which all judges are charged
procedure which, according to Daniel Webster,
with knowledge.
"hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It
is made more particular in a subsequent section:
"No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law" (Sec. 14 [a]).
Article 15, NCC
In said Criminal Case No. 922-M (87), the
complaining witness had absolutely no Idea that Van Dorn v. Romillo
he himself was on trial, like the very persons he
G.R. No. L-68470; October 8, 1985
was accusing, for the commission of some
offense (or perhaps for constructive contempt); Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J
he consequently had no opportunity whatsoever
to present any evidence in his behalf to exculpate

Facts: Alicia Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines Issue/s: W/n the divorce decree obtained by
while Upton is a citizen of the United States; they Upton is recognized here in the Philippines
were married in Hong Kong in 1972; that, after
Ruling: It is true that owing to the nationality
the marriage, they established their residence in
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
the Philippines; that they begot two children born
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
the policy against absolute divorces the same
respectively; that the parties were divorced in
being considered contrary to our concept of
Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that
public police and morality. However, aliens may
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
time to Theodore Van Dorn.
in the Philippines, provided they are valid
On June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit according to their national law. In this case, the
against petitioner stating that petitioner's divorce in Nevada released private respondent
business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop), is from the marriage from the standards of
their conjugal property, and he is thus asking that American law, under which divorce dissolves the
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of marriage.
that business, and that private respondent be

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
declared with right to manage the conjugal
respondent is no longer the husband of
property. Petitioner countered that private
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
respondents cause of action is barred by
the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court,
had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
community property" as of June 11, 1982.
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the estopped by his own representation before said
ground that the property involved is located in Court from asserting his right over the alleged
the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no conjugal property.
bearing in the case.

before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that,
while still married to said respondent, petitioner
Article 15, NCC
"had an affair with a certain William Chia as early
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983"..
G.R. No. 80116; June 30, 1989
Issue/s: W/n Geiling has the legal capacity to

Ponente: Regalado, J
initiate the complaint of adultery against Imelda
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion even after the issuance of a divorce decree
Facts: On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Ruling: The power to institute action to prosecute
Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private adultery is exclusively granted to the offended
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German spouse, it then necessarily follows that such
national, were married before the Registrar of initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in representation to do so at the time of the filing of
the Federal Republic of Germany.After the the criminal action.
marriage, the couple lived together for some time
in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella The status of the complainant vis-a-vis the
Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who
After about three and a half years of marriage, initiates the adultery case must be an offended
private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding spouse, and by this is meant that he is still
against petitioner in Germany before the married to the accused spouse, at the time of the
Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He filing of the complaint.
claimed that there was failure of their marriage
and that they had been living apart since April, In the present case, the fact that private
1982. respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may
the issuance of the divorce decree, private be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery respondent is concerned in view of the

nationality principle in our civil law on the matter On June 26, 1992, respondent became an
of status of persons. Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian
Taking into consideration the rule laid down in
government. Petitioner a Filipina and
the case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, private
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
respondent, being no longer the husband of
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence
City. In their application for a marriage license,
the adultery case under the imposture that he
respondent was declared as "single" and
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
"Filipino."
Complaint dismissed.
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and
respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were
still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
Article 15, NCC divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with
their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Garcia-Recio v. Recio
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint

G.R. No. 138322; October 2, 2001
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the
Ponente: Panganiban, J court a quo, on the ground of bigamy
respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on January
Facts: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived November, 1997.
together as husband and wife in Australia. On
Respondent contended that his first marriage to
May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly
an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
a divorce decree obtained in Australian in
Australian family court.

1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
petitioner in 1994. thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage,
while the second suspends it and leaves the bond
On July 7, 1998 while the suit for the declaration
in full force. There is no showing in the case at
of nullity was pending respondent was able to
bar which type of divorce was procured by
secure a divorce decree from a family court in
respondent.
Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down." Respondent presented a decree nisi or an
interlocutory decree a conditional or
The RTC declared their marriage dissolved. The
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the
decision rendered was based on the ground that
same as a separation from bed and board,
the divorce decree issued in Australia is valid and
although an absolute divorce may follow after
recognized here in the Philippines and not on
the lapse of the prescribed period during which
Redericks lack of legal capacity to marry.
no reconciliation is effected.

The decree itself shows that the decree obtained
by the respondent may have been restricted. The
Issue/s: W/n the respondent has the legal
ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
capacity to remarry at the time he married the
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso
petitioner
facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry,
Ruling: Respondent contends that the Australian has no basis.
divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
The legal capacity to contract marriage is
evidence, adequately established his legal
determined by the national law of the party
capacity to marry under Australian law.
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article
Such contention is untenable. In its strict legal 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. he duly presented it in court. A duly
But divorces are of different types. The two basic authenticated and admitted certificate is prima
ones are (1) absolute divorce ora vinculo facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the

part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. On 16 April 1972 Arturo died without
In this case, there is absolutely no evidence that will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a
proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petition with the Regional Trial Court for issuance
petitioner. of letters of administration concerning the estate
of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming
to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and
Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Article 15, NCC Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the
petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan,
Quita v. CA
opposed the petition and prayed for the
G.R. No. 124862; December 22, 1998 appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal,
later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April
Ponente: Bellosillo, J
1973 the oppositors submitted certified
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing
and the final judgment of divorce between
Facts: Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both
petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan,
Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
May 1941 but Fe eventually sued Arturo for
deceased Arturo, intervened.
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She
submitted in the divorce proceedings a private The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escano,
writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their which held that "a foreign divorce between
agreement to live separately from each other and Filipino citizens sought and
a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to
divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a recognition as valid in this
certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their jurisdiction," disregarded the divorce between
relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed
U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain the view that their marriage subsisted until the
Wernimont. death of Arturo in 1972.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the
immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent
and the distribution of his estate.
Article 15, NCC

Issue/s: W/n the divorce decree obtained by
Quita is recognized here in the Philippines Perez v. CA
Ruling: Tenchavez v. Escano held that a foreign G.R. No. 162580; January 27, 2006
divorce between Filipino citizens sought and
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code was not entitled to recognition as valid in Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
this jurisdiction while Van Dorn v. Romillo held
Facts: Private respondent Tristan
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig for the
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
second time on May 16, 1968. The first marriage
they are according to their national laws.
ceremony was celebrated at the Central
We deduce that the finding on their Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita,
citizenship pertained solely to the time Manila, while the second took place at the
of their marriage as the trial court was not Lourdes Catholic Church in La
supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's Loma, Quezon City. The marriage produced four
citizenship at the time of children.
their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether Several years later, they decided to
she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce obtain a divorce from the Dominican
was decreed. The trial court must have Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily
overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed
proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at to the Judge of the First Civil Court of
the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an
become applicable and petitioner could very well attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action
lose her right to inherit from Arturo. under its laws. Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the
The case is remanded to the lower court. private respondents filed a joint petition for
dissolution of conjugal partnership with the

Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, Tristan; hence her claim of legal interest has no
the civil court in the Dominican Republic ratified basis.
the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily. When petitioner and Tristan married
Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the Regional on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily
the complete separation of properties between obtained from the Dominican Republic never
Tristan and Lily. dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married basic that laws relating to family rights and
petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State duties, or to the status, condition and legal
of Virginia in the United States and both lived as capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
husband and wife until October 2001. the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Regardless of where a citizen of
It was only later during their marriage that Elmar
the Philippines might be, he or she will be
learned of the marriage of Tristan to Lily and the
governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or
status of their marriage.
her family rights and duties, or to his or her
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily Filipino regardless of whether he or she was
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. married here or abroad, initiates a petition
Elmar then filed her Motion to Intervene alleging abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from
that her status and as a companion to Tristan for spouse and eventually becomes successful in
17 years vest her with the requisite legal interest getting an absolute divorce decree,
required of a would intervenor under the Rules of the Philippines will not recognize such absolute
Court. divorce.
When Tristan and Lily married on May
Issue/s: W/n Elmar has the legal interest in the
18, 1968, their marriage was governed by the
annulment of marriage of Lily ad Tristan
provisions of the Civil Code which took effect
Ruling: Petitioners claim lacks merit. Under the on August 30, 1950. In the case
law, petitioner was never the legal wife of of Tenchavez v. Escano we held:

(1) That a foreign divorce between on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act Emilita and Manuel. On August 11,
No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
Five years later, on May 1, 1968,
contracted with another party by the divorced
Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom
consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of
he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
divorce, entitled to validity in the
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
country. (Emphasis added)
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of
Thus, petitioners claim that she is the
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of
wife of Tristan even if their marriage was
America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting
celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody
never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon
on December 14, 1973.
which her motion for intervention is based
Petition is dismissed. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer,
Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Article 15, NCC
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had
San Luis v. San Luis no children with respondent but lived with her
for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to
G.R. No. 133743; February 6, 2007
his death on December 18, 1992.
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago , J
On December 17, 1993, she filed a
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion petition for letters of administration before

the Regional Trial Court alleged that she is the
Facts: Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo),
widow of Felicisimo. She then prayed that the
former governor of the Province of Laguna,
conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and
contracted three marriages during his
that letters of administration be issued to
lifetime. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit
her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San

Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen.
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
The Court of Appeals however reversed
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
and set aside the decision of the RTC rationating
respondent has no legal personality to file the
that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
petition because she was only a mistress of
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. It found
Rodolfo San Luis was later joined by Linda, his
that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry
sister. The trial Court denied both petitions to
Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree
dismiss.
of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of
Felicidad presented the decree of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result,
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already with respondent.
been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo
Issue/s: W/n a Filipino who is divorced by his
had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and
the Civil Code
the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
Ruling: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by
On September 12, 1995, the trial court
Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
dismissed the petition for letters of
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the
administration. It held that the respondent was
legal personality to file the present petition as
without legal capacity to file the petition for
Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the
letters of administration because her marriage
records show that there is insufficient evidence
with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab
to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was
and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the

specific guidelines for pleading and proving on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and
foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and
due execution must be presented. Under Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
Article 15, NCC
may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official Amor-Catalan v. CA
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007
officer having legal custody of the document. If
the record is not kept in the Philippines, such Ponente: Ynares-Santiago , J
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed
Facts: Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married
in the foreign country in which the record is kept
respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the
With regard to respondents marriage to United States of America and allegedly became
Felicisimo allegedly solemnized naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of
in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated 1988.
text of the Family Law Act of California which

Two months after the divorce, or on June 16,
purportedly show that their marriage was done in
1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia,
Calasiao, Pangasinan. Contending that said
however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol,
Therefore, this case should be remanded petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity
to the trial court for further reception of evidence of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan
City against Orlando and Merope.

On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment of whether petitioner has the personality to file
declaring the subsequent marriage of Merope the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan null and void ab After all, she may have the personality to file the
initio, however, said decision was reversed by the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a
Court of Appeals. limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the
foreign law may restrict remarriage even after
Issue/s: W/n petitioner has the legal capacity to
the divorce decree becomes absolute. In such
seek the annulment of marriage between
case, the RTC would be correct to declare the
Orlando and Merope
marriage of the respondents void for being
bigamous, there being already in evidence two
Ruling: Divorce means the legal dissolution of a
existing marriage certificates, which were both
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage.
obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini,
But divorces are of different types. The two basic
Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between
ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope, and the
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16,
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage,
1988 between the respondents.
while the second suspends it and leaves the bond
in full force. A divorce obtained abroad by an
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree
alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
obtained and which, following the national law of
provided such decree is valid according to the
Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court
national law of the foreigner. However, before it
of Appeals would be correct in ruling that
can be recognized by our courts, the party
petitioner has no legal personality to file a
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
petition to declare the nullity of marriage.
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it, which must be proved considering On the other hand, whether under the New Civil
that our courts cannot take judicial notice of Code which is the law in force at the time the
foreign laws. respondents were married, nor in the Family
Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage;
part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue
however, only a party who can demonstrate

"proper interest" can file the same. A petition to granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other law which granted the same allows or restricts
actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the remarriage.
name of the real party in interest and must be
based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Bayadog, the Court held that the children have
the personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to Article 16 & 17, NCC
their stepmother as it affects their successional
rights. Aznar v. Garcia
G.R. No. L-16749; January 31, 1963

Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages Ponente:Labrador, J
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which
took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically
provides: Facts: The Court of First Instance of Davao in a
Special Proceeding No. 622 dated September 14,
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute
1949, directed the executor to reimburse Maria
nullity of void marriages.
Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy,
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to
solely by the husband or the wife. x x x x the residue of the property to be enjoyed during
her lifetime, and in case of death without issue,
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs.
to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with
ascertained because of the absence of the the provisions of the will of the testator Edward
divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for on March 5, 1951 and contains the following
reception of additional evidence is necessary to provisions:
determine whether respondent Orlando was

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, principal thereof as well as any interest which
named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
Bernard Daney), who was born in the
It is in accordance with the above-quoted
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and
provisions that the executor in his final account
who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young
and project of partition ratified the payment of
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
4. I further declare that I now have no living proposed that the residue of the estate be
ascendants and no descendants except my transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy
above named daughter, MARIA LUCY Christensen.
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
However, it is opposed Helen Christensen Garcia,
xxx xxx xxx insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime

as an acknowledged natural child, she having
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, Edward E. Christensen.
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Issue/s: W/n the lower court erred in failing to
Christensen, is not in any way related to me,
recognize that under international law,
nor has she been at any time adopted by me,
particularly under the renvoi doctrine,the
and who, from all information I have now
intrinsic validity of the testamentary disposition
resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the
of the distribution of the estate of the deceased
sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
Edward Christensen should be governed by the
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to
laws of the Philippines
be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
Ruling: Edward Christensen was born in New
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the
York, migrated to California and resided there for
rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00),
nine years, and since he came to the Philippines
Philippine Currency per month until the
in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and
only for short visits, and considering that he

appears never to have owned or acquired a home indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above
or properties in that state, which would indicate quoted cannot, therefore, possibly mean or apply
that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines to any general American law. So it can refer to no
and make home in the State of California. other than the private law of the State of
California.
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the
citizenship that he acquired in California when he Indeed, the decision of the court below, sustains
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to the contention of the executor-appellee that
1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, under the California Probate Code, a testator may
for the latter was a territory of the United States dispose of his property by will in the form and
until 1946 and the deceased appears to have manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
considered himself as a citizen of California by McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But
the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
that he appears never to have intended to
If there is no law to the contrary, in the
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
place where personal property is situated, it is
another.
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is
The law that governs the validity of his governed by the law of his domicile.
testamentary dispositions is defined in Article
The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
court of the forum, in determining the question
application of this article in the case at bar
before it, must take into account the whole law
requires the determination of the meaning of
of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to
the term "national law" is used therein.
conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the
There is no single American law governing the actual question which the rules of the other
validity of testamentary provisions in the United jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the
States, each state of the Union having its own forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally
private law applicable to its citizens only and in been repudiated by the American authorities. (2
force only within the state. The "national law" Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been (a) The provisions of a foreign law which
defined and the reasons for its application in a disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article regards their personal statute, and desires that
in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. said personal statute shall be determined by the
529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are law of the domicile, or even by the law of the
quoted herein below: place where the act in question occurred.
The recognition of the renvoi theory (b) The decision of two or more foreign systems
implies that the rules of the conflict of of law, provided it be certain that one of them is
laws are to be understood as necessarily competent, which agree in attributing
incorporating not only the ordinary or the determination of a question to the same
internal law of the foreign state or system of law.
country, but its rules of the conflict of
xxx xxx xxx
laws as well. According to this theory 'the
law of a country' means the whole of its
If, for example, the English law directs its
law.
judge to distribute the personal estate of
an Englishman who has died domiciled in
xxx xxx xxx
Belgium in accordance with the law of his
Von Bar presented his views at the domicile, he must first inquire whether
meeting of the Institute of International the law of Belgium would distribute
Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of personal property upon death in
the following theses: accordance with the law of domicile, and
if he finds that the Belgian law would
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its
make the distribution in accordance with
country as regards the application of
the law of nationality that is the
foreign laws.
English law he must accept this
reference back to his own law.
(2) Provided that no express provision to
the contrary exists, the court shall
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil
respect:
Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule

applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling
the law on succession and the conflict of laws by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property,
rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each and the reason for the recognition as in the case
in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the of intestate succession, is the general
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to convenience of the doctrine. The New York court
citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should has said on the point: 'The general principle that
apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled a disposition of a personal property, valid at the
in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one
laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile of the universal application. It had its origin in
in the determination of matters with foreign that international comity which was one of the
element involved is in accord with the general first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
principle of American law that the domiciliary law business intercourse and the process of
should govern in most matters or rights which accumulating property take but little notice of
follow the person of the owner. boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice
of the rule is more apparent than ever.
When a man dies leaving personal
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-
property in one or more states, and leaves a will
443.)
directing the manner of distribution of the
property, the law of the state where he was Appellees argue that what Article 16 of
domiciled at the time of his death will be looked the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
to in deciding legal questions about the will, the national law is the internal law of California.
almost as completely as the law of situs is But as above explained the laws of California
consulted in questions about the devise of land. It have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens,
is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control one for residents therein and another for those
devolution of the personal estate in case of domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands
intestate succession, the same rules should that We should enforce the California internal
determine the validity of an attempted law prescribed for its citizens residing therein,
testamentary disposition of the property. Here, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the
also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the
beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The law of California as in comity we are bound to go,

as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then forth between the two states, between the
we must enforce the law of California in country of which the decedent was a citizen and
accordance with the express mandate thereof the country of his domicile. The Philippine court
and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal must apply its own law as directed in the conflict
law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
rule for those domiciled abroad. question has to be decided, especially as the
application of the internal law of California
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause
provides no legitime for children while the
"if there is no law to the contrary in the place
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of
where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
the Philippines, makes natural children legally
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to
recognizing them.
the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in
said Article 16 that the national law of the We therefore find that as the domicile of the
deceased should govern. This contention can not deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is
be sustained. As explained in the various the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of
authorities cited above the national law his will depriving his acknowledged natural child,
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the the appellant, should be governed by the
law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946
i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
or return of the question to the law of the law of California.
testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers
back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled
in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the Article 16 & 17, NCC
domicile can not and should not refer the case
Tenchavez v. Escano
back to California; such action would leave the
issue incapable of determination because the G.R. No. L-19671; November 29, 1965
case will then be like a football, tossed back and

Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L., J Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal
that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a
lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then
Facts: On 24 February 1948, Vicenta Escao, 27 Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage.
years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially She did not sign the petition. The case was
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and dismissed without prejudice because of her non-
a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage appearance at the hearing.
vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband,
engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished
she applied for a passport, indicating in her
stock, without the knowledge of her parents,
application that she was single, that her purpose
before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in
was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City,
the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The
and that she intended to return after two years.
marriage was duly registered with the local civil
The application was approved, and she left for
register.
the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a
Vicenta and Pastor actually planned to elope verified complaint for divorce against the herein
after their marriage but it did not materialize plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of
because Vicenta was caught by her mother. The the State of Nevada in and for the County of
Escano spouses sought priestly advice the next Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty,
morning and the priest suggested the entirely mental in character." On 21 October
recelebration of Vicenta and Pastors marriage 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute",
but it also did not take place because on February was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
26, 1948, Mamerto Escano was informed of the
alleged amorous relationship between Pastor In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a
Tenchavez and Pacita Noel, thus resulting to petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul
Vicentas refusal to the recelebration of their their daughter's marriage to Pastor while on 10
marriage. September 1954, Vicenta sought papal

dispensation of her marriage.
Afterwhich, the newly wed became estranged to
each other. Vicenta had gone to Jimenez,

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the
American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada and she Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386),
acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958. already in force at the time, expressly provided:
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the Laws relating to family rights and duties
proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May persons are binding upon the citizens of the
1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Philippines, even though living abroad.
Mamerto and Mena Escao.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in
The Court of First Instance decreed that Pastor is force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad
now freed from supporting his wife and to vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use
acquire property in the exclusion of his wife. that term, to further emphasize its restrictive
policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding
Hence this appeal.
legislation that admitted absolute divorce on
grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of
Issue/s: W/n the Philippine court recognizes a
the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the
divorce decree obtained abroad by Filipino
present Civil Code only provides for legal
spouses
separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and,
Ruling: It is clear from the record that the valid even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the
marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106,
Escao remained subsisting and undissolved subpar. 1).
under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give
of absolute divorce that the wife sought and
recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens could
Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of
be a patent violation of the declared public policy
Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely
of the state, especially in view of the third
mental in character." At the time the divorce
paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that
decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her
prescribes the following:
husband, was still a Filipino citizen She was then

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. V. CA
acts or property, and those which have for
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
their object public order, policy and good
customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by Ponente: Cortes, J
laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon
in a foreign country. Facts: Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias
was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable
It is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez
and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual
should have appeared in the Nevada divorce
capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative
court. Primarily because the policy of our law
assistant to the engineering operations manager.
cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil
He discovered the anomalies within the company
Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally,
and then reported them on November 10, 1972
because the mere appearance of a non-resident
to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren
consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the
and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry, the
court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil.
Executive Vice-President and General Manager of
579).
GLOBE MACKAY.
From the preceding facts and considerations,

However, petitioner Hendry confronted him the
there flows as a necessary consequence that in
next day by stating that he was the number one
this jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and
suspect, and ordered him to take a one week
second marriage are not entitled to recognition
forced leave, not to communicate with the office,
as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff
to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the
Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and
office keys.
undissolved.
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent

Tobias returned to work after the forced leave,
petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him
a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then
Article 19, NCC
ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also

instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, Issue/s: W/n Globe Mackay and Hendy is liable
signature, and initials for examination by the for damages
police investigators to determine his complicity in
Ruling: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise
the anomalies. On December 6, 1972, the Manila
of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
police investigators submitted a laboratory crime
act with justice, give everyone his due, and
report clearing private respondent of
observe honesty and good faith.
participation in the anomalies.
This article, known to contain what is commonly

Notwithstanding the two police reports
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the
certain standards which must be observed not
fact that the report of the private investigator,
only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
was, by its own terms, not yet complete,
performance of one's duties. When a right is
petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a
exercised in a manner which does not conform
complaint for estafa through falsification of
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results
commercial documents, later amended to just
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
estafa.
committed for which the wrongdoer must be
On January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a
from petitioners that his employment has been rule of conduct for the government of human
terminated effective December 13, 1972. relations and for the maintenance of social order,
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). Generally, an action for damages under either
However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating
In the instant case, the Court found out that
that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due
petitioners have indeed abused the right that
to dishonesty.
they invoke causing damage to private
Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on respondent and which the latter must be
alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and indemnified.
abusive acts of petitioners.

The high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by issued several postdated checks to different
petitioners was certainly uncalled for. Also, when payees drawn against the said account.
Hendry said that, "Tobby, you are the crook and Sometime in March 1988, the respondent issued
swindler in this company.", the scornful remark Check No. 2434886 in the amount of P680.00 and
regarding the Flipinos, the letter sent to the the same was presented for payment to
RETELCO and the filing of malicious criminal petitioner bank on April 4, 1988.
complaints are all in transgression to the
standard provided under the principle of abuse of Upon its presentment on the said date,
right considering that these imputations of guilt Check No. 2434886 was dishonored by petitioner
without basis. Under the circumstances of the bank. Subsequently, when the respondent
instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to verified with petitioner bank about the dishonor
exercise in a legitimate manner their right to of Check No. 2434866, he discovered that his
dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to current account was closed on the ground that it
recover damages under Article 19 in relation to was improperly handled. On April 18, 1988, the
Article 21 of the Civil Code. respondent wrote to petitioner bank complaining
that the closure of his account was unjustified.
When he did not receive a reply from petitioner
bank, the respondent filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner bank and
Article 19, NCC Villadelgado.
Far East Bank v Pacilan Jr.

Issue/s: W/n FEBTC is liable for damages
G.R. No. 157314, July 29, 2005
Ruling: The elements of abuse of rights are the
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J
following: (a) the existence of a legal right or
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
Facts: Respondent Pacilan opened a current
another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of the
account with petitioner banks Bacolod Branch on
said provision. The law always presumes good
May 23, 1980.The respondent had since then

faith and any person who seeks to be awarded existence of bad faith or malice on its part in
damages due to acts of another has the burden closing the respondents account on April 4, 1988
of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or because on the said date the same was already
with ill-motive. Good faith refers to the state of overdrawn. The respondent issued four checks,
the mind which is manifested by the acts of the all due on April 4, 1988, amounting to P7,410.00
individual concerned. It consists of the intention when the balance of his current account deposit
to abstain from taking an unconscionable and was only P6,981.43. Thus, he incurred an
unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith overdraft of P428.57 which resulted in the
does not simply connote bad judgment or simple dishonor of his Check No. 2434886. Further,
negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral petitioner bank showed that in 1986, the current
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a account of the respondent was overdrawn 156
breach of known duty due to some motives or times due to his issuance of checks against
interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of insufficient funds. In 1987, the said account was
fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks overdrawn 117 times for the same reason, and
not in response to duty. It implies an intention to again in 1988, 26 times. There were also several
do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad instances when the respondent issued checks by
faith or bad motive. deliberately using a signature different from his
specimen signature on file with petitioner bank.
Undoubtedly, petitioner bank has the right to All these circumstances taken together justified
close the account of the respondent based on the the petitioner banks closure of the respondents
provisions of its Rules and Regulations Governing account on April 4, 1988 for improper handling.
the Establishment and Operation of Regular
Demand Deposits.
The facts of this case do not establish Article 19, NCC

that, in the exercise of this right, petitioner bank
Uypitching v. Quiamco
committed an abuse thereof. Specifically, the
second and third elements for abuse of rights are G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006
not attendant in the present case. The evidence
Ponente: Corona, J.
presented by petitioner bank negates the

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner
Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to
Facts: In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the
was approached by Juan Davalan, Josefino
motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt.
Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle
Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge and
the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery by
asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and
Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him
the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching
a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy
paced back and forth inside the establishment
of its certificate of registration. Respondent asked
uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
for the original certificate of registration but the
When the police were unable to find respondent
three accused never came to see him again.
in his residence, the policemen went back to
Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner
open space inside respondents business
Uypitchings instruction and over the clerks
establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where
objection, took the motorcycle.
it was visible and accessible to the public.
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed
It turned out that, in October 1981, the
a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or
motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to
violation of the Anti-Fencing La against
Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons,
respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by
Dumaguete City.He sought to hold the petitioners
petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To
liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the
secure its payment, the motorcycle was
motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory remark
mortgaged to petitioner corporation. Davalan
(that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate
later assumed he obligation to pay but he
filing of a baseless and malicious complaint.
stopped paying the remaining installments on
These acts humiliated and embarrassed the
September 1982 and told petitioner corporations
respondent and injured his reputation and
collector that the motorcycle was allegedly
integrity.
taken by the respondents men
On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a
decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was

motivated with malice and ill will when he called intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for
respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an damages to the injured party will attach.
abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle
qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-
was taken at petitioners instance was not only
Fencing Law. Petitioners acts were found to be
attended by bad faith but also contrary to the
contrary to Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
procedure laid down by law. Considered in
Code.Hence, the trial court held petitioners
conjunction with the defamatory statement,
liable. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the trial
petitioners exercise of the right to recover the
courts decision.
mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and
Issue/s: W/n the filing of a complaint for qualified injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the
theft and/o Officer is in violation of the Anti- precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint
Fencing Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor could not in any way be considered to be in
warranted the award of damages in favor of the accordance with the purpose for which the right
respondent to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the
totality of petitioners actions showed a
Ruling: Article 19, also known as the "principle of
calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and
abuse of right," prescribes that a person should
publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in
not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty
an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of
and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to
respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully
liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the
caused damage to respondent. Hence, they
tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means
should indemnify him.
to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised

solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise
of a right must be in accordance with the purpose
for which it was established and must not be Article 19, NCC
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
Cebu Country Club v. Elizague

G.R. No. 160273, January 18, 2008 During the other 2 meetings, action on
respondents application for proprietary
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
membership was deferred. In another Board
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondents
application was voted upon. On August 1, 1997,
Facts: Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner,
respondent received a letter informing him that
is a domestic corporation operating as a non-
the Board disapproved his application for
profit and non-stock private membership club,
proprietary membership. Elizague then sent 3
having its principal place of business in Banilad,
letters to CCCI to inquire regarding the reason of
Cebu City. Petitioners herein are members of its
his applications disapproval. These inquiries
Board of Directors. In 1987, San Miguel
remained unheeded.
Corporation, a special company proprietary
member of CCCI, designated respondent Ricardo On December 23, 1998, respondent filed a
F. Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and complaint for damages against petitioners
Operations Manager for the Visayas and
Issue/s: W/n petitioners are liable for damages to
Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary member.
the respondent in disapproving the latters
The designation was thereafter approved by the
application for propriety membership with CCCI
CCCIs Board of Directors.
Ruling: Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors,

In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application
under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right
for proprietary membership. As the price of a
to approve or disapprove an application for
proprietary share was around the P5 million
proprietary membership. But such right should
range, Benito Unchuan, then president of CCCI,
not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of
offered to sell respondent a share for only P3.5
the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human
million. Respondent, however, purchased the
Relations provide restrictions.
share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only P3 million.
Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued
In rejecting respondents application for
Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to
proprietary membership, the Court found that
respondent.
petitioners violated the rules governing human
relations, the basic principles to be observed for

the rightful relationship between human beings proper norm. When the right is exercised
and for the stability of social order. The trial court arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in
and the Court of Appeals aptly held that damage to another, a legal wrong is committed
petitioners committed fraud and evident bad for which the wrongdoer must be held
faith in disapproving respondents applications. responsible.
This is contrary to morals, good custom or public
policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for damages
pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of
the same Code.
Article 19, NCC

It bears stressing that the amendment to Section
3(c) of CCCIs Amended By-Laws requiring the Calatagan Golf Club v. Clemente
unanimous vote of the directors present at a
G.R. No. 165443 April 16, 2009
special or regular meeting was not printed on the
application form respondent filled and submitted Ponente: Tinga, J.
to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the
original provision of Section 3(c) which was silent
on the required number of votes needed for Facts: Clemente applied to purchase one
admission of an applicant as a proprietary share of stock of Calatagan, indicating in his
member. It is thus clear that respondent was left application for membership his mailing address at
groping in the dark wondering why his Phimco Industries, Inc. P.O. Box 240, MCC,
application was disapproved. He was not even complete residential address, office and
informed that a unanimous vote of the Board residence telephone numbers, as well as the
members was required. When he sent a letter for company (Phimco) with which he was connected,
reconsideration and an inquiry whether there Calatagan issued to him Certificate of Stock No.
was an objection to his application, petitioners A-01295 on 2 May 1990 after paying P120,000.00
apparently ignored him. for the share.
In the exercise of a right, though legal by itself, it

Calatagan charges monthly dues on its members
must nonetheless be in accordance with the
to meet expenses for general operations, as well

as costs for upkeep and improvement of the On 7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a
grounds and facilities. The provision on monthly third and final letter to Clemente which contains
dues is incorporated in Calatagans Articles of a warning that unless Clemente settles his
Incorporation and By-Laws. It is also reproduced outstanding dues, his share would be included
at the back of each certificate of stock. among the delinquent shares to be sold at public
auction on 15 January 1993 to the same mailing
When Clemente became a member the
address that had already been closed. The
monthly charge stood at P400.00. He
auction sale took place as scheduled on 15
paid P3,000.00 for his monthly dues on 21 March
January 1993, and Clementes share was sold.
1991 and another P5,400.00 on 9 December
Clemente learned of the sale of his share
1991. Then he ceased paying the dues. Ten (10)
only in November of 1997. He filed a claim with
months later, Calatagan attempted to collect
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Clementes back accounts by sending a demand
seeking the restoration of his shareholding in
letter dated 21 September 1992 and 22 October
Calatagan with damages. On 15 November 2000,
1992 to his mailing address as indicated in his
the SEC rendered a decision dismissing
membership application but were sent back to
Clementes complaint but on 1 June 2004, the
sender with the postal note that the address had
Court of Appeals promulgated a decision
been closed.
reversing the SEC.
Hence this appeal.
Calatagan declared Clemente delinquent for
Issue/s: W/n Calatagan Golf Club acted in bad
having failed to pay his monthly dues and
faith when it sold Clementes share
included Clementes name in the list of
delinquent members posted on the clubs bulletin Ruling: Calatagan argues that it exercised due
board. On 1 December 1992, Calatagans board of diligence before the foreclosure sale and sent
directors adopted a resolution authorizing the several notices to Clementes specified mailing
foreclosure of shares of delinquent members, address.The Court do not agree; Calatagans act of
including Clementes; and the public auction of sending the December 7, 1992 letter to
these shares. Clementes mailing address knowing fully well
that the P.O. Box had been closed cannot be
labeled as due diligence. Due diligence or good

faith imposes upon the Corporate Secretary the notice prior to the sale be made solely through
chief repository of all corporate records the the members mailing address.
obligation to check Clementes other address
Calatagans bad faith and failure to observe its
which, under the By-Laws, have to be kept on file
own By-Laws had resulted not merely in the loss
and are in fact on file. One obvious purpose of
of Clementes privilege to play golf at its golf
giving the Corporate Secretary the duty to keep
course and avail of its amenities, but also in
the addresses of members on file is specifically
significant pecuniary damage to him. The utter
for matters of this kind, when the member
bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into
cannot be reached through his or her mailing
operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
address.
Code, under the Chapter on Human Relations.
Ultimately, the petition must fail because These provisions, which the Court of Appeals did
Calatagan had failed to duly observe both the apply, enunciate a general obligation under law
spirit and letter of its own by-laws. The by-law for every person to act fairly and in good faith
provisions was clearly conceived to afford due towards one another. A non-stock corporation
notice to the delinquent member of the like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation
impending sale, and not just to provide an in its treatment of its members. The obligation of
intricate facade that would facilitate Calatagans a corporation to treat every person honestly and
sale of the share. But then, the bad faith on in good faith extends even to its shareholders or
Calatagans part is palpable. As found by the members, even if the latter find themselves
Court of Appeals, Calatagan very well knew that contractually bound to perform certain
Clementes postal box to which it sent its obligations to the corporation. A certificate of
previous letters had already been closed, yet it stock cannot be a charter of dehumanization.
persisted in sending that final letter to the same
postal box. It is noteworthy that Clemente in his
membership application had provided his
residential address along with his residence and
Article 19, NCC
office telephone numbers. Nothing in Section 32
of Calatagans By-Laws requires that the final Ardiente v Javier

G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013 months corresponding to the months of
December 1998, January 1999, and February
Ponente: Peralta, J.
1999. Ma. Theresa argued that the due date of
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion her payment was March 18, 1999 yet Mrs.
Madjos later told her that it was at the instance
Facts: Petitioner Joyce V. Ardiente and her
of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off.
husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a
housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the
de Oro City. On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente delinquent bills and at the same time, she wrote
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement a letter to the COWD through her lawyer to
selling, transferring and conveying in favor of explain who authorized the cutting of the water
[respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their line. On March 18, 1999, COWD, in its answer to
rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily the letter, reiterated that it was at the instance of
Homes in consideration of P70,000.00. The Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off.
Memorandum of Agreement includes a
On April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide and
stipulation that the water and power bill of the
her husband filed a complaint for damages
subject property shall be for the account of Ma.
against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar
Theresa Pastorfide, effective June 1, 1994, vis-a-
Gonzalez. The RTC awarded damages to the
vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the
complainant which was later affirmed with
payment of the mortgage loan secured by Joyce
modification by the Court of Appeals. Hence this
Ardiente from the National Home Mortgage.
petition.
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water
Issue/s: W/n COWD and Gonzales together with
connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was
Ardiente may be held to pay for damages
never questioned nor perturbed until on March
12, 1999. Without notice, the water connection Ruling: Yes. It is true that it is within petitioner's
of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the right to ask and even require the Spouses
office of the Cagayan de Oro Water District Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's
(COWD) to complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told account with COWD to the latter's name
Ma. Theresa that she was delinquent for three (3) pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement.

However, the remedy to enforce such right is not Facts: Plaintiff was enrolled in the University of
to cause the disconnection of the respondent the East College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In
spouses' water supply. Based on the principle of the first semester of his last year (School year
abuse of rights which provides that the exercise 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
of a right must be in accordance with the purpose examination in Practice Court I for which he was
for which it was established and must not be given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no second semester as fourth year law student and
intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for
damages to the injured party will attach. In the the removal of the incomplete grade given him
present case, intention to harm was evident on by Professor Carlos Ortega (which was approved
the part of petitioner when she requested for the by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the
disconnection of respondent spouses water required fee. He took the examination on March
supply without warning or informing the latter of 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos
such request. On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, Ortega submitted his grade. It was a grade of five
it is their failure to give prior notice of the (5).s
impending disconnection and their subsequent
When the Dean and the Faculty Members of the
neglect to reconnect respondent spouses' water
College of Law met to deliberate on who among
supply despite the latter's settlement of their
the fourth year students should be allowed to
delinquent account.
graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the
Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for
the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of
Second Semester (1987-1988) with the following
Article 19, NCC annotation:
University of the East v. Jader JADER ROMEO A.
G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000

Def. Conflict of Laws x-1-87-88,
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J. Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to
submit transcript with S.O.

The 35th Investitures & Commencement review class in Far Eastern University. Having
Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of learned of the deficiency he dropped his review
Laws was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at class and was not able to take the bar
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the examination. Consequently, respondent sued
invitation for that occasion the name of the petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered
plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates. At moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
the foot of the list of the names of the candidates besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
there appeared however the following sleepless nights when he was not able to take the
annotation: 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's
negligence.
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred
upon these candidates who satisfactorily The RTC then rendered judgment awarding
complete requirements as stated in the damages to Jader which was later affirmed by the
University Bulletin and as approved of the CA. Hence this petition.
Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
Issue/s: W/n the University of the East may be
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies held liable for damages for its failure to notify
at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto Campus, Jader of the deficiency in his grades
during the program of which he went up the
Ruling: The petition lacks merit.
stage when his name was called, escorted by her
(sic) mother and his eldest brother who assisted
Although commencement exercises are but a
in placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned
formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an
from left to right, and he was thereafter handed
ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the
by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper
educational institution's way of announcing to
symbolical of the Law Diploma.
the whole world that the students included in the
list of those who will be conferred a degree
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar
during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied
examination. He took a leave of absence without
all the requirements for such degree. Prior or
pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to
subsequent to the ceremony, the school has the
September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar
obligation to promptly inform the student of any

problem involving the latter's grades and Educational institutions are duty-bound
performance and also most importantly, of the to inform the students of their academic status
procedures for remedying the same. Petitioner, and not wait for the latter to inquire from the
in belatedly informing respondent of the result of former. Want of care to the conscious disregard
the removal examination, particularly at a time of civil obligations coupled with a conscious
when he had already commenced preparing for knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to
the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in produce them would make the erring party
good faith. Absence of good faith must be liable. Petitioner ought to have known that time
sufficiently established for a successful was of the essence in the performance of its
prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It
abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not
Good faith connotes an honest intention to prepare himself for the bar exams since that is
abstain from taking undue advantage of another, precisely the immediate concern after graduation
even though the forms and technicalities of the of an LL.B. Graduate. Petitioner's liability arose
law, together with the absence of all information from its failure to promptly inform respondent of
or belief of facts, would render the transaction the result of an examination and in misleading
unconscientious. It is the school that has access the latter into believing that he had satisfied all
to that information and it is only the school that requirements for the course.
can compel its professors to act and comply with
its rules, regulations and policies with respect to
the computation and the prompt submission of
grades. It is the school that exercises general
supervision and exclusive control over the Article 19, NCC
professors with respect to the submission of
reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive Development Bank of the Philippines v, Spouses
control means that no other person or entity had Doyon
any control over the instrumentality which G.R. No. 167238, March 25, 2009
caused the damage or injury.
Ponente: Corona, J.

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion principal amount of their loans (or P10 million) to
petitioner.
Facts: In the early 1990s, respondent spouses
Jesus and Anacorita Doyon obtained several loans In 1998, petitioner withdrew the application for
amounting to P10 million from petitioner extrajudicial foreclosure and thereafter moved
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). As for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3314-O. The
security for the loans, respondents mortgaged RTC granted the motion in an order dated March
their real estate properties as well as the motor 2, 1998. By agreement therefore between the
vehicles of JD Bus Lines. Due to their inability to parties, this case is considered DISMISSED with
fully pay their obligations upon prejudice.
maturity, respondents requested petitioner to
Weeks later, petitioner demanded from
restructure their past due loans. Petitioner
respondents the payment of their outstanding
agreed. Hence, respondents signed three
obligations which had by then ballooned to more
promissory notes on June 29, 1994.
than P20 million. Again, respondents ignored
Nonetheless, respondents still failed to pay the petitioner. Petitioner filed an application for
quarterly installments on the promissory notes. extrajudicial foreclosure of respondents real and
Thus, petitioner demanded the payment of the chattel mortgages with the DBP special sheriff in
total value of their loans from Makati and subsequently took constructive
respondents. Respondents, however, ignored possession of the foreclosed properties. It posted
petitioner and adamantly refused to pay their guards at the perimeter of respondents property
loans. in Barangay Cabulihan, Ormoc City (Cabulihan
property) where the foreclosed motor vehicles of
Consequently, petitioner filed an application for
JD Bus Lines were parked. Subsequently, the DBP
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages
special sheriff issued notices of sale at public
in the Regional Trial Court in 1995. To forestall
auction of the foreclosed properties.
the foreclosure proceedings, respondents
immediately filed an action for their nullification Respondents filed a complaint for damages
in the RTC claiming that they had already paid the against petitioner and the DBP special sheriff in
the RTC of Ormoc City alleging that by

withdrawing the application for extrajudicial (c) complainant was prejudiced or injured as a
foreclosure and moving for the dismissal of Civil result of the said exercise or performance by
Case No. 3314-O, petitioner led them to believe defendant.
that it would no longer seek the satisfaction of its
On the first requisite, we find that petitioner had
claims. Petitioner therefore acted contrary to
the legal right to foreclose on the real and chattel
Article 19 of the Civil Code when it foreclosed on
mortgages.The June 29, 1994 promissory notes
the real and chattel mortgages anew.
uniformly stated that failure to pay an installment
The RTC ruled that, by withdrawing its application (or interest) on the due date was an event of
for extrajudicial foreclosure and moving for the default. Respondents were therefore in default
dismissal of Civil Case No. 3314-O, petitioner led when they failed to pay the quarterly
respondents to believe that their loans had been amortizations on the designated due dates.
extinguished. Thus, petitioner acted in bad faith When the principal obligation becomes due and
when it foreclosed on the real and chattel the debtor fails to perform his obligation, the
mortgages anew. The decision was subsequently creditor may foreclose on the mortgage for the
affirmed by the Court of Appeals upon appeal. purpose of alienating the (mortgaged) property
Hence this petition. to satisfy his credit.
Issue/s: W/n DBP is liable for damages Regarding the second requisite, bad faith imports
a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity or
Ruling: What is due to a person is determined by
conscious doing of a wrong that partakes of the
the circumstances of each particular case. For an
nature of fraud. We note that the RTC of Ormoc
action for damages under Article 19 to prosper,
City (Judge Fortunito L. Madrona) "sat" on Civil
the complainant must prove that:
Case No. 3314-O for three long years. This
inordinate delay prejudiced petitioner. Inasmuch
(a) defendant has a legal right or duty;
as petitioner was in the business of lending out
(b) he exercised his right or performed his duty money it borrowed from the public, sound
with bad faith and banking practice called for the exercise of a more
efficient legal remedy against a defaulting debtor
like respondent. Thus, petitioner could not be

faulted for resorting to foreclosure through a
special sheriff. Such procedure was, after all, the
more efficient method of enforcing petitioners
rights as mortgagee under its charter.
Article 21, NCC
Moreover, the March 2, 1998 order of the RTC

Bunag v CA
merely stated that the withdrawal of the
application for extrajudicial foreclosure in the G.R. No. 101749, July 10, 1992
RTC rendered Civil Case No. 3314-O moot and

Ponente: Regalado, J.
academic. Nothing in the said order stated, or
even hinted, that respondents obligation to Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
petitioner had in fact been extinguished. Thus,

Facts: On September 8, 1973, Conrado Bunag
there was nothing on the part of petitioner even
brought Zenaida Cirilo to a motel where he
remotely showing that it led respondents to
allegedly deflowered her against her will and
believe that it had waived its claims.
consent.
Lastly, inasmuch as petitioner demanded

After that outrage on her virginity, Bunag brought
payment from them right after the dismissal of
her to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s
Civil Case No. 3314-O, respondents could not
grandmother in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro
have reasonably presumed that the bank had
Manila where they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the
waived its claims against them. Furthermore, the
evening. At about ten (10) o'clock that same
fact that a demand for payment was made
evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of
negated bad faith on the part of petitioner.
Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the
Despite giving respondents the opportunity to
following day which was a Monday, she and
pay their long overdue obligations and avoid
Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a
foreclosure, respondents still refused to pay.
marriage license, which they did. They filed their
Since respondents did not have a cause of action
applications for marriage license and after that
against petitioner, the RTC and CA erred in
plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the
granting damages to them.
house of Juana de Leon and lived there as

husband and wife from September 8, 1973 to actually incurred expenses for the wedding and
September 29, 1973. On September 29, 1973 the necessary incidents thereof.
defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned,
However, the award of moral damages is allowed
humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to go back
in cases specified in or analogous to those
to her parents on October 3, 1973.
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in
promise to marry was filed by herein private relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any
respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
Bunag, Sr. On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter good customs or public policy shall compensate
alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was
raped private respondent, the trial court adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the
rendered judgment ordering Bunag to indemnify statutes which leave so many victims of moral
Zenaida and absolved Conrado Bunag, Sr. from wrongs helpless even though they have actually
any and all liability. This decision was laer suffered material and moral injury, and is
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
this petition. that untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically
Issue/s: W/n Cirilo is liable for damages
provide for in the statutes.
Ruling: It is true that in this jurisdiction, we

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at
adhere to the time-honored rule that an action
bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting
for breach of promise to marry has no standing in
private respondent and having carnal knowledge
the civil law, apart from the right to recover
with her against her will, and thereafter
money or property advanced by the plaintiff
promising to marry her in order to escape
upon the faith of such promise. Generally,
criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on
therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is
such promise after cohabiting with her for
not actionable, except where the plaintiff has
twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts
contrary to morals and good customs. These are

grossly insensate and reprehensible Please do not ask too many people about the
transgressions which indisputably warrant and reason why That would only create a scandal.
abundantly justify the award of moral and
Paquing
exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in
relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the
Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING

VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE.
PAKING
Article 21, NCC
Wassmer v. Velez Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard
from again.
G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no
Ponente: Bengzon, J.
answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion adduced evidence before the clerk of court as
commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment
Facts: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
following their mutual promise of love, decided damages. The defendant now appeals to this
to get married and set September 4, 1954. On court.
September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his
bride-to-be:
Dear Bet Issue/s: W/n Wassmer may be held liable for

damages
Will have to postpone wedding My mother
opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today. Ruling: Defendant asserts that the judgment is
contrary to law considering that "there is no
provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action

for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, the ruling was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding
Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his
Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day
breach of a promise to marry" is not an before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing
actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress changed rest assured returning soon." But he
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new never returned and was never heard from again.
Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of
However, the extent to which acts not contrary to promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But
limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that to formally set a wedding and go through all the
"any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to above-described preparation and publicity, only
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to
good customs or public policy shall compensate be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably
the latter for the damage." and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954
damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently
issued. Their wedding was set for September 4,
1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to
relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-
Article 21, NCC
to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other
apparel for the important occasion were Tanjanco v CA
purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the

G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed,
with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L., J.
were given and gifts received. And then, with but

two days before the wedding, defendant, who

Facts: From December, 1957, the defendant upon and quoted from the memorandum
(appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the submitted by the Code Commission to the
plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of
that "defendant expressed and professed his the Civil Code where the Commission provided
undying love and affection for plaintiff who also for the following example:
in due time reciprocated the tender feelings";
"A" seduces the nineteen-year old
that in consideration of defendant's promise of
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage
marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to
either has not been made, or cannot be
defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that
proved. The girl becomes pregnant.
regularly until December 1959, as a result of
Under the present laws, there is no
which she conceived a child; that due to her
crime, as the girl is above eighteen years
pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and
of age. Neither can any civil action for
social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job
breach of promise of marriage be filed.
as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she
Therefore, though the grievous moral
was receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby
wrong has been committed, and though
plaintiff became unable to support herself and
the girl and her family have suffered
her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to
incalculable moral damage, she and her
marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered
parents cannot bring any action for
mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
damages. But under the proposed article,
wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
she and her parents would have such a
humiliation. The prayer was for a decree
right of action.
compelling the defendant to recognize the
unborn child that plaintiff was bearing and to pay
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked
her damages.
that the example set forth in the Code
Issue/s: W/n Tanjanco is liable for damages Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon
a minor who has been seduced. The essential
Ruling: No. In holding that the complaint stated a
feature is seduction, which in law is more than
cause of action for damages, under Article 21
mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise
above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied
of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of

deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of Article 21, NCC
confidence on the part of the seducer to which
Buenaventura v. CA
the woman has yielded
G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
With the material allegations of this case, the
facts stand out that for one whole year, from Ponente: Azcuna, J.
1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of

adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations
with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Facts: A petition for the declaration of nullity
Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of of marriage was filed by petitioner Noel
seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of
mutual passion; for had the appellant been the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife,
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent.
because of the deceit, artful persuasions and After respondent filed her answer, petitioner,
wiles of the defendant, she would not have again with leave of court, amended his petition by
yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, stating that both he and his wife were
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
promises of marriage, and would have cut chart essential obligations of marriage. In response,
all sexual relations upon finding that defendant respondent filed an amended answer denying the
did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we allegation that she was psychologically
conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of incapacitated.
the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of promulgated a Decision which declares the
First Instance in dismissing the complaint. marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A.
Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh
Lastly, a mere breach of a promise to marry is not
Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab
an actionable wrong under our jurisdiction.
initio and orders the plaintiff to pay defendant
damages, among others.

The lower court found that plaintiff-appellant Issue/s: W/n damages may be awarded by
deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying reason of the performance or non-performance
him by professing true love instead of revealing of marital obligations
to her that he was under heavy parental pressure
Ruling: The Court of Appeals and the trial court
to marry and that because of pride he married
considered the acts of the petitioner after the
defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to
marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity,
enter into marriage as in fact his career was and
and therefore a product of his incapacity or
always would be his first priority; that he was
inability to comply with the essential obligations
unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee
of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered
as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father;
these acts as willful and hence as grounds for
that he had no inclination to make the marriage
granting moral damages. It is contradictory to
work such that in times of trouble, he chose the
characterize acts as a product of psychological
easiest way out, that of leaving defendant
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the
appellee and their son; that he had no desire to
party because of an innate inability, while at the
keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved
same time considering the same set of acts as
by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile
willful. By declaring the petitioner as
after their separation; that the aforementioned
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts
anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation,
was negated. The award of moral damages
sleepless nights not only in those years the
should be predicated, not on the mere act of
parties were together but also after and
entering into the marriage, but on specific
throughout their separation.
evidence that it was done deliberately and with
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court malice by a party who had knowledge of his or
promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners her disability and yet willfully concealed the
appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto the same. No such evidence appears to have been
trial courts decision. Hence this appeal. adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological

incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of

the basic marital covenants that one must equipment for thermal and acoustic insulation. In
assume and discharge as a consequence of 1993, it ceased from using silica sand in the
marriage, it removes the basis for the contention manufacture of fiberglass and started using
that the petitioner purposely deceived the instead recycled broken glass or flint cullets to
private respondent. If the private respondent was save on manufacturing costs.
deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the
Petitioner contracted with respondent Editha C.
part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of
Coquia for the purchase of one (1) lot of flint
moral damages was without basis in law and in
cullets, consisting of 2,500 to 3,000 metric tons,
fact.
at a price of P4.20 per kilo under Purchase Order
Since the grant of moral damages was not
No. 106211 dated 6 October 1994. Several
proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary
deliveries made by respondent were accepted
damages cannot stand since the Civil Code
and paid for by petitioner at the unit price
provides that exemplary damages are imposed in
of P4.20 per kilo as indicated in Purchase Order
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
No. 106211.
compensatory damages.
However, on 28 October 1994, petitioner
demanded the reduction of the purchase price
from P4.20 per kilo to P3.65 per kilo to which
Article 21, NCC respondent acceded, albeit allegedly under

duress. Petitioner accordingly issued Purchase
ACI Philippines v. Coquia
Order No. 106373 explicitly superseding Purchase
G.R. No. 174466, July 14, 2008 Order No. 106211. Deliveries were again made by
respondent on 5, 8 and 12 November 1994 under
Ponente: Tinga, J.
Delivery Receipt Nos. 901, 719 and
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion 735, respectively. Petitioner accepted the

deliveries but refused to pay for them even at the
Facts: Petitioner ACI Philippines, Inc. is engaged reduced price of P3.65 per kilo, demanding
in the business of manufacturing fiberglass, which instead that the unit price be further reduced
is used in both commercial and industrial to P3.10 per kilo.

Respondent then filed a Complaint for specific from independent evidence. In determining
performance and damages. actual damages, the Court cannot rely on mere
assertions, speculations, conjectures or
The RTC ordered petitioner to accept deliveries of
guesswork but must depend on competent proof
the flint cullets contracted for under Purchase
and on the best evidence obtainable regarding
Order No. 106211 and to pay for the said
the actual amount of loss.
deliveries within ten (10) days from each delivery
at the unit price of P4.20 per kilo ad to pay Finally, the appellate courts citation of Article 21
damages. The CA affirmed the trial courts of the Civil Code misplaced not only because of
decision. the pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties which bars the application of this
Issue/s: W/n ACI is liable for damages
provision, but more importantly because we do
Ruling: The Court finds the award of damages to not deem petitioner to have acted fraudulently or
respondent to be without factual basis. in bad faith.
Respondent sought to prove the actual damages
she incurred merely through her own testimony,
without adducing any documentary evidence to
substantiate her alleged losses. While she claims
Article 21, NCC
that she obtained a bank loan at an interest rate
of 21%, respondent did not present any Gashem Baksh v. CA
document to prove the said loan or the use
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
thereof to purchase flint cullets for delivery to
petitioner. Neither did respondent present Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
documents to prove her alleged stock of 1,000
metric tons of flint cullets for which she allegedly
invested P2,500,000.00. Facts: On 27 October 1987, private respondent,
without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
The claim for actual damages in this case should
trial court a complaint for damages against the
be admitted with extreme caution since it is
petitioner for the alleged violation of their
based only on bare assertions without support
agreement to get married. She alleges in said

complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, Bacolod City. Petitioner admitted his personal
single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral circumstances as alleged but he denied all other
character and reputation duly respected in her allegations.
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying
Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments,
Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16
Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student
October 1989 a decision favoring the private
taking a medical course at the Lyceum
respondent. On 18 February 1991, respondent
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before
Court promulgated the challenged
20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed
decision affirming in toto the trial court's ruling.
to marry her; she accepted his love on the
condition that they would get married; they
therefore agreed to get married after the end of Issue/s: W/n Baksh is liable for damages
the school semester, which was in October of
Ruling: The existing rule is that a breach of
that year; petitioner then visited the private
promise to marry per se is not an actionable
respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon,
wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the
draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that
marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the
would have made it so. The reason therefor is set
petitioner forced her to live with him in the
forth in the report of the Senate Committees on
Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she
the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
began living with him; a week before the filing of
the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her
The elimination of this chapter is
started to change; he maltreated and threatened
proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
actionable has been definitely decided in the case
sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a
of De Jesus vs. Syquia. The history of breach of
representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a
promise suits in the United States and in England
day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner
has shown that no other action lends itself more
repudiated their marriage agreement and asked
readily to abuse by designing women and
her not to live with him anymore and; the
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has
petitioner is already married to someone living in
led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-

called Heart Balm suits in many of the American In the instant case, respondent Court found that
states. . . . it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand
womanhood to him and to live with him on the
the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
deception on appellant's part that made
impossible for human foresight to specifically
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-
enumerate and punish in the statute books.
in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage."
The Court so holds, that where a man's promise
to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of Article 22, NCC
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that
he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her Filinvest Land v. Ngilay
and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or G.R. No. 174715 October 11, 2012
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the Ponente: Peralta, J.
sexual act, could justify the award of damages Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and Facts: Respondents were grantees of agricultural
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor public lands located in Tambler, General Santos
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is City through Homestead and Fee Patents
essential however that such injury should have sometime in 1986 and 1991. In 1995,
been committed in a manner contrary to morals, negotiations were made by the petitioner,
good customs or public policy. through its representative, with the patriarch of
the Ngilays, Hadji Ngulam Ngilay. Eventually, the

Deed of Conditional Sale of the properties was Issue/s: W/n the Ngilays may be compelled as a
executed. Upon its execution, respondents were matter of law to return to petitioner what they
asked to deliver to petitioner the original owners have received as a downpayment
duplicate copy of the certificates of title of their
Ruling: The rule is settled that the declaration of
respective properties and they received the down
the nullity of contract which is void ab initio
payment on October 28, 1995.
operates to restore things to the state and
A few days later, they learned that the sale of condition in which they were found before the
their properties was null and void because it was execution thereof. Petitioner is correct in its
done within the period that they were not argument that allowing respondents to keep the
allowed to do so and that the sale did not have amount received from petitioner will amount to
the approval of the Secretary of the DENR unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment exists
prompting them to file a case for declaration of when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the
the nullity of the deeds of absolute and loss of another, or when a person retains a
conditional sale of the questioned properties. money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and
The RTC ruled in favor of Filinvest and upheld the
good conscience. There is unjust enrichment
sale of all the properties in litigation.
under Article 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a
Respondents elevated the case to the CA in which
person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit
the latter modified the judgment of the lower
is derived at the expense of or with damages to
court. It upheld the validity of the sale of the
another. Thus, the sale which created the
properties the patents of which were awarded in
obligation of petitioner to pay the agreed amount
1986, including the corresponding the right of
having been declared void, respondents have the
way. Hence this petition.
duty to return the downpayment as they no
Petitioner argues, among others, that the down longer have the right to keep it. The principle of
payment received by the Ngilays must be unjust enrichment essentially contemplates
returned. payment when there is no duty to pay and the
person who receives the payment has no right to
receive it.

Thereafter, respondent sought to collect
payment for the completed project. The DPWH
prepared the Disbursement Voucher in favor of
Article 22, NCC petitioner. However, the DPWH withheld

payment from respondent after the District
Republic v. Lacap
Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA)
G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007 disapproved the final release of funds on the
ground that the contractors license of
Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.
respondent had expired at the time of the
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion execution of the contract.
Facts: The District Engineer of Pampanga issued In a First Indorsement dated July 20, 1994, Cesar
and duly published an "Invitation to Bid" dated D. Mejia, Director III of the Legal Department,
January 27, 1992. Respondent, doing business recommended that payment should be made to
under the name and style Carwin Construction Carwin Construction, reiterating his earlier legal
and Construction Supply (Carwin Construction), opinion. Despite such recommendation for
was pre-qualified together with two other payment, no payment was made to respondent.
contractors. Since respondent submitted the Thus, on July 3, 1995, respondent filed the
lowest bid, he was awarded the contract for the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages
concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. On November 4, against petitioner before the RTC.
1992, a Contract Agreement was executed by

On February 19, 1997 in its Decision, RTC held
respondent and petitioner. On September 25,
that petitioner must be required to pay the
1992, District Engineer Rafael S. Ponio issued a
contract price since it has accepted the
Notice to Proceed with the concreting
completed project and enjoyed the benefits
of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. Accordingly, respondent
thereof; to hold otherwise would be to overrun
undertook the works, made advances for the
the long standing and consistent pronouncement
purchase of the materials and payment for labor
against enriching oneself at the expense of
costs.
another.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. Such
CA. On April 28, 2003, the CA rendered its unjust enrichment is not allowed by law.
Decision sustaining the Decision of the RTC.
Hence this decision
Issue/s: W/n respondent must be paid for the

completed projects
Article 22, NCC
Ruling: Article 22 of the Civil Code which Philippine Transmarine v. Legaspi

embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius
G.R. No. 202791, June 10, 2013
incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to
be made rich out of anothers injury). This article Ponente: Mendoza, J.
is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, the provisions of which were
formulated as "basic principles to be observed for
Facts: Respondent Leandro Legaspi (respondent)
the rightful relationship between human beings
was employed as Utility Pastry on board the
and for the stability of the social order, x x x
vessel "Azamara Journey" under the employment
designed to indicate certain norms that spring
of petitioner Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.
from the fountain of good conscience, x x x
(petitioner). Respondents employment was
guides human conduct [that] should run as
covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement
golden threads through society to the end that
(CBA) wherein it was agreed that the company
law may approach its supreme ideal which is the
shall pay a maximum disability compensation of
sway and dominance of justice." The rules
up to US$60,000.00 only.
thereon apply equally well to the
Government. Since respondent had rendered While on board the vessel, respondent suffered
services to the full satisfaction and acceptance by "Cardiac Arrest S/P ICD Insertion." He was
petitioner, then the former should be checked by the ships doctor and was prescribed
compensated for them. To allow petitioner to medications. On November 14, 2008, respondent
acquire the finished project at no cost would was repatriated to receive further medical
undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the treatment and examination. On May 23, 2009,

the company designated physician assessed his dated March 31, 2011, the LA ordered the release
condition to be Disability Grade 2. of the aforementioned amounts to respondent.
Not satisfied, respondent filed a complaint for full Unaware of a) the September 5, 2010 entry of
and permanent disability compensation against judgment of the NLRC, b) the October 22, 2010
petitioner before the Labor Arbiter (LA). In its payment of US$81,320.00, and c) the writ of
January 25, 2010 Decision, the LA ruled in favor execution issued by the LA, the CA rendered its
of respondent which was later affirmed by the Decision, dated June 29, 2011. The CA partially
NLRC. On October 22, 2010, during the hearing granted the petition for certiorari and modified
on the motion for execution before the NLRC, the assailed resolutions of the NLRC, awarding
petitioner agreed to pay respondent only US$60,000.00 pursuant to the CBA between
US$81,320.00. The terms and conditions of said Celebrity Cruise Lines and Federazione Italianaa
payment were embodied in the Receipt of Transporti CISL.
Judgment Award with Undertaking, wherein
Petitioner now seeks to recover the excess
respondent acknowledged receipt of the said
amount they paid to the respondent during the
amount and undertook to return it to petitioner
pre-execution conference. Hence this petition.
in the event the latters petition for certiorari
would be granted, without prejudice to
Issue/s:W/n the CA committed reversible error of
respondents right to appeal. It was also agreed
law in ruling that the petitioner is estopped in
upon that the remaining balance would be given
collecting the excess payment it made to the
on the next scheduled conference.
respondent notwithstanding the receipt of
judgment award signed by the respondent
In the meantime, on March 2, 2011, the LA issued
a writ of execution which noted petitioners
Ruling: As the agreement was voluntarily entered
payment of the amount of US$81,320.00. On
into and represented a reasonable settlement, it
March 16, 2011, in compliance with the said writ,
is binding on the parties and may not later be
petitioner tendered to the NLRC Cashier the
disowned simply because of a change of
additional amounts of US$8,132.00 as attorneys
mind. Respondent agreed to the stipulation that
fees and P3,042.95 as execution fee. In its Order,
he would return the amount paid to him in the
event that the petition for certiorari would be

granted. Since the petition was indeed granted by plus attorneys fees of US$8,132.00 pursuant to
the CA, albeit partially, respondent must comply the writ of execution. The June 29, 2011 CA
with the condition to return the excess amount. Decision, however, modified the final resolution
of the NLRC and awarded only US$60,000.00 to
The Court finds that the Receipt of the Judgment
respondent. If allowed not to return the excess,
Award with Undertaking was a fair and binding
the respondent would have been unjustly
agreement. It was executed by the parties subject
benefited to the prejudice and expense of
to outcome of the petition. To allow now
petitioner.
respondent to retain the excess money judgment
would amount to his unjust enrichment to the
prejudice of petitioner.
Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result

or effect of failure to make remuneration of or Article 22, NCC
for property or benefits received under

Reyes v. Lim
circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable
obligation to account for them. To be entitled to G.R. No. 134241. August 11, 2003
remuneration, one must confer benefit by

Ponente: Carpio, J.
mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust
enrichment is not itself a theory of reconveyance. Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of

Facts: On 23 March 1995, petitioner David
the doctrine of restitution. There is unjust
Reyes (Reyes) filed before the trial court a
enrichment when:
complaint for annulment of contract and
damages against respondents Jose Lim (Lim),
1. A person is unjustly benefited; and
Chuy Cheng Keng (Keng) and Harrison Lumber,
2. Such benefit is derived at the expense Inc. (Harrison Lumber) alleging that on 7
of or with damages to another. November 1994, Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer
entered into a contract to sell (Contract to Sell) a
In the case at bench, petitioner paid respondent parcel of land (Property) located along F.B.
US$81,320.00 in the pre-execution conference Harrison Street, Pasay City. Harrison Lumber

occupied the Property as lessee with a monthly Regional Trial Court of Paranaque. The trial court
rental of P35,000. The total consideration for the granted this motion.
purchase of the aforedescribed parcel of land
The trial court denied Reyes Motion for
together with the perimeter walls found therein
Reconsideration in its Order dated 3 October
is TWENTY EIGHT MILLION (P28,000,000.00)
1997. In the same order, the trial court directed
PESOS.
Reyes to deposit the P10 million downpayment
The complaint claimed that Reyes had with the Clerk of Court on or before 30 October
informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the Property 1997.
before the end of January 1995. Reyes also
On 8 December 1997, Reyes filed a Petition
informed Keng and Harrison Lumber that if they
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals which
failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he would hold
was dismissed for lack of merit on 12 May 1998.
them liable for the penalty of P400,000 a month
Hence this appeal.
as provided in the Contract to Sell. The complaint
further alleged that Lim connived with Harrison Reyes points out that deposit is not among
Lumber not to vacate the Property until the the provisional remedies enumerated in the 1997
P400,000 monthly penalty would have Rules of Civil Procedure. Reyes argues that a
accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase court cannot apply equity and require deposit if
price of P18,000,000. the law already prescribes the specific provisional
remedies which do not include deposit. Reyes
However, Lim learned that Reyes had
invokes the principle that equity is applied only in
already sold the Property to Line One Foods
the absence of, and never against, statutory law
Corporation (Line One) on 1 March 1995 for
or x x x judicial rules of procedure. Reyes adds the
P16,782,840. After the registration of the Deed of
fact that the provisional remedies do not include
Absolute Sale, the Register of Deeds issued to
deposit is a matter of dura lex sed lex.
Line One TCT No. 134767 covering the Property.
Issue/s: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
On 6 March 1997, Lim requested in open
holding the trial court could issue the questioned
court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10
Orders dated March 6, 1997, July 3, 1997 and
million downpayment with the cashier of the
October 3, 1997, requiring petitioner David Reyes
to deposit the amount of Ten Million Pesos

(P10,000,000.00) during the pendency of the that Reyes had subsequently sold the Property to
action, when deposit is not among the provisional another buyer.
remedies enumerated in Rule 57 to 61 of the
The principle that no person may unjustly
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
enrich himself at the expense of another is
Ruling: No. To subscribe to Reyes contention embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code. This
will unjustly enrich Reyes at the expense of Lim. principle applies not only to substantive rights
Reyes sold to Line One the Property even before but also to procedural remedies. One condition
the balance of P18 million under the Contract to for invoking this principle is that the aggrieved
Sell with Lim became due on 8 March 1995. On 1 party has no other action based on contract,
March 1995, Reyes signed a Deed of Absolute quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other
Sale in favor of Line One. On 3 March 1995, the provision of law. Courts can extend this condition
Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 134767 in the to the hiatus in the Rules of Court where the
name of Line One. Reyes cannot claim ownership aggrieved party, during the pendency of the case,
of the P10 million downpayment because Reyes has no other recourse based on the provisional
had already sold to another buyer the Property remedies of the Rules of Court.
for which Lim made the down payment. In fact, in There is unjust enrichment when a person
his Comment dated 20 March 1996, Reyes unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another,
reiterated his offer to return to Lim the P10 or when a person retains money or property of
million downpayment. another against the fundamental principles of
On balance, it is unreasonable and unjust for justice, equity and good conscience. In this case,
Reyes to object to the deposit of the P10 million it was just, equitable and proper for the trial
downpayment. The application of equity always court to order the deposit of the P10 million
involves a balancing of the equities in a particular downpayment to prevent unjust enrichment by
case, a matter addressed to the sound discretion Reyes at the expense of Lim.
of the court. Here, we find the equities weigh

heavily in favor of Lim, who paid the P10 million
down payment in good faith only to discover later
Article 29, 30 & 35, NCC

People v. Bayotas Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994
same may also be predicated on a source of
Ponente: Romero, J. obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise
Facts: Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged as a result of the same act or omission:
with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on

a) Law
June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his conviction,
Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at b) Contracts
the National Bilibid Hospital. Consequently, the
Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 c) Quasi-contracts
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal but it

d) Acts or omissions punishable
required the Solicitor General to file its comment
by law
with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from
his commission of the offense charged.
e) Quasi-delicts
Issue/s: W/n the death of the accused pending

Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
appeal of his conviction extinguish civil liability
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
Ruling: Death of the accused pending appeal of may be pursued but only by way of filing a
his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the as amended. This separate civil action may be
death of the accused prior to final judgment enforced either against the
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil executor/administrator or the estate of the
liability directly arising from and based solely on accused, depending on the source of obligation
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex upon which the same is based as explained
delicto in senso strictiore." above.

The Court thus holds that the death of appellant because the demolition of the complainants' stall
Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the was a violation of the very directive of the
civil liability based solely on the act complained petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners
of, i.e., rape. seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market
premises. The CA absolved the accused from
criminal liability but they are ordered to still pay
civil indemnity. Hence this petition.
Article 29, 30 & 35, NCC Issue/s: W/n CA erred in requiring the petitioners
to pay civil indemnity after acquitting them from
Padilla v. People
the criminal charge
G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984

Ruling: The judgment of acquittal extinguishes
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J. the liability of the accused for damages only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the
Facts: On February 8, 1964 the accused, Mayor civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal
Roy Padilla and some policemen by means of where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
threats, force and violence demolished and (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only
destroyed the stall and furnitures of the Vergaras preponderance of evidence is required in civil
and carried away the goods, wares and cases; where the court expressly declares that
merchandise found therein. A complaint was filed the liability of the accused is not criminal but only
in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558;
which rendered the petitioners guilty beyond People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the
reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
and to pay damages. committed by certain relatives who thereby incur

only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal
The petitioners appealed the judgment of
Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise
conviction to the Court of Appeals. They
from or is not based upon the criminal act of
contended that the trial court's finding of grave
which the accused was acquitted (Castro v.
coercion was not supported by the evidence

Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Therefore, the respondent Court of Appeals did
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., not err in awarding damages despite a judgment
p. 623) of acquittal.
Furthermore, Article 29 clearly and expressly

provides a remedy for the plaintiff in case the
defendant has been acquitted in a criminal
prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely
emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not Cancio v. Isip
precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal
G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002
act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not
state that the remedy can be availed of only in a Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
separate civil action. A separate civil case may be
filed but there is no statement that such separate
filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode Facts: Jose Cancio filed 3 cases of violation of BP
of recovering damages. 22 and 3 cases of estafa against Emerciana Isip
for issuing checks with insufficient funds.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code
provision in the rendition of a judgment of The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in dismissed 1 of the 3 violation of BP 22 cases on
the same criminal action. The two can stand side the ground that the check was deposited with the
by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to drawee bank after 90 days from the date of the
extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, check while the two other cases were filed with
however, extinguish the civil liability unless there and subsequently dismissed by the Municipal
is clear showing that the act from which civil Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga on the ground
liability might arise did not exist. of failure to prosecute.
Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed

with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, but
after failing to present its second witness, the

prosecution moved to dismiss the estafa cases (b) where the injured party is granted a right to
against respondent. The prosecution likewise file an action independent and distinct from the
reserved its right to file a separate civil action criminal action [Article 33, Civil Code]. Either of
arising from the said criminal cases. these two possible liabilities may be enforced
against the offender subject, however, to the
On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the
caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that
instant case for collection of sum of money. On
the offended party cannot recover damages
March 20, 1998, the trial court found in favor of
twice for the same act or omission or under both
respondent and dismissed the complaint. The
causes.
court held that the dismissal of the criminal cases
against respondent on the ground of lack of Evidently, petitioner sought to enforce
interest or failure to prosecute is an adjudication respondents obligation to make good the value
on the merits which amounted to res judicata on of the checks in exchange for the cash he
the civil case for collection. Hence this petition. delivered to respondent. In other words,
petitioners cause of action is the respondents
Issue/s: W/n the dismissal of the estafa cases
breach of the contractual obligation. It matters
against respondent bars the institution of a civil
not that petitioner claims his cause of action to
action for collection of the value of the checks
be one based on delict. The nature of a cause of
subject of the estafa cases
action is determined by the facts alleged in the
Ruling: An act or omission causing damage complaint as constituting the cause of action. The
to another may give rise to two separate civil purpose of an action or suit and the law to
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil govern it is to be determined not by the claim of
liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the the party filing the action, made in his argument
Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act allegations and prayer for relief.
or omission complained of as felony [e.g. culpa Under Article 31 of the Civil Code [w]hen the civil
contractual or obligations arising from law under action is based on an obligation not arising from
Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts the act or omission complained of as a felony,
under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa [e.g. culpa contractual] such civil action may
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code]; or proceed independently of the criminal

proceedings and regardless of the result of the a statement, Hence, if there is any liability of the
latter. accused, the same is purely civil, not criminal in
nature. Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila,
dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its
Order dated February 7, 2005 on account of the
failure of petitioner to identify the accused
respondents in open court.
Cheng v. Sy
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against
G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009 respondents before the RTC a complaint] for
collection of a sum of money with damages based
Ponente: Nachura, J.
on the same loaned amount of P600,000.00
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion covered by the two PBC checks previously subject
of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.
Facts: Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa
cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against In the assailed Order dated January 2, 2006, the
respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy for RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to
Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages
each, in payment of their loan, both of which was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22
were dishonored upon presentment for having cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule
been drawn against a closed account. Meanwhile, 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.
based on the same facts, petitioner, on January

20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2) cases
for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) Issue/s: W/n dismissal of an action based on
22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). culpa aquiliana is a bar to the enforcement of a
subsidiary liability of the employer
On March 16, 2004, the RTC dismissed the estafa
cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the Ruling: Under the present revised Rules, the
elements of the crime. On the other hand, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes
Order in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 contained the corresponding civil action to recover the

amount of the checks. It should be stressed that Facts: In an Information dated April 25, 1994,
this policy is intended to discourage the separate Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with
filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple
prohibits the reservation of a separate civil Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in
action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil connection with a vehicle collision between a
case after the criminal complaint is filed in southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan
court. The only instance when separate and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed
proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its
filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the passengers, including a two-month old baby, and
Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans
criminal cases. Thus, where petitioners rights passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
resort to a separate action to recover civil liability to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as
is clearly unwarranted on account of res there was a reservation to file a separate civil
judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the action, no pronouncement of civil liability was
civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special made by the municipal circuit trial court in its
rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, decision promulgated on December 17, 1998.
Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron
Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q.
Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
Article 29, 30 & 35, NCC City, pursuant to their reservation to file a
separate civil action. Viron Transit moved to
Santos v Pizarro
dismiss the complaint.
G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
Ponente: Tinga, J. principal ground that the cause of action had
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion already prescribed. According to the trial court,

actions based on quasi delict, as it construed from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an
petitioners cause of action to be, prescribe four action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
(4) years from the accrual of the cause of action.
An act or omission causing damage to another
Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners
may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
reserved the right to file a separate civil action,
the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex
the complaint ought to be dismissed on the
delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
ground of prescription. Petitioners filed a petition
Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which
those (a) not arising from an act or omission
dismissed the same.
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa
Hence this petition. contractual or obligations arising from law under
Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts
Issue/s: W/n the prescription of an action based
under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
on quasi-delict bars an action to enforce civil
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or
liability arising from the crime
(b) where the injured party is granted a right to
file an action independent and distinct from the
Ruling: A reading of the complaint reveals that
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil
the allegations therein are consistent with
Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced
petitioners claim that the action was brought to
against the offender subject to the caveat under
recover civil liability arising from crime. Although
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff
there are allegations of negligence on the part of
cannot recover damages twice for the same act
Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not
or omission of the defendant and the similar
necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing
proscription against double recovery under the
a cause of action based on quasi
Rules above-quoted.
delict, considering that at the time of the filing of
the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi
At the time of the filing of the complaint for
delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases
damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi
of negligence, the offended party has the choice
delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless,
between an action to enforce civil liability arising
petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue
opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the

surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so
because the prescription of the action ex quasi
delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime
Article 31-34, NCC
especially as the latter action had been expressly
reserved. MHP Garments v. CA
G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994

With this, the trial court should not have
dismissed the complaint on the ground of Ponente: Puno, J.
prescription, but instead allowed the complaint
for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the
merits, considering petitioners allegations in
Facts: On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP
their complaint, opposition to the motion to
Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of
dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the
the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and
order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to
distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies,
recover civil liability arising from crime.
badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum
Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the
This does not offend the policy that the
authority to "undertake or cause to be
reservation or institution of a separate civil action
undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal
waives the other civil actions. The rationale
sources of scout uniforms and other scouting
behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits
supplies."
between the same litigants arising out of the
same act or omission of the offender. However,
Sometime in October 1983, petitioner
since the stale action for damages based on quasi
corporation received information that private
delict should be considered waived, there is no
respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman,
more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits
and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts
against private respondents as the only recourse
items and paraphernalia without any authority.
available to them is to pursue damages ex
Petitioner de Guzman, an employee of petitioner
delicto. This interpretation is also consistent with
corporation, was tasked to undertake the
the bar against double recovery.
necessary surveillance and to make a report to

the Philippine Constabulary (PC). On October 25, Private respondents then filed Civil Case No.
1983, petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M. 51144 against the petitioners for sums of money
Peafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men of and damages.
the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village,
Issue/s: W/n the petitioners are liable for
Diliman, Quezon City went to the stores of
damages
respondents at the Marikina Public Market.
Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl
Ruling: Petitioners would deflect their liability
scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at
with the argument that it was the Philippine
respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a
Constabulary that conducted the raid and their
commotion and embarrassed private
participation was only to report the alleged illegal
respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized
activity of private respondents. While
items. The items were then turned over by
undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding
Captain Peafiel to petitioner corporation for
team should have been included in the complaint
safekeeping.
for violation of the private respondents'
constitutional rights, still, the omission will not
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was
exculpate petitioners.
then filed against private respondents. On
December 6, 1983, he Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, the court
dismissed the complaint against all the private
ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of
respondents and on February 6, 1984, he also
constitutional rights and liberties from public
ordered the return of the seized items. The seized
officer or private individual by citing Article 32 of
items were not immediately returned despite
the Civil Code as the basis thereof. The very
demands. Private respondents had to go
nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil
personally to petitioners' place of business to
or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that
recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized
there should be malice or bad faith. Furthermore,
items were returned. The other items returned
Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within
were of inferior quality.
the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well
as indirectly, responsible for its violations.

Applying the aforecited provision, the respondent Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, which she acquired
court correctly granted damages to private from Island Masters Realty and Development
respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved Corporation (IMRDC) by virtue of a Deed of Sale
in transgressing the right of private respondents dated Nov. 16, 1990.
against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly,
On December 7, 1990, petitioner, as the FIRST
they instigated the raid pursuant to their
PARTY, and Dra. Flora San Diego-Sison
covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to
(respondent), as the SECOND PARTY, entered into
undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal
a Memorandum of Agreement over the property.
sources of scouting supplies. Secondly, they failed
to report the unlawful peddling of scouting goods
Petitioner received from respondent two million
to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the
pesos in cash and one million pesos in a post-
proper application of a warrant. And thirdly, if
dated check dated February 28, 1990, instead of
petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they
1991, which rendered said check stale. Petitioner
should have filed a third-party complaint against
then gave respondent TCT No. 168173 in the
the raiding team for contribution or any other
name of IMRDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale
relief, in respect of respondents' claim for
over the property between petitioner and
Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages, of
IMRDC.
which they did not.
Respondent decided not to purchase the
property and notified petitioner through a
Article 31-34, NCC letter dated March 20, 1991, which petitioner
received only on June 11, 1991, reminding
Frias v. San Diego-Sison
petitioner of their agreement that the amount of
G.R. No. 155223, April 4, 2007 two million pesos which petitioner received from
respondent should be considered as a loan
Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.
payable within six months. Petitioner
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion subsequently failed to pay respondent the
amount of two million pesos.
Facts: Petitioner is the owner of a house and lot
located at No. 589 Batangas East, Ayala Alabang,

On April 1, 1993, respondent filed with the While petitioner was acquitted in the false
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a complaint testimony and perjury cases filed by respondent
for sum of money with preliminary attachment against her, those actions are entirely distinct
against petitioner alleging that petitioner tried to from the collection of sum of money with
deprive her of the security for the loan by making damages filed by respondent against petitioner.
a false report of the loss of her owners copy of
The Court agree with the findings of the trial
TCT No. 168173 to the Taguig Police Station on
court and the CA that petitioners act of trying to
June 3, 1991, executing an affidavit of loss and by
deprive respondent of the security of her loan by
filing a petition for the issuance of a new owners
executing an affidavit of loss of the title and
duplicate copy of said title with the RTC of
instituting a petition for the issuance of a new
Makati. Because of that, the court ordered the
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173
provincial public prosecutor to conduct an
entitles respondent to moral damages. Moral
investigation of petitioner for perjury and false
damages may be awarded in culpa contractual or
testimony.
breach of contract cases when the defendant
On January 31, 1996, the RTC rendered that the acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith does
fraudulent scheme employed by petitioner not simply connote bad judgment or negligence;
entitled respondent to damages. The CA affirmed it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
the trial courts decison on June 18, 2002. obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It
partakes of the nature of fraud.
Issue/s: W/n the respondent is entitled to moral The Memorandum of Agreement provides that in
damages the event that respondent opts not to buy the

property, the money given by respondent to
Ruling: Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that petitioner shall be treated as a loan and the
when the civil action is based on an obligation not property shall be considered as the security for
arising from the act or omission complained of as the mortgage. It was testified to by respondent
a felony, such civil action may proceed that after they executed the agreement on
independently of the criminal proceedings and December 7, 1990, petitioner gave her the
regardless of the result of the latter. owners copy of the title to the property, the

Deed of Sale between petitioner and IMRDC, the It is clear therefrom that petitioners execution of
certificate of occupancy, and the certificate of the the affidavit of loss became the basis of the filing
Secretary of the IMRDC who signed the Deed of of the petition with the RTC for the issuance of
Sale. However, notwithstanding that all those new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173.
documents were in respondents possession, Petitioners actuation would have deprived
petitioner executed an affidavit of loss that the respondent of the security for her loan were it
owners copy of the title and the Deed of Sale not for respondents timely filing of a petition for
were lost. relief whereby the RTC set aside its previous
order granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the
Although petitioner testified that her execution
award of moral damages is in order.
of the affidavit of loss was due to the fact that
she was of the belief that since she had
demanded from Atty. Lozada the return of the
title, she thought that the brown envelope with
markings which Atty. Lozada gave her on May 5,
Article 31-34, NCC
1991 already contained the title and the Deed of
Sale as those documents were in the same brown Casupanan v. Laroya
envelope which she gave to Atty. Lozada prior to

G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
the transaction with respondent. Such statement
remained a bare statement. It was not proven at Ponente: Carpio, J.
all since Atty. Lozada had not taken the stand to

corroborate her claim. In fact, even petitioners
own witness, Benilda Ynfante (Ynfante), was not Facts: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent
able to establish petitioner's claim that the title Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya") and the other
was returned by Atty. Lozada in view of Ynfante's owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo
testimony that after the brown envelope was ("Capitulo") and driven by petitioner Avelino
given to petitioner, the latter passed it on to her Casupanan ("Casupanan"), figured in an accident.
and she placed it in petitioners attach case and As a result, two cases were filed with the
did not bother to look at the envelope. Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac.
Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for

reckless imprudence resulting in damage to Issue/s: Whether or not an accused in a pending
property, while Casupanan and Capitulo filed a criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly
civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. file, simultaneously and independently, a
seperate civil action for quasi-delict against the
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case
private complainant in the criminal case
was then at its preliminary investigation stage.
Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion Ruling: Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111,
to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum- the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34
shopping considering the pendency of the and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed
criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in instituted with the criminal action but may be
the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the filed separately by the offended party even
civil case. without reservation. The commencement of the
criminal action does not suspend the prosecution
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and
of the independent civil action under these
Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate
articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
civil action which can proceed independently of
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to
the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a
the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
action is reserved or filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
commencement of the criminal action.
66, assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December
suits for the same act or omission. The first a
28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for
criminal case where the civil action to recover
lack of merit. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a
civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and
Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC
the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without
denied the same in the Resolution of August 24,
violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The
2000.
two cases can proceed simultaneously and
Hence this petition. independently of each other. The

commencement or prosecution of the criminal
action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-

delict. The only limitation is that the offended can avail of this remedy which is independent of
party cannot recover damages twice for the same the criminal action. To disallow the accused from
act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while
the offended party will have no reason to file a refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the
second civil action since he cannot recover criminal case, is to deny him due process of law,
damages twice for the same act or omission of access to the courts, and equal protection of the
the accused. In some instances, the accused may law.
be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed
case against his employer or guardians.
separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case
for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly erroneous.
allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present
Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of
the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil
action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the
accused is prohibited from setting up any Article 36, NCC
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed
instituted in the criminal case. The accused is Bobis v. Bobis
therefore forced to litigate separately his G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
counterclaim against the offended party. If the
accused does not file a separate civil action Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
since the period continues to run until the civil
action for quasi-delict is filed. Facts: On October 21, 1985, Isagani Bobis
contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, B. Javier. Without said marriage having been
has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil annulled, nullified or terminated, the same
Code, in the same way that the offended party respondent contracted a second marriage with

petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, from the crime but so intimately connected with
1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners accused. It must appear not only that the civil
complaint-affidavit, information for bigamy was case involves facts upon which the criminal action
filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, at is based, but also that the resolution of the issues
the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City. Sometime raised in the civil action would necessarily be
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for determinative of the criminal case. Consequently,
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his the defense must involve an issue similar or
first marriage on the ground that it was intimately related to the same issue raised in the
celebrated without a marriage license. criminal action and its resolution determinative
Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the of whether or not the latter action may
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy proceed. Its two essential elements are:
invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
first marriage as a prejudicial question to the
intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion
criminal action; and
to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated
December 29, 1998. Petitioner filed a motion for
(b) the resolution of such issue determines
reconsideration, but the same was denied.
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively
Issue/s: W/n the subsequent filing of a civil action resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but
for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal the information in order to sustain the further
case for bigamy prosecution of the criminal case. A party who

raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
Ruling: A prejudicial question is one which arises hypothetically admitted that all the essential
in a case the resolution of which is a logical elements of a crime have been adequately
antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a alleged in the information, considering that the
question based on a fact distinct and separate prosecution has not yet presented a single

evidence on the indictment or may not yet have Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to
rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
the information on the ground of prejudicial therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated
question is in effect a question on the merits of above, respondent cannot be permitted to use
the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action
against him.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective
at the time of celebration of the second marriage,
requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry.
The clear implication of this is that it is not for the
Article 36, NCC
parties, particularly the accused, to determine
the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether Philippine Agila Satellite v. Lichauco
or not the first marriage was void for lack of a
G.R. No. 134887, July 27, 2006
license is a matter of defense because there is
still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the Ponente: Carpio- Morales , J.
time the second marriage was contracted. It
should be remembered that bigamy can
successfully be prosecuted provided all its Facts: On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of
elements concur two of which are a previous Understanding (MOU) was entered into by a
marriage and a subsequent marriage which consortium of private telecommunications
would have been valid had it not been for the carriers and the Department of Transportation
existence at the material time of the first and Communications (DOTC) represented by then
marriage. Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. relative to the
launching, ownership, operation and
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to
management of a Philippine satellite by a
obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
Filipino-owned or controlled private consortium
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same
or corporation.
judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy.
Pursuant to Article IV of the MOU, the
He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
consortium of private telecommunications

carriers formed a corporation and adopted the a Notice of Offer for several orbital slots including
corporate name Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. 153E.
(PASI), herein petitioner. By letter dated June 28, PASI, claiming that the offer was without
1996, PASI president Rodrigo A. Silverio (Silverio) its knowledge and that it subsequently came to
requested the then DOTC Secretary Amado S. learn that another company whose identity had
Lagdameo, Jr. for official government not been disclosed had submitted a bid and won
confirmation of the assignment of Philippine the award for orbital slot 153E, filed on January
orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its AGILA 23, 1998 a complaint before the Regional Trial
satellites. Court against Lichauco and the Unknown
PASI thereupon undertook preparations for the Awardee for injunction to enjoin the award of
launching, operation and management of its orbital slot 153E, declare its nullity, and for
satellites by, among other things, obtaining loans, damages.
increasing its capital, conducting negotiations
with its business partners, and making an initial PASI also filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint
payment of US$ 3.5 million to Aerospatiale, a before the Office of the Ombudsman against
French satellite manufacturer. Secretary Josefina Trinidad Lichauco. In his
affidavit-complaint, de Guzman charged Lichauco
Michael de Guzman (de Guzman), PASI President with gross violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), later informed Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
Jesli Lapuz (Lapuz), President and CEO of the and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. The
Landbank of the Philippines, by letter of Ombudsman adopting Evaluation Report of its
December 3, 1996, of the governments Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
assignment to PASI of orbital slots 161E and 153E (EPIB) found the existence of a prejudicial
and requested the banks confirmation of its question after considering that the case filed with
participation in a club loan in the amount of US$ the RTC involves facts intimately related to those
11 million, the proceeds of which would be upon which the criminal prosecution would be
applied to PASIs interim satellite. based and that the guilt or the innocence of the
Lichauco subsequently issued, in December 1997, accused would necessarily be determined in the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil case.

A motion to dismiss the civil case against 2. The public officer committed the
respondent was denied by the trial court and on prohibited act during the performance of his
elevation of the order of denial to the Court of official duty or in relation to his public position;
Appeals, said court, by Decision dated February 3. The public officer acted with manifest
21, 2000, also ordered the dismissal of the case. partiality, evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable
Hence this petition. negligence; and
Issue/s: W/n the civil case is a prejudicial 4. His action caused undue injury to the
question to the complaint of violation of Section Government or any private party, or gave any
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference to such parties.
Ruling: The rationale for the principle of
prejudicial question is that although it does not
The civil case against Lichauco on the
conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the
other hand involves three causes of action. The
accused, it tests the sufficiency of the allegations
first, for injunction, seeks to enjoin the award of
in the complaint or information in order to
orbital slot 153E, the DOTC having previously
sustain the further prosecution of the criminal
assigned the same to PASI; the second, for
case. Hence, the need for its prior resolution
declaration of nullity of award, seeks to nullify
before further proceedings in the criminal action
the award given to the undisclosed bidder for
may be had.
being beyond Lichaucos authority; and the
To determine the existence of a prejudicial third, for damages arising from Lichaucos
question in the case before the Ombudsman, it is questioned acts.
necessary to examine the elements of Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019 for which Lichauco was charged and If the award to the undisclosed bidder of
the causes of action in the civil case which are orbital slot 153E is, in the civil case, declared valid
following: for being within Lichaucos scope of authority to
1. The accused is a public officer discharging thus free her from liability for damages, there
administrative or official functions or private would be no prohibited act to speak of nor would
persons charged in conspiracy with them; there be basis for undue injury claimed to have
been suffered by petitioner. The finding by the

Ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial prejudicial question because of a pending
question is thus well-taken. petition with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) involving the same parties.
It appears that on January 7, 1999, private

Article 36, NCC
respondent filed SEC Case No. 01-99-6185 for the
Omictin v. CA declaration of nullity of the respective
appointments of Alex Y. Tan and petitioner as
G.R. No.148004 , January 22, 2007
President Ad Interim and Operations Manager Ad
Ponente: Azcuna , J. Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., declaration of
dividends, recovery of share in the profits,
involuntary dissolution and the appointment of a
Facts: Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations receiver, recovery of damages and an application
Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., filed a for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
complaint for two counts of estafa with the Office injunction against Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., Nicholas Ng,
of the City Prosecutor of Makati against private Janifer Yeo, Tan and petitioner.
respondent George I. Lagos alleging that despite

In the action before the SEC, private respondent
repeated demands, Lagos refused to return the
averred that Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. is a foreign
two company vehicles entrusted to him when he
corporation organized and existing under the
was still the president of Saag Phils., Inc.
laws of Singapore, and is fully owned by Saag
On February 26, 1999, public prosecutor Alex G. Corporation (Bhd). On July 1, 1994, he was
Bagaoisan recommended the indictment of appointed as Area Sales Manager in the
private respondent, and on the same day, Philippines by Thiang Shiang Hiang, Manager of
respondent was charged with the crime of estafa Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. Pursuant to his appointment,
under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal respondent was authorized to organize a local
Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). joint venture corporation to be known as Saag
Philippines, Inc. for the wholesale trade and
On June 24, 1999, private respondent filed a service of industrial products for oil, gas and
motion to suspend proceedings on the basis of a power industries in the Philippines.

On September 9, 1994, Saag Philippines, Inc. was Executive Director of Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., to call for
incorporated with Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. as the a board meeting in order to discuss the following:
majority stockholder. Private respondent was a) implementation of the board resolution
appointed to the board of directors, along with declaring dividends; b) acquisition of private
Rommel I. Lagos, Jose E. Geronimo, Gan Ching Lai respondents shares by Saag (S) Pte. Ltd.; c)
and Thiang Shiang Hiang, and was elected dissolution of Saag Phils., Inc.; and d) the
president of the domestic corporation. Later, due termination of the JVA.
to intra-corporate disputes, Gan and Thiang
Ng and Yeo failed to appear, however, in the
resigned and divested their shares in Saag
scheduled board meetings. Instead, on
Corporation (Bhd), thereby resulting in a change
September 30, 1998 they issued a letter
in the controlling interest in Saag (S) Pte. Ltd.
appointing Alex Y. Tan as President Ad Interim of
On June 23, 1998, private respondent resigned Saag Phils., Inc. Tan, in turn, appointed petitioner
his post as president of Saag Phils., Inc. while still Omictin as the companys Operations Manager
retaining his position as a director of the Ad Interim.
company. According to private respondent, the
Citing as a reason the absence of a board
joint venture agreement (JVA) between him or
resolution authorizing the continued operations
Saag Phils., Inc. and Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. provided
of Saag Phils., Inc., private respondent retained
that should the controlling interest in the latter
his possession of the office equipment of the
company, or its parent company Saag Corp.
company in a fiduciary capacity as director of the
(Bhd), be acquired by any other person or entity
corporation pending its dissolution and/or the
without his prior consent, he has the option
resolution of the intra-corporate dispute. He
either to require the other stockholders to
likewise changed the locks of the offices of the
purchase his shares or to terminate the JVA and
company allegedly to prevent Tan and petitioner
dissolve Saag Phils., Inc. altogether. Thus,
from seizing company property.
pursuant to this provision, since private
respondent did not give his consent as regards
The trial court, in an order dated September 8,
the transfer of shares made by Gan and Thiang,
1999, denied respondents motion to suspend
he made several requests to Nicholas Ng, who
proceedings and motion to recuse. And on June
replaced Gan as director, and Janifer Yeo,

30, 2000, the CA rendered that a prejudicial 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code is a demand made
question exists which calls for the suspension of by the offended party to the offender:
the criminal proceedings before the lower court.
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence
Hence this petition. under subdivision No. 1, par. (b) of Art. 315 are as
follows:
Issue/s: W/n a prejudicial question exist to
warrant the suspension of the criminal 1. That money, goods, or other personal
proceedings pending resolution of the intra- property be received by the offender in
corporate controversy that was originally filed trust, or on commission, or for
with the SEC administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make
Ruling: A prejudicial question is defined as that
delivery of, or to return the same;
which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein 2. That there be misrepresentation or
and the cognizance of which pertains to another conversion of such money or property by
tribunal. Here, the case which was lodged the offender, or denial on his part of such
originally before the SEC and which is now receipt;
pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong City by
3. That such misappropriation or
virtue of Republic Act No. 8799 involves facts that
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
are intimately related to those upon which the
another; and
criminal prosecution is based.
4. That there is a demand made by the

Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in
offended party to the offender.
the intra-corporate dispute will determine the
guilt or innocence of private respondent in the
Logically, under the circumstances, since the
crime of estafa filed against him by petitioner
alleged offended party is Saag Phils., Inc., the
before the RTC of Makati. As correctly stated by
validity of the demand for the delivery of the
the CA, one of the elements of the crime of estafa
subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the
with abuse of confidence under Article 315, par.
person making such a demand on the companys

behalf. Private respondent is challenging fees for hospital services rendered in line with his
petitioners authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in specialization. The agreement further provided
the corporate case pending before the RTC of that either party may terminate the contract
Mandaluyong, Branch 214. Taken in this light, if upon giving thirty (30)-day written notice to the
the supposed authority of petitioner is found to other. In consideration of the retainers fee, Dr.
be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, Climaco agrees to perform the duties and
hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper. obligations enumerated in the Comprehensive
Moreover, the mere failure to return the thing Medical Plan, which was attached and made an
received for safekeeping or on commission, or for integral part of the agreement.
administration, or under any other obligation
Explicit in the contract, however, is the
involving the duty to deliver or to return the
provision that no employee-employer
same or deliver the value thereof to the owner
relationship shall exist between the company and
could only give rise to a civil action and does not
Dr. Climaco while the contract is in effect. In case
constitute the crime of estafa.
of its termination, Dr. Climaco shall be entitled
only to such retainer fee as may be due him at
the time of termination.
Dr. Climaco continuously served as the company

Article 36, NCC
physician, performing all the duties stipulated in
Coca-Cola Bottlers Inc. v. Social Security System the Retainer Agreement and the Comprehensive
Medical Plan. By 1992, his salary was increased
G.R. No. 159323, July 31, 2008
to P7,500.00 per month. Meantime, Dr. Climaco
Ponente: Reyes, R.T., J. inquired with the Department of Labor and

Employment and the SSS whether he was an
employee of the company. Both agencies replied
Facts: In 1988, petitioner company and Dr. in the affirmative. As a result, Dr. Climaco filed a
Climaco entered into a Retainer Agreement for complaint before the National Labor Relations
one year, with a monthly compensation Commission (NLRC), Bacolod City. In his
of P3,800.00, where he may charge professional complaint, he sought recognition as a regular

employee of the company and demanded the civil action is resolved would be
payment of his 13th month pay, cost of living determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
allowance, holiday pay, service incentive leave innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
pay, Christmas bonus and all other benefits.
Here, no prejudicial question exists because
During the pendency of the complaint, the there is no pending criminal case. The
company terminated its Retainer Agreement with consolidated NLRC cases cannot be considered as
Dr. Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco filed another previously instituted civil action. In Berbari v.
complaint for illegal dismissal against the Concepcion it was held that a prejudicial question
company before the NLRC Bacolod City. He asked is understood in law to be that which must
that he be reinstated to his former position as precede the criminal action, that which requires
company physician of its BacolodPlant, without a decision with which said question is closely
loss of seniority rights, with full payment of related.
backwages, other unpaid benefits, and for
Neither can the doctrine of prejudicial question
payment of damages.
be applied by analogy. The issue in the case filed
Issue/s: W/n there exist a prejudicial by Dr. Climaco with the SSC involves the question
question of whether or not he is an employee of Coca-Cola
Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. and subject to the
Ruling: The rule is that there is prejudicial
compulsory coverage of the Social Security
question when (a) the previously instituted civil
System. On the contrary, the cases filed by Dr.
action involves an issue similar or intimately
Climaco before the NLRC involved different
related to the issue raised in the subsequent
issues. In his first complaint, Dr. Climaco sought
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
recognition as a regular employee of the
issue determines whether or not the criminal
company and demanded payment of his 13th
action may proceed. It comes into play generally
month pay, cost of living allowance, holiday pay,
in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
service incentive leave pay, Christmas bonus and
action both pending and there exists in the
all other benefits. The second complaint was for
former an issue which must be preemptively
illegal dismissal, with prayer for reinstatement to
resolved before the criminal action may proceed.
his former position as company physician of the
This is so because howsoever the issue raised in

companys Bacolod Plant, without loss of under Section 36 of the Family Code on the
seniority rights, with full payment of backwages, ground of psychological incapacity.
other unpaid benefits, and for payment of On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent
damages. Thus, the issues in the NLRC cases are motion to suspend the proceedings before the
not determinative of whether or not the SSC RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence
should proceed. It is settled that the question of a prejudicial question.
claimed to be prejudicial in nature must be Issue/s: W/n the resolution of the action for
determinative of the case before the court. annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case
for frustrated parricide against petitioner
Ruling: A prejudicial question is defined as:
Article 36, NCC

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution
Pimentel v. Pimentel
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010 involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is a
Ponente: Carpio, J.
question based on a fact distinct and
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion separate from the crime but so intimately

connected with it that it determines the
Facts: On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it
Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an
to suspend the criminal action, it must
action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
appear not only that said case involves facts
Pimentel (petitioner). On 7 February 2005,
intimately related to those upon which the
petitioner received summons to appear before
criminal prosecution would be based but
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the
also that in the resolution of the issue or
pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito
innocence of the accused would necessarily
Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
be determined.

The relationship between the offender subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case
and the victim is a key element in the crime of the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted,
parricide, which punishes any person who shall will have no effect on the alleged crime that was
kill his father, mother, or child, whether committed at the time of the subsistence of the
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his marriage. In short, even if the marriage between
ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. The petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
relationship between the offender and the victim could still be held criminally liable since at the
distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder time of the commission of the alleged crime, he
or homicide. However, the issue in the was still married to respondent.
annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately
related to the issue in the criminal case for
parricide. Further, the relationship between the
offender and the victim is not determinative of
Article 36, NCC
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan
The issue in the civil case for annulment of
G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether petitioner is psychologically Ponente: Kapunan, J.
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The issue in parricide is
whether the accused killed the victim. In this
Facts: On 9 February 1989, private respondents
case, since petitioner was charged with
Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
designated as industrial labor sectoral
performed all the acts of execution which would
representative and agricultural labor sectoral
have killed respondent as a consequence but
representative respectively, for the Sangguniang
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental
of causes independent of petitioners will. At the
by then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the
time of the commission of the alleged crime,
Department of Local Government. Private
petitioner and respondent were married. The
respondents Binaohan and Estrellanes took their

oath of office on 16 February 1989 and 17 Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
February 1989, respectively. amended.
Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated On 9 September 1991, petitioners filed a motion

petition with the Office of the President for with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the
review and recall of said designations. The latter, proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 on the
however, in a letter dated 20 March 1989, denied ground that a prejudicial question exists in Civil
the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Case No. 9955 pending before the Regional Trial
Tuanda to recognize private respondents as Court of Dumaguete City.
sectoral representatives.
Issue/s: W/n the legality or validity of private
On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a respondents' designation as sectoral
petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial representatives which is pending resolution in
Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 36769 is a prejudicial question
Special Civil Action No. 9661, for recognition as justifying suspension of the proceedings in the
members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was criminal case against petitioners.
dismissed on 23 July 1991.
Ruling: The rationale behind the principle of
Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
action with the Regional Trial Court of decisions. It has two essential elements:
Dumaguete City to declare null and void the
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
designations of private respondents as sectoral
intimately related to the issue raised in the
representatives, docketed as Civil Case No. 9955
criminal action; and
entitled "Reynaldo Tuanda, et al. versus Secretary
of the Department of Local Government, et al."
(b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
On 21 July 1991, information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at
16936 entitled "People of the Philippines versus
bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CA-
Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." charging petitioners of
G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial

question to warrant suspension of the (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus, were null and void.
arraignment and further proceedings in the Therefore, should the Court of Appeals uphold
criminal case against petitioners. the trial court's decision declaring null and void
private respondents' designations as sectoral
All the elements of a prejudicial question are
representatives for failure to comply with the
clearly and unmistakably present in this case.
provisions of the Local Government Code (B.P.
There is no doubt that the facts and issues
Blg. 337, sec. 146[2]), the charges against
involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the
petitioners would no longer, so to speak, have a
criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The
leg to stand on. Petitioners cannot be accused of
filing of the criminal case was premised on
bad faith and partiality there being in the first
petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad
place no obligation on their part to pay private
faith in not paying private respondents' salaries
respondents' claims. Private respondents do not
and per diems as sectoral representatives, while
have any legal right to demand salaries, per
the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve
diems and other benefits. In other words, the
whether or not the designations of private
Court of Appeals' resolution of the issues raised
respondents as sectoral representatives were
in the civil action will ultimately determine
made in accordance with law.
whether or not there is basis to proceed with the
criminal case.
More importantly, the resolution of the civil case
will certainly determine if there will still be any
reason to proceed with the criminal action.
Petitioners were criminally charged under the

Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec, Article 36, NCC
3[e]) due to their refusal, allegedly in bad faith
Consing v People
and with manifest partiality, to pay private
respondents' salaries as sectoral representatives. G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013
This refusal, however, was anchored on
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
petitioners' assertion that said designations were
made in violation of the Local Government Code Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: Petitioner negotiated with and obtained de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the
for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de demands.
la Cruz) various loans totaling P18,000,000.00
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No.
from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were
1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC)
secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on
(Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief, thereby
a parcel of land (property) registered under the
seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding
name of de la Cruz. In accordance with its option
against him for the collection of
to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital
theP41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had
agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a
acted as a mere agent of his mother. On the
total consideration ofP21,221,500.00. Payment
same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal
was effected by off-setting the amounts due to
complaint for estafa through falsification of
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la
public document against Consing and de la Cruz
Cruz and Consing in the amount
in the Makati City Prosecutors Office.
of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional
amount of P3,145,946.50. The other half of the
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the
property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc.
RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the
(Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of
recovery of a sum of money and damages, with
Unicapital.
an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment (Makati civil case).
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop
the property, they learned that the title to the
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer
property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names
his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on
of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties
the ground of existence of a prejudicial question
from whom the property had been allegedly
due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil
acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by
cases.
De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.
Issue/s: Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of
prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati criminal
the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April
cases?
19, 1999 that had been paid to and received by

Ruling: A perusal of Unicapitals complaint in the Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question
Makati civil case reveals that the action was if the civil and the criminal action can, according
predicated on fraud. This was apparent from the to law, proceed independently of each other.
allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in
"wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
manner in offering as security and later object of independent civil action may be brought by the
sale, a property which they do not own, and offended party. It shall proceed independently of
foisting to the public a spurious title." As such, the criminal action and shall require only a
the action was one that could proceed preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 may the offended party recover damages twice
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, which for the same act or omission charged in the
states as follows: criminal action. x x x x
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for
physical injuries a civil action for damages, Damages and Attachment on account of the
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal alleged fraud committed by respondent and his
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
civil action shall proceed independently of the independent civil action under Article 33 of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
preponderance of evidence. prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of the criminal case at bar.
It is well settled that a civil action based on
defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be Contrary to Consings stance, it was not improper
independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of for the CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193
the Civil Code, and does not operate as a to his case with Unicapital, for, although the
prejudicial question that will justify the Manila and Makati civil cases involved different
suspension of a criminal case. This was precisely complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital),
the Courts thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus: the civil actions Plus Builders and Unicapital had
separately instituted against him were

undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they were both the second marriage serves as a prejudicial
based on fraud, and were thus covered by Article question in the instant criminal case.
33 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the Makati criminal
Issue/s: W/n the subsequent declaration of
case could not be suspended pending the
nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy
had filed.
Ruling: Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code

defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows:
Article 36, NCC Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor
shall be imposed upon any person who shall
Capili v People
contract a second or subsequent marriage before
G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013 the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared
Ponente:Peralta, J.
presumptively dead by means of a judgment
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion rendered in the proper proceedings.
Facts: On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore,
with the crime of bigamy before the Regional are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2)
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. Petitioner the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for spouse could not yet be presumed dead
declaration of nullity of the second marriage according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts
before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that
Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage the second or subsequent marriage has all the
is declared null and void, it would exculpate him essential requisites for validity.
from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency
of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of

In the present case, it appears that all the The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity
elements of the crime of bigamy were present of the first marriage was immaterial because
when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004. prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had
already been consummated. Moreover,
It is undisputed that a second marriage between
petitioners assertion would only delay the
petitioner and private respondent was contracted
prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a
accused could simply file a petition to declare his
valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency
Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3,
of that action as a prejudicial question in the
1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself
criminal case. We cannot allow that.
declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private The outcome of the civil case for annulment of
respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial petitioners marriage to [private complainant]
declaration of the second marriage for being had no bearing upon the determination of
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case
of petitioner for the crime of bigamy. for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that
marriage be subsisting at the time the second
the accused may still be charged with the crime
marriage is contracted.
of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage,
so long as the first marriage was still subsisting
when the second marriage was celebrated.
Article 36, NCC

In Jarillo v. People, the Court affirmed the
accuseds conviction for bigamy ruling that the Beltran v People
crime of bigamy is consummated on the
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
celebration of the subsequent marriage without
the previous one having been judicially declared Ponente:Buena, J.
null and void, viz.:

Facts: Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, Family Code is a prejudicial question that should
1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish merit the suspension of the criminal case for
Church in Cubao, Quezon City. On February 7, concubinage
1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and
Ruling: The rationale behind the principle of
four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
of marriage on the ground of psychological
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home
The pendency of the case for declaration of
and lived with a certain woman named Milagros
nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial
Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case
complaint for concubinage under Article 334 of
to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action
the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his
as to cause the suspension of the latter pending
paramour.
the final determination of the civil case, it must
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to appear not only that the said civil case involves
forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, the same facts upon which the criminal
filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the prosecution would be based, but also that in the
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of
civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage the accused would necessarily be determined.
posed a prejudicial question to the determination
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code,
of the criminal case.
respondent, without first having obtained the
Issue/s: W/n the pendency of the petition for judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage,
declaration of nullity of marriage based on can not be said to have validly entered into the

second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a Facts: On October 31, 1997, petitioner Reyes and
marriage though void still needs a judicial Advanced Foundation Construction Systems
declaration of such fact before any party can Corporation (Advanced) represented by its
marry again; otherwise the second marriage will Executive Project Director, Ettori Reyes executed
also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial a deed of conditional sale involving the purchase
declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is by Reyes of equipment consisting of a Warman
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, Dredging Pump worth 10 million pesos. The
respondent was for all legal intents and purposes parties agreed therein that Reyes would pay 3
regarded as a married man at the time he million pesos as downpayment and the 7 million
contracted his second marriage with balance through 4 post-dated checks. Reyes
petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any complied but in 1998 he asked for the
decision in the civil action for nullity would not restructuring of his obligation by replacing the 4
erase the fact that respondent entered into a post dated checks with 9 post dated checks that
second marriage during the subsistence of a first would include the interest at the rate of
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not P25,000.00/month accruing on the unpaid
essential to the determination of the criminal portion of the obligation from April 30 to October
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. 31, 1998.
Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes request

and returned the 4 checks. In turn, Reyes issued
the 9 post dated checks with the aggregate
Article 36, NCC amount of P7,125,000.00 drawn against United

Coconut Planters Bank.
Reyes v. Rossi
Rossi deposited 3 of the post-dated checks on
G.R. No. 159823; February 18, 2013
their maturity in Advanced Foundations bank
Ponente:Bersamin, J. account at the PCI Ba k in Makati. 2 of the checs

were denied payment ostensibly upon Reyes
instruction to stop their payment while the 3rd
was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

Rossi likewise deposited 2 more checks but the the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
checks were returned with the notation Account criminal case.
Closed stamped on them.
It is true that the rescission of a contract results
On July 29, 1998, Reyes commenced an action for in the extinguishment of the obligatory relation
rescission of contract and damages in the Quezon as if it was never created, the extinguishment
City RTC while on September 8, 1998, Rossi having retroactive effect. The rescission is
charged Reyes with 5 counts of estafa and 5 equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the
counts of violation of BP Blg. 22. juridical tie, leaving things in their status before
the celebration of the contract. However, until
On November 20, 1998, the Assistant City
the contract is rescinded the juridical tie and the
Prosecutor handling the preliminary investigation
concomitant obligations subsist.
recommended the dismissal of the case of estafa
and the suspension of the proceedings relating to On the other hand, violation of BP Blg. 22
the violation of BP Blg. 22 based on prejudicial requires the concurrence of the following
question. This recommendation was adopted by elements, namely: (1) making, drawing and
the City Prosecutor of Manila and subsequently issuance of a check to apply for account or for
by the Secretary of Justice. value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or
issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
Issue/s: W/n the civil action for rescission of the
the sufficient funds in or credit in the drawee
contract of sale raised a prejudicial question that
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
required the suspension of the criminal
presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the
prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
Ruling: A prejudicial question comes into play in a funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason
situation where a civil action and a criminal had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
action are both pending and there exist in the ordered the bank to stop payment.
former an issue that must be first determined
The issue therefore in criminal actions upon the
before the latter may proceed, because
violations of BP Blg. 22 is therefore, whether or
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
not Reyes issued the dishonored checks knowing
resolved would be determinative juris e de jure of
them to be without funds upon presentment. On

the other hand, the issue in the civil action for Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl
rescission is whether or not the breach in the Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita
fulfillment of Advanced Foundations obligation Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.
warranted the rescission of the conditional sale.
The first few checks were honored by the bank,
Indeed, under the BP Blg. 22, the mere issuance but in the early part of 1997, when the remaining
of a worthless check was already an offense itself checks were deposited with the drawee bank,
and under such circumstance, the criminal they were dishonored for the reason that
proceedings for the violation of BP Blg. 22 could the Account is Closed. Demands were made by
proceed despite the pendency of the civil action Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to
for rescission of the conditional sale. the petitioner to make good the checks. Despite
this, however, the latter failed to pay the
amounts represented by the said checks.
On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed
Article 36, NCC a civil action for collection of sum of money,

damages and attorney's fee with prayer for the
Yap v. Cabales
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
G.R. No. 159186 June 5, 2009 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of General Santos City and on December
Ponente:Peralta, J.
15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion instituted a similar action.
Facts: Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the
Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed
business through their company Primetown several informations for violation of Batas
Property Group. Sometime in 1996, petitioner Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the
purchased several real properties from a certain petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of said (MTCC), General Santos City.
purchases, petitioner issued several Bank of the

Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated checks to

In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for
motions to suspend proceedings on account of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of
the existence of a prejudicial question worthless checks with knowledge of the
and motion to exclude the private prosecutor insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in
from participating in the proceedings. Petitioner itself an offense. Thus, it is clear that
prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases the determination of the issues involved in Civil
be suspended until the civil cases pending before Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of
the RTC were finally resolved. money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or
innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases
Issue/s: W/n there exists a prejudicial question
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
that necessitates the suspension of the
proceedings in the MTCC
Ruling: The issue in the criminal cases is whether Article 36, NCC
the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22,
Dreamwork Construction v. Janiola
while in the civil case, it is whether the private
respondents are entitled to collect from the G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009
petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that
Ponente:Velasco, Jr., J.
they have rediscounted from Evelyn. The
resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal cases against him, and Facts: On February 2, 2005, petitioner, through
there is no necessity that the civil case be its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-
determined first before taking up the criminal President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy
cases. P. Amora, filed a Complaint for violation of Batas

Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private
respondent Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20,
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband,
petitioner is declared not liable for the payment instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by
of the value of the checks and damages, he filing a Complaint dated August 2006 for the

rescission of an alleged construction agreement reason had not the drawer, without any
between the parties, as well as for damages. The valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
case was filed with the RTC, Las Pias City. payment.
Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid
before the MTC, were issued in consideration of
contract or agreement to support the issuance of
the construction agreement. Thereafter, on July
the check/s or that the checks were issued for
25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to
valuable consideration does not make up the
Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007 in
elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the
in a long line of cases that the agreement
civil case posed a prejudicial question as against
surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is
the criminal cases.
irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP
Issue/s: W/n there exist a prejudicial question 22.
Ruling: It must be remembered that the To determine the reason for which checks are
elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 issued, or the terms and conditions for their
are as follows: issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public
reposes in the stability and commercial value of
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in
any check to apply for account or for trade and in banking communities. The clear
value; intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the
mere act of issuing a worthless check malum
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer,
prohibitum.
or issuer that at the time of issue there
are no sufficient funds in or credit with Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case
the drawee bank for the payment of such declares that the construction agreement
check in full upon its presentment; and between the parties is void for lack of
consideration; this would not affect the
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check
prosecution of private respondent in the criminal
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
case. The fact of the matter is that private
funds or credit, or dishonor for the same

respondent indeed issued checks which were
subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It
is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP
22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element

required for the existence of a prejudicial
question, that the resolution of the issue in the
civil action would determine whether the criminal
action may proceed, is absent in the instant case.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists.


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Article 2 and 3, NCC Ruling: In a long line of decisions, this Court has

ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is

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The clear object of the above-quoted provision is

The publication of all presidential issuances of a

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3. Must a distinction be made between laws of

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meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the

However, no publication is required of the Ponente: Cortes, J

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Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the

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On petition of Don Jose the court by

rendered a separate report. The auditor umpire,

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The petition for the suspension of the declarative

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parties were separated. marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny

merely to harass him. Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the

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Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Laws in 1971 and passed the same years bar Attorneys.

examinations with a general weighted average of

Oath at the Philippine International Convention

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Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and

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Sydney, Australia. recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the

After hearing, the probate court held in favor of

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Ateneo de Davao University

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Ateneo de Davao University

Miciano v. Brimo constitute an error. There is, therefore, no

Facts: The judicial administrator of the estate of

declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent

G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011

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After asking for extension of time,

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An instance of retroactive application of the

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15, 1981. original or amendatory, has been applied in many

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to employees not entitled thereto under

In December 1991, he found respondent sleeping

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Issue/s: W/n the Article 40 of the Family Code be

Rulings: Article 40 is applicable to remarriages Zulueta v. Asia Brewery

entered into after the effectivity of the Family

the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive

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Orders consolidating the two cases could no

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