G.R. No.

116123 March 13, 1997
SERGIO F. NAGUIAT, doing business under the name and style
SERGIO F. NAGUIAT ENT., INC., & CLARK FIELD TAXI,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION),
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WORKINGMEN and its members,
LEONARDO T. GALANG, et al., respondents.
("NOWM"), a labor organization which they subsequently joined, filed a
complaint5against "Sergio F. Naguiat doing business under the name and
style Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Army-Air Force Exchange Services
(AAFES) with Mark Hooper as Area Service Manager, Pacific Region, and
AAFES Taxi Drivers Association with Eduardo Castillo as President," for
payment of separation pay due to termination/phase-out. Said complaint
was later amended6 to include additional taxi drivers who were similarly
situated as complainants, and CFTI with Antolin T. Naguiat as vice
president and general manager, as party respondent.

In their complaint, herein private respondents alleged that they were

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Are private respondent-employees of petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Inc., who
were separated from service due the closure of Clark Air Base, entitled to
separation pay and, if so, in what amount? Are officers of
corporations ipso facto liable jointly and severally with the companies they
represent for the payment of separation pay?
These questions are answered by the Court in resolving this petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolutions
of the National Labor Relations Commission (Third
Division) 1 promulgated on February 28, 1994, 2 and May 31, 1994.3 The
February 28, 1994 Resolution affirmed with modifications the decision 4of
Labor Arbiter Ariel C. Santos in NLRC Case No. RAB-III-12-2477-91. The
second Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration of herein
petitioners.
The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter by granting
separation pay to herein individual respondents in the increased amount
of US$120.00 for every year of service or its peso equivalent, and holding
Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T.
Naguiat, jointly and severally liable with Clark Field Taxi, Inc. ("CFTI").
The Facts
The following facts are derived from the records of the case:
regular employees of Naguiat Enterprises, although their individual
applications for employment were approved by CFTI. They claimed to
have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by
CFTI, and that the former thence managed, controlled and supervised
their employment. They averred further that they were entitled to
separation pay based on their latest daily earnings of US$15.00 for
working sixteen (16) days a month.
In their position paper submitted to the labor arbiter, herein petitioners
claimed that the cessation of business of CFTI on November 26, 1991, was
due to "great financial losses and lost business opportunity" resulting
from the phase-out of Clark Air Base brought about by the Mt. Pinatubo
eruption and the expiration of the RP-US military bases agreement. They
admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers' union, through its
President Eduardo Castillo who claimed to have had blanket authority to
negotiate with CFTI in behalf of union members, to grant its taxi driver-
employees separation pay equivalent to P500.00 for every year of service.
The labor arbiter, finding the individual complainants to be regular
workers of CFTI, ordered the latter to pay them P1,200.00 for every year of
service "for humanitarian consideration," setting aside the earlier
agreement between CFTI and the drivers' union of P500.00 for every year
of service. The labor arbiter rejected the allegation of CFTI that it was
forced to close business due to "great financial losses and lost business
opportunity" since, at the time it ceased operations, CFTI was profitably
earning and the cessation of its business was due to the untimely closure
of Clark Air Base. In not awarding separation pay in accordance with the
Labor Code, the labor arbiter explained:

To allow respondents exemption from its (sic)

Petitioner CFTI held a concessionaire's contract with the Army Air Force
obligation to pay separation pay would be inhuman
Exchange Services ("AAFES") for the operation of taxi services within Clark
to complainants but to impose a monetary obligation
Air Base. Sergio F. Naguiat was CFTI's president, while Antolin T. Naguiat
to an employer whose profitable business was
was its vice-president. Like Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated
abruptly shot (sic) down by force majeure would be
("Naguiat Enterprises"), a trading firm, it was a family-owned corporation.
unfair and unjust to say the least.7

Individual respondents were previously employed by CFTI as taxicab

drivers. During their employment, they were required to pay a daily
"boundary fee" in the amount of US$26.50 for those working from 1:00
a.m. to 12:00 noon, and US$27.00 for those working from 12:00 noon to
12:00 midnight. All incidental expenses for the maintenance of the
vehicles they were driving were accounted against them, including
gasoline expenses.
and thus, simply awarded an amount for "humanitarian
consideration."
Herein individual private respondents appealed to the NLRC. In its
Resolution, the NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter by
granting separation pay to the private respondents. The concluding
paragraphs of the NLRC Resolution read:

The drivers worked at least three to four times a week, depending on the
availability of taxicabs. They earned not less than US$15.00 daily.
In excess of that amount, however, they were required to make cash
deposits to the company, which they could later withdraw every fifteen
days.
Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in the Philippines, from
which Clark Air Base was not spared, the AAFES was dissolved, and the
services of individual respondents were officially terminated on November
26, 1991.
The AAFES Taxi Drivers Association ("drivers' union"), through its local
president, Eduardo Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations as regards
separation benefits that should be awarded in favor of the drivers. They
arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers will be given P500.00
for every year of service as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted
said amount in December 1991 and January 1992. However, individual
respondents herein refused to accept theirs.
Instead, after disaffiliating themselves from the drivers' union, individual
respondents, through the National Organization of Workingmen
The contention of complainant is partly correct. One-
half month salary should be US$120.00 but this
amount can not be paid to the complainant in U.S.
Dollar which is not the legal tender in the Philippines.
Paras, in commenting on Art. 1249 of the New Civil
Code, defines legal tender as "that which a debtor
may compel a creditor to accept in payment of the
debt. The complainants who are the creditors in this
instance can be compelled to accept the Philippine
peso which is the legal tender, in which case, the table
of conversion (exchange rate) at the time of payment
or satisfaction of the judgment should be used.
However, since the choice is left to the debtor,
(respondents) they may choose to pay in US dollar."
(Phoenix Assurance Co. vs. Macondray & Co. Inc., L-
25048, May 13, 1975)
In discharging the above obligations, Sergio F.
Naguiat Enterprises, which is headed by Sergio F.
Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat, father and son at the
same time the President and Vice-President and
General Manager, respectively, should be joined as

Page 1 of 45
 indispensable party whose liability is joint and several.
(Sec. 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court)8
As mentioned earlier, the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners
was denied by the NLRC. Hence, this petition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order. Upon posting by the petitioners of a surety
bond, a temporary restraining order 9 was issued by this Court enjoining
execution of the assailed Resolutions.
Issues
The petitioners raise the following issues before this Court for resolution:
I. Whether or not public respondent NLRC (3rd Div.)
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in issuing the appealed resolution;
II. Whether or not Messrs. Teofilo Rafols and Romeo
N. Lopez could validly represent herein private
respondents; and,
III. Whether or not the resolution issued by public
respondent is contrary to law. 10
Petitioners also submit two additional issues by way of a supplement 11 to
their petition, to wit: that Petitioners Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin
Naguiat were denied due process; and that petitioners were not furnished
copies of private respondents' appeal to the NLRC. As to the procedural
lapse of insufficient copies of the appeal, the proper forum before which
petitioners should have raised it is the NLRC. They, however, failed to
question this in their motion for reconsideration. As a consequence, they
are deemed to have waived the same and voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the appellate body.
Anent the first issue raised in their original petition, petitioners contend
that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in unilaterally increasing the amount of severance
pay granted by the labor arbiter. They claim that this was not supported
by substantial evidence since it was based simply on the self-serving
allegation of respondents that their monthly take-home pay was not lower
than $240.00.
On the second issue, petitioners aver that NOWM cannot make legal
representations in behalf of individual respondents who should, instead,
be bound by the decision of the union (AAFES Taxi Drivers Association) of
which they were members.
As to the third issue, petitioners incessantly insist that Sergio F. Naguiat
Enterprises, Inc. is a separate and distinct juridical entity which cannot be
held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of CFTI. And similarly,
Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were merely officers and
stockholders of CFTI and, thus, could not be held personally accountable
for corporate debts.
Lastly, Sergio and Antolin Naguiat assail the Resolution of NLRC holding
them solidarily liable despite not having been impleaded as parties to the
complaint.
Individual respondents filed a comment separate from that of NOWM. In
sum, both aver that petitioners had the opportunity but failed to refute,
the taxi drivers' claim of having an average monthly earning of $240.00;
that individual respondents became members of NOWM after
disaffiliating themselves from the AAFES Taxi Drivers Association which,
through the manipulations of its President Eduardo Castillo,
unconscionably compromised their separation pay; and that Naguiat
Enterprises, being their indirect employer, is solidarily liable under the law
for violation of the Labor Code, in this case, for nonpayment of their
separation pay.
The Solicitor General unqualifiedly supports the allegations of private
respondents. In addition, he submits that the separate personalities of
respondent corporations and their officers should be disregarded and
considered one and the same as these were used to perpetrate injustice to
their employees.
The Court's Ruling
As will be discussed below, the petition is partially meritorious.
First Issue: Amount of Separation Pay
Firmly, we reiterate the rule that in a petition for certiorari filed pursuant
to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is the only way a labor case may
reach the Supreme Court, the petitioner/s must clearly show that the
NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. 12
Long-standing and well-settled in Philippine jurisprudence is the judicial
dictum that findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect
but even finality; and are binding upon this Court unless there is a
showing of grave abuse of discretion, or where it is clearly shown that they
were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. 13
Nevertheless, this Court carefully perused the records of the instant case if
only to determine whether public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in granting the clamor of
private respondents that their separation pay should be based on the
amount of $240.00, allegedly their minimum monthly earnings as taxi
drivers of petitioners.
In their amended complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch in San
Fernando, Pampanga, herein private respondents set forth in detail the
work schedule and financial arrangement they had with their employer.
Therefrom they inferred that their monthly take-home pay amounted to
not less than $240.00. Herein petitioners did not bother to refute nor offer
any evidence to controvert said allegations. Remaining undisputed, the
labor arbiter adopted such facts in his decision. Petitioners did not even
appeal from the decision of the labor arbiter nor manifest any error in his
findings and conclusions. Thus, petitioners are in estoppel for not having
questioned such facts when they had all opportunity to do so. Private
respondents, like petitioners, are bound by the factual findings of
Respondent Commission.
Petitioners also claim that the closure of their taxi business was due to
great financial losses brought about by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo
which made the roads practically impassable to their taxicabs. Likewise
well-settled is the rule that business losses or financial reverses, in order to
sustain retrenchment of personnel or closure of business and warrant
exemption from payment of separation pay, must be proved with clear
and satisfactory evidence. 14 The records, however, are devoid of such
evidence.
The labor arbiter, as affirmed by NLRC, correctly found that petitioners
stopped their taxi business within Clark Air Base because of the phase-out
of U.S. military presence thereat. It was not due to any great financial loss
because petitioners' taxi business was earning profitably at the time of its
closure.
With respect to the amount of separation pay that should be granted,
Article 283 of the Labor Code provides:
. . . In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in
cases of closures or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, the separation
pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at
least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six
(6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
Considering the above, we find that NLRC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that individual respondents were entitled to separation
pay 15 in the amount $120.00 (one-half of $240.00 monthly pay) or its peso
equivalent for every year of service.
Second Issue: NOWM's Personality to
Represent Individual Respondents-Employees
Page 2 of 45
On the question of NOWM's authority to represent private respondents,
we hold petitioners in estoppel for not having seasonably raised this issue
before the labor arbiter or the NLRC. NOWM was already a party-litigant
as the organization representing the taxi driver-complainants before the
labor arbiter. But petitioners who were party-respondents in said
complaint did not assail the juridical personality of NOWM and the validity
of its representations in behalf of the complaining taxi drivers before the
quasi-judicial bodies. Therefore, they are now estopped from raising such
question before this Court. In any event, petitioners acknowledged before
this Court that the taxi drivers allegedly represented by NOWM, are
themselves parties in this case. 16
Third Issue: Liability of Petitioner-
Corporations and Their Respective Officers
The resolution of this issue involves another factual finding that Naguiat
Enterprises actually managed, supervised and controlled employment
terms of the taxi drivers, making it their indirect employer. As adverted to
earlier, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies are binding upon the court
in the absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Unfortunately, the NLRC did not discuss or give any explanation for
holding Naguiat Enterprises and its officers jointly and severally liable in
discharging CFTI's liability for payment of separation pay. We again
remind those concerned that decisions, however concisely written, must
distinctly and clearly set forth the facts and law upon which they are
based. 17 This rule applies as well to dispositions by quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies.
Naguiat Enterprise Not Liable
In impleading Naguiat Enterprises as solidarily liable for the obligations of
CFTI, respondents rely on Articles 106, 18107 19 and 109 20 of the Labor
Code.
Based on factual submissions of the parties, the labor arbiter, however,
found that individual respondents were regular employees of CFTI who
received wages on a boundary or commission basis.
We find no reason to make a contrary finding. Labor-only contracting
exists where: (1) the person supplying workers to an employer does not
have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machinery, and work premises, among others; and (2) the workers
recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are
directly related to the principal business of the employer. 21 Independent
contractors, meanwhile, are those who exercise independent employment,
contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods without
being subject to control of their employer except as to the result of their
Work. 22
From the evidence proffered by both parties, there is no substantial basis
to hold that Naguiat Enterprises is an indirect employer of individual
respondents much less a labor only contractor. On the contrary,
petitioners submitted documents such as the drivers' applications for
employment with CFTI, 23 and social security remittances 24 and
payroll 25 of Naguiat Enterprises showing that none of the individual
respondents were its employees. Moreover, in the contract 26 between
CFTI and AAFES, the former, as concessionaire, agreed to purchase from
AAFES for a certain amount within a specified period a fleet of vehicles to
be "ke(pt) on the road" by CFTI, pursuant to their concessionaire's
contract. This indicates that CFTI became the owner of the taxicabs which
became the principal investment and asset of the company.
Private respondents failed to substantiate their claim that Naguiat
Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their employment. It
appears that they were confused on the personalities of Sergio F. Naguiat
as an individual who was the president of CFTI, and Sergio F. Naguiat
Enterprises, Inc., as a separate corporate entity with a separate business.
They presumed that Sergio F. Naguiat, who was at the same time a
stockholder and director 27 of Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., was
managing and controlling the taxi business on behalf of the latter. A closer
scrutiny and analysis of the records, however, evince the truth of the
matter: that Sergio F. Naguiat, in supervising the taxi drivers and
determining their employment terms, was rather carrying out his
responsibilities as president of CFTI. Hence, Naguiat Enterprises as a
separate corporation does not appear to be involved at all in the taxi
business.
To illustrate further, we refer to the testimony of a driver-claimant on
cross examination.
Atty. Suarez
Is it not true that you applied not with Sergio F. Naguiat but
with Clark Field Taxi?
Witness
I applied for (sic) Sergio F. Naguiat.
Atty. Suarez
Sergio F. Naguiat as an individual or the corporation?
Witness
Sergio F. Naguiat na tao.
Atty. Suarez
Who is Sergio F. Naguiat?
Witness
He is the one managing the Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises and
he is the one whom we believe as our employer
Atty. Suarez
What is exactly the position of Sergio F. Naguiat with the Sergio
F. Naguiat Enterprises?
Witness
He is the owner, sir.
Atty. Suarez
How about with Clark Field Taxi Incorporated what is the
position of Mr. Naguiat?
Witness
What I know is that he is a concessionaire.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Suarez
But do you also know that Sergio F. Naguiat is the President of
Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated?
Witness
Yes, sir.
Atty. Suarez
How about Mr. Antolin Naguiat what is his role in the taxi
services, the operation of the Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated?
Witness
He is the vice president. 28
And, although the witness insisted that Naguiat Enterprises was his
employer, he could not deny that he received his salary from the office of
CFTI inside the base. 29
Another driver-claimant admitted, upon the prodding of counsel for the
corporations, that Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while
CFTI was in taxi services. 30
In addition, the Constitution 31 of CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association
which, admittedly, was the union of individual respondents while still
working at Clark Air Base, states that members thereof are the employees
of CFTI and "(f)or collective bargaining purposes, the definite employer is
the Clark Field Taxi Inc."
From the foregoing, the ineludible conclusion is that CFTI was the actual
and direct employer of individual respondents, and that Naguiat
Enterprises was neither their indirect employer nor labor-only contractor.
It was not involved at all in the taxi business.
CFTI president
solidarily liable
Petitioner-corporations would likewise want to avoid the solidary liability
of their officers. To bolster their position, Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T.
Naguiat specifically aver that they were denied due process since they
were not parties to the complaint below. 32 In the broader interest of
justice, we, however, hold that Sergio F. Naguiat, in his capacity as
president of CFTI, cannot be exonerated from joint and several liability in
the payment of separation pay to individual respondents.
A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC 33 is the case in point. A.C.
Ransom Corporation was a family corporation, the stockholders of which
were members of the Hernandez family. In 1973, it filed an application for
clearance to close or cease operations, which was duly granted by the
Ministry of Labor and Employment, without prejudice to the right of
employees to seek redress of grievance, if any. Backwages of 22
employees, who engaged in a strike prior to the closure, were
subsequently computed at P164,984.00. Up to September 1976, the union
Page 3 of 45
filed about ten (10) motions for execution against the corporation, but
none could be implemented, presumably for failure to find leviable assets
of said corporation. In its last motion for execution, the union asked that
officers and agents of the company be held personally liable for payment
of the backwages. This was granted by the labor arbiter. In the
corporation's appeal to the NLRC, one of the issues raised was: "Is the
judgment against a corporation to reinstate its dismissed employees with
backwages, enforceable against its officer and agents, in their individual,
private and personal capacities, who were not parties in the case where
the judgment was rendered!" The NLRC answered in the negative, on the
ground that officers of a corporation are not liable personally for official
acts unless they exceeded the scope of their authority.
On certiorari, this Court reversed the NLRC and upheld the labor arbiter. In
imposing joint and several liability upon the company president, the
Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera,
ratiocinated this wise:
(b) How can the foregoing (Articles 265 and 273 of
the Labor Code) provisions be implemented when the
employer is a corporation? The answer is found in
Article 212(c) of the Labor Code which provides:
(c) "Employer" includes any person acting in the
interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term
shall not include any labor organization or any of its
officers or agents except when acting as employer.
The foregoing was culled from Section 2 of RA 602,
the Minimum Wage Law. Since RANSOM is an
artificial person, it must have an officer who can be
presumed to be the employer, being the "person
acting in the interest of (the) employer" RANSOM.
The corporation, only in the technical sense, is the
employer.
The responsible officer of an employer corporation
can be held personally, not to say even criminally,
liable for nonpayment of back wages. That is the
policy of the law. . . .
(c) If the policy of the law were otherwise, the
corporation employer can have devious ways for
evading payment of back wages. . . .
(d) The record does not clearly identify "the officer or
officers" of RANSOM directly responsible for failure to
pay the back wages of the 22 strikers. In the absence
of definite Proof in that regard, we believe it should be
presumed that the responsible officer is the President
of the corporation who can be deemed the chief
operation officer thereof. Thus, in RA 602, criminal
responsibility is with the "Manager or in his default, the
person acting as such." In RANSOM. the President
appears to be the Manager. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who actively
managed the business. Thus, applying the ruling in A.C. Ransom, he falls
within the meaning of an "employer" as contemplated by the Labor Code,
who may be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the
corporation to its dismissed employees.
Moreover, petitioners also conceded that both CFTI and Naguiat
Enterprises were "close family corporations" 34owned by the Naguiat
family. Section 100, paragraph 5, (under Title XII on Close Corporations) of
the Corporation Code, states:
(5) To the extent that the stockholders are actively
engage(d) in the management or operation of the
business and affairs of a close corporation, the
stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to
each other and among themselves. Said stockholders
shall be personally liable for corporate tortsunless the
corporation has obtained reasonably adequate
liability insurance. (emphasis supplied)
Nothing in the records show whether CFTI obtained "reasonably
adequate liability insurance;" thus, what remains is to determine
whether there was corporate tort.
Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of "corporate tort."
Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of a right given or the omission
of a duty imposed by law. 35 Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal
duty. 36 Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates the employer to grant
separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of operations
of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or
financial reverses, which is the condition obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to
comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation. Consequently, its
stockholder who was actively engaged in the management or operation of
the business should be held personally liable.
Furthermore, in MAM Realty Development vs. NLRC, 37 the Court
recognized that a director or officer may still be held solidarily liable with
a corporation by specific provision of law. Thus:
. . . A corporation, being a juridical entity, may act
only through its directors, officers and employees.
Obligations incurred by them, acting as such
corporate agents, are not theirs but the direct
accountabilities of the corporation they represent.
True, solidary liabilities may at times be incurred but
only when exceptional circumstances warrant such as,
generally, in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When a director, trustee or officer is made, by
specific provision of law, personally liable for his
corporate action. (footnotes omitted)
As pointed out earlier, the fifth paragraph of Section 100 of the
Corporation Code specifically imposes personal liability upon the
stockholder actively managing or operating the business and affairs of the
close corporation.
In fact, in posting the surety bond required by this Court for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order enjoining the execution of the assailed
NLRC Resolutions, only Sergio F. Naguiat, in his individual and personal
capacity, principally bound himself to comply with the obligation
thereunder, i.e., "to guarantee the payment to private respondents of any
damages which they may incur by reason of the issuance of a temporary
restraining order sought, if it should be finally adjudged that said
principals were not entitled thereto. 38
The Court here finds no application to the rule that a corporate officer
cannot be held solidarily liable with a corporation in the absence of
evidence that he had acted in bad faith or with malice. 39 In the present
case, Sergio Naguiat is held solidarily liable for corporate tort because he
had actively engaged in the management and operation of CFTI, a close
corporation.
Antolin Naguiat not personally liable
Antolin T. Naguiat was the vice president of the CFTI. Although he carried
the title of "general manager" as well, it had not been shown that he had
acted in such capacity. Furthermore, no evidence on the extent of his
participation in the management or operation of the business was
preferred. In this light, he cannot be held solidarily liable for the
obligations of CFTI and Sergio Naguiat to the private respondents.
Fourth Issue: No Denial of Due Process
Lastly, in petitioners' Supplement to their original petition, they assail the
NLRC Resolution holding Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T. Naguiat jointly
and severally liable with petitioner-corporations in the payment of
separation pay, averring denial of due process since the individual
Naguiats were not impleaded as parties to the complaint.
We advert to the case of A.C. Ransom once more. The officers of the
corporation were not parties to the case when the judgment in favor of
the employees was rendered. The corporate officers raised this issue when
the labor arbiter granted the motion of the employees to enforce the
Page 4 of 45
judgment against them. In spite of this, the Court held the corporation
president solidarily liable with the corporation.
Furthermore, Sergio and Antolin Naguiat voluntarily submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter when they, in their individual
capacities, filed a position paper 40 together with CFTI, before the arbiter.
They cannot now claim to have been denied due process since they
availed of the opportunity to present their positions.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The assailed February 28, 1994 Resolution of the NLRC is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated, and Sergio F. Naguiat,
president and co-owner thereof, are ORDERED to pay, jointly and
severally, the individual respondents their separation pay computed at
US$120.00 for every year of service, or its peso equivalent at the time of
payment or satisfaction of the judgment;
(2) Petitioner Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated, and Antolin T.
Naguiat are ABSOLVED from liability in the payment of separation pay to
individual respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 47167, which affirmed the September 29, 1997 Order 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina, Branch 272, in Civil Case No. 97-
341-MK, denying petitioners motion to dismiss. The complaint filed by
respondent sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of its
constitutional rights arising from petitioners issuance of Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93), which the Court declared
invalid in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.3
Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue while respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity
engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among
which are "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA
7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette
brands Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands
subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1,
1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-
93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad
valorem tax.4 RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More,"
and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to
Sec. 142,5 (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently
classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of
"55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos
(P5.00) per pack."6
On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A.
Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but
it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune
Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93.
On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting
the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30,
1993.7 The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency
amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and
demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof. 8 On August 3,
1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the
implementation of RMC 37-93.9 In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the
CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and
further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment
issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Court of Appeals.10 It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen
short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.
On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint 11 for
damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended
that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the
Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of
law and the right to equal protection of the laws.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss 12 contending that: (1) respondent has
no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority.
She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and
therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint
states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and
(3) the certification against forum shopping was signed by respondents
counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party
who should sign the same.
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss
holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to
prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to
present evidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against
forum shopping was cured by respondents submission of the corporate
secretarys certificate authorizing its counsel to execute the certification
against forum shopping. The dispositive portion thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to
dismiss filed by the defendant Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and the
motion to strike out and expunge from the record the said
motion to dismiss filed by plaintiff Fortune Tobacco Corporation
are both denied on the grounds aforecited. The defendant is
ordered to file her answer to the complaint within ten (10) days
from receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.13
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground that under
Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did
not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that
Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the
civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the
special law that governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad
faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained
the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the certification against forum
shopping was cured by the submission of the corporate secretarys
certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the same.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is
grounded on her acts done in the performance of her functions as a
public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code
which should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only
when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence.
She further averred that the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows
recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights, is a general law
on the liability of public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public officers
liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the instant case, does not allege
bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to
state a cause of action. As to the defect of the certification against forum
shopping, she urged the Court to strictly construe the rules and to dismiss
the complaint.
Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the
public officers "acts" from which civil liability may arise, is a general law;
while Article 32 which deals specifically with the public officers violation
of constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine
whether the complaint states a cause of action or not. Citing the case
of Lim v. Ponce de Leon,14 respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the
Civil Code, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional
rights of the plaintiff and it is not required that said public officer should
have acted with malice or in bad faith. Hence, it concluded that even
Page 5 of 45
granting that the complaint failed to allege bad faith or malice, the motion
to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action should be denied inasmuch
as bad faith or malice are not necessary to hold petitioner liable.
The issues for resolution are as follows:
(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the
functions of his/her office?
(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section
38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in
determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of
action?
(3) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with
the rule on certification against forum shopping?
(4) May petitioner be held liable for damages?
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of
his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. 15 An officer
who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which
he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to
another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not
amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its
consent.16 However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages
in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside
the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of
immunity for official actions.17
Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil
liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on
the part of a superior public officer. And, under Section 39 of the same
Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence. Thus
Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. (1) A public officer
shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his
official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith,
malice or gross negligence.
xxxx
Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. No
subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts
done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties.
However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by
him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good
customs even if he acts under orders or instructions of his
superior.
In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,18 that a
public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of
another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued
in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance
of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with
malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a
constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent
stated a cause of action and that the decisive provision thereon is Article
32 of the Civil Code.
A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and
does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A
special statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to
particular persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section
of the state only.19
A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari
materia and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if
possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there
are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other general
which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict
with the special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the
legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must not
be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions
of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order
to give its words any meaning at all. 20
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general
act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be
regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act;
and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as
remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by
necessary implication. 21
Thus, in City of Manila v. Teotico,22 the Court held that Article 2189 of the
Civil Code which holds provinces, cities, and municipalities civilly liable for
death or injuries by reason of defective conditions of roads and other
public works, is a special provision and should prevail over Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 409, the Charter of Manila, in determining the liability for
defective street conditions. Under said Charter, the city shall not be held
for damages or injuries arising from the failure of the local officials to
enforce the provision of the charter, law, or ordinance, or from negligence
while enforcing or attempting to enforce the same. As explained by the
Court:
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over
the latter, because Republic Act 409 is a special law, intended
exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a
general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we
think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application
is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil
Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject matter of
the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of
Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property arising
from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of"
said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of
the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the
other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury
suffered by, any person by reason" specifically "of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or supervision." In
other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from
negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof,
whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective
streets," in particular. Since the present action is based
upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article
2189 is decisive thereon.23
In the case of Bagatsing v. Ramirez,24 the issue was which law should
govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the City Charter of Manila, a
special act which treats ordinances in general and which requires their
publication before enactment and after approval, or the Tax Code, a
general law, which deals in particular with "ordinances levying or imposing
taxes, fees or other charges," and which demands publication only after
approval. In holding that it is the Tax Code which should prevail, the Court
elucidated that:
There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila,
whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies
universally to all local governments. Blackstone defines general
law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and
special law as one relating to particular persons or things of a
class. And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is
not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact
that one is special and the other general creates a presumption
that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception
of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the
Page 6 of 45
 law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a
situation where the special statute refers to a subject in
general, which the general statute treats in particular. Th[is]
exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the
nature and scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local
Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes,
fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to
ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force
loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of
"ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other
charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code
controls. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to
a particular provision. Special provision governs.
Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar. Article 32 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates,
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
xxxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due
process of law;
xxxx
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
xxxx
The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the
Code Commission, as follows:
"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights,
Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so amended
as to make a public official liable for violation of another
persons constitutional rights only if the public official acted
maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this
suggestion for these reasons:
"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or
criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be
malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the
main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of
individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their
powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is
to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the
United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.
"Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental
articles introduced in the New Civil Code to implement
democracy. There is no real democracy if a public official is
abusing and we made the article so strong and so
comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights
even if done in good faith, that official is liable. As a matter of
fact, we know that there are very few public officials who openly
and definitely abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most
cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to enforce the
law to comply with ones duty. And so, if we should limit the
scope of this article, that would practically nullify the object of
the article. Precisely, the opening object of the article is to put
an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith,
which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual
rights."25
The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public
officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of the rights
enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. It is not necessary that the
defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith,
otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective
protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the
constitutional right of the plaintiff. 26
Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law. 27 A tort is a
wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or
omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some
injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation. 28 There are
cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by
the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are
circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been
rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act
itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. 29 Presence of good
motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an
act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability
in tort is not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil
intent.30
The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct
cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights,
irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant. 31 This is a
fundamental innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the
Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then
President Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this
constitutional protection on civil liberties.
In Aberca v. Ver,32 it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the
principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution
acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may
a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his
subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for
the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally
protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that
propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception
that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually
responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would
certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would
easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should
nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the
Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for the transgression, joint tortfeasors.
On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code,
laid down the rule on the civil liability of superior and subordinate public
officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For both superior
and subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and
negligence are vital elements that will make them liable for damages.
Note that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of
government officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e., "acts" done in the
performance of official duties, without specifying the action or omission
that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.
Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal
terms a particular specie of an "act" that may give rise to an action for
damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of
rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals
specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All
other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and
39 of the Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the
Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same
Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable
for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be
committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the
Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from
errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the
specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed
to seek damages for violation of constitutional rights.
The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil
Code. Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action
based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the
same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts
below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint
avers a violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Page 7 of 45
Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping,
the subsequent submission of the secretarys certificate authorizing the
counsel to sign and execute the certification against forum shopping
cured the defect of respondents complaint. Besides, the merits of the
instant case justify the liberal application of the rules. 33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1999 which affirmed the
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, denying
petitioners motion to dismiss, is AFFIRMED. The Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, is hereby DIRECTED to
continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK with dispatch.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150898 April 13, 2011
OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION CORP., and/or DENNIS
HAO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ANTONIO and ANICIA CUBACUB, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as maintenance man by
petitioner company Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its office in
Caloocan City.
On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus
advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the companys general manager,
to rest for three days which he did at the companys "barracks" where he
lives free of charge.
Three days later or on April 12, 1995, Bladimir went about his usual chores
of manning the gate of the company premises and even cleaned the
company vehicles. Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a co-worker,
Ignacio Silangga (Silangga), to accompany him to his house in Capas,
Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimirs intention, Hao
gave Bladimir 1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to
the nearest hospital.
Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado, Silangga thus brought
Bladimir to the Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a
primary-care hospital around one kilometer away from the office of the
company.
The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the hospital. He was then
confined, with Narding keeping watch over him. The next day, April 13,
1995, a doctor of the hospital informed Narding that they needed to talk
to Bladimirs parents, hence, on Silanggas request, their co-workers June
Matias and Joel Edrene fetched Bladimirs parents from Tarlac.
At about 8 oclock in the evening of the same day, April 13, 1995,
Bladimirs parents-respondent spouses Cubacub, with their friend Dr.
Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias), arrived at the Caybiga Hospital and transferred
Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) where he was
placed in the intensive care unit and died the following day, April 14, 1995.
The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimirs immediate
cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as
pneumonia. On the other hand, the death certificate issued by Dr. Frias
recorded the causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ system
failure, septicemia and chicken pox.
Bladimirs parents-herein respondents later filed on August 17, 1995
before the Tarlac Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Capas a complaint for
damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of negligence
which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimirs condition leading to his
death.
By Decision of April 14, 1997, 1 Branch 66 of the Tarlac RTC at Capas
dismissed the complaint, holding that Hao was not negligent. It ruled that
Hao was not under any obligation to bring Bladimir to better tertiary
hospitals, and assuming that Bladimir died of chicken pox aggravated by
pneumonia or some other complications due to lack of adequate facilities
at the hospital, the same cannot be attributed to Hao.
On respondents appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of June 22,
2001, reversed the trial courts decision, holding that by Haos failure to
bring Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital, he violated Article 161 of the
Labor Code. It went on to state that Hao should have foreseen that
Bladimir, an adult, could suffer complications from chicken pox and, had
he been brought to hospitals like St. Lukes, Capitol Medical Center,
Philippine General Hospital and the like, Bladimir could have been saved.
Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac,
Branch 66 in Civil Case No. 349 dated April 14, 1997 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered holding the defendants solidarily
liable to plaintiffs-appellants for the following:
1. 50,000.00 for the life of Bladimir Cubacub;
2. P584,630.00 for loss of Bladimirs earning capacity;
3. P4,834.60 as reimbursement of expenses incurred at Quezon
City General Hospital as evidenced by Exhibits "E" to "E-14"
inclusive;
4. P18,107.75 as reimbursement of expenses for the 5-day wake
covered by Exhibits "F" to "F-17";
5. P30,000.00 as funeral expenses at Prudential Funeral Homes
covered by Exhibit "I";
6. P6,700.00 for acquisition of memorial lot at Sto. Rosario
Memorial Park covered by Exhibit "J";
7. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
8. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
9. P15,000.00 as attorneys fees and
10. Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
The motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution 3 of November
26, 2001, hence this petition.
Petitioners maintain that Hao exercised the diligence more than what the
law requires, hence, they are not liable for damages.
The petition is meritorious.
At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is one for damages
based on torts, the employer-employee relationship being merely
incidental. To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three
elements must be present, viz: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate
causation. The assailed decision of the appellate court held that it was the
duty of petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance to the
employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach is
committed.
Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 161. Assistance of employer. It shall be the duty of any employer to
provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and
immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or
sick employee in case of emergency. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Page 8 of 45
The Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten what the phrase
"adequate and immediate" medical attendance means in relation to an
"emergency." It would thus appear that the determination of what it
means is left to the employer, except when a full-time registered nurse or
physician are available on-site as required, also under the Labor Code,
specifically Art. 157 which provides:
Article 157. Emergency Medical and Dental Services. It shall be the duty
of every employer to furnish his employees in any locality with free
medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of:
(a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number
of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not more than two hundred
(200) except when the employer does not maintain hazardous
workplaces, in which case, the services of a graduate first-aider
shall be provided for the protection of workers, where no
registered nurse is available. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment shall provide by appropriate regulations, the
services that shall be required where the number of employees
does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate
order, hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article;
(b) The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time
physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic, when the
number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not more
than three hundred (300); and
(c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-time
registered nurse as well as a dental clinic and an infirmary or
emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one
hundred (100) employees when the number of employees
exceeds three hundred (300). (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the present case, there is no allegation that the company premises are
hazardous. Neither is there any allegation on the number of employees
the company has. If Haos testimony 4 would be believed, the company had
only seven regular employees and 20 contractual employees still short
of the minimum 50 workers that an establishment must have for it to be
required to have a full-time registered nurse.
The Court can thus only determine whether the actions taken by
petitioners when Bladimir became ill amounted to the "necessary
assistance" to ensure "adequate and immediate medical . . . attendance"
to Bladimir as required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code.
As found by the trial court and borne by the records, petitioner Haos
advice for Bladimir to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have him
brought to the nearest hospital constituted "adequate and immediate
medical" attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161, to provide to a
sick employee in an emergency.
Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical
background. He may not be thus expected to have known that Bladimir
needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities than the Caybiga
Hospital, contrary to appellate courts ruling.
AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as
the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would
not have occurred.5 An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act
or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case
that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or
actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was
either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or
omission.6
Verily, the issue in this case is essentially factual in nature. The dissent,
apart from adopting the appellate courts findings, finds that Bladimir
contracted chicken pox from a co-worker and Hao was negligent in not
bringing that co-worker to the nearest physician, or isolating him as well.
This finding is not, however, borne by the records. Nowhere in the
appellate courts or even the trial courts decision is there any such
definite finding that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker. At
best, the only allusion to another employee being afflicted with chicken
pox was when Hao testified that he knew it to heal within three days as
was the case of another worker, without reference, however, as to when it
happened.7
On the issue of which of the two death certificates is more credible, the
dissent, noting that Dr. Frias attended to Bladimir during his "last illness,"
holds that the certificate which he issued citing chicken pox as
antecedent cause deserves more credence.
There appears, however, to be no conflict in the two death certificates on
the immediate cause of Bladimirs death since both cite cardio-respiratory
arrest due to complications from pneumonia per QCGH, septicemia and
chicken pox per Dr. Frias. In fact, Dr. Frias admitted that the causes of
death in both certificates were the same. 8
Be that as it may, Dr. Frias could not be considered as Bladimirs attending
physician, he having merely ordered Bladimirs transfer to the QCGH after
seeing him at the Caybiga Hospital. He thereafter left Bladimir to the care
of doctors at QCGH, returning to Capas, Tarlac at 4 oclock the following
morning or eight hours after seeing Bladimir. As he himself testified upon
cross-examination, he did not personally attend to Bladimir anymore once
the latter was brought to the ICU at QCGH.9
It bears emphasis that a duly-registered death certificate is considered a
public document and the entries therein are presumed correct, unless the
party who contests its accuracy can produce positive evidence
establishing otherwise.10 The QCGH death certificate was received by the
City Civil Registrar on April 17, 1995. Not only was the certificate shown by
positive evidence to be inaccurate. Its credibility, more than that issued by
Dr. Frias, becomes more pronounced as note is taken of the fact that he
was not around at the time of death.
IN FINE, petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Dennis Hao are
not guilty of negligence.1avvphil
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
DISSENTING OPINION
BERSAMIN, J.:
I dissent.
I find myself unable to join my Honorable Brethren in the Third Division in
the result to be reached herein. My review of the records constrains me to
travel the lonely path, convinced to now forsake unanimity in order to
urge giving just solace to the aggrieved parents of a poor employee who
died from the complications of chicken pox after his employers forced him
to continue on the job despite his affliction that, in the first place, he had
contracted in the workplace from a co-employee. To me, his death was
wrongful by reason of the employers failure: (a) to isolate the co-worker
to prevent the spread of chicken pox; (b) to provide to him the legally
mandated first aid treatment; and (c) to extend adequate medical and
other assistance for his affliction with chicken pox and the expected
complications of the affliction (like letting him off from work in order to
have complete rest).
Antecedents
This action concerns the damages claimed by the respondents, plaintiffs
below, arising from the untimely death of their son, Bladimir Cubacub,
while employed by Ocean Builders Construction Corporation (OBCC), then
managed by petitioner Dennis Hao. Bladimir had contracted chicken pox
and a cough and had later on collapsed in the workplace and rushed to
the hospital. In its decision dated April 14, 1997, the RTC absolved the
petitioners of any liability, and dismissed the complaint and the
counterclaim, ruling that the proximate cause of Bladimirs death could
not be attributed to the petitioners, particularly because the death
certificate issued by the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) did not
state chicken pox to be the cause of death, unlike the death certificate
issued by Dr. Hermes Frias. The RTC observed that Bladimir, being already
of age, had been responsible for his own act of reporting to work despite
his illness; that chicken pox was not a serious disease requiring
hospitalization, but a self-limiting one that would heal by itself if proper
care of the patient was taken; and that the petitioners as employers were
not mandated by any law to send Bladimir to a hospital.
Page 9 of 45
The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed
the RTC. The CA held that the respondents established the petitioners
liability by preponderant evidence, and, accordingly, found that Bladimirs
health had deteriorated because he had been made to work despite his
illness and because Hao, as the manager of OBCC, had denied Bladimirs
request to take a vacation; that prior to his collapse, Bladimir had been
suffering from the complications of chicken pox and had needed
immediate medical treatment; and that the petitioners did not extend the
requisite assistance to Bladimir despite their employers duty under Article
161 of the Labor Code to provide medical attention and treatment to an
injured or sick employee in times of emergency.
The CA then disposed thuswise:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac,
Branch 66 in Civil Case No. 349 dated dated April 14, 1997 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered holding the
defendants solidarily liable to plaintiffs-appellants for the following:
1. 50,000.00 for the life of Bladimir Cubacub;
2. 584,630.00 for loss of Bladimir's earning capacity;
3. 4,834.60 as reimbursement of expenses incurred at Quezon
City General Hospital as evidenced by Exhibit "E" to "E-14"
inclusive;
4. 18,107.75 as reimbursement of expenses for the 5-day wake
covered by Exhibits "F" to "F-17";
5. 30,000.00 as funeral expenses at Prudential Funeral Homes
covered by Exhibit "I";
6. 6,700.00 for acquisition of memorial lot at Sto. Rosario
Memorial Park covered by Exhibit "J";
7. 50,000.00 as moral damages;
8. 20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
9. 15,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
10. Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.1
The petitioners sought reconsideration, but the CA rebuffed them.
Hence, this appeal, wherein the petitioners contend that the CA erred in
concluding that they had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family and in giving weight to the death certificate issued by Dr. Frias.
Submission
The appeal has no merit.
1.
CA must be upheld on its resolution because
the appeal involves essentially factual issues
The petitioners, conscious that they hereby raise issues essentially factual
in nature, submit that their appeal should be given due course as an
exception pursuant to Fuentes v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 109849,
February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 703) because the factual findings of the CA
conflicted with those of the RTC.
I am not persuaded that we should give due course to the appeal on that
basis. The mere variance between the factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts does not necessarily indicate that the CAs ruling was
erroneous, or less worthy than the RTCs. The petitioners burden was to
present strong cogent reasons to convince the Court to reverse the CA,
but their reasons were weak and contrary to the records. The CA, acting as
the reviewing court vis--vis the RTC, reasonably considered and
appreciated the records of the trial; hence, its appreciation and
determination of the factual and legal issues are entitled to great respect.
Thus, the CAs ruling should be affirmed, not reversed.
2.
Petitioners were guilty for
the wrongful death of Bladimir
The respondents have anchored their action for damages on the
provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delict and human relations.
Under the concept of quasi-delict, whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done.2 To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following
requisites must concur: (a) there must be damage caused to the plaintiff;
(b) there must be negligence by act or omission, of which the defendant
or some other person for whose acts the defendant must respond was
guilty; and (c) there must be a connection of cause and effect between
such negligence and the damage.3
Negligence, according to Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,4 is "the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do,5 or as Judge Cooley defines it, 6 (t)he failure to observe
for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury." 7
The test for the existence of negligence in a particular case has been aptly
put in Picart v. Smith,8 thuswise:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a
given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the
light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but
this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct
by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They
are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence
they can be expected to take care only when there is something
before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the
case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually
pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard
against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the
proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given
case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful
to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the
conduct or guarding against its consequences. 9
Negligence is a relative term, not an absolute one, because its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the reasonable degree of
care and vigilance that the surrounding circumstances reasonably impose.
Consequently, when the danger is great, a high degree of care is required,
and the failure to observe such degree of care amounts to want of
ordinary care.10
The essential linkage between the negligence or fault, on one hand, and
the injury or damage, on the other hand, must be credibly and sufficiently
established. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a
failure to act whenever it appears from the evidence that the act or
Page 10 of 45
omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing
the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct
result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. 11
According to the petitioners, the following acts of Hao proved that they
were not negligent, namely: (a) it was at Haos instance that Bladimir was
brought to the Caybiga Community Hospital; (b) before leaving for
Hongkong, Hao instructed Ignacio Silangga, another employee, to attend
to the needs of Bladimir who had been admitted in the hospital; and (c)
Hao advised Bladimir to take a rest for three days.
The Majority hold that all that Article 161 of the Labor Code, upon which,
12
among others, the CA anchored its decision against the petitioners,
required of the petitioners as the employers of the ill Bladimir was to
render "necessary assistance" to ensure "adequate and immediate medical
attendance"; that Haos advice to Bladimir to take a 3-day rest, which he
did, and to later have Bladimir brought to the nearest hospital constituted
the adequate and immediate medical attendance Article 161 mandated;
and that given that chicken pox was self-limiting, Hao, who did not appear
to have a medical background, might not be expected to have known that
Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities than the
Caybiga Hospital.
The Majority further hold that the alleged negligence of Hao could not be
the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir, because whatever he did or
did not do played no substantial part in bring about or actually causing
the injury or damage; hence, the death of Bladimir was neither the direct
result nor a reasonably probable consequence of Haos act or omission;
that there was nothing in the records to show that Bladimir had
contracted the chicken pox from an afflicted co-worker whom Hao
negligently did not bring to the nearest physician, or did not isolate from
his co-workers; that both lower courts did not make any definite finding
that Bladimir had contracted the chicken pox from a co-worker; and that
the only allusion to another employee being afflicted with chicken pox
was made by Hao when he testified that he had known that chicken pox
would heal within three days "as was the case of another worker, without
reference, however, as to when it happened." 13
I cannot accept the Majoritys holding.
The Majoritys favoring the petitioners disregards the records, which
convincingly demonstrated and preponderantly established that Hao had
failed to exercise the degree of care and vigilance required under the
circumstances. Besides, the aforestated acts of Hao, objectively
considered, did not warrant the petitioners absolution from liability.
Let me elucidate.
2.a.
Petitioners violated the requirements of
the Labor Code and its implementing rules
It is good to start by unhesitatingly indicating that the petitioners as
employers committed violations of the minimum standards of care that
the law erected for the benefit of Bladimir and his co-workers.
The implementing rules of the Labor Code required OBCC to provide
medical and dental services and facilities to its employees. Specifically,
under Section 4(a), Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules of Book IV, OBCC
had the legal obligation due to the number of its workers being at least 27
in number (that is, seven regular employees and 20 contractual ones,
according to Hao) to employ at least a graduate first-aider, who might be
one of the workers in the workplace; such graduate first-aider must be
afforded immediate access to the first-aid medicines, equipment, and
facilities.14 The term first-aider refers to a person who has been trained
and duly certified as qualified to administer first aid by the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) or any other organization accredited by the
PNRC.15 The term first-aid treatment means adequate, immediate, and
necessary medical attention or remedy given in case of injury or sudden
illness suffered by a worker during employment, irrespective of whether or
not such an injury or illness is work-connected, before more extensive
medical or dental treatment can be secured; it does not include continued
treatment or follow-up treatment for any injury or illness. 16
However, Hao admitted that OBCC did not have a clinic in the workplace,
or a nurse or other competent person who might assist an employee in an
emergency, or that OBCC had any agreement with a nearby hospital to
attend to a sick employee.17 The admitted failure to provide to the
employees, in general, and to Bladimir, in particular, any of the several free
emergency medical and dental services and facilities the Labor Code and
the implementing rules and regulations of the Department of Labor and
Employment required removed the foundation for absolving the
petitioners from liability.
Chicken pox, or varicella, is a highly contagious disease of childhood,
caused by a large DNA virus and characterized by a well-defined
incubation period, and a vesicular rash that typically occurs in successive
crops and most marked on the trunk. In healthy children, the disease is
usually mild with clinical symptoms limited to the skin; but in
immunosuppressed children and adults, life-threatening illness caused by
deep visceral involvement is not uncommon. 18 Among the known
complications of varicella are: (a) secondary bacterial infection; (b) varicella
pneumonia; (c) dissemination to other viscera; (d) central nervous system
complications; (e) coagulation complications; and (f) rare complications
such as varicella infection of the cornea, edema, Reyes syndrome, or
myocarditis.19
Chicken pox is a self-limiting disease that heals by itself when properly
taken care of by giving the patient sufficient time to rest and
administering symptomatic medications. Dr. Hermes Frias enlightened the
trial court thereon:
COURT
Q: He contracted chicken pox?
A: Yes, your honor, which is a self limiting disease.
Q: What do you mean by that?
A: Meaning to say, your Honor, if it is properly taken care of, it will not
reach to the point of seriously affecting the patient and there is a certain
period wherein the chicken pox will heal. 20
ATTY. SANTILLAN
Q: That is you said if taken care of at the initial?
A: Yes, sir.21
xxx
COURT
Q: Will you clarify. You said that the disease is self limiting disease.
A: Yes your honor.
Q: So more or less, even without any medicine or without any medical
attendance if it is self limiting disease, it will heal by itself, Isnt it?
A: Yes, your Honor, if you would let me clarify on that thing, your Honor.
Chicken pox has no medicine, it is being treated symptomatically. What I
mean that it has no medicine. There are medicines that are being tested
that claim to have anti-viral activities but it cannot be positively claimed
that there is a medicine solely for chicken pox. So chicken pox, you,
Honor, is being treated symptomatically. If the patient having chicken pox
will have fever, he will be given anti-fever medicine and if the patient have
pneumonia due to chicken pox, that is when the appropriate antibiotics is
given.
Q: If it is self limiting, doctor, can you not say you dont even have to
confine him in the hospital?
A: Yes, your honor, but the patient should be confined in bed. 22
Based on the foregoing testimony of Dr. Frias, it is imperative that the
chicken pox-afflicted patient should be confined in bed to rest during the
Page 11 of 45
initial stages of the disease; otherwise, the complications of chicken pox,
which are deadly, may set in.
Dr. Frias explained the probability of the complications of chicken pox
affecting the patient, viz:
A: Among the complications of chicken pox especially in adults that
contacted it is pneumonia, then another complication is the brain,
encephalitis, those are the complications, sir.
Q: In your medical opinion, doctor, when can these complications set in?
Taruc stated, too, that Bladimir, already looking weak and full of rashes in
his body, wanted very much to go home to Capas, Tarlac to rest during
the Holy Week break but his manager (Hao) did not give him permission
to do so. I excerpt Tarucs relevant testimony, to wit:
Q: Now on April 11, 1995, what time did you and Mr. Cubacub talk?
A: 9:00 o'clock in the morning, sir.
Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court why you went there on April 11,
1995?

A: There is no specific time on when these complications set in; but if the A: I wanted to invite him to go home because that was a Holy Week, sir.
patient is properly taken care of during his illness having chicken pox,
these complications usually do not set in. The book states that COURT
complications of pneumonia is around, if I am not mistaken, 20% to 30%
of patients contacting chicken pox.
Holy Tuesday, you did not work on that day?

Q: In your medical opinion also, doctor, if the patient who has chicken pox
WITNESS
do(es) not rest and continue(s) working and without medication, would
your answer still be the same as to the time when these complications will
set in? We did not have work on that day ma'am.

A: Without proper rest and medication, your Honor, the chances of COURT
complication setting in is much higher than in a patient who is fully rested
and receiving symptomatic medications. 23 Alright, proceed.

With the records showing that OBCC did not have the graduate first aider ATTY. S. SANTILLAN:
or clinic in the workplace, Bladimir received no first aid treatment from
April 9, 1995 (when he contracted chicken pox) until April 12, 1995 (when
Q: In what particular place you met Bladimir Cubacub on April 11, 1995 at
he was rushed to the community hospital after collapsing in the
9:00 o'clock in the morning?
workplace). Also, Bladimir was not allowed to have bed rest, considering
that Hao instead required him to continue on the job despite his affliction,
denying the latters request to be allowed to rest in his parents home in WITNESS
Capas, Tarlac, all because Hao was due to leave for Hongkong for the Holy
Week break and had no one else to remain in the premises in his absence. A: At the guard house, sir.
Haos utter lack of concern and solicitude for the welfare of Bladimir not
only contravened the letter and spirit of the Labor Code but also
Q: Guard house of what company if you know or what place?
manifested a callous disregard of Bladimirs weakened condition.

A: Ocean Builders, sir.

It is not to be lost sight of, too, that, even assuming that Hao really told
Bladimir to take a rest in the company barracks upon his affliction with
chicken pox on April 9, 1995, the petitioners should still answer for the Q: What was Bladimir doing there at the guard house when you arrived?
wrongful death because the barracks provided to Bladimir and others (free
of charge, the Majority point out) were unsuitable for any employee A: He was assigned in that guard house, sir.
afflicted with chicken pox to have the requisite complete rest. The
barracks consisted of a small, cramped, and guardhouse-like structure
Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court what you and Bladimir talked about
constructed of wood and plywood that even raised the chances for
during that meeting at 9:00 o'clock on April 11, 1995?
chicken pox to spread. Under the circumstances, the petitioners neglect
of the welfare of Bladimir became all the more pronounced.
A: I also invited Bladimir to go home on Holy Thursday, however, he
informed me that he could not go home because he was not allowed by
2.b.
his manager to go home as his manager was going somewhere, sir.

Bladimir succumbed to complications of chicken pox

after petitioners refused to let him have complete rest
There are two sides of whether or not Bladimir was afforded the sufficient
time to rest. The first is Haos claim that Bladimir took a three-day rest,
more particularly, on April 9, 10 and 11, 1995. The second is the
respondents insistence that Hao still required Bladimir to remain on the
job from April 9 to April 12, 1995 despite Bladimirs several requests to be
allowed to go to his parents home in Capas, Tarlac to have the much
needed rest, because Hao was then set to travel to Hongkong during the
Holy Week break and desired Bladimir to man the premises in his absence.
Q: Now, can you tell this Honorable Court also if you know what was the
physical condition of Bladimir at the time you are talking to him?
A: At that time, sir, his face was full of chicken pox, sir, and he looks weak,
sir.
Q: Now, was that the only subject of conversation between you and
Bladimir Cubacub at the time you visited him?
A: I was inviting him to go home that week, however he did not want to
go home, in fact he showed his chicken pox in his stomach and he
informed me that he will be going home when I come back for work, sir.

The Majority adopts the first, despite Hao supporting his claim with only
his mere say-so, but I incline towards the respondents version, because of
the objective confirmation of the version by two witnesses, who coincided
in their declarations that Bladimir was on the job on April 11, 1995 and
April 12, 1995, contrary to Haos claim.
Q: Will you tell the Court, you describe what those bulutong looks like?
A: "Butil-butil" with pus and his face, both arms and his stomach were full
of chicken pox, and they look like boil (pigsa), mam. 24

The first objective witness was Ariel Taruc, who was presented by the The second objective witness was Ignacio Silangga, an employee of OBCC
respondents. Taruc testified that he saw Bladimir working, cleaning the whom the petitioners presented on their side. Like Taruc, Silangga saw
company premises and vehicles, and manning the gate on April 11, 1995. Bladimir working on April 11, 1995 by cleaning the company premises and

Page 12 of 45
vehicles, and opening and closing the gate of the premises, as the
following except of his testimony bears out:
Q: On April 11?
A: On April 11, I saw him, sir.
Q: Also working in the premises?
A: He was cleaning the vehicle, sir.
Q: So aside from cleaning the premises, opening, closing the gate, you
also see him cleaning the vehicles of the corporation, is that what you
mean?
A: Yes, sir, that is his duty or job.
COURT
Q: Cleaning the vehicle is his job?
A: Yes, maam.25
In addition, Silangga attested that Bladimir continued on the job on April
12, 1995, instead of resting. In fact, Silangga recalled Bladimir requesting
to bring him home to Tarlac ("bring me to Tarlac") because he wanted his
own brothers and sisters to take care of him and to rest. The relevant
excerpt of Silanggas testimony follows:
Q: Can you recall to us what date was that when you last saw him before
you saw him at the hospital?
A: On April 12, 1995, sir, I came from Manila because I secured the Plate
Number of Mr. Dennis Hao, sir.
Q: And, from Manila, where did you go?
A: Upon entering the gate of your company, Bladimir was there and he
was the one who opened the gate for me, sir.
Q: And, when Bladimir opened the gate for you on April 12, 1995, was he
in his ordinary self or usual ordinary self?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Alright, so, after opening the gate of Ocean Builders, do you remember
what happened next?
A: Bladimir Cubacub calls me "Kuya", sir, and he told me, "Kuya, can you
bring me to Tarlac", sir.
Q: And, did Bladimir Cubacub tell you the reason why he wants to be
brought to Tarlac?
A: He told me that he wants to take a rest, sir.
Q: And, did he also tell you the reason why he wanted to take a rest?
A: He did not tell me the reason, sir. He just told me that he wants to take
a rest, so, his brothers and sisters could take care of him, sir.
Q: Did he not also tell you the reason why he wants his brothers and
sisters to take care of him?
A: What I know, he was suffering from chicken pox, sir. 26
With the aforequoted testimonies definitely confirming that Bladimir
worked until April 12, 1995 (at least) despite his greatly weakened
condition, I wonder how and why the RTC still held that Bladimir was
solely responsible for the fatal consequence of his affliction, and why the
Majority agrees with the RTC and completely absolves the petitioners
from responsibility and liability.
2.c.
Bladimir contracted chicken pox
from a co-employee
Citing the lack of any finding to that effect in the decisions of both lower
courts, the Majority downplays the cause of Bladimirs chicken pox and
ignores that Bladimir contracted the chicken pox from a co-worker.
I cannot go along with the Majority. It will be odd if the Court refuses to
rectify the omission of both lower courts in missing out on such an
important detail as the causation of the chicken pox and ignores the
evidence to that effect. The silence of the lower courts ought not to
impede the rectification, for ours is the foremost duty, as the ultimate
dispenser of justice and fairness, to make judicial decisions speak the
truth.
Thus, I excerpt from Haos testimony the portion that incontrovertibly
shows that he well knew that Bladimir had contracted his chicken pox
from a co-worker, in order to show how Bladimir contracted the chicken
pox from a co-worker, viz:
Q: Personally, have you experience from chicken pox (sic), do you know
whether it is something serious or what kind disease?
A: Actually, before Bladimir Cubacub was afflicted with chicken pox from
one of his co-employee who is also residing in the barracks who was
afflicted with chicken pox, that is why I saw that chicken pox could ill in
about three (3) days, sir.27
Clearly, it was Hao who himself confirmed that Bladimir had contracted his
chicken pox from a co-worker.
2.d.
Haos acts after Bladimir collapsed and was rushed to the hospital
were superficial, too little, and too late
It is true that Hao directed Silangga to bring Bladimir to the community
hospital after he collapsed in the workplace, giving 1,000.00 for
Bladimirs medical bill. But Haos solicitude was superficial (if not feigned),
too little, and too late.
Superficial (if not feigned), for, although Bladimir, as a stay-in employee of
OBCC under Haos supervision, was Haos responsibility, Hao had not
earlier done anything to prevent Bladimir from contracting chicken pox by
isolating Bladimir from contact with the afflicted co-worker. Instead,
Bladimir and the afflicted co-worker were forced to stay together in their
crowded barracks. In addition, Hao showed no further interest in seeing to
the condition of Bladimir and in ascertaining whether the community
hospital to where Bladimir had been rushed upon Haos directive had the
adequate facilities and medical personnel to attend to Bladimir. Obviously,
the community hospital was not adequate, because Bladimirs condition
deteriorated until he fell into coma on April 13, 1995, the day following his
admission.
Too little, because 1,000.00 was a mere pittance when compared with
OBCCs undeserved savings from not complying with its legally mandated
obligation to provide first aid treatment to its employees, and from not
doing more after Bladimir had been rushed to the community hospital by
Silangga.
Too late, because by the time of rushing him to the community hospital
Bladimir had already collapsed due to the irreversible effects of the deadly
complications of the 3-days old affliction.
2.e.
Conclusion
Unlike the Majority, I find a direct link between the petitioners acts and
omissions and Bladimirs death. The chain of the events from the time
when Bladimir was exposed to the chicken pox afflicting his co-worker due
to their staying together in the cramped space of the workers barracks, to
the time when Hao directed Silangga to rush the collapsed Bladimir to the
Page 13 of 45
community hospital, and until Bladimir succumbed in QCGH indicated a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, demonstrating how their gross neglect of their employees plight
led to or caused the wrongful death.
Contrary to the Majoritys conclusion, Hao willfully disregarded Bladimirs
deteriorating condition and prevented him from taking time off from his
job to have the much needed complete rest. Haos attitude enabled the
complications of chicken pox, like pneumonia, to set in to complicate
Bladimirs condition. Hao did not need to have a medical background to
realize Bladimirs worsening condition and the concomitant perils, for such
condition was not concealed due to Bladimirs body notoriously bearing
the signs of his affliction and general debility. By the time Hao acted and
had Bladimir brought to the community hospital, the complications of the
disease were already irreversible.
Undoubtedly, the petitioners did not use that reasonable care and caution
that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation.
3.
Dr. Frias death certificate was more reliable on the cause of death
The Majority do not consider the later death certificate issued by Dr. Frias
(which included chicken pox among the causes of death) more reliable
than the death certificate issued on April 17, 1995 by the QCGH (which did
not include chicken pox among the causes of death), mainly because Dr.
Frias could not be considered as Bladimirs attending physician, he having
merely ordered Bladimirs transfer to the QCGH after seeing him at the
Caybiga Community Hospital; and because the QCGH death certificate
was a public document whose entries are presumed correct unless their
inaccuracy is first shown by positive evidence.
I disagree with the Majority.
Although, concededly, any competent health professional can confirm
that death has occurred, only a physician who attended the patient during
his last illness can execute a death certificate. Anent the task, the physician
provides an opinion on the cause of death and certifies to such cause of
death, not to the fact of death. The physician is not required to confirm
that life is extinct; or to view the body of the deceased; or to report the
fact that death has occurred. The death certificate is not a medical
document, but a civil one intended to serve various legal purposes.
Was Dr. Frias qualified to execute the second death certificate?
I answer in the affirmative.
I deem to be uncontroverted that Dr. Frias medically attended to Bladimir
during his last illness, considering that Dr. Frias was the physician who
coordinated Bladimirs transfer to QCGH from the Caybiga Community
Hospital based on his professional assessment of the true medical
condition of Bladimir and of the urgent need for the transfer to another
medical institution with better facilities.
In contrast, the physician who executed on April 17, 1995 the death
certificate for Bladimir in QCGH did not attend to Bladimir during his last
illness. This fact is unquestionably borne out in the death certificate itself,
in which the physician ticked the box denominated as Question No. 20 in
the form for the death certificate, thereby stating that he had not
attended to the deceased.28
Moreover, Dr. Frias testified that the QCGH death certificate was prepared
principally to enable the transport of the remains of Bladimir from Quezon
City to Tarlac. Upon seeing the incompleteness of the QCGH death
certificate on the causes of death, however, Dr. Frias felt compelled to
execute another death certificate, as the following excerpt of his testimony
reveals:
Q: The Court would like to be clarified, Dr. Frias. Who is authorized to
issue a death certificate based on the rules and regulations of the
Department of Health?
A: Attending physicians, your Honor, and any doctor who saw the patient.
COURT
Q: Could you reconcile why there are two (2) death certificates in this case,
one issued by the hospital where the patient died and one which you
issued?
A: They can be reconciled your Honor...
Q: No, I'm not asking for reconciliation. I'm just asking why there are two
death certificates?
A: Yes, it was given to him so that the patient can be transported while I
made the other one to show how seriously ill the patient was at the time
of his death, anyway I initially saw the patient and I was with him all the
way up to the time he was transferred to the Quezon City General
Hospital, your Honor.
Q: Did I hear you correctly when you said that you issued the certificate
after you saw the death certificate issued by the Quezon City General
Hospital?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: The Court is asking why is there a need for another death certificate
when in fact you said there was already a death certificate that was
already issued if it is for transporting the corpse?
A: I made one, your Honor. The answer is I made one so to show the real
cause of death of the patient. I think in my opinion, the death certificate of
the Quezon City General Hospital is inadequate to show the real condition
of the patient.29
Based on the foregoing, therefore, that Dr. Frias had the basic competence
to execute the second death certificate, and that such death certificate
was the more reliable on the causes of Bladimirs death should be beyond
debate.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny the petition for review on certiorari, and to
affirm the decision rendered on June 22, 2001 by the Court of Appeals.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner
herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia
caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by
said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road
between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on
collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla
and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned,
and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered
injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed
against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and
one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case
granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be
reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in
the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the
deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the
Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the
Page 14 of 45
Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the
plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This
decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages
to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is
undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as
he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to
Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is
proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it
is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been
caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and
speeding (Exhibit A) violation which appeared in the records
of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to
himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the
provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is
governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary,
and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person
criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The
petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued
for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to
prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words,
The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903
of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in
Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes
said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case
at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the
Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code
itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from
wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable by
law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability
sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not a civil
obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of
Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of
the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or
supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this
separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily
and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an
employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's
negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability
as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but
Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not
been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle
that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled
together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and
fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should
REVISED PENAL CODE
be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and
remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry
by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists
and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases
as well as by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences
of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa
aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording
and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as
follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-
contracts, and from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in
which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal
Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in
which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes
shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this
book.
xxx xxx xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for
the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article
is enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who
live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or
incapacitated persons subject to their authority and living with
them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally
liable for any damages caused by their employees while
engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on
occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a
special agent, but not if the damage shall have been caused by
the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the
act performed, in which case the provisions of the next
preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the
persons mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his
employees may recover from the latter what he may have paid.
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The
exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2,
3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this
Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall
be enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil
liability for acts committed by any imbecile or insane person,
and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine
but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment shall devolve upon those having such person
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that
there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Page 15 of 45
 Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or
minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if
such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the
person for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be
civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have
received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate
amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even
approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to
the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever
the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their
agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special
laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons
using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily,
or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving
always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers
and proprietors of establishment. In default of persons
criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other
persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation
of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of
goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses lodging
therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the
innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the
deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore
have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the care of
and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of
robbery with violence against or intimidation against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's
employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall
also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted
a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall
commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall
be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code
seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant
case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not
punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently
been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse
confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of
scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and
unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early
ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal
terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The
Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or
negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7,
says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a
sabiendas en dao al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According
to article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal
institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que
intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093
provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of
Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil
Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and
the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of
private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal
act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the
damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are
punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the
latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or
negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations
of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the
rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso
Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of
quasi-delicts and the employer's primary and direct liability under article
1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia
Juridica Espaola" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
SPANISH DELETED
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects
and comprises different persons. Thus, there is a civil
responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it
any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary
consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or
misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case:
There had been a collision between two trains belonging respectively to
the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of
the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company
had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The
employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the
Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was
whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for
damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the
affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
SPANISH DELETED
Page 16 of 45
 As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts,
it seems less tenable that there should be res judicata with
regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the
losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which
the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the
civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the
latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with
aggravating aspects which give rise to penal measures that are
more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations,
or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public
order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office
of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means
the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no
longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of
effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to
ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to
contractual faults which are not pertinent and belong to
another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil
Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages
in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that
such actions are every day filed before the civil courts without
the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and
121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the
social and political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate
the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime,
separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which
is known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent
of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed
comparison between the former provisions and that regarding
the obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is
pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their
own way the civil responsibilities among those who, for different
reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil
responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for
which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary
character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal
Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this
regard, the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903
says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among
the persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees of
establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service
or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it
happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the
companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases
because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the
crime, are sued and sentenced directly and separately with
regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the
separation between punitive justice and the civil courts being a
true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different
fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different
modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaa del
Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the
criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it
seems undeniable that the action for indemnification for the
losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub
judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a
sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of March 21
was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal,
it has already been shown that such action had been
legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but
because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony
and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the
crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which
the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason
for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the
action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil
Code, on which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose
provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of
the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil
Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person
responsible (for another), without including the author of the
act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense
that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by
the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not
be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act
or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action
for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action.
(Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol.
20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429,
430), declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not
subsidiary. He writes:
Spanish deleted
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for
the acts or omissions of those persons for who one is
responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this
question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the
legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for
the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but such
assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal
maxim that all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for
those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in
question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not
because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to
say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian,
proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc.
Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article
referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees,
apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the
father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of
negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this
fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only
apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in
reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea
that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely
inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes
al Codigo Civil Espaol," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Spanish Deleted
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others,
because one is liable only for his own faults, this being the
doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the
acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which
gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or
subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code
distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the
one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring that the
responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the
latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the
civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be
understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for
precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons
for whom one should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court
has upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa
extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent
from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an
employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly
responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October
21, 1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been
run over by a street car owned by the "compaia Electric Madrilea de
Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was
acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car
Page 17 of 45
company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower
court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme
Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had
been declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Spanish Deleted
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the
mistaken supposition that the trial court, in sentencing
the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the damage caused
by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value
and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the
criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is a
fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same
act in its different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction
declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question
did not constitute a felony because there was no grave
carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of
acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil
obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting,
in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the
managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the
damages caused by employees under certain conditions, it is
manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the
same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company,
appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by
one of its employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in
relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal
Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes
which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way
contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or
with the street car company. This is precisely what happens in the present
case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone
or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal
negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not
exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on
the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the
present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so
that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime,
he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo
would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are
directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own
presumed negligence which he did not overcome under article 1903.
Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because
of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal
negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under
article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and
they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within
their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the
more expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was
either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably
without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment
against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the
employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the
employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason
should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for
damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been
convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case
cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former
was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found
guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above
quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919,
an action was brought against a railroad company for damages because
the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly
and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly
under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de
los hechos que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito:
1., que las expediciones facturadas por la compaia ferroviaria
a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su
demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a
sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que llegadas a su
destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho
consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y
con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de entrega de estas
expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le
originaron daos y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante
importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y
alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse
privado de servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho por los
remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los
cuatro motivos que integran este recurso, porque la demanda
inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca
del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no
se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de
ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes,
careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo
de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido,
sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daos y
perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la
injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las
mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la
sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada
en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente
a la Compaia demandada como ligada con el causante de
aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia
administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue
of the facts which it declares, in relation to the evidence in the
case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor
of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles
referred to in the complaint should be returned to the
consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said
merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the
consignee was refused by the station agent without justification
and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of
these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused
him losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was
a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize
the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by
the consignors of the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the
four assignments of error, as the original complaint did not
contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a
contract of transportation, because the action was not based on
the delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between
the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of
Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is
not applicable; but it limits to asking for reparation for losses
and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on
account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to
deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the
sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in
article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next
article, the defendant company, because the latter is connected
with the person who caused the damage by relations of
economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come
under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of
the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been
the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper
Page 18 of 45
subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be
noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being
sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359,
362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a
laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to
repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was
being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This
Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the
action that the necessary conclusion from these collated laws is
that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a
criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must
be made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily
to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have
procured the arrest of the representative of the company
accountable for not repairing the track, and on his prosecution
a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by
him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes
upon this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes
obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by
the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI.
Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage
to another when there is fault or negligence shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the
preceeding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the
persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the
mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or
enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter may be employed or in the
performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease
when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it
may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of
statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or
9-year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to
maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation
recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run
therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil
over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial
rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a
court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to
sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in
adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes, such as is
part:
proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these
articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from
the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights
dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper
criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of
the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if
these articles had always stood alone, such a construction
would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their
meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of
Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in
actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or
explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of
action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or
separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was
suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once
started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it
had been waived by the party injured or been expressly
reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil
action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could
be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action
thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in
harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on
the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but
the citation of these articles suffices to show that the civil
liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even
to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the
law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or
omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek
out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a
condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an
employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal
actions against his employees only while they are in process of
prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the
criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under
the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred
thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch
as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing our of
the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can
not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary
to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in
penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has
been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure
now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited
in this case appears from the briefs before us to have arisen
from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or
negligence not punished by law," as applied to the
comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of
the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an
employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the
offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence
punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and
1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within
the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of
which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to
be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to
one another. But where relations already formed give rise to
duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then
breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and
1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction
may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to
defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his
employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that
to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to
the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern
part of Solana Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real
Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the
latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along
Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to
run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way
along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the
speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully
Page 19 of 45
 crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on
Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto
precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could
not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed,
aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of
crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward
direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the
latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left,
and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the
automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's
body had already been stretched out on the ground, the
automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this
circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana
Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant
having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by
the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death
of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of
the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter
either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a
crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction,
the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil
Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same
doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant,
Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal,
brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a result
of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the
evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in
Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal
had come from another municipality to attend the same. After the
procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing
along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric &
Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile
appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was slightly
ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to
run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from
the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the
burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was
no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages
from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder
of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore
outlined, he nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the
action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It
is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the
stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a
perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on
the evening when the religious procession was held. There was
nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces
in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence
of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running
and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine
announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf
and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the
Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence
of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to
recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction
of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically
applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House
could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence
and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was
for damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been
caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the
child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering
gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the
International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers
during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court
to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed
the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the
exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the
presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. He
obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far
as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise
selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the
Government in their particular calling, and apparently
thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few
hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the
evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or
constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in
cases of negligence, but also provides when the liability shall
cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease
when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an
injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee
there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be
rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on
his own negligence and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs.
Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged
that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile,
which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile
struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article
1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part
(p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where
he is the owner or director of a business or enterprise and the
negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his
master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and
Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The
latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of
his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school
with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and
pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo
Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of
defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide
through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court,
applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the
relationship of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of
the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
Page 20 of 45
 his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624;
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517
(year 1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition
of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to
the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's
wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized to
navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the
appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a
captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of
the opinion that the presumption of liability against the
defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa,
in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the
cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from
all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary
liability is negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the
authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages
under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant.
We study first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year
1928). A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of
the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged
in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was
prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries
through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a
fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from
Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric
Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily
liable. The main defense was that the defendant had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower
court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part,
that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping
the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code govern.
The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes
the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code
negatives its application by providing that civil obligations
arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman
was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code.
The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or
omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation
connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of
the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its
jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is
a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises
and not a case of civil negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal
Code and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the
trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to
escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master
had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its
servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense
to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil
action either as a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime
or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further
that the statements here made are offered to meet the
argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that
article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal
articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's
proposition, because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the
present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903
of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's
criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila
Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is
the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his
employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals
in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of
the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and
independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by
the defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company
had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced,
among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000.
An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the
defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted
to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil
liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and
so hold, (1) that the exemption from civil liability established in
article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the
subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the
instant case, because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement
of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the
case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's
primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In
fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention because that
decision illustrates the principle that the employer's primary responsibility
under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from his
subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant
has failed to recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a
crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise
failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327).
That case need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved
was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as
the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality
of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they
show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the
same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the
employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and
directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily
be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless
but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application
in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through
any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be
indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime.
In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we,
in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito,
Page 21 of 45
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance
of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's)
property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a
devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a
remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is
based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under
article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the
defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of
common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public
conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay
damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go
through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure?
In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate
the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility
of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to
protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and
supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or
employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee
the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of
others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least,
some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their
negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and
just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who
could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the
injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used such
employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12,
p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the
employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent.
Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before
third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola
personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le
emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the
person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All
these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes
to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only
by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-
contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual
course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by
such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow
on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for
the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an
ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.
G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918
JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
Ramon Sotelo for appellant.
Kincaid & Hartigan for appellee.
FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff,
Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the
capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of
San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the
defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the
company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass,
supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's
trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the
plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding
and, making, his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of
the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station
there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient
some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front
of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several
coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio
Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car,
alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the
level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther the
plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in
contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped
from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once
rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his
right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the
plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters
before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the
railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance
away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult
to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform
where the plaintiff alighted is found in the fact that it was the customary
season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to
the station for the shipment to the market. They were contained in
numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in a row one upon
another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of
melons and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff
was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the
moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to
see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition,
and it appeared that the injuries which he had received were very serious.
He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of
Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The
result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then
carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and
the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears
in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of
medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the
process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages of the defendant
company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the
platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of
passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court
Page 22 of 45
of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as
above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the effect that,
although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the
fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers
passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed
to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore
precluded form recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of
the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were
guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner
above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted
from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause
of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the
defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless
recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In
resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of
liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately
examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the
defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond
for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach
of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care
in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate,
differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive
responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of
the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care
in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-
contractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that
article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of
the Civil Code, clearly points out this distinction, which was also
recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093
Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and
independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation
between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie"
and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an obligation
already existing . . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest
squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil
Code] are applicable are understood to be those not growing
out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But
where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether
springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of
those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the
same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep.,
359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the
Spanish law, is, in certain cases imposed upon employers with respect to
damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to persons to
whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the English
Common Law, upon the principle of respondeat superior if it were, the
master would be liable in every case and unconditionally but upon the
principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon
all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the
obligation of making good the damage caused. One who places a
powerful automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be
ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an
act of negligence which makes him liable for all the consequences of his
imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage arises at the very
instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of his
employment causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal and
direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in
the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of
the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the
damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract
between the master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection
and control of the servant relieves the master from liability for the latter's
acts on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has never
existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-
contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused
damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the
selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they
should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to
confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs
his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and
he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his
servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third person
suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law
creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or
direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to
proof of due care and diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as
found in the Porto Rico Code, has held that these articles are applicable to
cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto
Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the
case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an
action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the
defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his
employee while acting within the scope of his employment. The Court,
after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an
injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee
there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be
rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on
his own negligence and not on that of his servant. This is the
notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of
course, in striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in
relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant in
conclusively the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of
extra-contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that there
shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and
that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable
presumption, is in complete accord with the authoritative opinion of
Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903
is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special
relations of authority or superiority existing between the person called
upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was
the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent
acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions
cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based
upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or
control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this
regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his
contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or
contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or
omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it
members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of
certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept
of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the
Page 23 of 45
measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character,
which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of
society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or
to mere inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to
indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between
obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests
upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful
or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris,
whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the
breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into
the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence,
whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect
and our Legislature has so elected whom such an obligation is imposed
is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to
extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as
to include responsibility for the negligence of those person who acts or
mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to
exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which
adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability
with certain well-defined exceptions to cases in which moral culpability
can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in the
selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control of
persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency
with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by
contract to render service to another, is wholly different from that to
which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which
plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the
burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if he does
not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual
undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that
plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary
for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract
is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of
his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is
sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual
culpa, a suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of its
existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while
on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the
existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it
exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to
prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a
contract to show that the breach was due to the negligent conduct of
defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the actual cause
of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the
negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the
contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If the negligence of
servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the liability
arising from contract, the anomalous result would be that person acting
through the medium of agents or servants in the performance of their
contracts, would be in a better position than those acting in person. If one
delivers a valuable watch to watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the
bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is
unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his liability for
the breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise due care in
the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose
negligence caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical
persons would enjoy practically complete immunity from damages arising
from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts as such
juridical persons can of necessity only act through agents or servants, and
it would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care had
been taken in selection and direction of such servants. If one delivers
securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by
reason of the negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it be
just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for the
breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of the
debt by proving that due care had been exercised in the selection and
direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation,
and culpa contractual as a mere incident to the performance of a contract
has frequently been recognized by the supreme court of Spain.
(Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December 13,
1896.) In the decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's
action arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of the
provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish
Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing
obligation, by fault or negligence, such as those to which article
1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the
defendant's failure to carry out the undertakings imposed by
the contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of
employers for damage done by the negligent acts of their servants will
show that in no case has the court ever decided that the negligence of the
defendant's servants has been held to constitute a defense to an action
for damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the
owner of a carriage was not liable for the damages caused by the
negligence of his driver. In that case the court commented on the fact that
no evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the defendant had
been negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had any
knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6
Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by
the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get adrift
by the negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the
performance of a contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol.
8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a
contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not think that the
provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued
the defendant to recover damages for the personal injuries caused by the
negligence of defendant's chauffeur while driving defendant's automobile
in which defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the
damages were caused by the negligence of the driver of the automobile,
but held that the master was not liable, although he was present at the
time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a
length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. . . .
The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the
owner for such length of time that the owner by his
acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage &
Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true that the court rested its conclusion
as to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903, although the facts
disclosed that the injury complaint of by plaintiff constituted a breach of
the duty to him arising out of the contract of transportation. The express
ground of the decision in this case was that article 1903, in dealing with
the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servants "makes the
distinction between private individuals and public enterprise;" that as to
the latter the law creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the
selection or direction of servants; and that in the particular case the
presumption of negligence had not been overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated
plaintiff's action as though founded in tort rather than as based upon the
breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination of the pleadings
and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact discussed
upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant the
practical result must have been the same in any event. The proof disclosed
beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was grossly negligent and that
his negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also
affirmatively appeared that defendant had been guilty of negligence in its
failure to exercise proper discretion in the direction of the servant.
Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether
the breach of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa
aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and
Page 24 of 45
69) whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the
performance of a contractual undertaking or its itself the source of an
extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are
identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage due to
carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently,
when the court holds that a defendant is liable in damages for having
failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise proper
care in the selection and direction of his servants, the practical result is
identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred,
because the court held in the Yamada case that defendant was liable for
the damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to whom it
was bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant
was negligent in the selection and control of its servants, that in such a
case the court would have held that it would have been a good defense to
the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of the
contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in
the selection and control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the
attention to the relative spheres of contractual and extra-contractual
obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation is much more broader
than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole
extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking,
concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another
by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the
source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between
the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by
implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of
entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being
contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not
be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's
servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even
granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an
obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation
to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct
and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own
contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a
complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative
negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was
caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon
defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to
his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important
to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a
full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not
have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in support
of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight
from a moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in
its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is too badly
stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day life. In this
particular instance, that the train was barely moving when plaintiff
alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six
meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person
alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and
sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from
dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would
have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for
defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe
alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is
that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as
follows:
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been
guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving
railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be
considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age,
sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the
passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which
may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the
care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar
circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on
Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in
Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may say that the test is this; Was
there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time
he alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of
average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then
existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from
alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.1awph!
l.net
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a
conclusion can be drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able
to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet
slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it should not
be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that
the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the
platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as
a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its
trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some
circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The
place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also
is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of
a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility concede
that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the
placing of them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are to be noted: The
company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the
car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the
platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to
stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement
material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which
to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility
of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off
while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an
aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory
negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger
acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the
passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a
general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under such
conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free
movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was
perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of
the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his
mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to
take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our
conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight
while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was
earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has
suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that
employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation
is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the standard
mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion
that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his
permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to
recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention,
hospital services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the
treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered
plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street and Avancea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
Page 25 of 45
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural
Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated
January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald
Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint
of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a
minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant
Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the
killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of
which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a
violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III,
of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is
now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against
defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above
grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by
the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments therein
contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious
and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8,
1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal
of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40,
Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are
presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE
BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I because his negligence causing the death of the child
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT
ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW
RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND
THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS
APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT
WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176
TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN
THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE
OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY
MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal
Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial,
he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the
parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably
because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated
in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint
against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of
the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-
referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues
presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not
reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of
the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and
getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration
and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or
negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on
the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence
of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only
under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion
holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the
same act machinist. come under both the Penal Code
and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the
agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore
could have been the subject of a criminal action. And
yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil
action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to
be noted that it was the employer and not the
employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73
Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case
could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a
clear instance of the same act of negligence being a
proper subject matter either of a criminal action with
its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of
an entirely separate and independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
Page 26 of 45
individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under
the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized,
even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such
a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this
Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have
been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made
civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an
independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already
invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of
this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood, in the
past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365
punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence.
If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to persons
and damage to property- through any degree of
negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability
arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what
sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker
any intention to bring about a situation so absurd
and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of
the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use
the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish
Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal
case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a
civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the
provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility
arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of
the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is
allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious
and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are
asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we
believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms
done by such practice and to restore the principle of
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high
time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that
its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a
crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed,
make for the better safeguarding or private rights
because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy,
and for the further reason that an independent civil
action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed
by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to
secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73
Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the
Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but
that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here
at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are
derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of
this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized
could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the
law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling
that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-
grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code."
And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission
that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that
the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses
the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or
in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is
Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-
delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177
of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article
2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when
we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is
a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has
been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained
as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish
jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not,
shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising
from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the
Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts
of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction
that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that
killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the
Page 27 of 45
same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of
the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character
(under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime
fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules
of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same
separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice,
and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous
relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to
hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case
has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not
a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his
father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees
that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of
the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation
takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear
that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not
really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It
shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of
age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property
without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and
be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant
case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient
to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind
the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child
under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their
minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third
persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in
providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless,
sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or
do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II,
pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not
give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor
married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity,
the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs
against appellees.
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and
MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
is whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths,
water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing
inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for
damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts
such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the
criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a
parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to
that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a
religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated
and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the
lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons,
and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal
Case No. TG-907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4
(Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin,
officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by
means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action
against respondent corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil
Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the
complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the
land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent
corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an
order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after
judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22,
1984, the trial court issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed
order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the
criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still
unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a),
Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions
arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted
until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate
Court. 3
Page 28 of 45
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases
Division, promulgated a decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the
trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied
by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748
in accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in
dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.
Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The
purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period
of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the
action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily
determined or controlled by its title or heading but the body of the
pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice
due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be
liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to
prove their respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in
Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso),
Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of
plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the
middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or opening,
also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its
concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its
cemented gate fronting the provincial highway, and connected
by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement culverts
which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise
beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the
said inter-connected culverts again connected by defendant to
a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the same
concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said
cemented gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected by
defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also
constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big
hole or opening which was also built by defendant thru the
lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which
separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and
which serves as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from
the land of defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point
of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year,
during rainy or stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just
beside the land of plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an
artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water
being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-
connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by
rain water during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the
water below it seeps into, and the excess water above it
inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by
defendant's aforementioned water conductors, contrivances
and manipulators, a young man was drowned to death, while
herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded
and converted to deep, wide and long canals, such
that the same can no longer be planted to any crop
or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on
several occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of
plaintiffs and their laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other
portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed to
destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil
action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some
other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built
by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of
petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection
between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained
by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which
may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now
Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due
authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication
between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages
to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use
and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an
indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public
domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned,
the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that
petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the
waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the
recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the
petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the
act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between
the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a
thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of
a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover,
adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require
that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to
infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize
the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must
be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they
cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the
usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim
indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for
damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence,
thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also
criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code,
which states:
Page 29 of 45
 Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision
though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we
consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and
"culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions
of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code
with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create
an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal
where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action
arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability
would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he
civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to
Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion
than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said
articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be
conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17,
1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to
reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and
Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and
to proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is
immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to review and set aside the Decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939
Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or
not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of
counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years
old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other
hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig,
Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the
Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987,
the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on
the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get
married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that
year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime
in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started
to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such
maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a
representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of
the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked
her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to
someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for
judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of
not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting
to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief
and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed
as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the
rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts
are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed
that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the
private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her
parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her,
but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that
she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no
confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain.
Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and
unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into
court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety
and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for
miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a
Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had
agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of
Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is
single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano
Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1,
1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum
Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine,
second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay
Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City
since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high
school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other
when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette,
Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the
plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil
Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private
respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages
and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Page 30 of 45
 IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff
the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as
moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the
plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos
as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at
(sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that
(a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is
not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits
to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his
persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by
him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her
parents in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions made
some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of
October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and
relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise
to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and
who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of
morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full
credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would
not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her
honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed
summary of the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing
decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the
time and that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant
started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his
love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on
which same day he went with her to her hometown of Baaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and
inform them of their relationship and their intention to get
married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their
submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or
with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion,
defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that
he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October,
1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and
trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their
daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house
and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in
Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to
Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's
apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987,
defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to
school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the
morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the
following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to
abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant
and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he
told her that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left
defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted
a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in
Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a
barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to
defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant
insisted that he could not do so because he was already married
to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the
parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after
defendant had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he
already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing
for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even
already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming
wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of
Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he
contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack
of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In
sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the
following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met
defendant who was already 29 years old at the time, does not
appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she
was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant
and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower
court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of
modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no
persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her." In
fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant
must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have
thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise,
she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those
depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe,
therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to
him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate.
Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown
of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town
fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a
beach party together with the manager and employees of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on
April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who
told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would
defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the
serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in
Baaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special
relationship between them? And this special relationship must
indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage
to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her
parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant
where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed
marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant
after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March
7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of
good moral character and must think so low and have so little
respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted
that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he
finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to
study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In
other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City
but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff.
It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff,
a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his
lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was
defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and
it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And
as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely
Page 31 of 45
 and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as
they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality
of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study
in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant
should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury
that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to
do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26
March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21
of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had
not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or
public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the
private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial
court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and
ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with
such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is
not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he
had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is
excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes
to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4)
wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in
ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his
controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had
been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that
even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship,
the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be
actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere
breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment
to the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's
arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which
boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is
the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial
court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having
heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely
their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had
plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and
trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could
alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is
not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the
evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are,
however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina
vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these
exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil.
257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v.
People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6)
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto
Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970];
Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of
the above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual
findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the
New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason
therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the
Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That
breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been
definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the
United States and in England has shown that no other
action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing
women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience
which has led to the abolition of rights of action in
the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the
American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which
is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the
sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive
law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission
has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following
rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm:
"A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of
marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The
girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no
crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any
civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been
committed, and though the girl and family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring
action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is
approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Page 32 of 45
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of
willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises
as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-
American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system
envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to
be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article
21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles
19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple
and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only
a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept
him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however,
that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and
to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction the
kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to.
The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished
under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because
the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied
in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied
recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner
is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered
herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for
him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at
possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was
eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction
existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made
in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the
example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum
refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to
which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil.
121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some
sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must
yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig.
tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart
from the path of virtue by the use of some species of
arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to
have and do have that effect, and which result in her
person to ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the
enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence
of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the
willingness arises out of sexual desire of curiosity of
the female, and the defendant merely affords her
the needed opportunity for the commission of the
act. It has been emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would tend to the
demoralization of the female sex, and would be a
reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur.
662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that
for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a
woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit,
artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not
have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of
marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did
not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no
case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other
cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the
Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras,
who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to
marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if
the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-
14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56
(sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-
17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be
the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal
knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal
or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages
will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can
Page 33 of 45
 be no recovery of moral damages, because here
mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as
the expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v.
Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29
is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra
vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if
there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense,
but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the
sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or
qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or
influence, but the woman, already of age, has
knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said
that there is an injury which can be the basis for
indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by
willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court, however,
must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to
deceive the woman under the circumstances, because
an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age
may not constitute deceit as to an experienced
woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be
civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under
the criminal law and there should have been an
acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that
reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the
effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to
him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of
the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the
private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter
even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained
any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her
own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter
will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that
she is a plain high school graduate and a mere
employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51,
January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without
doubt, is in need of a man who can give her
economic security. Her family is in dire need of
financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988).
And this predicament prompted her to accept a
proposition that may have been offered by the
petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It
is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the
private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior
educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable
employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so
circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his
profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into
believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a
Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and
proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and
security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It
can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person
to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs
and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the
private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of
intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress
not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that
she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she
found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left
him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or
in legal fault." 35At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty
of the parties, where his transgression has been
brought about by the imposition of undue influence
of the party on whom the burden of the original
wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the
transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at
fault, there should be no action by one against the
other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however,
has been interpreted as applicable only where the
fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does
not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and
the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil.
209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent,
let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her
parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in
their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the
higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge
of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO
and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
Eriberto Seno for appellant.
Jose M. Mesina for appellees.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu rendered on November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court
of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account
of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by
Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last
three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a
criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the
same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private
respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final
Page 34 of 45
determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no
civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in
whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment
in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970,
ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25,
1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970,
alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. 2
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for
certiorari on the ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as
damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil
action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the
criminal case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and,
therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the Petition is defective
inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus
(Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
respondent Judge in an Order dated November 14,1970 (Annex "S" and
Annex "U").
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due
course on February 25, 1971. 3
Petitioner makes these:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO
CANONOY, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF
THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY COURT
OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER
A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL
CASE.
2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN
ORDER TO AVOID DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY
SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL
CASE.
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITION FOR certiorari IS NOT PROPER, BECAUSE
THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS INTERLOCUTORY.
4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITION IS DEFECTIVE. 4
all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not
there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during
the pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue
City, Cebu, it is evident that the nature and character of his action
was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is caned a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage. (1903a)
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or
negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney
owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile
and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because of
the collision; that there was a direct causal connection between the
damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others,
that defendant, Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection
and supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-defendant Romeo
Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a
separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article
2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. (n)
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence
and quasi-delict, which is readily discernible from the
foregoing codal provision, has been expounded
in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-
621, 6 thus:
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes
not only reckless but also simple imprudence. if we
were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished
by law, according to the literal import of article 1093
of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application
in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage
to property through any degree of negligence even
the slightest would have to be indemnified only
through the principle of civil hability arising from
crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would
remain for quasidelito or culpa aquiliana We are loath
to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are
we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that
giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle
of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which
is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to
11910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages.
There are numerous cases of criminal negligence
which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt,
Page 35 of 45
but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
In such cases, the defendant can and should be made
responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise, there would be
many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus
ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make
defendants liability effective, and that is, to sue the
driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first,
would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to
follow a devious and cumbersome method of
obtaining a reliel True, there is such a remedy under
our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way,
which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of
the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the
procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and
productive of delay, it being a matter of common
knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and
similar public conveyances usually do not have
sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why,
then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go
through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably
useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts
have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the
pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and
direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect
society. Workmen and employees should be carefully
chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the
public. It is the masters or employers who principally
reap the profits resulting from the services of these
servants and employees. It is but right that they
should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the
personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As
Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves,
at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor
selection and all for their negligence." And according
to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that
such responsibility should fail upon the principal or
director who could have chosen a careful and prudent
employee, and not upon the such employee because
of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12,
p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary
responsibility of the employer on the principle of
representation of the principal by the agent. Thus,
Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747)
that before third persons the employer and employee
vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por
refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien la
emplea y utihza (become as one personality by the
merging of the person of the employee in that of him
who employs and utilizes him.) All these observations
acquire a peculiar force and significance when it
comes to motor accidents, and there is need of
stressing and accentuating the responsibility of
owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the
provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
on this subject, which has given rise to overlapping or
concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for
lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of
the action for culpaaquiliana there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of
the Civil responsibility arising from crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this
habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual.
In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate
this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to
restore the principle of responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil
Code to its full rigor. It is high time we cause the
stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its
own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer
be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code.
This will, it is believed, make for the bet ter
safeguarding of private rights because it re-
establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for
the further reason that an independent civil action,
not depending on the issues, stations and results of a
criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the
party wronged or his counsel is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (Garcia vs. Florida
52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis
supplied)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly
recognized in section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the c action,
may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such
civil action shag proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists
cases provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of
an "independent civil action."
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the
City Court, in surrounding the civil action, erred in placing reliance on
section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra which refers to "other
civil actions arising from cases not included in the section just cited" (i.e.,
Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal
action has being commenced, no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever
stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has
been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a)
and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended
after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the
criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it
provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent
source of obligation "not arising from the act or omission complained of
as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when it
specifically recognizes that:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
(Emphasis supplied)
Page 36 of 45
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-
delict. The concept of quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil
Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but
also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between "damage to
persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed,
the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it
includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited
to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-
delict in the law itself include damage to property. An instance is Article
2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages
caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to persons or property."
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision
of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil action based
on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated. Having
arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assigned
becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside,
and the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby ordered to
proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and MS. LYDIA
GERONIMO, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Offices for petitioner.
Alejandro M. Villamil for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This case concerns the proprietress of a school canteen which had to close
down as a consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft drinks triggered
by the discovery of foreign substances in certain beverages sold by it. The
interesting issue posed is whether the subsequent action for damages by
the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as
one for breach of implied warranty against hidden defects or
merchantability, as claimed by the manufacturer, the petitioner herein
which must therefore be filed within six months from the delivery of the
thing sold pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-
delict, as held by the public respondent, which can be filed within four
years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code.
On 7 May 1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the herein private respondent, filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City. 1 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. D-9629.
She alleges in her complaint that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten
Wonderland Canteen docketed as located in Dagupan City, an enterprise
engaged in the sale of soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other
goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public; on
or about 12 August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her
that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter
and other foreign substances or particles; he then went over her stock of
softdrinks and discovered the presence of some fiber-like substances in
the contents of some unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter in the
contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; she brought the said bottles to the
Regional Health Office of the Department of Health at San Fernando, La
Union, for examination; subsequently, she received a letter from the
Department of Health informing her that the samples she submitted "are
adulterated;" as a consequence of the discovery of the foreign substances
in the beverages, her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted from the
usual 10 cases per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses
of from P200.00 to P300.00 per day, and not long after that she had to
lose shop on 12 December 1989; she became jobless and destitute; she
demanded from the petitioner the payment of damages but was rebuffed
by it. She prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
P5,000.00 as actual damages, P72,000.00 as compensatory damages,
P500,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, the
amount equal to 30% of the damages awarded as attorney's fees, and the
costs. 2
The petitioner moved to dismiss 3 the complaint on the grounds of failure
to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. Anent the latter
ground, the petitioner argued that since the complaint is for breach of
warranty under Article 1561 of the said Code. In her Comment 4 thereto,
private respondent alleged that the complaint is one for damages which
does not involve an administrative action and that her cause of action is
based on an injury to plaintiff's right which can be brought within four
years pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code; hence, the complaint was
seasonably filed. Subsequent related pleadings were thereafter filed by
the parties. 5
In its Order of 23 January 1991, 6 the trial court granted the motion to
dismiss. It ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply as the existing administrative remedy is not adequate. It
also stated that the complaint is based on a contract, and not on quasi-
delict, as there exists pre-existing contractual relation between the parties;
thus, on the basis of Article 1571, in relation to Article 1562, the complaint
should have been filed within six months from the delivery of the thing
sold.
Her motion for the reconsideration of the order having been denied by
the trial court in its Order of 17 April 1991, 7the private respondent came
to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari which we referred to the
public respondent "for proper determination and disposition. 8 The public
respondent docketed the case as CA-G.R. SP No. 25391.
In a decision promulgated on 28 January 1992, 9 the public respondent
annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct
further proceedings in Civil Case No. D-9629. In holding for the private
respondent, it ruled that:
Petitioner's complaint being one for quasi-delict, and
not for breach of warranty as respondent contends,
the applicable prescriptive period is four years.
It should be stressed that the allegations in the
complaint plainly show that it is an action or damages
arising from respondent's act of "recklessly and
negligently manufacturing adulterated food items
intended to be sold or public consumption" (p.
25, rollo). It is truism in legal procedure that what
determines the nature of an action are the facts
alleged in the complaint and those averred as a
defense in the defendant's answer (I Moran 126; Calo
v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445; Alger Electric, Inc. v. CA, 135
SCRA 340).
Secondly, despite the literal wording of Article 2176
of the Civil code, the existence of contractual relations
between the parties does not absolutely preclude an
action by one against the other for quasi-delict arising
from negligence in the performance of a contract.
In Singson v. Court of Appeals (23 SCRA 1117), the Supreme Court ruled:
It has been repeatedly held: that
the existence of a contract
between the parties does not bar
the commission of a tort by the
one against the other and the
consequent recovery of damages
therefor
. . . . Thus in Air France vs.
Carrascoso, . . . (it was held that)
although the relation between a
passenger and a carrier is
"contractual both in origin and in
nature the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort.
Page 37 of 45
 Significantly, in American jurisprudence, from which
Our law on Sales was taken, the authorities are one in
saying that he availability of an action or breach of
warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of
defective goods. 10
Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by
the public respondent in its Resolution of 14 May 1993, 11 the petitioner
took his recourse under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. It alleges in
its petition that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
ARTICLE 2176, THE GENERAL PROVISION ON QUASI-
DELICTS, IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE WHEN THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY SHOW
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS
BASEDON BREACH OF A SELLER'S IMPLIED
WARRANTIES UNDER OUR LAW ON SALES.
II.
CORROLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
OVERRULING PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD
PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLE 1571 OF THE CIVIL
CODE. 12
The petitioner insists that a cursory reading of the complaint will reveal
that the primary legal basis for private respondent's cause of action is not
Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict for the complaint does not
ascribe any tortious or wrongful conduct on its part but Articles 1561
and 1562 thereof on breach of a seller's implied warranties under the law
on sales. It contends the existence of a contractual relation between the
parties (arising from the contract of sale) bars the application of the law
on quasi-delicts and that since private respondent's cause of action arose
from the breach of implied warranties, the complaint should have been
filed within six months room delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to Article
171 of the Civil Code.
In her Comment the private respondent argues that in case of breach of
the seller's implied warranties, the vendee may, under Article 1567 of the
Civil Code, elect between withdrawing from the contract or demanding a
proportionate reduction of the price, with damages in either case. She
asserts that Civil Case No. D-9629 is neither an action for rescission nor for
proportionate reduction of the price, but for damages arising from
a quasi-delict and that the public respondent was correct in ruling that the
existence of a contract did not preclude the action for quasi-delict. As to
the issue of prescription, the private respondent insists that since her
cause of action is based on quasi-delict, the prescriptive period therefore
is four (4) years in accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil Code and thus
the filing of the complaint was well within the said period.
We find no merit in the petition. The public respondent's conclusion that
the cause of action in Civil Case No. D-9629 is found on quasi-delict and
that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in
four (4) years is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more
particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless
and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold
for public consumption."
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties
against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not
limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564,
1565 and 1566, the vendee may elect between
withdrawing from the contract and demanding a
proportionate reduction of the price, with damages
either
case. 13
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of
error or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be
applicable. 14 Under the law on obligations, responsibility arising from
fraud is demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an action for
future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also
demandable in any obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the
courts, according to the circumstances. 15 Those guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay in the performance of their obligations and those
who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages. 16
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the
vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the
parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-
delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise fromquasi-delict, i.e., the
acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson
vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 17 this Court stated:
We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence
of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the other and
the consequent recovery of damages
therefor. 18 Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air
France vs. Carrascoso, 19 involving an airplane
passenger who, despite hi first-class ticket, had been
illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation
and compelled to take a seat in the tourist
compartment, was held entitled to recover damages
from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the
latter's part, for, although the relation between the
passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin
and nature . . . the act that breaks the contract may
also be a tort.
Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the
presence of contractual relations. 20
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of
injury-causing products may be based on negligence, 21 breach
of warranty, 22 tort, 23 or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. 24Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa
aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) 25 is
homologous but not identical to tort under the common
law, 26 which includes not only negligence, but also intentional
criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. 27
It must be made clear that our affirmance of the decision of the public
respondent should by no means be understood as suggesting that the
private respondent's claims for moral damages have sufficient factual and
legal basis.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158995 September 26, 2006
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President
and General Manager, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, and
SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA VALLEJERA, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review
on certiorari is the Decision1 dated April 25, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), as reiterated in its Resolution of July 10, 2003, 2 in CA-G.R. SP No.
67600, affirming an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Page 38 of 45
Bacolod City, Branch 43, which denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss
in Civil Case No. 99-10845, an action for damages arising from a vehicular
accident thereat instituted by the herein private respondents - the
spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera - against the
petitioners.
The antecedent facts may be briefly stated as follows:
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses
Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van
owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was
filed against the driver before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Vincent Norman Yeneza.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver
committed suicide, evidently bothered by conscience and remorse. On
account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30, 1998, dismissed
the criminal case.
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a
complaint3 for damages against the petitioners as employers of the
deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10845, the complaint was raffled to
Branch 43 of the court.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,4 the petitioners as
defendants denied liability for the death of the Vallejeras' 7-year old son,
claiming that they had exercised the required due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees, including the deceased
driver. They thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera couple.
During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted that their dismissal
prayer be resolved. Hence, the trial court required them to file within ten
days a memorandum of authorities supportive of their position.
Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities, the
defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that
the complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary liability against an
employer" under the provision of Article 103 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be a judgment
of conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them
liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal
action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not
fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs.
They further argue that since the plaintiffs did not make a reservation to
institute a separate action for damages when the criminal case was filed,
the damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal
action. which was already dismissed.
In an Order dated September 4, 2001, 6 the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial. With their motion
for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its
subsequent order7 of September 26, 2001, the petitioners then went
on certiorari to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to dismiss the basic
complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845.
In the herein assailed decision 8 dated April 25, 2003, the CA denied the
petition and upheld the trial court. Partly says the CA in its challenged
issuance:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that the complaint neither represents nor implies that
the responsibility charged was the petitioner's subsidiary liability
under Art. 103, Revised Penal Code. As pointed out [by the trial
court] in the Order of September 4, 2001, the complaint does
not even allege the basic elements for such a liability, like the
conviction of the accused employee and his insolvency. Truly
enough, a civil action to enforce subsidiary liability separate and
distinct from the criminal action is even unnecessary.
xxx xxx xxx
Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845 exacts responsibility for
fault or negligence under Art. 2176, Civil Code, which is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore, the
liability under Art. 2180, Civil Code, is direct and immediate, and
not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee or prior showing of the latter's insolvency.
(Underscoring in the original.)
In time, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their motion was
denied by the CA in its resolution 9 of July 10, 2003. Hence, the petitioners'
present recourse on their submission that the appellate court committed
reversible error in upholding the trial court's denial of their motion to
dismiss.
We DENY.
As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution is whether the spouses
Vallejeras' cause of action in Civil Case No. 99-10845 is founded on Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, as maintained by the petitioners, or
derived from Article 218010 of the Civil Code, as ruled by the two courts
below.
It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the complaint for
damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845. That complaint alleged, inter alia, as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the registered owner
of a Ford Fiera Van with Plate No. NMS 881 and employer
sometime February of 1996 of one Vincent Norman Yeneza y
Ferrer, a salesman of said corporation;
4. That sometime February 26, 1996 at around 2:00 P.M. at
Rosario St., Bacolod City, the minor son of said plaintiffs [now
respondents], Charles Vallejera, 7 years old, was hit and bumped
by above-described vehicle then driven by said employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;
5. That the mishap was due to the gross fault and negligence of
defendant's employee, who drove said vehicle, recklessly,
negligently and at a high speed without regard to traffic
condition and safety of other road users and likewise to the
fault and negligence of the owner employer, herein defendants
LG Food Corporation who failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of his employee, Vincent Norman
Yeneza y Ferrer;
6. That as a result of said incident, plaintiffs' son suffered
multiple body injuries which led to his untimely demise on that
very day;
7. That a criminal case was filed against the defendant's
employee, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787, (earlier filed as
Crim. Case No. 96-17570 before RTC) before MTC-Branch III,
entitled "People v. Yeneza" for "Reckless Imprudence resulting
to Homicide," but the same was dismissed because pending
litigation, then remorse-stricken [accused] committed suicide;
xxx xxx xxx
8. That the injuries and complications as well as the resultant
death suffered by the late minor Charles Vallejera were due to
the negligence and imprudence of defendant's employee;
9. That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for
the negligence/imprudence of its employee since it failed to
exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of his
Page 39 of 45
 employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which diligence
if exercised, would have prevented said incident. (Bracketed
words and emphasis ours.)
Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the
herein petitioners are being made to account for their subsidiary liability
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. As correctly pointed out by
the trial court in its order of September 4, 2001 denying the
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, the complaint did not even aver the basic
elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the
criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency.
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras
were suing the defendant petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict.
Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-
delict was their choice of remedy against the petitioners. To stress, the
plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on
the part of the driver and the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable for the
negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the
necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could
have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their
7-year old son.
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of
action as the "act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another." Such act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may come
from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts.11
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to
two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil
liability ex delicto;12 and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a)
not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law;13 the intentional
torts; and culpa aquiliana ); or (b) where the injured party is granted a
14 15
right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal
action.16 Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against
the offender.17
Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice
between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa
criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action
for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil
Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may
hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to
the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the
family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the
plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior
conviction of its employee.18
Article 116119 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from
criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to the provision
of Article 217720 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary
Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating
damages. Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the
plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of
arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort.
The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his
initiatory pleading or complaint,21 and not with the defendant who can not
ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action or lack of it based on
the defendant's perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a
claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct
or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. 22
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's
minor son was caused by the negligent act of the petitioners' driver; and
that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of
their driver for failing "to exercise the necessary diligence required of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their]
employee, the driver, which diligence, if exercised, would have prevented
said accident."
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, they would have alleged that the
guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that such
accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the
defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their
employee (driver) based on the principle that every person criminally
liable is also civilly liable.23 Since there was no conviction in the criminal
case against the driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the
termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses' recourse was,
therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct and primary liability based
on quasi-delict.
Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in their Answer with
Compulsory Counter-Claim,24 repeatedly made mention of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code and anchored their defense on their allegation that "they
had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of [their]
employees." The Court views this defense as an admission that indeed the
petitioners acknowledged the private respondents' cause of action as one
for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article
2176 - Civil Code to recover damages primarily from the petitioners as
employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to Article 2180
of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused
by his employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in any business or
industry.
Citing Maniago v. CA,25 petitioner would argue that Civil Case No. 99-
10845 should have been dismissed for failure of the respondent spouses
to make a reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages when
the criminal case against the driver was filed.
The argument is specious.
To start with, the petitioners' reliance on Maniago is obviously misplaced.
There, the civil case was filed while the criminal case against the employee
was still pending. Here, the criminal case against the employee driver was
prematurely terminated due to his death. Precisely, Civil Case No. 99-
10845 was filed by the respondent spouses because no remedy can be
obtained by them against the petitioners with the dismissal of the criminal
case against their driver during the pendency thereof.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for
damages was made when the criminal case was filed is of no moment for
the simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed without any
pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if
there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place. And for the
petitioners to insist for the conviction of their driver as a condition sine
qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for the impossible.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141910 August 6, 2002
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION and LAMBERT M.
EROLES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on 18
June 1994 thirty (30) units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one
of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the plant site of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., along South Superhighway in Alabang, Metro
Manila, to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While the truck
was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway in
Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck,
causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
Page 40 of 45
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to
Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes in the sum of
P204,450.00. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights and interests
of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of the amount it had
paid to the latter from GPS. Since the trucking company failed to heed the
claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of
carriage against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 66, of Makati City. In its answer, respondents asserted that
GPS was the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc., since
1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a common carrier.
Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was purely
accidental.1wphi1.nt
The issues having thus been joined, FGU presented its evidence,
establishing the extent of damage to the cargoes and the amount it had
paid to the assured. GPS, instead of submitting its evidence, filed with
leave of court a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to
evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a
common carrier.
The trial court, in its order of 30 April 1996, 1 granted the motion to
dismiss, explaining thusly:
"Under Section 1 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is provided
that Each party must prove his own affirmative allegation, xxx.
"In the instant case, plaintiff did not present any single evidence
that would prove that defendant is a common carrier.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Accordingly, the application of the law on common carriers is
not warranted and the presumption of fault or negligence on
the part of a common carrier in case of loss, damage or
deterioration of goods during transport under 1735 of the Civil
Code is not availing.
"Thus, the laws governing the contract between the owner of
the cargo to whom the plaintiff was subrogated and the owner
of the vehicle which transports the cargo are the laws on
obligation and contract of the Civil Code as well as the law on
quasi delicts.
"Under the law on obligation and contract, negligence or fault is
not presumed. The law on quasi delict provides for some
presumption of negligence but only upon the attendance of
some circumstances. Thus, Article 2185 provides:
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.
"Evidence for the plaintiff shows no proof that defendant was
violating any traffic regulation. Hence, the presumption of
negligence is not obtaining.
"Considering that plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that
defendant is a common carrier and defendants driver was the
one negligent, defendant cannot be made liable for the
damages of the subject cargoes."2
The subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, 3 plaintiff
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial
court had erred (a) in holding that the appellee corporation was not a
common carrier defined under the law and existing jurisprudence; and (b)
in dismissing the complaint on a demurrer to evidence.
The Court of Appeals rejected the appeal of petitioner and ruled in favor
of GPS. The appellate court, in its decision of 10 June 1999, 4 discoursed,
among other things, that -
"x x x in order for the presumption of negligence provided for
under the law governing common carrier (Article 1735, Civil
Code) to arise, the appellant must first prove that the appellee is
a common carrier. Should the appellant fail to prove that the
appellee is a common carrier, the presumption would not arise;
consequently, the appellant would have to prove that the carrier
was negligent.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Because it is the appellant who insists that the appellees can
still be considered as a common carrier, despite its `limited
clientele, (assuming it was really a common carrier), it follows
that it (appellant) has the burden of proving the same. It
(plaintiff-appellant) `must establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence, which means that the evidence as a whole adduced
by one side is superior to that of the other. (Summa Insurance
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 175). This,
unfortunately, the appellant failed to do -- hence, the dismissal
of the plaintiffs complaint by the trial court is justified.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Based on the foregoing disquisitions and considering the
circumstances that the appellee trucking corporation has been
`its exclusive contractor, hauler since 1970, defendant has no
choice but to comply with the directive of its principal, the
inevitable conclusion is that the appellee is a private carrier.
"x x x xxx xxx
"x x x the lower court correctly ruled that 'the application of the
law on common carriers is not warranted and the presumption
of fault or negligence on the part of a common carrier in case of
loss, damage or deterioration of good[s] during transport under
[article] 1735 of the Civil Code is not availing.' x x x.
"Finally, We advert to the long established rule that conclusions
and findings of fact of a trial court are entitled to great weight
on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and
valid reasons."5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; 6 hence, the
instant petition,7 raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A
COMMON CARRIER AS DEFINED UNDER THE LAW AND
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
II
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS, EITHER AS A COMMON CARRIER
OR A PRIVATE CARRIER, MAY BE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN
NEGLIGENT WHEN THE GOODS IT UNDERTOOK TO
TRANSPORT SAFELY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DAMAGED WHILE
IN ITS PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AND POSSESSION.
III
WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS
APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
On the first issue, the Court finds the conclusion of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals to be amply justified. GPS, being an exclusive contractor
and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its services
to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier.
Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged
in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both,
by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation, offering their services to
the public,8 whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in
particular, but never on an exclusive basis. 9 The true test of a common
carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, providing space for those
who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. 10Given
accepted standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term "common carrier."
The above conclusion nothwithstanding, GPS cannot escape from liability.
Page 41 of 45
In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the
subrogee of Concepcion Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence
of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief.11 The law, recognizing the obligatory force of
contracts,12 will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind
of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of
the tenor thereof.13 A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured
party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost or
suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promisee that
may include his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the
benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have
been in had the contract been performed, or his "reliance interest," which
is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the
contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had
the contract not been made; or his "restitution interest," which is his
interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the
other party.14 Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for their
makers or for society, unless they are made the basis for action. 15 The
effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make
recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to
observe his contractual obligation16 unless he can show extenuating
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally that of
the diligence of a good father of a family or, exceptionally by stipulation
or by law such as in the case of common carriers, that of extraordinary
diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his
ensuing liability.
Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract of
carriage between it and petitioners assured, and admits that the cargoes
it has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged while in its custody.
In such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with, the
obligation in this case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to the
place of destination - gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and
corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden
being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.
Respondent driver, on the other hand, without concrete proof of his
negligence or fault, may not himself be ordered to pay petitioner. The
driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioners
principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A
contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their
successors who have assumed their personality or their juridical
position.17 Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet
prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third person.
Petitioners civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa
aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the claimant for
damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the defendant. 18
A word in passing. Res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine being invoked by
petitioner, holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the
injury complained of is shown to be under the latters management and
the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be
expected to happen if those who have its management or control use
proper care. It affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. 19 It is not a
rule of substantive law and, as such, it does not create an independent
ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere
procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the
plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. The
maxim simply places on the defendant the burden of going forward with
the proof.20 Resort to the doctrine, however, may be allowed only when (a)
the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence; (b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the
plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to
the plaintiff.21 Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may
be attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the defendant
could not be responsible.22
Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual
relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the
inference of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the
occurrence and not from the nature of the relation of the
parties.23 Nevertheless, the requirement that responsible causes other than
those due to defendants conduct must first be eliminated, for the
doctrine to apply, should be understood as being confined only to cases
of pure (non-contractual) tort since obviously the presumption of
negligence in culpa contractual, as previously so pointed out, immediately
attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor. In the case of the truck
driver, whose liability in a civil action is predicated on culpa acquiliana,
while he admittedly can be said to have been in control and management
of the vehicle which figured in the accident, it is not equally shown,
however, that the accident could have been exclusively due to his
negligence, a matter that can allow, forthwith, res ipsa loquitur to work
against him.
If a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal
is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.24 Thus, respondent corporation may no longer offer
proof to establish that it has exercised due care in transporting the
cargoes of the assured so as to still warrant a remand of the case to the
trial court.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the order, dated 30 April 1996, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, of Makati City, and the decision, dated 10 June 1999, of the
Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED only insofar as respondent Lambert M.
Eroles is concerned, but said assailed order of the trial court and decision
of the appellate court are REVERSED as regards G.P. Sarmiento Trucking
Corporation which, instead, is hereby ordered to pay FGU Insurance
Corporation the value of the damaged and lost cargoes in the amount of
P204,450.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO
SALVA, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding damages
instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an
action for breach of contract of carriage.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza
Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical
Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and
operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to
capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an
"extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of
the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped
to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga
gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu
truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped
the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She
sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe
necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg
circular casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her
confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989.
Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon,
certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three months and
would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas,
alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to
exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the
other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the
owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant
and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu
truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another
Page 42 of 45
case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for
quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his
driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was
reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a
contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed
to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate
court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged
Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is entered
ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas to pay
plaintiff-appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the
accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make
the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends
that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso
fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on
the ground that it is not supported by evidence.
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores
the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the
principle of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena
were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney.
On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on
his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised
upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of
contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of
the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier,
failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. 2 In case of death
or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence
as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily
shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to
petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was
the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach
of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person
where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case,
the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some
aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence
required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as
well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers. It provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound
to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and
1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary
diligence for the safety of the passengers is further
set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption
of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove
that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care
and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art.
1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate against petitioner's
contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly
parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad
shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a
diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. No person shall drive
his motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or
impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while
discharging or taking on passengers or loading or
unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other
vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers
than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of
the same law. It provides:
Exceeding registered capacity. No person operating
any motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or
more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered
capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril
greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore,
not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also,
the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that
Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of
risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the
tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those
passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an
overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the
Page 43 of 45
jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso
fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, was inevitable. 3 This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the
debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury
to the
creditor.4 Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his
jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it
is excessive and without basis in law. We find this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a
first-year college student in that school year 1989-
1990 at the Silliman University, majoring in Physical
Education. Because of the injury, she was not able to
enroll in the second semester of that school year. She
testified that she had no more intention of continuing
with her schooling, because she could not walk and
decided not to pursue her degree, major in Physical
Education "because of my leg which has a defect
already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while
she was under confinement, she cried in pain because
of her injured left foot. As a result of her injury, the
Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has
"residual bowing of the fracture side." She likewise
decided not to further pursue Physical Education as
her major subject, because "my left leg . . . has a
defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the
inevitable bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered.
Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to
recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00,
which is fair, just and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. 5 As an exception, such
damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the
death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3)
of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud
or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. 6
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since
there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in
bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's
contention that petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the
jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be
construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of
the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner
was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is
merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the
accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995,
and its resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.
Alejo Mabanag for appellant.
G. E. Campbell for appellee.
STREET, J.:
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the
defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum of P31,000, as damages alleged to
have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant. From a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union
absolving the defendant from liability the plaintiff has appealed.
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place
on December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union.
It appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was riding on
his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the
defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile,
going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant
neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give
warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken
the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that
the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the
warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the
apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up
against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the
left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not
have sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is shown to
have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the
automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the
defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The
pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for
the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the
defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or
slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant
quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse
alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the
railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the
flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was
thrown off with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we
believe that when the accident occurred the free space where the pony
stood between the automobile and the railing of the bridge was probably
less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died.
The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in
maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of
negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage
done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant
started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and
the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the
center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not
be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for
the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature
of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet
some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the
power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of
greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the
defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop
or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the
other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the
danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on
until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing
this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of
the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the
animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get
exited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When
the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our
opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
Page 44 of 45
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a
given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in
a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be
profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the
circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and
are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be
expected to take care only when there is something before them to
suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If
so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that
harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the
suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence
can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is
said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense
pleaded in the defendant's answer, to the effect that the subject matter of
the action had been previously adjudicated in the court of a justice of the
peace. In this connection it appears that soon after the accident in
question occurred, the plaintiff caused criminal proceedings to be
instituted before a justice of the peace charging the defendant with the
infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary
investigation the defendant was discharged by the magistrate and the
proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that the acquittal of the
defendant at the trial upon the merits in a criminal prosecution for the
offense mentioned would be res adjudicata upon the question of his civil
liability arising from negligence -- a point upon which it is unnecessary to
express an opinion -- the action of the justice of the peace in dismissing
the criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no effect.
(See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court
must be reversed, and judgment is her rendered that the plaintiff recover
of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of
other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value
of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage
occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to
the date of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are
remote or otherwise of such character as not to be recoverable. So
ordered.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Araullo, Avancea, and Fisher, JJ., concur.
think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence
Separate Opinions
of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the
defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for
he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong After mature deliberation, I have finally decided to concur with the
side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also judgment in this case. I do so because of my understanding of the "last
negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent clear chance" rule of the law of negligence as particularly applied to
is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent automobile accidents. This rule cannot be invoked where the negligence
acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant. Again, if a traveler
of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an when he reaches the point of collision is in a situation to extricate himself
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person and avoid injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a recovery. But
who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do Justice Street finds as a fact that the negligent act of the interval of time,
so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior and that at the moment the plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid the
negligence of the other party. accident. Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is applicable. In other
words, when a traveler has reached a point where he cannot extricate
himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in
The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil.
reaching that position becomes the condition and not the proximate
Rep., 359) should perhaps be mentioned in this connection. This Court
cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery. (Note especially Aiken
there held that while contributory negligence on the part of the person
vs. Metcalf [1917], 102 Atl., 330.)
injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in
evidence to reduce the damages which would otherwise have been
assessed wholly against the other party. The defendant company had
there employed the plaintiff, as a laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails
from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far
away. The rails were conveyed upon cars which were hauled along a
narrow track. At certain spot near the water's edge the track gave way by
reason of the combined effect of the weight of the car and the insecurity
of the road bed. The car was in consequence upset; the rails slid off; and
the plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. It appeared in evidence that the
accident was due to the effects of the typhoon which had dislodged one
of the supports of the track. The court found that the defendant company
was negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that
the plaintiff was, at the moment of the accident, guilty of contributory
negligence in walking at the side of the car instead of being in front or
behind. It was held that while the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by
reason of its negligence in having failed to keep the track in proper repair
nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on account
of the contributory negligence in the plaintiff. As will be seen the
defendant's negligence in that case consisted in an omission only. The
liability of the company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous
condition of its track. In a case like the one now before us, where the
defendant was actually present and operating the automobile which
caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the
negligence of the respective parties in order to apportion the damage
according to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to say that the
negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate and
determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of
the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.

Page 45 of 45