9/11/2015 G.R. No.

174340

TodayisFriday,September11,2015

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBAN

G.R.No.174340October17,2006

INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORISSUANCEOFWRITOFHABEASCORPUSOFCAMILOL.SABIO,
petitioner,
J.ERMINERNESTLOUIER.MIGUEL,petitionerrelator,
vs.
HONORABLESENATORRICHARDGORDON,inhiscapacityasChairman,andtheHONORABLEMEMBERS
OFTHECOMMITTEEONGOVERNMENTCORPORATIONSANDPUBLICENTERPRISESandTHE
COMMITTEEONPUBLICSERVICESoftheSenate,HONORABLESENATORJUANPONCEENRILE,inhis
officialcapacityasMember,HONORABLEMANUELVILLAR,SenatePresident,SENATESERGEANTAT
ARMS,andtheSENATEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondents.

xx

G.R.No.174318October17,2006

PRESIDENTIALCOMMISSIONONGOODGOVERNMENT(PCGG)andCAMILOL.SABIO,Chairman,
NARCISOS.NARIO,RICARDOM.ABCEDE,TERESOL.JAVIERandNICASIOA.CONTI,Commissioners,
MANUELANDALandJULIOJALANDONI,PCGGnomineestoPhilcomsatHoldingsCorporation,petitioners,
vs.
RICHARDGORDON,inhiscapacityasChairman,andMEMBERSOFTHECOMMITTEEONGOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONSANDPUBLICENTERPRISES,MEMBERSOFTHECOMMITTEEONPUBLICSERVICES,
SENATORJUANPONCEENRILE,inhiscapacityasmemberofbothsaidCommittees,MANUELVILLAR,
SenatePresident,THESENATESERGEANTATARMS,andSENATEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondents.

xx

G.R.No.174177October17,2006

PHILCOMSATHOLDINGSCORPORATIONS,PHILIPG.BRODETT,LUISK.LOKIN,JR.,ROBERTOV.SAN
JOSE,DELFINP.ANGCAO,ROBERTOL.ABAD,ALMAKRISTINAALOBBA,andJOHNNYTAN,petitioners,
vs.
SENATECOMMITTEEONGOVERNMENTCORPORATIONSandPUBLICENTERPRISES,itsMEMBERSand
CHAIRMAN,theHONORABLESENATORRICHARDGORDONandSENATECOMMITTEEONPUBLIC
SERVICES,itsMembersandChairman,theHONORABLESENATORJOKERP.ARROYO,respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,J.:

Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former President Corazon C. Aquino installed her regime by issuing
ExecutiveOrder(E.O.)No.1,1creatingthePresidentialCommissiononGoodGovernment(PCGG).Sheentrusted
uponthisCommissiontheherculeantaskofrecoveringtheillgottenwealthaccumulatedbythedeposedPresident
FerdinandE.Marcos,hisfamily,relatives,subordinatesandcloseassociates.2Section4(b)ofE.O.No.1provides
that:"NomemberorstaffoftheCommissionshallberequiredtotestifyorproduceevidenceinanyjudicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance." Apparently, the
purposeistoensurePCGG'sunhamperedperformanceofitstask.3

Today, the constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples upon the Senate's
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powertoconductlegislativeinquiryunderArticleVI,Section21ofthe1987Constitution,whichreads:

TheSenateortheHouseofRepresentativesoranyofitsrespectivecommitteesmayconductinquiriesinaid
oflegislationinaccordancewithitsdulypublishedrulesofprocedure.Therightsofpersonsappearinginor
affectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected.

Thefactsareundisputed.

OnFebruary20,2006,SenatorMiriamDefensorSantiagointroducedPhilippineSenateResolutionNo.455(Senate
Res. No. 455),4 "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT),andPHILCOMSATHoldingsCorporation(PHC)duetotheallegedimproprietiesintheiroperations
bytheirrespectiveBoardofDirectors."

ThepertinentportionsoftheResolutionread:

WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC
skyrocketedtoP4.3million,ascomparedtothepreviousyear'smereP106thousand

WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called Telecommunications
Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned in 18 months, over P73 million had been
allegedlyadvancedtoTCIwithoutanyaccountabilityreportgiventoPHCandPHILCOMSAT

WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee of
PhilcomsathasprecipitatelyreleasedP265millionandgrantedP125millionloantoarelativeofanexecutive
committee member to date there have been no payments given, subjecting the company to an estimated
interestincomelossofP11.25millionin2004

WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to protect the interest of the Republic of the Philippines in the PHC,
PHILCOMSAT,andPOTCfromanyanomaloustransaction,andtoconserveorsalvageanyremainingvalue
ofthegovernment'sequitypositioninthesecorporationsfromanyabusesofpowerdonebytheirrespective
boardofdirectors

WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in aid of
legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their
respectiveboardofdirectors.

Adopted.

(Sgd)MIRIAMDEFENSORSANTIAGO

On the same date, February 20, 2006, Senate Res. No. 455 was submitted to the Senate and referred to the
CommitteeonAccountabilityofPublicOfficersandInvestigationsandCommitteeonPublicServices.However,on
March28,2006,uponmotionofSenatorFrancisN.Pangilinan,itwastransferredtotheCommitteeonGovernment
CorporationsandPublicEnterprises.5

OnMay8,2006,ChiefofStaffRioC.Inocencio,undertheauthorityofSenatorRichardJ.Gordon,wroteChairman
CamiloL.SabioofthePCGG,oneofthehereinpetitioners,invitinghimtobeoneoftheresourcepersonsinthe
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
CommitteeonPublicServices.ThepurposeofthepublicmeetingwastodeliberateonSenateRes.No.455.6

On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.7 At the same time, he
invokedSection4(b)ofE.O.No.1earlierquoted.

On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum,8 approved by Senate President
Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso
JavierandNarcisoNariotoappearinthepublichearingscheduledonAugust23,2006andtestifyonwhatthey
knowrelativetothemattersspecifiedinSenateRes.No.455.Similarsubpoenaewereissuedagainstthedirectors
and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, namely: Benito V. Araneta, Philip J. Brodett, Enrique L. Locsin,
Manuel D. Andal, Roberto L. Abad, Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Julio J. Jalandoni, Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao,
AlmaKristinaAllobaandJohnnyTan.9

Again,ChairmanSabiorefusedtoappear.InhislettertoSenatorGordondatedAugust18,2006,hereiteratedhis
earlier position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other hand, the directors and officers of Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation relied on the position paper they previously filed, which raised issues on the propriety of
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legislativeinquiry.

Thereafter,ChiefofStaffMa.CarissaO.Coscolluela,undertheauthorityofSenatorGordon,sentanothernotice10
toChairmanSabiorequiringhimtoappearandtestifyonthesamesubjectmattersetonSeptember6,2006.The
noticewasissued"underthesameauthorityoftheSubpoenaAdTestificandumpreviouslyservedupon(him)last
16August2006."

Oncemore,ChairmanSabiodidnotcomplywiththenotice.Hesentaletter11datedSeptember4,2006toSenator
Gordonreiteratinghisreasonfordecliningtoappearinthepublichearing.

This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order dated September 7, 2006 requiring Chairman Sabio and
Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt of the
Senate. On September 11, 2006, they submitted to the Senate their Compliance and Explanation,12 which partly
reads:

Doubtless,therearelaudableintentionsofthesubjectinquiryinaidoflegislation.Buttheruleoflaw
requiresthateventhebestintentionsmustbecarriedoutwithintheparametersoftheConstitutionandthe
law.Verily,laudablepurposesmustbecarriedoutbylegalmethods.(Brillantes,Jr.,etal.v.Commissionon
Elections,EnBanc[G.R.No.163193,June15,2004])

Onthisscore,Section4(b)ofE.O.No.1shouldnotbeignoredasitexplicitlyprovides:

NomemberorstaffoftheCommissionshallberequiredtotestifyorproduceevidenceinany
judicial legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.

Withallduerespect,Section4(b)ofE.O.No.1constitutesalimitationonthepoweroflegislativeinquiry,and
arecognitionbytheStateoftheneedtoprovideprotectiontothePCGGinordertoensuretheunhampered
performanceofitsdutiesunderitscharter.E.O.No.1isalaw,Section4(b)ofwhichhadnotbeenamended,
repealedorrevisedinanyway.

To say the least, it would require both Houses of Congress and Presidential fiat to amend or repeal the
provisionincontroversy.Untilthen,itstandstoberespectedaspartofthelegalsysteminthisjurisdiction.
(As held in People v. Veneracion, G.R. Nos. 11998788, October 12, 1995: Obedience to the rule of law
forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were
allowedtoroamunrestrictedbeyondboundarieswithinwhichtheyarerequiredbylawtoexercisetheduties
of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of
broaddiscretionarypowersbythoseactingunderitsauthority.Underthissystem,judgesareguidedbythe
Rule of Law, and ought to 'protect and enforce it without fear or favor,' 4 [Act of Athens (1955)] resist
encroachmentsbygovernments,politicalparties,oreventheinterferenceoftheirownpersonalbeliefs.)

xxxxxx

Relevantly, Chairman Sabio's letter to Sen. Gordon dated August 19, 2006 pointed out that the anomalous
transactionsreferredtointheP.S.ResolutionNo.455aresubjectofpendingcasesbeforetheregularcourts,
theSandiganbayanandtheSupremeCourt(Pendingcasesinclude:a.SamuelDivinav.ManuelNieto,Jr.,et
al., CAG.R. No. 89102 b. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Manuel Nieto, et al. c.
PhilippineCommunicationsSatelliteCorporationv.ManuelD.Andal,CivilCaseNo.06095,RTC,Branch61,
MakatiCityd.PhilippineCommunicationsSatelliteCorporationv.PHILCOMSATHoldingsCorporation,etal.,
CivilCaseNo.041049)forwhichreasontheymaynotbeabletotestifythereonundertheprincipleofsub
judice. The laudable objectives of the PCGG's functions, recognized in several cases decided by the
Supreme Court, of the PCGG will be put to naught if its recovery efforts will be unduly impeded by a
legislativeinvestigationofcasesthatarealreadypendingbeforetheSandiganbayanandtrialcourts.

InBengzonv.SenateBlueRibbonCommittee,(203SCRA767,784[1991])theHonorableSupremeCourt
held:

"[T]heissuessoughttobeinvestigatedbytherespondentCommitteeisoneoverwhichjurisdiction
hadbeenacquiredbytheSandiganbayan.Inshort,theissuehasbeenpreemptedbythatcourt.To
allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the
Sandigabayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between a legislative
committeeandajudicialtribunal,butiftheCommittee'sjudgmentweretobereachedbeforethatofthe
Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the
Sandiganbayancannotbediscounted.

xxxxxx

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IT IS IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS that the Commission decided not to attend the
Senateinquirytotestifyandproduceevidencethereat.

UnconvincedwiththeaboveComplianceandExplanation,theCommitteeonGovernmentCorporationsandPublic
EnterprisesandtheCommitteeonPublicServicesissuedanOrder13directingMajorGeneralJoseBalajadia(Ret.),
Senate SergeantAtArms, to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the
Senate. The Order bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the Committees'
members.

On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at
IRCBuilding,No.82EDSA,MandaluyongCityandbroughthimtotheSenatepremiseswherehewasdetained.

Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators
RichardGordonandJokerP.ArroyoandMembers.ThecasewasdocketedasG.R.No.174340.

Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier, and the PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat
HoldingsCorporation,ManuelAndalandJulioJalandoni,likewisefiledapetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionagainst
thesamerespondents,andalsoagainstSenatePresidentManuelVillar,SenatorJuanPonceEnrile,theSergeant
atArms,andtheentireSenate.ThecasewasdocketedasG.R.No.174318.

Meanwhile,PhilcomsatHoldingsCorporationanditsofficersanddirectors,namely:PhilipG.Brodett,LuisK.Lokin,
Jr.,RobertoV.SanJose,DelfinP.Angcao,RobertoL.Abad,AlmaKristinaAlobbaandJohnnyTanfiledapetition
for certiorari and prohibition against the Senate Committees on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises
andPublicServices,theirChairmen,SenatorsGordonandArroyo,andMembers.ThecasewasdocketedasG.R.
No.174177.

In G.R. No. 174340 (for habeas corpus) and G.R. No. 174318 (for certiorari and prohibition) Chairman Sabio,
Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier and the PCGG's nominees Andal and Jalandoni alleged: first,
respondentSenateCommitteesdisregardedSection4(b)ofE.O.No.1withoutanyjustifiablereasonsecond,the
inquiries conducted by respondent Senate Committees are not in aid of legislation third, the inquiries were
conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
andfourth,respondentSenateCommitteesarenotvestedwiththepowerofcontempt.

In G.R. No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers alleged: first,
respondentSenateCommitteeshavenojurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterstatedinSenateRes.No.455second,
thesameinquiryisnotinaccordancewiththeSenate'sRulesofProcedureGoverningInquiriesinAidofLegislation
third,thesubpoenaeagainsttheindividualpetitionersarevoidforhavingbeenissuedwithoutauthorityfourth,the
conductoflegislativeinquirypursuanttoSenateRes.No.455constitutesundueencroachmentbyrespondentsinto
justiciable controversies over which several courts and tribunals have already acquired jurisdiction and fifth, the
subpoenaeviolatedpetitioners'rightstoprivacyandagainstselfincrimination.

In their Consolidated Comment, the abovenamed respondents countered: first, the issues raised in the petitions
involvepoliticalquestionsoverwhichthisCourthasnojurisdictionsecond,Section4(b)hasbeenrepealedbythe
Constitution third, respondent Senate Committees are vested with contempt power fourth, Senate's Rules of
ProcedureGoverningInquiriesinAidofLegislationhavebeendulypublishedfifth,respondentshavenotviolated
anycivilrightoftheindividualpetitioners,suchastheir(a)righttoprivacyand(b)rightagainstselfincrimination
andsixth,theinquirydoesnotconstituteundueencroachmentintojusticiablecontroversies.

During the oral arguments held on September 21, 2006, the parties were directed to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda within a nonextendible period of fifteen (15) days from date. In the meantime, per
agreementoftheparties,petitionerChairmanSabiowasallowedtogohome.Thus,hispetitionforhabeascorpus
hasbecomemoot.Thepartiesalsoagreedthattheserviceofthearrestwarrantsissuedagainstallpetitionersand
the proceedings before the respondent Senate Committees are suspended during the pendency of the instant
cases.14

CrucialtotheresolutionofthepresentpetitionsisthefundamentalissueofwhetherSection4(b)ofE.O.No.1is
repealedbythe1987Constitution.OnthisloneissuehingesthemeritofthecontentionofChairmanSabioand
hisCommissionersthattheirrefusaltoappearbeforerespondentSenateCommitteesisjustified.Withtheresolution
ofthisissue,alltheotherissuesraisedbythepartieshavebecomeinconsequential.

Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting respondent
SenateCommitteesthepoweroflegislativeinquiry.Itreads:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiriesinaidoflegislationinaccordancewithitsdulypublishedrulesofprocedure.Therightsof
personsappearinginoraffectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected.
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OntheotherarmofthescaleisSection4(b)ofE.O.No.1limitingsuchpoweroflegislativeinquirybyexemptingall
PCGGmembersorstafffromtestifyinginanyjudicial,legislativeoradministrativeproceeding,thus:

NomemberorstaffoftheCommissionshallberequiredtotestifyorproduceevidenceinanyjudicial,
legislativeoradministrativeproceedingconcerningmatterswithinitsofficialcognizance.

To determine whether there exists a clear and unequivocal repugnancy between the two quoted provisions that
warrants a declaration that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution, a brief consideration of the
Congress'powerofinquiryisimperative.

The Congress' power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our shores
throughMcGrainv.Daugherty,15citedinArnaultv.Nazareno.16Inthoseearlierdays,Americancourtsconsidered
the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate. The 1864 case of Briggs v. MacKellar17 explains the
breathandbasisofthepower,thus:

Wherenoconstitutionallimitationorrestrictionexists,itiscompetentforeitherofthetwobodiescomposing
thelegislaturetodo,intheirseparatecapacity,whatevermaybeessentialtoenablethemtolegislate.Itis
wellestablished principle of this parliamentary law, that either house may institute any investigation
havingreferencetoitsownorganization,theconductorqualificationofitsmembers,itsproceedings,rights,
orprivilegesoranymatteraffectingthepublicinterestuponwhichitmaybeimportantthatitshould
haveexactinformation,andinrespecttowhichitwouldbecompetentforittolegislate.Therightto
passlaws,necessarilyimpliestherighttoobtaininformationuponanymatterwhichmaybecomethe
subject of a law. It is essential to the full and intelligent exercise of the legislative function.In
American legislatures the investigation of public matters before committees, preliminary to
legislation, or with the view of advising the house appointing the committee is, as a parliamentary
usage, well established as it is in England, and the right of either house to compel witnesses to appear
andtestifybeforeitscommittee,andtopunishfordisobediencehasbeenfrequentlyenforced.Therightof
inquiry, I think, extends to other matters, in respect to which it may be necessary, or may be deemed
advisabletoapplyforlegislativeaid.

Remarkably,inArnault,thisCourtadheredtoasimilartheory.CitingMcGrain,itrecognizedthatthepowerofinquiry
is"anessentialandappropriateauxiliarytothelegislativefunction,"thus:

Althoughthereisnoprovisioninthe"ConstitutionexpresslyinvestingeitherHouseofCongresswithpowerto
makeinvestigationsandexacttestimonytotheendthatitmayexerciseitslegislativefunctionsadvisedlyand
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
informationrespectingtheconditionswhichthelegislationisintendedtoaffectorchangeandwhere
thelegislationbodydoesnotitselfpossesstherequisiteinformationwhichisnotinfrequentlytrue
recoursemustbehadtootherswhopossessit."

DispellinganydoubtastothePhilippineCongress'powerofinquiry,provisionsonsuchpowermadetheirmaiden
appearanceinArticleVIII,Section12ofthe1973Constitution.18Thencamethe1987Constitutionincorporatingthe
presentArticleVI,Section12.Whatwasthereforeimplicitunderthe1935Constitution,asinfluencedbyAmerican
jurisprudence,becameexplicitunderthe1973and1987Constitutions.19

Notably,the1987Constitutionrecognizesthepowerofinvestigation,notjustofCongress,butalsoof"any of its
committee."Thisissignificantbecauseitconstitutesadirectconferralofinvestigatorypoweruponthecommittees
and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative
functionarealsoavailabletothecommittees.20

It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The
Court'shighregardtosuchpowerisrenderedmoreevidentinSenatev.Ermita,21whereitcategoricallyruledthat
"thepowerofinquiryisbroadenoughtocoverofficialsoftheexecutivebranch."Verily,theCourtreinforced
thedoctrineinArnaultthat"theoperationofgovernment,beingalegitimatesubjectforlegislation,isaproper
subjectforinvestigation"andthat"thepowerofinquiryiscoextensivewiththepowertolegislate."

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21.
Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power of
inquiry,beingbroad,encompasseseverythingthatconcernstheadministrationofexistinglawsaswellasproposed
or possibly needed statutes.22 It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers
whosepositionsarewithinthepowerofCongresstoregulateorevenabolish."23PCGGbelongstothisclass.

Certainly,amereprovisionoflawcannotposealimitationtothebroadpowerofCongress,intheabsenceofany
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constitutionalbasis.

Furthermore,Section4(b)isalsoinconsistentwithArticleXI,Section1oftheConstitutionstatingthat:"Publicoffice
is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmostresponsibility,integrity,loyalty,andefficiency,actwithpatriotismandjustice,andleadmodestlives."

Theprovisionpresupposesthatsinceanincumbentofapublicofficeisinvestedwithcertainpowersandcharged
withcertaindutiespertinenttosovereignty,thepowerssodelegatedtotheofficerareheldintrustforthepeople
andaretobeexercisedinbehalfofthegovernmentorofallcitizenswhomayneedtheinterventionofthe
officers.Suchtrustextendstoallmatterswithintherangeofdutiespertainingtotheoffice.Inotherwords,
publicofficersarebuttheservantsofthepeople,andnottheirrulers.24

Section4(b),beinginthenatureofanimmunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It

placesthePCGGmembersandstaffbeyondthereachofcourts,Congressandotheradministrativebodies.Instead
ofencouragingpublicaccountability,thesameprovisiononlyinstitutionalizesirresponsibilityandnonaccountability.
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea,25 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as
"obiter"theportionofthemajorityopinionbarring,onthebasisofSections4(a)and(b)ofE.O.No.1,acivilcasefor
damagesfiledagainstthePCGGanditsCommissioners.Heeloquentlyopined:

Theaboveunderscoredportionsare,itisrespectfullysubmitted,clearlyobiter.Itisimportanttomakeclear
that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal
terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as
immunizingthePCGGoranymemberthereoffromcivilliability"foranythingdoneoromittedinthedischarge
of the task contemplated by this Order," the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be
opentomostseriousdoubt.Forsoviewed,Section4(a)wouldinstitutionalizetheirresponsibilityandnon
accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and
1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987
Constitution.xxx.

xxxxxx

It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG
couldnotberequiredtotestifybeforetheSandiganbayanorthatsuchmemberswereexemptedfrom
complyingwithordersofthisCourt.

Chavezv.Sandiganbayan26reiteratesthesameview.Indeed,Section4(b)hasbeenfrowneduponbythisCourt
evenbeforethefilingofthepresentpetitions.

Corollarily,Section4(b)alsorunscountertothefollowingconstitutionalprovisionsensuringthepeople'saccessto
information:

ArticleII,Section28

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
publicdisclosureofallitstransactionsinvolvingpublicinterest.

ArticleIII,Section7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
officialrecords,andtodocuments,andpaperspertainingtoofficialacts,transactions,ordecisions,as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen,subjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

ThesetwinprovisionsoftheConstitutionseektopromotetransparencyinpolicymakingandintheoperationsofthe
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their
constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.27 the Court
explainedthataninformedcitizenryisessentialtotheexistenceandproperfunctioningofanydemocracy,thus:

Anessentialelementofthesefreedomsistokeepopenacontinuingdialogueorprocessofcommunication
between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussionbemaintainedtotheendthatthegovernmentmayperceiveandberesponsivetothepeople'swill.
Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulateitswillintelligently.Onlywhentheparticipantsinthediscussionareawareoftheissuesandhave
accesstoinformationrelatingtheretocansuchbearfruit.

Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress but also the
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citizenry.Thepeopleareequallyconcernedwiththisproceedingandhavetherighttoparticipatethereininorderto
protect their interests. The extent of their participation will largely depend on the information gathered and made
knowntothem.Inotherwords,therighttoinformationreallygoeshandinhandwiththeconstitutionalpoliciesoffull
public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmentaldecisionmakingaswellasincheckingabuseinthegovernment.28ThecasesofTaadav.Tuvera29
andLegaspiv.CivilServiceCommission30haverecognizedacitizen'sinterestandpersonalitytoenforceapublic
dutyandtobringanactiontocompelpublicofficialsandemployeestoperformthatduty.

Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff information and
otherdatainaidofitspowertolegislate.Again,thismustnotbecountenanced.InSenatev.Ermita,31 this Court
stressed:

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any
executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is
presumedtobeamatterofpublicconcern.Thecitizensaretherebydeniedaccesstoinformationwhich
theycanuseinformulatingtheirownopinionsonthematterbeforeCongressopinionswhichtheycanthen
communicatetotheirrepresentativesandothergovernmentofficialsthroughthevariouslegalmeansallowed
bytheirfreedomofexpression.

Astatutemaybedeclaredunconstitutionalbecauseitisnotwithinthelegislativepowertoenactoritcreatesor
establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles or its purpose or effect violates the
Constitutionoritsbasicprinciples.32Asshownintheabovediscussion,Section4(b)isinconsistentwithArticle
VI, Section 21 (Congress' power of inquiry), Article XI, Section 1 (principle of public accountability), Article II,
Section28(policyoffulldisclosure)andArticleIII,Section7(righttopublicinformation).

Significantly,ArticleXVIII,Section3oftheConstitutionprovides:

All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or
revoked.

Theclearimportofthisprovisionisthatallexistinglaws,executiveorders,proclamations,lettersofinstructionsand
otherexecutiveissuancesinconsistentorrepugnanttotheConstitutionarerepealed.

Jurisprudence is replete with decisions invalidating laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances inconsistent with the Constitution. In Pelaez v. Auditor General,33 the
Court considered repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 authorizing the Executive to
change the seat of the government of any subdivision of local governments, upon the approval of the 1935
Constitution. Section 68 was adjudged incompatible and inconsistent with the Constitutional grant of limited
executive supervision over local governments. In Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., v. Office of the
ExecutiveSecretary,34theCourtdeclaredExecutiveOrderNo.46,entitled"AuthorizingtheOfficeonMuslimAffairs
to Undertake Philippine Halal Certification," void for encroaching on the religious freedom of Muslims. In The
ProvinceofBatangasv.Romulo,35theCourtdeclaredsomeprovisionsoftheGeneralAppropriationsActsof1999,
2000and2001unconstitutionalforviolatingtheConstitutionalpreceptonlocalautonomy.AndinOplev.Torres,36
the Court likewise declared unconstitutional Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System," for being violative of the right to privacy protected by the
Constitution.

TheseDecisions,andmanyothers,highlightthattheConstitutionisthehighestlawoftheland.Itis"thebasicand
paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest
officialsoftheland,mustdefer.Noactshallbevalid,howevernobleitsintentions,ifitconflictswiththe
Constitution."37Consequently,thisCourthasnorecoursebuttodeclareSection4(b)ofE.O.No.1repealedby
the1987Constitution.

Significantly, during the oral arguments on September 21, 2006, Chairman Sabio admitted that should this Court
rulethatSection4(b)isunconstitutionalorthatitdoesnotapplytotheSenate,hewillanswerthequestionsofthe
Senators,thus:

CHIEFJUSTICEPANGANIBAN:

Okay.Now,iftheSupremeCourtrulesthatSec.4(b)isunconstitutionalorthatitdoesnotapplytothe
Senate,willyouanswerthequestionsoftheSenators?

CHAIRMANSABIO:

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YourHonor,myfatherwasajudge,diedbeingajudge.IwashereintheSupremeCourtasChiefof
StaffofJusticeFeria.IwoulddefinitelyhonortheSupremeCourtandtheruleoflaw.

CHIEFJUSTICEPANGANIBAN:

YouwillanswerthequestionsoftheSenatorsifwesaythat?

CHAIRMANSABIO:

Yes,YourHonor.ThatisthelawalreadyasfarasIamconcerned.

With his admission, Chairman Sabio is not fully convinced that he and his Commissioners are shielded from
testifyingbeforerespondentSenateCommitteesbySection4(b)ofE.O.No.1.Ineffect,hisargumentthatthesaid
provisionexemptshimandhiscorespondentCommissionersfromtestifyingbeforerespondentSenateCommittees
concerningSenateRes.No.455utterlylacksmerit.

Incidentally, an argument repeated by Chairman Sabio is that respondent Senate Committees have no power to
punishhimandhisCommissionersforcontemptoftheSenate.

Theargumentismisleading.

ArticleVI,Section21provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiriesinaidoflegislationinaccordancewithitsdulypublishedrulesofprocedure.Therightsof
personsappearinginoraffectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected.

It must be stressed that the Order of Arrest for "contempt of Senate Committees and the Philippine Senate" was
approvedbySenatePresidentVillarandsignedbyfifteen(15)Senators.Fromthis,itcanbeconcludedthatthe
Orderisundertheauthority,notonlyoftherespondentSenateCommittees,butoftheentireSenate.

At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of
Representatives,butalsotoanyoftheirrespectivecommittees.Clearly,thereisadirectconferralofpowerto
thecommittees.FatherBernas,inhisCommentaryonthe1987Constitution,correctlypointedoutitssignificance:

It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of investigation not just of
Congressbutalsoof"anyofitscommittees."Thisissignificantbecauseitconstitutesadirectconferral
ofinvestigatorypoweruponthecommitteesanditmeansthatthemeanswhichtheHousescantake
inordertoeffectivelyperformitsinvestigativefunctionarealsoavailabletotheCommittees.38

Thisisareasonableconclusion.TheconferralofthelegislativepowerofinquiryuponanycommitteeofCongress
mustcarrywithitallpowersnecessaryandproperforitseffectivedischarge.Otherwise,ArticleVI,Section21will
bemeaningless.Theindispensabilityandusefulnessofthepowerofcontemptinalegislativeinquiryisunderscored
inacatenaofcases,foreignandlocal.

Inthe1821caseofAndersonv.Dunn,39thefunctionoftheHousesofCongresswithrespecttothecontemptpower
waslikenedtothatofacourt,thus:

Butthecourtinitsreasoninggoesbeyondthis,andthoughthegroundsofthedecisionarenotveryclearly
stated,wetakethemtobe:thatthereisinsomecasesapowerineachHouseofCongresstopunish
forcontemptthatthispowerisanalogoustothatexercisedbycourtsofjustice,andthatitbeingthe
well established doctrine that when it appears that a prisoner is held under the order of a court of
generaljurisdictionforacontemptofitsauthority,noothercourtwilldischargetheprisonerormake
furtherinquiryintothecauseofhiscommitment.Thatthisisthegeneralruleasregardstherelationof
onecourttoanothermustbeconceded.

InMcGrain,40theU.S.SupremeCourtheld:"Experiencehasshownthatmererequestsforsuchinformation
areoftenunavailing,andalsothatinformationwhichisvolunteeredisnotalwaysaccurateorcompleteso
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed." The Court, in Arnault v. Nazareno,41
sustainedtheCongress'powerofcontemptonthebasisofthisobservation.

InArnaultv.Balagtas,42theCourtfurtherexplainedthatthecontemptpowerofCongressisfoundeduponreason
andpolicyandthatthepowerofinquirywillnotbecompleteifforeverycontumaciousact,Congresshastoresortto
judicialinterference,thus:

TheprinciplethatCongressoranyofitsbodieshasthepowertopunishrecalcitrantwitnessesisfounded
upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative
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power.Howcouldalegislativebodyobtaintheknowledgeandinformationonwhichtobaseintended
legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information if it is
impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution
adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its
respective authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be full and complete,
independently of the other's authority or power. And how could the authority and power become
complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the
legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is
impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or
dignity.43

In Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete,44 the Court
characterizedcontemptpowerasamatterofselfpreservation,thus:

Theexercisebythelegislatureofthecontemptpowerisamatterofselfpreservationasthatbranchofthe
governmentvestedwiththelegislativepower,independentlyofthejudicialbranch,assertsitsauthorityand
punishescontemptsthereof.Thecontemptpowerofthelegislatureis,therefore,suigenerisxxx.

Meanwhile,withrespecttoG.R.No.174177,thepetitionofPhilcomsatHoldingsCorporationanditsdirectorsand
officers,thisCourtholdsthattherespondentSenateCommittees'inquirydoesnotviolatetheirrighttoprivacyand
rightagainstselfincrimination.

OneimportantlimitationontheCongress'powerofinquiryisthat"therightsofpersonsappearinginoraffected
by such inquiries shall be respected." This is just another way of saying that the power of inquiry must be
"subjecttothelimitationsplacedbytheConstitutionongovernmentaction."AsheldinBarenblattv.UnitedStates,45
"theCongress,incommonwithalltheotherbranchesoftheGovernment,mustexerciseitspowerssubject
tothelimitationsplacedbytheConstitutionongovernmentalaction,moreparticularlyinthecontextofthis
case,therelevantlimitationsoftheBillofRights."

Firstistherighttoprivacy.

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws.46 Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissibleunlessexcusedbylawandinaccordancewithcustomarylegalprocess.Themeticulousregardwe
accordtothesezonesarisesnotonlyfromourconvictionthattherighttoprivacyisa"constitutionalright"and"the
rightmost valued by civilizedmen,"47 but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
whichmandatesthat,"noone shall besubjectedto arbitraryinterferencewith his privacy" and "everyone has the
righttotheprotectionofthelawagainstsuchinterferenceorattacks."48

OurBillofRights,enshrinedinArticleIIIoftheConstitution,providesatleasttwoguaranteesthatexplicitlycreate
zonesofprivacy.Ithighlightsaperson's"righttobeletalone"orthe"righttodeterminewhat,howmuch,towhom
and when information about himself shall be disclosed."49Section2 guarantees "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose." Section 3 renders inviolable the "privacy of communication and
correspondence"andfurthercautionsthat"anyevidenceobtainedinviolationofthisortheprecedingsection
shallbeinadmissibleforanypurposeinanyproceeding."

Inevaluatingaclaimforviolationoftherighttoprivacy,acourtmustdeterminewhetherapersonhasexhibiteda
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable
government intrusion.50 Applying this determination to these cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the
directorsandofficersofPhilcomsatHoldingsCorporationexhibitareasonableexpectationofprivacy?andsecond,
didthegovernmentviolatesuchexpectation?

The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senate's public hearing to deliberate on Senate
Res.No.455,particularly"ontheanomalouslossesincurredbythePhilippineOverseasTelecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat
HoldingsCorporations(PHC)duetotheallegedimproprietiesintheoperationsbytheirrespectiveboardof
directors."Obviously,theinquiryfocusonpetitioners'actscommittedinthedischargeoftheirdutiesasofficersand
directors of the said corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. Consequently, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the
governmenthasinterest.Certainly,suchmattersareofpublicconcernandoverwhichthepeoplehavethe
righttoinformation.

Thisgoestoshowthattherighttoprivacyisnotabsolutewherethereisanoverridingcompellingstateinterest.In
Morfev.Mutuc,51theCourt,inlinewithWhalenv.Roe,52employedtherationalbasisrelationshiptestwhenitheld
thattherewasnoinfringementoftheindividual'srighttoprivacyastherequirementtodisclosureinformationisfora

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validpurpose,i.e.,tocurtailandminimizetheopportunitiesforofficialcorruption,maintainastandardofhonestyin
publicservice,andpromotemoralityinpublicadministration.53InValmontev.Belmonte,54theCourtremarkedthat
as public figures, the Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
comparedtoordinaryindividuals,andtheiractionsaresubjecttocloserscrutiny.Takingthisintoconsideration,the
Courtruledthattherightofthepeopletoaccessinformationonmattersofpublicconcernprevailsovertherightto
privacyoffinancialtransactions.

Underthepresentcircumstances,theallegedanomaliesinthePHILCOMSAT,PHCandPOTC,ranginginmillions
ofpesos,andtheconspiratorialparticipationofthePCGGanditsofficialsarecompellingreasonsfortheSenate
to exact vital information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well as from
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and
formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding PCGG's efficacy. There being no reasonable
expectationofprivacyonthepartofthosedirectorsandofficersoverthesubjectcoveredbySenateRes.No.455,it
followsthattheirrighttoprivacyhasnotbeenviolatedbyrespondentSenateCommittees.

Anenttherightagainstselfincrimination,itmustbeemphasizedthatthisrightmaybeinvokedbythesaiddirectors
and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation only when the incriminating question is being asked, since
theyhavenowayofknowinginadvancethenatureoreffectofthequestionstobeaskedofthem."55That
thisrightmaypossiblybeviolatedorabusedisnogroundfordenyingrespondentSenateCommitteestheirpower
ofinquiry.Theconsolationisthatwhenthispowerisabused,suchissuemaybepresentedbeforethecourts.Atthis
juncture,whatisimportantisthatrespondentSenateCommitteeshavesufficientRulestoguidethemwhentheright
againstselfincriminationisinvoked.Sec.19reads:

Sec.19.PrivilegeAgainstSelfIncrimination

Awitnesscaninvokehisrightagainstselfincriminationonlywhenaquestiontendstoelicitananswerthat
will incriminate him is propounded to him. However, he may offer to answer any question in an executive
session.

No person can refuse to testify or be placed under oath or affirmation or answer questions before an
incriminatoryquestionisasked.Hisinvocationofsuchrightdoesnotbyitselfexcusehimfromhisdutytogive
testimony.

In such a case, the Committee, by a majority vote of the members present there being a quorum, shall
determinewhethertherighthasbeenproperlyinvoked.IftheCommitteedecidesotherwise,itshallresume
its investigation and the question or questions previously refused to be answered shall be repeated to the
witness.Ifthelattercontinuestorefusetoanswerthequestion,theCommitteemaypunishhimforcontempt
forcontumaciousconduct.

ThesamedirectorsandofficerscontendthattheSenateisbarredfrominquiringintothesameissuesbeinglitigated
before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution of criminal or
administrativeactionshouldnotstoporabateanyinquirytocarryoutalegislativepurpose.

Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it their duty to cooperate with them in their
effortstoobtainthefactsneededforintelligentlegislativeaction.Theunremittingobligationof every citizen is to
respondtosubpoenae,torespectthedignityoftheCongressanditsCommittees,andtotestifyfullywithrespectto
matterswithintherealmofproperinvestigation.

In fine, PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti, and
Tereso Javier and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as
wellasitsdirectorsandofficers,mustcomplywiththeSubpoenaeAdTestificandumissuedbyrespondentSenate
CommitteesdirectingthemtoappearandtestifyinpublichearingsrelativetoSenateResolutionNo.455.

WHEREFORE,thepetitioninG.R.No.174340forhabeascorpusisDISMISSED,forbeingmoot.Thepetitionsin
G.RNos.174318and174177arelikewiseDISMISSED.

Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution. Respondent Senate Committees'
powerofinquiryrelativetoSenateResolution455isupheld.PCGGChairmanCamiloL.SabioandCommissioners
RicardoAbcede,NarcisoNario,NicasioContiandTeresoJavierandManuelAndalandJulioJalandoni,PCGG's
nomineestoPhilcomsatHoldingsCorporation,aswellasitsdirectorsandofficers,petitionersinG.R.No.174177,
are ordered to comply with the SubpoenaeAd Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing
themtoappearandtestifyinpublichearingsrelativetoSenateResolutionNo.455.

SOORDERED.

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Panganiban,C.J.,Puno,Quisumbing,YnaresSantiago,Carpio,AustriaMartinez,Corona,CarpioMorales,Callejo,
Sr.,Azcuna,ChicoNazario,Tinga,Garcia,andVelasco,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1E.O.No.1wasissuedbyFormerPresidentAquinointheexerciseofherlegislativepowerunderthe
Provisional(Freedom)Constitution.Thus,itisofthesamecategoryandhasthesamebindingforceasa
statute.(Agpalo,StatutoryConstruction,1998citingLegaspiv.MinistryofFinance,115SCRA418[1982]
GarciaPadillav.PonceEnrile,G.R.No.61388,April20,1983Aquinov.CommissiononElections,62SCRA
275[1975])
2Section2(a),ExecutiveOrderNo.1.

3SeePresidentialCommissiononGoodGovernmentv.Pena,April12,1988,159SCRA558

4Annex"E"ofthePetitioninG.R.No.174318.

5Id.

6Annex"F"ofthePetitioninG.R.No.174318.

7Annex"G"ofthePetitioninG.R.No.174318.

8Annex"A"ofthePetitioninG.R.No.174318.

9PetitioninG.R.No.174177atp.15.

10Annex"B"ofthePetitioninG.R.No.174318.

11Annex"I"ofthePetitioninG.R.No.174318.

12Annex"J"ofthePetitioninG.R.No.174318.

13Annex"D"ofthepetitioninG.R.No.174318.

14EnBancResolutiondatedSeptember21,2006.

15273U.S.135,47S.Ct.319,71L.Ed.580,50A.L.R.1(1927).

16No.L3820,87Phil.29(1950).

172Abb.Pr.30(N.Y.1864).

18Puno,LectureonLegislativeInvestigationsandtheRighttoPrivacy,atp.22.

19BernasS.J.,The1987ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,2003Ed.atp.737.

20BernasS.J.,The1987ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,2003Ed.atp.739.

21G.R.No.169777,April20,2006.

22Watkinsv.UnitedStates,354U.S.178(1957),pp.194195.

23Senatev.Ermita,Id.

24DeLeon,DeLeon,Jr.TheLawonPublicOfficersandElectionLaw,p.2.

25No.L77663,April12,1988,159SCRA558.

26193SCRA282(1991).

27G.R.No.74930,February13,1989,170SCRA256.

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28Valmontev.Belmonte,Jr.,supra.

29136SCRA27.

30150SCRA530.

31Supra.

32Agpalo,StatutoryConstruction,1998citingInreCunanan,94Phil.534(1954).

33No.L23825,December24,1965,15SCRA569.

34G.R.No.153888,July9,2003,405SCRA497.

35G.R.No.152774,May27,2004,429SCRA736.

36293SCRA141(1998).

37Cruz,ConstitutionalLaw,2003,p.4.

38Bernas,S.J.,The1987ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesACommentary,p.678.

3919U.S.[6Wheat.]204(1821)citedinJusticePuno,LegislativeInvestigationsandRighttoPrivacy.

40Supra.

41Supra.

4297Phil.358[1955].

43Id.

44No.L72492,November5,1987,155SCRA421.

45360U.S.109(1959).

46Marquezv.Desierto,G.R.No.135882,June27,2001,359SCRA772.

47SeeMorfev.MutucNo.L20387,January31,1968,22SCRA424.

48Article12oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.SeealsoArticle17(1)and(2)oftheInternational
CovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights.
49ConstitutionalandLegalSystemsofASEANCountries,Sison,AcademyofASEANLawand
Jurisprudence,1990,at221,citingI.R.Cortes,TheConstitutionalFoundationsofPrivacy,7(1970).
50Burrowsv.SuperiorCourtofSanBernardinoCounty,13Cal.3d238,529P2d590(1974).SeeKatzv.
Unitedstates(1967),389U.S.347,350352,88S.Ct.507,19L.Ed.2d576Peoplev.Krivda(1971)5Cal.
3d357,364,96Cal.Rptr.62,486P.2d12628Cal.3d623624,105Cal.Rptr.521,504P.2d457.INSERT
Herrera'sHandbookonArrest,SearchandSeizure.
51Supra.

52429U.S.589(1977).

53JusticePuno,LectureonLegislativeInquiryandRighttoPrivacy,p.60.

54170SCRA256(1989)

55Cruz,ConstitutionalLaw,2003,p.307.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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