Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases

1. CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS| Brion

G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

FACTS
Petitioner was a former Filipino Citizen who acquired Canadian Citizenship by
Naturalization on 2000. On January 18, 2005 he married a Filipina. Due to work and
other commitments, he left for Canada soon after the wedding. Around April 2005, he
went home to surprise his wife but was shocked to discover the she is having an affair
with another man. Hurt and disappointed, he filed for Divorce in Canada. On December
8, 2005, it was granted and took effect on January 8, 2006. Two years after he finally
moved on and was able to found another Filipina to love. Desirous to marry her, he
went to the Pasig LCR to register his Divorce Decree for the first marriage. Despite this
official registry, an official of NSO informed him the first marriage still subsists in
Philippine law and for proper enforcement it must judicially recognized before a
Philippine Court. Hence he filed for its Judicial Recognition.

Wife of the first marriage offered no opposition to the petition and even alleged her
desire to file a similar case but was only prevented due to financial constraints. The RTC
denied the petition concluding Petitioner is not the proper party to institute the action. It
ruled based on Article 26 of the Family Code, which remedy is available only to Filipino
Citizens.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

Whether Petitioner, a foreign national, could properly apply for the Judicial Recognition
of a Divorce Decree pursuant to Article 261 of the FC.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

NO. The proper party to file the same is the Filipino spouse. The Law recognizes the
absurdities of marrying Alien spouses. This remedy is to capacitate the Filipino spouse to
remarry.

Doctrine: The Alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26
as the substantive right established is in favor of the Filipino Spouse.

1 Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive
Order 227)
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ. Page 1 of 15
 Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases
2. Suazo vs. Suazo| Brion
G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010 | 615 SCRA 154
FACTS
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they
were residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to
Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents
sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to Bian,
Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were
married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with
Angelitos parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling.
Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as household help. Angelito,
on the other hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged
Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another
woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their
relationship, she alleged in her complaint:
- That their relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels which
caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the
plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every
time they had a troublesome encounter;
- That their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his
indolence and his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations making life unbearably
bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their separation in fact in
July 1987;
- That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the
time of their marriage and became very apparent as time went and
proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to
a psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired
by Jocelyn).
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no
collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the
psychologist testified at the trial.
Jocelyns testimony reaffirmed her allegations in her complaint. However, the
psychologist who testified failed to personally examine Angelito, which is now the bone
of contention in this case.
The RTC ruled in favor of Jocelyn and held that:
While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a
person may be considered as psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic)
some admitted grounds that would render a person to be unfit to comply
with his marital obligation, such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective
sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants
(like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence
on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the
condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks
(The Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
However, on appeal, the CA reversed the RTCs ruling and held that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines
set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not
require that a physician personally examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of
evidence approach which allows the fact of psychological incapacity to be
drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify the root causes of
the illness. If the totality of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the
aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the
social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove psychological
incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the
person whose mental and psychological capacity was in question.
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal
of the CA ruling.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Art. 36 of
the Family Code.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
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 Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of
law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with
Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.
The Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. The law is so designed
to allow some resiliency in its application.
Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos
psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based
on our own examination of the evidence on record, that:
Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not
conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged
psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion
evidence the psychologists testimony and the psychological evaluation report that
Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated
Angelitos psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her
conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of
course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist
heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with
due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards
outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties
by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity
that is grave, severe and incurable.
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged
to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of
examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we
recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged
relations between the parties. For a determination though of a partys complete
personality profile, information coming from persons intimately related to him (such as
the partys close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the
application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not
totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based
entirely on doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager
information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete
personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or
diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be
conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for
Angelitos. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering
from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the
Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists report and
testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos purported anti-social
personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave
and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her
conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. These
particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they be found in her testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is
chronic or incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his
marriage with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not
developed. However, she did not support this declaration with any factual basis. In her
Report, she based her conclusion on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a
dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologists own equivocation on
this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have realized that it
was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it was
based entirely on Jocelyns assumed knowledge of Angelitos family background and
upbringing.
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to
what extent was Angelitos personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of
the disorder on Angelitos awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.
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 Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important
concerns or requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the success
of Jocelyns cause.

As to Jocelyns testimony, it is found to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified

on Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the
physical beatings she received from him all of which occurred after the marriage.
Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent
behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at
the earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical
beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took place whether it was near or at the
time of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary
gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that
the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of

psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these
simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as
the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological
incapacity in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in
some debilitating psychological condition or illness.

The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment.

While we may concede that physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral
or personality patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological
incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or
the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost in the present case under
our finding that the opinion of the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming,
therefore, that Jocelyns account of the physical beatings she received from Angelito
were true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related
jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.

On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases
we now find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the
finality of the factual findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyns
main anchor in her present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We
find that, on the contrary, the CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related
jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the present case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
62443. Costs against the petitioner.

ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ. Page 4 of 15
 Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases
3. R. Toring v. T. Toring| Brion
G.R. No. 165321 August 3, 2010 |
FACTS
Resp. Teresita was the teacher in Hawaiian dance of petitioner Ricardos cousin.
Ricardo courted Teresita and the two became a couple 3 months after. When
Ricardos other girlfriend, who was already pregnant at that time, pressured him to
marry her he decided to elope with Teresita. The two got married and begot 3
children.
More than 20 years after their wedding, Ricardo sought nullification of their HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
marriage on the ground that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply CA did not err in dismissing the case. RTCs decision lacked factual and legal
with the essential obligations of marriage.
Expert witness presented was psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia Albaran. Teresita did not file
an answer or opposition to the petition.
Accdg to Ricardo, Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer. During one of his
visits to the country, he suspected Teresitas pregnancy because of her slightly bigger
stomach. Her miscarriage 5 months into the pregnancy confirmed this because the 3
instances of sexual contact they had during the visit were characterized by
withdrawals. Ricardo also said that Teresita was very extravagant, materialistic,
controlling and demanding; she spent for herself the money he sent for their family,
forcing their children to live in a small rented room.
Accdg to. Dr. Albaran, Teresita was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder
that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations: a sense of entitlement as she expected favorable treatment and
automatic compliance to her wishes, being interpersonally exploitative as on several
occasions she took advantage of him to achieve her own ends, lack of empathy as
she was unwilling to recognize her partners feelings and needs, taking into
consideration her own feelings and needs only, her haughty and arrogant behavior
and attitude and her proneness to blame others for her failures and shortcomings.
She based these findings on the information she gathered from her psychological
evaluation of the couples eldest son.
OSG opposed saying that the psychological evaluation only revealed a vague and
general conclusion on the couples personality traits but not on Teresitas
psychological makeup. OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically
identify and sufficiently prove the medical cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate that the alleged psychological incapacity
existed prior to or at the time of marriage, nor that the incapacity was grave and
incurable.
RTC agreed with Ricardo. CA reversed and held that RTCs findings did not satisfy
the rules and guidelines in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. The RTC failed to
specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused Teresitas psychological
incapacity, and likewise failed to how that the incapacity already existed at the time
of celebration of marriage. Furthermore, Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation
dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Re allegations on Teresitas
overspending and infidelity, they do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. These allegations,
even if true, could only effectively serve as grounds for legal separation or a criminal
charge for adultery.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court,
particularly the expert testimony of Dr. Albaran.
basis.
Santos v. Court of Appeals solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that
the factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability.
Subsequently, Molina laid down definitive guidelines: (1) burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision; (3) incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage; (4) incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable; (5) illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6)
essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children; (7) interpretations given by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
Applying the aforesaid standards to this case:
(1) Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation and testimony
Mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and eldest son, coupled
with the results of the psychological tests administered only on
Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the
conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder.
Although the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated
spouse be personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity, this does not
signify that the evidence should be any less than what Art. 36, by its
nature, require. This simply means that the requirements for nullity
outlined in Santos and Molina need not necessarily come from the
allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still essential
although from sources other than the respondent spouse to show
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 Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases
his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of
marriage; the root cause of the inability to appreciate the essential
obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and incurability
of the condition. Other than from the spouses, such evidence can
come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close
friends or even family doctors or lawyers.
Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardos cause, is the failure of
Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation to fully explain the details i.e.,
the what, how, when, where and since when of Teresitas alleged
Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
(2) Ricardos testimony
Ricardos characterizations of his wife is sufficient to constitute
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Article
36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal,
or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on
the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.
Even Ricardos added testimony, relating to rumors of Teresitas dates
with other men and her pregnancy by another man, would not fill in
the deficiencies we have observed, given the absence of an adverse
integral element and link to Teresitas allegedly disordered personality.
Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresitas alleged character
traits already existed at the inception of their marriage. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the psychological incapacity must exist
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.24 In the absence of
this element, a marriage cannot be annulled under Article 36.

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 Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases
4. Camacho-Reyes v. Camacho| Nachura the parties as valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
G.R. No., 185286 August 18, 2010 | Santos v. Court of Appeals solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that
the factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
FACTS obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We
explained:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the UP
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would
Diliman. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
relationship.
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which included
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
dining out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university students budget
it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
(array ko natamaan ako dito). At that time, respondent held a job in the family
beyond the means of the party involved.
business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB
The SC found all these present in this case, with all three expert witnesses
Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his
finding that respondent suffered from :Mixed Personality Disorder
third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant. The year
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder] and
following petitioners graduation and her fathers death, petitioner and respondent
Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive
got married.
sadistic and dependent features.
When their first child was born, financial difficulties started. When petitioner
mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that
THERAPHY will not necessarily mean that the decree will not issue.
he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondents
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the
game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and
psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable. The appellate court is
restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. While petitioner struggled to make
mistaken. A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability.
ends meet as the single-income earner of the household, respondents business
In general, recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or
floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was
even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddocks textbook
similarly unsuccessful. Due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business
entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry, treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to
stopped operations. Although without any means to support his family, respondent
pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personality disorders are
refused to go back to work for the family business
recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that respondent should
The final string was that petitioner had a cyst operation but respondent proved
undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondents
indifferent. They even resorted to a marriage encounter but it did not resolve their
psychological incapacity is incurable.
marital problems. In short, both are really INCOMPATIBLE.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and
Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the
the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1)
respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code
irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the
RTC granted the decree while the CA reversed.
needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and
a trail of unpaid money obligations.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the
W/N the CA properly dismissed the case factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and
W/N the availability of the THERAPHY will make the PI curable thus established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that
the decree SHOULD NOT ISSUE respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
CA erred in dismissing the case. DECREE should be granted. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the
appellate courts ruling that the psychological incapacity of respondent was not Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854
sufficiently established. We disagree with its decision declaring the marriage between declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID
under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs.
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ. Page 7 of 15
 Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases
5. Ligeralde vs. Patalinghug| Mendoza emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010 | 535 SCRA 28 cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of
FACTS marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals. The
same provides that (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four
belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
children
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
Silvino observed that May had several manifestations of a negative marital behavior.
experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be
He described her as immature, irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity, negligence
existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must
and nocturnal activities, he claimed, characterized their marital relations.
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such
Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 oclock in the morning. Her
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
excuse was that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but
essential obligations of marriage.
admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel.
In this case, Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and
Silvino tried to persuade her to be conscientious of her duties as wife and mother.
incurability of private respondents condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to
His pleas were ignored.
show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the
The couple tried to reconcile for the sake of the children but months after, Silvino
psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its
arrived home one day and learned that she was nowhere to be found. He searched
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence
for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover. The
presented during trial
couple lived separately.
The acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level of the psychological
Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-
incapacity that the law requires. Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life
Basilio for psychological evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations; that the
specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after marriage; and
inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's
that the same was serious and incurable.
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her
Subsequently, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. Its
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state
findings were based on the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-
Further, although Private respondent was far from being a perfect wife and a good
Basilio.
mother and had some character flaws, these imperfections do not warrant a
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that private respondents
conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that
alleged sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute
rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and obligations
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code and that the
Hence petition is denied. CA decision affirmed.
psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity
was medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Hence this petition.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the wife is psychologically incapacitated to warrant the nullity of the
marriage

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Petitioners evidence failed to establish Mays psychological incapacity
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ. Page 8 of 15
 Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases
6. ABLAZA v REPUBLIC |Bersamin, J.
G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010
FACTS
The petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between
his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on
January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a marriage license.
He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died
without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that
any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the
marriage being void ab initio.
RTC: The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and
that the petitioner is not a party to the marriage.
CA: While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the
beginning does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must
be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties
to the marriage
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
The petition is meritorious. A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation
of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out
of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the
validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the
marriage is contracted.
Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by
the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule
that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after
March 15, 2003.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity
of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code
and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code,
the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the
rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to
initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
On whether a brother has a material interest in his siblings estate
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil
Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action
to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the
plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party
in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper interest can file
the action.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and
surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he
has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by
any judgment in the suit.
Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a
prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or
children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late
Cresencianos surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial
court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.

On which law is applicable:

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein
of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on
March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the

ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ. Page 9 of 15
 Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases
7. Mario SIOCHI v Alfredo GOZON| Carpio
G.R. No. 169977, March 18, 2010|
FACTS
Elvira Gozon filed a case of LEGAL SEPARATION (LSEP) against her husband,
Alfredo Gozon. Later, she filed a notice of lis pendens over a 30,000 sq.m. lot in
Malabon registered in the name of Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira Gozon.
Pending the LSEP case, Mario entered an agreement to sell the said lot to Mario
Sochi for 18M. Mario paid a DP of 5M under an agreement that Alfredo as the
exclusive owner of the property, will secure the exclusion of the property in the
LSEP case and secure the removal of notice of lis pendens. After payment of DP,
Mario took possession of the property.
Later, the LSEP case was granted, the CPG was declared dissolved and
liquidated; the land was declared conjugal. Because Alfredo was the offending
spouse, the net profit of his share will be forfeited in favor of their daughter,
Winifred.
Alfredo later donated the lot to Winifred. Pursant to an SPA, Alfredo sold the
property to INTER-DIMENTIONAL Realty for 18M. Inter-dimentional obtained
the TCT in their name free from the annotation of the notice of lis pendens.
Mario then files a case for specific performance, damages and annulment of the
donation and sale.
RTC decision: Donation and Sale are void. Cancellation of the TCT of Inter-
dimentional. Approve the sale to Mario WRT to the share of Alfredo. Alfredo
liable to return the 18M of Interdimentional, liable for damages both to Inter-
dimentional and Mario. Mario should pay the balance of P4M to Alfredo.
CA decision: Sale between Mario and Alfredo is void. Share of Alfredo forfeited in
favor of Winifred. Alfredo should return the DP of 5M and pay damages. Winifred
has the option to dispose or not to dispose of the lot.
Mario and Inter-dimentional now APPEAL.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the Alfredo forfeits his entire share of of lot (as it is deemed part of
the conjugal property) as the offending spouse in the LSEP case?
What is the status of the sale between Mario and Alfredo? Between Inter-
dimentional and Alfredo?
o MARIO SOCHI: the agreement should be treated as a continuing offer
which was perfected when wife Elvira, acquiesced to the sale, thus Sps
Alfredo should execute the Deed of Sale of the lot him upon payment of
the balance.
o INTER-DIMENTIONAL: It was a buyer in good faith and his title
should not be defeated.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
Pursuant to Art 63(2) of the FC, Alfredo as the offending spouse in the LSEP case
forfeits his NET PROFITS earned in the CPG in favor of their common child,
NOT HIS ENTIRE SHARE in the CPG.
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(2) the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and
liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which
shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of article 43(2);
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding article shall produce the following effects:
xxx
(2) the absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted
said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited
in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the
guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent
spouse; (emphasis supplied)
Net profits: refer to the increase in the market value of the property from the
time of the celebration of the marriage until the time of its dissolution
Sale between Mario and Alfredo is void.
According to Art 124 (2) of the FC:
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of administration. These powers DO NOT INCLUDE the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be VOID.
Acquiescence is not enough. There must be written consent from Elvira or a
court order. Because neither proofs exist, the sale is void.
Sale between Inter-dimentional and Alfredo is void.
Interdimentional failed to prove good faith because it has actual knowledge of the
facts and circumstances of the case which impels a reasonably cautious person to
make further inquiries about the vendors title. Its representative admitted
knowledge of the notice of lis pendens and the legal separation case. They cannot
now feign ignorance that the property was deemed conjugal by the RTC of Cavite.
DENY the Petition. Affirm the CA ruling with modifications: (1) Delete forfeiture
of the land in favor of the daughter Winifred; (2) the Gozons should pay
Interdimentional P18M plus legal interest.
Page 10 of 15
 Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases
8. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. vs. OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. and Spouses
Martinez | Villarama, Jr.
G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010|(Property Relations between H & W )
FACTS
Spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from Equitable PCI Bank,
Inc. (the Bank) in the aggregate amount of P4,048,800.00, secured with a REM over
a condominium unit in San Miguel Court, Valle Verde 5, where the spouses are
residing. Mr. Martinez signed the REM both as principal debtor and as President of
the registered owner and third-party mortgagor, OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. The REM
was annotated on the Condominium Certificate of Title
The Spouses defaulted in the payment of their outstanding loan obligation
In a letter, they offered to settle their indebtedness with the assignment to the Bank
of a commercial lot of corresponding value and also requested for recomputation
at a lower interest rate and condonation of penalties
While the Banks officers held a meeting with Mr. Martinez, he failed to submit the
required documents such as certificates of title and tax declarations so that the bank
can evaluate his proposal to pay the mortgage debt via dacion en pago
Consequently, the Bank initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage
The Spouses filed a civil action for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
Injunction and Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale in the RTC of Pasig
City, which the RTC granted by issuing a TRO for 20 days
o It was alleged in their Complaint that the subject property is being used
and occupied as a family home
The RTC granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. MR denied
On appeal, the CA affirmed the issuance of the Writ of PI
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the Spouses have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure and
public auction of the third-party mortgagors property while the case for
annulment of REM on said property is being tried
o It is alleged by the Bank that while the condominium unit is supposedly a
family home, it is admittedly owned by the corporation and not by the
conjugal partnership or absolute community of the Spouses and that even
assuming that OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. is a family corporation, the Spouses
stance contravenes the established rule that properties registered in the
name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct
from its members or stockholders
o The Spouses on the other hand claims that the said unit being a Family
Home is exempt from foreclosure as provided under Art. 153 of the
Family Code and that if the injunctive relief would not be granted, they will
suffer an irreparable injury, as well as their children
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
The Spouses failed to show that they have a right to be protected and that the acts
against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right.
In a real estate mortgage when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the
mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized
and sold with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation
The Court notes that the claim of exemption under Art. 153 of the Family Code,
thereby raising issue on the mortgaged condominium unit being a family home and
not corporate property, is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual agreement
of the REM. Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged condominium unit constitutes
respondents family home, the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article
155 (3) of the same Code allows the execution or forced sale of a family home for
debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution. The
Spouses thus failed to show an ostensible right that needs protection of the injunctive
writ. Clearly, the appellate court seriously erred in sustaining the trial courts orders
granting the Spouses application for preliminary injunction
Anent the grave and irreparable injury which respondents alleged they will suffer if
no preliminary injunction is issued, this Court has previously declared that all is not
lost for defaulting mortgagors whose properties were foreclosed by creditors-
mortgagees, viz:
o In any case, petitioners will not be deprived outrightly of their property.
Pursuant to Section 47 of the General Banking Law of 2000, mortgagors
who have judicially or extrajudicially sold their real property for the full or
partial payment of their obligation have the right to redeem the property
within one year after the sale. They can redeem their real estate by paying
the amount due, with interest rate specified, under the mortgage deed; as
well as all the costs and expenses incurred by the bank
o Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, petitioners have the right to receive
any surplus in the selling price. This right was recognized in Sulit v. CA, in
which the Court held that if the mortgagee is retaining more of the
proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the
validity of the sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to
recover such surplus
W HEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 29, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77703 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction is DENIED. No
costs.
Page 11 of 15
 Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases
9. Francisco Muoz vs. Erlinda Ramirez & Eliseo Carlos | Brion
G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010
FACTS
A 77-square meter residential house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of TCT
No. 7650 in the name of the petitioner was previously covered by TCT No. 1427, in
the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos (respondents).
Erlinda and Eliseo contracted a P136,000 housing loan with the GSIS, and
mortgaged the lot as security therefor. They then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square
meter, two-story residential house on the lot.
Subsequently, the title was transferred to the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a
stated consideration of P602,000.
Later on, however, respondents filed a complaint for the nullification thereof,
alleging that it was only a mortgage transaction, and that the documents transferring
the title were falsified. During the trial, they presented NBI reports showing that
Eliseos purported signatures in the SPA and the Affidavit of Waiver of Rights were
forgeries.
Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that the subject property was paraphernal in
nature, since it was registered in Erlindas name, and because the lot was part of a
bigger parcel owned by Erlindas parents.
The RTC dismissed the complaint filed by the respondents on the ground that the
subject house and lot was Erlindas paraphernal property, and could thus be sold to
petitioner even without Eliseos consent.
Meanwhile, the CA set aside the RTC decision, applying the second paragraph of
Article 1582 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun.3 The CA held that
although the house and lot were originally Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property,
these became conjugal property when it was used as collateral for the GSIS housing
loan, which loan was paid through conjugal funds (i.e. Eliseos monthly salary
deductions). Therefore, the property cannot be validly sold or mortgaged without
Eliseos consent, pursuant to Article 124.4 Thus, it voided the deed of absolute sale.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
2 A land that originally belonged to one spouse becomes conjugal upon the construction of
improvements thereon at the expense of the partnership.
3 In this case, we held that when the conjugal house is constructed on land belonging exclusively to
the husband, the land ipso facto becomes conjugal, but the husband is entitled to reimbursement of
the value of the land at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
4 The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses
jointly These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
Whether the subject property is paraphernal or conjugal
o Petitioner: The CA misapplied the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil
Code and Calimlim-Canullas. Article 120 of the Family Code is the applicable
rule, and since the value of the house is less than the value of the lot, Erlinda
retained ownership of the subject property.
o Respondents: It is unnecessary to compare the respective values of the house
and of the lot to determine ownership of the subject property. Since it was
acquired during their marriage, it is thus considered conjugal property.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS PARAPHERNAL.
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
In the present case, there is clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot
from her father, and this has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal
ownership. Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code provide that properties acquired
by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the
community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse. The residential
lot, therefore, is Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property.
The CA misapplied Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas doctrine.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil
Code, provides as follows:
When the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase
in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to
the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement;
otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-
spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement.
Although it is true that Eliseo partly paid for the improvements on the lot (i.e. the
two-story residential house) through monthly salary deductions, petitioner advanced
P136,000 to Erlinda to cancel the GSIS loan. Therefore, considering the
P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that
the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the P60,755.76 amount
paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions.
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda
at the time she contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the
transaction was not necessary.
Page 12 of 15
 Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases
10. FUENTES v ROCA| Abad
G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010
FACTS:
Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) bought a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar,
Zamboanga City from his mother (Sabina Tarroza ). But Tarciano did not for the
meantime have the registered title transferred to his name.
Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia
Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty. Romulo D.
Plagata whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale. They later signed an
agreement to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared dated April 29, 1988, which agreement
expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of
P60,000.00 for the transfer of the lots title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano
was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged
wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarcianos compliance with
these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an
additional P140,000.00 or P160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in
demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these
conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further
formality and payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the
other requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one
of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. As soon as Tarciano met
the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosarios affidavit in Zamboanga City. On
January 11, 1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes
spouses. They then paid him the additional P140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement.
A new title was issued in the name of the spouses who immediately constructed a
building on the lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife
Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, (collectively, the
Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the
Fuentes spouses before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in Civil Case
4707. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarcianos wife,
Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had
been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon
reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
1. Whether Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband
Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the
spouses already prescribed; and
3. Whether only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the
action to annul that sale.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her
husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
The Court agrees with the CAs observation that Rosarios signature strokes on the
affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other
hand, are consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters R and s
were written is also remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained
eye.
Significantly, Rosarios specimen signatures were made at about the time that she signed
the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable standards for
comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario suffered from any
illness or disease that accounted for the variance in her signature when she signed the
affidavit of consent. Notably, Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30
years since 1958. And she resided so far away in Manila. It would have been quite
tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and avoid the risk that she would not
give her consent to the sale or demand a stiff price for it.
What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent. That
jurat declared that Rosario swore to the document and signed it in Zamboanga City on
January 11, 1989 when, as Atty. Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it about four
months earlier at her residence in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988. While a
defective notarization will merely strip the document of its public character and reduce it
to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in
the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosarios consent to the sale of the
land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of
Rosarios consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.
2. Whether the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the
spouses already prescribed
Page 13 of 15
 Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies tothis case is the
Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950,
Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does
not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her
husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses
written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Under the
provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no
force and effect from the very beginning. But, although a void contract has no legal
effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been
performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what
has been given under it. This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does
not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment
of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mothers
(his wifes) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an
action.

3. Whether only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring
the action to annul that sale

The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning.
Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale.
When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely,
the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil
Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.

In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other things,
to recover from Tarcianos heirs, the Rocas, the P200,000.00 that they paid him, with
legal interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.

ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ. Page 14 of 15
 Persons Digests March- August 2010 Cases
11. BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO v ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ,
represented by her mother ARACELI LOPEZ,| Carpio Morales
G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010
FACTS
RESPONDENT Arhbencel Lopez was born June 8, 1999, out of an extramarital
affair of PETITIONER Nepomuceno with Araceli. However, PETITIONER
refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a
HANDWRITTEN NOTE dated August 7, 1999, petitioner just obligated himself
to give her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of
each month beginning August 15, 1999.
RESPONDENT argued that her filiation to PETITIONER having been established
by the HANDWRITTEN NOTE, she prayed for the RTC to (1) recognize her as
his child, (2) give her support pendente lite in the increased amount of P8,000 a
month, and (3) give her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age
of majority.
Pending the resolution on the merits of the case, RTC granted RESPONDENTs
prayer for support pendente lite (P3,000 a month) on the basis of the
HANDWRITTEN NOTE which the court treated as contractual support.
However, thereafter, RTC dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence.
On appeal to the CA, the latter reversed RTC and declared RESPONDENT to be
PETITIONERs illegitimate daughter.
Hence this petition.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED SHOWED
ESTABLISHED THAT PETITIONER IS THE FATHER OF THE
RESPONDENT?
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO HER OTHER
PRAYERS?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IS SHOWN TO HOLD THAT PETITIONER
IS THE FATHER OF THE RESPONDENT.
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation
in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten
note executed by petitioner which reads:
Manila, Aug. 7, 1999
I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial support
in the amount of P1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each month for a total of
P3,000.00 a month starting Aug. 15, 1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the
custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the necessity of demand, subject to adjustment
later depending on the needs of the child and my income.
The abovequoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about
Arhbencels filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of
Article 172(2) vis--vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as
competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her
Certificate of Birth,[11] has no probative value to establish filiation to
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioners handwritten undertaking
to provide financial support to her which, without more, fails to establish her
claim of filiation.
The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of
the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace
of the putative fathers legitimate family.
RESPONDENT NOT ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM PETITIONER
Arhbencels demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to
petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As such, her
entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of
her filiation.
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