G.R. No.

156367 May 16, 2005 Case 1

AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO BAUTISTA, respondent.

Antonio Bautista has been employed by auto bus transport systems, INC. as a driver conductor with travel routes
since May 24, 1995 with a wage based on commission which is 7% of the gross total income per travel, on a twice a
month basis.

Antonio Bautista was terminated due to January 3, 2000s accident wherein the auto bus no. 114 he was driving
accidentally bumped the rear portion of auto bus no. 124 and then refused to pay the amount of 75,551.50

The respondent instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims for non-payment of 13th month pay
and service incentive leave against auto bus.

The auto bus petitioned that respondents employment was full of offenses involving reckless imprudence, gross
negligence and dishonesty with supporting documents such as copies of letters and memos irregularity reports
and warrants of arrest pertaining to some incidents that Bautista was involved.

The complaint for illegal dismissal is hereby dismissed on September 29. 2000. However, auto bus must pay
Bautista with 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. But then Autobus is not satisfied with the decision of
the Labor Arbiter and thus appealed the decision to the NLRC. The decision dated September 29. 2000 is
MODIFIED by deleting the award of 13TH month pay but the service incentive leave pay is affirmed.

Displeased with only the partial grant of its appeal to the NLRC, petitioner sought the review of said decision with
the Court of Appeals

ISSUES

1. Whether or not respondent is entitled to service incentive leave

2. Whether or not the 3 year prescriptive period provided under Article 95 of the Labor Code , as amended, is
applicable to respondents claim of service incentive leave pay.

RULING OF THE COURT

1. Yes, the appeal has no merit

Accdg to Art. 95 of the Labor Code Every employees who has rendered at least one year of service shall be
entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of 5 days with pay but except to the employees that are field personnel
and other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the employer including those who are engaged on
task or contract basis, purely commission basis , or those who are paid in a fixed amount for performing work
irrespective of the time consumed in the performance. The petitioners contention that respondent is not entitled
to the grant of service incentive leave just because he was paid on purely commission basis is misplaced. What
matters is whether or not the respondent is field personnel. As a general rule, field personnel are those whose
performance of their job/service is not supervised by the employer or his representative, the workplace being
away from the principal office and whose hours and days of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty
hence, they are paid specific amount for rendering specific service or performing specific work.

Thus, the respondent is not a field personnel because there are inspector assigned at strategic places who board
the bus and inspect the passengers, the punch tickets, and the conductors reports which implied that the driver
was under constant supervision while in the performance of his work.

2. YES.

Accdg to Art. 291 states that all money claims arising from employer- employee relationship shall be filed within 3
years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
Applying the article above, we can conclude that the 3 year prescriptive period begins not at the end of the year
when the employee becomes entitled to the commutation of his service incentive leave. Considering that the
respondent filed his money claim after a month from the time of his dismissal, his money claim is filed within the
three-year prescriptive period in accordance to the Article 291 of the Labor Code.

G.R. No. 111744 September 8, 1995 Case 2

LOURDES G. MARCOS, ALEJANDRO T. ANDRADA, BALTAZARA J. LOPEZ AND VILMA L. CRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner were regular employees of private respondent Insular Life Insurance Co;, Ltd., and were dismissed when
their positions were declared redundant. A special redundancy benefit was paid to them, which included payment
of accrued vacation leave and fifty percent (50%) of unused current sick leave , special redundancy benefit,
equivalent to 3 months salary for every year of service; and additional cash benefits, in lieu of others benefits
provided by the company or required by law.

Prior to the termination of their services, petitioner Marcos were employed for more than 20 years; petitioner
Andrada for more than 25 years; petitioner Lopez for exactly 30 years; and petitioner Cruz for more than 20 years.

Petitioner Lopez sent a letter to the company questioning the redundancy package and claimed that they should
receive the respective service award and other prorated bonuses which they had earned at the time they are
dismissed. Also she argued that the cash service awards have already been budgeted in a fund distinct and apart
from redundancy fund and subsequently the company execute a release and quitclaim.

The petitioner inquired from the Legal Service of the Department of Labor and Employment whether Respondent
Corporation could legally refuse the payment of their service awards as mandated in their Employees Manual.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the service award is part of the benefits of the employees of Insular Life.

2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the performance and anniversary bonuses.

RULING

1. Yes.

Under prevailing jurisprudence the fact that an employee has signed the satisfaction receipt his claims does not
necessarily result in the waiver thereof. The law does not consider as valid any agreement whereby a worker
agrees to receive less compensation that what he is entitled to recover. A deed of release or quitclaim cannot bar
an employee from demanding benefits to which he is legally entitled.

As earlier stated the petitioners even sought the opinion of the Department of Labor and Employment to determine
where and how they stood in the controversy which shows their adamant desire to obtain their service awards and
to underscore their disagreement with the Release and Quitclaim they were virtually forced to sign in order to
receive the separation pay.

In accordance of the Article 6 of the Civil Code it renders a quitclaim agreement void where it obligates the workers
concerned to forego their benefits while at the same time exempting the employer from any liability that it may
choose to reject and it is counterpart of Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides that no one shall be unjustly
enriched at the expense of another. In accordance of the findings of the Labor Arbiter that petitioners are indeed
entitled to receive service awards presumed that since each of the complainants have rendered service in multiple
of five years prior to their separation from employment, the company should be paid their service awards.
2. YES

A bonus is not a gift or gratuity, but it is paid for some services or consideration and is in addition to what would
ordinarily be given and also conveys an idea of something which is gratuitos, or which may be claimed to be
gratuitos , over and above the prescribed wage which the employer agrees to pay.

The authorities hold that if one enters into a contract of employment, under an agreement that he shall be paid a
certain salary by the week or some other stated period and , in addition, a bonus in case he serves for a specified
length of time, there is no reason for refusing to enforce the promise to pay the bonus, if the employee has served
during the stipulated time, on the ground that it was a promise of a mere gratuity. Thus, the petitioners are entitled
to the performance and anniversary bonuses.

G.R. No. 110068 February 15, 1995 Case 3

PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS EMPLOYEES UNION-
TUPAS, respondents.

FACTS:

The respondents asked Philippine Duplicators for payment of 13th month pay computed on the basis of the
salesmens fixed or guaranteed wages plus commissions, and was affirmed by the Labor Arbiter Felipe T. Garduque
II.

The petitioner filed for Certiorari but was dismissed by the court through its Third Division and upheld the
decision of public respondent NLRC.

Philippine Duplicators filed (a) a Motion for Leave to Admit Decond Motion for Reconsideration, and (b) a Second
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners prays that the decision rendered in Duplicators be set aside and another be
entered directing the dismissal of the money claims of private responded Philippine Duplicators Employees
Union, and was disagreed by the Third Division of the Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the sales commission is included in the coverage of basic salary for purposes of computing 13th
month pay.

RULING OF THE COURT

YES.

According to Article 97 of the Labor Code defines the term wage which is equivalent to salary, as used in P.D.
No. 851 and Memorandum Order No. 28 in the following terms: Wage paid to any employee shall mean the
remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable
by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done,
or for services rendered or to be rendered, and includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the
Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the employee.
Fair and reasonable value shall not include any profit to the employer or to any person affiliated with the
employer.

In the instant case, there is no question that the sales commissions earned by salesmen who make or close a sale of
duplicating machines distributed by petitioner corporation constitute part of the compensation or remuneration
paid to salesmen for serving as salesmen, and hence as part of the wage or salary of petitioners salesmen. Indeed,
it appears that petitioner pays its salesmen a small fixed or guaranteed wage; the greater part of the salesmens
wages or salaries being composed of the sales or incentive commissions earned on actual sales closed by them. No
doubt this particular salary structure was intended for the benefit of petitioner, on the apparent assumption that
thereby its salesmen would be moved to greater enterprise and diligence and close more sales in the expectation of
increasing their sales commissions. This, however, does not detract from the character of such commissions as part
of the salary or wage paid to each of its salesmen for rendering services to petitioner corporation.

The provisions of Explanatory Bulletin No. 86-12, Item No. 5 (a): Since the salesmen of Philippine Duplicators are
receiving a fixed basic wage plus commission on sales and not purely on commission basis, they are entitled to
receive 13th month pay provided they worked at least one (1) month during the calendar year. May we add at this
point that in computing such 13th month pay, the total commissions of said salesmen for the calendar year shall be
divided by twelve.

G.R. No. 149013 August 31, 2006 Case 4

HOUSE OF SARA LEE, Petitioner,

vs.
CYNTHIA F. REY, Respondent.

FACTS:

The House of Sara Lee is engaged in the direct selling of a variety of product lines for men and women, which
include cosmetics, intimate apparels, perfumes, ready to wear clothes and other novelty items, through its various
outlets nationwide. The latter engages and contracts with dealers to sell the aforementioned merchandise for the
pursuit of its business.

The dealers must remit to the petitioner the proceeds of their sales within a designated credit in accord with
existing company policy period which would either be 38 days for IGSs or 52 days for IBMs, counted from the day
the said dealers acquired the merchandise from the petitioner.

To discourage late remittances, the petitioner imposes a Credit Administration Charge, or simply, a penalty
charge, on the value of the unremitted payment, and if the dealer concerned has overdue payments or is said to be
in default, he or she cannot purchase additional products from the petitioner.

Cynthia Rey, the Accounts Receivable Clerk and later Credit Administration Supervisor, was found to have violated
the company policies pertaining to the unauthorized extension of credit periods, non-collection of remittances,
non-imposition of penalty charges, authorizing purchases and giving of supervision fees despite non-remittance,
which result to the dismissal of the former for breach of trust and confidence.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the dismissal is valid.

2) Whether or not the respondent is entitled to 13th, 14th or 15th month pay.

RULING OF THE COURT

1. YES due to the Loss of confidence.

Loss of confidence is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence
which rendered a just cause of dismissal. It applies where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate
matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employers property. But, in order to
constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related, such that the employee
concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer.

Distinction must be made as to the application of the doctrine of breach of trust and confidence with respect to
rank-in-file employees and managerial employees. In the case at bar, respondent is not an ordinary rank-and-file
employee. Respondent occupied a highly sensitive and critical position and may thus be dismissed on the ground of
loss of trust and confidence. The position carried with it the duty to observe proper company procedures in the
fulfillment of her job, as it relates closely to the financial interests of the company.
Respondents unauthorized extensions of the credit periods of the dealers are prejudicial to the interest of the
petitioner and bear serious financial implications: First, the dealer concerned is allowed to withhold remittances to
the company for his or her credit purchases beyond the expiration of the 38- or 52-day rolling deadline; second,
the Credit Administration Charges or interest penalties are not imposed on the erring dealer; third, the dealer
concerned is allowed to purchase goods on credit despite the fact that he or she has not remitted payment, which is
against company policy; and fourth, undue Service Fees were unknowingly paid by the company to certain IBMs.

2. NO, The respondent is not entitled to 13th, 14th, 15th month pay, and salary increases.

The award of 13 Month pay must be deleted due to the reason that the respondent is not a rank and file. The
decision of NLRC and the CA in refusing to award 14th and 15th month pay as well as the monthly salary increase
of 10 percent per year for two years based on her latest salary rate is right. The respondent must show that these
benefits are due to her as a matter of right. The rule in these cases is, she who alleges, not she who denies, must
prove. Mere allegations by the respondent do not suffice in the absence of proof supporting the same. With respect
to salary increases in particular, the respondent must likewise show that she has a vested right to the same, such
that her salary increases can be made a component in the computation of back wages. What is evident is that salary
increases are a mere expectancy which by nature volatile and dependent on numerous variables, including the
companys fiscal situation, the employees future performance on the job, or the employees continued stay in a
position. In short, absent any proof, there is no vested right to salary increases.

G.R No. 79004-08 October 4, 1991 Case 5

FRANKLIN BAGUIO AND 15 OTHERS, BONIFACIO IGOT AND 6 OTHERS, ROY MAGALLANES AND 4 OTHERS,
CLAUDIO BONGO, EDUARDO ANDALES and 4 OTHERS, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (3rd DIVISION), GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION and/or
FELICIANO LUPO, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Feliciano LUPO, a building contractor, entered into a contract with GMC, a domestic
corporation engaged in flour and feeds manufacturing, for the construction of an annex building inside the latters
plant in Cebu City wherein the former hired the petitioners either as carpenters, masons or laborers which
subsequently have been terminated on different dates by LUPO.

The petitioners filed Complaints against LUPO and GMC before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Brach No. VII, Cebu
City, for unpaid wages, COLA differentials, bonus, and overtime pay.

The executive Labor Arbiter, Branch VII, found LUPO and GMC jointly and severally liable to petitioners in
accordance to Article 109 of the Labor Code, and ordered them to pay the aggregate amount of P95,382.92. NLRC
subsequently denied the decision due to lack of Merit in a Resolution.

Upon motion for reconsideration, the case was reassigned to Third Division which the latter absolved GMC from
any liability. Then the petitioners assailed that judgment in this petition for Certiorari and contend that GMC is
jointly and severally liable with LUP. The petitioner seek for recovery from GMC based on Aticle 106 of the Labor
Code.

The Article 106 of the Labor Code has no application in the case but rather just limited to situations where the
work being performed by the contractors employee are directly related to the business of the employer, according
to GMC and NLRC. The latter further opines that Article 109 on Solidary Liability find no application either because
GMC was neither petitioners employer nor indirect employer.

ISSUE

Whether or not GMC is jointly and severally liable with LUPO

RULING OF THE COURT

YES.

Article 106 provides that whenever the employer enters into a contract with another person for the performance
of the formers work, the employees of the contractor and of the latters subcontractor shall be paid in accordance
with the provisions of this Code. Failure to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with his code, the
employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent
of the work performed under the contract. When there is labor-only wherein the person supplying workers to an
employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tool, equipment, machineries, work
premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed are performing activities directly to the employers
principal business, the latter will become an agent of the employer wherein the employer shall be as responsible to
the workers as the agent. However, the case has no labor-only, thus, Article 106 is inapplicable.

But instead, in Article 107 covering the job-contracting involved Indirect employer wherein the contractor himself
is the direct employer of the employees and the employer is deemed, by the operation of Law, as an indirect
employer. Specifically there is job contracting when the contractor carries on an independent business and
undertakes the contract work on his account under his own responsibility, and when the contractor has substantial
capital or investment in the form of tool, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials which are
necessary in the conduct of his business. The forgoing qualifies GMC as an indirect employer, and for the purposes
of determining the extent of its civil liability, GMC is deemed a direct employee of his contractors employee
pursuant to the last sentence of Article 109 of the Labor Code. The petition for certiorari is granted. As a
consequence, GMC is jointly and severally liable to the petitioners.

G.R. No. 79351 November 28, 1989 Case 6

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, CRESENCIA DIFONTORUM, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines seeks the nullification of an order dated July 29, 1987 and issued
by the Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, affirming that of Antional Capital Region Officer-in-charge
Romeo A. Young, directing the petitioner to deliver the properties of Riverside Mills Corporation (RMC) which it
had in its possession to the Department of Labor and Employment for proper disposition in Case No. NCR-LSED-7-
334-84 which involves a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, illegal deductions from the salaries,
and violation of the minimum wage law filed by private respondents against RMC.

The writ of execution was returned unserved and unsatisfied with the information that the companies premises of
RMC right after private respondents filed with the DOLE a motion for delivery of properties of RMC in the
possession of the DBP to the DOLE for proper disposition in pursued of Article 110 of the Labor Code, and it has
been granted.

Petitioner filed on its motion for reconsideration asserting that Article 110 of the Labor Code has no application in
the case because of the following reasons:

a. The properties sought to be delivered have ceased to belong to RMC in view of the fact that petitioner had
foreclosed on the mortgage, and the properties have been sold and delivered to third parties.

b. The requisite condition for the application of Art. 110 of the Labor Code is not present since no bankruptcy or
insolvency proceedings over RMC properties and assets have been undertaken.

Hence, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 110 of the Labor Code finds application on the instant case.

RULING:

No.

Article 110 provides that in case of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's business, his workers enjoy first
preference as regards wages due them for services rendered during the period prior to the bankruptcy or
liquidation and is held by the Supreme Court that it cannot be applied in the instant case because the important
requisite that employer's business must be bankrupt is lacking. The Supreme Court ruled that in the Philippine
jurisdiction, bankruptcy, insolvency and general judicial liquidation proceedings are the only means to establish
that a business is bankrupt or insolvent. Absent of such judicial declaration, the business cannot be considered
bankrupt for the purpose of applying the provisions of Article 110.

G.R. No. 179652 May 8, 2009 Case 7

PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.), Petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE
REGION VII, and JANDELEON JUEZAN, Respondents.

FACTS : Private respondent, Jandeleon Juezan, filed a complaint against petitioner with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) for illegal deduction, non-payment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium
pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and no coverage of SSS,
PAG-IBIG and Philhealth. The DOLE Regional Director found that private respondent was an employee of
petitioner, and was entitled to his money claims.

When the matter was brought before the CA, where petitioner (Bombo Radyo) claimed that it had been denied due
process, it was held that petitioner was accorded due process as it had been given the opportunity to be heard, and
that the DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction over the matter. In the Decision of this Court, the CA Decision was
reversed and set aside, and the complaint against petitioner was dismissed. The National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) was held to be the primary agency in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. This was the interpretation of the Court of the clause "in cases where the relationship of employer-
employee still exists" in Art. 128(b).From this Decision, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed a Motion for
Clarification of Decision (with Leave of Court). The PAO sought to clarify as to when the visitorial and enforcement
power of the DOLE be not considered as co-extensive with the power to determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship

ISSUE: May the DOLE make a determination of whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists?

HELD: No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a preliminary finding, that
the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE would first seek the NLRCs
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, or that should the existence of the employer-
employee relationship be disputed, the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC.The DOLE, in determining the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, has a ready set of guidelines to follow, the same guide the courts
themselves use. The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; (4) the employers power to
control the employees conduct.9 The use of this test is not solely limited to the NLRC Under Art. 128(b) of the
Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully empowered to make a determination as to the existence of
an employer-employee relationship in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, subject to judicial
review, not review by the NLRC. The exercise of the DOLEs visitorial and enforcement power, the Labor Secretary
or the latters authorized representative of the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, to the exclusion of the NLRC is affirmed.
G.R. No. 117378 March 26, 1997 Case 8

GIL CAPILI and RICARDO CAPILI, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, National Capital Region (First Division), BENIGNO SANTOS,
DELFIN YUSON, LUISITO SANTOS, URSINO BASISTER, RICARDO REYES, JOSELITO SANTOS, JORGE BINUYA
and NICOLAS MULINGBAYAN, respondents.

FACTS

Respondents Benigno Santos, Delfin Yuson, Luisito Santos, ursino Basister, Ricardo Reyes, Joselito Santos, Jorge
Binuya and Nicolas Mulingbayang are licensed drivers of public utility jeepneys plying the Libertad-Sta Cruz route
in Manila. The jeepenys were formerly owned by a petitioner Gil Capili.

The respondents and the other drivers were required by the jeepney operators, Ricardo Capili together with his
wife, to sign individually contracts of lease of the jeepneys to formalize there lessor-lessee relationship. However,
the impression regarding the signing of contracts of lease is that before they could continue driving for petitioners,
all the driver should stopped plying their assigned routes.

The 22 drivers file the complaint for illegal dismissal before the labor arbiter asking not for reinstatement but for
separation pay. 14 of the complainants desisted and resumed plying their routes temporarily, and the remaining 8
complainants were mentioned above as private respondents.

Petitioners opposed the claim of private respondents before the labor arbiter alleging that the respondents
voluntarily abandoned their respective jobs without any valid cause and thereafter refused and still continue to
refuse to return to work despite repeated demands and/or notices given to them to return to work.

ISSUES

Whether or not the private respondents abandoned their work

Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to separation pay.

RULING OF THE COURT

1. Yes, it is not sound business practice to dismiss business employees at the same time since it would cripple the
operations like what happened in this case wherein 22 of them filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Thus, this is
merely abandonment of work due to the misunderstanding and misappreciation of the situation of the both
parties. And to remedy the situation the most prudent approach would be to let the parties return to the
relationship that existed between them prior to the signing of contract of lease. The private respondents were
directed to reinstate them to their former position.

2. No. Since there was a clear finding of abandonment by the labor arbiter consisting in the failure of private
respondents to report for work without justifiable reason, the amount of separation pay could not be warranted.
The award of separation pay cannot be justified solely because of the existence of strained relations between the
employer and employee relationship.

G.R. No. 163891 May 21, 2009 Case 9

CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HERBERT TAN and AMALIA SONSING, Respondents.

FACTS
Herbert Tan and Amalia Sonsing, respondents, were employed as officer-in-charge and office secretary,
respectively at Davao Branch, and were placed under preventive suspension for their failure to satisfactorily
explain the discrepancies in the stock inventory at the Davao depot warehouse, and were also asked to explain the
alleged dishonesty in the punching of their time cards, and later became terminated.

The respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against the petitioner which favoured by
the Labor Arbiter Nicolas S. Sayson declaring their dismissal as Illegal and ordered the petitioner to pay the
respondents separation pay, back wages, 13th month pay, and damages.

The petitioner received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter and sent its notice through LBC but it was
received by the NLRC beyond 10 days and thus, on October 11, 2001 Resolution, NLRC dismissed the petitioners
appeal.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the NLRC in its February 6 2002 Resolution. And
subsequently, NLRC dismissed respondents complaint for illegal dismissal. Later, the respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration and was denied by NLRC in its April 22, 2002 Resolution.

Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, and was granted in its March 9 2004
Decision and ruled that NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting petitioners belated appeal. And
then the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and was denied in the Court of Appeals June 4 2004
Resolution.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the March 9 2004 Decision and the June 4 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence.

RULING OF THE COURT

NO, the petition has no merit.

According to the Court of Appeals, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting petitioners belated
appeal and should have adhered to the rule that the appeal should be filled within 10 calendar days from the
receipt of the decisions as mandated by Article 223 of the Labor Code.

The failure to file an appeal within the reglementary rendered the assailed decision final and executor and deprives
the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the judgment, much less to entertain the appeal.

There is no argument that the petitioner received a copy of the Labor Arbiters decision on 7 February 2001. Thus,
pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code, petitioner had only until 17 February 2001, within which to file an
appeal. However, as 17 February 2001 fell on a Saturday, petitioner had until the next working day , or until 19
February 2011, to file its appeal. On 16 February 2001, petitioner consigned its notice of appeal to LBC for delivery
to the NLRC. The NLRC received petitioners notice of appeal only on 26 February 2001 and the appeal was clearly
filed out of time. Thus, the petitioner lost its right from the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC should have
dismissed its notice of appeal.

The petition was denied and the March 9 2004 Decision and June 4 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals was
affirmed.

G.R. No. 84433 June 2, 1992

ALEXANDER REYES, ALBERTO M. NERA, EDGARDO M. GECA, and 138 others, petitioners,
vs.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, as Officer-in-Charge, Bureau of Labor Relations, Med. Arbiter PATERNO ADAP,
and TRI-UNION EMPLOYEES UNION, et al., respondent.

FACTS
The officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations (Hon. Cresenciano Trajano) sustained the denial by the
Med Arbiter of the right to vote of one hundred forty-one (141) members of the Iglesia ni Kristo (INK), all
employed in the same company, at a certification election at which two (2) labor organizations were contesting the
right to be the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.

The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees
of Tri-Union Industries Corporation on October 20, 1987. The competing unions were the Tri-Union Employees
Union-Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the
Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be qualified voters, only

240 actually took part in the election, conducted under the supervision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Among
the 240 employees who cast their votes were 141 members of the INK. The ballots provided for three (3) choices.
They provided for votes to be cast, of course, for either of the two (2) contending labor organizations, (a) TUPAS
and (b) TUEU-OLALIA; and, conformably with established rule and practice, 1 for (c) a third choice: NO UNION.

The 141 votes of INK members were segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement
between competing unions

ISSUE

Whether or not employees who are not part of any union may validly exercise their right to vote in a certification
election.

RULING OF THE COURT

Yes.

The right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organization of their own choosing for purposes of
collective bargaining is guaranteed to all employees or workers. This includes the right to organize or affiliate with
a labor union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join and to engage in concerted
activities with coworkers.

The purpose of a certication election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit; to be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative
case by which particular labor organization.

Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor
organization may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law
is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit whether they are members of a labor
organization or not.