In Re: Cunanan

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have
been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and
zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than
six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power
granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this
Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function,
properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established
rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals.
and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a
judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not
legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to
be revoked or modified.
In the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is solely vested the power to admit, suspend,
disbar, and reinstate attorneys at law in practice of the profession as well as their supervision. In the
creation of the LEB by the Congress, it was given the power to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission. This vested power is unconstitutional because it restricts the power of the Supreme Court
as regards the persons who can be admitted to the bar. Prescribing the minimum requirements
which overlaps the minimum prescribed by the Supreme Court clearly inhibits the Supreme Court in
exercising its power to admit persons to the bar. If the Supreme Court prescribes a lower minimum
than what is prescribed by the LEB, then in effect, lesser persons can only be admitted in the bar.
This restricts the Supreme Court from admitting persons who it deems fit to become lawyers,
however was not able to attain the additional minimum prescribed by the LEB. In vice versa, if the
LEB prescribes a minimum which is considerably lower than the minimum requirements by the
Supreme Court, then this minimum becomes nugatory for the Supreme Courts decision must still
prevail. The LEB in effect was granted the power to restrict persons to be admitted to the bar in
prescribing such minimum because one cannot be admitted to the bar without having to accomplish
the pre-requisite degree in law school. If a person cannot pursue legal education because he did not
qualify for an examination required by the LEB then he cannot take the bar and eventually be
admitted to the bar. Simply say, that the admission to the bar, includes the admission to the legal
education. This is evidenced by the continuous supervision of the Supreme Court over law schools
despite the fact that there is an executive body which oversees this matter in particular the academic
curriculum which is to be followed by all law schools.