CRUZ, Vanessa Evans D.

1-D
FRANCISCO SILVA VS. LEOVIGILDO T. MATIONG
G.R. No. 160174
August 28, 2006
FACTS:
Aklan Electric Cooperative, Inc. (AKELCO) is an electric cooperative under the supervision and
control of the NEA pursuant to PD 296, as amended by PD 1645 and to the Contract of Loan
between the two. Respondent Leovigildo T Mationg was the gen. manager of AKELCO.

The present controversy arose when the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) cut-off the
electricity in Aklan from 18-20 March 2002 for AKELCOs failure to pay its approximately P25 million
obligation. On 20 March 2002, NAPOCOR restored the power supply to the area upon learning of the
NEA take-over. Despite the take-over, the respondent remained to be the general manager of
AKELCO. On the same day, the AKELCO Board of Directors received a complaint seeking the
dismissal of respondent as general manger of AKELCO for gross incompetence and
mismanagement.

The AKELCO-BOD issued Resolution No. 18 placing respondent under indefinite preventive
suspension. However, Bueno issued a Memorandum stating that the NEA received another AKELCO-
BoD resolution, disowning and recalling R.N. 18 and expressing full and confidence in respondents
management. Based on these contradicting resolutions, it is obvious that AKELCO is suffering from
intra-corporate dispute, involving two factions, the Peralta faction and the Rentillo faction.

Due to the complexity of the issue, Bueno revoked the approval of Board Resolution No. 18 and
submitted the determination of the validity of the two board resolutions to the NEA Board of
Administrators (NEA-BOA). Further, Bueno directed the opposing parties to submit their respective
position papers on the matter and enjoined them to cooperate with the NEA management team.
The two factions submitted their respective position papers.

On 11 April 2002, petitioner issued a Resolution approving Board Resolution No. 18 and disapproving
Board Resolution No. 17. On the same day, the NEA-BOA issued Resolution No. 22 authorizing
petitioner to remove respondent as general manager of AKELCO. On 19 April 2002, petitioner issued
an Order for AKELCOs non-payment of its loans and non-compliance with NEA policies, orders and
guidelines.

On 2 May 2002, respondent filed a petition with the Court of Appeals to enjoin petitioner from
enforcing the 11 April 2002 Resolution and the 19 April 2002 Order.

On 8 May 2002, the NEA-BOA issued Board Resolution No. 26 confirming petitioners Order dated 19
April 2002 which provided, among others, the preventive suspension of respondent for 30 days. On 11
May 2002, in the AKELCO-BOD Res. No. 2, terminated its investigation, finding respondent guilty of
willful breach of trust and confidence to the consumer-members and gross and habitual neglect of
his duties as gen. manager of AKELCO. On 17 May 2002, petitioner approved the AKELCO Res. NO. 2,
by an Order.

As an answer, the respondent filed a Manifestation and Supplemental Motion with the CA assailing
his removal from his office and praying for the nullification of petitioners issuances and for
reinstatement as AKELCOs G.M.

In its Decision of 19 June 2003, the Court of Appeals granted respondents petition and nullified the
assailed Resolution and Orders.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of 26 September
2003. Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In nullifying petitioners issuances and reinstating respondent as general manager of AKELCO, the
Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
At the outset, We shall first tackle respondents assertion that the instant case does not fall within our
jurisdiction. In essence, respondent argues that the foregoing acts establish a labor dispute
cognizable only by the Labor Arbiter. We disagree.

If the electric cooperative concerned or other similar entity fails after due notice to comply with NEA
orders, rules and regulations and/or decisions, or with any of the terms of the Loan Agreement, the
NEA Board of Administrators may take preventive and/or disciplinary measures including suspension
and/or removal and replacement of any or all of the members of the Board of Directors, officers or
employees of the Cooperative, other borrower institutions or supervised or controlled entities as the
NEA Board of Administrators may deem fit and necessary and to take any other remedial measures
as the law or the Loan Agreement may provide. x x x It is the Board of Administrators and not the
Administrator himself who is empowered to suspend and/or terminate the incumbent general
manager and appoint an acting general manager of an erring electric cooperative. The
Administrator cannot arrogate unto himself a power that is not given to him by the statute. It is a well-
established rule of law that a public official must trace his powers from the statute that created the
office or position. The power, however, need not be express but may be implied from the wording of
the law. In the absence of such conferment, the public official cannot validly exercise the power. If
executed and properly challenged, the unauthorized exercise of such power may be set aside. xxx

ISSUE:
WON, petitioners approval of the AKELCO-BODs resolutions suspending and terminating respondent
as AKELCO general manger is valid.

RULING:
The petition is meritorious.

The Court declares that its resolution of the present case is confined to determining the validity of
petitioners Resolution and Orders insofar as the preventive suspension and dismissal of respondent
are concerned.

Moreover, the Court finds no reversible error in the Court of Appeals findings on the issues of
jurisdiction, forum-shopping, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and amendment of the petition
for certiorari. Hence, the instant controversy does not involve a labor dispute requiring the expertise
of the National Labor Relations Commission. This case involves the exercise of the enforcement
power of the NEA under Section 10 of PD 269 as amended

As to the Enforcement power of NEA it is provided that: the extent of government control over
electric cooperatives covered by PD 269, as amended, is largely a function of the NEA as a primary
source of funds of these electric cooperatives. In exercising its power of supervision and control over
electric cooperatives, the NEA, through its Board of Administrators, can issue orders, rules and
regulations, and motu proprio or upon petition of third parties, can conduct investigations in all
matters affecting electric cooperatives pursuant to Section 10 of PD 269, as amended. One of these
remedial measures, Section 10(e) of PD 269, as amended, provides for the suspension or removal of
members of the Board of Directors, officers or employees of the defiant electric cooperative as the
NEA-BOA may deem fit and necessary
The question is whether the NEA-BOA can delegate to the NEA Administrator its power under Section
10(e) of PD 269, as amended, to take preventive and disciplinary measures against electric
cooperative officers. Under Section 10 of PD 269, as amended, the power to impose preventive and
disciplinary measures on erring electric cooperative officers can be exercised by the NEA-BOA as a
collegial body to whom all the powers of the NEA had been vested in.

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, there was no undue delegation of power by the NEA-
BOA to the NEA Administrator.

It is clear from Resolution No. 22 that any action of the NEA Administrator is subject to the
confirmation of the NEA-BOA. What is delegated to the NEA Administrator is only the power to
investigate and to make a recommendation, not the power to discipline. The disciplining authority is
still the NEA-BOA. The authority of the NEA Administrator is only recommendatory.

The act of the NEA-BOA in delegating the power to investigate to the NEA Administrator is not without
basis. Hence:
The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not
preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates
to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is
sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.

In this case, the phrase subject to confirmation of the Board of Administrators implies that the final
decision rests on the NEA-BOA. The NEA-BOA may confirm, modify or nullify the act of the NEA
Administrator. Further, the delegation of authority by the NEA-BOA was in accordance with Section
5(b)(7) of PD 269, as amended

The Court notes that petitioners counsel relied on several decisions of the Court of Appeals in
addition to Supreme Court cases to buttress his arguments. The Court reminds counsel that decisions
of the Court of Appeals are neither controlling nor conclusive on this Court.
 MARIA PAZ V. NEPOMUCENO, FERMIN A. NEPOMUCENO VS. CITY OF SURIGAO and
SALVADOR SERING in his capacity as City Mayor of Surigao
G.R. No. 146091
July 28, 2008

FACTS:
A complaint for Recovery of Real Property and/or its Market Value filed by petitioner Maria Paz
Nepomuceno to recover a 652 sq. m. portion of her 50,000 sq. m. lot which was occupied,
developed and used as a city road by the city government of Surigao.Maria Paz alleged that the
city government neither asked her permission to use the land nor instituted expropriation proceedings
for its acquisition. On October 4, 1994, she and her husband, co-petitioner, Fermin A. Nepomuceno,
wrote respondent (then Surigao City Mayor) Salvador Sering a letter proposing an amicable
settlement for the payment of the portion taken over by the city. They subsequently met with Mayor
Sering to discuss their proposal but the mayor rebuffed them in public and refused to pay them
anything. In a letter dated January 30, 1995, petitioners sought reconsideration of the mayors stand.
But again, the city mayor turned this down in his reply dated January 31, 1995. As a consequence,
petitioners claimed that they suffered mental anguish, embarrassment, disappointment and
emotional distress which entitled them to moral damages.

In their answer, respondents admitted the existence of the road in question but alleged that it
was constructed way back in the 1960s during the administration of former Mayor Pedro Espina. At
that time, the lot was owned by the spouses Vicente and Josefa Fernandez who signed a road right-
of-way agreement in favor of the municipal government. However, a copy of the agreement could
no longer be found because the records were completely destroyed and lost when the Office of the
City Engineer was demolished by typhoon Nitang in 1994.

After hearing the parties and evaluating their respective evidence, the RTC rendered its
decision[4] and held ordering the City of Surigao to pay to Maria Paz V. Nepomuceno and her
husband, Fermin Nepomuceno, the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees, and the further sum
of P3,260.00 as compensation for the portion of land in dispute, with legal interest thereon from 1960
until fully paid, and upon payment, directing her to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance
in favor of the said defendant.

Unsatisfied with that decision, the petitioners appealed to the CA. As stated earlier, the CA
modified the RTC decision and held that petitioners were entitled to P30,000 as moral damages for
having been rebuffed by Mayor Sering in the presence of other people. It also awarded
petitioners P20,000 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses considering that they were forced to
litigate to protect their rights and had to travel to Surigao City from their residence in Ormoc City to
prosecute their claim. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in all other respects. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA decision in Spouses Mamerto Espina, Sr. and Flor Espina v. City of
Ormoc[7] should be applied to this case because of the substantial factual similarity between the
two cases.

HELD: No.

RATIO: Where actual taking is made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and the owner
seeks recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, it is
the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation, the
reason for this rule is:

The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not
intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the
actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way the compensation to be paid
can be truly just; i.e., just not only to the individual whose property is taken, but to the public, which is
to pay for it.

Petitioners cannot properly insist on the application of the CA decision in Spouses Mamerto Espina, Sr.
and Flor Espina v. City of Ormoc.[13] A decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent. A
ruling of the CA on any question of law is not binding on this Court.[14] In fact, the Court may review,
modify or reverse any such ruling of the CA.

Finally, we deny petitioners prayer for exemplary damages. Exemplary damages may be imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good.[15] The award of these damages is meant to be a
deterrent to socially deleterious actions.[16] Exemplary damages would have been appropriate had
it been shown that the city government indeed misused its power of eminent domain.[17] In this
case, both the RTC and the CA found there was no socially deleterious action or misuse of power to
speak of. We see no reason to rule otherwise.
 AYALA CORPORATION, v.
ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
December 1, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner, Ayala Corporation, was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alfaro
Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City with an area of 840 square meters, more or less, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 233435 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to
Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and the buyers contained special conditions
of sale and deed restrictions. The Deed Restrictions contained the stipulation that the gross floor area
of the building to be constructed shall not be more than five (5) times the lot area and the total
height shall not exceed forty-two (42) meters. The restrictions were to expire in the year 2025.
The buyers Sy and Kieng failed to construct the building in violation of the Special Conditions of Sale.
Notwithstanding the violation, in April 1989 they were able to sell the lot to respondent Rosa-Diana
Realty and Development Corporation with Ayalas approval and with the same special conditions
and restrictions.

In consideration for Ayala to release the Certificate of Title of the property, Rosa Diana, on July
27, 1989, executed an Undertaking promising to abide by the special conditions of sale executed by
Ayala with the original buyers. Upon submission of the Undertaking together with the building
plans for a condominium project, known as The Peak, Ayala released title to the lot, thereby
enabling Rosa-Diana to register the deed of sale in its favor and obtain Certificate of Title No. 165720
in its name. The title carried as encumbrances the special conditions of sale and the deed
restrictions. Rosa-Dianas building plans as approved by Ayala were subject to strict compliance of
cautionary notices appearing on the building plans and to the restrictions encumbering the Lot
regarding the use and occupancy of the same.
Rosa-Diana submitted to Ayala for approval envisioned a 24-meter high, seven-(7) storey
condominium project with a gross floor area of 3,968.56 square meters. It, however, submitted a
different set of building plan of The Peak to the building official of Makati that contemplated a
91.65-meter high, 38-storey condominium building with a gross floor area of 23,305.09 square meters.
The construction of the building ensued.

Thereafter, Ayala prayed for rescission of the sale of the subject lot to Rosa-Diana Realty. The
lower court denied Ayalas prayer for injunctive relief, thus enabling Rosa-Diana to complete the
construction of the building. Undeterred, Ayala tried to cause the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on Rosa-Dianas title. The Register of Deeds of Makati, however, refused registration of the
notice of lis pendens on the ground that the case pending before the trial court, being an action for
specific performance and/or rescission, is an action in personal, which does not involve the title, use
or possession of the property. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) reversed the ruling of
the Register of Deeds saying that an action for specific performance or recession may be classified
as a proceeding of any kind in court directly affecting title to the land or the use or occupation
thereof for which a notice of lis pendens may be held proper.
The decision of the LRA, nevertheless, was overturned by the Court of Appeals citing its decision
under the doctrine of stare decisis in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, a
case similar to the present case. Ayala however contended that the pronouncement by the CA in its
case with Ray Burton Development Corporation is merely an obiter dictum in as much as the only
issue raised in the present case was the propriety of the lis pendens annotation on the Certificate of
Title of the subject lot.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Ayalas appeal based on its decision on
Ayala vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation under the doctrine of stare decisis.
HELD:
Yes. There is no reason how the law of the case or stare decisis can be held to be applicable
in the case at bar.

RATIO:
The pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Ayala is barred from
enforcing the deed of restrictions can only be considered as an obiter dicta. As earlier mentioned,
the only issue before the Court of Appeals at the time was the propriety of the annotation of the lis
pendens. The additional pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that Ayala is estopped from
enforcing the deed of restrictions even as it recognized that the said issue is being tried before the
trial court was not necessary to dispose of the issue as to the propriety of the annotation of the lis
pendens. A dictum is an opinion of the judge, which does not embody the resolution or
determination of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point, not the
proffered deliberate opinion of the judge himself. It is not necessarily limited to the issues essential to
the decision but may also include expressions or opinion, which are not necessary to support the
decision reached by the court. Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis.
The appellate courts decision in Ayala vs. Ray Burton cannot also be cited as a precedent under the
doctrine of stare decisis. It must be pointed out that the time the presently assailed decision of the
CA was rendered, the Ayala vs. Ray Burton case was on appeal to the Court. As held by the Court in
Ayala vs. Ray Burton, the CA went beyond the sole issue raised before it and made factual findings
without any basis in the record to rule inappropriately that Ayala is in estoppel and has waived its
right to enforce the subject restrictions. Thus, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals was reversed and set aside. Rosa Diana was also ordered to pay Ayala development
charges and damages.
 SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY v. NANILA FONTELO-PAALAN
GR NO. 170948
June 26, 2007

FACTS:
In 1962, respondent was employed by the petitioner and was assigned to the Medical Records
Section of the Silliman University Medical Center. She was later promoted as the Head of the Medical
Records Section, the position she held until her retirement on 31 May 1997 at the age of 57 years
old.[6] Respondent's retirement was pursuant to the provision of the petitioner's retirement plan,
integrated into the employees' employment contract, providing that retirement shall be automatic
for any member[7] after reaching the age of 65 or after 35 years of uninterrupted service to the
university.[8] Accordingly, respondent, on 2 June 1997, received her retirement benefits in the sum of
P102,410.00 and P46,219.25, as additional adjustment.[9] Almost three years after she received her
retirement benefits or on 19 May 2000, respondent filed with the NLRC a Complaint[10] for illegal
dismissal against petitioner. Respondent averred in her Position Paper that the stipulation in the
retirement program providing for compulsory retirement after rendering 35 years of uninterrupted
service constitutes a violation of her constitutional right to security of tenure and is in contravention of
the provision of Republic Act No. 7641[11] providing that the compulsory retirement age is 65 years
old.
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of
employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but
not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has
served at least five (5) years in the said establishment may retire and shall be entitled to retirement
pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least
six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
Petitioner asserted that the compulsory retirement age of 65 years applies only in cases where
there is no agreement between the employer and the employee embodied either in the
employment contract or the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Thus, since it has an existing
retirement program integrated in its employees' employment contract, the provisions of the said
retirement program providing for compulsory retirement after rendering 35 years of uninterrupted
service shall govern the retirement of its employees. In addition, petitioner advanced that the
security of tenure clause in the Constitution presupposes that there is an existing and ongoing
employment and not after the employment was already severed on account of a valid retirement
and after the employee received retirement benefits on account of such retirement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the balance of retirement benefits as adjudged by the NLRC
and affirmed by the court of appeals.

HELD:

We are mindful that the petitioner had initially manifested its opposition to the NLRC ruling that
it is still liable for the deficiency in retirement benefits due the respondent by timely interposing a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Convincingly, however, when the NLRC denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner obviously no longer objected to the award, as it did not take any further
action thereon. Such was a serious procedural lapse warranting the dismissal of the instant case.

As admitted by the petitioner, it received a copy of the NLRC Resolution dated 19 April 2004
denying its Motion for Reconsideration on 13 July 2004.[22] It had, therefore, until 13 September
2004[23] to file a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals,[24] but failed to do so. Instead, it
was the respondent who timely assailed the adverse decision before the appellate court.
 The rule is well-settled that a party cannot impugn the correctness of a judgment not
appealed from by him; and while he may make counter assignment of errors, he can do so only to
sustain the judgment on other grounds but not to seek modification or reversal thereof, for in such
case, he must appeal. Stated differently, a party who does not appeal[28] from a judgment can no
longer seek modification or reversal of the same. He may oppose the appeal of the other party only
on grounds consistent with the judgment. Since the petitioner in the case at bar failed to question the
finding of the NLRC that it was still liable for the balance of respondent's retirement benefits, the same
had therefore long become final and executory and it can no longer impugn the same in this action.

Considering that the judgment is already final and executory against the party who does not
appeal,[29] then the winning party already acquired vested rights by virtue of said judgment. Time
and again, we never fail to press the dictum that just as the losing party has the privilege to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the decision.[30]

It also bears to emphasize that in respondent's Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, the issues extensively discussed by the parties were limited to whether respondent's
retirement violated her security of tenure and thus amounted to illegal dismissal and whether the
petitioner's retirement plan is valid and binding on the respondent. Petitioner only resurrected its
objection to the Order of the NLRC for the payment of the balance of respondent's retirement
benefits in an Opposition with Manifestation Ad Cautelam,[31] which cannot be deemed a substitute
for a Petition for Certiorari.

Consequently, we are already without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the present Petition
and resolve the substantive issues raised herein lest we transgress the well-established statutory and
jurisprudential principles succinctly laid above. While in the review of cases, we relax procedural rules
to serve substantial justice, we do so only based on exceptional grounds or under extraordinary
circumstances.[32] Petitioner failed to establish any exceptional grounds or extraordinary
circumstances that may warrant the relaxation of the procedural rules. Neither did petitioner even
bother to explain its failure to question the adverse NLRC Resolution, a procedural course of
undiscounted significance, the omission of which throws the entire case into a travesty, as what
happened in the case at bar.
 RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
FACTS:

On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and
Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC
election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by
adding Article XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend
the Constitution.

HELD:
A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the system of initiative to amend
the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present
petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not
comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments
to the Constitution.