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GO ONG VS.

CA
G.R. No. 75884
September 24, 1987

FACTS: 2 parcels of land under 1 TCT are owned by alfredo and when he died, his wife julita
go ong was appointed administratrix of his estate. Julita thereafter mortgaged 1 lot to Allied
Banking Corp. to secure a loan obtained by JK Exports, annotated as a lien on the original TCT,
with the following notation: mortgagees consent necessary in case of subsequent alienation or
encumbrance of the property
On the loan there was due a sum and Allied tried to collect it from Julita. Hence, the complaint
alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial approval which the bank had allegedly
promised to secure from the court. In response thereto, the bank averred that it was Julita who
promised to secure the courts approval.

Trial court ruled for Julita, stating that the contract is valid. CA affirmed with modification the
lower courts decision

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL OF


LAND UNDER PETITIONERS ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF
JUDICIAL APPROVAL.

HELD: contract is valid


Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval, quoted Section 7 of
Rule 89 of the Rules of Court . The CA aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court is not applicable, since the mortgage was constituted in her personal capacity and not in
her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her husband.

Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the CA cannot be faulted in ruling that the
questioned mortgage constituted on the property under administration, by authority of the
petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, with respect to her conjugal
share and to her hereditary rights.

VILLANUEVA V. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. NO. 143286

FACTS: On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her
husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas son. Eusebia sought the reconveyance
from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties (subject properties), claiming that such are her
conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas, having
been married on October 7, 1926.
Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue
City. During their marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in
Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the coowner of a parcel of land situated in
Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as
the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City.
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita
Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son.

Pacita, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation. She had
no properties of her own from which she could derive income. Nicolas died. Trial court in favor
of Eusebia Natuya. Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs. CA
upheld trial courts decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia and
Procopio are conjugal

HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied decision of CA affirmed. The Family Code
provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia
even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code. Thus, under the Family Code, if
the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The
burden of proof is on the party claiming conjugal. Since the subject properties were acquired
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family
Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.

G.R. No. L-68873, March 31, 1989Lucilda Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, ET. Al.

FACTS:
Cesario Cabutihan was married to Beinvenida Durana, whom he had five children, upon the
deathof the wife; Cesario contracted a second marriage with his former wifes sister Victorina.
Private respondents filed settlement over the property of their deceased parents. Trial Court
rendered a decision holding that Victorina Durana had no paraphernal properties brought to her
marriage with Cesario. That the copra business was formed during the first marriage and
Victorina used the same facilities, credit and capital in managing the business, and the main
source of the income not only of Cesario and also of Victorina during their respective lifetimes
was the copra business. Hence, the extent ofthe Estate of Victorina shall consist only of her share
in the inheritance of the Estate of Cesario Cabutihan. Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the
decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:Is the marital community of proprietary interest continued to exist in the second
marriage, evenafter the Cesario-Beinvenida conjugal partnership has been dissolved by the death
of Bienvenida?
HOLDING:
The first conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved because of death of Bienvenida and it
was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership. There should be liquidation of properties
before contracting another marriage. Since there was none, the total mass of the partnership
property shall bedivided between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each
and to the property belonging to the respective spouses.One-half (1/2) of the properties that
pertain to the first conjugal partnership belong to Cesario as his conjugal share therein, while
the other half shall be considered as inherited by him and his five childrenas the heirs
of Bienvenida.The properties pertaining to the second partnership shall also be equally divided,
one-half (1/2) tobelong to Cesario and the other to Victorina as their respective shares in their
conjugal partnershipproperties. The share of Cesario should then be divided among his heirs, namely,
Victorina and his five (5)children.

JOCSON V. VASQUEZ
170 SCRA 333

Facts: Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving
offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto
Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her
intestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1, 1972.

The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson
during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share
in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be
declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him
and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.

Petitioner filed his original complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 27, Rollo) on June 20,1973 with the
then Court of First Instance of Naic, Cavite (docketed as Civil Case No. TM- 531), and which
was twice amended. In his Second Amended Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein
petitioner assailed the evidence documents for being null and void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R rendered a decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo)
and reversed that of the trial court's.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed properties are part of the conjugal partnership of property of
their parents.

Held: NO. It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under
Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the
marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which
petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name
of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired
during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.It
may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still
a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why
he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter. There being no such proof, the
condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not exist. Necessarily, We
rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.

MOISES JOCSON V. CA

170 SCRA 333

Facts: Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving
offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto
Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her
intestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1, 1972.

The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson
during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share
in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be
declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him
and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.

Petitioner filed his original complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 27, Rollo) on June 20,1973 with the
then Court of First Instance of Naic, Cavite (docketed as Civil Case No. TM- 531), and which
was twice amended. In his Second Amended Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein
petitioner assailed the evidence documents for being null and void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R rendered a decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo)
and reversed that of the trial court's.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed properties are part of the conjugal partnership of property of
their parents.

Held: NO. It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under
Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the
marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which
petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name
of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired
during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.It
may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still
a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why
he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter. There being no such proof, the
condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not exist. Necessarily, We
rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.