Eceta vs.

Eceta
G.R. No. 157037 May 20, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926. During the subsistence of their
marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The couple acquired several properties, among which is the disputed property. Isaac died
in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs.
In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time
of his death, his compulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa.
In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the RTC of Quezon City for "Partition and Accounting with Damages"
against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her fathers death, she became Rosalinas co-heir and co-owner of the property. In
her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively.

Issue:
Whether the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of the certificate of live birth is competent evidence to prove the
alleged filiation of the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter" of her alleged father Vicente Eceta.

Ruling:
Notably, what was filed and tried before the trial court and the Court of Appeals is one for partition and accounting
with damages only. The filiation, or compulsory recognition by Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact,
both parties have already agreed and admitted, as duly noted in the trial courts pre-trial order, that Maria Theresa is Rosalinas
granddaughter.
Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth
certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresas birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act
alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa.

Valdez vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

Facts:
Same. Article 147; Emphasis to the RTCs judgment on liquidation of properties in connection with the provision of
property regime w/o unions of marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 147 correctly applied on the status of the parties in the liquidation of their properties.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court stated that, in avoid marriage, the property regimes are those provided for in Article 147 or
148as, the case may be. The liquidation of the co-ownership shall be in accordance with the provisions on co-ownership under
the Civil Code which are not in conflict with Article 147 or 148.
The conjugal home shall equally be co-owned by the couple and shall be divided equally during liquidation in
accordance with the rules on co-ownership. However, the fruits of couples separate property are not included in the co-
ownership.
 Agapay vs. Palang
276 SCRA 341

Facts:
Same. Article 148.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is co-owner of the riceland acquired by cohabitation between her and Miguel.

Ruling:
The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of
the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and
Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was patently void because earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting
and unaffected by the latters de facto separation.
Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy-and-sell and had a sari-sari store
but failed to persuade the SC that she actually contributed money to buy the riceland. Since petitioner failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, SC finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the
same.

Hontiveros vs. RTC

G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999

Facts:
The spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio
Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson for damages due to uncollected rentals on a land located at Jamindan, Capiz.
Petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that private respondents answer did not tender an
issue or that it otherwise admitted the material allegations of the complaint. Private respondents opposed the motion alleging
that they had denied petitioners claims and thus tendered certain issues of fact which could only be resolved after trial.
The trial court denied petitioners motion. After an assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by
both parties, pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact that the defendants in their answer specifically denied the claim of
damages against them, but also because the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof, however an
exception to it, that is, that when the allegations refer to the amount of damages, the allegations must still be proved. The
court dismissed the case and petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but their motion was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the complaint on the ground that it does not allege under oath that earnest efforts toward
compromise were made prior to filing thereof.

Ruling:
Petition was granted. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as
plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase "members of the same
family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether
full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.
Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros,
and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to
the Hontiveros family.

Mallilin vs. Castillo

G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000

Facts:
 Petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting
and Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint alleged that petitioner and respondent, both married and
with children, but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship while their respective marriages
still subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president
and chairman of the board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner
and respondent acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent's name. Due to irreconcilable
differences, the couple separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties, but respondent
refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name.
Respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerage business with petitioner but alleged that the
Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation was organized with other individuals and duly registered with the SEC. She denied
that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because the fact was that they were still legally married to their respective
spouses. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition on the
ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in her name.

Issue:
Whether or not the parties are considered as co-owners of the properties.

Ruling:
A co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions
which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple are
not capacitated to marry each other.

MERCADO-FEHR vs. FEHR

G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003

Facts:
In March 1983, after 2 years of long-distance courtship, Elna left Cebuand moved in with
Bruno in Manila. They had their first child in December thesame year. They purchased a
condominium unit (Suite 204) at LGCcondominium by a contract TO sell dated July 26, 1983. They
got married inMarch 1985. In 1998, trial court declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno,void
ab initio under FC 36 and subsequently ordered the liquidation of theirconjugal partnership. The
court found Suite 204 to be exclusive property of Bruno because it was purchased on installment
basis using Bruno s exclusivefunds prior to the marriage. Their properties were also divided into 3
(1/3-Elna;1/3-Bruno; 1/3-2 children).

Issue:
Whether or not Suite 204 is Brunos exclusive property

Ruling:
No. The Family Code, Article 147 applies in this case because 1) both of them were
capacitated tomarry each other; 2) they lived exclusively as husband and wife; and 3) theirunion is
without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Evidenceshows that the property was
acquired during their cohabitation and in applyingFC 147, the rules on co-ownership should govern.
Suite 204 must be consideredas common property of Elna and Bruno. 3-way partition of properties
does not apply also. Property regime should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership
 MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J. REYES vs. LOURDES REYES,
MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR.
G.R. No. 154645 July 13, 2004

Facts:

In the marriage between Lourdes Reyes and the deceased husband Rodolfo Reyes, Rodolfo
has an illicit relationship with Milagros Joaquino. The deceased allegedly "put into custody" some of
the couple's conjugal properties to Milagros.

On July 12,1979, there is a transfer of property in favor of the petitioner and for which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90293 of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV was
issued in the name of petitioner Milagros B. Joaquino. The complainant alleges that that the funds
used to purchase the property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased.

The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in petitioners possession and
that the real and personal properties in petitioners possession are conjugal partnership properties of
the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half belongs exclusively to respondent
Lourdes P. Reyes and the other half to the estate of Rodolfo A. Reyes to be apportioned among the
other respondents as his forced heirs. Respondents therefore, pray that the property covered by
T.C.T. No. 90293 be declared conjugal property of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A.
Reyes and that petitioner be ordered to reconvey the property in respondents favor; that the two
cars in petitioners possession be delivered to respondents and that petitioner be made to pay actual,
compensatory and moral damages to respondents as well as attorneys fees.

Issue:
Whether or not the common law relationship between Milagros Joaquino and the deceases
validates her claim of ownership.

Ruling:
No. Under Article 145 of the Civil Code, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created
upon marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or
judicial separation of property. Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband
and wife. As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153 of the Code, which we
quote:

"(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either
of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the
common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse."

Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to
pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the
rebuttable presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been acquired
during the existence of the marriage.

In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family Code has been applied.
Thus, when a common-law couple has a legal impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by
them -- through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall be owned by
them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Milagros likewise failed to
prove that she was indeed financially capable of purchasing the house and lot, that she actually
contributed to the payments, and that she was employed any time after 1961 when the property was
purchased. The Certification and Affidavits stating that she borrowed money from her siblings and
had earnings from a jewelry business were also deemed to have no probative values, they were not
cross-examined by the respondents.

TE vs. TE
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009

Facts:

On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to court to get married. He was 25 years
old and she was 20. They continued to stay at her uncles place but he Edward was being treated like
a prisoner. In one instance, Rowena insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they could live
independently but this request was angrily denied by his father who insisted that Edward go home
else, he would be disinherited. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle
and stayed with his parents. His family hid him from Rowena when she called. In June 1996,
Edward was able to talk to Rowena but, unmoved by Edwards persistence that they live together,
she decided that they should separate ways. On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage with Rowena on the ground
of psychological incapacity.

On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted an investigation report
stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between the parties and therefore,
recommended trial on the merits. Upon the findings of the clinical psychologist of psychological
incapacity of Edward (dependent personality disorder) and Rowena (narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder), the Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void. However, the
Appellate Court reversed and set aside the Trial Courts decision on the ground that the clinical
psychologist did not examine the respondent and merely banked on the testimony of the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity given
the petitioners totality of evidence.

Ruling:
Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. The psychological
assessment adequately, sufficiently and decisively points to Edwards dependent personality disorder
and Rowenas narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder. Also, the Regional Trial Court viewed,
at first-hand, the witnesses deportment. With Edwards affliction of dependent personality disorder,
he cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love and respect and
rendering help and support because he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from
others, allows others to make most of his important decisions, tends to agree with people even when
he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone
and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. The petitioner followed everything dictated
to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.Rowenas
affliction with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations.

This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.Moreover, as shown in
this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner
with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.Both parties being afflicted with grave,
severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on April 23,
1996 is thus, declared null and void, reversing and setting aside the decision of the appellate court.

NIAL vs. BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

Facts:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa.
One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

After Pepitos death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license.

Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article
34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license.

Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved
at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.

Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal
and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled.

In this case, at the time Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the
time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20
months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse.

The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as husband and wife.

Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to
the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.