People vs Gary dela Cruz Case Summary

People vs Gary dela Cruz, GR 185717, 2011
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated June 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727, which affirmed in toto the February 8, 2007 Decision[2] in
Criminal Case No. Q-03-117814 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 in Quezon City.
The RTC found accused Garry de la Cruz y dela Cruz (Garry) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
In an Information[3] filed on June 3, 2003, accused was indicted for the crime allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th of May, 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell,
dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction,
zero point zero two (0.02) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on July 28, 2003, accused pleaded not guilty to the above
charge.[4] Trial[5] on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
After conducting surveillance for a week, the Station Drug Enforcement Unit in La
Loma, Quezon City planned a buy-bust operation against a certain Garry who was in
the Barangay Watch List. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA).
On May 29, 2003, at around 9:00 a.m., the stations Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Police
Inspector Oliver Villanueva (P/Insp. Villanueva), gave a briefing on the buy-bust operation. Police
Officer 2 Edcel Ibasco (PO2 Ibasco) was designated as poseur-buyer, while PO1
Roderick Valencia (PO1 Valencia), PO1 Alfredo Mabutol, and PO2 Ronald Pascual were
assigned as back-up operatives. Their informant attended the briefing.
Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to Biak-na-Bato corner Mauban

Streets, Quezon City and arrived there at around 9:30 a.m. The informant introduced PO2 Ibasco
to the accused, who was standing in front of a shanty, as wanting to buy shabu. The accused
asked for PhP 100, and when PO2 Ibasco paid the amount, the former handed over to him a
white crystalline substance in a plastic sachet. Upon PO2 Ibascos prearranged signal, the other
members of the buy-bust team approached them. The accused, sensing what was happening,
ran towards the shanty but was caught by PO1 Valencia at the alley. PO1 Valencia introduced
himself as a police officer and frisked the accused, in the process recovering the buy-bust
money.
The buy-bust team then brought the accused to the station. The accused was turned
over to the desk officer on duty, along with the substance in the sachet bought from him and the
Trial tech first quarter | 1

recovered buy-bust money. After inquest, the Information was filed on June 3, 2003. Accused
was then committed to the Quezon City Jail.[6]
Consequently, the substance inside the sachet believed to be shabu was sent to and
examined by a Philippine National Police forensic chemist, Engr. Leonard Jabonillo (Engr.
Jabonillo). The laboratory result confirmed that the substance was positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Only PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia testified for the prosecution during the trial. The
testimony of Engr. Jabonillo was dispensed with upon stipulation by the defense.
Version of the Defense
The accused denied selling shabu to PO2 Ibasco. In short, the accused used the defense
of denial and alleged a frame-up by the arresting officers.
The accused testified that he was arrested on May 29, 2003 at around 9:00 a.m. inside
his house at Barangay Manresa, Quezon City while he was alone drinking coffee. While two
neighbors were talking in front of his house, a Tamaraw FX arrived. Five armed men alighted
from it, whereupon his neighbors ran away and were chased by them. The armed men then
returned, saying, Nakatakas, nakatakbo. (They had escaped and ran.) One of the armed men
saw the accused and entered his house. It was PO2 Ibasco, who frisked him and got PhP 60
from his pocket. PO1 Valencia also entered his house and came out with a shoe box, then
said, Sige, isakay nyo na. (Take him in the car.) He asked the armed men what his violation was
but was told to merely explain at the precinct.
In the police precinct, he was investigated and subsequently detained. They showed him
a plastic sachet which they allegedly recovered from him. Then a man approached him and
demanded PhP 30,000 for his release, but he said he did not have the money. Thereafter, he
was presented for inquest.
A witness, Rodolfo Buencamino (Buencamino), narrated that in the morning of May 29,
2003, he called the police precinct to have a certain Taba, an alleged drug pusher in their area,
arrested. PO2 Ibasco and other police officers responded immediately. When the police officers
arrived, Buencamino pointed to Taba, who, however, was able to evade arrest. Thereafter, he
was surprised to see the accused inside the vehicle of the policemen. But he did not know why
and where the accused was arrested since he did not witness the actual arrest.
Another witness, Marbelita Collado Lepiten (Lepiten), testified that she was at the terrace
of her house on 135 Manba St., Manresa, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, when she
noticed the accused talking to a certain Taba, a resident of the area. When a maroon Tamaraw
FX stopped in front of the house of accused, Taba ran away and was pursued by two men who
alighted from the vehicle. The two men returned without Taba, who evidently escaped, and
entered the house of the accused. She did not know what happened inside the house but she
eventually saw the men push the accused outside into their vehicle.
The Ruling of the RTC
On February 8, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused GARRY

DELA CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 5, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165, and hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS.

SO ORDERED.
In convicting the accused, the RTC relied on and gave credence to the testimony of
prosecution witnesses PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia. Citing People v.
Jubail,[7] which enumerated the elements required to be established by the prosecution for the
illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the trial court found that the prosecution had established the
elements of the crime.
The RTC pointed out that Buencamino may, indeed, have called the police to arrest a
certain Taba, an alleged pusher in the area, but he was not present when the accused was
arrested. The trial court likewise did not accord evidentiary weight to the testimony of Lepiten,
who testified that she saw the accused talking to Taba and that when the police officers entered
the house of the accused, she was unaware of what transpired inside. Thus, the RTC concluded
that her testimony did not provide clear and convincing justification to cast doubt on the candid
and straightforward testimonies of the police officers.
Applying the presumption of the performance of official function, the lack of showing any
ill motive on the part of the police officers to testify against the accused, and the principle that the
bare denial of an accused is inherently weak, the RTC convicted the accused.
Consequently, with his conviction, the accused started to serve his sentence[8] and was
subsequently committed to the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City.
Aggrieved, accused appealed[9] his conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On June 30, 2008, the appellate court rendered the appealed decision, wholly affirming
the findings of the RTC and the conviction of appellant. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein appeal is hereby DENIED

and the assailed Decision supra is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
The CA upheld the findings of the trial court that the essential elements required for the
conviction of an accused for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 were present in the instant
case. The appellate court brushed aside the irregularities raised by accused-appellant by putting
premium credence on the testimonies of the arresting police officers, who positively identified
accused-appellant in open court. One with the trial court, the CA found no improper motive on
the part of the police officers who, it said, were regularly performing their official duties. Besides,
relying on People v. Barlaan,[10] the CA held that the irregularities raised that there was no
coordination with the PDEA and that no inventory was made and no photograph taken of the
seized drug, if true, did not invalidate the legitimate buy-bust operation conducted. Moreover, the
CA found that the corpus delicti, i.e., the confiscated shabu and the PhP 100 bill, were presented
as evidence of the commission of the offense.
The CA also ruled that accused-appellants mere denial, as corroborated by Buencamino

and Lepiten, deserved scant consideration vis--vis the positive identification by the arresting
officers who arrested him in flagrante delicto. Anent the questioned chain of custody, the CA
found it unbroken and duly proven by the prosecution.
The Issues

Hence, We have this appeal.
Only accused-appellant, however, filed his Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental

Brief),[11] while the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the People of
the Philippines, submitted neither a Manifestation nor a Motion. Consequently, on July 27, 2009,
the Court dispensed with the OSGs submission of a supplemental brief.[12] Since no new issues
are raised nor supervening events transpired, We scrutinize the Brief for the Accused-
Appellant[13] and the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee,[14] filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727, in
resolving the instant appeal.
Thus, accused-appellant raises the same assignment of errors, in that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5, ARTICLE II, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND

CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF DENIAL.[15]
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Accused-appellant argues that, first, the prosecution has not proved his commission of
the crime charged for the following irregularities: (1) the arresting officers did not coordinate with
the PDEA, as required under Sec. 86 of RA 9165; (2) no physical inventory was conducted and
photograph taken of the alleged seized drug in the presence of public officials, as required by
Sec. 21 of RA 9165; and (3) the chain of custody was not duly proved by the prosecution.
And second, his denial is worthy of credence upon corroboration by the credible witnesses
presented by the defense.
After a careful and thorough review of the records, We are convinced that accused-
appellant should be acquitted, for the prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt his
commission of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in flagrante

delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to
apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the
commission of the crime.[16] However, where there really was no buy-bust operation conducted, it
cannot be denied that the elements for illegal sale of prohibited drugs cannot be duly proved
despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the seeming
straightforward testimony in court by the arresting police officers. After all, the indictment for
illegal sale of prohibited drugs will not have a leg to stand on.
This is the situation in the instant case.
The courts a quo uniformly based their findings and affirmance of accused-appellants
guilt on: (1) the straightforward testimony of the arresting police officers; (2) their positive
identification of accused-appellant; (3) no ill motive was shown for their testimony against
accused-appellant; (4) the self-serving defense of denial by accused-appellant; (5) the seeming
irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust operation and the arrest of accused-appellant not

invalidating the operation; and (6) the testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten not showing that
the buy-bust operation was not conducted.
Although the trial courts findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will not be
disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied in a case under appeal,[17] as here.
For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be
proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction
actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti.[18]
In People v. Doria,[19] the Court laid down the objective test in determining the credibility
of prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust operations. It is the duty of the
prosecution to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operationfrom the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of
sale.[20] We said that [t]he manner by which the initial contact was made, x x x the offer to
purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug x x x
must be the subject of strict scrutiny by the courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not
unlawfully induced to commit an offense.[21]
No Surveillance Conducted
The testimony of PO2 Ibasco on direct examination did not mention an alleged
surveillance conducted by PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia prior to the alleged buy-bust operation,
the corresponding intelligence report, and the written communiqu with the PDEA. The defense in
cross-examination put to task both PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia concerning these matters, as
attested to in the Joint Affidavit of Apprehension[22]executed by the two police officers on May 30,
2003. PO2 Ibasco testified that his unit, specifically PO1 Valencia and himself, conducted
surveillance on accused-appellant for a week prior to the buy-bust operation on May 29, 2003
which, according to him, turned out positive, i.e., accused-appellant was, indeed, selling shabu.

PO2 Ibasco on cross-examination May I make a reservation for
testified, thus: continuance of the
cross-examination
ATTY. LOYOLA: considering that there
Being an operative, you are of are documents that
course, trained in the witness has to
intelligence work? present.
PO2 IBASCO: COURT:

Yes, sir. What documents?
Q: You said you conducted ATTY. LOYOLA:

surveillance but you The proof your Honor that
cannot show any proof there was indeed a
that there is an coordination and the
intelligence report, you intelligence report.
have no proof?
A: Yes, sir. There is, we were COURT:
dispatched. Will you be able to produce
those documents?
Q: Where is your proof now? A: Yes, sir. Titingnan ko po.
A: Its in our office.
PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
Q: Your dispatch order for the Titingnan?
surveillance do you
have any? COURT:
A: I dont have it now sir but its You are not sure? You dont
in the office. have any copy of
those documents?
Q: You said that you
conducted surveillance A: You Honor, what we have
for one week, did I in the office is the
hear you right? dispatch.[23]
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx PO1 Valencia, likewise, on cross-

examination testified:
Q: So, you are saying you did
not actually see him
selling drugs at that ATTY. LOYOLA:
time during the Mr. Witness, tell me during the
surveillance? orientation, you will
A: We saw him, sir. agree with me that
there was no
xxxx coordination made to
the PDEA regarding
Q: None. You did not even this intended buy bust
coordinate this operation?
operation with the
PDEA? PO1 VALENCIA:
A: We coordinated it, sir. We have coordinated
at the PDEA.
Q: What is your proof that you
indeed coordinated? Q: You say that but you have
A: Its in the office, sir. no proof to show us
that there was
ATTY. LOYOLA: coordination?

A: We have, sir.
xxxx
Q: What is your proof?
A: We have files in our office Q: In fact you dont have any
for coordination. information report?
A: We have, sir. Its in the
Q: Are you sure about that? office. Its with Insp.
A: Yes, sir. Villanueva.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, based Q: And because you claim

on the information, you that you have
already planned to submitted an
conduct a buy bust information and report,
operation against the of course, you should
accused? have come up with an
A: Yes, sir. intelligence report.
A: Yes, sir. Its also in the
Q: But you will agree with me office of Insp.
that there was no Villanueva.
surveillance against
the accused? xxxx
A: We have conducted a
surveillance one week Q: And the alleged recovered
before the operation item, the plastic sachet
and we conducted which contained white
surveillance Pinakawal crystalline substance
an namin ang was brought by whom
informant. to the PNP Crime
Laboratory?
Q: What do you A: I cannot remember who
mean pinakawalan brought it sir because
ang informant? it was a long time
A: So that we have a spy ago.[24]
inside to verify
whether Garry was
really selling shabu.
These documentsspecifically the dispatch order, the intelligence report of the alleged
surveillance, and the written communiqu from the PDEA for the conduct of the surveillance and
buy-bust operationwere not, however, presented in court. Evidently, these documents are non-
existent, tending to show that there really was no surveillance and, consequently, no intelligence
report about the surveillance or the averred written communiqu from PDEA attesting to
coordination with said agency. Worse, the prosecution never bothered to explain why it could not
present these documents. Thus, there is no basis to say that accused-appellant allegedly
sold shabu a week before he was arrested.
Even putting this lapse aside, the other irregularities raised by accused-appellant in the
backdrop of the uncontroverted testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten tend to show that there
was really no buy-bust operation conducted resulting in the valid arrest of accused-appellant.
Generally, non-compliance with Secs. 21 and 86 of RA 9165 does not mean that no buy-
bust operation against appellant ever took place.[25] The prosecutions failure to submit in
evidence the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to
Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 will not discharge the accused from the crime. Non-compliance with
said section is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.[26]

No Buy-Bust Operation
But where there are other pieces of evidence putting in doubt the conduct of the buy-bust
operation, these irregularities take on more significance which are, well nigh, fatal to the
prosecution.
Putting in doubt the conduct of the buy-bust operation are the uncontroverted testimonies
of Buencamino and Lepiten, which gave credence to accused-appellants denial and frame-up
theory. The Court is not unaware that, in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of
planting evidence to extract information from or even to harass civilians.[27] This Court has been
issuing cautionary warnings to trial courts to exercise extra vigilance in trying drug cases, lest
an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.[28]
The defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because
of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their
official duties.[29]Nonetheless, such a defense may be given credence when there is sufficient
evidence or proof making it to be very plausible or true. We are of the view that accused-
appellants defenses of denial and frame-up are credible given the circumstances of the
case. Indeed, jurisprudence has established that the defense of denial assumes significance only
when the prosecutions evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt,[30] as in the instant case. At the very least, there is reasonable doubt that there was a buy-
bust operation conducted and that accused-appellant sold the seized shabu. After all, a criminal
conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of
the defense.[31]
Notably, Buencamino voluntarily testified to the effect that he called the police asking
them to apprehend a certain Taba, a notorious drug pusher in their area. PO2 Ibasco and
company responded to his call and Buencamino helped identify and direct the policemen but
Taba unfortunately escaped. Thus, Buencamino testified:
ATTY. BARTOLOME: Q: Why did you call the

Mr. Witness, who asked you police station?
to testify today? A: Ibasco talked to me to
arrest Taba.
BUENCAMINO:
I volunteered myself Q: Why are they going to
to testify. arrest Taba?
A: Because he is a pusher in
xxxx the area.
Q: Can you tell us how, Q: Why do you know

when and where the Ibasco?
accused was A: Because he was a
arrested? previous resident of
A: I was the one who called- Barangay Manresa.
up the precinct to
arrest a Q: You said you called police
certain Taba and not officer [sic] what was
Garry. Taba was the the topic. Mr.
target of the Witness?
operation. A: That Taba is already there
and he already
Q: When was that? showed up and they
A: May 29, 2003. immediately

responded to arrest A: No, sir. He was able to
Taba. escape.
Q: So, Ibasco immediately Q: Whey they were not able

responded to your to arrest alias Taba
call? what happened, next
A: Yes, sir. Mr. Witness? What
happened to Garry
Q: When they arrived in your Dela Cruz?
place what A: I was surprised because I
happened else, if saw Garry Dela Cruz
any? already inside the
A: I pointed to Taba so they vehicle and I dont
could arrest him. know why Garry was
inside the vehicle.[32]
Q: Where they able to arrest
Taba?
Buencaminos assertion of knowing PO2 Ibasco was likewise not rebutted. Moreover, the
presentation of the police logbook on calls received in the morning of May 29, 2003 would indeed
show if Buencamino or someone else made a call to the precinct about a certain Taba, but then,
again, the prosecution did not bother to rebut the testimony of Buencamino. Verily, this time the
presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced[33] applies. In fact,
the prosecution did not even assail Buencaminos credibility as a witness but merely made the
point in the cross-examination that he had no actual knowledge of the arrest of accused-
appellant. Thus, Buencamino was cross-examined:
PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
You were not with Garry at the time he was arrested?
BUENCAMINO:
No, sir.
Q: You dont know where he was arrested at that time?

A: I dont know where Garry was, sir.
PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
That will be all, your Honor.[34]
More telling is the testimony of Lepiten which, uncontroverted, shows that there was no
buy-bust operation. Her testimony corroborates the testimony of Buencamino that police
enforcers indeed responded to Buencaminos phone call but were not able to apprehend
Taba. This destroys the buy-bust operation angle testified to by PO2 Ibasco and PO1
Valencia. Since the buy-bust operation allegedly happened not inside the house of accused-
appellant but in an open area in front of a shanty, such cannot be sustained in light of what
Lepiten witnessed: The policemen chased but were not able to arrest Taba; thereafter, the
policemen went inside the house of accused-appellant, emerging later with him who was led to
the vehicle of the policemen. Thus, Lepiten testified:
ATTY. BARTOLOME: What time?

Mrs. Witness, where were you on May 29,
2003, if you could still remember? ATTY. BARTOLOME:
At around 9:00 in the morning.
COURT:

LEPITEN:
I was at the terrace of the house we are Q: What happened next, if any?
renting while sipping coffee. A: Two (2) men in blue pants and white shirt
alighted from the maroon FX and ran
Q: Where is that house located? after Taba.
A: No. 135 Mauban Street, Barangay
Manresa, Quezon City. Q: Were they able to arrest Taba, Ms.
Witness?
COURT: A: No, sir. They were not able to catch him.
Where is this, Novaliches?
Q: When they failed to arrest Taba, what did
A: No, your Honor, near San Francisco Del these two (2) men do, if any?
Monte. A: They returned in front of the house and
Garry and I saw them entered the house of
xxxx Garry.
ATTY. BARTOLOME: xxxx

While drinking coffee, what transpired
next, Mrs. Witness or was there any unusual Q: What did they do, if any?
thing that happened? A: I dont know what they did inside because
A: Yes, sir. While I was sitting on the terrace I could not see them, sir. Then I saw them
in front of the house we are renting is the went down and pushed Garry towards the
house of Garry. Garry was talking to a FX.
certain Taba whom I know.
xxxx
xxxx
Q: After that what else happened, if any?
Q: While you saw them talking to each A: I just saw that they boarded Garry inside
other, what happened next? the FX.
A: Suddenly a maroon FX stopped.
xxxx
Q: Where?
A: In front of the house of Garry. COURT:
Any cross?
Q: When this maroon FX stopped, what
happened next, if any? PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
A: Taba ran, sir. No cross, your Honor.[35]
Thus, taking into consideration the defense of denial by accused-appellant, in light of the
foregoing testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten, the Court cannot conclude that there was a
buy-bust operation conducted by the arresting police officers as they attested to and testified
on. The prosecutions story is like a sieve full of holes.
Non-Compliance with the Rule on Chain of Custody
Moreover, the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the requisite chain of custody of the
seized specimen. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.[36] The CA found an
unbroken chain of custody of the purportedly confiscated shabu specimen. However, the records
belie such conclusion.
The testimonies of PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia, as well as their Joint Affidavit of
Apprehension, were bereft of any assertion on how the seized shabu in a heat-sealed sachet
was duly passed from PO2 Ibasco, the chosen poseur-buyer, who allegedly received it from

accused-appellant, to forensic chemist Engr. Jabonillo, who conducted the forensic
examination. While the testimony of Engr. Jabonillo was dispensed with upon stipulation by the
defense, as duly embodied in the RCT Order dated March 16, 2004, it is likewise bereft of any
assertion substantially proving the custodial safeguards on the identity and integrity of
the shabu allegedly received from accused-appellant. The stipulation merely asserts:
x x x that he is a Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National Police; that
his office received a request for laboratory examination marked as Exhibit A; that
together with said request is a brown envelope marked as Exhibit B; which
contained a plastic sachet marked as Exhibit B-1; that he conducted a requested
laboratory examination and, in connection therewith, he submitted a Chemistry
Report marked as Exhibit C. The findings thereon showing the specimen positive
for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride was marked as Exhibit C-1, and the
signature of the said police officer was marked as Exhibit C-2. He likewise issued
a Certification marked as Exhibits D and D-1, and thereafter, turned over the
specimen to the evidence custodian and retrieved the same for [sic] purposed
proceeding scheduled today.[37]
While both PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia testified on the identity of the plastic sachet
duly marked with the initials EIGC, there was no sufficient proof of compliance with the chain of
custody. The records merely show that, after the arrest of accused-appellant, the specimen was
allegedly turned over to the desk officer on duty, whose identity was not revealed. Then it was
the stations OIC, P/Insp. Villanueva, who requested the forensic examination of the specimen. In
gist, from the alleged receipt of the plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of shabu by PO2 Ibasco
from the alleged buy-bust operation, the chain of custody of the specimen has not been
substantially shown. The Court cannot make an inference that PO2 Ibasco passed the specimen
to an unnamed desk officer on duty until it made its way to the laboratory examination. There are
no details on who kept custody of the specimen, who brought it to the Crime Laboratory, and who
received and kept custody of it until Engr. Jabonillo conducted the forensic examination. The
stipulated facts merely made an allusion that the specimen custodian of the Crime Laboratory
had possession of the specimen and released it for the proceedings before the trial court.
It is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is
the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of
guilt.[38] This, the prosecution failed to do. The prosecution must offer the testimony of key
witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody.[39]
As the Court aptly put in People v. Cantalejo:
x x x the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the custody
of the seized drugs raises doubt as to its origins.
x x x failure to observe the proper procedure also negates the operation

of the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers. As a general rule, the
testimony of police officers who apprehended the accused is usually accorded full
faith and credit because of the presumption that they have performed their duties
regularly. However, when the performance of their duties is tainted with
irregularities, such presumption is effectively destroyed.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the

performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[40]

In sum, considering the multifarious irregularities and non-compliance with the chain of
custody, We cannot but acquit accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt. The law
demands that only proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify a verdict of guilt.[41] In all
criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise,
the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.[42] As the Court often reiterated, it would be better to set free ten men
who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime
he did not commit.[43]
In fine, We repeat what the Court fittingly held in People v. Ong, a case similarly involving
a buy-bust operation, thus:
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. While appellants defense
engenders suspicion that he probably perpetrated the crime charged, it is not
sufficient for a conviction that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or
probability of guilt. It is the burden of the prosecution to overcome the
presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required.
In the case at bar, the basis of acquittal is reasonable doubt, the evidence
for the prosecution not being sufficient to sustain and prove the guilt of appellants
with moral certainty. By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility
may arise but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof
and an inability, after such an investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even
though the appellants innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests
on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of
the evidence of the defense. Suffice it to say, a slightest doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused.[44]
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accused-appellant Garry De La Cruz y

Dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on basis of reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the CA Decision dated June 30, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727 is SET
ASIDE. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of
accused-appellant, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause.
No costs.
[G.R. No. 128106-07. January 24, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GONZALO BALDOGO, accused-

appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment,[i] dated October 18, 1996, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City, finding accused-appellant Gonzalo Baldogo
alias Baguio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 12900
and Kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 12903. The trial court imposed on accused-appellant the

supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. 12900 and reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case
No. 12903.
I. The Indictments
Two Informations were filed against accused-appellant and Edgar Bermas

alias Bunso which read:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1996 in the evening at the residence of Mr. Julio
Camacho of Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused who were both convicted by final judgment
of the offense of Homicide and while already serving sentence, committed the above name
offense by conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and while armed with a bolo, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and hack one JORGE CAMACHO, hitting him
and inflicting upon him mortal wounds at the different parts of his body, which was the direct and
immediate cause of his death shortly thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident[,] premeditation

and recidivism. Puerto Princesa City, Philippines, March 5, 1996.[1]
xxx
That on Thursday, February 22, 1996 at more or less 8:15 in the evening at the Victims
residence, Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused while serving sentence at the Central Sub-
Colony both for the offense of Homicide, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, commits (sic) another offense, kidnapping one JULIE E. CAMACHO, a girl
12 years of age, and brought her to the mountains, where said Julie E. Camacho was detained
and deprived of her liberty fro [sic] more than five days.
CONTRARY TO LAW and attended by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.[2]
Accused-appellant was arraigned on June 28, 1996 and entered a plea of not guilty to both
charges.[3] Edgardo Bermas died before he could be arraigned.[4] The two cases were ordered
consolidated and a joint trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Julie Camacho, Dr. Edilberto Joaquin,
Esteban Mamites and Julio Camacho, Sr., and offered documentary and object evidence on its
evidence-in-chief.
II. The Antecedent Facts
Julio Camacho, Sr. and his wife, Heather Esteban, had four children, namely: Julio, Jr., a
student of the Palawan State University in Puerto Princesa City and who stayed in Guaygo,
Puerto Princesa City; Jorge, who was fourteen years old;[5] Julie, who was 12 years old and a
grade six elementary pupil at the Iwahig Elementary School and Jasper, who was eight years
old. Julio Sr. was employed as a security guard in the Iwahig Prison and Penal Colony. He and
his family lived in a compound inside the sub-colony. Edgardo Bermas alias Bunso, an inmate of
the penal colony, was assigned as a domestic helper of the Camacho spouses. Accused-
appellant alias Baguio, also an inmate of the colony, was assigned in January 1996 as a

domestic helper of the Camacho family. Both helpers resided in a hut located about ten meters
away from the house of the Camacho family.
In the evening of February 22, 1996, accused-appellant and Bermas served dinner to Julio
Sr., Jorge and Julie in the house of the Camachos. At about 7:30 p.m., Julio Sr. left the house to
attend a bible study at the dormitory in the Agronomy Section of the Penal Farm. Heather and
her son, Jasper, were in Aborlan town. Only Jorge and his sister Julie were left in the house.
After Julio Sr. had left the house, Julie went to the sala to study her
assignment. Momentarily, Bermas called Julie from the kitchen saying: Jul, tawag ka ng kuya
mo. Julie ignored him. After five minutes, Bermas called her again but Julie again ignored
him. Julie was perturbed when she heard a loud sound, akin to a yell, Aahh! Ahh! coming from
the kitchen located ten meters from the house. This prompted Julie to stand up and run to the
kitchen. She was appalled to see Jorge sprawled on the ground near the kitchen, face down and
bloodied. The vicinity was lighted by a fluorescent lamp. Standing over Jorge were accused-
appellant and Bermas, each armed with a bolo.[6] The shirt of Bermas was bloodied.[7] Julie was
horrified and so petrified that although she wanted to shout, she could not. She ran back to the
sala with accused-appellant and Bermas in pursuit. Accused-appellant overtook Julie, tied her
hands at her back with a torn t-shirt and placed a piece of cloth in her mouth to prevent her from
shouting for help from their neighbors. Bermas went to the room of Julies brothers. Accused-
appellant dragged Julie outside the house and towards the mountain. Bermas tarried in the
house.
With the aid of a flashlight, accused-appellant, with Julie in tow, walked for hours towards
the direction of the mountain. About a kilometer away from the house of the Camachos, accused-
appellant and Julie stopped under a big tamarind tree at the foot of the mountain. After about
thirty minutes, Bermas arrived with a kettle and raw rice. Accused-appellant and Bermas
retrieved a bag containing their clothing and belongings from the trunk of the tamarind tree. They
untied Julie and removed the gag from her mouth. The three then proceeded to climb the
mountain and after walking for six hours or so, stopped under a big tree where they spent the
night. When the three woke up in the morning of the following day, February 23, 1996, they
continued their ascent of the mountain. Seven hours thereafter, they started to follow a
descending route. Accused-appellant and Bermas told Julie that they would later release her. At
about 3:00 p.m., Bermas left accused-appellant and Julie. However, accused-appellant did not
let go of Julie. The two survived on sugar and rice cooked by accused-appellant. Once, they saw
uniformed men looking for Julie.However, accused-appellant hid Julie behind the tree. She
wanted to shout but he covered her mouth.
In the early morning of February 28, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie that he was leaving
her as he was going to Puerto Princesa City. He told her to fend for herself and return to the
lowland the next day. After their breakfast, accused-appellant left Julie alone to fend for
herself. A few hours after accused-appellant had left, Julie decided to return to the lowlands. She
found a river and followed its course toward Balsaham until she saw a hut. She called upon its
occupant who introduced himself as Nicodemus. Julie sought help from him. When asked by
Nicodemus if she was the girl whom the police authorities were looking for, she replied in the
affirmative. Nicodemus brought Julie to Balsaham where they met some personnel of the penal
colony and police officers, and Nicodemus turned Julie over for custody to them.
Meanwhile, Julio, Sr. arrived home after his bible study at about 9:00 p.m. on February 22,
1996. He noticed that the television set was switched on but no one was watching it. He looked
for his children but they were nowhere to be found. He then proceeded to the hut occupied by
accused-appellant and Bermas but he also failed to find them. Julio Sr. then rushed to the house
of his older brother, Augusto Camacho, to look for his children, but Augusto told him that Jorge
and Julie were not there. Julio Sr. then sought the help of Romualdo Esparagoza, a trustee of the
penal farm. The two rushed back to the Camacho residence and proceeded to the kitchen where
they noticed blood on the floor. The two proceeded to the dirty kitchen and saw the bloodied
body of Jorge dumped about three meters away from the dirty kitchen. Julio Sr. and Esparagoza
then brought Jorge to the Iwahig Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival at 12:40
a.m. of February 23, 1996. Dr. Edilberto Joaquin examined the cadaver and found that the victim

was stabbed on the breast once and at the back seven times. He sustained a lacerated wound
on the neck. The layers of the neck, trachea and esophagus of Jorge had been cut. Jorge did not
sustain any defensive wound. Dr. Joaquin performed an autopsy of the cadaver and signed a
medical certificate with his findings, thus:
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
GENERAL DATA:
JORGE CAMACHO y ESTEBAN, 14 years old, student, resident of Iwahig Prison and Penal
Farm, approximately 53 inches in-height, was brought to the hospital, (DOA) dead on arrival at
12:40 AM, 23 February 1996, approximate time of death 8:00 P.M. February 22, 1996.
FINDINGS
1. Stab wound, deep, penetrating, approximately 1 inch in length, at the level of the
xyphoid process, anteriorly.
2. Stab wound, chest, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, level of
the 3rd rib.
3. Stab wound, back, right midclavicular line, level of the 5th rib.
4. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length level of the 5th rib, left midclavicular
line.
5. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, 6th rib.
6. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, level of the
4th lumbar region.
7. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch in length, right third lumbar region, deep,
penetrating involving the liver.
8. Stab wound, back, approximately 3/4 inch, at the level of the 2nd lumbar region.
9. Lacerated wound, neck, anteriorly, deep, penetrating, cutting the layers of the neck
and the trachea and esophagus.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Hypovolemia due to severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and laceration of the
neck.[8]
Wounds numbers 7 and 9 were fatal. It was possible that two sharp-edged and sharp
pointed weapons were used in stabbing Jorge and that two assailants stabbed the victim.[9]
On February 29, 1996, Julie gave her sworn statement and a supplemental sworn statement
to the police investigators.[10] Julio Sr. suffered mental anguish and sleepless nights because of
the death of Jorge.
The prosecution adduced in evidence excerpts of the personal file of accused-appellant kept
in the penal colony showing that he had been convicted of homicide by the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City and that he commenced serving sentence on November 19, 1992 and that the
minimum term of his penalty was to expire on August 16, 1997.[11]
III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant

Accused-appellant denied killing Jorge and kidnapping Julie. Accused-appellant asserted
that Julie implicated him because she was coached and rehearsed. He testified that he was
assigned as a helper in the house of Augusto Camacho, the Chief of the Industrial Section of the
colony and the older brother of Julio Sr. Augusto told accused-appellant that his brother, Julio
Sr., wanted to have accused-appellant transferred as his domestic helper. However, accused-
appellant balked because he had heard from Edgardo Bermas, the helper of Julio Sr., that the
latter was cruel and had been maltreating Bermas. Nonetheless, in December 1995, accused-
appellant was transferred as a domestic helper of Julio Sr. Accused-appellant confirmed that
indeed Julio Sr. was cruel because whenever the latter was angry, he maltreated accused-
appellant by spanking and boxing him. These would occur about two times a week.
On February 22, 1996, at about 6:30 p.m., accused-appellant took his dinner in the
kitchen. At about 7:00 p.m., while he was already in his quarters and preparing to sleep, Bermas
arrived, armed with a bloodied bolo measuring about 1 feet long and told accused-appellant that
he (Bermas) had just killed Jorge to avenge the maltreatment he received from Julio Sr. Bermas
warned accused-appellant not to shout, otherwise he will also kill him. Petrified, accused-
appellant kept silent. Bermas then brought accused-appellant to the kitchen in the house of the
Camachos where accused-appellant saw the bloodied body of Jorge sprawled near the
kitchen. Bermas called Julie three times, telling her that her brother was calling for her but Julie
at first ignored Bermas. Julie later relented and went to the kitchen where Bermas grabbed her
and threatened to kill her if she shouted. Bermas tied the hands of Julie with a piece of cloth and
placed a piece of cloth around her face to prevent her from shouting.
Bermas, still armed with his bolo tucked on his waist and a knife on his hand, brought
accused-appellant and Julie outside the house. The three then trekked towards the mountain. On
the way, Bermas picked a bag containing food provisions and his and accused-appellants
clothings. Accused-appellant thought of escaping but could not because Bermas was watching
him. With the help of a flashlight brought by Bermas, the three walked towards the mountain, with
Julie walking ahead of accused-appellant and Bermas. After walking for hours, they stopped by a
tree to which Bermas tied Julie. At one time, while Bermas and accused-appellant were scouring
for water, Bermas kicked accused-appellant and pushed him into a ten feet deep ravine. The
right hand and foot of accused-appellant sustained bruises. He likewise sustained a sprain on his
foot. Bermas left accused-appellant and Julie after 1 days.
In the meantime, accused-appellant managed to climb out of the ravine and heard Julie
calling his name. Julie later told accused-appellant that before Bermas left, the latter told her that
he was going to kill accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant and Julie remained in the mountain after Bermas had left. At one time,
accused-appellant and Julie saw soldiers who were looking for her. Accused-appellant did not
reveal his and Julies location to the soldiers because he was afraid that he might be killed. On
February 25, 1996, accused-appellant untied Julie. He told her that he will set her free as soon
as his foot shall have healed.
On February 27, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie that she can go home already. He
ordered her to go down the mountain and proceed to Balsaham on her way back home. Although
his foot was still aching, accused-appellant went down from the mountain ahead of Julie and
proceeded to Balsaham. He then walked to Irawan where he took a tricycle to the public market
in the poblacion in Puerto Princesa City. He then took a passenger jeepney and alighted at
Brookes Point where he was arrested after one week for the killing of Jorge and the kidnapping
of Julie.
Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt Julie or deprive her of her
liberty. He averred that during the entire period that he and Julie were in the mountain before
Bermas left him, he tried to protect her from Bermas. Accused-appellant asserted that he wanted
to bring Julie back to her parents after Bermas had left them and to surrender but accused-
appellant was afraid that Julio Sr. might kill him.

IV. The Verdict of the Trial Court
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered its decision, the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, a Joint Judgment is hereby rendered in:
A. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12900 finding the accused Gonzalo Baldogo, alias Baguio, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of murder as defined and penalized in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659, and
appreciating against him the specific aggravating circumstance of taking advantage and use of
superior strength, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and pursuant to the
provisions of the second paragraph, No. 1, of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby
sentenced to death in the manner prescribed by law; to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge
Camacho;
1. Actual and compensatory damages:

For expenses incurred for funeral and
other expenses incident to his death ---P45,000.00
2. Moral damages ----------------------------- 100,000.00
3. Civil indemnity for the death of the
victim, Jorge Camacho ------------------- 50,000.00
or the aggregate amount of ------------- 195,000.00
B. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12903 finding the accused GONZALO BALDOGO, alias, Baguio, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as
defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 7659, and there being no modifying circumstance appreciated and pursuant to
the provisions of the second paragraph, No. 2, of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, and not
being entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life, and of perpetual
absolute disqualification; to pay the offended party, Julie Camacho for physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety and moral shock, moral damages of P100,000; and to pay the
costs.
The case as against co-accused Edgar Bermas is ordered dismissed by reason of extinction of
criminal liability occasioned by his death pending conclusion of the proceedings as against him.
SO ORDERED.[12]
V. Assignment of Error
In his appeal brief, accused-appellant avers that:

I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND KIDNAPPING.
II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF
DENIAL.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND GENERIC AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE SAME.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN THE (SIC) CRIMINAL CASE #12900.[13]
VI. Resolution of this Court
The first two assignments of errors being interrelated, the Court will delve into and resolve
the same simultaneously.
Accused-appellant avers that he had nothing to do with, and hence should not be claimed
for, the death of Jorge and the kidnapping and detention of Julie. Accused-appellant claims that
he was acting under duress because he was threatened by Bermas with death unless he did
what Bermas ordered him to do. Accused-appellant was even protective of Julie. He insists that
the latter was not a credible witness and her testimony is not entitled to probative weight because
she was merely coached into implicating him for the death of Jorge and her kidnapping and
detention by Bermas.
We find the contention of accused-appellant farcical. At the heart of the submission of
accused-appellant is the credibility of Julie, the 12-year old principal witness of the prosecution
and the probative weight of her testimony.
This Court has held in a catena of cases that the findings of facts of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment of the probative weight of
the collective evidence of the parties and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded
by the appellate court great respect, if not conclusive effect. The raison detre of this principle is
that this Court has to contend itself with the mute pages of the original records in resolving the
issues posed by the parties:
x x x The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the
contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie
or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record
will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily
with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed
in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the
case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned
verdict.[14]
In contrast, the trial court has the unique advantage of monitoring and observing at close
range the attitude, conduct and deportment of witnesses as they narrate their respective
testimonies before said court. Echoing a foreign courts observation, this Court declared:
Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a printed abstract in a court
of last resort. She oft hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the minds eye of the judge who
tries the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation,
the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the
candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and

mien. The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the
itching overeagerness of the swift witness, as well as the honest face of the truthful one, are
alone seen by him.[15]
The rule, however, is not iron clad. This Court has enumerated exceptions thereto,
namely: (a) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial
court; (b) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence; (c) when the
trial court ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or misconstrued facts and circumstances
of substance which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case.[16] In this case, the trial court
found the youthful Julie credible and her testimony entitled to full probative weight. Accused-
appellant has not sufficiently demonstrated to this Court the application of any of the aforestated
exceptions.
The Court agrees with accused-appellant that the prosecution was burdened to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the felonies for which he is charged. This Court has held that
accusation is not synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove the corpus
delicti, more specifically, that the crimes charged had been committed and that accused-
appellant precisely committed the same. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused.[17] The reasonable standard
rule which was adopted by the United States way back in 1978 is a requirement and a safeguard,
in the words of Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court, of due process
of law in the historic, procedural content of due process. The United States Supreme Court
emphasized in Re: Winship[18] that in a criminal prosecution, the accused has at stake interests
of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty or even his
life upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.
In the cases at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove that accused-
appellant killed Jorge. However, the prosecution adduced indubitable proof that accused-
appellant conspired with Bermas not only in killing Jorge but also in kidnapping and detaining
Julie.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy if two or more persons
agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence
or circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, before,
during and after the commission of a felony pointing to a joint purpose and design and
community of intent.[19] It is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period
prior to the commission of a felony; rather, it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the
offense, all the conspira`tors had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[20] In a
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.[21] All the accused are criminally liable as co-principals
regardless of the degree of their participation.[22] For a conspirator to be criminally liable of
murder or homicide, it is not necessary that he actually attacks or kills the victim.As long as all
the conspirators performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to
unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim, all
the conspirators are criminally liable for the death of said victim.[23]
In these cases, the prosecution adduced conclusive proof that accused-appellant indeed
conspired with Bermas to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie as shown by the following cogent facts and
circumstances:
1. When Julie responded to the repeated calls of Bermas for her to go to the kitchen on his
pretext that Jorge wanted to talk to her, Julie saw accused-appellant and Bermas, each armed
with a bolo, about half a meter from Jorge who was sprawled on the ground, bloodied all over.[24]
2. Even as Julie fled from the kitchen for dear life to the sala of their house, accused-
appellant and Bermas ran after her. Accused-appellant tied the hands of Julie with a piece of
cloth and inserted a piece of cloth into her mouth to prevent her from shouting for help from their
neighbors.[25]
3. With a flashlight on hand, accused-appellant then exited from the house, dragged Julie
towards the direction of the mountain while Bermas remained in the house to rummage through

the things in the bedroom of her brothers.Accused-appellant stopped for a while for Bermas to
join him.[26]
4. Before the killing of Jorge, accused-appellant and Bermas placed their clothing and
personal belongings in a bag and buried the bag under a tree, and when accused-appellant and
Bermas were on their way to the mountain after killing Jorge, they excavated and retrieved the
bag from under the tree.[27]
5. Accused-appellant and Bermas brought with them to the mountain a kettle filled with raw
rice which they cooked in the forest.[28]
6. When Julie saw uniformed men who were looking for her and wanted to shout for help,
accused-appellant covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting for help.[29]
7. Even after Bermas had left accused-appellant and Julie in the forest in the afternoon of
February 23, 1991, accused-appellant continued detaining Julie in the forest until February 27,
1996, when he abandoned Julie in the forest to fend for herself.
The evidence of the prosecution was even buttressed by the judicial admissions of accused-
appellant, thus:
1. After releasing Julie on February 27, 1996, accused-appellant proceeded to Puerto
Princesa City and on to Brookes Point where he was arrested a week after said date.[30]
2. Both accused-appellant and Bermas had a motive to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie, that is, to
avenge the repeated maltreatment and physical abuse on them by Julio Sr., the father of Jorge
and Julie.[31]
The flight of both accused-appellant and Bermas from the house of Julio Sr. to the mountain
where they found refuge after killing Jorge, and their motive to kill Jorge Jr. and kidnap and
detain Julie in conjunto constitute potent evidence of their confabulation and of their guilt for the
death of Jorge and kidnapping and detention of Julie.[32]
The bare denial by accused-appellant of criminal liability for the crimes charged is inherently
weak. Accused-appellants claims that he even protected Julie from harm and that he was forced
by Bermas to kidnap Julie are of the same genre.[33] The bare denial by accused-appellant of the
crimes charged constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot prevail over the
categorical and positive testimony of Julie and her unequivocal identification of accused-
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged.[34]
Accused-appellants insistence that he was forced by Bermas, under pain of death, to
cooperate with him in killing Jorge and kidnapping and detaining Julie is merely an
afterthought. For duress to exempt accused-appellant of the crimes charged, the fear must be
well-founded, and immediate and actual damages of death or great bodily harm must be present
and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused for
escape or interpose self-defense in equal combat.[35] Accused-appellant is burdened to prove by
clear and convincing evidence his defense of duress. He should not be shielded from
prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear from, or because of, a threat of a third
person.[36] As Lord Dennan declared in Reg. Vs. Tyler,[37] No man from fear of circumstances to
himself has the right to make himself a party to committing mischief on mankind. In these cases,
in light of the testimony of Julie and the inculpatory acts of accused-appellant no less, there is no
doubt that the latter acted in concert with Bermas and is himself a principal by direct
participation. That accused-appellant abandoned Julie after six days of captivity does not lessen
his criminal culpability much less exempt him from criminal liability for the killing of Jorge and the
kidnapping and detention of Julie.
Accused-appellant failed to prove his claim that Julie was coached on how and what to
testify on. Indeed, when asked to identify the person or persons who coached Julie, accused-
appellant failed to mention any person:

Q You heard the testimony of Julie Camacho that she is pointing to you to have
kidnapped her and participated in the killing of her brother Jorge, what can you say
to that?
A That is not true.
Q You donot (sic) know the reason why? In fact you treated her well, why she pointed
you as one of the authors of the crime?
A Maybe somebody coached her.
Q Who do you think coached her?
A I cannot mention the name but I am sure that somebody coached her.[38]
It bears stressing that when she testified, Julie was merely 12 years old. The Court has
repeatedly held that the testimony of a minor of tender age and of sound mind is likewise to be
more correct and truthful than that of an older person so that once it is established that they have
fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimony should be given full
credence and probative weight.[39] Julie had no ill motive to tergiversate the truth and falsely
testify against accused-appellant. Hence, her testimony must be accorded full probative
weight.[40]
VII. Crimes Committed by Accused-Appellant
The Court shall now delve into and resolve the issue of what crime or crimes accused-
appellant is guilty of. The trial court convicted accused-appellant of two separate crimes and not
the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide under the last paragraph of
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659.[41] The trial court is
correct. There is no evidence that Jorge was kidnapped or detained first by accused-appellant
and Bermas before he was killed. The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Code is applicable only
if kidnapping or serious illegal detention is committed and the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
Re: Criminal Case No. 12900

(For Murder)
The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder with the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation, based on the following findings and ratiocination:
The slaying of Jorge Camacho took place about 8:30 oclock in the evening of February 22,
1996. It was carried out after the accused have been through tidying-up the kitchen, the dining
room and the kitchen wares the family of the Camachos used in their early dinner before 7:00
oclock that evening. But even before dinner, the accused have already made preparations for
their flight, shown by the fact that they already had their clothes, other personal belongings and
food provisions stacked in their respective travelling bags then placed in a spot where they can
just pick them up as they take to flight.[42]
The trial court also appreciated against accused-appellant the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength with the following disquisition:
The victim, Jorge Camacho, is a lad only 14 years of age and unarmed when brutally slain. On
the contrary, both accused are of age and confirmed convicted felons. Any one of them would

already be superior in strength and disposition to their hapless and innocent victim. How much
more with the combined strength and force of the two of them.
Their choice of the object of their brutality is indicative of their unmistakable intent of taking
advantage of their superior strength. The likely object of their resentment, for purported cruelty to
them, is Prison Guard Julio Camacho, father of the victim. They could have directed their criminal
intent on Julio Camacho himself. But Julio Camacho could be a match in strength and agility to
any of them or even to the combined force of both of them. So, to insure execution of their
criminal intent without risk to them for the defense which the offended party might put up, they
directed their criminal acts against the deceased who is very much inferior in physical combat
even only to any one of them.[43]
While the Court agrees that accused-appellant is guilty of murder, it does not agree with the
rulings of the trial court that the crime was qualified by evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish
the confluence of the following requisites:
x x x (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly
indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time
between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. x x x[44]
The qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, like any other qualifying
circumstance, must be proved with certainty as the crime itself. A finding of evident premeditation
cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time from the time the malefactor has decided to
commit a felony up to the time that he actually commits it.[45] The prosecution must adduce clear
and convincing evidence as to when and how the felony was planned and prepared before it was
effected.[46] The prosecution is burdened to prove overt acts that after deciding to commit the
felony, the felon clung to his determination to commit the crime. The law does not prescribe a
time frame that must elapse from the time the felon has decided to commit a felony up to the time
that he commits it. Each case must be resolved on the basis of the extant factual milieu.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation. The barefaced fact that
accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag containing their clothing under a tree located about a
kilometer or so from the house of Julio Sr. does not constitute clear evidence that they decided to
kill Jorge and kidnap Julie. It is possible that they hid their clothing therein preparatory to
escaping from the colony. There is no evidence establishing when accused-appellant and
Bermas hid the bag under the tree. The prosecution even failed to adduce any evidence of overt
acts on the part of accused-appellant, nor did it present evidence as to when and how he and
Bermas planned and prepared to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie and to prove that the two felons
since then clung to their determination to commit the said crimes. Although accused-appellant
and Bermas were armed with bolos, there is no evidence that they took advantage of their
numerical superiority and weapons to kill Jorge. Hence, abuse of superior strength cannot be
deemed to have attended the killing of Jorge.[47] Nighttime cannot likewise be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance because there is no evidence that accused-appellant and Bermas
purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the killing or to insure its execution or accomplishment or
to evade their arrest.[48] Neither is dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge
was killed in their house or taken from their house and killed outside the said house.
In light of the evidence on record, it is clear that the killing of Jorge was qualified by
treachery. When Jorge was killed by accused-appellant and Bermas, he was barely 14 years
old. The Court has previously held that the killing of minor children who by reason of their tender
years could not be expected to put up a defense is attended by treachery.[49] Since treachery
attended the killing, abuse of superior strength is absorbed by said circumstance.[50]
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances in the commission of the crime, accused-appellant should be meted the penalty

of reclusion perpetua.[51] Conformably with current jurisprudence, accused-appellant is hereby
ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and the
amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages. Although Julio Sr. testified that he
spent P45,000.00 during the wake and burial of the victim, the prosecution failed to adduce any
receipts to prove the same. Hence, the award of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages has no
factual basis and should thus be deleted.
Re: Criminal Case No. 12903

(For Kidnapping)
The trial court convicted accused-appellant of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court is correct.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was taken from Article 267 of the Spanish Penal
Code, which reads:
Art. 267Detencin ilegal grave.Ser castigado con la pena de reclusin temporal el particular que
secuestrare o encerrare a otro o en cualquier forma le privare de libertad.
Secuestrare means sequestration.[52] To sequester is to separate for a special purpose,

remove or set apart, withdraw from circulation.[53] It also means to lock-up or
imprison. Encerrare is a broader concept than secuestrare.[54]Encerrare includes not only the
imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever
length of time. As explained by Groizard, encerrar es meter una persona cosa en parte de donde
no pueda salir; detener o arrestar, poner en prisin, privar de la libertad alguno. He continued
that la detencin, la prisin, la privacin de la libertad de una persona, en cualquier forma y por
cualquier medio por cualquier tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el libre ejercicio de
su actividad.[55] On his commentary on the Spanish Penal Code, Cuello Calon says that the
law preve dos modalidades de privacion de libertad, el encierro y la detencion. Encerrar significa
recluir a una persona en un lugar de donde no puede salir, detener a una persona equivale a
impedirle o restringirle la libertad de movimiento. Para que el sujeto pasivo no quiera
permanecer en el sitio donde esta recluido, pues no es posible llamar encierro ni detencion a la
estancia de un a persona en lugar del que no quiere salir.[56]
In this case, Julie, a minor, was not locked up. However, she was seized and taken from her
house through force and dragged to the mountain. Since then, she was restrained of her liberty
by and kept under the control of accused-appellant and Bermas. She was prevented from going
back home for a period of about six days. Patently then, accused-appellant is guilty of kidnapping
and illegally detaining Julie. The crime was aggravated by dwelling because Julie was taken from
their house by accused-appellant and Bermas. However, dwelling was not alleged in the
Information as an aggravating circumstance as required by Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure which reads:
SEC. 9. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.[57]
Even if dwelling is proven but is not alleged in the Information as an aggravating

circumstance, the same will not serve to aggravate the penalty.[58]
Quasi-recidivism as defined in Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code[59] is alleged in both
Informations. Accused-appellant is alleged to have committed murder and kidnapping while
serving sentence in the penal colony by final judgment for the crime of homicide. Quasi-
recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance.[60] The prosecution is burdened to prove the

said circumstance by the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. In the present case, to
prove quasi-recidivism, the prosecution was burdened to adduce in evidence a certified copy of
the judgment convicting accused-appellant of homicide and to prove that the said judgment had
become final and executory.[61] The raison detre is that:
x x x Since the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to such information, there was a
joinder of issues not only as to his guilt or innocence, but also as to the presence or absence of
the modifying circumstances so alleged. The prosecution was thus burdened to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the existence of the modifying
circumstances. It was then grave error for the trial court to appreciate against the accused-
appellant the aggravating circumstance of recidivism simply because of his failure to object to the
prosecutions omission as mentioned earlier.[62]
In this case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely the excerpt of the prison record of
accused-appellant showing that he was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 10357-R by
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6) with a penalty of from six years and one day as
minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day as maximum and that the sentence of
accused-appellant commenced on November 19, 1992 and that the minimum term of the penalty
was to expire on August 16, 1997.[63] The excerpt of the prison record of accused-appellant is not
the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court[64] to prove the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and to prove that said judgment had become
final and executory. Said excerpt is merely secondary or substitutionary evidence which is
inadmissible absent proof that the original of the judgment had been lost or destroyed or that the
same cannot be produced without the fault of the prosecution. The barefaced fact that accused-
appellant was detained in the penal colony does prove the fact that final judgment for homicide
has been rendered against him.[65] There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of
the crime, accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably
with Article 63 of the Revised penal Code.[66]
VIII. Civil Liability of Accused-Appellant for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
The trial court awarded the amount of P100,000.00 to Julie by way of moral damages for the
felony of kidnapping with serious illegal detention, predicated on her having suffered serious
anxiety and fright when she was kidnapped and dragged to the mountain where she was
detained for several days. The trial court is correct. Julie is entitled to moral damages.[67] In light
of the factual milieu in this case, the amount is reasonable. Julie is also entitled to exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00.[68]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION:
1. In Criminal Case No. 12900, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being no modifying circumstances attendant to the
commission of the felony. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the amount of P50,000.00 as of moral
damages. The award of P45,000.00 as of actual damages is deleted.
2. In Criminal Case No. 12903, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of kidnapping with serious illegal detention defined in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7659, and there being no modifying circumstances attendant to the
commission of the felony is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is
hereby ordered to pay moral damages to the victim, Julie Camacho, in the amount
of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 189301
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
- versus - CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
JOSE PEPITO D. COMBATE a.k.a. PEPING, DEL CASTILLO, and
Accused-Appellant. PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:
December 15, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the January 30, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No. 00294 entitled People of the Philippines v. Jose Pepito D. Combante
a.k.a. Peping, which affirmed with modification the July 2, 2003 Decision[2] in Criminal Case Nos.
95-17070 & 95-17071 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50 in Bacolod City.
Accused-appellant Jose Pepito D. Combate stands convicted of the crime of Murder and
Homicide, as defined and penalized under Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), respectively. He was sentenced to suffer the penalties of reclusion
temporal and reclusion perpetua.
The Facts
The charge against accused-appellant stemmed from two Informations:
Criminal Case No. 95-17070

That on or about 16th day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Murcia,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a firearm, with
treachery, with intent to kill and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot on EDMUND
PRAYCO y OSABEL, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the body of the
latter which caused the death of the said victim.
Contrary to law.[3]
Criminal Case No. 95-17071

That on or about 16th day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Murcia,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a firearm, with
treachery, with intent to kill and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot on LEOPOLDO

GUIRO, JR. y PEREZ alias Nene thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the
body of the latter which caused the death of the said victim.
Contrary to law.[4]
On November 28, 2001, the trial court ordered the consolidation of the two cases. When
arraigned with assistance of counsel, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.
During the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Shenette Guiro, the wife of the
deceased victim Leopoldo Guiro; Jose Tomaro; Rebecca Montino Apdo; Senior Police Officer 1
(SPO1) Rolando Salamisan; Inspector Jose Labuyo; Police Inspector William Senoron; PO1
Rommel Pregil; Dr. Jimmy Nadal; and Dr. Emmanuel Bando. On the other hand, the defense
presented as its witnesses Magno Montinola and accused-appellant.
The Prosecutions Version of Facts
On March 16, 1995, at around 9 oclock in the evening, Tomaro parked his passenger
jeepney at the garage of Leopoldos mother, Patria Guiro, located at Purok 2, Barangay Minoyan
in Murcia, Negros Occidental. He then proceeded to the house of Leopoldo where he usually
sleeps after driving the jeepney owned by Leopoldos parents.
Upon entering the gate, Tomaro met Leopoldo and Edmund Prayco, who were on their
way out. Leopoldo invited him to join them in drinking liquor but he declined saying he was
already tired. He continued on his way and was about to ascend the stairs when he heard a
gunshot. He rushed back to the road and there he saw accused-appellant pointing a gun at the
fallen Leopoldo. When Edmund was about to intervene, accused-appellant also shot Edmund at
a very close range. After shooting Edmund, accused-appellant turned his attention back to
Leopoldo and shot him for a second time.
Tomaro then rushed to help Leopoldo and pleaded for his life. Instead of heeding his
plea, accused-appellant pointed his gun towards Tomaro and pulled the trigger but the gun did
not fire. At that instant, Tomaro jumped on accused-appellant and was able to grab the gun.
Tomaro tried to shoot accused-appellant but the gun still did not fire. Hastily, accused-appellant
fled to the direction of Bacolod City.
Leopoldo and Edmund were later brought to the Bacolod Sanitarium and Hospital.
Edmund was declared dead on arrival, while Leopoldo died the following day.
Accused-appellants defense, on the other hand, was confined to a denial, to wit:
In the evening of March 16, 1995, accused-appellant was in his house drinking liquor
when Montinola, a close friend, arrived to fetch him. He was told to report to the barangay hall
and to render duty as a tanod. Before leaving, Montinola also partook of a small quantity of
liquor.

On their way to the barangay hall, they passed by the house of Leopoldo, who was
drinking liquor by the side of the street fronting his house, along with Tomaro, Edmund, and
someone else who accused-appellant could not identify. He and Montinola were walking on the
left side of the street going towards the direction of the Mambucal Resort, while Leopoldo and his
group were on the right side. Accused-appellant then extended a greeting to Leopoldo, who
responded with a sarcastic remark. Accused-appellant and Montinola ignored the rudeness
thrown their way and just continued walking.
They, however, soon noticed Leopoldo crossing the street and started to follow them.
Edmund likewise also followed them but on the other side of the street. Suddenly, accused-
appellant saw Leopoldo pull something out from his waist. He then heard a gunshot and saw
Leopoldo fall to the ground. He pushed Montinola aside and they ran away.
After a few moments, he heard more gunshots coming from the direction of where
Leopoldo and his group were situated. He was stricken with fear so he went home. Later, he
learned that he was the suspect in the killing of Leopoldo and Edmundo. Thus, to avoid trouble,
he fled to Victorias City, Negros Occidental where he was arrested by the Murcia police
on October 13, 2001.
The story of accused-appellant was corroborated by Montinola.
Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial, the RTC convicted accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of its July 2,
2003 Decision reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding the

accused Jose Combate, Jr. y Dallarte alias Peping, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE in Criminal Case NO. 95-17071 as Principal
thereof. There being no modifying circumstances, the accused is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall serve a prison term of Eight (8)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion
Temporal.
By way of civil liability, the accused is condemned to pay the heirs of the
late Leopoldo Guiro the following:
1. The sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity.
2. The sum of P932,712.00 as compensatory damages and;
3. The sum of P56,319.59 as reimbursement for the burial expenses.
In addition, the accused is ordered to pay Shenette Guiro the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The accused is also declared GUILTY of MURDER for the death of
Edmund Prayco as charged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-17070 as
Principal thereof. There being no modifying circumstances, the accused is

sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is condemned to
pay the heirs of the late Edmund Prayco the sum of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity and the sum of P30,000.00 as compensatory damages.[5]
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On January 30, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court and modified the
award of damages. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial

court, Branch 50 of Bacolod City dated 2 July 200[3] is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. The award of compensatory damages in both cases is
deleted, and in lieu thereof, exemplary damages of P25,000.00 is awarded to the
heirs of Leopoldo Guiro and another P25,000.00 to the heirs of Edmund Prayco.
In all other respects, the assailed decision is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The Issue
Hence, this appeal is before us, with accused-appellant maintaining that the trial court
erred in convicting him of the crimes of homicide and murder, despite the fact that his guilt was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The Courts Ruling
We sustain accused-appellants conviction.
Factual findings of the trial court should be respected
In his Brief, accused-appellant says that the trial court failed to consider several
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. First, as to Tomaro, who directly
implicated accused-appellant, his testimony was unsubstantiated and did not conform to the
physical evidence. According to Tomaro, Edmund was shot at close range yet no powder burns
were found around the entry wound. Second, as to the testimony of Shenette Guiro, accused-
appellant harps on the fact that she never mentioned Tomaro being present at the scene of the
crime and that she only heard one gunshot while the other witnesses heard three or four. Lastly,
as to the testimony of SPO1 Salamisan, accused-appellant points out that SPO1 Salamisan
testified that he only saw one spot of blood when there were two victims.
To accused-appellant, the inconsistencies thus described erode the credibility of the

witnesses when taken as a whole.
We do not agree.
Time-tested is the doctrine that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness
is entitled to great weight, sometimes even with finality.[7] The Supreme Court will not interfere
with that assessment, absent any indication that the lower court has overlooked some material
facts or gravely abused its discretion.[8]

Complementing the above doctrine is the equally established rule that minor and
insignificant inconsistencies in the testimony tend to bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of
witnesses, for they show that the testimony is not contrived or rehearsed.[9] As the Court put it
in People v. Cristobal, Trivial inconsistencies do not rock the pedestal upon which the credibility
of the witness rests, but enhances credibility as they manifest spontaneity and lack of
scheming.[10]
A careful review of the records shows that the RTC, as well as the CA, committed no
reversible error when it gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as
opposed to accused-appellants bare denials.
Moreover, the testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety and not merely on
its truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated
parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by
witnesses, everything stated by them on direct, cross, and redirect examinations must be
calibrated and considered.[11] It must be stressed in this regard that facts imperfectly or
erroneously stated in an answer to one question may be supplied or explained as qualified by the
answer to other question. The principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied to
this jurisdiction.[12] As explained in People v. Osias:
It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with

respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. And it has
been aptly said that even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified
in some material particulars, it is not required that the whole of their
uncorroborated testimony be rejected but such portions thereof deemed
worthy of belief may be credited.
The primordial consideration is that the witness was present at the
scene of the crime and that he positively identified [the accused] as one of
the perpetrators of the crime charged x x x.[13] (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, we agree with the trial court that the alleged inconsistencies merely refer to
minor details which do not affect the witnesses credibility. In disregarding the alleged inconsistent
statements, the trial court explained:
The inconsistencies are more imagined than real. The inconsistencies,

like the ownership of the passenger jeepney, whether said jeepney is owned by
Guiro or his mother, are so trivial and does not at all affect credibility.
The accused also makes much fuss about the fact that Shenette Guiro
heard only one (1) shot while the other prosecution witnesses as well as the
accused and his witness Magno Montinola, heard three (3) to four (4) shots. The
accused conveniently forgot that Shenette Guiro was asleep when the shooting
took place. She was awakened by the shot she heard and that shot might have
been the last shot.
The accused flays the testimony of Jose Tomaro as incredible and
unbelievable when the said witness testified that he ran and cradled Guiro in his
arms after the latter was shot. The accused asserts that it is unnatural for a
person to unnecessarily expose himself to danger.
The argument need not detain the Court. It is a settled rule on evidence
that witnesses to a crime react in different ways. (Pp. vs. Paynor, 261 SCRA
615).

There is no standard behavior when one is considered
with a strange, startling or frightening situation. (Pp. v. De Leon,
262 SCRA 445)
Moreover, Jose Tomaro has no quarrel with the accused. He has every
reason to expect that he will not be assaulted as he was not making any
aggressive move against him.[14]
Likewise, we are not persuaded as to the alleged inconsistency of Tamaros testimony

that Edmund was shot at close range but the physical evidence revealed that there were no
powder burns around the entry wounds. In his testimony, Tamaro described the incident as
follows:
COURT:
Q: Now according to your testimony, the next time around, Combate was pointing
his gun at Prayco?
WITNESS
A: Yes, sir.
Q: He pointed his gun to Prayco and fired his gun. At the time he fired his gun,
how far was he from Prayco?
COURT
Witness indicating a very short distance where the Court Interpreter is
situated which is less than (1) meter away.[15] (Emphasis supplied.)
As aptly held by the CA, such testimony is in fact consistent with the lack of powder
burns on Edmunds body, viz:
The distance from which a shot is fired affects the nature and extent of
the injury caused on the victim. In close range fire, the injury is not only due to the
missile but also due to the pressure of the expanded gases, flame and other solid
products of combustion. In contrast, distant fire usually produces the
characteristic effect of the bullet alone. A shot fired from a distance of more than
60 cm or about two (2) feet does not produce the burning, smudging or tattooing
typically present in loose contact or near fire, short range fire and medium range
fire.
Powder burns is a term commonly used by physicians whenever there is
blackening of the margin at the entrance of the gunshot wound. The blackening is
due to smoke smudging, gunpowder tattooing and, to a certain extent, burning of
the wound margin.
In this case, the fact that there were no powder burns found in EDMUNDs
body indicates that the shots were fired at a distance of more than two (2) feet
which is consistent with Jose Tomaros testimony that Edmund was shot at about
less than 1 meter away from appellant.[16]
Defense of denial cannot prevail over positive identification
For his defense, accused-appellant wants this Court to believe his innocence and offers
his version of the facts wherein he did not commit the crime. This Court is not persuaded.

Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the defense of denial.[17]Accused-
appellant was positively and categorically identified by the witnesses. They have no reason to
perjure and accused-appellant was unable to prove that the prosecution witnesses were moved
by any consideration other than to see that justice is done. Thus, the presumption that their
testimonies were not moved by any ill will and bias stands, and, therefore, their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.[18]
Lest it be overlooked, accused-appellant fled to Victorias City, Negros Occidental right

after the incident, an act that is evidence of his guilt. It is well-established that the flight of an
accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.[19] Indeed, the wicked flee when no
man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion.[20]
Award of damages
This Court will now endeavor to end, once and for all, the confusion as to the proper
award of damages in criminal cases where the imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion
perpetua or death. As a rule, the Court awards three kinds of damages in these types of criminal
cases: civil indemnity and moral and exemplary damages. We shall discuss all three.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the
offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other
proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil
law.[21] This award stems from Art. 100 of the RPC which states, Every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable.
Civil liability ex delicto may come in the form of restitution, reparation, and
indemnification.[22] Restitution is defined as the compensation for loss; it is full or partial
compensation paid by a criminal to a victim ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as a
condition for probation.[23] Likewise, reparation and indemnification are similarly defined as the
compensation for an injury, wrong, loss, or damage sustained.[24] Clearly, all of these correspond
to actual or compensatory damages defined under the Civil Code.[25]
The other kinds of damages, i.e., moral and exemplary or corrective damages,[26] have
altogether different jural foundations.
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also
compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals explained the nature and purpose of
moral damages, viz:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate

one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These
damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or
corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury
suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless,

that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must
have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219[27] and Article
2220[28] of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as compensatory

damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a
wrong.[29] They may also be considered and allowed for resulting pain and suffering, and for
humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailants
conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the
attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress.[30]
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey
Castillon: [T]he award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of
the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[31]
And lastly, the Court awards exemplary damages as provided for in Arts. 2229 and 2230
of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of

example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil

liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines
and shall be paid to the offended party.
Clearly, as a general rule, exemplary damages are only imposed in criminal offenses
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, be they generic or
qualifying. However, there have been instances wherein exemplary damages were awarded
despite the lack of an aggravating circumstance. This led the Court to clarify this confusion
in People v. Dalisay, where it categorically stated that exemplary damages may be awarded,
not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the
offender, to wit:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts

generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended
the commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the information.
This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the
promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating
circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in
the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been
proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. x x x
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may
still award exemplary damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if
the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been
proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules

which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive
application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of
the private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially
those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an
aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime had not been
sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and
another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has
both been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the
first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v.
Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y
Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the
Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People v. Llave, People of
the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v. Edwin
Mejia. Again, the difference between the two sets rests on when the criminal case
was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the
grant of exemplary damages taking into account simply the attendance of an
aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of
the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening
on this point, thus
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary or
corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty
of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always,
used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use
of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to
feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and
wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be
compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible
conduct of the defendant associated with such circumstances as
willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness,
oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud that intensifies the injury.
The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to
those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to
punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these
damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and
others like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be
awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also
where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230
prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229,
the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v.
Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with
perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own
daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages
on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in
sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the
Philippines v. Cristino Caada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito
Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court
awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to

elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual
abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article
2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages.
Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales words in her separate opinion in People
of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, [t]he application of Article 2230 of the
Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the
underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damages to set a public
example or correction for the public good.[32]
Before awarding any of the above-mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first
consider the penalty imposed by law. Under Republic Act No. (RA) 7659 or An Act to Impose the
Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws,
and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws were amended to
impose the penalty of death under certain circumstances.
For a full appreciation of the award on damages, it is imperative that a thorough

discussion of RA 7659 be undertaken. Each crime will be discussed as well as the proper
amount of damages for each crime.
Under RA 7659, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in
general,[33] mutiny on the high seas,[34] and simple rape.[35]
For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death: qualified piracy;[36] qualified bribery under certain
circumstances; parricide; murder;[39] infanticide, except when committed by the mother of
[37] [38]
the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the
same purpose;[40] kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain
circumstances;[41] robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under certain
circumstances;[42] destructive arson, except when death results as a consequence of the
commission of any of the acts penalized under the article;[43] attempted or frustrated rape, when
a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder;[44] and carnapping, when the
driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.[45]
RA 7659 imposes the penalty of death on the following crimes:
(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift
or present.
(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person;
(ii) when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is
raped, subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the

acts penalized under Article 320, death results.
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes
insane or homicide is committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil

degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is under the
custody of the police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full view of the
husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity;
(4) when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when the offender knows
that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when
committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National
Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
Nevertheless, all these must be taken in relation to Art. 63 of the RPC, which provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in
which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two

indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application
thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only

one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty
shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances
attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably
allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number
and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in
accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of
such compensation.
Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties,
the court has the duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can
impose either reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present.
But with the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now
prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.[46]
As a result, courts now cannot impose the penalty of death. Instead, they have to
impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages,
following the ruling in People v. Salome[47] and People v. Quiachon,[48] is the penalty provided by
law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually
imposed on the offender.[49]

When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the penalty
of death were it not for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v.
Victor,[50] that the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by death should
be PhP 75,000. We reasoned that [t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception
of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.[51] Such reasoning
also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659.
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v.

Arizapa,[52] PhP 50,000 was awarded as moral damages without need of pleading or proving
them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that the victims injury is concomitant with and necessarily
results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral
damages.[53] Subsequently, the amount was increased to PhP 75,000 in People v. Soriano.[54]
As to exemplary damages, existing jurisprudence has pegged its award at PhP

30,000,[55] despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance. The reason, as previously
discussed, is to deter similar conduct and to serve as an example for public good.
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA
9346, the imposable penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA
7569, must be used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.
On the other hand, when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition
of reclusion perpetua only, the Court has ruled that the proper amounts should be PhP 50,000 as
civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.[56]
Accordingly, in Criminal Case Nos. 95-17070 and 95-17071, the exemplary damages
awarded by the CA in the amount of PhP 25,000 should be increased to PhP 30,000.00 in line
with prevailing jurisprudence.
Moreover, the deletion of the award of compensatory damages for unearned income by
the CA in Criminal Case No. 95-17071 is proper. This Court pronounced in People v. Mallari:[57]
The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to

substantiate a claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of
exception, damages therefore may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence provided that there is testimony that the victim was either
(1) self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws,
and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the victims line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
In this case, neither of the exemption applies. The earnings of Leopoldo at the time of his
death were above minimum wage set by labor laws in his respective place at the time of his
death.[58] As testified to by his wife, Shenette Guiro, Leopoldo was earning between PhP 200 to
PhP 300 per day. This is more than minimum wage. Hence, absent any documentary evidence,
the award of compensatory damages must be deleted.

Likewise, the deletion of the award of compensatory damages by the CA in Criminal
Case No. 95-17070 is proper for lack of any basis. The trial court did not discuss why it awarded
compensatory damages to the heirs of Edmund.
Interest on damages
When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper
cases.[59] In People v. Tubongbanua,[60] interest at the rate of six percent (6%) was ordered to be
applied on the award of damages. This rule would be subsequently applied by the Court in
several cases such as Mendoza v. People,[61] People v. Buban,[62] People v.
[63] [64]
Guevarra, and People v. Regalario. Thus, we likewise adopt this rule in the instant case.
Interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on the award of civil indemnity and all
damages, i.e., actual or compensatory damages, moral damages and exemplary damages, from
the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No.
00294 finding accused-appellant Jose Pepito D. Combate guilty of the crimes charged
is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION. As modified, the ruling of the trial court should read as
follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding the

accused Jose Combate, Jr. y Dallarte alias Peping, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE in Criminal Case NO. 95-17071 as Principal
thereof. There being no modifying circumstances, the accused is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall serve a prison term of Eight (8)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion
Temporal.
By way of civil liability, the accused is condemned to pay the heirs of the
late Leopoldo Guiro the following:
1. The sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
2. The sum of P56,319.59 as reimbursement for the burial expenses.
In addition, the accused is ordered to pay Shenette Guiro the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The accused is also declared GUILTY of MURDER for the death of
Edmund Prayco as charged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-17070 as
Principal thereof. There being no modifying circumstances, the accused is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is condemned
to pay the heirs of the late Edmund Prayco the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Finally, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be
applied to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages from the finality of judgment until fully paid in the two (2)
aforementioned criminal cases.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 110554. February 19, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMY SAGUN @ POKPOK, accused-

appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Accused-appellant Romy Sagun @ Pokpok assails the decision[1] dated April 23, 1993, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32,[2] of Cabarroguis, Quirino, in Criminal Case No. 891, finding
him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and to pay private complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as damages without subsidiary
imprisonment.
On September 25, 1991, the Provincial Prosecutor, Anthony A. Fox, filed with the court a
quo an information,[3] charging accused-appellant of the crime of rape, allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about 12:00 oclock midnight on November 5, 1990, in Barangay Bonifacio,

Municipality of Diffun, Province of Quirino, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused ROMY SAGUN alias POKPOK, armed with a bolo, by means of force
and intimidation and lewd design, did then and there there (sic) willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with MARITESS A. MARZO against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
During arraignment on June 25, 1992, accused-appellant assisted by his counsel,[4] entered
a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution, culled from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
succinctly synthesized in the Appellees Brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General,
established the following facts:
In the evening of November 5, 1990, Maritess Marzo, single and a third year high school student,
was asleep in the room of her boarding house located at Bonifacio St., Diffun, Quirino (p. 2, tsn,
July 9, 1992). Fronting said boarding house and separated by a road is the house of Romy
Sagun where he and his family reside (p. 3, tsn, March 31, 1993).
At about midnight of November 5, 1990, Maritess was awakened by sounds of footsteps

approaching her. Maritess shouted but a man whom she recognized as Romy Sagun, her
neighbor, poked his bolo at her head (p. 4, tsn, Aug. 11, 1992) and uttered, Do not shout or else I
will kill you and tomorrow you will not be living any more (p. 5, supra). Then, Sagun shifted his
bolo to the neck of Maritess, who was lying on her side, and started removing her skirt and panty
(pp. 7-8, supra). Sagun took off his pants and laid on top of Maritess (p. 10, supra); opened her
legs and inserted his organ into Maritess (p. 12, supra) and started gyrating for about five
minutes. Maritess struggled and pushed Sagun but to no avail. Thereafter, Sagun stood up, put
on his pants and left (p. 13, supra). Maritess felt that Saguns male genital partly penetrated hers
(p. 15, supra).

After Sagun left, Maritess woke up her boardmates and informed them that somebody entered
the boarding house but did not reveal that she was raped because of Saguns death threat (p. 15,
supra). The following morning, however, Maritess informed her landlord, Rudy Agsalud that
Sagun entered her room and sexually abused her. Rudy Agsalud immediately reported the
incident to the police authorities (p. 6, supra).
On November 6, 1990 (p. 9, tsn, Aug. 17, 1992), Maritess submitted herself to a medical
examination. Dr. Moises Lazaro, the examining physician, testifying on the results of his
examination, pertinently declared as follows:
Q - Doctor, you were saying that there was a partial penetration on the vagina. How many
centimeters was the deep of the penetration?
A - As I said from the opening to the hymen 1-1.5 cm. May be the tip of the penis penetrated
the hymen but it did not break the hymen. Because we have to consider the
circumstance whether there is resistance or force x x x(p. 11, supra)[5]
Accused-appellant denied having committed said crime. His counterstatement of the facts
as tersely summarized by the trial court, is as follows:
He knows Maritess Marzo, the complainant. She was boarding in the house of Mercedes
Agsalud sometime in November 1990. Student at the Quirino State College. Complainants
boarding house is about 45 meters from their house. In the evening of November 5, 1990, he
was in their house with his wife and children. Before 9:00 oclock of the same evening, he had a
drinking spree with his nephew. After consuming two bottles of beer grande, he went to buy
cigarette. On his way home, he noticed that the door of the boarding house of complainant was
opened. She was reviewing. His nephew at that time was already asleep. He entered the
boarding house of the complainant, sat down on the chair about four meters from
her. Complainant inquired why he entered the house. Told complainant that he just came for a
visit because she is a neighbor. Because he was drunk, complainant had to go
upstairs. Complainant told him to leave the house or else she will report him to Mrs.
Agsalud. With that warning, he went home. He denied the testimony of the complainant to the
effect that he threatened her with a bolo, undressed her, removed her panty, mounted at her and
had sexual intercourse with her. That there is no truth about the testimony of the complainant
because nothing had happened to her. That he does not know why the complainant testified
against him.
On cross examination, witness testified that he went to the boarding house of the complainant on
the alleged night of the incident after a drinking spree with his nephew. That it was only when he
was already drunk that gave him the idea of going to the boarding house of the complainant. At
that time, he entered the boarding house, complainant was reviewing, she was alone. He went
near the complainant to talk to her being a neighbor. That he used to go to the boarding
house. He was asking complainant why she was reviewing at that late hour of the night. He was
seated near the door of the house while Maritess Marzo was reviewing in the sala of the
house. That in the first floor of the house, there are no rooms while the second floor, it has
rooms. That the drinking spree took place in his house. That after buying cigarette he did not go
home directly because he dropped by at the boarding house of the complainant. He talked with
the complainant. After he was warned that she is going to report his coming in the house of Mrs.
Agsalud, he left and that was the time he went home. He told complainant that he was visiting
her being a neighbor and sensing that she was mad, he left.
On clarificatory question of the court, accused testified that he knows that complainant was alone
at that night, and that he entered the house to talk with her considering that she is a neighbor. He
entered the boarding house of the complainant because he could not get his sleep that night. He
just wanted to talk with the complainant. That he entered the boarding house of Maritess Marzo
past 9:00 oclock that evening. That he does not know of any reason why the complainant filed
the case against him. Before November 5, 1990, he never visited Maritess Marzo because she

used to go home in their barangay except on November 5, 1990. That he did not have any
misunderstanding between Maritess Marzo and her parents before November 5, 1990 neither
has he any misunderstanding before November 5, 1990 with Mrs. Agsalud. That he left Quirino
sometime on November 9, 1990 in order to have a driving job in Tondo, Manila because his
former employer Engr. Valido went abroad. That he came to know for the first time that he was
charged for rape when his wife went to Manila before Christmas in 1990.[6]
In its decision dated May 10, 1993, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged, and rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the guilt of the accused of the crime charged has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA plus all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to indemnity the
complainant Maritess Marzo the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost. The detention of the accused
shall be fully credited in his favor.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Hence, this appeal from the lower courts decision. Significantly, accused-appellant makes
only one assignment of error:
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ERRED IN
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND, ON THE
BASIS THEREOF, IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
AGAINST HIM AND IN AWARDING DAMAGES AGAINST HIM.
In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court gravely erred in giving credence
to the testimony of the complainant because it is tainted with inconsistencies and
improbabilities. Drawing our attention to the medico-legal findings, he avers that the medical
certificate issued by the physician who conducted the physical examination negates
complainants claim of carnal knowledge as her hymen remains intact. He likewise bewails the
fact that complainants acts and deeds the day after the alleged rape was committed are simply
incredulous, as no rape victim could have easily recovered from the effects of such a traumatic
experience.
Thus, at the outset, it may be noted that accused-appellant places at issue the credibility of
private complainant, upon whose testimony he was convicted. Once again, however, we have to
stress that the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the
trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of the
demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses presented at the trial. The trial judge is thereby
placed in a vantage position to discriminate finely between what is true and what is false [8] in the
versions given by the witnesses of the opposing parties. Appellate courts will not disturb the
findings on the credibility, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimony of witnesses,
unless it be clearly shown that the trial court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily certain
facts and circumstances of significance in the case.[9] On this score, accused-appellants plea that
it was error to rely on the testimony of the complaining witness is less than persuasive.
The crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, hence it
is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus.[10] As a result,
conviction may be based justifiably on the plausible testimony of the private complainant herself.
In the present case, we find the trial courts reliance on the testimony of the complainant
based on solid evidentiary grounds. She had no improper motive whatsoever, as admitted by
accused-appellant himself,[11] to impute such a very serious offense to him. It is accepted
doctrine, that in the absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the victim to falsely
testify against the accused, her testimony deserves credence.[12]

The spontaneity of complainants testimony could not be discredited by mere denials of
accused-appellant. For an affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony,
especially so when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness.[13]Denial is an intrinsically
weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of nonculpability to merit
credence.[14] Furthermore, in the light of the complainants positive identification of accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime, the latters defense of bare denial must necessarily fail,
as her positive testimony overrides his negative testimony.[15] Note that accused-appellants own
version of a friendly visit he made to complainant in her boarding house on November 5, 1990,
puts him squarely at the place and time of the alleged offense.
As pointed out by the lower court, complainant testified in a direct and straightforward
manner. She even demonstrated in court how she was raped by accused-appellant. Complainant
cried when she testified; her tears added poignancy to verity born out of human nature and
experience.[16] There was no grave abuse of discretion when the trial court considered the
testimony of complainant worthy of full faith and credit, thus:
"x x x Complainants detailed and straight forward narration and demonstration in court how she
was abused and raped bear the earmarks of truth. There is no showing that she was ill motivated
in filing the case against the accused.[17]
Moreover, it is simply inconceivable that complaining witness, a 17-year-old lass[18] from a

remote barrio in Rafael Palma, Diffun, Quirino, who was inexperienced with the ways of the
world, would fabricate a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and
thereafter submit herself to the indignity of a public trail or endure a lifetime of ridicule, if she had
not, in fact, been a victim of rape and deeply motivated by a sincere desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished. As well said, when a woman says she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.
As borne out by the evidence, complainant was forced to submit to appellants bestial
desires through violence and intimidation.[19] When appellant pointed his bolo at complainants
neck, while he was removing her skirt and underwear, there was indeed force and intimidation
directly against her person. When he warned her not to shout unless she wanted to die, his
evident intentions to harm her could not be disputed. Even when appellant put down the bolo to
remove his pants, the threat and intimidation continued, since he could pick up the bolo anytime,
to stab her. In any event, the significant consideration is that, the violence and intimidation were
continuous as to engender fear for the safety of her life and limb.
Intimidation is said to be addressed to the mind of the victim. It is subjective and its
presence cannot be tested by any hard-and-fast rule, but must be viewed in the light of the
victims perception and judgment at the time of the crime.[20] It may be of the moral kind, such as
the fear caused by threatening a woman with a knife.[21] It is enough that it produces fear--fear
that if the victim does not yield to the bestial lust of the accused, something would happen to her
at the moment or thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the
incident.[22] Intimidation would also explain why sometimes there are no traces of struggle which
would indicate that the victim fought off her attacker.[23]
Based on the record with the testimony of the complainant in the light of experience and
common sense, we entertain no doubt that appellant employed such amount of intimidation and
violence sufficient to consummate rape. Appellant admittedly had been drinking and the influence
of alcohol on his conduct was undeniable. Moreover, according to the complainant, appellant is
much stronger than her. The physical superiority of appellant would show not only when his body
violently held down complainants but also when her mind was subdued by his intimidating words
and weapon at hand.
Moreover, though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet if by an array of physical forces, he
so overpowers her mind that she does not resist, or she ceases resistance through fear of
greater harm, the consummation of the sexual act is recognized in jurisprudence as
rape.[24] Physical resistance need not be established in rape, when intimidation is exercised upon

the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapists embrace because of fear
for life and personal safety.[25]
Undoubtedly, in the present case, complainant could not have safely resisted accused-
appellants unchaste urge as the latter poked the bolo he was holding first at her head, then at
her neck. Threats, intimidation, violence, fear and terror all combined to suppress the will to
resist, kick, shout or struggle against the rapist. Thus, despite her lack of strong resistance or
failure to shout in order to attract the attention of her boardmates, who were just sleeping a few
meters away in another room, she could not be considered as giving consent to his attackers
bestial deed. Evidence shows that the appellant had undressed the complainant and forcibly
taken off her underwear while he was holding a bolo aimed at her neck, before he took off his
pants and had sex with her. The consummation of the offense of rape could not be any clearer.
Moreover, settled is the rule that for rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or
intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as to be irresistible. It
is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which
the accused had in mind.[26]
Appellant would want to capitalize on the fact that there was no full or deep penetration of
complainants vagina to negate the finding that rape had been committed. But penetration of a
womans sex organ is not an element of the crime of rape. Penile invasion of and contact with the
labia would suffice. Note that even the briefest of contacts under circumstances of force,
intimidation, or unconsciousness is already rape in our jurisdiction.[27] In order to sustain a
conviction for rape, penetration of the female genital organ by the male is not
indispensable. Neither rupture nor laceration of any part of the womans genitalia is
required. Thus, the fact that the complainants hymen is intact and there is no sign of laceration
will not negate a finding that rape was committed.[28] In this case, what counts is the fact of
contact with and penetration of the sexual organ, no matter how slight.[29] There was, therefore,
on this point no error on the part of the trial court in concluding that indeed rape has been
committed.
Accused-appellant likewise contends that complainants acts and deeds after the assault
was unnatural and not in accord with the ordinary experience of mankind, for a rape victim
usually suffers trauma or even a nervous breakdown. But it has been repeatedly held by the
Court, that different people react differently to emotional stress. There is no standard form of
behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident. The workings of the human mind when
placed under emotional stress are unpredictable.[30] As held in People v. Luzorata,[31] this Court
indeed has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she has
been abused. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim
depending on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of
doubt.
Certain victims of rape might never be able to complain or file criminal charges against the
rapist. They might bear the ignominy and pain of the offense in private, rather than reveal their
shame to the world or risk the rapists making good the threat to kill or hurt the victims. [32] But the
silence of the victim of rape, or her failure to disclose her state without loss of time to persons
close to her and to report the matter promptly to the authorities, will not perforce warrant the
conclusion that she was not sexually molested or that her charges against the accused are
baseless, untrue and fabricated. Mere failure to report the incident immediately will not cast
doubt on the credibility of the charge. Even if delay could not be attributed to death threats and
intimidation made and exercised by the accused on the victim,[33] such failure in making a prompt
report to the proper authorities does not destroy the truth per se of the complaint.
Moreover, accused-appellant could not capitalize on the minor inconsistencies in the
testimony of the complainant, even if they do exist. Such minor inconsistencies tend to bolster,
rather than weaken, her credibility for they show that her testimony was not contrived nor
rehearsed. Besides, errorless testimony could not be expected when complainant is recounting
details of a harrowing experience. No matter how courageous she is, the act of filing a complaint
and appearing in court would exact a heavy psychological and social toll on the victim who is
usually twice victimized: by the rapist during the act of rape and by misguided elements of

society which devalue the victims worth. She would not be expected to possess total recall and
complete composure on the witness stand.
To conclude, we find the assigned error in this appeal utterly without basis. The conviction of
the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape is supported by the
prosecutions evidence which could not be overthrown by the accused-appellants self-serving
denials. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we note that the award of moral damages is in
order.[34] They are awarded to victims of rape cases involving young girls between thirteen and
nineteen years of age, taking into account the immeasurable havoc wrought on their youthful
feminine psyche.[35] Such award is distinct from indemnity awarded to complainant for the injury
that she suffers because of the offense committed on her person. In this case, both indemnity
and moral damages are justifiably called for.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the
court a quo imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further ORDERED to pay the
complainant indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos and moral damages
also in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00). Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129058. March 29, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PAULINO

SEVILLENO Y VILLANUEVA alias TAMAYO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
By pleading guilty to the rape and killing of a 9-year old girl a death sentence would seem
inevitable. But a mere plea of guilt is not sufficient for conviction as the court must first assure
itself that the accused fully understood the consequences of his plea. In the instant case, the trial
court failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of his admission of guilt and that
he fully comprehended the implications thereof. As the court a quo inadequately discharged its
duty of conducting a searching inquiry, the plea of guilt to a capital offense therefore inevitably
became null and void.[1]
On 22 July 1995, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Paulino Sevilleno y Villanueva
alias Tamayo went to Barangay Guadalupe, San Carlos City. He brought with him bread and ice
candy for his 9-year old and 8-year old nieces, Virginia and Norma, both surnamed Baquia. He
then invited Virginia to accompany him to Sitio Guindali-an "to see (a) beta show."[2] To reach the
place, Paulino and Virginia passed through the sugarcane fields.
At around 11:00 o'clock that same morning, Rogelio Baquia, father of Virginia and Norma,
arrived. Not seeing Virginia in their house, Rogelio asked Norma where her sister was. After
learning from her that Virginia had gone with accused Paulino to Sitio Guindali-an, Rogelio
immediately set out to look for them.
Rogelio failed to find his daughter upon reaching Sitio Guindali-an; instead, he bumped into
the accused. When asked about Virginia the accused denied knowing where she was. However,
Rogelio noticed that the accused had nail scratches on his neck and a wound on his left cheek.
Rogelio continued his search. He was accompanied by Eugenio Tiongson, a relative of the
accused. The next day they met the accused at the house of the former barangay captain of Sitio
Guindali-an, Paeng Lopez. Eugenio asked Paulino where Virginia was. This time the accused

replied that she was in a sugarcane field known as "Campo 9," still a part of Guadalupe, like Sitio
Guindali-an. Accompanied by some police officers, Rogelio and Eugenio proceeded to "Campo
9." There they found Virginia covered with dried leaves, her dress raised to her armpits; the lower
portion of her torso was naked; her legs were spread apart. She had wounds on various parts of
her body. She was dead.[3]
Dr. Arnel Laurence Q. Portuguez, City Health Officer of San Carlos City, autopsied the body
of Virginia. His postmortem examination showed these findings: linear abrasion over hematoma,
3.0 x 2.0 cm., right superior anterior neck; linear abrasion over hematoma, 2.5 x 3.0 cm., left
superior anterior neck; hematoma 9.0 x 4.0 cm., right inguinal area; hematoma 9.0 x 5.0 cm., left
inguinal area; superficial hymenal laceration 0.5 cm., at 12 o'clock position, with clot formation at
intuitus; abrasion 5.5 x 4.0 cm., left superior gluteal area; abrasion 5.0 x 3.0 cm., right superior
gluteal area; abrasion 6.0 x 2.0 cm., right inferior lateral gluteal area; vaginal smear showing
absence of sperm cells except pus cells and epithelial cells. Cause of death: asphyxia secondary
to strangulation.[4] Based on his findings, Dr. Portuguez concluded that Virginia was raped and
then strangled to death.
When news of the gruesome rape and killing spread around the community, the local
residents immediately arrested the accused Paulino Sevilleno and turned him over to the police
authorities. Thereafter, on 25 July 1995, the accused was charged with rape with homicide for
having carnal knowledge of Virginia Baquia, a minor, 9 years of age, by means of force, violence
and intimidation and against her will, and after ravishing her, with intent to hide his identity and to
prevent discovery thereof, with intent to kill, strangled her which directly caused her death.[5]
The arraignment where the accused was represented by Atty. Vic Agravante of the Public
Attorney's Office proceeded thus -
Court: Call the case x x x x
Interpreter: Appearances?.
Pros. Tabinas: Appearing for the government, ready for arraignment.
Atty. Agravante: Respectfully appearing for the accused, ready, you Honor.
Court: Arraign the accused.
Stenographer's Observation: Accused was arraigned in a Cebuano language duly known and
understood by him, pleaded GUILTY.
COURT (to accused): Do you understand your plea of guilty?
Accused: Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know that your plea of guilty could bring death penalty?
A. Yes, sir.
Court (to Pros. Tabinas): You still have to present your evidence.
Pros. Tabinas: Yes, your honor.[6]
The hearing for the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution was scheduled on 31
August 1995. It was however reset several times. On 10 October 1995 the accused manifested
that he had no counsel. Thus, the trial court ordered the Public Attorney's Office to provide a
counsel de oficio for him. The next hearing was set on 21 November 1995.[7]
On 28 October 1995, taking advantage of typhoon "Pepang" that struck the island of
Negros, the accused escaped from detention, of which the Presiding judge was accordingly
informed.
The records show that Atty. Vic Agravante assisted the accused during the arraignment
only. In the succeeding hearings, Atty. Danilo Pabalinas, another lawyer of PAO, represented the
accused. But after the escape Atty. Pabalinas sought permission from the court to be released

from his duty to assist the accused. The court then directed that the accused be tried in
absentia and counsel was relieved from his responsibility to his client and the court.[8]
The prosecution presented the examining physician as well as Maria Lariosa and Norma
Baquia. Notably, these witnesses were not cross-examined because, as already adverted to,
Atty. Pabalinas earlier excused himself from the case. Neither did the court appoint another
counsel for the accused.
The next hearing was set on 30 January 1996. However, for various reasons, the hearing
was reset to 13 March 1996, 21 April 1996, 18 June 1996 and 17 July 1996.
Meanwhile, on 10 July 1996 the Jail Warden of San Carlos City reported to the court that the
accused had been recaptured.[9]
Atty. Florentino Saldavia, also of PAO, was appointed counsel de oficio for the accused. On
17 July 1996 the prosecution presented Rogelio Baquia as its last witness. Atty. Saldavia cross-
examined Rogelio but his questions were only considered token, and even irrelevant. Then the
prosecution rested.
On 28 August 1996, the date set for the presentation of the evidence for the defense,
Atty. Saldavia moved that the hearing be reset as he was not feeling well. On 19 November
1996, Atty. Saldavia again moved for postponement and the hearing was reset to 3 December
1996 on which date, instead of presenting evidence, Atty. Saldavia manifested that he was
submitting the case for decision but invoking the plea of guilt of the accused as a mitigating
circumstance. As recorded, the hearing proceeded thus -
Court: Call the case x x x x
Interpreter: Appearances.
Pros. Tabinas: Appearing for the government.
Atty. Saldavia: For the accused. Your honor please, this is already the turn of the defense to
present evidence. He already pleaded GUILTY. We have no mitigating circumstance to
prove except the plea of guilty. I believe there is no need of presenting evidence, he
already pleaded guilty.
Court: (to Atty. Saldavia): You will rest the case?
Atty. Saldavia: Yes, your honor.
Pros. Tabinas: You will invoke the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty?
Atty. Saldavia: Yes.
Pros. Tabinas: We have no objection to that.
Court: Order.
When this case was called for the presentation of evidence for the accused, counsel for the
accused manifested that he had no evidence to present in favor of the accused except the plea
of GUILTY made in open court.
In view thereof, the above-entitled case is hereby submitted for decision based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution without the accused presenting evidence in his behalf except the
plea of GUILTY which is admitted by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the above-entitled case is hereby submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.[10]

On 6 March 1997 the Regional Trial Court-Br. 57, San Carlos City, rendered its decision
finding the accused guilty of rape with homicide and sentencing him to death and to pay the heirs
of Virginia Baquia -P50,000.00 plus costs.[11]
This case is now on automatic review. The defense contends that the court a quo erred in
convicting the accused and imposing upon him the penalty of death as it failed to observe the
required procedure for cases where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense when
arraigned.[12] The defense also argues that the arraignment conducted by the trial court was null
and void as it did not conduct a "searching inquiry" before accepting the plea of guilt and
sentencing the accused to death. It concludes that since the arraignment was fatally defective
and not in accordance with law, the case must be remanded to the court of origin for the proper
arraignment of the accused before the capital punishment may be imposed.
We sustain the defense. Under Sec. 3, Rule 116, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea. It must also require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his
culpability. If the accused so desires he may also present evidence in his behalf. This procedure
is mandatory and a judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of discretion.[13]
The questions propounded by the trial judge during arraignment hardly satisfied the requisite
searching inquiry. Regrettably, there were only two (2) questions propounded to the
accused: First. Do you understand your plea of guilt? Second. Do you know that your plea of guilt
could bring death penalty? In every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital
offense, especially where he is an ignorant person with little or no education, the proper and
prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as are available and necessary in support of
the material allegations of the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein
enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in
determining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning,
full significance and consequences of his plea.[14]
In the instant case, the trial court did not bother to explain the essential elements of the
crime of rape with homicide with which the accused was charged. On the same note, the trial
judge also failed to inform the accused the certainty by which the death penalty would be
imposed on him and the fact that he would also be made to indemnify the heirs of his victim. As a
result, the accused was not properly accorded his fundamental right to be informed of the precise
nature of the accusation leveled against him.[15] Thus, it is with apprehension that ruling for the
affirmance of the decision in this case will prejudice the due observance of the fundamental
requirements of fairness and due process.[16] The constitutional rights of the accused are for the
protection of the guilty and of the innocent alike. Only with the assurance that even the guilty
shall be given the benefit of every constitutional guaranty can the innocent be secure in the same
rights.[17]
Trial courts must exercise meticulous care in accepting a plea of guilty in a capital
offense. Judges are duty-bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads
guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of his inevitable
conviction.[18] Courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its
severest form - death - for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is
irrevocable. Experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.[19] Only a
clear, definite and unconditional plea of guilty by the accused must be accepted by trial
courts.[20] There is no such rule which provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to
the charge that his conviction should automatically follow.[21] A judge should always be an
embodiment of competence.[22] As an administrator of justice, it is imperative that the trial judge
carry out his duties ably and competently so as not to erode public confidence in the judiciary.
It is quite unfortunate that Attys. Vic Agravante, Danilo Pabalinas and Florentino Saldavia,
all of PAO, were remiss in their duties as defenders of the accused. Atty. Agravante did not take
time to explain to his client the nature of the crime of which he was charged and the gravity of the
consequences of his plea. Instead, he readily agreed to the accused pleading guilty to a capital
offense. In the succeeding hearings, Atty. Pabalinas was supposed to assist the accused ably

but miserably failed. When the case was called and appearances noted, the trial judge informed
the parties that the accused had escaped from detention. It was then that the prosecution and
the defense, including the trial court, agreed that the accused would be tried in absentia. Then, at
this juncture, Atty. Pabalinas sought to be relieved of his responsibilities as
counsel de oficio which, unfortunately, the court also granted. The court proceeded with the
presentation of three (3) prosecution witnesses who testified but were never cross-examined
because Atty. Pabalinas already left the courtroom, apparently with the consent of the trial
court. Nobody was assigned to replace Atty. Pabalinas. Consequently, not only was the accused
tried in absentia, he was also tried without the assistance of counsel.
When the prosecution rested its case, Atty. Saldavia of the PAO asked for the
postponement of the succeeding hearings not only once but thrice allegedly because he was not
feeling well. Interestingly, when the time came for him to adduce evidence in behalf of the
accused, he manifested that since his client had already pleaded guilty he would no longer
present any evidence. He only invoked the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.
The plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance is misplaced. Not under any circumstance
would any admission of guilt affect or reduce the death sentence.[23] Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code prescribes the penalty of death when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed. Death is a single indivisible penalty and corollary to Art. 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, in all cases in which a single indivisible penalty is prescribed, it shall be applied by
the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the
commission of the offense.
The court below also erred in disregarding the testimony of Norma Baquia "for the reason
that her testimony failed to establish that the incident happened within the territorial jurisdiction of
this court."[24] The court did not consider her testimony purportedly because she only testified that
her sister Virginia went with the accused to Guindali-an without specifying as to what municipality
or city it was part of.[25] Again, this is error. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court requires
courts to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
geographical divisions of our country. There is only one Sitio Guindali-an, Brgy. Guadalupe, San
Carlos City (Negros Occidental).
We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our displeasure over the
manner by which the PAO lawyers dispensed with their duties. All three (3) of them displayed
manifest disinterest on the plight of their client. They lacked vigor and dedication to their
work. Atty. Agravante did not explain to the accused the nature of the crime of which he was
charged and the consequences of his plea. Atty. Pabalinas, instead of assisting the accused,
hastily left the courtroom after obtaining leave while the prosecution was presenting its three (3)
witnesses. Resultingly, all three (3) witnesses were never cross-examined. On the other hand,
Atty. Saldavia moved for the postponement of the scheduled hearings during which he was
supposed to present evidence for the defense; worse, on the last scheduled hearing he
submitted the case for decision without presenting evidence. In short, no evidence was ever
presented for the defense. And, as if to compound his deficiency with ignorance, Atty. Saldavia
relied on his client's plea of guilt in the mistaken belief that it would modify and reduce
to reclusion perpetua the imposable penalty of death.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client
with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable.[26] Obviously, in the
instant case, the aforenamed defense lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, the
fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as
counsel de oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however guilty he
might have been found to be after trial. Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys. Agravante,
Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of
Professional Responsibility; otherwise, commission of any similar act in the future will be
severely sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, the 6 March 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 57, San Carlos
City (Negros Occidental), in Crim. Case No. 129058, convicting the accused PAULINO

SEVILLENO Y VILLANUEVA alias Tamayo of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to
DEATH is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the court of origin for the
proper arraignment and trial of the accused until terminated.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 187730

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT, DEL CASTILLO, and
Accused-Appellant, PEREZ, JJ.
FIDES PACARDO y JUNGCO and PILAR Promulgated:

MANTA y DUNGO, June 29, 2010
Accused.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated December 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02764 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Gallo y Gadot
(accused-appellant), Fides Pacardo y Jungco and Pilar Manta y Dungo (accused), which
affirmed the Decision[2] dated March 15, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 in
Manila which convicted the accused-appellant Rodolfo Gallo y Gadot (accused-appellant) of
syndicated illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and estafa in Criminal Case No.
02-206297.
The Facts
Originally, accused-appellant Gallo and accused Fides Pacardo (Pacardo) and Pilar
Manta (Manta), together with Mardeolyn Martir (Mardeolyn) and nine (9) others, were charged
with syndicated illegal recruitment and eighteen (18) counts of estafa committed against eighteen
complainants, including Edgardo V. Dela Caza (Dela Caza), Sandy Guantero (Guantero) and
Danilo Sare (Sare). The cases were respectively docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 02-2062936 to
02-206311. However, records reveal that only Criminal Case No. 02-206293, which was filed
against accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for syndicated illegal recruitment, and
Criminal Case Nos. 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308, which were filed against accused-
appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for estafa, proceeded to trial due to the fact that the rest of
the accused remained at large. Further, the other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 02-206294 to 02-
206296, 02-206298 to 02-206299, 02-206301 to 02-206307 and 02-206309 to 02-206311 were
likewise provisionally dismissed upon motion of Pacardo, Manta and accused-appellant for
failure of the respective complainants in said cases to appear and testify during trial.

It should also be noted that after trial, Pacardo and Manta were acquitted in Criminal
Case Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308 for insufficiency of evidence.
Likewise, accused-appellant Gallo was similarly acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206300, the
case filed by Guantero, and 02-206308, the case filed by Sare. However, accused-appellant was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297, both
filed by Dela Caza, for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa, respectively.
Thus, the present appeal concerns solely accused-appellants conviction for syndicated
illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and for estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-
206297.
In Criminal Case No. 02-206293, the information charges the accused-appellant,

together with the others, as follows:
The undersigned accuses MARDEOLYN MARTIR, ISMAEL GALANZA,

NELMAR MARTIR, MARCELINO MARTIR, NORMAN MARTIR, NELSON
MARTIR, MA. CECILIA M. RAMOS, LULU MENDANES, FIDES PACARDO y
JUNGCO, RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT, PILAR MANTA y DUNGO, ELEONOR
PANUNCIO and YEO SIN UNG of a violation of Section 6(a), (l) and (m) of
Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Workers Act of 1995, committed by a syndicate and in large scale, as
follows:
That in or about and during the period comprised between November
2000 and December, 2001, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating together and helping with one another,
representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport
Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to
FERDINAND ASISTIN, ENTICE BRENDO, REYMOND G. CENA, EDGARDO V.
DELA CAZA, RAYMUND EDAYA, SANDY O. GUANTENO, RENATO V.
HUFALAR, ELENA JUBICO, LUPO A. MANALO, ALMA V. MENOR, ROGELIO
S. MORON, FEDILA G. NAIPA, OSCAR RAMIREZ, MARISOL L. SABALDAN,
DANILO SARE, MARY BETH SARDON, JOHNNY SOLATORIO and JOEL TINIO
in Korea as factory workers and charge or accept directly or indirectly from said
FERDINAND ASISTIN the amount of P45,000.00; ENTICE BRENDO
P35,000.00; REYMOND G. CENA P30,000.00; EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA
P45,000.00; RAYMUND EDAYA P100,000.00; SANDY O. GUANTENO
P35,000.00; RENATO V. HUFALAR P70,000.00; ELENA JUBICO P30,000.00;
LUPO A. MANALO P75,000.00; ALMA V. MENOR P45,000.00; ROGELIO S.
MORON P70,000.00; FEDILA G. NAIPA P45,000.00; OSCAR RAMIREZ
P45,000.00; MARISOL L. SABALDAN P75,000.00; DANILO SARE P100,000.00;
MARY BETH SARDON P25,000.00; JOHNNY SOLATORIO P35,000.00; and
JOEL TINIO P120,000.00 as placement fees in connection with their overseas
employment, which amounts are in excess of or greater than those specified in
the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the POEA Board Resolution No. 02,
Series 1998, and without valid reasons and without the fault of the said
complainants failed to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse the expenses
incurred by the said complainants in connection with their documentation and
processing for purposes of their deployment.[3](Emphasis supplied)
In Criminal Case No. 02-206297, the information reads:

That on or about May 28, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating together and helping with [sic] one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to
the latter, prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the
effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ said
EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in Korea as factory worker and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof; induced and succeeded in inducing said EDGARDO V.
DELA CAZA to give and deliver, as in fact, he gave and delivered to said
accused the amount of P45,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and untrue
and were made [solely] for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact they did obtain the
said amount of P45,000.00 which amount once in their possession, with intent to
defraud said [EDGARDO] V. DELA CAZA, they willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of
P45,000.00 to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice
of the said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in the aforesaid amount of P45,000.00,
Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
When arraigned on January 19, 2004, accused-appellant Gallo entered a plea of not
guilty to all charges.
On March 3, 2004, the pre-trial was terminated and trial ensued, thereafter.
During the trial, the prosecution presented as their witnesses, Armando Albines Roa, the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) representative and private
complainants Dela Caza, Guanteno and Sare. On the other hand, the defense presented as its
witnesses, accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta.
Version of the Prosecution
On May 22, 2001, Dela Caza was introduced by Eleanor Panuncio to accused-appellant
Gallo, Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes, Yeo Sin Ung and another Korean national at
the office of MPM International Recruitment and Promotion Agency (MPM Agency) located in
Malate, Manila.
Dela Caza was told that Mardeolyn was the President of MPM Agency, while Nelmar
Martir was one of the incorporators. Also, that Marcelino Martir, Norman Martir, Nelson Martir
and Ma. Cecilia Ramos were its board members. Lulu Mendanes acted as the cashier and
accountant, while Pacardo acted as the agencys employee who was in charge of the records of
the applicants. Manta, on the other hand, was also an employee who was tasked to deliver
documents to the Korean embassy.
Accused-appellant Gallo then introduced himself as a relative of Mardeolyn and informed

Dela Caza that the agency was able to send many workers abroad. Together with Pacardo and
Manta, he also told Dela Caza about the placement fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos

(PhP 150,000) with a down payment of Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) and the
balance to be paid through salary deduction.
Dela Caza, together with the other applicants, were briefed by Mardeolyn about the
processing of their application papers for job placement in Korea as a factory worker and their
possible salary. Accused Yeo Sin Ung also gave a briefing about the business and what to
expect from the company and the salary.
With accused-appellants assurance that many workers have been sent abroad, as well
as the presence of the two (2) Korean nationals and upon being shown the visas procured for the
deployed workers, Dela Caza was convinced to part with his money. Thus, on May 29, 2001, he
paid Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) to MPM Agency through accused-appellant Gallo
who, while in the presence of Pacardo, Manta and Mardeolyn, issued and signed Official Receipt
No. 401.
Two (2) weeks after paying MPM Agency, Dela Caza went back to the agencys office in
Malate, Manila only to discover that the office had moved to a new location at Batangas Street,
Brgy. San Isidro, Makati. He proceeded to the new address and found out that the agency was
renamed to New Filipino Manpower Development & Services, Inc. (New Filipino). At the new
office, he talked to Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes and accused-appellant Gallo. He
was informed that the transfer was done for easy accessibility to clients and for the purpose of
changing the name of the agency.
Dela Caza decided to withdraw his application and recover the amount he paid but
Mardeolyn, Pacardo, Manta and Lulu Mendanes talked him out from pursuing his decision. On
the other hand, accused-appellant Gallo even denied any knowledge about the money.
After two (2) more months of waiting in vain to be deployed, Dela Caza and the other
applicants decided to take action. The first attempt was unsuccessful because the agency again
moved to another place. However, with the help of the Office of Ambassador Seeres and the
Western Police District, they were able to locate the new address at 500 Prudential Building,
Carriedo, Manila. The agency explained that it had to move in order to separate those who are
applying as entertainers from those applying as factory workers. Accused-appellant Gallo,
together with Pacardo and Manta, were then arrested.
The testimony of prosecution witness Armando Albines Roa, a POEA employee, was
dispensed with after the prosecution and defense stipulated and admitted to the existence of the
following documents:
1. Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay, Director II, Licensing Branch of the

POEA to the effect that New Filipino Manpower Development & Services,
Inc., with office address at 1256 Batangas St., Brgy. San Isidro, Makati City,
was a licensed landbased agency whose license expired on December 10,
2001 and was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies on December 14,
2001. It further certified that Fides J. Pacardo was the agencys Recruitment
Officer;
2. Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay of the POEA to the effect that MPM
International Recruitment and Promotion is not licensed by the POEA to
recruit workers for overseas employment;

3. Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1999
regarding placement fee ceiling for landbased workers.
4. Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 1998 on
the placement fee ceiling for Taiwan and Korean markets, and
5. Certified copy of POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 02, series of 1998.
For his defense, accused-appellant denied having any part in the recruitment of Dela
Caza. In fact, he testified that he also applied with MPM Agency for deployment to Korea as a
factory worker. According to him, he gave his application directly with Mardeolyn because she
was his town mate and he was allowed to pay only Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP 10,000) as
processing fee. Further, in order to facilitate the processing of his papers, he agreed to perform
some tasks for the agency, such as taking photographs of the visa and passport of applicants,
running errands and performing such other tasks assigned to him, without salary except for some
allowance. He said that he only saw Dela Caza one or twice at the agencys office when he
applied for work abroad. Lastly, that he was also promised deployment abroad but it never
materialized.
Ruling of the Trial Court
On March 15, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting the accused of syndicated
illegal recruitment and estafa. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. Accused FIDES PACARDO y JUNGO and PILAR MANTA y

DUNGO are hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-
206308;
II. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 of the
crime of Illegal Recruitment committed by a syndicate and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00) PESOS. He is
also ordered to indemnify EDGARDO DELA CAZA of the sum of
FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND (Php45,000.00) PESOS with legal
interest from the filing of the information on September 18, 2002
until fully paid.
III. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT in Criminal Case No.

02-206297 is likewise found guilty and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) years of prision
correccional as minimum to NINE (9) years of prision mayor as
maximum.
IV. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is hereby

ACQUITTED of the crime charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-
206300 and 02-206308.

Let alias warrants for the arrest of the other accused be issued anew in all
the criminal cases. Pending their arrest, the cases are sent to the archives.
The immediate release of accused Fides Pacardo and Pilar Manta is

hereby ordered unless detained for other lawful cause or charge.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated December 24, 2008, disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,

Branch 30, in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297, dated March 15,
2007, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 02-
206297, for estafa, appellant is sentenced to four (4) years of prision
correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The CA held the totality of the prosecutions evidence showed that the accused-appellant,
together with others, engaged in the recruitment of Dela Caza. His actions and representations to
Dela Caza can hardly be construed as the actions of a mere errand boy.
As determined by the appellate court, the offense is considered economic sabotage having been
committed by more than three (3) persons, namely, accused-appellant Gallo, Mardeolyn, Eleonor
Panuncio and Yeo Sin Ung. More importantly, a personal found guilty of illegal recruitment may
also be convicted of estafa.[7] The same evidence proving accused-appellants commission of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale also establishes his liability for estafa under paragragh
2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
On January 15, 2009, the accused-appellant filed a timely appeal before this Court.
The Issues
Accused-appellant interposes in the present appeal the following assignment of errors:
I
The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate despite the failure of the prosecution to
prove the same beyond reasonable doubt.
II
The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
of estafa despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the same beyond
reasonable doubt.

Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Evidence supports conviction of the crime

of Syndicated Illegal Recruitment
Accused-appellant avers that he cannot be held criminally liable for illegal recruitment
because he was neither an officer nor an employee of the recruitment agency. He alleges that
the trial court erred in adopting the asseveration of the private complainant that he was indeed an
employee because such was not duly supported by competent evidence. According to him, even
assuming that he was an employee, such cannot warrant his outright conviction sans evidence
that he acted in conspiracy with the officers of the agency.
We disagree.
To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be established: (1) the
offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined
under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor
Code; (2) he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers;[8] and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.[9] When illegal
recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against three (3)
or more persons individually or as a group, it is considered an offense involving economic
sabotage.[10]
Under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not.
After a thorough review of the records, we believe that the prosecution was able to
establish the elements of the offense sufficiently. The evidence readily reveals that MPM Agency
was never licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Even with a license, however, illegal recruitment could still be committed under Section 6
of Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), otherwise known as the Migrants and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, viz:
Sec. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by
a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code
of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more
persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise, include the following act,

whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee
or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than
that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any
amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or
advance;
xxxx
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the
Department of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection
with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment
and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the
deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault.
Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.
It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having
control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.
In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts enumerated in Sec. 6 of R.A.
8042. Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in consideration of
a promise of foreign employment, accused-appellant received the amount of Php 45,000.00 from
Dela Caza. When accused-appellant made misrepresentations concerning the agencys
purported power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process, collected
money in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment.[11] Such acts were accurately described in the testimony of prosecution witness,
Dela Caza, to wit:
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: How about this Rodolfo Gallo?
A: He was the one who received my money.
Q: Aside from receiving your money, was there any other representations or acts made by
Rodolfo Gallo?
A: He introduced himself to me as relative of Mardeolyn Martir and he even intimated to me that
their agency has sent so many workers abroad.
xxxx
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: Mr. Witness, as you claimed you tried to withdraw your application at the agency. Was there
any instance that you were able to talk to Fides Pacardo, Rodolfo Gallo and Pilar Manta?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: What was the conversation that transpired among you before you demanded the return of
your money and documents?
A: When I tried to withdraw my application as well as my money, Mr. Gallo told me I know
nothing about your money while Pilar Manta and Fides Pacardo told me, why should I withdraw
my application and my money when I was about to be [deployed] or I was about to leave.
xxxx

Q: And what transpired at that office after this Panuncio introduced you to those persons whom
you just mentioned?
A: The three of them including Rodolfo Gallo told me that the placement fee in that agency is Php
150,000.00 and then I should deposit the amount of Php 45,000.00. After I have deposited said
amount, I would just wait for few days
xxxx
Q: They were the one (sic) who told you that you have to pay Php 45,000.00 for deposit only?
A: Yes, maam, I was told by them to deposit Php 45,000.00 and then I would pay the remaining
balance of Php105,000.00, payment of it would be through salary deduction.
Q: That is for what Mr. Witness again?
A: For placement fee.
Q: Now did you believe to (sic) them?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Why, why did you believe?
A: Because of the presence of the two Korean nationals and they keep on telling me that they
have sent abroad several workers and they even showed visas of the records that they have
already deployed abroad.
Q: Aside from that, was there any other representations which have been made upon you or
make you believe that they can deploy you?
A: At first I was adamant but they told me If you do not want to believe us, then we could do
nothing. But once they showed me the [visas] of the people whom they have deployed abroad,
that was the time I believe them.
Q: So after believing on the representations, what did you do next Mr. Witness?
A: That was the time that I decided to give the money.
xxxx
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: Do you have proof that you gave the money?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Where is your proof that you gave the money?
A: I have it here.
PROS. MAGABLIN:
Witness is producing to this court a Receipt dated May 28, 2001 in the amount of Php45,000.00
which for purposes of record Your Honor, may I request that the same be marked in the evidence
as our Exhibit F.
xxxx
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: There appears a signature appearing at the left bottom portion of this receipt. Do you know
whose signature is this?
A: Yes, maam, signature of Rodolfo Gallo.
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: Why do you say that that is his signature?
A: Rodolfo Gallos signature Your Honor because he was the one who received the money and
he was the one who filled up this O.R. and while he was doing it, he was flanked by Fides
Pacardo, Pilar Manta and Mardeolyn Martir.
xxxx
Q: So it was Gallo who received your money?
A: Yes, maam.
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: And after that, what did this Gallo do after he received your money?
A: They told me maam just to call up and make a follow up with our agency.
xxxx
Q: Now Mr. Witness, after you gave your money to the accused, what happened with the
application, with the promise of employment that he promised?
A: Two (2) weeks after giving them the money, they moved to a new office in Makati, Brgy. San
Isidro.

xxxx
Q: And were they able to deploy you as promised by them?
A: No, maam, they were not able to send us abroad.[12]
Essentially, Dela Caza appeared very firm and consistent in positively identifying
accused-appellant as one of those who induced him and the other applicants to part with their
money. His testimony showed that accused-appellant made false misrepresentations and
promises in assuring them that after they paid the placement fee, jobs in Korea as factory
workers were waiting for them and that they would be deployed soon. In fact, Dela Caza
personally talked to accused-appellant and gave him the money and saw him sign and issue an
official receipt as proof of his payment. Without a doubt, accused-appellants actions constituted
illegal recruitment.
Additionally, accused-appellant cannot argue that the trial court erred in finding that he
was indeed an employee of the recruitment agency. On the contrary, his active participation in
the illegal recruitment is unmistakable. The fact that he was the one who issued and signed the
official receipt belies his profession of innocence.
This Court likewise finds the existence of a conspiracy between the accused-appellant
and the other persons in the agency who are currently at large, resulting in the commission of the
crime of syndicated illegal recruitment.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the accused-appellent together with Mardeolyn and
the rest of the officers and employees of MPM Agency participated in a network of
deception. Verily, the active involvement of each in the recruitment scam was directed at one
single purpose to divest complainants with their money on the pretext of guaranteed employment
abroad. The prosecution evidence shows that complainants were briefed by Mardeolyn about the
processing of their papers for a possible job opportunity in Korea, as well as their possible salary.
Likewise, Yeo Sin Ung, a Korean national, gave a briefing about the business and what to expect
from the company. Then, here comes accused-appellant who introduced himself as Mardeolyns
relative and specifically told Dela Caza of the fact that the agency was able to send many
workers abroad. Dela Caza was even showed several workers visas who were already allegedly
deployed abroad. Later on, accused-appellant signed and issued an official receipt
acknowledging the down payment of Dela Caza. Without a doubt, the nature and extent of the
actions of accused-appellant, as well as with the other persons in MPM Agency clearly show
unity of action towards a common undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is evidently present.
In People v. Gamboa,[13] this Court discussed the nature of conspiracy in the context of
illegal recruitment, viz:
Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract workers was evident

from the acts of the malefactors whose conduct before, during and after the
commission of the crime clearly indicated that they were one in purpose and
united in its execution. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is
not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. As such,
all the accused, including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of the crime of
illegal recruitment since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.

To reiterate, in establishing conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof that
all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective.[14]
Estafa
The prosecution likewise established that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime

of estafa as defined under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any
means mentioned hereinbelow
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by
abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[15] Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or
is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.
All these elements are present in the instant case: the accused-appellant, together with
the other accused at large, deceived the complainants into believing that the agency had the
power and capability to send them abroad for employment; that there were available jobs for
them in Korea as factory workers; that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the
complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fees; that after receiving the
money, accused-appellant and his co-accused went into hiding by changing their office locations
without informing complainants; and that complainants were never deployed abroad. As all these
representations of the accused-appellant proved false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code is thus applicable.
Defense of Denial Cannot Prevail

over Positive Identification
Indubitably, accused-appellants denial of the crimes charged crumbles in the face of the
positive identification made by Dela Caza and his co-complainants as one of the perpetrators of
the crimes charged. As enunciated by this Court in People v. Abolidor,[16] [p]ositive identification
where categorical and consistent and not attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses on the matter prevails over alibi and denial.
The defense has miserably failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against him.

Therefore, between the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the one
hand, and bare denials of the accused, on the other hand, the former must prevail.[17]
Moreover, this Court accords the trial courts findings with the probative weight it deserves
in the absence of any compelling reason to discredit the same. It is a fundamental judicial dictum
that the findings of fact of the trial court are not disturbed on appeal except when it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would
have materially affected the outcome of the case. We find that the trial court did not err in
convicting the accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for failure to sufficiently show reversible error in
the assailed decision. The Decision dated December 24, 2008 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02764 is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116279 January 29, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO CRISTOBAL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and
charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which
every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an
intrinsically evil act,1 an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the
society itself.
The pain rape causes becomes more excruciating when the victim carries the life of an unborn
within her womb. That tender and innocent life, born of love and its parents' participation in the
mystery of life, is thereby placed in undue danger. Such was the case of Cherry Tamayo, a
married woman. She was twenty-eight years old, with one child and another on the way, when
tragedy struck. She was sexually assaulted on 31 March 1986. Fortunately, the life in her womb
survived.
She accused Rogelio Cristobal of rape in a sworn complaint2 filed with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Maddela, Quirino, on 8 April 1986.
Having found sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime charged has
been committed and the accused was probably guilty thereof, the court ruled that the accused
should be held for trial.3 Accordingly, it issued a warrant for his arrest4 and fixed his bail bond at
P17,000.00. 5 The accused was arrested but was later released on bail.6 Thereafter, the court
increased the amount of bail to P30,000.00 and, consequently, ordered the rearrest of the
accused.7 Unfortunately, by this time, he was nowhere to be found.

On 26 August 1986, the MTC ordered the case to be "sent to the files without prejudice to its
subsequent prosecution as soon as the defendant is apprehended." 8 Almost a year after, or
specifically on 24 August 1987, the said court ordered the records of the case to be forwarded to
the Provincial Fiscal for proper disposition. 9
On 15 September 1987, the Provincial Fiscal of Quirino filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cabarroguis, Quirino, an information10 charging accused Rogelio Cristobal with the crime of
rape committed as follows:
That between the hours of 12:00 to 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 31, 1986 in
Barangay San Dionisio I, Municipality of Maddela, Province of Quirino, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of
force, threat and intimidation and with lewd design, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with one CHERRY A. TAMAYO against the will of the latter.
That the aggravating circumstance of the accused having committed the crime in
uninhabited place attended the commission of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 604 and assigned to Branch 32 of the said court.
A warrant of arrest was issued on 18 October 1987. Because it was returned unserved,
an alias warrant of arrest was issued on 1 February 1988, which was also returned unserved.
The trial court then ordered the archival of the case and the arrest of the accused. 11
It was only on 27 July 1993 when accused Rogelio Cristobal was arrested and detained at the
provincial jail. 12 On 21 October 1993, the Provincial Prosecutor filed a Manifestation for the
revival of the case,13 which the court favorably acted upon.14
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the offended party, Cherry Tamayo, and the physician who
conducted a medical examination on her, Dr. Mercedita S. Erni-Reta. The defense presented the
accused Rogelio Cristobal and his employer, Wilfredo Manzano, who is married to the accused's
cousin, Emilia Manzano. Being merely corroborative to the testimonies of the first two defense
witnesses that at the time of the alleged commission of the crime the accused was hired by the
Manzano spouses to plow their field,15 the testimony of Mrs. Emilia Manzano was admitted by the
prosecution to expedite the disposition of the case.16
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
In the morning of 31 March 1986, Cherry Tamayo, a resident of Barangay San Dionisio I,
Maddela, Quirino, went to the nearby Bilala Creek to wash her family's clothes. She was alone.
At around midday, between the hours of 12:00 and 1:00 and after accomplishing her task, she
decided to take a bath in the creek. She was about to start when somebody held her neck from
behind and thereafter forcibly laid her down the ground. Only then did she recognize her
attacker, the accused Rogelio Cristobal. Cherry managed to stand up and run away, but Rogelio
caught up with her and delivered two fistblows to her stomach. Not content with this, Rogelio,
while viciously holding her hair, pressed down Cherry's face into the water. Rogelio then took her
three meters away from the creek and forcibly laid her down on the ground. Because of her
weakened and pregnant state, Cherry could not struggle any further. Rogelio removed her
clothes and panties. He then went on top of her, inserted his private organ into hers, and
succeeded in satisfying his lust on her.17 Afterwhich, he slapped and threatened Cherry with
death if she would talk.18

The threat went unheeded as Cherry, upon reaching her home, immediately told her husband of
what had happened to her. Her husband accompanied her to the police station of Maddela,
Quirino, to report the incident and then to Dr. Mercedita Erni-Reta for medical examination.19
Dr. Erni-Reta found that Cherry's vaginal canal had a laceration at the erythematous border at
2:00 and chemoses at 3:00 at the vaginal os.20 On the witness stand, Dr. Erni-Reta confirmed
these findings.21 She added that, upon internal examination, she found seminal fluid in the
vaginal canal which must have been there for no longer than twenty-four hours.22
The defense, on the other hand, established the following to refute the version of the
prosecution:
On 31 March 1986, Rogelio Cristobal was plowing the land of the spouses Wilfredo and Emilia
Manzano located in Salay, San Agustin, Isabela. He started plowing at 7:00 a.m. and went with
Wilfredo to the latter's home for lunch at around 11:00 a.m.. Emilia was with them for lunch. The
three of them talked until 2:00 p.m.. He went home thereafter, attended to his children, and then
brought out his carabao to graze in Talaytay, Dagubog Grande, which is about 200 meters away
from his house.23 Then he went to the house of Melchor Cristobal. While he was at Melchor's
house, a policeman by the name of Jimmy Benedicto arrested him for the crime of rape and
brought him to Councilor Benjamin Dumlao. He was subsequently taken to the 166th PC
Detachment in San Dionisio, Maddela, Quirino, where he was interrogated and where he spent
the night. In the morning, he was brought to the municipal court to face the charges filed against
him.24
In its decision25 dated 28 March 1994, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the complainant, Cherry Tamayo, in the amount of P30,000.00.
The trial court found clear and convincing the categorical testimony of Cherry Tamayo of having
been accosted from behind, knocked to the ground, boxed, submerged in water, taken three
meters from the creek, and raped.26 In view of her positive identification of the accused, it
disregarded the defense of alibi set up by the latter, which it found to be a weak one. It ruled that
for the defense of alibi to prosper the accused must show physical impossibility to be at the
scene of the crime at the time it was committed. The accused was within three kilometers only
from Bilala Creek where the rape was committed. Such distance is near enough to cover by
walking in a matter of thirty minutes.27 It was not, therefore, physically impossible for him to be at
the crime scene at the time the crime was committed.
In this appeal, the accused contends that the trial court erred in (1) convicting him on the basis of
the private complainant's inconsistent testimony, and (2) not giving due weight to his defense of
alibi.28
The Appellee disagrees with him and prays that the assailed decision be affirmed with
modification of the award for moral damages, which should be increased from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00.29
Central to the accused's assigned errors is the issue of the credibility of the complainant. It has
long been settled that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position
to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial.30 It has been aptly said:
In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation Of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them
on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and
prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not

be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The
record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the
contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a
ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down
in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The
record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in remembered pain, or in feigned
innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his
observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.31
This rule admits of exceptions, such as when the evaluation was reached arbitrarily, when the
trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which could affect the result of the case. 32 None of these exceptions exists in this
case.
It is also settled that when a woman Says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that she has been raped, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.33
Moreover, the accused was unable to prove any ill motive on the part of the complainant. In fact,
in his answer to the court's questions, he categorically stated that there was no grudge between
him and the complainant.34 Where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper
motive why a prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or falsely implicate
him in a heinous crime, the said testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 35
Additionally, no married woman in her right mind, like Cherry Tamayo, would subject herself to
public scrutiny and humiliation in order to perpetuate a falsehood. Neither would she take the risk
of being alienated from her husband and her family. If Cherry Tamayo then resolved to face the
ordeal and relate in public what many similarly situated would have kept secret, she did so simply
to obtain justice.
To cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant, the accused cites an inconsistency in the
testimony of the complainant. He points out that at first, the complainant said that her panties
were removed by the accused while she was already lying down, but later she said that it was
before she was laid down on the ground that the accused stripped her of her panties. The
accused failed to elevate this inconsistency to the level of a major one sufficient to strip the
complainant of credibility. Being too trivial, such inconsistency does not rock the pedestal upon
which the complainant's credibility rests. In fact, it enhances her credibility, as it manifests
spontaneity and lack of scheming. 36
As to the second assigned error, the accused submits that although as a general rule alibi is a
weak defense, it gained strength in this case in the light of the aforementioned inconsistency in
the complainant's testimony. We are not persuaded. Since, as discussed above, such
inconsistency does not pierce the complainant's credibility, the, second assigned error has
therefore no leg to stand on.
The alibi of the accused thus maintains its weak and impotent state. For the defense of alibi to
prosper, it must establish the physical impossibility for the accused to be present at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission.37 The accused's testimony placing himself somewhere
else was corroborated by the testimony of Wilfredo and Emilia Manzano. But he failed to
establish physical impossibility because the alibi places him within only three kilometers from
where the crime was committed, a manageable distance to travel in a few minutes.
For sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has shown moral corruption,
perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The

imposition then of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from committing similar
acts or for correction for the public good38 is warranted. 39 We hereby fix it at P25,000.00.
Pursuant to the current policy of this Court, the moral damages awarded by the trial court should
be increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the decision of Branch 32 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, in Criminal Case No. 604 convicting the accused ROGELIO
CRISTOBAL of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED, subject to the foregoing modifications. As
modified, the award of moral damages is increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00, and the
accused is further ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
9. Layson vs Lawa, GR 150756, 2006
Respondents. October 11, 2006
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23756 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), General
Santos City, Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. 12205, except as to the penalty imposed on
petitioners Eduardo Leyson, Sr., Eduardo Bantulo, Dominador Bantulo, Eduardo Padayag, Eddie
Padayag and Rodolfo Padayag.
The Antecedents
On February 28, 1997, an Information charging petitioners with arson was filed before the
RTC of General Santos City:
That on or about 10:00 oclock in the morning of September 7, 1996 at Nopol,

Conel, General Santos City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused Eduardo Leyson, as ranch owner,
and the accused Ramon Soy, Dominador Bantulo alias Doming, Bernardo
Bantulo alias Boy, Eduardo Padayag alias Edring, Eddie Padayag alias Oyong
and Rodolfo Padayag alias Juan, who are the cowboys or farm-hands of accused
Eduardo Leyson, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another
with malice aforethought, with intent to destroy and cause damage and in order to
drive away the different complainants from the area of the ranch of Eduardo
Leyson which they have been cultivating for years, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously set fire on the thirteen (13) houses one after the other
of the complainants causing damage representing the value of the houses and
their personal belongings which were reduced to ashes with their corresponding
value as follows:

1. Pedro Lawa - P67,795.00 9. Gloria P. Anda - 7,000.00
2. Jennifer Moso - 7,000.00 10. Alicia B. Gilon -

98,735.00
3. Lino Mendi - 37,500.00
11. Eddie Bagon - 27,140.00
4. Mamer Bagon - 85,950.00
12. Pedro Bagon - 28,710.00
5. Joel Bagon - 8,500.00
13. Romeo Jarmin -
6. Teresita Bagon - 25,000.00
19,000.00
with the total value
7. Lea Taculod - 31,160.00 of P468,490.00, more or
less, and to their damage
8. Lilia Bagon - 25,000.00 and prejudice in such
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Petitioners, assisted by counsel, were arraigned on September 25, 1997 and entered
their respective pleas of not guilty.
The Case for the Prosecution
Sometime in October 1993, Eduardo Leyson allowed some members of the Blaan Tribe
to till portions of his 29-hectare landholding in Nopol, Conel, General Santos City which he called
Nopol Hills Ranch. The following members of the Blaan Tribe were allowed to build their houses
and till portions of the land, provided that they would deliver to Leyson 50% of their produce:
Romeo Jarmin, Judith Jarmin, Mamer Bagon, Joel Bagon, Teresita Bagon, Lilia Bagon, Eddie
Bagon, Pedro Bagon, Pedro Lawa, Jennifer Moso, Lino Mendi, Leah Taculod, Gloria P. Anda,
Alicia B. Gilon, and Bonifacio Batata.
Romeo Jarmin built his house on the ranch sometime in December 1993. The roof was
made of cogon, the walls of split bamboo, and the side of a coconut tree was used for flooring.
The portion of the ranch where he planted corn and palay was about 3 hectares.[3] Mamer
Bagon, his brother-in-law, lived about 50 meters away from him, also in a house made of
wood.[4] Mamer Bagon planted palay, coconut trees and other agricultural plants and gave 50%
of his produce to Leyson.[5] Joel, Teresita, Lilia, Eddie, Pedro, all surnamed Bagon, also built
their respective huts in the ranch. Pedro Lawa, who also built a house on the landholding, also
delivered to Leyson his share of the produce from his agricultural crops as agreed upon.
However, on July 20, 1996, Leyson called all the farmers to a meeting and told them to
vacate his ranch. The farmers refused to leave the premises.[6]
At about 4:00 p.m. on September 1, 1996, Leyson and his son Winkie, together with his
employees Ramon Soy, Dominador Bantulo, Juan Padayag and Eduardo Padayag and some
policemen, arrived in the ranch. They were armed, and Leyson himself had a long
firearm.[7] They fired their guns at the farmers in an effort to drive them away from the land.
Although no one was hurt, the farmers were petrified. They fled from the ranch and sought
sanctuary at the barangay hall. The next day, Romeo Jarmin, Mamer Bagon, Bonifacio Batata
and the other farmers returned to their houses to retrieve their farm animals.[8] Leyson and his
men threatened to inflict bodily harm on them unless they left the ranch. The farmers reported
the incident to Barangay Captain Manuel Abadimas and to Benjamin Sumog-Oy, the Executive
Assistant for Community Affairs of the City Mayor of General Santos City.[9]

At about 10:00 a.m. on September 7, 1996, Romeo Jarmin returned to his house in the
ranch with Mamer Bagon and Bonifacio Batata. Bonifacio Batata wanted to get his share of the
agricultural crops from Alicia Gilon.[10] Jarmin proceeded to the house of his brother-in-law,
Mamer Bagon, and saw Leyson with his employees Rodolfo Padayag, Dominador Bantulo,
Eduardo Bantulo, Eduardo Padayag, Eddie Padayag and Ramon Soy.[11] Two of the men were
armed with M-16 carbine rifles, another with an M-16 rifle, and yet another with an
armalite.[12] When they saw the armed men, Jarmin and Batata hid in a canal near the cogon
area. The armed men fired their guns in the air. One of them set fire on the houses of Mamer
Bagon, Pedro Bagon, Alicia Gilon, Joel Bagon, Romeo Jarmin, Pedro Lawa. The houses of the
other farmers were also set aflame. He, along with Mamer Bagon and Bonifacio Batata, watched
as the houses burned down to mere rubble. The value of the structures and personal belongings
that were lost in the fire, as well as their respective owners, are as follows:
a. Pablo Lawa, g. Lea Taculod, for her house,

for his house
1/2 sack rice, a plow, and
& the items
inside P67,000.0 a guitar 31,000.00
0
h. Delia Bagon, for her house
b. Jennifer Moso, for her
house 7,000.00 & personal belongings 30,000.00
i. Gloria P. Anda, for her small

hut 7,000.00
j. Alicia B. Gilon, for her house,

c. Lino Mendi, for his house,
corn planted in l/2 hectares
corn plants, and lost personal
of land, 35 punos of banana
properties 37,500.00
plants, 10 head chickens, and
d. Mamer Bagon,
for his house, carpentry
tools 98,000.00
8 chickens,
shoes, pants, k. Eddie Bagon,
for his house &
2 sacks rice,
2 sacks other belongings 27,000.00
corn 85,000.
l. Pedro Bagon,
00
for his house and
e. Joel Bagon, for his
Other lost properties 28,700.00
house 8,500.00
m. Romeo Jarmin, for his
f. Teresita Bagon, for her
house 25,000.00[13]
house 19,000.00
The farmers reported the matter to Sumog-Oy who then invited members of the media,
police and barangay personnel to the ranch on September 10, 1996. Leyson and the six
employees responsible for the burning of the farmers houses were pointed out to Sumog-
Oy.[14] He examined the debris and what remained of the farmers razed houses. Pictures of the
site were also taken.[15] Sumog-Oy also saw cattle owned by Leyson feasting on the crops of the
farmers nearby.[16] When Sumog-Oy asked Leyson what the latter planned to do about the
incident, the latter replied that he wanted to be furnished the list of the crops which had been
eaten by his cattle, including the damages sustained by the farmers and the amount thereof. He
averred, however, that the cost of the wood used in constructing the huts should not be included

because the farmers had taken the same from his ranch.[17] Leyson stated that he would pay for
the damages sustained by the farmers.
The Case for the Accused
Petitioners denied having burned the huts of the complainants and interposed the
defense of alibi.
Leyson testified that his co-accused Dominador Bantulo, Eduardo Bantulo, Eduardo
Padayag, Jun Padayag and Eddie Padayag, were employees in his eight-hectare farm located
at Lower Nopol, Purok 7, Barangay Mabuhay, General Santos City.[18] Ramon Soy, however,
was not his employee. Leyson claimed that this property is different from his ranch. He had a
contract with Pioneer Seeds Production for the use of his property for the production of corn
seeds.[19]
He narrated that during the period of September 1 to 11, 1996, he was supervising his
men in the harvesting and loading of corn in his farm which was about 6 kilometers from his
ranch, one to two hours away by horse ride.[20] They did not go to his ranch on September 1 to 7,
1996.[21] He admitted that he allowed Pedro Lawa, Judith Jarmin, who was the wife of Romeo
Jarmin, Leah Taculod, Romeo Mozo, Eddie Bagon, Mamer Bagon, Joel Bagon, Lilia Bagon and
her two sons, to farm portions of his ranch and to construct their huts thereon.[22] He asked them
to leave the place after two years, but they refused to go, and even filed a complaint against him
before the barangay captain, who endorsed it to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.[23] Sometime in August 1996, he went to his ranch to repair the perimeter fence and
saw 47 heavily armed men who appeared to be professional squatters and MILF elements.[24]
Dominador Bantulo testified that he and Bernardo Bantulo were brothers, employed by
Leyson as laborers in the farm. Rodolfo and Eduardo Padayag were also Leysons laborers. All of
them resided in Leysons house in Lower Nopol, Purok 7. Romeo Jarmin was also employed as
Leysons cowboy.[25] Dominador denied any involvement in the burning of the farmers houses. He
claimed that he and his co-accused were harvesting corn in Leysons farm in Lower
Nopol from September 1 to 11, 1996. Leyson and his son later asked him to operate the trailer-
tractor, while the others loaded the corn.[26] They did not leave the place because they were
prohibited from visiting their families. They had to watch the seeds.[27]
The other accused likewise denied the charge. They insisted that they were in the farm of
Eduardo Leyson harvesting and loading corn from September 1 to 11, 1996.
Renilo Punay, a laborer of Pioneer Seeds Production, corroborated the testimony of the
accused. He narrated that he was the roving guard of the company and stayed with the men as
they harvested and loaded corn for Pioneer Seeds Production from September 1 to 11, 1996. His
tour of duty was from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. the following day.[28] There were times that the
accused left the farm, but only one at a time to get food.[29]He further testified that at 4:30 p.m. on
September 1, 1996, the accused were in Leysons farm, which was about 5 to 6 kms away from
the ranch.[30] They were also in the farm on September 7, 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
On August 10, 1997, the court rendered judgment convicting all the accused of arson,
except Leyson who was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. However, all the accused
were ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the damages sustained by the private
complainants. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding the accused

DOMINADOR BANTULO alias DOMING, EDUARDO BANTULO alias BOY,
EDUARDO PADAYAG alias EDRING, EDDIE PADAYAG alias OYONG,
RODOLFO PADAYAG alias JUAN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of ARSON, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
each of them is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two years four
months and one day as minimum, to eight years, as maximum. All of them,
including Eduardo Leyson, are severally liable for the actual damages of private
complainants.
Accused EDUARDO LEYSON, SR. is hereby ACQUITTED. However, he

is hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally with the other accused the following
amounts to the private complainants:
1. Pablo Lawa, for 1/2 sack rice, a plow, and

his house
a guitar 26,000.00
& the items
inside P62,000.0 8. Delia Bagon, for her house
0
& personal belongings 25,000.00
2. Jennifer Moso, for her
house 7,000.00 9. Gloria P. Anda, for her small
hut 7,000.00
3. Lino Mendi, for his house,
10. Alicia B. Gilon, for her house,
corn plants, and lost personal
corn planted in l/2 hectares
properties 32,500.00
of land, 35 punos of banana
4. Mamer Bagon,
for his house, plants, 10 chickens, and
8 chickens, carpentry
shoes, pants, tools 93,000.00
2 sacks rice, 11. Eddie Bagon, for

2 sacks his house &
corn 80,000.
other belongings 22,000.00
00
12. Pedro Bagon, for
5. Joel Bagon, for his
his house and
house 8,500.00
other lost properties 23,700.00
6. Teresita Bagon, for her
house 14,000.00 13. Romeo Jarmin, for his
house 20,000.00
7. Lea Taculod, for her house,
The accused found guilty should suffer all the accessory penalties
provided for by law. Also, they are ordered to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[31]
The accused appealed the decision to the CA, alleging that
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

IDENTITIES OF THE PERSONS WHO BURNED THE HOUSES OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANTS WERE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED
EDUARDO BANTULO ALIAS BOY, DOMINADOR BANTULO ALIAS DOMING,
EDUARDO PADAYAG ALIAS EDRING, EDDIE PADAYAG ALIAS OYONG, AND
RODOLFO PADAYAG ALIAS JUAN DESPITE REASONABLE DOUBTS ON
THE IDENTITIES OF THE PERSONS WHO ALLEGEDLY BURNED THE
HOUSES.[32]
On July 31, 2001, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification
as to the sentence of the appellants. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the

modification that accused DOMINADOR BANTULO, EDUARDO BANTULO,
EDUARDO PADAYAG, EDDIE PADAYAG and RODOLFO PADAYAG are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other
respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.[33]
According to the appellate court, the testimony of Batata and Jarmin, corroborated by
Lino Mendi, were credible and entitled to full probative weight. It took into account Leysons
admission that he would pay for the damages sustained by the private complainants. The
appellate court rejected as barren of factual basis the appellants defenses of denial and alibi.
Leyson and his men filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied;
hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari, where petitioners submit the following
contentions:
BOTH COURTS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE IDENTITIES OF

THE PERSONS WHO BURNED THE HOUSES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
WERE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED. THIS FINDING IS PURE SPECULATION,
SURMISE AND CONJECTURE, BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD IN THIS CASE.
xxx
BOTH COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED EDUARDO

BANTULO alias BOY DOMINADOR BANTULO alias DOMING, EDUARDO
PADAYAG alias EDRING, EDDIE PADAYAG alias OYONG and RODOLFO
PADAYAG alias JUAN, DESPITE DOUBTS ON THE IDENTITIES OF THE
PERSONS WHO ALLEGEDLY BURNED THE HOUSES OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS. THIS FINDING IS A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.
xxx
BOTH COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING EDUARDO LEYSON, SR.

CIVILLY LIABLE TOGETHER WITH THE CONVICTED ACCUSED, THUS, THE
TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS WRONGLY APPLIED THE
LAW ON CIVIL LIABILITY OF AN ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE.[34]
The issues to be resolved in the present case are: (1) whether the prosecution was able
to prove the guilt of petitioner, except petitioner Leyson, of the crime of arson under Article 320 of
the Revised Penal Code;and (2) whether petitioner Leyson is civilly liable for alleged damages to
the private complainants.
Petitioners aver that respondents failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
arson. The testimonies of respondent Romeo Jarmin and Bonifacio Batata were inconsistent with

the affidavits given to the police investigators. While Jarmin pointed to and identified petitioner
Eduardo Leyson during the trial as one of those who burned the houses, in his affidavit,[35] Jarmin
failed to mention Leyson, and even erroneously declared that the men were cowboys. Petitioners
further point out that Jarmin had admitted that he returned to the farm only on September 2,
1996; hence, it was impossible for him to have seen the burning of the houses on September 11,
1996.
Bonifacio Batata admitted when he testified that even before the burning of the houses
on September 7, 1996 he already knew petitioner Leyson, yet, never identified him as one of the
perpetrators in the affidavit which he gave to the police investigators.[36] In fact, Batata, in his
affidavit, never identified any of petitioners as the perpetrators. Moreover, Batata and Jarmin
could not have seen the burning of the houses so as to properly identify the culprits, considering
that the surface of the canal where they claim to have hidden was covered by three feet cogon
grass, and Jarmin and Batata were only 5 feet and four inches tall. While Batata declared that he
saw petitioners burn the houses of private respondents, he later changed his testimony and
declared that he saw only one of them setting the houses on fire. Batata even admitted that he
did not see the face of the arsonist. And contrary to the ruling of the CA, Lino Mendi did not see
the burning of the houses.
Petitioners conclude that conformably with the aphorism falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus, the testimonies of Jarmin and Batata have no probative weight.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the ruling of the CA is
buttressed by the testimonial and documentary evidence on record. The alleged inconsistencies
between the testimonies of Jarmin and Batata and their respective affidavits pertain to minor and
peripheral matters, and did not necessarily discredit them. The OSG asserts that Leyson, having
been acquitted merely on reasonable doubt, is nevertheless civilly liable to private
respondents. It points out that he even obliged himself to pay for the damages sustained by
private respondents.
We agree with the rulings of the RTC and the CA that petitioners conspired to burn the
houses of private respondents on September 7, 1996.
Well-entrenched rule is that the findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA on appeal,
are accorded with high respect, if not conclusive effect by this Court. The assessment by the trial
court of the credibility of the
witnesses and its calibration of the probative weight thereof are even conclusive on this Court,
absent clear evidence that facts and circumstances of substance which if considered would alter
or reverse the outcome of the case were ignored, misinterpreted or misconstrued.[37]
The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated

parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and
anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by a witness,
everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and
considered.
It must be stressed that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in answer to one question
may be supplied or explained as qualified by his answer to other question. The principle falsus in
uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction.[38] The doctrine deals only with the
weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law, and the same is not an inflexible one of
universal application.[39] The testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and
disbelieved as to others:
Nor can we subscribe to the proposition that since the trial court did not
give credit to Edwin and Linas testimonies that they positively identified Edgardo,
it should, pursuant to the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, likewise
disregard their testimonies as against the appellant and accordingly acquit
him. In People vs. Dasig, this Court stated that the maxim is not a mandatory rule

of evidence, but rather a permissible inference that the court may or may not
draw. In People vs. Pacada, we stated that the testimony of a witness can be
believed as to some facts and disbelieved as to others. And in People vs.
Osias, we ruled that:
It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a

witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect
to other facts. And it has been aptly said that even when
witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material
particulars, it is not required that the whole of their uncorroborated
testimony be rejected but such portions thereof deemed worthy of
belief may be credited.
The primordial consideration is that the witness was

present at the scene of the crime and that he positively identified
[the accused] as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged x x
x.
Professor Wigmore gives the following enlightening commentary:
It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself

worthless first, in point of validity, because in one form it merely
contains in loose fashion a kernel of truth which no one needs to
be told, and in the others, it is absolutely false as a maxim of life;
and secondly, in point of utility, because it merely tells the jury
what they may do in any event, not what they must do or must not
do, and therefore it is a superfluous form of words. It is also in
practice pernicious, first, because there is frequently a
misunderstanding of its proper force, and secondly, because it
has become in the hands of many counsel a mere instrument for
obtaining new trials upon points wholly unimportant in
themselves.[40]
The general rule is that inconsistencies and discrepancies between the testimony of a witness in
contrast with what he stated in an affidavit do not necessarily discredit him. Affidavits given to
police and barangay officers are made ex parte and often incomplete or incorrect for lack or
absence of sufficient inquiries by the investigating officer.[41] It is of judicial knowledge that sworn
statements are almost incomplete and often inaccurate and are generally inferior to the testimony
of a witness in open court.[42]
Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of the witness relative to minor or peripheral

matters and not to the significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused from the
crime charged or the elements of such crime are not grounds for the acquittal of the accused.
It is not correct for petitioners to claim that Jarmin[43] in his affidavit, did not implicate petitioner
Leyson for the burning of the houses. In fact, Jarmin declared therein that petitioner Leyson
conspired with his co-petitioners to burn the houses of private respondents because they refused
to vacate the ranch.[44] Moreover, petitioner Leyson, with his co-petitioners, was present when
the houses were burned on September 7, 1996, as he was even armed with a long
firearm. Petitioner Leyson even assured Sumog-oy later that he would pay for the damages
sustained by private respondents. The testimony of Sumog-Oy on the matter reads:

Q And you talked to Mister Q And that was the response
Leyson? of Mister Leyson
when you asked him
A Yes, sir, and in fact I if he could assist
asked him what these people?
things he will do
considering that his A I did not particularly ask
cattle were feasting him to assist, it was
on the crops of the his own suggestion.
Blaans and he told
me that all these
things will be listed
and he will pay for Q So he suggested that he
them.[45] would assist these
people?
Sumog-oy reiterated his testimony on cross
examination: A Because I told him, what
are you going to do
Q Because you of course now that the houses
asked Mister Leyson of these people were
if he could assist destroyed and your
those people? cattle were feasting
on the crops and he
A No sir, I just asked him told me that just tell
what is he planning them to list the things
to do that his cattle that were destroyed
were feasting on the including the amount
crops of the Blaans. and I will pay them.
Q And so you asked Q Pay them as his

particularly on the assistance to these
crops that as you people?
said were feasted by
his cattle? A He just plainly said, I will
pay.
A Yes sir including the
houses and he said
to list all the things
that were damaged Q In other words, his offer to
and then including pay was in response
the crops amount to your questioning
and he also him what he would
mentioned about the do to the destroyed
houses and in fact houses and on the
he told me that they damaged crops,
should not charge correct?
the cost of the woods
A That is the logical
because the woods
interpretation sir.
used for the
construction of the
houses were just cut
from his ranch, he Q That is the correct
said. interpretation?
A Probably the logical

interpretation.[46]

On redirect examination, Jarmin declared understand the
that, in his affidavit he wanted to charge not words to file a
only petitioner Leysons employees but also complaint against the
the cowboys as well: cowboys of Mr.
Eduardo Leyson, as
far as against whom
you are filing?
Q Mister Witness, do you
understand the A All of them, Mister Leyson
words or how do you and his cowboys.[47]
Apparently, Jarmin did not know whether petitioners were farmhands or cowboys of petitioner
Leyson. But whether petitioners were the farmhands or cowboys of petitioner Leyson is of little
significance. The fact of the matter is that petitioner Leyson employed his co-petitioners, who
were given long firearms when they drove away the private respondents from the farm on
September 1 to 2, 1996; and on September 7, 1996, they fired shots and burned private
respondents houses.
Petitioner Leyson ordered his men to intimidate the private respondents with bodily harm if they
did not leave the ranch. Indeed, as testified by Jarmin, petitioner Leyson was with his co-
petitioners on September 7, 1996 when private respondents houses were burned:
Q Where are your houses Padayag, Boy,

now? Ebring Padayag
together with Mister
A Our houses were burned Eduardo Leyson.
on September 7,
1996.
Q How many houses were Q Are they in court today

burned on Mister Jarmin?
September 7, 1996?
A There are only four here in
A 13 houses were burned court now.
down.
Q Around what time were

the houses burned?
Q Will you please point at
A 10 oclock in the morning. them.
A That is one (witness

pointing to a person
Q Who were those persons wearing a striped t-
who burned the shirt who answered
houses Mister by the name of
Jarmin? Rodolfo
Padayag). That
A Their companions were person Doming
Ramon Soy, Doming Bantolo (who
Bantolo, Juan

answered by the A The last time to go there
name of Dominador was on September 7.
Bantolo) and that
person (who
answered by the
name of Fernando COURT
Bantolo) and Mister
Proceed.
Eduardo Leyson
(pointing to a person
wearing red t-shirt
who answered by the ATTY. MELLIZA:
name of Eduardo
Leyson). Q And what was the reason
why you returned
there on September
2, 1996?
Q Will you tell us how they
burned your houses? A To get my carabao and to
harvest some
A They set on fire on the vegetables.
cogo[n] roofing with
a match.[48]
Q As a matter of fact, you

were not able to
We agree with petitioners contention that enter the area?
during his direct examination on June 24,
1998, Jarmin testified that after they were A I actually went inside the
driven off with gun fire from their houses on area because my
September 2, 1996, they were never able to carabao was inside
return to their farmhouses until the area.
today. However, when queried by the trial
court if he returned to the farm after
September 2, 1996, Jarmin declared that he
came back on September 2 and on Q And you were able to get
September 7, 1996: your carabao?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q Did you not return on Q Who were your

September 2? companions in
returning to that
A I returned there to get place on September
some vegetables 2, 1996?
and to get my
carabao. A Mamer Bagon and
Bonifacio Batata.
Q So that was the only time

you returned? Q And were they able to get
their work animals?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A This Bonifacio Batata has
no animal of his own
there because he
Q On September 2, 1996? just went there to
harvest palay.

A Bonifacio Batata.[49]
Q What is the complete

name of Batata?
Evidently, when Jarmin was asked whether he returned to the farm after September 2,
1996 he understood the question to refer to him and to the other private respondents. Indeed, the
only persons who returned to the farm on September 7, 1996, were Jarmin himself, Mamer
Bagon and Batata. The other private respondents no longer returned to their farmhouses.
We agree with petitioners contention that Lino Mendi did not witness the burning of his
house and the houses of the other private respondents on September 7, 1996 and that he
learned of the burning and all the perpetrators thereof only from Batata and Jarmin.[50] However,
the thrust of Mendis testimony was only for the purpose of proving the actual damages he
sustained, consisting of the value of his house and his other personal belongings which were
burned. Likewise of minimal significance is the seeming discrepancy between the testimony of
Jarmin, that petitioners burned the houses of private respondents, and the testimony of Batata,
that only one of petitioners whose face he did not actually see burned the houses.
Considering the entirety of the testimonies of Batata and Jarmin, they declared that all the
petitioners were responsible for the burning because of their collective acts, including those that
transpired on September 1 and 2, 1996. By their collective acts, petitioners (except petitioner
Leyson) conspired to burn the houses of private respondents. It is elementary that when there is
a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and a conspirator may be held as a
principal even if he did not participate in the actual commission of every act constituting the
offense. In conspiracy, all those who in one way or another helped and cooperated in the
consummation of the crime are considered co-principals since the degree or character of the
individual participation of each conspirator in the commission of the crime becomes
immaterial. Thus, liability exists notwithstanding appellants non-participation in every detail in the
execution of the crime.[51]
Thus, Batata testified that petitioners, who were in the company of petitioner Leyson, burned
private respondents houses. From the canal where he and Jarmin hid, they saw one of them
burn the houses after firing their guns:
Q Did you see the persons who fired their

guns? Q And then what happened thereafter?
A Yes, sir. A After firing their guns, they set the houses
on fire.
Q Will you still be able to recognize them if
you see them again? Q Whose house Mister Witness?
A I only knew them through their faces but A The first house was the house of Mamer
not their names. Bagon.
Q Are they in court today? Q And then?

A Yes, sir, they are here. A They again went upwards and set fire the
house of Pedro Bagon and Alicia Gilon, as
Q Please point at them. well the house of Eddie Bagon.
A These persons (pointing to all the persons
seated at the accused bench). Q Did you see the persons who set the fire
on the houses?
Q So what did you do Mister Witness when A The same persons who burned the house
you heard the persons firing their guns? of Mamer.
A We jumped towards the canal near the
cogonal place and hid ourselves. Q Are they in court today?

A Yes, sir. Q But you are very much certain that only
one of the six (6) armed men set fire on the
Q Will you please point to them. houses?
A The same persons seated in the accused A Yes, sir.
bench.
Q What weapons if you could remember
Q And after witnessing the persons setting were used by the six (6) armed men who
fire on the houses of the complaining fired the gunshots?
witnesses in this case, what happened A Garand, carbine and M-16 armalite.
next?
A They proceeded going towards the upper Q So you are very sure of that, that it is or
direction. the only weapons used?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many houses were burned?
A From the house starting down going Q What weapon was being held by that
upward were burned. person who was setting fire on the houses?
A Garand.
Q Can you estimate how many houses were
burned?
A About 14 houses.
Q You have generally pointed to all the
Q Do you know the owners of the houses persons sitting now on the accused
Mister Witness? bench. What weapon was being held by this
A Mamer, Eddie, Pedro, Alicia, Romeo man?
Jarmin, the house of Ronnie, Lawa while the A M-16 armalite.
others I do not know the owners names but
which were also burned. Q What [w]as he doing with the M-16
armalite?
Q Do you still remember at what time were A While he was setting fire on the houses,
the houses burned by the accused? the other accused were standing by as if
A About 10 oclock in the morning.[52] they are guarding.
xxxx Q How many garand rifles did you see at

that time?
ATTY. MELLIZA: A If I am not wrong, two of them were
Q You said the persons whom you saw set carrying a garand.
fire on the houses. Do you mean that all
those persons whom you saw actually set Q And how many of them did you see
fire on the houses? carrying M-16 rifles?
A Yes, sir, although only one person set fire A One.
on the houses.
Q So what else were the weapons you saw
Q Who was that person when you said only at that time?
one person set fire on the houses, who was A Carbine.
that person?
A I did not see him when he set fire on the Q How many carbine rifles did you see?
houses because his back was towards me. A Two.
Q So it is now clear Mister Batata that the Q So one armalite, two garands and two
person whom you actually saw setting fire carbines, is that what you mean?
on the houses could not be one of the A Yes, sir.
persons now sitting on the accused bench?
A No, sir, because his back was towards COURT:
me. Q Five?
A Yes, Your Honor.[53]
xxxx

Q Mister Batata, you said you were in Nopol COURT:
Hills on September 7, 1996 when you Q So actually you were only going there
witnessed the burning by the accused in this from time to time to harvest palay or corn in
case and you pointed to these persons in the farm of your friends?
the accused bench. Why, please tell us, did A Yes, Your Honor.
you point at these persons in the accused
bench? Q Because you have no farm there of your
A Because they are the ones whom I saw own?
setting fire on the houses and fire their guns. A No, Your Honor.
Q You saw them on September 7, 1996? Q So during the gun firing or the burning you
A Yes, sir. were only looking at these persons?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q You see the first person?
Q For how many minutes did you look at
COURT: them?
Q At a distance of 40 meters? A I can not estimate Your Honor.
A Yes, Your Honor, but only through their
faces but not their names. Q For a long time or a short time.
A For quite a time.
COURT:
Continue. Q About one hour?
A No, Your Honor.
ATTY. GACAL:
Q Did you see the first person and I am Q About half an hour?
pointing to Mister Leyson? A About 10 minutes only.[55]
A Yes and I know him. While it is true that Jarmin and Batata fled,
jumped into a canal and hid there while
petitioners burned private respondents
houses, the foliage or the surface of the
ATTY. MELLIZA: canal did not obstruct their view. Batata is
May we request Your Honor that the five feet and four inches tall, and the canal
statement I know him because he is an ex- was only three feet deep:
kagawad be included.
ATTY. GACAL:
ATTY. GACAL: Q Mister Batata, you mentioned that while
Q About the second person in the person of you were in the canal or where cogon
Eduardo Padayag? grasses on the surface of the canal, will you
A I also saw him. tell us how tall are the cogon grasses?
A The height of the cogon is that when you
Q And the third person by the name of will stand up, your head will be exposed.
Dominador Bantolo, you saw him also?
A Yes, sir. COURT:
So that must be about two (2) feet tall from
Q What about the fourth person Bernardo the ground?
Bantolo, you saw him? A About this tall (demonstrating a height of
A Yes, sir. about 2 to 3 feet).
Q What about the fifth person Padayao? Q How tall are you?
A Yes, sir, I saw him.[54] A 54.
Q How tall is the canal?

It bears stressing that Batata saw petitioners A Up to my breast (about 3 feet deep).
before the latter burned the houses, when
they fired their guns to scare off anybody COURT:
who could be in the houses:

3 feet cogon above the canal about 6 Q Were there obstructions from your vision
feet.[56] to the 40 meters distance where you said
you saw the accused?
Jarmins view was likewise not obstructed by A None, if you will look down, you can see
the cogon grass: the place.
Q Were the cogons then thick Mister Q Were you on a high plain or lower plain?
Witness? A We are on the higher plain.
A Not so thick.
Q So the cogon grass were never an
obstruction to your vision?
A No, sir.[57]
Thus, petitioners denials and alibi cannot prevail over the collective positive testimonies
of Jarmin and Batata, who positively and spontaneously pointed to them as the perpetrators at
the trial. Denial and alibi are weak defenses in criminal prosecution: alibi is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove, while denial is mere self-serving evidence which cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of witnesses who identified the perpetrators. To merit approbation, clear and
convincing evidence must be adduced to show that petitioners were in a place other than
the situs of the crime when it was committed, such that it was physically impossible for them to
have committed the crime.[58] In this case, it was not impossible for petitioners to rush to the
ranch of petitioner Leyson from his farm which was only 5 to 6 kms away on horseback, arrive
there at 10:00 a.m., fire their guns and burn the houses of private respondents.
The trial court acquitted petitioner Leyson of arson but ruled that he is civilly liable to
private respondents. The CA affirmed the ruling of the court a quo. We quote with approval the
ruling of the appellate court:
Finally, the rule is that a persons acquittal of a crime on the ground that
his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt does not bar a civil action
for damages founded on the same acts involved in the offense. Rule 111, Section
2(b) of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise
did not exist. It is also an established rule that the acquittal of an accused on
reasonable doubt is not generally an impediment to the imposition, in the same
criminal action, of civil liability for damages on said accused. In the case at bar,
there is no finding by the court a quo that the houses of the complainants were
not burned which is the basis of the civil liability of appellant Leyson. Leyson was
acquitted for lack of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[59]
Besides, petitioner Leyson obliged himself to pay for the damages sustained by private
respondents.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23756 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
10. People va Padilla, GR 167955, 2009

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 23, 2005 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00571 which affirmed, with modification, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 166-M-96,[2] finding appellant
Armando Padilla y Nicolas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape and

sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Death. The CA found appellant guilty of Qualified Rape
and likewise imposed on him the penalty of Death. It reduced the awards for civil indemnity
from P100,000.00 to P75,000.00 and exemplary damages from P50,000.00 to P25,000.00. In
addition, the CA awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
Consistent with the Court's decision in People v. Cabalquinto,[3] the real name of the rape victim
in this case is withheld and, instead, fictitious initials are used to represent her. Also, the personal
circumstances of the victim or any other information tending to establish or compromise her
identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this
decision.
The facts of the case, as established by the prosecution, are as follows:
Around 9 o'clock in the evening of February 22, 1994, AAA was inside their house located at
Marilao, Bulacan.[4] With her were her father, herein appellant, her two older brothers and her
sister BBB.[5] She was then staying in one of the rooms because she was suffering from asthma
and was taking medicine through the help of her sister, BBB.[6] On the other hand, her brothers
were already asleep in another room.[7] After AAA took her medicine, appellant told BBB to sleep
outside the room where AAA was staying.[8] When BBB went outside, appellant turned off the
light and proceeded to their kitchen.[9] Thereafter, appellant returned to the room where AAA was
staying.[10] He then took off AAA's clothes and also removed his.[11] He went on top of AAA and
tried to insert his penis into her vagina.[12] AAA resisted but appellant held her hands and boxed
her left thigh twice.[13] She was then rendered weak enabling appellant to successfully insert his
organ inside her vagina.[14] AAA felt pain, after which her vagina bled.[15] While appellant's penis
was inside her vagina, he made push and pull movements.[16] She pleaded with appellant to stop
but to no avail.[17] It was in the course of her struggle against appellant's advances that she called
on her sister for help.[18] Thereafter, she felt something come out of his penis.[19] Appellant
withdrew his penis from her vagina but remained on top of her and even began touching her
breast.[20] It was during that compromising position that BBB entered the room and saw
them.[21] Appellant immediately gathered his clothes and went to the comfort room.[22] Thereafter,
AAA cried while BBB handed her clothes to her.[23] They then slept beside each other.[24]
AAA did not complain nor tell her brothers about her ordeal because she was afraid as she was
threatened by appellant that he will hurt them and burn their house if she relates the incident to
them.[25] It was only in October 1995 that she was able to tell her aunt about her experience in
the hands of appellant.[26] Subsequently, her aunt accompanied her to the office of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where they filed a complaint against appellant.[27]
On February 1, 1996, an Information[28] was filed against appellant charging him before the RTC
of Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of statutory rape, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1994 in the Municipality of Marilao,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with lewd designs have carnal knowledge of said AAA, a minor who
is 11 years old, against her will.
All contrary to law with an aggravating circumstance that the accused is the
legitimate father of AAA.[29]
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.[30] Pre-trial conference followed.[31] Thereafter, trial
ensued.
On November 5, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision,[32] the dispositive portion of which is as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Armando Padilla y Nicolas GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape described and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 7659 otherwise

referred to as the Death Penalty Law, and hereby sentences him the capital
penalty of DEATH.
The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the offended party AAA damages in
the amount of P100,000.00 and to pay exemplary damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 to deter other sex perverts from sexually assaulting hapless and
innocent girls especially their kin.
In passing, Justice Vicente Abad Santos once remarked there should be a special
place in hell for child molesters. The accused deserves a deeper pit because the
child he molested was his own daughter. More than anyone else, it was he
to whom the child would have looked up for the protection of her chastity. He
cynically betrayed that faith with his unnatural lechery.
SO ORDERED.[33]
In an Order[34] dated November 6, 2001, the RTC directed the transmittal of the entire records of
the case to this Court and likewise ordered the commitment of the accused to the National
Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.
Pursuant to the Court's pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[35] which modified the provisions of
the Rules of Court insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
case was referred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.[36]
After a review of the case, the CA affirmed, with modification, the decision of the RTC convicting
the appellant. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment dated November 5,

2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15 in Criminal Case
No. 166-M-96 finding Armando Padilla y Nicolas guilty of Qualified Rape and
sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay the victim the amount of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on October 15, 2004,
amending Section 13, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, let
the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[37]
The case was then elevated to this Court for review.
In a Resolution[38] dated July 19, 2005, the parties were required to simultaneously submit their
respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. However, both parties manifested that they are
not filing their supplemental briefs as their positions in the present case had been thoroughly
expounded in their respective appeal briefs which were forwarded to the CA. Thereafter, the case
was deemed submitted for deliberation.
Appellant assigned the following assignment of errors in his Brief:
APPLYING THE PRUNA GUIDELINES, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED

IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON ACCUSED-APPELLANT
CONSIDERING THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO SUFFICIENTLY PROVE

THE MINORITY OF THE COMPLAINANT AND HER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
ACCUSED.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

PROSECUTION HAD PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILT FOR QUALIFIED RAPE.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE

PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.[39]
As to the first assigned error, appellant avers that the death penalty may not be imposed
because the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were not properly alleged and
proved by the prosecution.
The Court agrees in part.
The first issue is whether or not the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were
properly alleged by the prosecution.
It is clear from the Information that AAA was alleged to be a minor who was aged eleven (11) at
the time of the commission of the crime and that the accused is her father. Contrary to the
prosecution's asseveration, it does not matter that the private complainant's relationship with the
accused was denominated as an aggravating circumstance and not as a special qualifying
circumstance.
The Court has repeatedly held, even after the amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure
took effect,[40] that qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as
qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense.[41] The Court has repeatedly qualified
cases of rape where the twin circumstances of minority and relationship have been specifically
alleged in the Information even without the use of the descriptive words qualifying or qualified
by.[42] In the instant case, the fact that AAA's relationship with appellant was described as
aggravating instead of qualifying does not take the Information out of the purview of Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC ), as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 (RA
7659),[43] which was the prevailing law at the time of the commission of the offense. Article 335
does not use the words qualifying or aggravating in enumerating the circumstances that qualify
rape so as to make it a heinous crime punishable by death. It merely refers to the enumerated
circumstances as attendant circumstances. The specific allegation of the attendant
circumstances in the Information, coupled with the designation of the offense and a statement of
the acts constituting the offense as required in Sections 8[44] and 9[45] of Rule 110, are sufficient to
warn appellant that the crime charged is qualified rape punishable by death.
In the present case, the attendant circumstances of minority and relationship were specifically
alleged in the Information. These allegations are sufficient to qualify the offense of rape.
The next question to be resolved is whether the prosecution was able to prove appellant's
relationship with AAA as well as the latter's minority.
As to AAAs relationship with appellant, the Court agrees that the prosecution was able to prove it
beyond reasonable doubt. The Information alleged that appellant is the father of AAA. Appellant,
in turn, admitted during trial that AAA is her daughter.[46] Under prevailing jurisprudence,
admission in open court of relationship has been held to be sufficient and, hence, conclusive to
prove relationship with the victim.[47]
However, with respect to AAA's minority, the settled rule is that there must be independent
evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
and the absence of denial by appellant.[48] The victim's original or duly certified birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or school records would suffice as competent evidence of her
age.[49] In the instant case, aside from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, coupled with

appellant's absence of denial, no independent substantial evidence was presented to prove the
age of AAA. Neither was it shown by the prosecution that the said documents had been lost,
destroyed, unavailable or were otherwise totally absent.
Anent appellants failure to object to the testimony of AAA, regarding her age, the Court has held
that the failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding the rape victims
age shall not be taken against him.[50] Even the appellant's implied admission of the victim's age,
in the absence of any supporting independent evidence, may not be considered sufficient to
prove her age. In People v. Biong,[51] the appellant testified as to the exact date when her
daughter, the complainant, was born. However, the Court held that appellant's testimony falls
short of the quantum of proof required to establish her age. As the qualifying circumstance of
minority alters the nature of the crime of rape and increases the penalty thereof, it must be
proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself.[52] In the present case, the Court
agrees with appellant that the prosecution failed to discharge this burden.
Coming to the second assigned error, appellant questions the credibility of the victim, AAA,
arguing that his constitutional right to be presumed innocent should take precedence over the
unfounded claim of AAA that he raped her.
It is settled that to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are
guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility
and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[53]
Accordingly, in resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the credibility of the
victim's testimony.[54] The settled rule is that the trial courts conclusions on the credibility of
witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times even
finality, unless there appear in the record certain facts or circumstances of weight and value
which the lower court overlooked or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would
alter the result of the case.[55]
Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of
testifying, the trial court stood in a much better position to decide the question of
credibility.[56] Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on the
appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.[57] No such facts or circumstances exist in the
present case.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA are in agreement that AAAs account of her ordeal in the
hands of her father was categorical and straightforward.
Appellant contends that AAA had a grudge against him and, aside from that, she was influenced
and even instigated by her aunt, Elena Manahan, to file the complaint against appellant because
of the bitterness that Elena feels towards him. According to the appellant, this bitterness was
brought about by a misunderstanding between him and Elena involving money entrusted to the
latter by his wife which was supposed to be used for the construction of apartments.[58] However,
appellant's claim deserves scant consideration. The Court finds it incredible for private
complainant to trump up a charge of rape against appellant on the simple reason that she has a
grudge against the latter or that she was influenced by her aunt who harbors resentment against
him. No woman would cry rape, allow an examination of
her private parts, subject herself to humiliation, go through the rigors of public trial and taint her
good name if her claim were not true.[59]
Thus, the unfounded claim of evil motive on the part of the victim would not destroy the credibility
reposed upon her by the RTC and the CA because, as the Court has held, a rape victims
testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close relative of having raped her, as
in the case of a daughter against her father.[60]

Moreover, appellant's rape of private complainant was corroborated by no less than the latter's
sister who is also a daughter of appellant. The rule is that where there is no evidence that the
witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not
so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence.[61]
In addition, AAAs subsequent acts of disclosing and complaining about her molestation to her
aunt and the authorities and taking immediate steps to subject herself to medical examination
represent conduct consistent with her straightforward, logical and probable testimony that she
was in fact raped by appellant. They represent strong and compelling factors that enhance
complainants credibility as a witness.
Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, appellant merely interposed the defense
of denial. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill-motive on
the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the defense of denial.[62] In the
present case, there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the victim to testify
falsely against the appellant or to implicate him falsely in the commission of the crime; hence, the
logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony is worthy of full
faith and credence. Accordingly, appellant's weak defense of denial cannot prosper.
The prevailing law at the time the crime was committed in 1994 was still Article 335 of the
RPC as amended by Section 11 of RA 7659, the first paragraph of which provides as follows:
When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal

knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
Paragraph 7(1) of the same Article further provides that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxxx
The elements of statutory rape, of which appellant was charged are: (1) that [63]
the accused had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the age of AAA, much less the allegation that
she was under the age of twelve when she was raped. Thus, the Court cannot hold appellant
liable for statutory rape.However, since the prosecution was able to establish, without any
objection from the defense, that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA with the use of force, he
can be convicted of simple rape the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua. Appellant may not be
convicted of rape in its qualified form, as to impose upon him the penalty of death, considering
that, while the aggravating circumstance of relationship was proven, the prosecution failed to
establish AAA's minority by independent proof.
With respect to the last assigned error, the Court agrees with the CA in awarding civil indemnity
as well as moral and exemplary damages to AAA. However, since the penalty is reclusion
perpetua, the civil indemnity must be reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.[64] Moreover, when a crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is
justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.[65]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 23, 2005 in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00571 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Armando Padilla is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Simple Rape under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and ordered to pay the private complainant AAA the reduced amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and the increased amount of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

People vs Gary dela Cruz Case Summary

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People vs Gary dela Cruz Case Summary

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People vs Gary dela Cruz, GR 185717, 2011

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Version of the Prosecution

Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to Biak-na-Bato corner Mauban

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Version of the Defense

The Ruling of the RTC

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused GARRY

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Aggrieved, accused appealed[9] his conviction before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein appeal is hereby DENIED

The CA also ruled that accused-appellants mere denial, as corroborated by Buencamino

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Only accused-appellant, however, filed his Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental

Thus, accused-appellant raises the same assignment of errors, in that:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in flagrante

This is the situation in the instant case.

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PO2 IBASCO: COURT:

Q: You said you conducted ATTY. LOYOLA:

xxxx PO1 Valencia, likewise, on cross-

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Q: Now, Mr. Witness, based Q: And because you claim

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ATTY. BARTOLOME: Q: Why did you call the

Q: Can you tell us how, Q: Why do you know

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Q: So, Ibasco immediately Q: Whey they were not able

Q: You dont know where he was arrested at that time?

ATTY. BARTOLOME: What time?

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ATTY. BARTOLOME: xxxx

Non-Compliance with the Rule on Chain of Custody

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As the Court aptly put in People v. Cantalejo:

x x x failure to observe the proper procedure also negates the operation

While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the

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The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accused-appellant Garry De La Cruz y

[G.R. No. 128106-07. January 24, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GONZALO BALDOGO, accused-

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Two Informations were filed against accused-appellant and Edgar Bermas

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident[,] premeditation

CONTRARY TO LAW and attended by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.[2]

II. The Antecedent Facts

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III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant

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WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, a Joint Judgment is hereby rendered in:

1. Actual and compensatory damages:

In his appeal brief, accused-appellant avers that:

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VI. Resolution of this Court