the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issues.
Cayetano vs. Leonidas
G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984
o GENERAL RULE: Limited jurisdiction of the probate court
o EXCEPTION: Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issues.
FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father)
and her sisters, Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina
as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory heir is Hermogenes, he
executed an Affidavit of Adjudication, adjudicating unto himself the
entire estate of Adoracion.
Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will,
alleging among others that Adoracion was an American citizen and
that the will was executed in teh US. Adoracion died in Manila while
temporarily residing in Malate.
While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will,
appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix. Hence, this case.
ISSUEs:
o Whether or not the will was valid
o Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings
HELD:
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes
only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that
In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an
American citizen and the law which governs her will is the law of
Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions
of the will, the national law of the decedent must apply.
As to the issue of jurisdiction --
The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with
the CFI of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and
proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and
permanent resident of Pennsylvania, USA and not a usual resident of
Cavite.
Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a
party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/cayetano-vs-leonidas.html
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. CA, PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA
B. GARCIA, 74 SCRA 189 (1976) (SpecPro 2016)
FACTS: Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of Laguna a
petition for letters of administration alleging that on April 26, 1973, Amado
G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of
Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and
in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court. At the same
time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratix over
the estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion.
1
Page
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, the surviving
spouse of the deceased, contending that
1) The decedent resided in QC for 3 months before his death as shown by
his death certificate and therefore have an improper venue.
2) The CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction over the petition.
CFI denied the motion.
CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the administratix.
Thus, Fule elevated the matter to the SC on appeal by certiorari.
ISSUES:
a.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be determined in the
present case?
b.) What does the word resides in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73 Section
1 Mean?
c.) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?
Held:
1. No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case base
on the merits or the substance of the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the
trial proceeding. It is granted by law or by the constitution and cannot be
waived or stipulated.
On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper court
which has jurisdiction over the area wherein real property involved or a
portion thereof is situated. Venue is the location of the court with
jurisdiction. It is more on convenience purposes. Its more on procedural
aspect of the case. In some cases it may be waived or stipulated by the
parties.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: If the decedent is
an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
1. Resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary.
1. In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased
should be the venue of the court. Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and
not at Calamba, Laguna base on his death certificate. A death certificate is
admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C.
Fules petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court
of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore Preciosa B. Garcia was
granted as a special administratix.
https://casedigestrequest.wordpress.com/2016/06/29/virginia-garcia-fule-
vs-ca-preciosa-b-garcia-and-agustina-b-garcia-74-scra-189-1976/
2
Page
 HELD:
Cuenco vs. CA
The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the
G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973 testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and
testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as
o The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts wish.
FACTS: On Venue and Jurisdiction

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
his widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children other courts.
from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an
died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If
and Quezon City. this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of
justice.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the
second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take
will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise
an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have
acted on the probate proceedings.
http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/cuenco-vs-ca.html
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on
ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that
CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The
opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled
in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

ISSUEs:

o Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition

o Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the

3
probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting

Page
in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO,
LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN
CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ,
respondents
Facts:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital,
Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two
(2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador Cuenco, all residing at
Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein,
namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera,
Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all
of legal age and residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging
that the Senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with
properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
While the petition was still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the
last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an
opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in
abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted
on the probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on
ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI
Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition
and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of
Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
Issues: 1.)Whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually
from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting
aside all its orders and actions
2.) Whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive
jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order
expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over
intestate proceedings.
Held:
1.) The Court ruled in the affirmative.
According to the Court, Rule 73 specifies that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." It is equally conceded that
the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element
of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue.
A court may, upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the
decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving
widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate
petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually
false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition
before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has
before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
This is exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing
with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it declined to take
cognizance of the case and deferred it to the Quezon City court.
4
Page
2.) The Court ruled in the negative.
 The Quezon City court can not be deemed to have acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since
under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the
estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other
courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed,
said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court
indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition
before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and
deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by
the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case, respondents submitted to the Quezon City
court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be
declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in
admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow
as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary
disposition.
With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when
it is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the
petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such
"jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in
Fernando vs. Crisostomo" are the death of the decedent, his residence at
the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such
province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that
"(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as
a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the
whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is
binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a
court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and
validity."
It should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its
supervisory authority over all inferior courts, it may properly determine, as
it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by and
transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and
in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference
and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will
and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix.
SCRIBD: https://www.scribd.com/document/341031671/Cuenco-vs-CA
MANG-OY VS CA
G.R. 144 SCRA 35
SEPTEMBER 12, 1986
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Old Tumpao begot 3 children (respondents) with his first wife. Upon
her death, he took himself a second wife but without issues. However
she had adopted 2 children according to the practice of Igorots. On
September 4, 1937, Old Tumpao executed what he called last will
and testament which were read to and thumb mark affixed by all of
the beneficiaries who at the time were already occupying the portions
respectively allotted to them. After the death of Old Tumpao, the
parties remained to be in possession of the lots assign to them which
was in accordance of the wishes of old Tumpao which was also
agreed upon by the parties in a public document.
5
On November 4, 1960, respondents executed an extra-judicial
Page
partition in which they divided the property of Old Tumpao among the
three of them only. Petitioners sued for reconveyance , sustained by
trial court but reversed by CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will and testament of Old Tumpao be duly
allowed even without being proved in the court
RULING:
In accordance with the rules of court, no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court.
However the document maybe sustained by art 1056 of the Old Civil
Code which was the law in force at the time the document was made.
The law says: If the testator should make a partition of his properties
by an act inter vivors, or by will such partition shall stand in so far as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
Such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or donation inter
vivos, which is a consequence of its special nature. Thus, the last will
and testament of Old Tumpao is sustained by the provision of Art
1056, Old Civil Code, which became a binding law when the
beneficiaries, parties herein, agreed and confirmed with the
disposition made by Old Tumpao.
http://favesongdiary.blogspot.com/2010/06/case-digest-civil-law.html
MANG-OY v CA
144 SCRA 33CRUZ; September 12, 1986
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
FACTS
- Old Man Tumpao had a wife and begot 3 children , the respondents in
this case. Afterhis wife's death, he married again. His second wife had 2
children she had adoptedaccodring to the practice of igorots- On Sept 4,
1937, Old man tumpao executed a "last will and testament". According to
such, Bandao Tumpao shall be the one to carry or fulfill the Testament,
and shall have the power to see and dispose of the Old Man Tumpao's
property.- The will was read to the beneficiaries who were already
occupying the lands allotted to them. On Sept 7, 1937, they had an
agreement recognizing the will and Bandos appointment. 2 days later,
Old Man Tumpao died.- The parties remained in possession of the
lots assigned to them, apparently inobedience to the wish of Old Man
Tumpao as expressed in his last will.- However, in 1960, the respondents
executed an extrajudicial partition of the lands of Old Man Tumpao. The
latters title was cancelled and the respondents were given anew one. It
is that title which is the being questioned by the petitioners.- The TC
ruled for the petitioners. The CA reversed as it said that the will
was void since it was not probated.
The agreement of partition among the supposed beneficiaries of
the will was nullified because it was a partition inter vivos and had not
been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the will was valid
HELD
1. NO
Ratio
The will is not valid since it was not probated. However, the document
may besustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899,
which was in force atthe time the said document was executed by Old
Man Tumpao in 1937.
Reasoning
- Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties
by an act intervivos, or by win, such partition shall stand in so far
as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs- Article 1056
of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes a testator to partition inter vivos his
property, and distribute them among his heirs, and
that this partition is not
necessarily either a donation nor a testament, but
an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which is
revocable at any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does
not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives its
binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of
the owner of the property, limited only by his creditors and the
intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs- It was sufficient,
therefore, that the partition should be in writing. It does not have to be
in a public document except to affect third persons (Art. 1280),
being valid between the parties who signed it in its present form.- as
the trial court put it: The will alone, would be inoperative for the simple
6
reason that it was not probated,However, when the persons
Page
who were named therein as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily
agreed in writing to abide by its terms probably to save the expenses
of probate. and furthermore, carried out its terms after the death of the
testator untilnow, then it must be held to be binding between them.
Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir
before the death of the testator, but a nagreement to carry out the will. It
was not contested by the defendants and after the lapse of 25 years their
right, if any, to assail it has prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code.
Any formal defect of the deed, was cured by the lapse of time.- The
agreement entered into by the parties did not have to be approved
by theDirector of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes because the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was not extended to the
Mountain Province. Moreover, thedocument was not a conveyance
of properties or property right.- It remains to state that the property in
dispute having been registered in 1917, the presumption is that it was
acquired during the second marriage and so cannot be claimed by
the respondents as the conjugal property of their mother and Old
Man Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land
as their exclusive inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots occupied
by the petitioners
1. Fernandez v. Dimagiba
Facts:
Ismaela Dimagiba filed a petition for probate of the will of Benedicta de los
Reyes. Such petition was opposed by Dionisio Fernandez, et al. The court
ruled in favor of probate. Fernandez et al appealed, but it was beyond the
reglamentary period. They argued that they were entitled to await the other
grounds for opposition before appealing.
Issue: Whether the probate of the will become final for lack of appeal
Ruling: Yes. A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions
concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing
of the will. As such, probate order is final and appealable. They do not have
to await the resolution of its other oppositions since the Rules of Court
enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in special
proceedings.
2. Mercado v. Santos
FACTS: Mercado filed a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased
wife. The court admitted the will to probate. 16 months after the probate of
the will, the intervenors filed a complaint against Mercado for falsification or
forgery of the will probated. Mercado moved to dismiss claiming that the will
alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the
order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution
thereof.
ISSUE: w/n the probate of the will bars criminal prosecution for the alleged
forgery of the probated will.
HELD: YES
The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due
execution thereof and cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized
by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or
proceeding. The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction
thereof is usually considered as conclusive as to its due execution and
validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing
mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under duress,
menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a
forgery.
The probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice
by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive
notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the
7
court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.
Page

Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so
peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof
however strong. The will in question having been probated by a competent
court, the law will not admit any proof to overthrow the legal presumption that
it is genuine and not a forgery.
Atillano Mercado vs. Santos (1938 Case)
Important points:
1. WILLS; CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE DUE EXECUTION OF A
PROBATED WILL. Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure is explicit
as to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probated will. It provides:
"No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and
allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court;
and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be
conclusive as to its due execution."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID. The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction
thereof is considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and is
also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time
when he executed the will, and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud,
or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery.
3. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDING "IN REM." The probate of a will in this
jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by publication as
a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole
world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding
upon everybody, even against the State.
4. ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION. Conclusive presumptions
are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will not allow them
to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong. The will in question
having been probated by a competent court, the law will not admit any proof
to overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and not a forgery.
5. ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL ACTION AGAINST FORGER OF A DULY
PROBATED WILL. Upon the facts stated in the opinion of the court, it
was held: That in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction
against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a
court of competent jurisdiction.
FACTS:
On May 28, 1931, the petitioner herein filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines
Basa. Without any opposition, and upon the testimony of Benigno F. Gabino,
one of the attesting witnesses, the probate court, on June 27, 1931, admitted
the will to probate.
Almost three years later, on April 11, 1934, the five intervenors herein
moved ex parte to reopen the proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the
court to probate the will and to close the proceedings. Because filed ex parte,
the motion was denied. The same motion was filed a second time, but with
notice to the adverse party. The motion was nevertheless denied by the
probate court on May 24, 1934. On appeal to this court, the order of denial
was affirmed on July 26, 1935. (Basa v. Mercado, 33 off. Gaz., 2521.)
It appears that on October 27, 1932, i. e., sixteen months after the probate of
the will of Ines Basa, intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed with the justice
of the peace court of San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint against the
petitioner herein, for falsification or forgery of the will probated as above
indicated. The petitioner was arrested. He put up a bond in the sum of P4,000
and engaged the services of an attorney to undertake his defense. Preliminary
investigation of the case was continued twice upon petition of the
complainant. The complaint was finally dismissed, at the instance of the
complainant herself, in an order dated December 8, 1932.
Three months later, or on March 2, 1933, the same intervenor charged the
petition for the second time with the same offense, presenting the complaint
this time in the justice of the peace court of Mexico, Pampanga. The
petitioner was again arrested, again put up a bond in the sum of P4,000, and
engaged the services of counsel to defend him. This second complaint, after
investigation, was also dismissed, again at the instance of the complainant
8
herself who alleged that the petitioner was in poor health. That was on April
Page
27, 1933.
Some nine months later, on February 2, 1934, to be exact, the same
intervenor accused the same petitioner for the third time of the same offense.
The information was filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga in the justice
of the peace court of Mexico. The petitioner was again arrested, again put up
a bond of P4,000, and engaged the services of defense counsel. The case was
dismissed on April 24, 1934, after due investigation, on the ground that the
will alleged to have been falsified had already been probated and there was
no evidence that the petitioner had forged the signature of the testatrix
appearing thereon, but that, on the contrary, the evidence satisfactorily
established the authenticity of the signature aforesaid.
Dissatisfied with the result, the provincial fiscal, on May 9, 1934, moved in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for reinvestigation of the case. The
motion was granted on May 23, 1934, and, for the fourth time, the petitioner
was arrested, filed a bond and engaged the services of counsel to handle his
defense. The reinvestigation dragged on for almost a year until February 18,
1934, when the Court of First Instance ordered that the case be tried on the
merits.
The petitioner interposed a demurrer on November 25, 1935, on the ground
that the will alleged to have been forged had already been probated. This
demurrer was overruled on December 24, 1935, whereupon an exception was
taken and a motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal were filed. The
motion for reconsideration and the proposed appeal were denied on January
14, 1936.
The case proceeded to trial, and forthwith petitioner moved to dismiss the
case claiming again that the will alleged to have been forged had already
been probated and, further, that the order probating the will is conclusive as
to the authenticity and due execution thereof.
The motion was overruled and the petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to enjoin the trial court
from further proceedings in the matter. The injunction was issued and
thereafter, on June 19, 1937, the Court of Appeals denied the petition
for certiorari, and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. Three justices
dissented in a separate opinion. The case is now before this court for review
on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the probate of the will of Petitioners deceased wife is
a bar to his criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will.
Ruling:
Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of the
due execution of a probated will. It says: "SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary,
and Conclusive as to Execution. No will shall pass either the real or
personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First
Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the
court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due
execution." (Emphasis ours.)
In Manahan v. Manahan (58 Phil., 448, 451), we held: ". . . The decree of
probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot
be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud,
in any separate or independent action or proceeding
In 28 R. C. L., p. 377, section 378, it is said:j"The probate of a will by the
probate court having jurisdiction thereof is usually considered as conclusive
as to its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive that the testator
was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and
was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the
will is genuine and not a forgery." (Emphasis ours.)
As our law on wills, particularly section 625 of our Code of Civil Procedure
aforequoted, was taken almost bodily from the Statutes of Vermont, the
decisions of the Supreme Court of that State relative to the effect of the
probate of a will are of persuasive authority in this jurisdiction.
The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The
provision of notice by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will
is constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the
judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. This
court held in the case of Manalo v. Paredes and Philippine Food Co. (47
Phil., 938):
"The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265), and
the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested, through the
publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil
9
Procedure, and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of
Page
them.

"Through the publication of the petition for the probate of the will, the court
acquires jurisdiction over all such persons as are interested in said will; and
any judgment that may be rendered after said proceeding is binding against
the world."virtua1aw library
Section 333, paragraph 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an
incontrovertible presumption in favor of judgments declared by it to be
conclusive. library
The will in question having been probated by a competent court, the law
will not admit any proof to overthrow the legal presumption that it is
genuine and not a forgery.
The majority decision of the Court of Appeals cites English decisions to
bolster up its conclusion that "the judgment admitting the will to probate is
binding upon the whole world as to the due execution and genuineness of the
will insofar as civil rights and liabilities are concerned, but not for the
purpose of punishment of a crime."
"A judgment admitting a will to probate cannot be attacked collaterally
although the will was forged; and a payment to the executor names therein of
a debt due the decedent will discharge the same, notwithstanding the
spurious character of the instrument probated. It has also been held that, upon
an indictment for forging a will, the probate of the paper in question is
conclusive evidence in the defendants favor of its genuine character. But
this particular point has lately been ruled otherwise."cralaw virtua1aw library
The dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals in the instant case under
review makes a cursory study of the statutes obtaining in England,
Massachusetts and Florida, and comes to the conclusion that the
decisions cited in the majority opinion do not appear to "have been
promulgated in the face of statutes similar to ours." The dissenting
opinion cites Whartons Criminal Evidence (11th ed., sec. 831), to show
that the probate of a will in England is only prima facie proof of the
validity of the will (Op. Cit. quoting Marriot v. Marriot, 93 English
Reprint, 770); and 21 L. R. A. (pp. 686-689 and note), to show that in
Massachusetts there is no statute making the probate of a will
conclusive, and that in Florida the statute (sec. 1810, Revised Statutes)
makes the probate conclusive evidence as to the validity of the will with
regard to personal, and prima facie as to real estate. The cases decided
by the Supreme Court of Florida cited by the majority opinion, supra,
refer to wills of both personal and real estate.
Although in the foregoing case (State v. McGlynn) the information filed by
the State was to set aside the decree of probate on the ground that the will
was forged, we see no difference in principle between that case and the case
at bar. A subtle distinction could perhaps be drawn between setting aside a
decree of probate, and declaring a probated will to be a forgery. it is clear,
however, that a duly probated will cannot be declared to be a forgery without
disturbing in a way the decree allowing said will to probate. It is at least
anomalous that a will should be regarded as genuine for one purpose and
spurious for another.
The American and English cases show a conflict of authorities on the
question as to whether or not the probate of a will bars criminal prosecution
of the alleged forger of the probated will. We have examined some important
cases and have come to the conclusion that no fixed standard may be adopted
or drawn therefrom, in view of the conflict no less than of diversity of
statutory provisions obtaining in different jurisdictions. It behooves us,
therefore, as the court of last resort, to choose that rule most consistent with
our statutory law, having in view the needed stability of property rights and
the public interest in general.
To be sure, we have seriously reflected upon the dangers of evasion from
punishment of culprits deserving of the severity of the law in cases where, as
here, forgery is discovered after the probate of the will and the prosecution is
had before the prescription of the offense. By and large, however, the balance
seems inclined in favor of the view that we have taken. Not only does the law
surround the execution of the will with the necessary formalities and require
probate to be made after an elaborate judicial proceeding, but section 113,
not to speak of section 513, of our Code of Civil Procedure provides for an
adequate remedy to any party who might have been adversely affected by the
probate of a forged will, much in the same way as other parties against whom
a judgment is rendered under the same or similar circumstances. (Pecson v.
Coronel, 43 Phil., 358.)
The aggrieved party may file an application for relief with the proper court
within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after said court
has rendered the judgment of probate, on the ground of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. An appeal lies to review the
10
action of a court of first instance when that court refuses to grant relief.
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After a judgment allowing a will to be probated has become final and
unappelable, and after the period fixed by section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure has expired, the law as an expression of the legislative wisdom
goes no further and the case ends there.
We hold, therefore, that in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333
and 625 of our Code of Civil Code Procedure, criminal action will not lie
in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been duly
admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The resolution of the foregoing legal question is sufficient to dispose of the
case.
From the view we take of the instant case, the petitioner is entitled to have
the criminal proceedings against him quashed. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is hereby reversed, without pronouncement regarding costs. So
ordered.
Spouses Alvaro PASTOR, Jr. and Ma. Elena Achaval de PASTOR,
petitioners, vs.
The COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. Juan Y. REYES, and Lewellyn
QUEMADA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983.
FACTS:
Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by
their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia
Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada.
Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged
holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained only one
testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of
30% of Pastor Sr.s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS. Thereafter,
the probate court appointed Quemada as special administrator of the
entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or not covered or affected by the
holographic will. Consequently, Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr.,
and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of estate
which included the properties subject of the legacy which were in the
names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimed to be the
owners in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The probate court
issued an order allowing the will to probate. The order was affirmed by
CA and on petition for review, the SC dismissed the petition and
remanded the same to the probate court after denying
reconsideration. For two years after remand of the case to the probate
court, all pleadings of both parties remained unacted upon. Not long
after, the probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the
will but upon objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the ground of
pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the
probate court required the parties to submit their respective position
papers. While the reconveyance suit was still pending in another
court, the probate court issued Order of Execution and Garnishment,
resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS
and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious.
Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly to
Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedents estate, of which
Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee.
Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees was
ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada.
Being immediately executory, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a
Writ of Execution and Garnishment. The oppositors sought
reconsideration thereof but in the meantime, the probate court
ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or
his assignees until after resolution of oppositors motion for
reconsideration. Pending motion, Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with the
CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction assailing the writ of execution and garnishment
issued by the probate court. However, said petition was denied as
well as their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review
by certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the
questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.
RULING:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and
large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the
question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate
11
Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
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inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and
is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of
execution is the Probate Order allegedly resolved the question of
ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the
dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific
properties. On the contrary, it is manifested therein that ownership
was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic
validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a
special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic
will with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly
authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must
proceed subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of
ownership and possession of real and personal properties.
The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of
the properties listed in the estate inventory, considering that the issue
of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance
suit that was still pending. It was, therefore, error for the assailed
implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged
with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and
royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion
of the said Probate Order directed special administrator to pay the
legacy in dispute.
De Aranz v. Judge Galing
GR No. 77047, 28 May 1988
Padilla, J.
Facts:
Private respondent filed w/ the Pasig RTC a petition for the probate &
allowance of the will of the late Montserrat Infante. The petition
specified the names & addresses of herein petitioners as legatees &
devisees. The probate court issued an order setting the petition for
hearing & the order was published in a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Mla once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. On the
date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. The hearing was reset,
on w/c date the probate court issued an order designating the clerk of
court to receive evidence ex-parte of the petitioner as there was no
opposition. During the proceedings, private respondent was
appointed executor.
2 Days later, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order.
They alleged that as legatees, no notices were sent to them as
required by Sec 4 of Rule 76 ROC. They prayed that they be given
10 days to file their opposition to the probate of the will.
The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration. The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari & prohibition consequently filed by
petitioners.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in holding that the requirement of notice on
individual heirs, devisees & legatees is merely a matter of procedural
convenience to better satisfy in some instances the requirements of
due process
12
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Held:
Yes. It is clear from Sec 4 Rule 76 ROC that notice of the time and
place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to
the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing
in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of
residence be known. There is no question that the residences of
herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate
court. The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the
names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator.
But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of
the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the
allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the
notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
The case cited by the CA in its assailed decision to support its theory
is not applicable in the present case. . If the allegation of the petition
was wrong and the true residence of petitioners was not known, then
notice upon them individually was not necessary. Individual notice
upon heirs, legatees and devisees is necessary only when they are
known or when their places of residence are known. In other
instances, such notice is not necessary and the court may acquire
and exercise jurisdiction simply upon the publication of the notice in a
newspaper of general circulation.
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-
appellant, vs. AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees,
ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.
FACTS: On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her
favor. The petition was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza
Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim
Bonilla on the following grounds: (1) Appellant was estopped from
claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will
within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75,
section 2 of the Rules of Court; (2) The alleged copy of the alleged
holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death
and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was
not a will; (3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged
copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect,
as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and (4 ) The deceased did not
leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as
required by law.
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the
case. Their motion was granted by the court in an order dated April 4,
1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the
cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the
probate of the will. They argued that: (1) The alleged holographic was
not a last will but merely an instruction as to the management and
improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent
Ricardo B. Bonilla; and (2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot
be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by
the court in its order of February 23, 1979.
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration. On July
23, 1979, the court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and
dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla.
It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the
holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the
original.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme
Court held that in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is
reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material
13
proof of authenticity of said wills.
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will
Page
was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on
May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the Rodelas v. Aranza
time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
that the original of the will could not be located shows to our mind that Relova, J. (Ponente)
the decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing
Facts:
Holographic Will. 1. The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of
Appellants motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an Ricardo Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the
appeal to the Court of Appeals. ground that the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.

2. The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the
RULING: The only question here is whether a holographic will which original will was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the
was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic original.
copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic
Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a
wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution
photocopy
has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If
uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no RULING: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be
witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic determined by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.
will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will
can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the
handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a
comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator
and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made
with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap,
104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that the execution and the contents of
a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will
itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law
regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity. But, in
Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that Perhaps it may be proved by
a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon
copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the
probate court, Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or

14
destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by

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the probate court.