Pacete v Comm.

on Appointments

Facts: Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the
Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office
on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. Explication
The then Secretary of Justice advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal
judge, the ground being that his appointment had been by-passed.
Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for
the reconsideration of the confirmation of the appointment of petitioner as municipal judge of
Pigcawayan, Cotabato, in view of derogatory information which he had received.
Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus was led to notify the
then Secretary of Justice accordingly, following what he considered to be the prevailing practice
of such body that the mere presentation of such letter "automatically vacated the confirmation
of the appointment in question . . ." Respondent Secretary of Justice through the Judicial
Superintendent then advised petitioner that he should vacate his position as municipal judge,
as he had not been duly confirmed. Petitioner contends that the Commission on Appointments
exercises power to approve or reject appointments thru majority votes of members in the
quorum and not thru members individually as provided by Sec. 10 of its Rules, and that the
Supreme Court has no Jurisdiction because the case only involves internal rules of Commission
on Appointments. There are no constitutional questions involved.

Issue:
1. Whether the confirmation of his appointment had become final and executory upon the
adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress at midnight of May 21, 1965
or was not duly confirmed

Held:
WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus and the Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments is commanded to issue the certificate of confirmation prayed for
by petitioner. The right of petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge of Pigcawayan,
Cotabato is in accordance with law, his confirmation having been duly confirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
For respondents to argue that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did suffice to set
it aside, even in the absence of any further action, is, as stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of
what is provided in the Constitution. That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a
move of a single member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority
were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse. It is indefensible in principle and
pernicious in operation. It can find no shelter in the constitutional prescription.

Arroyo v De Venecia

Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
"constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question
on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress
as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November
21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22,
1996.

Issue:
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules

Held:
The Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in
enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

Ratio:
To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the
other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void
because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure. In the absence
of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in
the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body.

In view of House Rules

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that
in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must
restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House.
Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here
seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a
debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken
every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third
readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill
over the veto of the President.