Vigiliae Christianae 69 (2015) 500-527 Vigiliae

Christianae
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Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1

Anthony Briggman
Emory University, 1531 Dickey Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA
abriggm@emory.edu

Abstract

Scholars have long queried the influence of rhetorical theory upon Irenaeus thought.
Despite the identification of various aspects of rhetorical theory in his work, a clear
sense of the centrality and importance of rhetorical theory to Irenaeus has not emerged.
In this article I argue that concepts belonging to literary and rhetorical theory are of
central importance to Irenaeus anti-Gnostic polemic in AH 1.8.1-10.3 and even feature in
his constructive thought. What emerges is a picture of Irenaeus as a polemicist and
theologian who ably uses tools acquired in a thorough grammatical and rhetorical
education.

Keywords

Irenaeus rhetoric rhetorical theory literary theory Gnosticism

hypothesis conomia

The suggestion that Irenaeus of Lyons drew upon rhetorical theory is not new.
Eighty years ago Bruno Reynders highlighted Irenaeus use of the dilemma,
counter question, and ad hominem argument.1 The following decade saw
Robert M. Grant demonstrate Irenaeus rhetorical training in his seminal arti-
cle, Irenaeus and Hellenistic Culture.2 Grant concluded by famously exhort-
ing scholars to refocus the camera and take again the picture of Irenaeus.3 Ten
years later William R. Schoedel argued that the structure of Against Heresies

1 B. Reynders, La Polmique de S. Irne, RTAM 7 (1935) 5-27, here 8-10.

2 R.M. Grant, Irenaeus and Hellenistic Culture, HTR 42.1 (1949) 41-51, esp. 47-51.
3 Grant, Irenaeus and Hellenistic Culture, 51.

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 5|doi 10.1163/15700720-12341238

Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1 501

coincides with rhetorical models and that the method of Irenaeus argumenta-
tion corresponds to those advocated in the rhetorical schools.4 But he was tem-
pered in his conclusions: Irenaeus had some knowledge of Hellenistic rhetoric
and had been exposed at some time to the fundamentals of a Hellenistic edu-
cation, but Irenaeus argumentation falls short of the rhetorical goal of suc-
cessfully refuting and supporting a proposition.5
In the years that followed scholars have recognized the importance of lit-
erary and rhetorical theory to Irenaeus thought in terms of his use of the
concepts of hypothesis (), conomia (), and recapitulation
().6 Even so, these studies have done little more than note that
Irenaeus use of these terms conforms to the literary and rhetorical theory of
his day. They have not established the degree to which these concepts define
his polemic or his constructive thought, and, therefore, have not led to a new
consensus concerning the importance of literary and rhetorical theory to
Irenaeus work. It is as if Schoedels tempered evaluation still reigns.
This article is the first of a two-part study that refocuses the camera and
takes the picture of Irenaeus once again.7 I argue that aspects of literary and
rhetorical theory are of central importance to Irenaeus anti-Gnostic polemic
in Against Heresies 1.8.1-10.3 and even feature in his constructive thought.
Irenaeus appears, then, to have enjoyed a more thorough grammatical and
rhetorical education than previously recognized.

4 W.R. Schoedel, Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Adversus Haereses of Irenaeus, VC 13.1 (1959)
22-32, here 27-32.
5 Schoedel, Philosophy and Rhetoric in Irenaeus, 31. The following paragraphs indicate that
Schoedel is mainly questioning, in this last point, Irenaeus success in supporting a propo-
sition. He writes, for instance, Irenaeus partial and undeveloped answers are never to be
separated from their polemical framework (p. 32).
6 E.g., W.C. van Unnik, An Interesting Document of Second Century Theological Discussion
(Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.10.3), VC 31.3 (1977) 196-228, here 206-7; R.A. Norris, Theology and
Language in Irenaeus of Lyon, ATR 76.3 (1994) 285-95, here 287-90; R.M. Grant, Irenaeus
of Lyons (TECF; London and New York: Routledge, 1997) 46-53; P.M. Blowers, The Regula
Fidei and the Narrative Character of Early Christian Faith, ProEcc 6.2 (1997) 199-228, here
211-12; and J. Behr, The Way to Nicaea (Formation of Christian Theology, vol. 1; Crestwood, NY:
St. Vladimirs Seminary Press, 2001) 123-33. In contrast, A. DAles suggests over 120 appear-
ances of oo in Irenaeus but fails to identify a single meaning that corresponds to its
use in literary and rhetorical theory in his Le mot oikonomia dans la langue thologique de
saint Irne, Revue des tudes Grecques 32 (1919) 1-9, esp. 6-7.
7 To this end, see also my Revisiting Irenaeus Philosophical Acumen, VC 65.2 (2011) 115-24; and
Irenaeus Christology of Mixture, JTS 64.2 (2013) 516-55.

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502 Briggman

I shall proceed by examining Irenaeus appropriation of three concepts

belonging to ancient literary and rhetorical theory, though it must be said that
I give a little more attention to their rhetorical provenance. The first section
of this study considers his use of hypothesis (), the second conomia
(), and the third fiction ( and ).8

1 Hypothesis ()

The importance of the concept of hypothesis to Irenaeus polemical and theo-

logical argumentation has garnered attention since Philip Hefner asserted, the
one highest authority for Irenaeus is the system, framework, or hypothesis of
the Faith.9 A few years later Robert Wilken added, it appears that the question
of the hypothesis, the sense, the meaning of the Christian faith is at the very
heart of his theological work.10 The most important contributions, however,
have come from the pens of W.C. van Unnik and, much later, Robert M. Grant
and Richard A. Norris. Each sought to establish the particular meaning of the
term in Irenaeus, and each argued that the term is best rendered as plot or
argument in accordance with its use in ancient literary and rhetorical theory.11
Hypothesis stands among the foundational concepts of literary and rhe-
torical theory. Writing toward the end of the second century, Sextus Empiricus
introduced his argument against geometers by defining three principle mean-
ings of the term.12 Rhetoricians use hypothesis to signify an investigation
of particulars, in which sense the sophists are wont to say often in their dis-
courses, One must posit the hypothesis. Philosophers and scientists term

8 A portion of this study was first presented at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the North
American Patristics Society as part of a paper prompted by discussion with Lewis Ayres,
whose own article on similar themes is forthcoming in JECS (2015). I am grateful for his
comments on an earlier draft of this article.
9 P. Hefner, Theological Methodology and St. Irenaeus, JrnRel 44.4 (1964) 294-309, here 295.
10 R.L. Wilken, The Homeric Cento in Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses I, 9,4, VC 21.1 (1967)
25-33, here 33.
11 W.C. van Unnik, Interesting Document, 206-7; R.A. Norris, Theology and Language,
287-90; and R.M. Grant, Irenaeus of Lyons, 47-9. See also: P.M. Blowers, Regula Fidei and
Narrative Character, 211-12.
12 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 3.3-4. Unless otherwise noted the text and trans-
lation of Sextus comes from Sextus Empiricus in Four Volumes (LCL; trans. R.G. Bury;
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933-59). My presentation of Sextus closely follows
the work of W. Trimpi, The Ancient Hypothesis of Fiction: An Essay on the Origins of
Literary Theory, Traditio 2 (1971) 1-78, here 21-22.

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Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1 503

the starting point of proofs hypothesis, it being the postulating something

for the purpose of proving something. A third group, including presumably
dramatists and literary critics, use the word to mean:

...the peripeteia (or argument or plot) of a drama, as we say that there

is a tragic or a comic hypothesis, and certain hypotheses of Dicaearchus
of the stories of Euripides and Sophocles, meaning by hypothesis noth-
ing else than the peripeteia of the drama.

It is this last meaning of hypothesis (which Sextus actually presents first) that
is most applicable to Irenaeus thought. R.M. Grant has illustrated the breadth
of this meaning by highlighting various uses of hypothesis in literary and rhe-
torical sources.13 Hypothesis, he observes, appears in the old grammatical
scholia on the Odyssey with the meaning of plot. At Odyssey 1.328 the whole
oikonomia (arrangement) of the hypothesis (plot) would have fallen apart
if the minstrel had sung about Odysseus impending return, for Telemachus
would not have left home and Penelopes suitors would have left.14 The histo-
rian Polybius refers to his proposed subject as the hypothesis.15 The rhetorical
analyst Theon refers to the hypotheses of political speeches.16 And, of particu-
lar relevance to Sextus definition, Grant points out that hypotheses for plays
by Sophocles and Euripides appear in Oxyrhynchus papyri of the second and
third centuries.17
The meanings of plot, narrative, and subject-matter suit Irenaeus use of
, as is most easily seen in AH 1.9.4. In the three sections that precede

13 R.M. Grant, Irenaeus of Lyons, 47-8. For a more thorough sense of the terms breadth,
see: D. Holwerda, Zur szenisch-technischen Bedeutung des Wortes , pp. 173-98
in Miscellanea tragica in honorem J.C. Kamerbeek (eds. J.M. Bremer, et al.; Amsterdam:
A. Hakkert, 1976); R. Kassel, Hypothesis, pp. 53-9 in X: Studia ad criticam inter-
pretationemque textuum Graecorum et ad historiam iuris Graceo-Romani pertinentia viro
doctissimo D. Holwerda oblata (eds. W.J. Aerts, et al.; Groningen: E. Forsten, 1985); and
R. Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories in Greek Scholia (Groningen: E. Forsten,
1987) 105-33.
14 A. Mai and P. Buttmann, Scholia Antiqua in Homeri Odysseam (Berlin, 1821), 39; Grant,
Irenaeus of Lyons, 47 and 194n.8. The translation is Grants.
15 Polybius, Histories 1.2.1; see, Grant, Irenaeus of Lyons, 47. R. Nnlist likewise reminds us
that hypothesis is the most common word for subject-matter in ancient literary criti-
cism (The Ancient Critic at Work: Terms and Concepts of Literary Criticism in Greek Scholia
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011] 24n.5).
16 Theon, Progymnasmata 1 (2.61.21 Spengel); see, Grant, Irenaeus of Lyons, 48.
17 Grant, Irenaeus of Lyons, 48; as found in Oxyrhynchus Papyri 52 (1984) 3650-53.

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this section Irenaeus argues that his Gnostic opponents offer a distorted read-
ing of Scripture in order to support an errant hypothesis of Scripture. In AH
1.9.4 he then illustrates his criticism of their methods of Scriptural interpreta-
tion by appealing to a Homeric cento.18 It is in his commentary surrounding
that cento that his understanding of hypothesis is evident:

Their own hypothesis ( / argumentationem) being fabricated,

they then collect sayings and names scattered here and there and trans-
fer them, as we have said before, from a natural to a non-natural sense.
They (thus) act like those who propose whatever hypotheses ( /
controversias) they chance upon, and then endeavor to deliver them from
the poems of Homer, so that the ignorant believe that Homer composed
the poems with that hypothesis ( / controversia), which in
reality has only recently been constructed...Who among the simple-
minded would not be led away by these verses and believe that Homer
composed them in accordance with that hypothesis ( / argu-
mento)? But the one who knows the Homeric writings, will recognize
the verses but will not recognize the hypothesis ( / argumen-
tum), since he knows that some of them were spoken, indeed, of Ulysses,
others of Hercules himself, others of Priam, and still others of Menelaus
and Agamemnon. Moreover, if he takes them and restores each one to its
proper place, he will make (their) hypothesis ( / argumentum)
disappear...By restoring each one of the passages to its proper order and
by adapting it to the body of truth, he will lay bare their fiction ( /
figmentum) and prove it (to be) without foundation.19

According to Irenaeus, the method of scriptural interpretation used by his

Gnostic opponents is like the method used by those who articulate a hypothesis
and then gather unrelated lines from Homer in order to produce a cento hav-
ing that hypothesis. Irenaeus states that a person familiar with Homer would
recognize the lines abstracted from Homers text, but would not recognize

18 J. Danilou ascribed the cento to Valentinus himself (Gospel Message and Hellenistic
Culture [A History of Early Christian Doctrine Before the Council of Nicaea, vol. 2; tr.
J.A. Baker; London: Darton, Longman & Todd / Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973]
85-6), but Wilken has since offered a persuasive argument against that theory (The
Homeric Cento in Irenaeus).
19 AH 1.9.3-4. Greek and Latin quotations of Against Heresies are taken from Irne de Lyon,
Contre les Hrsies in 10 volumes (Sources Chrtiennes; eds. A. Rousseau, et al.; Paris:
ditions du Cerf, 1965-82). Translations of AH are my own.

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Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1 505

the hypothesis fabricated out of those lines. His meaning is clear. The lines
abstracted from Homer remain the same, so they are recognizable, but the
abstraction of those lines from their original context and the arrangement of
them into a new order results in a plot, narrative, or subject-matter which dif-
fers from that of the Illiad or Odyssey.20 In the same way, Irenaeus contends,
his Gnostic opponents abstract verses, names, and expressions from Scripture
and rearrange them such that they support a plot, narrative, or subject-matter
other than that articulated by Scripture.21 The term he uses to express this
notion of plot, narrative, or subject-matter is .
Irenaeus not only uses the concept of hypothesis to characterize and cri-
tique the system of thought advocated by his Gnostic opponents, but it is also
the term he uses to present his own narrative of Scripture.22 We gain some
insight into Irenaeus hypothesis of Scripture from statements that appear in
AH 1.9.2 and 1.10.3:

Manifest, therefore, is the fabrication (the hypothesis of his Gnostic

opponents) of this exegesis. For John, when he proclaims one God
Almighty and one Only-Begotten Christ Jesus, through whom he says all
things were made (Jn 1:3), says this is the Word of God (Jn 1:1), this the
Only-Begotten (cf. Jn 1:18), this the Maker of all things, this the true Light
who enlightens every man (Jn 1:9), this the Maker of the World (Jn 1:10),
this the one who came to his own (Jn 1:11), this he that became flesh and
dwelt among us (Jn 1:14).23

Moreover, it does not follow from the fact that some know more or less
by insight24 that they should change the hypothesis itself and invent

20 Cf. Norris, Theology and Language, 289.

21 The idea that a given arrangement of texts supports a given hypothesis reflects the liter-
ary and rhetorical principle of conomia (oo), which I shall discuss in the next
section.
22 Irenaeus polemical argumentation and constructive thought should not be separated
too strictly. Irenaeus presentation of his hypothesis of Scripture is meant to counter the
hypothesis of his Gnostic opponents, but it also plays a central role in the hermeneutical
principles articulated in AH 2.25-27 and, more broadly, is the basis for the constructive
thought we find in AH 2.
23 AH 1.9.2. Irenaeus desire in this selection to establish the proper hypothesis of the
Johannine prologue calls attention to the fact that particular sections or episodes of a
work can have their own hypotheses, each subordinate to and in support of the whole.
24 For this rendering of , see: Van Unnik,
Interesting Document, 203.

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506 Briggman

another God besides the Creator, and Maker, and Nourisher of this
universeas if he were not sufficient for usor another Christ, or
another Only-Begotten.25

Each of these passages offers a glimpse of Irenaeus hypothesis articulated in

opposition to that of his Gnostic opponents. His most complete and important
statement of his hypothesis, however, has long been misidentified. In AH 1.10.1
he writes:

The Church, although dispersed throughout the whole world, even to the
ends of the earth, has received from the apostles and their disciples
the faith in one God, the Father Almighty, who made the heaven and the
earth and the sea and all that are in them;26 and in one Christ Jesus, the
Son of God, who was incarnated for our salvation; and in one Holy Spirit,
who has proclaimed through the prophets the economies: the coming,
the birth from the virgin, the passion, the resurrection from the dead,
and the bodily ascension into the heavens of the beloved Christ Jesus,
our Lord, and his coming from the heavens in the glory of the Father to
recapitulate all things (Eph 1:10), and to raise up all flesh of the whole
human race, in order that to Christ Jesus our Lord, and God, and Savior,
and King, according to the good pleasure of the invisible Father, every
knee should bow, of those in heaven and on the earth and under the
earth, and every tongue confess (Phil. 2:10-11) him, and that he should
render a just judgment toward all, and, on the one hand, he would send
to eternal fire the spiritual forces of evil (Eph 6:12), the angels who trans-
gressed and became apostates, and the impious, unjust, lawless, and blas-
phemous among men, but, on the other hand, to the righteous, and holy,
and those who have kept his commandments, and have persevered in his
loveboth those who did so from the beginning, and those who did so
after repentancehe would confer, graciously bestowing, life incorrupt-
ible, and lay up eternal glory.

This passage is usually classified as a statement of Irenaeus regula ().27

Such a reading is by no means unreasonable. Just a paragraph separates this

25 AH 1.10.3.
26 LXX Exod. 20:11; LXX Ps. 145:6; Acts 4:24, 14:15.
27 E.g., W.C. van Unnik, Interesting Document, 201; D.J. Unger, St. Irenaeus of Lyons: Against
the Heresies Book 1 (ACW 55; New York: Newman Press, 1992) 183 n.1; F. Young, The Art
of Performance: Towards a Theology of Scripture (London: Dartmon, Longman and Todd,

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Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1 507

text, which is introduced as the faith received from the apostles, from Irenaeus
reference in AH 1.9.4 to the baptismal reception of the Rule of Truth. Moreover,
the structure of this statement corresponds to what one might expect in an
early doctrinal statement such as the regula: it is oriented around the three
fundamental articles of the faith, belief in God, Jesus Christ, and the Holy
Spirit.28 Nevertheless, the reasons for regarding this passage as a statement of
Irenaeus hypothesis of Scripture are just as good, indeed, even better.
While it is true that this passage follows just one paragraph after Irenaeus ref-
erence to the Rule of Truth and is introduced as the faith received by the apos-
tles, there is no explicit identification of the text as a statement of the regula.
This runs counter to the pattern we see in Irenaeus other substantive state-
ments of the regula, in AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1, which are explicitly introduced as the
regula veritatis held by or established in the church. And while it is true that the
structure of this passage, oriented as it is around the three fundamental articles
of faith, is what one might expect to find in an early doctrinal statement,29 nei-
ther of the explicitly identified regula statements just mentioned shares that
structure. Indeed, the Rules of Truth in AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1 differ from the peri-
cope in AH 1.10.1 not only in terms of structure but also content and form.
In terms of content the regulae in AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1 are more limited in
scope. Rather than broadly addressing the creative and redemptive activity of
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as does AH 1.10.1, the regulae in AH 1.22.1 and
3.11.1 narrowly focus on the creative activity of God and his Word.30 Though
the regula articulated in AH 1.22.1 is prolix when compared to that of 3.11.1, they

1990) 49-51; E. Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)
149. According to J. Behr while this text is not formally called a canon of truth, this is the
fullest such statement given by Irenaeus (p. 79). His subsequent comments are mixed,
acknowledging Irenaeus reference to his passage with the term hypothesis (79), but later
referring to it as the Rule of Truth (85). J. Behr, Irenaeus of Lyons: Identifying Christianity
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Rousseau is the notable exception. To my knowl-
edge he does not identify this text as a statement of his regula in his notes justificatives;
he does not refer to this text in his discussion of the regula in SC 210: 220-21.
28 For the structure of this passage see Rousseau, SC 263: 133-34.
29 So, for instance, Van Unnik finds this Creed...remarkable since it is trinitarian
(Interesting Document, 201.).
30 The Holy Spirit is the subject of the third article of faith in AH 1.10.1 but does not receive
similar attention in the regulae of AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1. The brief mention of the creative
activity of the Holy Spirit later in AH 1.22.1 is unsupported by a text of Scripture and does
not find a place in 3.11.1. For a reading of the pneumatology of AH 1.22.1, see my Irenaeus of
Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit (OECS; eds. A. Louth and G. Clark; Oxford: OUP,
2012) 32-7.

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508 Briggman

share the same theme.31 Indeed, the statement at the heart of the regula in
AH 1.22.1, the Father made all things by him (the Word of the Lord), whether
visible or invisible (omnia per ipsum fecit Pater, sive visibilia sive invisibilia), is
nearly identical to the concise regula offered in AH 3.11.1, there is one almighty
God, who made all things by his Word, both visible and invisible (est unus Deus
omnipotens, qui per Verbum suum omnia fecit et visibilia et invisibilia). As the
comparison of these phrases suggests, the regula statements in these chapters
converge to reveal the essence of Irenaeus Rule of Truth as the affirmation
that there is one almighty God, who made all things by his own Word, both visible
and invisible.32
The regulae in AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1 also differ from the text of AH 1.10.1 in terms
of form. Though founded upon and informed by the Scriptures the regulae in
AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1 are theological assertions largely abstracted from the scrip-
tural narrative. That is to say, these regulae do not constitute summaries of the
scriptural narrative but rather doctrines that are based upon and emerge from
the scriptural narrative. On the other hand, the text of AH 1.10.1 underscores
episodes of Scripture in order to summarize the creative and redemptive activ-
ity of God. It is very much a prcis or summative outline of the scriptural nar-
rative: the hypothesis of ancient literary and rhetorical theory.33

31 The variation we see in Irenaeus regulae is well explained by Rousseau, when he

writes that the regula is firm in its content, although relatively supple in its formulation
(SC 210: 221).
32 Rousseau offers a similar summary of the regulae found in AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1: un seul
Dieu tout-puissant qui a cr toutes choses par son propre Verbe (SC 210: 220). However,
there is no need to deemphasize the totality of Gods creative activity by not including
visible and invisible.
33 The proper identification of Irenaeus hypothesis and regula resolve some conflicting
readings of Irenaeus. F. Young (Art of Performance) and P. Blowers (Regula Fidei and
Narrative Character) have commented upon the character of Irenaeus regula(e), both
in terms of its content and its literary form. Young contends that, while Irenaeus regula
statements contain quotations of Scripture and are generally informed by Scripture, they
are not straightforward summaries of the story of Scripture (pp. 51-52). Irenaeus regula(e)
should not, she says, be understood as simply a summary of Scripture, a rsum of the
plot (p. 49). Rather, we should think of his regula as an abstract which focuses on key
perspectives or an assertion of...doctrine (pp. 51, 52). Blowers insists that Young over-
states the non-narrative nature of Irenaeus regula (p. 210) and argues the regula articu-
lates the scriptural narrative and presents its basic dramatic structure (p. 202; see also
210-13, where his notes reveal his focus on AH 1.8.1-10.3). Their conflicting readings are
largely due to their incorrect classification of AH 1.10.1 as Irenaeus regula. Youngs com-
ments correctly characterize the true regula statements in AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1; Blowers
comments correctly characterize the hypothesis in AH 1.10.1.

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Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1 509

Understanding the text of AH 1.10.1 as a statement of Irenaeus hypothesis is

not only supported by a comparison with the two explicitly identified regulae
in Against Heresies, but also by the paragraphs that follow. At the end of AH
1.10.2 Irenaeus is in the midst of arguing that the faith articulated in AH 1.10.1 is
preserved throughout the church catholic for, he contends, the most eloquent
will not teach something different, nor will the most feeble in speech dimin-
ish that tradition. He continues this line of argumentation in AH 1.10.3 when
he writes that it does not follow from the fact that some know more or less by
insight that the hypothesis / argumentum) itself should be changed.
In so saying, Irenaeus identifies the statement of faith articulated in AH 1.10.1,
that which was received from the apostles and preserved by the church catho-
lic, as the true hypothesis of Scripture.
I would like to draw a few pertinent observations about Irenaeus hypoth-
esis of Scripture from these three passages. To begin with, Irenaeus articulates
detailed statements of his hypothesis. A brief discussion of the function of the
hypothesis in narrative construction will bring to light the significance of this
observation. Wesley Trimpi, in an article yet to be fully mined for its riches,34
approaches this topic by analyzing the seventeenth chapter of Aristotles
Poetics. The noun hypothesis never occurs in the Poetics, but Trimpi observes
that Aristotle uses its verbal forms to describe how a subject should be set out
and treated in a drama.35
According to Aristotle, The argument of the play should first be drafted
in general terms ( ), then expanded with episodes.36 The
general outline Aristotle provides of Euripides Iphigenia in Tauris illustrates
the way in which an author begins with a more abstract, less particularized,
hypothesis in order to arrive at clarity concerning the general structure of the
plot.37 Once the bare outline of events has been established the author further
particularizesfurther hypothesizesthe hypothesis by filling in specific
details such as names and then episodes which comprise the circumstances
of the story. By filling in these additional details the author is able to explain

34 W. Trimpi, The Ancient Hypothesis of Fiction: An Essay on the Origins of Literary Theory,
Traditio 2 (1971) 1-78.
35 Trimpi, Ancient Hypothesis, 43.
36 Aristotle, Poetics 17, 1455a34-b3. Unless otherwise noted, text and translations of
Aristotles Poetics come from G. Else, Aristotles Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1957), here p. 503. For an excellent commentary on this aspect
of Aristotles thought, see pp. 504-11 in Else.
37 As Trimpi points out, the verbal forms and that appear in Aristotles
discussion are related to the same root verb, , as (Ancient Hypothesis, 44).

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510 Briggman

causes and establish sequential connections, demonstrating the consistency

of the action sketched in the abstract hypothesis. Thus, the process of further
particularization or hypothesization is the method by which the author works
to establish the logical unity of the hypothesis, thereby creating a plausible
narrative.38 For this reason, the more detailed a hypothesis is, the more per-
suasive that hypothesis is.39
The hypothetical statements that Irenaeus provides above are of the par-
ticularized sort. They are not abstract outlines of the redemptive activity of
God, but rather include the names of the actors and the episodes conveying
the specific circumstances of Gods activity. For example, he names God the
Father, the Almighty, the Creator, Maker, and Nourisher of this universe; Jesus
Christ, the Son of God, the Only-Begotten, our Lord, God, Savior, and King; and,
finally, he names the Holy Spirit. He speaks of the creation of all things, the
enlightenment of humanity, the revelation of prophets, the coming, virginal
birth, passion, resurrection, and ascension of the Son of God, and the eschato-
logical judgmentall episodes in his narrative of Scripture.40
This use of detailed hypothetical statements makes polemical and construc-
tive sense. These details enable him to accentuate the logical consistency of his
hypothesis, an important move since he argues the hypotheses of his Gnostic
opponents are methodologically unsound.41 The details also ground some of
his central constructive commitments: he proclaims one God, the Creator of
all things, his Only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ, the agent of creation, who took
flesh and dwelt among us for the redemption of humanity, and the Holy Spirit
by whom the economy of salvation was proclaimed. Indeed, these selections
reveal that he regarded not only the activity central to the plot but also the
subject of that activity as essential to the hypothesis of Scripture. That is to
say, he is not only interested in the activity of God but the God who acts, not
just the economy but the one who enacts the economy. For Irenaeus a proper
conception of the one who enacts the divine economy is essential to a proper

38 Trimpi, Ancient Hypothesis, 44-45 and 48; see also: Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical
Theories, esp. 164-67.
39 The more deeply an action is rooted in circumstance, by means of further hypothesiza-
tion, the more the initial premise(s) of the hypothesis are intelligible and persuasive.
Trimpi, Ancient Hypothesis, 48.
40 J.J. OKeefe and R.R. Reno reduce Irenaeus hypothesis to Jesus Christ (Jesus Christ is
the hypothesis); this paragraph and the next reveal such a reading as unduly simplistic.
OKeefe and Reno, Sanctified Vision: An Introduction to Early Christian Interpretation of the
Bible (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005) 41.
41 I will address Irenaeus critique of their method in the upcoming sections on conomia
and fiction.

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Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1 511

conception of the divine economy itself. This is because the very purpose of
the divine economy is to establish the participation of human beings with
God, which involves the ever-increasing approximation of created beings to
the uncreated Creator.42
Having now identified and discussed the hypothesis Irenaeus articulates
in opposition to his Gnostic opponents, I would like to establish whence his
hypothesis comes. While many who have treated this question note that his
hypothesis is informed by the text of Scripture itself,43 all have stated that
Irenaeus hypothesis is in some way rooted in the tradition, namely the Rule
of Truth or Faith that he received.44 Some go so far as to identify the hypoth-
esis of Scripture with the regula.45 This identification, at times, accompanies
the assertion that Irenaeus needs an extra-scriptural rule (found in tradition)
to guide the interpretation of scriptural texts.46 The combined effect of these
readings is the minimization of scriptural texts and the elevation of received
tradition as the source of Irenaeus hypothesis.

42 Briggman, Irenaeus and the Holy Spirit, 173-81. Norris approaches this understanding
of the relationship of God to his economy when he writes, There can, it seems, be no
going beyond this hypothesis, but only inquiry into the mystery and the economy of
God that is (2.28.1) (Theology and Language, 294). The implication of this statement is
that the mystery of God is the end of the divine economy articulated in the hypothesis of
Scripture.
43 E.g., Hefner, who says the hypothesis is expounded from Scripture that is rightly inter-
preted (Theological Methodology and St. Irenaeus, 304); Blowers, who argues strongly
that the regula (which he seems to identify with the hypothesis) represents interpre-
tive canons rooted in scripture (Regula Fidei and Narrative Character, 210-11); and Norris,
who argues against the notion that Irenaeus opposed tradition (namely, the regula which
includes the hypothesis) and Scripture (Theology and Language, 290).
44 E.g., Hefner, Theological Methodology and St. Irenaeus, 303-4; Norris, Theology and
Language, 290; Grant, Irenaeus of Lyons, 49; and Blowers, Regula Fidei and Narrative
Character, 213;
45 E.g., Rousseau (SC 293: 297), Norris (Theology and Language, 290), and Grant (Irenaeus
of Lyons, 49). Both Blowers and F. Young assume the identification of the hypothesis with
the regula. Blowers when he contends the regula articulated and authenticated a world-
encompassing story or metanarrative of creation...that set[s] forth the basic dramatic
structure of the Christian vision of the world, Young when she criticizes the notion that
the regula (canon) contains a summary of the story of the scriptures (Blowers, Regula
Fidei and Narrative Character, 202, see also 210-11 and 220; Young, Art of Performance,
47-52).
46 Young, The Art of Performance, 47-52; Blowers critiques Youngs position (Regula Fidei
and Narrative Character, 210 and passim).

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512 Briggman

There is no question, given my argument above, that received tradition

was a source of Irenaeus hypothesis. His introduction of the hypothesis in
AH 1.10.1 by remarking, the church...has received from the apostles and their
disciples the faith, eliminates any doubt.47 But the source of his hypothesis
should not be restricted to tradition alone, for Irenaeus argument of AH 2.27.1
reveals that he understands the texts of Scripture themselves to furnish the
hypothesis. He writes:

The sound mind, and one which avoids danger and is pious, and which
loves the truth, will readily meditate on those things which God has
placed within the power of human beings, and has subjected to our
knowledge, and will make progress in them, daily study making the
knowledge of them easy. These are those things that come before our eyes
and those that are, in (their) very modes of expression, clearly and unam-
biguously set down in the Scriptures. And, therefore, parables should not
be adapted (non adaptari) to ambiguous (expressions). For, in this way,
the one who interprets (them) interprets without danger, and parables
will receive a like interpretation from all, and the body of truth remains
whole (veritatis corpus integrum),48 with a like adaptation of its members
(simili aptatione membrorum) and without conflict (concussione). But to

47 It may be that instruction in the hypothesis of Scripture was an aspect of baptismal cat-
echesis, for Irenaeus states in Proof 7 that baptism takes place through the three articles
of faith concerning the Father, Word/Son, and Holy Spirit (listed in Prf 6).
48 Following Rousseaus emendation of a veritate corpus to veritatis corpus (SC 293: 308-9).
Rousseau, however, compares veritatis corpus with veritatis corpusculum (
), lit. little body of truth, in AH 1.9.4 and concludes that if the diminutive cor-
pusculum () refers to the Scriptures then in this text corpus must have a broader
scope, referring to the truth received through the Scriptures as well as the created order
(SC 293: 308-9). Rousseaus interpretation improves upon previous readings, which under-
stood corpusculum () itself as broader than Scripture (e.g., F. Kattenbusch, Das
bei Irenus, ZNTW 10 [1909] 331-2; and Unger, Irenaeus: Against the
Heresies I, 182-3 n.24). But a simple comparison of corpus with corpusculum (),
which occur almost two books apart, is not a sufficient basis for determining that veritatis
corpus in 2.27.1 must have a broader scope (esp. because did not necessarily
require a diminutive meaning, since it was also used to speak of a volume, book, or even
the structure of a poemas Unger already noted in Against Heresies I, 182 n.24). It is
better to understand veritatis corpus in 2.27.1 as also referring to the Scriptures since the
members harmoniously adapted to each other in order to form a whole body of truth are
nothing but the texts of Scripture. Argued from another angle, the true hypothesis, which
Irenaeus is concerned to establish by the adaptation of ambiguous texts to clear ones, is
the hypothesis of Scripture.

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Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1 513

connect (copulare) those things which have not been clearly expressed
or placed before our eyes with the interpretations of the parables, which
each one devises as he wishes, (is absurd). For, in this way, no one will
have the hypothesis of truth (regula veritatis); rather, (for) as many as
will interpret the parables, there will be seen just as many truths mutu-
ally clashing (pugnantes...invicem) with each other and doctrines stand-
ing contrary (contraria) to one another, as with questions among Gentile
philosophers.

My turn to a passage that deals with the relationship between texts of Scripture
and the regula veritatis may be confusing given my interest in identifying the
source of his hypothesis. The mists should begin to clear, however, when I point
out that the Greek substrate for the term regula veritatis is uncertain. Rousseau
has observed that despite the fact that historians of doctrine read regula verita-
tis as rendering (the canon of truth) in Irenaeus text the
word regula is often used to translate .49 Rousseau refuses to offer an
opinion about the original substrate in this passage, reasoning that Irenaeus
thought remains substantially the same in either case. But he does not recog-
nize the importance of literary and rhetorical theory to Irenaeus thought. As
a result, it is not likely that he grasps the way in which a substrate of
would better suit the broader argument of which this passage is a part as well
as the argument in this passage itself.50
AH 2.27.1 belongs to a line of argumentation that begins two chapters earlier.
In AH 2.25.1 Irenaeus is concerned to establish the proper relationship between
particular thingsnames, works of the Lord, created thingsand the veritatis
argumento. Argumentum must translate, here, . Bruno Reynders lists
as the only Greek term in the extant fragments to be rendered by argu-
mentum.51 And this particular use in AH 2.25.1 corresponds to the repeated use
of argumentum to translate in AH 1.8.1-10.3, including the use of verita-
tis argumento to render in AH 1.10.3.52

49 SC 293: 310 (p. 267, n.1, part 2).

50 Rousseaus analysis of the substrate focuses on previous uses of regula veritatis in AH,
mentioning its use at the end of AH 1.9.4 to render and in 1.10.3 to render
(SC 293: 310). Such an approach, as Rousseaus conclusion illustrates, is unproductive.
Only a close reading of the argument in which the term appears will indicate the Greek
substrate.
51 B. Reynders, Lexique Compar du Texte Grec et des Versions Latine, Armnienne et Syriaque
de l Adversus Haereses de Saint Irne II (CSCO 142, tome 6; Louvain: L. Durbecq, 1954) 35.
52 Following Rousseaus emendation of to (SC 263: 226-27).

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514 Briggman

When, then, in AH 2.27.1 Irenaeus looks to establish the relationship between

clear texts and the regula veritatis he is in fact continuing the discussion that
began in AH 2.25.1 about the relationship of particular things to the hypothesis
of truth. For this reason, it makes the most sense to recognize
as the substrate of regula veritatis in AH 2.27.1.53 Having established
the relevance of this passage to a treatment of Irenaeus hypothesis, I turn now
to the insight this text grants with regard to the source of his hypothesis.
Irenaeus contends that interpreting parabolic texts54 by adapting them to
ambiguous texts will not lead to the hypothesis of truth but rather to as many
truths mutually clashing with each other and doctrines standing contrary to
one another as there are interpreters.55 In contrast, those who do not adapt
parabolic texts to ambiguous onesor put positively, those who adapt para-
bolic texts to clear and unambiguous texts56will interpret parabolic texts
without danger, and parables will receive a like interpretation from all, and

53 This reading is further supported by the fact that the Latin translator also renders
by regula in AH 2.25.1. Rousseau has observed that the Greek substrate for the two uses of
regula at the end of AH 2.25.1 must be the same term rendered by argumentum through-
out that section, namely, (SC 293: 299).
54 Irenaeus reference to parables (parabolae) in this section, as elsewhere in this discourse
(e.g., AH 2.20.1, 2.27.3, 2.28.3), should not be taken as a reference to the parables of which
we commonly speak, such as the parable of the prodigal son. It is, rather, a more general
term referring to any fact or event in the Scriptures understood as able to make known a
more profound reality than it represents or is supposed to represent (for examples, see
AH 2.20.1-4). See Rousseaus excellent notes on this topic in SC 293: 226-7 (note justif. p. 87,
n.2), 279-80 (p. 201, n.1), and 308 (p. 265, n.2.1).
55 Irenaeus reasons that parabolic texts should not be adapted to ambiguous texts because
our understanding of ambiguous texts remains uncertain and, therefore, they make unre-
liable interpretive guides. This reasoning builds upon his previous statement in AH 2.10.1,
where he addresses the Gnostic interest in explaining ambiguous texts of Scripture by
writing: But no question will be resolved by another question; nor, by those with sense,
will an ambiguity be explained by another ambiguity, or enigmas by another greater
enigma. But such things receive their solutions from those which are plain, harmonious,
and clear.
56 Irenaeus does not make explicit a comparable positive statement in this pericope but
his logic is clear enough. Instead of adapting texts to ambiguous texts, texts ought to be
adapted to those passages that are clear and unambiguousthose within our purview,
those that can be known by daily study. Or, as he says in AH 2.28.3, where he does offer a
positive statement: all Scripture, which has been given to us by God will be found by us
(to be) harmonious (consonans); the parables will harmonize (consonabunt) with those
(statements) which have been plainly expressed (manifeste dicta sunt), and the plain
expressions (manifeste dicta) will interpret the parables.

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Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1 515

the body of truth remains whole, with a like adaptation of its members and
without conflict.
Irenaeus explicitly identifies, therefore, three benefits of adapting parabolic
texts to the clear and unambiguous parts of Scripture. First, the interpreter
will not run the danger of producing an impious interpretation.57 Second,
rather than having multiple interpretations emerge from the adaptation of
parabolic texts to ambiguous expressions or texts, adapting them to clear and
unambiguous things results in a like interpretation from all. And, third, the
body of truth remains entire because its members, the texts, exist in a harmo-
nious arrangementthey are likewise adapted and do not conflict with one
another.58
It is, however, the fourth benefit, implicit but central to Irenaeus logic, that
bears on the source of his hypothesis. His logic is straightforward. While the
adaptation of parabolic texts to ambiguous texts will not lead to the hypoth-
esis of truth but produce mutually clashing truths and contrary doctrines, the
adaptation of parabolic texts to unambiguous texts will produce a like adap-
tation of texts without conflict, and, we must add, lead to the hypothesis of
truth. In order to understand how the adaptation of parabolic texts to unam-
biguous texts leads to the hypothesis of truth, it is necessary to make clear
Irenaeus appropriation of literary and rhetorical theory beyond his use of the
term hypothesis.
The notion of adapting unclear texts to clear ones in order to produce a
body of truth constituted by a harmonious arrangement of texts represents an
engagement with the ancient literary and rhetorical principle of oo.59

57 Succeeding passages make it clear that this is the danger against which Irenaeus is warn-
ing, see: AH 2.25.4, 2.28.3, and 2.28.7.
58 The selection from AH 2.28.3 quoted in note 56 makes clear that the method of interpreta-
tion advocated by Irenaeus in AH 2.27.1 results in a harmonious arrangement of the texts.
59 Irenaeus assertion that a text should be adapted to another discrete text, rather than to
the whole is unusual and requires explanation. We can make sense of this assertion by
seeing in this passage not just a general engagement with the principle of oo but
a specific engagement with Quintilians Inst. Ora. 7.10.16-17 (a quotation and detailed dis-
cussion of this text appears in the next section). The parallels between this passage and
AH 2.27.1 are striking and the influence of this text may explain Irenaeus unusual asser-
tion. According to Quintilian the totality of an arranged text should be understood as a
united whole characterized by continuity (continua), rather than an aggregate of parts
merely put together (composita). An conomic reading of a text may utilize more than
one standard as a referent for the whole, one of which may be the arranged texts them-
selves, which, as Quintilian establishes, should be taken as a continuous whole (see: Eden,
Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 29-41). Should Irenaeus have shared such an

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516 Briggman

As I will explain more thoroughly in the next section, the principle of oo

maintains that discrete parts of a literary narrative or rhetorical discourse are
arranged in such a way that they substantiate the plot or argument of that
work. An interpretive corollary follows: since the arrangement of the parts of
a discourse or narrative substantiates the intention of the whole (as found in
the hypothesis), the hypothesis is established by the arrangement of texts and,
therefore, may be identified from the arrangement of texts.60
With this corollary we can make sense of Irenaeus reasoning. Interpreting
parabolic texts by adapting them to ambiguous texts will result in a mis-
guided arrangement of texts that is not consistent with the true hypothesis of
Scripture. Such an arrangement of texts will produce mutually clashing truths
and contrary doctrines, it will not lead to the hypothesis of truth. On the other
hand, interpreting parabolic texts by adapting them to clear and unambigu-
ous texts will result in an accurate arrangement of textsa like adaptation
of texts without conflictthat is consistent with the true hypothesis of
Scripture. Because such an arrangement of texts is not only consistent with but
even substantiates the true hypothesis, the interpreter is able to discern that
hypothesis from it. That is to say, such an arrangement leads to the hypothesis
of truth. Therefore, according to Irenaeus if one utilizes the proper hermeneu-
tical method one may learn the hypothesis from the scriptural text itself.
To this point we have seen that the ancient literary and rhetorical concept
of features in Irenaeus thought. It is central to his polemic with his
Gnostic opponents and his understanding of the faith passed down from the
apostles. The hypothesis Irenaeus affirms, moreover, may be received from
tradition or derived from the Scriptures. Hypothesis, however, is not the only
concept Irenaeus appropriates from literary and rhetorical theory to counter
Gnostic thought. Indeed, as we have just seen, another key element of his chal-
lenge to Gnostic interpretations of Scripture is the appropriation of the prin-
ciple oo. It is to a more detailed examination of Irenaeus use of this
principle that we now turn.

understanding, it would be logical for him to regard clear texts as markers that indicate
the overall structure or arrangement of the whole. Such markers would constitute reliable
guides for the interpretation of ambiguous texts, and, conceivably, function as worthy
standards to which ambiguous texts may be adapted.
60 A detailed discussion of the theoretical basis of this corollary appears in the next section.

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Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1 517

2 conomia (oo)

Kathy Edens studies have thrown the principle of conomia into relief.61 The
Greek rhetorician Hermagoras borrowed the term from the domestic arena to
explain various elements of elocutio, or style.62 Roman rhetoricians, however,
seemed to understand it as a principle of composition and reception that
applied more exclusively to matters of arrangement, or dispositio [Gr. ],
the second of the five rhetorical partes.63 Similar to decorum in matters of
style, conomia is the most important rhetorical principle concerned with
the accommodation of particular cases or circumstances.64 This accommo-
dation of particular cases or circumstances often manifests itself in narrative
construction as the rejection of a standard or straightforward presentation of
materialone that follows the natural order of events or the conventional
order of compositionin favor of an indirect or artificial organization of
material in order to accommodate the particular case or circumstance at
hand.65 So, for instance, Quintilian points to Homers practice of beginning at
times in the middle of a story or even at the end in order to suit the require-
ments, or circumstances, of a given story.66
This illustration grants some insight into the function of this principle in
narrative construction. conomia legislates that discrete parts of a literary or
rhetorical work should be subordinated to the intention of the whole;67 there-
fore, an conomic arrangement of material presupposes the whole.68 Since

61 K. Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition: Chapters in the Ancient Legacy &
Its Humanist Reception (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997) esp. 7-40;
and Economy in the Hermeneutics of Late Antiquity, in Reconfiguring the Relation
Rhetoric/Hermeneutics, ed. George Pullman, Studies in the Literary Imagination 28.2
(1995) 13-26. As the notes indicate, the following discussion draws heavily upon Edens
work. However, see also: Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories, 134-200; and Nnlist,
Ancient Critic, 24.
62 Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 27.
63 Eden, Economy in the Hermeneutics of Late Antiquity, 13, for both quotations; see also,
Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 27-28.
64 Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 27.
65 Eden, Economy in the Hermeneutics of Late Antiquity, 13-14; see also, Hermeneutics and
the Rhetorical Tradition, 28-29.
66 Quintilian, Inst. Orat. 7.10.11-12 and 7.10.16-17; see, Eden, Economy in the Hermeneutics of
Late Antiquity, 14.
67 Eden, Economy in the Hermeneutics of Late Antiquity, 14.
68 Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 29.

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518 Briggman

the intention of a whole literary or rhetorical work resides in its hypothesis,

then an conomic arrangement presupposes the hypothesisit takes the
hypothesis as its starting-place.69 Thus, Homer arranges his episodes in order
to begin in the middle or the end of a story because it supports the direction of
the hypothesis, with which he starts, perhaps by establishing purpose or per-
haps plausibility.70 At the same time, however, the very sequence of and con-
nections between the parts of a work that are established by their conomic
arrangement substantiate the logical unity of the hypothesis. So it is that the
arrangement of the parts of a literary narrative or rhetorical discourse substan-
tiates its plot or argument.71
A discourse, however, was not understood as merely an arrangement of
parts (composita) but as whole and complete (continua).72 Such is Quintilians
contention in his Institutes of Oratory (Inst. Ora.) 7.10.16-17:

And it is not enough merely to arrange (dispositio) the various parts:

each several part has its own internal economy, according to which one
thought will come first, another second, another third, while we must
struggle not merely to place these thoughts in their proper order, but to
link them together (vincti) and give them such cohesion (cohaerentes)
that there will be no trace of any suture: they must form a body, not a
congeries of limbs (corpus sit, non membra). This end will be attained
if we note what best suits each position, and take care that the words
which we place together are such as will not clash (non pugnantia), but
will mutually harmonise (invicem complectantur). Thus different facts
will not seem like perfect strangers thrust into uncongenial company
from distant places, but will be united with what precedes and follows by
an intimate bond of union, with the result that our speech will give the
impression not merely of having been put together (composita), but of
natural continuity (continua).73

69 As discussed in the previous section, the model advocated in literary and rhetorical the-
ory began with the articulation of the hypothesis, the plot of a narrative or argument of
a discourse, the arrangement of the parts of the narrative or discourse followed and cor-
responded to the articulated hypothesis. See: Trimpi, Ancient Hypothesis, 43-46.
70 Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories, 184.
71 Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories, esp. 164-7, 182-6; and Nnlist, Ancient Critic, 24.
The degree to which oo is essential to the direction of the plot may be illustrated by
Nnlists observation that oo itself often means plot in scholia and elsewhere.
72 Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 29.
73 I will return to this passage from Quintilian when discussing the third hermeneutic prin-
ciple of Irenaeus I would like to highlight.

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Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1 519

The simple arrangement of thoughts, such that one just comes after another,
is insufficientthe thoughts of a discourse must be ordered with care such
that they are linked together and coherent.74 Properly arranged thoughts,
Quintilian says, will not be a congeries of limbs but will constitute a body, they
will not clash as dissonant notes but will mutually harmonize as notes in a
melody, they will not be as strangers thrust together but will be familiar to or at
home with those around them.75 A discourse so arranged will not appear to be
a collection of parts (composita) but continuous (continua) because each part
will be united with what goes before and what comes after.76
Because conomia plays a central role in the construction of a literary or
rhetorical text, it also plays a central role in textual interpretation. Two inter-
pretive corollaries follow from the relationship of the parts to the whole estab-
lished by the principle of conomia. First, because the arrangement of the
parts substantiates the intention of the whole, the hypothesis is established by
the arrangement of texts and, therefore, may be identified from the arrange-
ment of texts. Second, because the arrangement of the parts presupposes
the intention of the whole, discrete parts find their meanings in light of the
whole and, therefore, should be interpreted in light of the whole.
With regard to this second corollary, Quintilian, as well as later grammari-
ans such as Servius and Donatus and the rhetorician Sulpitius Victor, identified
episodes of good economy (bona conomia) in a given work. They applied this
term to those moments in the narrative or dramatic action that seem unfitting
when read in isolation but entirely appropriate or artistic in the context of the
work as a whole.77 Such an conomic reading of a text can utilize more than
one standard as a referent for the whole. Since the arranged texts presuppose
the intention of the whole as found in the hypothesis, then a given text may
be read in light of the hypothesis. But a given text may also be read in light of
the arranged texts themselves,78 the totality of whichas the recent selection

74 Of course, the proper arrangement of a work does not stop at the level of its thoughts, but,
Quintilian says, extends to the ordering of each word.
75 Eden observes that conomia takes social organization, based on the unity of the family,
oikos, (Lat. domus), as the shaping analogy for literary composition (Hermeneutics and
the Rhetorical Tradition, 30).
76 So we see, again, that the proper arrangement of its parts substantiates the logical unity
of a discourse or a narrative.
77 Eden, Economy in the Hermeneutics of Late Antiquity, 14; and Hermeneutics and the
Rhetorical Tradition, 42. In the latter work Eden explains that a text may be read in light of
either the historical or textual context (pp. 29-41); this study is primarily interested in the
textual context.
78 Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 29-41.

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520 Briggman

from Quintilian shows79was understood as a united whole rather than an

aggregate of parts.80
Both of these interpretive corollaries feature in Irenaeus polemic against his
Gnostic opponents. Against Heresies opens with a recitation of the hypothesis
of his Gnostic opponents.81 Irenaeus soon turns, however, to a short critique
of the interpretive method by which his opponents support their hypothesis.
It is in this critique, which extends from AH 1.8.1-10.3, that we first glimpse the
centrality of the principle of oo to Irenaeus polemic and hermeneutic.
In AH 1.8.1 Irenaeus reproaches his opponents, writing:

...they attempt to adapt (aptare / ), in a plausible man-

ner, to their assertions either the parables of the Lord, the sayings of the
prophets, or the words of the apostles, in order that their fiction (figmen-
tum / ) may not appear to be unattested. They disregard the order
(ordinem / ) and the connection (textum / ) of the Scriptures
and, so far as in them lies, disjoint the members (membra / ) of
the truth. Moreover, they transfer and rearrange (passages), and mak-
ing one thing out of another, they deceive many by adapting (aptant /
) the words of the Lord to (their) badly composed fantasy.
Indeed, it is as if one would take an accurate image of a king, which was
carefully constructed out of precious stones by a skillful artist, destroy the
existing image of the man, change around and rearrange those stones,
and make the form of a dog or of a fox...In the same way these people

79 Cf. Cicero, De inventione 2.40.117: if words are to be considered separately by themselves,

every word, or at least many words, would seem ambiguous (ambigua); but it is not
right to regard as ambiguous what becomes plain on consideration of the whole context
(ex omni considerata scriptura) (Loeb 386; tr. H.M. Hubbell; ed. E.H. Warmington).
80 Irenaeus identifies a third standard by which one may arrive at an conomic reading
of Scripture. At the end of AH 1.9.4 Irenaeus writes that those who remember the Rule
(regula / ) of Truth received at baptism will both be able to recognize the improper
arrangement of texts, in support of an improper hypothesis, and restore texts to their
proper position. This indicates, given the discussion above, that Irenaeus regards the
regula as another referent for the whole of Scripture.
81 So defined at the beginning of AH 1.8.1: Such, then, is their hypothesis.... E. Thomassen
has identified the source of the Gnostic hypothesis Irenaeus opposes in AH 1.1-9 as writ-
ings circulated among Valentinians near the Rhne who considered themselves follow-
ers of Ptolemaeus. The authorship of the writings and their importance to this group of
Valentinians, however, remains unknown. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed: The Church of
the Valentinians (Leiden: Brill, 2008) 21. For a concise treatment of this portion of AH see,
Behr, Irenaeus: Identifying Christianity, 78-83; Behr follows Thomassen on these matters.

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Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1 521

cobble together old wives fables, and, then, plucking words, sayings, and
parables from here and there, they want to adapt (adaptare / )
the words of God to their myths (fabulis / ).

Irenaeus here levels two charges against his opponents. First, they are mishan-
dling scriptural texts by adapting (aptare / adaptare / ) them to their
fantasy. Since the fantasy of which he speaks is the hypothesis he recounted
in the chapters prior to this, then the charge really is that his opponents are
adapting scriptural texts to their (own) hypothesis.82 Second, they are mis-
handling scriptural texts by abstracting them from their original contexts and
rearranging them. He likens this process of disregarding the order (ordinem /
) and connection (textum / ) of the scriptural textsthe disjointing
of the members of the truth and arranging them anewto the rearrange-
ment of gems that constitute a mosaic of a king such that they now depict a
fox. Just a few paragraphs later in AH 1.9.4, as discussed above, he also likens
this approach to that used in the construction of a Homeric cento, accord-
ing to which lines are abstracted and rearranged so that they substantiate a
new hypothesis. In fact, his point is the same here: his Gnostic opponents are
abstracting scriptural texts from their context and rearranging them so that
they substantiate a new hypothesis, one other than the hypothesis of Scripture.
In leveling these charges Irenaeus is drawing upon the principle of oo.
Both charges are founded upon the conomic principle that discrete parts of
a discourse or narrative are arranged in a way that presupposes and substanti-
ates the intention of the whole, as found in the hypothesis. Indeed, they reflect
the two interpretive corollaries already identified. Irenaeus first charge, that
his Gnostic opponents are adapting texts to their own hypothesis, draws upon
the second corollary. He is contending that they are interpreting discrete texts
in light of the wrong whole, the wrong hypothesis, and are therefore distort-
ing the meaning of those texts.83 His second charge, that his opponents are
abstracting texts from their original context and rearranging them, draws
upon the first corollary. He is contending that the Gnostics have dissolved the
natural and correct order of the scriptural texts and arranged them anew in a

82 Irenaeus labeling of the Gnostic hypothesis as fictional, by means of the terms

and , is itself an engagement with literary theory. I shall discuss this aspect of his
polemic in the final section of this study.
83 The idea that texts are distorted when they are read in light of the Gnostic hypothesis
reflects Irenaeus characterization of the Gnostic hypothesis as fictional, as verisimilar. As
mentioned in the previous note, the final section of this study contains a more thorough
discussion of this topic.

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522 Briggman

deliberate effort to substantiate a hypothesis foreign to Scripture, namely that

which he outlines in the first chapters of AH 1. This is the theoretical point
his references to the rearranged mosaic in AH 1.8.1 and Homeric cento in
AH 1.9.4 illustrate.84
Indisputable evidence that Irenaeus is here engaging the principle of co-
nomia appears in the first line of AH 1.8.2 and again in the first lines of AH 1.10.3.
In AH 1.8.2 Irenaeus introduces several paragraphs containing illustrations of
the Gnostic practice of adapting Scripture to their hypothesis, writing:

As to those things outside their pleroma, the following are examples of

how much they attempt to accommodate (insinuare / ) (pas-
sages) from the Scriptures (to their hypothesis).

This sentence summarizes the first charge he levels in AH 1.8.1. Rather than
using or (rendered by aptare and adaptare) as he did
in 1.8.1 to speak of the adaptation of Scripture to the Gnostic hypothesis, here
he uses (rendered as insinuare). The term belongs to
the same word family as oo. But its use is even more significant because
it corresponds to the use of by the grammarians commenting on
the Homeric scholia, sometimes as a synonym for oo, sometimes with
the more specific meaning of arranging action in advance.85
Just as the use of establishes Irenaeus engagement with
the principle of oo toward the beginning of his critique, the use of
in AH 1.10.3 establishes it at the end. In AH 1.10.3 Irenaeus writes
that differing degrees of divine insight do not result in different hypotheses
but rather in different capacities to elucidate parables and accommodate
(adiungere / ) them to the hypothesis of truth.86 is a
technical term in Stoic hermeneutics by the time of Cicero, who translated it

84 His assertion in AH 1.8.1 that his opponents dissolve the members (membra / ) of
the truth may be an allusion to Quintilians assertion (Inst. Ora. 7.10.16-17) that thoughts
should be arranged so that they constitute a unified whole: they must form a body, not a
congeries of limbs (corpus sit, non membra). The hermeneutical principle Irenaeus offers
in AH 2.27.1 embodies a more substantial interaction with this passage from Quintilian,
as I discuss in the second part of this study: Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus,
part 2.
85 Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories, 185-6.
86 This statement draws upon the second interpretive corollary that follows from the princi-
ple of conomia, as identified above. Furthermore, I discuss the context of this statement
in the previous section when considering the classification of AH 1.10.1 as a statement of
Irenaeus hypothesis.

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Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1 523

with accommodare.87 A century later Plutarch instructed the young reader to

learn to adapt () the usage of words to fit the matter in hand, as the
grammarians teach us to do, taking a word for one signification at one time,
and at another time for another.88 Both uses, Eden explains, instantiate the
principle of oo.89 So too, then, does Irenaeus.
These uses of and have two important implica-
tions. First, they establish that Irenaeus polemic against Gnostic interpre-
tive method in AH 1.8.1-10.3 utilizes the literary and rhetorical principle of
oo. Second, since the use of (insinuare) parallels the use
of and (aptare and adaptare) in AH 1.8.1, it establishes
the use of any of these terms in a hermeneutical context as a likely point of
engagement with the literary and rhetorical principle of oo. The same
holds for and adiungere.
The principle of oo, therefore, constitutes the logical basis for
Irenaeus polemic against Gnostic interpretations of Scripture. It offers the
hermeneutical method by which he argues that the Gnostic hypothesis is for-
eign to the Scriptures and, therefore, misguided. The term he uses to charac-
terize such a hypothesis also derives from ancient literary theory. I turn, then,
to the final section of this paper, a short discussion of the concept of fiction in
Irenaeus.

3 Fiction ( and )

Irenaeus critique of the interpretive practices of his Gnostic opponents

includes one final nod toward ancient literary theory. Over the course of
AH 1.8.1-9.4 he characterizes Gnostic accounts as their fiction (figmentum
illorum / ), old-wives fables (anicularum fabulas /
), and myths (fabulis / ) in AH 1.8.1, as their own fiction (finc-
tionem suam / ) in AH 1.9.1, and their fiction (figmentum
ipsorum / ) in AH 1.9.4. In so doing, Irenaeus incorporates the
technical terms (fiction) and (myth), without differentiating
them, in order to label the Gnostic hypothesis as fictional.
We gain a sense for the place of these terms in literary theory from Against
the Professors 1.263-65, where Sextus Empiricus distinguishes , ,
and :

87 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 1.41.

88 Plutarch, Moralia (On How to Study Poetry) 22F.
89 Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 31-32.

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524 Briggman

Moreover, since of the subjects of history ( ) one part is

history (), another legend (), another fiction ()and
of these history () is the recording of certain things which are true
and have happened ()...and fiction () is the narrating
[of] things which are not real events but are similar (
) to real events in the telling, such as the hypothetical situations in
comedies and mimes; and legend () is the narrating of events which
have never happened () and are false ()...such then
being the variety in histories (), since there exists no art which
deals with things false and unreal ( ), and the leg-
ends and fictions ( ), which form the main
subjects of the historical part with which grammar is concerned, are false
and unreal, it will follow that there exists no art which deals with the his-
torical part of grammar ( ).

Sextus is here repeating the Hellenistic distinction between the historical nar-
rative of true events (), the narration of things like truth (), and
the legend that has no relation to truth at all ().90 Fiction () is
the realm of the verisimilar, the most historically important type of fictional
narrative.91 Myth () can be distinguished from fiction, as it is here, but
its meaning can also draw very close to that given for fiction.92 So D.A. Russell
writes, the myth-maker (muthopoios), even the maker of what we should call
fantasy, produces a suggestive or distorted image of reality, not a structure
that exists in its own right and for its own sake.93 The following selection from
Plutarchs Isis and Osiris bears this out:

But the fact is that you yourself detest those persons who hold such
abnormal and outlandish opinions about the gods. That these accounts
do not, in the least, resemble the sort of loose fictions and frivolous fab-
rications ( ) which poets and
writers of prose evolve from themselves, after the manner of spiders,

90 Trimpi, Ancient Hypothesis, 22 n.21.

91 Trimpi, Ancient Hypothesis, 22.
92 For a concise summary of the various meanings of , see Else, Aristotles Poetics, 243
and 243 n.81. Else suggests that the dominant connotation in Plato is that the story is not
literally true. Aristotles use of the term in his Poetics with the sense of the structure or
composition of eventssimilar to is a radical departure from its previous use.
93 D.A. Russell, Criticism in Antiquity (Berkely/Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1981) 100.

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Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1 525

interweaving and extending their unestablished first thoughts...Just as

the rainbow...is the reflection of the sun...so the somewhat fanciful
accounts ( ...) here set down are but reflections of some true
tale which turns back our thoughts to other matters...94

This particular combination of and does not suggest a great

distinction between the terms. Even more significant is his description of
as a reflection of a true tale, a description which clearly suggests
the definition of verisimilar.
We see in the passages of Irenaeus listed above an undifferentiated use of
and designed to discredit the hypothesis of his Gnostic oppo-
nents as fictionalas a narration of things which are not real events but are
similar to real events in the telling.95 That this is Irenaeus intent is clear from
AH 1.9.2, in which he writes: The counterfeit nature (transfinctio / ),
then, of (the Gnostic) exposition is manifest...These men, by a plausible kind
of exposition (verisimile expositionem / ), perverting
these statements (of Scripture that substantiate Irenaeus hypothesis), main-
tain the tenets of their own hypothesis. The Gnostic hypothesis is a counterfeit
(), a fraudulent imitation, which is persuasive precisely because of
the plausibility it garners by being verisimilar. It is, moreover, the very plausi-
bility garnered by its approximation to the truth that enables Irenaeus oppo-
nents to deceive the ignorant into thinking that the likeness of a fox is the
image of a king (AH 1.8.1) and to lead the simple-minded into thinking that the
cento was composed by Homer (1.9.4).
Those familiar with Plutarchs thoughts about poetry as a propaedeutic to
philosophy would not have had to read more than a few lines of AH 1.8.1 to dis-
cern this facet of Irenaeus argument. Irenaeus writes in those lines:

Citing from non-scriptural texts, they (his Gnostic opponents), as the

saying goes, strive to weave ropes of sand (harena resticulas nectere /
x ). They attempt to adapt (aptare /),
in a plausible manner (fide digne / ), to their assertions either
the parables of the Lord, the sayings of the prophets, or the words of the
apostles, in order that their fiction (figmentum / ) may not appear
to be unattested.

94 Plutarch, Moralia 358F-359A (LCL 306; Moralia vol. V; trans. F.C. Babbitt; Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1936, repr. 2003)
95 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 1.263; a longer quotation of this passage appears
in the previous section.

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526 Briggman

His association of weaving, plausibility, and fiction bears a striking resemblance

to this selection from Plutarchs How to Study Poetry (De audiendis poetis):

For the truth, because it is what actually happens does not deviate from
its course, even though the end be unpleasant; whereas fiction, being a
verbal fabrication (... ), very readily follows a round-
about route, and turns aside the painful to what is more pleasant. For
not metre nor figure of speech nor loftiness of diction nor aptness of
metaphor nor unity of composition has so much allurement and charm,
as a clever interweaving of fabulous narrative (
). But, just as in pictures, colour is more stimulating than line-
drawing because it is life-like, and creates an illusion, so in poetry false-
hood combined with plausibility ( ) is more
striking, and gives more satisfaction, than the work which is elaborate in
metre and diction, but devoid of myth and fiction ( ).96

In addition to the clear parallel constituted by the association of weaving,

plausibility, and fiction, Plutarchs linking of myth and fiction corresponds to
Irenaeus undifferentiated use of and , and Plutarchs assertion
that myth and fiction are desirable (more striking and give more satisfac-
tion) because of the combination of falsehood and plausibility corresponds
to Irenaeus assertion that the Gnostic myth/fiction is persuasive because of
its fraudulent plausibility.97 While it is impossible to prove, this level of agree-
ment between the texts strongly suggests that Irenaeus had this passage in
mind when writing AH 1.8.1. At the very least, it is safe to say that Irenaeus use
of weaving as a means to characterize the Gnostic hypothesis as fictional draws
upon the literary theory of his day. And it is likely that readers familiar with
Plutarchs literary theorizing, or even the connection between weaving and
fiction in the Latin tradition,98 would have easily perceived Irenaeus intent.

96 Moralia 16B-C (LCL 197; Moralia vol. I; trans. F.C. Babbitt; London: William Heinemann;
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927 / repr. 1986).
97 In AH 1.8.1-10.3.
98 Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 35 n.30. With regard to the Latin tradi-
tion, Eden highlights the continuing use of the terms textus, contextus, and integumen-
tum. On integumentum, see Peter Dronke, Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth in
Medieval Platonism (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974) esp. 48-52, including the long note on ancient
and patristic uses that stretches across 48 and 49, and 119-22.

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Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1 527

Conclusions

The first part of this study has shown that Irenaeus polemic against Gnostic
interpretations of Scripture in AH 1.8.1-10.3 incorporates concepts belonging to
ancient literary and rhetorical theory. Indeed, incorporate is too weak a term,
the very logic of Irenaeus argument is founded upon the concepts of hypoth-
esis (), conomia (oo), and fiction ( and ). They
are the pillars of his polemic.
Though this article has focused upon the use of literary and rhetorical the-
ory in his polemic, Irenaeus also uses concepts belonging to these theories in
his constructive thought. A small indication of this was seen in AH 1.10.1 where
he classified the confession of faith passed down from the apostles as his
hypothesis. Another example appears, as the second part of this study demon-
strates, in AH 2.25-27, where the concepts of hypothesis and conomia feature
in the hermeneutical principles he articulates.99 Taken in conjunction with his
polemic against Gnostic hermeneutic methods, the articulation of these her-
meneutical principles reveals, contra Schoedel, at least one instance in which
Irenaeus argumentation does not fall short of the rhetorical goal of success-
fully refuting and supporting a position.100
The camera has been refocused and the picture taken again. Concepts
belonging to ancient literary and rhetorical theory are not accidental to
Irenaeus thought but integral. They define contours of his polemic and even
feature in his constructive thought. Portrayals of Irenaeus as having been
exposed to just the fundamentals of a Hellenistic education and as having
only some knowledge of Hellenistic rhetoric appear ever more distorted. At
the same time, the picture of Irenaeus as a polemicist and theologian who
ably uses tools acquired in a thorough grammatical and rhetorical education
emerges ever more clearly. The second part of this study considers the herme-
neutical use to which he puts these tools.

99 See my Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, part 2.

100 Schoedel, Philosophy and Rhetoric in Irenaeus, 31; as discussed in the introduction to
this study.

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