DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G.

LUCERO
G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

FACTS:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been
bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol,
the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The accused, assisted by counsel, appeared
at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he
pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. Then his counsel moved that the complainant present
her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law. The
fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In view thereof, the
accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence, and the justice of the peace forwarded the
case to the court of first instance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Justice of the Peace court of Masantol committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's
motion to return the record.

HELD:
Evidence is the mode and manner of proving competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in
dispute in judicial proceedings. It is fundamentally a procedural law. The Supreme Court that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail
the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. Said section defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the
preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a
course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority and denied even any discretion
on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses
to testify anew.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

EL GRECO SHIP MANNING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

G.R. No. 177188 December 4, 2008

FACTS:
The BOC issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention of the rice shipped by M/V Criston, operated by Glucer Shipping, on the
ground that it left the Port of Manila without the necessary clearance from the Philippine Coast Guard. A notice of the scheduled
hearing of the seizure cases was sent to Glucer Shipping but it failed to appear at the hearing. After a typhoon had passed
through Albay, M/V Criston failed to return to the Port of Tabaco and was nowhere to be found. The BOC then received
information that M/V Criston was found in Bataan sporting the name of M/V Neptune Breeze. The District Collector rendered a
Decision ordering the forfeiture of the M/V Criston, also known as M/V Neptune Breeze, and its cargo. In the meantime, El Greco,
the duly authorized local agent of the registered owner of M/V Neptune Breeze filed a Motion for Intervention claiming that M/V
Neptune Breeze was a foreign registered vessel owned by Atlantic Pacific, and different from M/V Criston which had been
involved in smuggling activities in Legaspi, Albay.

Manila District Collector issued an Order quashing the Warrant of Seizure and Detention it issued against M/V Neptune Breeze
for lack of probable cause that the said vessel was the same one known as M/V Criston which fled from the jurisdiction of the
BOC Legaspi District after being seized and detained therein for allegedly engaging in smuggling activities. By review of the BOC,
the prior order was reversed. CTA ordered forfeiture of the vessel. MR was denied for failure to present issues that had not been
previously threshed out in its earlier Decision. CTA en Banc affirmed CTA division.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT M/V NEPTUNE BREEZE AND M/V CRISTON ARE ONE AND THE SAME VESSEL.

RULING: YES
Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of facts of the CTA are binding on this Court and can only be disturbed on appeal if not
supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
The court cannot give much credence to the self-serving denial by El Greco that M/V Neptune Breeze is not the same as M/V
Criston in light of the substantial evidence on record to the contrary. The foreign registration of M/V Neptune Breeze proves only
that it was registered in a foreign country; but it does not render impossible the conclusions consistently reached by the courts,
that M/V Neptune Breeze was the very same vessel used in the conduct of smuggling activities in the name M/V Criston.

In administrative proceedings, such as those before the BOC, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied
and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Although it was not able to participate in the proceedings, it had ample opportunity to present its side of the controversy in
before the Manila District Collector. Even the evidence presented by El Greco in the latter proceedings fails to persuade. The only
vital evidence it presented before the Manila District Collector was the foreign registration of M/V Neptune Breeze. It was still
the same piece of evidence which El Greco submitted to this Court.

Governor Sadikul A. Sahali v. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

During the 2010 elections, Sadikul A. Sahali (Sadikul) and private respondent Rashidin H. Matba (Matba) were two of the four
candidates who ran for the position of governor in the Province of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and private respondent Jilkasi J. Usman
(Usman) ran for the position of Vice-Governor.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as the duly elected governor and vice-
governor, respectively.

Matba and Usman filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the COMELEC. Matba contested the results in 39 out of 282
clustered precincts that functioned in the province of TawiTawi. Sadikul and Ruby filed their answer with counter protest.

The COMELEC First Division directed its Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to conduct a technical examination of
the said election paraphernalia by comparing the signature and thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as against those appearing
on the VRRs and the Book of Voters. Sadikul and Ruby jointly filed with the COMELEC First Division a Strong Manifestation of
Grave Concern and Motion for Reconsideration.

The COMELEC First Division issued the herein assailed Order which denied the said motion for reconsideration filed by Sadikul
and Ruby.

Sadikul and Ruby filed the instant petition asserting that the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUES: Whether or not Sadikul and Rubys resort to the remedy of certiorari to assail an interlocutory order issued by the
COMELEC first division is proper?

Whether or not Sadikul and Ruby were denied due process when the COMELEC granted the motion for technical examination
filed by Matba and Usman without giving them the opportunity to oppose the said motion?

HELD: Petition is denied.

POLITICAL LAW: Section 7, Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution; due process

FIRST ISSUE: The power of the Supreme Court to review election cases falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC only extends to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory orders issued by a Division
thereof.
In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, Supreme Court elucidated on the import of Section 7, Art IX of the Constitution in this wise: We have
interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers. This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly
not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even
a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.

Here, the Orders issued by the First Division of the COMELEC were merely interlocutory orders since they only disposed of an
incident in the main case i.e. the propriety of the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia. Thus, the proper
recourse for Sadikul and Ruby is to await the decision of the COMELEC First Division in the election protests filed by Matba and
Usman, and should they be aggrieved thereby, to appeal the same to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for
reconsideration.

SECOND ISSUE: The Supreme Court cannot see how due process was denied to the petitioners in the issuance of the COMELEC
First Divisions Order.

It bears stressing that the COMELEC, in election disputes, is not duty-bound to notify and direct a party therein to file an
opposition to a motion filed by the other party. It is incumbent upon the party concerned, if he/she deems it necessary, to file an
opposition to a motion within five days from receipt of a copy of the same without awaiting for the COMELECs directive to do
so.

Sadikul and Ruby were able to present their opposition to the said motion for technical examination in their manifestation and
motion for reconsideration which they filed with the COMELEC First Division. Indeed, their objections to the technical
examination of the said election paraphernalia were exhaustively discussed by the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution. Having
filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC First Divisions Order, their claim of denial of due process is clearly
unfounded.

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity
or right to be heard.

COMELEC, AFFIRMED.

Rustan Ang Pascua Vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and Irish Sagud

,Facts:Rustan Ang and Irish Sagud were on-and- off sweethearts, when the latter learned afterwards thatRustan had taken a live-
in partner (now his wife), whom he gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.Prior to the marriage of Rustan, he got in touch with
Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him. Irishrejected the proposal and changed her cellphone number but Rustan
somehow managed to get hold of itand sent her text messages, using the following numbers: 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768.
Irish repliedto his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone. In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irishreceived
through multimedia message (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with
Irishs face superimposed on the figure. The senders cellphone number, stated in
the message, was0921-8084768, one of the numbers Rustan used. Rustan boasted that it would be easy for him to
createsimilarly scandalous pictures and threatened to spread the picture through the internet. One of themessages he sent to
Irish
was:
Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa
lahat ng chatter.
Irish sought the help of Vice Mayor Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under the police supervision, Irish contacted
Rustan through the cellphone number he used in sending thepicture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan if he could meet
her at Lorentess Resort. Rustan camewith a motorcycle and was arrested by the police upon walking towards Irish. The police
searched himand seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
Irish filed a case in violation of Sec 5 (h) of Republic Act 9262. The RTC found Irishs testimony
completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. Thus the RTC found Rustan guilty of the said crime. Rustan
appealed but denied, then raised the case to the higher court.Issues:Whether or not the accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone
message the picture pasted with her facepasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and
humiliation on her inviolation of Sec 5 (h) of RA 9262.The subordinate issues are:1)
Whether or not a dating relationship existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in
RA 92622) Whether or not a single act of harassment, like sending the nude picture in this case, constitutesa violation of Sec 5 (h)
of RA 92623) Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of hisconstitutional rights;
and4) Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case

Held:1)
Yes. Dating relationship as defined in Section 3 refers to a situation wherein the parties live as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on acontinuing basis during the
course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinarysocialization between two individuals in a business or social context
is not a dating relationship.2)

Yes. Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 punishes

any
act or series of
acts
that constitutes violenceagainst women.This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, wouldbe
enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence thatis repeatedly committed would
license isolated ones.3) No. Prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the policeofficers
seized from him at the time of the arrest. The prosecution did not need such items toprove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution
was but a photograph depicting the Sony EricssonP900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during
pre-trialconference. Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text message to Irish.4) The objection is too late
since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on suchground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived suchground for objection. Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action.
TheRules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi judicial proceedings, andadministrative proceedings. The court
AFFIRMED the decision of RTC

Miro v. Vda. de Erederos

FACTS: Mendoza, Director of the Regional Office VII of the Land Transportation Office, Cebu City (LTO Cebu), Erederos,
Mendoza's niece and secretary, Alingasa, LTO clerk, and Peque, Officer-in-Charge, Operation Division of LTO Cebu, were
administratively charged with Grave Misconduct before the Deputy Ombudsman by private complainants, namely: Maricar G
Huete (Liaison Officer of GCY Parts), Ernesto R Cantillas (Liaison Officer of Isuzu Cebu, Inc.), Leonardo Villaraso (General Manager
of TBS Trading), and Romeo C. Climaco (Corporate Secretary of Penta Star).They were likewise charged with criminal complaints
for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."

The administrative and criminal charges arose from the alleged anomalies in the distribution at the LTO Cebu of confirmation
certificates, an indispensable requirement in the processing of documents for the registration of motor vehicle with the LTO.

Specifically, the private complainants accused Alingasa of selling the confirmation certificates, supposed to be issued by the LTO
free of charge. This scheme allegedly existed upon Mendoza's assumption in office as Regional Director of LTO Cebu. They
observed that:

The NBI/Progress report submitted to the LTO Manila also revealed that the confirmation certificates were given to the
representatives of car dealers, who were authorized to supply the needed data therein. In the Requisition and Issue Voucher, it
was Roque who received the forms. On August 19, 2002, Cantillas executed an Affidavit of Desistance on the ground that he was
no longer interested in prosecuting the case.

On September 25, 2002, the Deputy Ombudsman ordered the respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits. The
respondents complied with the order and made the required submission.On December 12, 2002, the case was called for
preliminary conference. At the conference, the respondents, thru their counsels, manifested their intention to submit the case
for decision on the basis of the evidence on record after the submission of their memoranda/position papers.

In the interim, additional administrative and criminal complaints for the same charges were filed by liason officers of car
dealerships against the respondents. These new complaints were consolidated with the complaints already then pending.

In their complaints, the new complainants commonly alleged that they had to payP2,500.00 per pad to Alingasa before they
could be issued confirmation certificates by the LTO Cebu. Alingasa would give her collections to Erederos and to Mendoza.
When they protested, Erederos and Alingasa pointed to Mendoza as the source of the instructions. They were also told that the
confirmation certificates processed during the previous administration would no longer be honored under Mendoza s
administration; hence, they had to buy new sets of confirmation certificates to process the registration of their motor vehicles
with the LTO.

On January 9, 2004, the Deputy Ombudsman rendered a joint decision on the administrative aspect of the cases filed against the
respondents, and a joint resolution on the criminal aspect of the cases.

In its joint decision, the Deputy Ombudsman found Mendoza, Erederos and Alingasa guilty of grave misconduct and imposed the
penalty of dismissal from the service. Peque, on the other hand, was only found guilty of simple misconduct and was meted the
penalty of reprimand.

The Deputy Ombudsman believed the complainants allegations that Alingasa collectedP2,500.00 for the issuance of confirmation
certificates and, thereafter, remitted the collections to Erederos and to Mendoza. He relied largely on the affidavits supporting
the respondents guilt. He found the affidavits and the NBI/Progress report strong enough to establish the respondents guilt. The
Deputy Ombudsman also explained that while the distribution of confirmation certificates to authorized car dealers is not
prohibited, the demand and the collection of payment during their distribution are anomalous.

The respondents separately moved for reconsideration, but the Deputy Ombudsman denied their motions on March 5, 2004.

The respondents separately appealed to the CA to challenge the rulings against them.

On November 22, 2005, the CA granted the respondents petition and reversed the Deputy Ombudsman s joint decision in the
administrative aspect. The CA ruled that the Deputy Ombudsman s finding of grave misconduct was not supported by substantial
evidence because the affidavits, on which the decision was mainly anchored, were not corroborated by any other documentary
evidence. Additionally, the affiants did not appear during the scheduled hearings. The CA also found that the affiants failed to
categorically specify that the respondents personally demanded from them the payment ofP2,500.00 -an allegation that the
appellate court deemed material in establishing their personal knowledge. Without this allegation of personal knowledge, the CA
held that the statements in the affidavits were hearsay and, thus, should not be given any evidentiary weight.

With respect to the assailed Joint Resolution also dated January 9, 2004 (criminal aspect) issued by the public respondent, this
Court has no jurisdiction to review the same.

The Deputy Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the CA denied the motion in its resolution of April
21, 2006. The denial led to the filing of the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the administrative charge against the respondents?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.

The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the findings and conclusions of the Deputy Ombudsman on the ground
that they were not supported by substantial evidence.

POLITICAL LAW: Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact is not absolute

It is well settled that findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence.Their factual findings are generally accorded with great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by reason of
their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.

This rule was reiterated in Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-Region VII,where we held that: When the findings of fact of the
Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, it should be considered as conclusive. This Court recognizes the expertise
and independence of the Ombudsman and will avoid interfering with its findings absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, being supported by substantial evidence, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the Ombudsman which are
affirmed by the CA.
This rule on conclusiveness of factual findings, however, is not an absolute one. Despite the respect given to administrative
findings of fact, the CA may resolve factual issues, review and re-evaluate the evidence on record and reverse the administrative
agencys findings if not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, when the findings of fact by the administrative or quasi-judicial
agencies are not adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts.

In the present case, the CA found no substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the respondents are guilty of the
administrative charges against them. Mere allegation and speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof.Since the
Deputy Ombudsmans findings were found wanting by the CA of substantial evidence, the same shall not bind this Court.

REMEDIAL LAW: Rule 45 petition limited to questions of law

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, this Court deems it necessary to emphasize that a petition for review under Rule 45
is limited only to questions of law. Factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. This Court will not
review facts, as it is not our function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below. As
held in Diokno v. Hon. Cacdac,a re-examination of factual findings is outside the province of a petition for review on certiorari to
wit:

It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court because as earlier stated, this Court is not a trier of facts. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze
and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. This is already outside the province of the instant Petition for
Certiorari.

There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact, on
the other hand, exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.Unless the case falls
under any of the recognized exceptions, we are limited solely to the review of legal questions.

REMEDIAL LAW: Rule 45 petition is limited to errors of the appellate court

Furthermore, the "errors" which we may review in a petition for review on certiorari are those of the CA, and not directly those
of the trial court or the quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, or officer which rendered the decision in the first instance.It is imperative
that we refrain from conducting further scrutiny of the findings of fact made by trial courts, lest we convert this Court into a trier
of facts. As held in Reman Recio v. Heirs of the Spouses Agueda and Maria Altamirano etc. et al., SC review is limited only to the
errors of law committed by the appellate court. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is generally limited to the review
of errors of law committed by the appellate court. The Supreme Court is not obliged to review all over again the evidence which
the parties adduced in the court a quo. Of course, the general rule admits of exceptions, such as where the factual findings of the
CA and the trial court are conflicting or contradictory.

POLITICAL LAW: judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies

In Montemayor v. Bundalian,this Court laid down the guidelines for the judicial review of decisions rendered by administrative
agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers, as follows:

First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in reviewing
administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so
long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence,
determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to
the sufficiency of evidence.

Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of
discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the
evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence
that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.

The present petition directly raises, as issue, the propriety of the CA s reversal of the Deputy Ombudsman s decision that found
the respondents guilty of grave misconduct. While this issue may be one of law, its resolution also requires us to resolve the
underlying issue of whether or not substantial evidence exists to hold the respondents liable for the charge of grave misconduct.
The latter question is one of fact, but a review is warranted considering the conflicting findings of fact of the Deputy Ombudsman
and of the CA. Accordingly, we now focus on and assess the findings of fact of the Deputy Ombudsman and of the CA for their
merits.

We agree with the CA. The findings of fact of the Deputy Ombudsman are not supported by substantial evidence on record.

POLITICAL LAW: quantum of proof in administrative cases

Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence.The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is
reasonable ground to believe, based on the evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of. It need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as is required in an ordinary civil case,or evidence beyond
reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal cases, but the evidence must be enough for a reasonable mind to support a
conclusion.

Section 27 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989provides that:

Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or
decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final
and unappealable.

The only pieces of evidence presented by the complainants to establish the respondents' guilt of the act charged are: (1) their
complaint-affidavits and the (2) NBl/Progress report. As correctly found by the CA, these pieces of evidence do not meet the
quantum of proof required in administrative cases.

The affidavits show that the complainants lack personal knowledge of the participation of Mendoza and Erederos in the allegedly
anomalous act. These affidavits indicate that the complainants have commonly noticed and witnessed the anomalous sale
transaction concerning the confirmation certificates. Without going into details, they uniformly allege that to secure the
confirmation certificates, an amount ofP2,500.00 would be paid to Alingasa, an L TO personnel, "who will remit her collections to
a certain Marilyn Mendoza vda. Erederos, a niece and the Secretary of the Regional Director, Porferio Mendoza."While the
payment to Alingasa might be considered based on personal knowledge, the alleged remittance to Erederos and Mendoza -on its
face - is hearsay.

Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness

REMEDIAL LAW: facts based on a witness personal knowledge

It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own Rersonal knowledge, i.e. those
which are derived from his own perception.A witness may not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others
because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or
heard.Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only
limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as affidavits.

The records show that not one of the complainants actually witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to Erederos and
Mendoza. Nowhere in their affidavits did they specifically allege that they saw Alingasa remit the collections to Erederos. In fact,
there is no specific allegation that they saw or witnessed Erederos or Mendoza receive money. That the complainants alleged in
the preface of their affidavits that they "noticed and witnessed" the anomalous act complained of does not take their statements
out of the coverage of the hearsay evidence rule. Their testimonies are still "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but
of what he has heard from others." Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.

The affidavits also show that the complainants did not allege any specific act of the respondents. All that the affidavits allege is a
description of the allegedly anomalous scheme and the arrangement whereby payments were to be made to Alingasa. There is
no averment relating to any "personal demand" for the amount ofP2,500.00.

Based on these considerations, we cannot conclude that the complainants have personal knowledge of Erederos' and Mendoza's
participation in the anomalous act. At most, their personal knowledge only extends to the acts of Alingasa who is the recipient of
all payments for the processing of confirmation certificates. This situation, however, is affected by the complainants' failure to
specify Alingasa's act of personally demandingP2,500.00 -a crucial element in determining her guilt or innocence of the grave
misconduct charged.

With respect to Pedroza's allegation in her affidavitthat Alingasa and Erederos categorically told them that it was Mendoza who
instructed them to collect theP2,500.00 for the confirmation certificates, we once again draw a distinction between utterances
or testimonies that are merely hearsay in character or "non-hearsay," and those that are considered as legal hearsay.

REMEDIAL LAW: distinction between non-hearsay v. legal hearsay

To the former belongs the fact that utterances or statements were made; this class of extrajudicial utterances or statements is
offered not s an assertion to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but only as to the fact of the utterance made. The latter
class, on the other hand, consists of the truth of the facts asserted in the statement; this kind pertains to extrajudicial utterances
and statements that are offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted.

The difference between these two classes of utterances lies in the applicability of the rule on exclusion of hearsay evidence. The
first class, i.e. the fact that the statement was made, is not covered by the hearsay rule, while the second class, i.e. the truth of
the facts asserted in the statement, is covered by the hearsay rule. Pedroza's allegation belongs to the first class; hence, it is
inadmissible to prove the truth of the facts asserted in the statement. The following discussion, made m Patula v. People of the
Philippinesis particularly instructive:

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted,
the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received s evidence only when
made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an
assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not
apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a
thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused
uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between
(a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.

Failure to identify the affidavits renders them inadmissible under the hearsay evidence rule.

We additionally note that the affidavits were never identified by the complainants. All the allegations contained therein were
likewise uncorroborated by evidence, other than the NBI/Progress report.

In Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,we had the occasion to rule on the implications of the affiants' failure to appear during
the preliminary investigation and to identify their respective sworn statements, to wit:

A thorough review of the records, however, showed that the subject affidavits of Beck and Terencio were not even identified by
the respective affiants during the fact-finding investigation conducted by the BID Resident Ombudsman at the BID office in
Manila. Neither did they appear during the preliminary investigation to identify their respective sworn statements despite prior
notice before the investigating officer who subsequently dismissed the criminal aspect of the case upon finding that the charge
against the petitioner "was not supported by any evidence." Hence, Beck's affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. On
this basis alone, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman should have dismissed the
administrative complaint against the petitioner in the first instance.

For the affiants' failure to identify their sworn statements, and considering the seriousness of the charges filed, their affidavits
must not be accepted at face value and should be treated as inadmissible under the hearsay evidence rule.

With regard to the NBI/Progress report submitted by the complainants as corroborating evidence, the same should not be given
any weight. Contrary to the Ombudsman's assertions, the report cannot help its case under the circumstances of this case as it is
insufficient to serve as substantial basis.

REMEDIAL LAW: double hearsay rule

This quoted portion shows that it was based on complainant Huete's and Cantillas' affidavits. It constitutes double hearsay
because the material facts recited were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. As
held in Africa, et al. v. Caltex Phil. Inc., et al.,reports of investigations made by law enforcement officers or other public officials
are hearsay unless they fall within the scope of Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit: The first question before Us
refers to the admissibility of certain reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fire Departments and by a certain
Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in the reports as to
the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation.
Was knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through official information?

The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by the
reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.

The NBI/Progress report, having been submitted by the officials in the performance of their duties not on the basis of their own
personal observation of the facts reported but merely on the basis of the complainants affidavits, is hearsay. Thus, the Deputy
Ombudsman cannot rely on it.

REMEDIAL LAW: Non-applicability of strict technical rules of procedure in administrative or quasi-judicial bodies is not a license to
disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules

While administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure, this rule cannot be taken as a license to disregard fundamental evidentiary rules; the decision of the administrative
agencies and the evidence it relies upon must, at the very least, be substantial. that:

In Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumapis,we ruled that:

While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the
adjudication of cases, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary
rules. The evidence presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have probative value. Not only must there
be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

With a portion of the complainants affidavits and the NBI/Progress report being hearsay evidence, the only question that remains
is whether the respondents conduct, based on the evidence on record, amounted to grave misconduct, warranting their
dismissal in office.

CRIMINAL LAW: misconduct

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer.The misconduct is considered as grave if it involves additional elements such as corruption or willful
intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the
misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person
who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary
to duty and the rights of others.

Based on these rulings, the Deputy Ombudsman failed to establish the elements of grave misconduct.To reiterate, no substantial
evidence exists to show that Erederos and Mendoza received collected payments from Alingasa Their involvement or complicity
in the allegedly anomalous scheme cannot be justified under the affidavits of the complainants and the NBI/Progress report,
which are both hearsay. With respect to Alingasa, in view of the lack of substantial evidence showing that she personally
demanded the payment ofP2,500.00 a crucial factor in the wrongdoing alleged we find that the elements of misconduct, simple
or grave, to be wanting and unproven.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS y DELANTAR, and ROGER JALANDONI y
ARI, Appellants.

FACTS: On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Pias charged appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas), Arnold Gomez y
Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y Delantar (Santos), and Roger Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) with murder before the Las Pifias
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case 06-0854.1

PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (P02 Gregorio) testified that at around 10:30 in the evening of August 29, 2006, he and P02 Francisco
Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted a taxi that was
suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The
officers approached the taxi and asked the driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for his documents. The latter complied but,
having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they asked him to come with them to the police
station in their mobile car for further questioning.2

Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi behind. On reaching the 7-11 convenience store on the
Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he approached the
stores door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead
and hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.

On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man whom he saw running towards Pilar Village. He saw
another man, who came from the Jollibbee outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The
latter returned fire but the men were able to take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance. On
returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them had fled.

P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation Division of the Las Pias Police, testified that he and PO2 Teoson
Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito) immediately responded to PO2 Gregorios urgent call. Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver who
fled, was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas apparently
left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages.3

The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2 Pangilinan had killed was someone named Reynaldo Mendoza who was
armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The police found spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the crime scene. Follow-up operations at
nearby provinces resulted in finding the dead body of one of the suspects, Alex Angeles, at the Metro South Medical Center
along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.4

PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused Enojas mobile phone and, posing as Enojas,
communicated with the other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of
accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution
presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.5

The victims father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified that his son was at the time of his death 28 years old, unmarried, and was
receiving police pay of 8,000.00 to 10,000.00 per month. Ricardo spent 99,999 for burial expense, 16,000.00 for the
interment services, and 50,000.00 for purchase of the cemetery lot.6

Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or testify in the case,7 the accused opted to instead file
a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008 for their defense. They pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since they
were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.

On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment,8 finding all the accused guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation and use
of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. It thus sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the possibility of parole and to indemnify the heirs of PO2 Pangilinan with 165,999.00 as
actual damages, 50,000.00 as moral damages, 25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and 2,080,000.00 as compensation for loss
of earning capacity.
Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012 the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the
conviction of the accused.9 The CA, however, found the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution failed to prove
that the several accused planned the crime before committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to this Court.10

The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or
Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead.11 This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by
circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.12

Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the
accused. Thus:

1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in front of the
Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing him with them to the police station because of the questionable
documents he showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas mobile phone that contained
messages which led to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who were also taxicab drivers.

2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police station where he was about to be
taken for questioning, tending to show that he had something to hide. He certainly did not go to the police afterwards
to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.

3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away from the scene of the
shooting.

4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the
messages also referred to "Kua Justin" as the one who was hit in such shootout and later died in a hospital in Bacoor,
Cavite. These messages linked the other accused.

5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas,
and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.

6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made references to the 7-11
shootout and to the wounding of "Kua Justin," one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death.

7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an organized group of taxicab drivers
engaged in illegal activities.

8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with call numbers that
corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas left in his taxicab.13

The Court must, however, disagree with the CAs ruling that the aggravating circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b) use of
unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In "aid of armed men," the men act as accomplices only.
They must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to
be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating
circumstance that is not among the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to
murder.14 Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide, aggravated by the use of unlicensed
firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Courts earlier Resolution applying the
Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.15 Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party
to the same or has personal knowledge of them.16 Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with
the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in
his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest.1wphi1 But, assuming that this was so, it cannot
be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after
an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been
committedthe killing of PO2 Pangilinanand the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the persons they were to arrest had committed it.17 The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by
accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an
entrapment using this knowledge.

The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified to conform to current jurisprudence.18

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of Appeals Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03377. The Court instead
FINDS accused-appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit, Arnold Gomez y Fabregas, Fernando Santos y Delantar, and Roger Jalandoni y Ari
GUILTY of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court SENTENCES each of them to 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. The Court also MODIFIES the award of exemplary damages by increasing it to 30,000.00, with
an additional 50,000.00 for civil indemnity.

Admissibility of Evidence

Section 3 Rules of Court. Admissibility of evidence- Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by
law or these rules.

I. Introduction.

A. Admissibility- the character or quality which any material must necessarily possess for it to be accepted and allowed to be
presented or introduced as evidence in court. It answers the question: should the court allow the material to be used as evidence
by the party?

B. Weight- the value given or significance or impact, or importance given to the material after it has been admitted; its tendency
to convince or persuade. Hence a particular evidence may be admissible but it has no weight. Conversely, an evidence may be of
great weight or importance but it is not admissible.

II. Conditions for admissibility (Axioms of admissibility per Wigmore)

A. RELEVANCY (None but facts having rational probative value are admissible). Per section 4, Evidence must have such a relation
to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.

1. The material presented as evidence must affect the issue or question. It must have a bearing on the outcome of the case. It
requires both:

a). rational or logical relevancy in that it has a connection to the issue and therefore it has a tendency to establish the fact which
it is offered to prove. The evidence must therefore have probative value

b). legal relevancy in that the evidence is offered to prove a matter which has been properly put in issue as determined by the
pleadings in civil cases, or as fixed by the pre-trial order, or as determined by substantive law. If so the matter has materiality.

Illustration: (i). Criminal case: the fact that the crime was committed at nighttime is rationally or logically relevant to a killing at
12 midnight but evidence thereon would be not be legally relevant if nighttime was not alleged in the Information. It would be
immaterial. (ii) Civil Case: In an action for sum of money based on a promissory note, evidence that the defendant was misled
into signing the note would be rationally relevant but if fraud was never alleged as a defense, then evidence thereof would be
legally irrelevant or immaterial.
The components of relevancy are therefore probative value and materiality.

2. Rule as to collateral matters: Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or improbability of the facts in issue

a). collateral matters-facts or matters which are not in issue. They are not generally allowed to be proven except when relevant.

b) In criminal cases, the collateral matters allowed to be proven, being relevant include:

(i). Antecedent Circumstances, or those in existing even prior to the commission of the crime. They include such matters as habit,
custom, bad moral character when self defense is invoked; or plan design, conspiracy, or premeditation, agreement to a price,
promise or reward

(ii) Concomitant circumstances or those which accompany the commission of the crime such as opportunity to do the act or
incompatibility

(iii).Subsequent circumstances or those which occur after the commission of the crime, such as flight, escape, concealment, offer
of compromise

c). Example: Motive is generally irrelevant and proof thereof is not allowed except: when the evidence is purely circumstantial,
when there is doubt as to the identity of the accused, or when it is an element of the crime.

B. COMPETENCY ( All facts having rational probative value are admissible unless some specific law or rule forbids). In short the
evidence is not excluded by law or rules.

III. Principles which exclude relevant or material evidence:

A. The Exclusionary Rule Principle - the principle which mandates that evidence obtained from an illegal arrest, unreasonable
search or coercive investigation, or in violation of a particular law, must be excluded from the trial and will not be admitted as
evidence.

1. The principle judges the admissibility of evidence based on HOW the evidence is obtained or acquired and not WHAT the
evidence proves.

2. The principle is to be applied only if it is so expressly provided for by the constitution or by a particular law. Even if the manner
of obtaining the evidence is in violation of a certain law but the law does not declare that the evidence is inadmissible, then such
evidence will be admissible.

Example: The accused claimed that information about his bank accounts i.e. trust funds, was obtained in violation of the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Law ( R.A. 1405) and moved to have them be excluded as evidence. HELD: R.A. 1405 nowhere provides that an
unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence there from inadmissible in evidence. If Congress has both
established a right and provided exclusive remedies for its violation, the court would encroaching upon the prerogatives of
congress if it authorizes a remedy not provided for by statute. Absent a specific reference to an exclusionary rule, it is not
appropriate for the courts to read such a provision into the act. ( Ejercito vs. Sandiganbayan, 509 SCRA 190, Nov. 30, 2006).

3. The phrase is attributed to Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme and has its biblical reference to Mathew 7: 17-20.

B. The Doctrine of the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

1. Evidence will be excluded if it was gained through evidence uncovered in an illegal arrest, unreasonable search or coercive
interrogation, or violation of a particular exclusionary law.

2. It is an offshoot of the Exclusionary Rule which applies to primary evidence. The doctrine applies only to secondary or
derivative evidence. There must first be a primary evidence which is determined to have been illegally obtained then secondary
evidence is obtained because of the primary evidence. Since the primary evidence is inadmissible, any secondary evidence
discovered or obtained because of it may not also be used.

a. The poisonous tree is the evidence seized in an illegal arrest, search or interrogation. The fruit of this poisonous tree is
evidence discovered because of knowledge gained from the first illegal search, arrest, or interrogation or violation of a law.
b. It is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the
original illegally obtained evidence taints all those subsequently obtained.

C Illustrations: A suspect as forced to make a confession where he revealed he took shabu from the room of X. Based on this
knowledge the police went to the house of X and with the consent of X, searched his room and found the shabu. The confession
is inadmissible because of the exclusionary. It is the poisoned tree. The shabu is inadmissible because knowledge of its existence
was based on the confession. It is the fruit.

D. Exceptions to the two principles- when evidence is still admissible despite the commission of an illegal arrest, search or
interrogation, or violation of a particular exclusionary law.

1. Under the Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery- Evidence is admissible even if obtained through an unlawful arrest, search,
interrogation, or violation of an exclusionary law, if it can be established, to a very high degree of probability, that normal police
investigation would have inevitably led to the discovery of the evidence

2. Independent Source Doctrine- evidence is admissible if knowledge of the evidence is gained from a separate or independent
source that is completely unrelated to the illegal act of the law enforcers.

3. Attentuation Doctrine: evidence maybe suppressed only if there is a clear causal connection between the illegal police action
and the evidence. Or, that the chain of causation between the illegal action and the tainted evidence is too attenuated i.e too
thin, weak, decreased or fragile. This takes into consideration the following factors:

a). The time period between the illegal arrest and the ensuing confession or consented search

b). The presence of intervening factors or events

c). The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct

E. Remedy : By filing a Motion to Suppress the Evidence

III. Evidence Excluded by the Constitution

A. Under Article III of the Constitution the following evidence are inadmissible

1. evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure

2. evidence obtained in violation of the privacy of communication and correspondence, except upon lawful order of the court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise

3. evidence consisting of extra-judicial confessions which are uncounselled, or when the confessant was not properly informed of
his constitutional rights, or when the confession was coerced

4. evidence obtained in violation of the right against self-incrimination

B. Principles:

1. The exclusionary rule in all the foregoing provisions is TOTAL in that the inadmissibility or incompetency applies to all cases,
whether civil criminal or administrative, and for all purposes.

2. The incompetency applies only if the evidence was obtained by law enforcers or other authorized agencies of the government.
It does not apply if the evidence was obtained by private persons such as private security personnel or private detectives even if
they perform functions similar to the police whenever a crime was committed.

a). Thus evidence obtained by the following are not covered by the constitutional provisions: (i) the security personnel or house
detectives of hotels or commercial establishments or schools (ii) private security agencies even if they are guarding public or
government buildings/offices (iii) employers and their agents.
It will be some other appropriate principle on the admissibility of evidence which will govern.

b). However, by way of exception, the rule of incompetency applies if what are involved are the private correspondence of an
individual. In Zulueta vs. CA ( Feb. 1986) it was held that pictures and love letters proving the infidelity of the husband, kept by
him in his private clinic, taken by the wife without the knowledge of the husband, are inadmissible as evidence for being obtained
in violation of the husbands privacy of communication and correspondence.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them breaking the drawers and cabinet of the other and
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his or her
integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is available to him or her

3. Secondary evidence resulting from a violation of the foregoing provisions is inadmissible under the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
Doctrine.

IV. R.A. 4200 ( The Anti Wire Tapping Law) Exclusion as to evidence obtained through mechanical, electronic or other surveillance
or intercepting devises. (Intercepted communications)

A. Coverage: R.A 4200 declares that evidence is inadmissible if obtained through any of the following ways:

1. By using any device to secretly eavesdrop, overhear, intercept or record any communication or spoken word

a. The person who obtained the evidence may be a third person or a participant in the conversation or communication.

FACTS: Ramirez and Garcia had a confrontation in the office of Garcia. Ramirez secretly taped their verbal confrontation and
used it as evidence in her action for damages against Garcia who in turn filed a criminal case against Ramirez for violation of R.A.
4200. Ramirez held that the taping by a participant to a conversation is not covered by the law.

HELD: 1. The law does not make a distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized is a party or not to the private
conversation. 2. The nature of the conversation is immaterial What is penalized is the act of secretly overhearing, intercepting,
or recording private communications by the devices enumerate under Section 1. (Ramirez vs. C.A., September 28, 1995)

b. To be admissible the consent of the person speaking or of all the parties to the conversation. However consent is not
necessary if the words which were taped or recorded were not intended to be confidential as when the were intended to be
heard by an audience or when uttered under circumstances of time, place, occasion and similar circumstances whereby it may
reasonably be inferred that the conversation was without regard to the presence of third persons.

c. Questions:

i). Does this apply if the recording of the words was unintentional or inadvertent, such as conversations captured by a moving
video camera?

ii). Are conversations in a police entrapment included?

iii). Is lip-reading included?

iv). Are conversations captured in surveillance cameras included?

v). Does this apply to secret taping through spy cameras purposely made to be aired in television programs, such as Bitag,
XXX and Cheaters?

vi). Are the gestures, snores, laughs, weeping, included as communication or spoken words?

vii). What about satellite discs and similar facilities? Google earth?

2. By the unauthorized tapping of any wire or cable as to communications used via telephone/cable, as opposed to verbal
communications.

a). There must be a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
over hear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
i). hence over hearing through an extension telephone wire is not included even if intentional because each party to a
telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear
the conversation ( Ganaan vs. IAC, 1986)

ii). Does the Ganaan ruling apply to overhearing by telephone operators of hotels, schools, hospitals and similar establishments?

B. Exceptions: when evidence through secret recording or tapping is admissible

1. When Judicial Authorization was granted upon a written petition filed pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 4200 if the crimes
involve (a). treason (b) espionage (c) provoking war and disloyalty ( d). piracy and mutiny in the high seas (e) sedition, inciting to
sedition (g)kidnapping (h) other offenses against national security. The list is exclusive and does not include offenses which are
equally or more serious as those enumerated, such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, Trafficking in Persons, Rape, Murder.

2.When Judicial Authorization is granted upon a written petition under R.A. 9372 ( The Human Security Act of 2007) in
connection with the crimes of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. If granted the authority covers written
communications.

VI. Exclusion by Certain Rules of Evidence

1. The rule excluding secondary evidence when the primary or best evidence is available

2. The rule excluding hearsay evidence

3. The rule excluding privilege communications

VII. Kinds of Admissibility

A. Multiple Admissibility: when a material is asked by a party to be admitted as evidence, the party presenting must inform the
court of the purpose which the material is intended to serve and the court then admits the material as evidence. Multiple
admissibility may mean either (i) the evidence is admissible for several purposes or (ii) an evidence is not admissible for one
purpose but may be admitted for a different purpose if it satisfies all the requirements of the other purpose

1. Examples of the first concept: (a) a knife may be admitted to prove the accused was armed with a deadly weapon; to prove the
weapon is far deadlier than the weapon of the victim; to prove it was the weapon of the accused which cause the wounds and
not some other instrument; to corroborate the statement of a witness who claims he saw the accused holding a bladed
instrument.

2. Example of the second concept: (a). the extra judicial confession of one of several accused may not be admitted to prove there
was conspiracy among them or to prove the guilt of the other co-accused but it maybe admitted to prove the guilt of the
confessant (b) the statement of the victim may not be admitted as a dying declaration but as part of the res gestae.

B. Curative admissibility or fighting fire with fire or Opening the Door

1. This applies to a situation when improper evidence was allowed to be presented by one party, then the other party may be
allowed to introduce or present similar improper evidence but only to cure or to counter the prejudicial effect of the opponents
inadmissible evidence.

2. The party presenting must have raised an objection to the improper evidence, for if he did not, then it is discretionary for the
court to allow him to present curative evidence

3. The evidence sought to be countered should not refer to those which are incompetent due to an exclusionary rule

4. Example: P vs. D for sum of money. P was allowed to introduce evidence that D did not pay his debt as shown by his refusal to
pay his indebtedness to X, Y and Z. Defendant may introduce evidence that he paid his debts to A, B and C.
C. Conditional Admissibility: An evidence is allowed to be presented for the time being or temporarily, subject to the condition
that its relevancy or connection to other facts will later be proven, or that the party later submit evidence that it meets certain
requirements of the law or rules. If the conditions are not later met, the evidence will be stricken from the record.

1. Example: A Xerox copy of a document may be allowed to presented subject to the condition that the original be later
presented

2. Example: P vs. D to recover a parcel of land. P presents a document that the land belonged to X. If D objects to it as being
irrelevant, P can state that he will alter show that X sold the land to Y who in turn sold it to Z and then to P. The Court may admit
the document conditionally.

VIII. Policy on the Admissibility of Evidence

A. Policy of Liberality: In case a question arises as to whether or not a particular material should be admitted as evidence, Courts
are given wide discretion what to admit and to be liberal in admitting materials offered as evidence, unless the material is clearly
incompetent. The reasons are: (i) so that it may have a substantial range of facts as basis for deciding the case and (ii) in case of
appeal the appellate court may have before it all the evidence to determine whether the decision appealed from is in accordance
with the evidence, (iii) to minimize any adverse effect of the non-admission upon the party affected.

B. Limitations:

1. Evidence may be excluded even if relevant if its probative value is outweighed by the risk that its admission will cause:

a). undue or unfair prejudice

b). confusion of the issues

c). misleads the court

d). undue delay or waste of time

2. The court has the power to limit the presentation of additional evidence which are but cumulative, or to prove points which a
party has already well presented

TOMAS P. TAN, JR. VS. JOSE G. HOSANA

Void Contracts

Facts: On January 14, 1979, Jose Hosana (Jose) married Milagros Hosana (Milagros). They bought a house and lot during their
marriage in Naga City. On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to Tomas Tan (Tomas) the said property for P 200,000.00. On October
19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale against Milagros averring that while he was working in Japan, Milagros,
without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Joses signature making it appear that
Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas.

Tomas maintained that the SPA authorizing Milagros to sell the property was annotated at the back of the title Jose presented his
brother, Bonifacio as sole witness. Bonifacio testified that he learned of the sale of the subject property from Milagros son.
When Bonifacio confronted Milagros that Jose would get angry because of the sale, Milagros retorted that she sold the property
because she needed the money. Bonifacio immediately informed Jose, who was then in Japan, of the sale.
Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to the Philippines. Jose and Bonifacio verified with the Register of
Deeds and discovered that the title covering the disputed property had been transferred to Tomas. Bonifacio further testified
that Joses signature in the SPA was forged. He presented documents containing the signature of Jose for comparison.

With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a partial payment of P350,000.00 and another
P350,000.00 upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale.

Tomas noticed that the consideration written by Milagros on the Deed was only P200,000.00; he inquired why it was lower than
the actual consideration paid. Milagros explained that it was done to save on taxes. She told Tomas she needed money badly and
had to sell the house because Jose had stopped sending her money.

Issue: WON the Deed of Sale is void

Held: YES. A void or inexistent has no force and effect from the very beginning. This rule applies to contracts that are declared
void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouses written consent.

A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or
prescription. When, however, any of the terms of a void contract have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence
is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it.

There is no question on the presence of the consideration of the sale, except with respect to the actual amount paid. While the
deed of sale has no force and effect as a contract, it remains prima facie evidence of the actual consideration paid.

Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that he paid to Milagros the amount of P700,000.00, instead of the amount of
P200,000.00 stated in the deed of sale.

No documentary or testimonial evidence to prove payment of the higher amount was presented, apart from Tomas sole
testimony. Tomas sole testimony of payment is self-serving and insufficient to unequivocally prove that Milagros received
P700,000.00 for the subject property. Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains sufficient evidence of the
actual amount the petitioner paid and the same amount which should be returned under the principle of unjust enrichment.

MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZMALIT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-
Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness to become an
officer of the Court.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

In the Affidavit-Complaint1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1
March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former
as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of
money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore
aware that the market stall was government-owned. Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused
complainant legal and financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in September
1999 without the signature of the lessees. However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been signed by the
lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale agreement over a
property covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes
Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not advise complainant that the
property was still covered by the period within which it could not be alienated.

In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently submitted three Special Powers of Attorney
(SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainants secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were
not signed by the principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named attorneyin-fact, Florina B. Limpioso
(Limpioso). Tolentinos Affidavit corroborated complainants allegations against respondent.2

On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to submit her comment
on the Complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.3

In her Comment,4 respondent explained thatthe mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of complainant and that the
latter had read it before affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract was
hastily done. It was only copied from a similar file in respondents computer, and the phrase "absolute and registered owner"
was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary action, because complainant constructed the
subject public market stall under a "Build Operate and Transfer" contract with the local government unit and, technically, she
could be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract over the same property in which complainant
was represented as the propertys absolute owner, but she did not complain. Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against
complainant was not the representation ofherself as owner of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from
all liens and encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the prosecutor found that complainant and her
spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the previous mortgage contract over the same market stall.

With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was actually
new. She gave the courts copy of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the latters request for an extra copy. Thus,
respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainants assurance that the lessees would sign it and that it
would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.

As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that complainant was an experienced
realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the purchase agreement
was notarized, complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing about it. Rather, the agreement
expressly stated that the property was the subject of a case pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the status of the subject property. Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs
submitted by complainant as additional evidence wereproperly notarized. It can be easily gleaned from the documents that the
attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent; hence,the notarization was limited to the formers participation in the
execution ofthe document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must be notarized in the principals
place of residence.

An exchange of pleadings ensuedafter respondent submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder, complainant filed an Urgent Ex-
ParteMotion for Submission of Additional Evidence.5 Attached thereto were copies of documents notarized by respondent,
including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2)
five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete
signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor;
(6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation
Letter toa potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10)an unsigned Consent to Adoption.

After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective Position Papers.6 Notably, respondents
Position Paper did not tackle the additional documents attached to complainants Urgent Ex ParteMotion.

THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP

In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate revocation
of the Notarial Commission of respondent and her disqualification as notary public for two years for her violation of her oath as
such by notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties who had purportedly appeared before her. He accepted
respondents explanations with respect to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso.
However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold respondent
liable for violation of Canon 187 and Rule 18.038of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also recommended that she
besuspended from the practice of law for six months.9

The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008, unanimously adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year.10

Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration11 and Second Motion for Reconsideration.12 She maintained that the
additional documents submitted by complainant were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the procedural
requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).13Moreover, the Urgent Ex
ParteMotion of complainant was actually a supplemental pleading, which was prohibited under the rules of procedure of the
Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not the proper party to question those documents. Hence, the investigating
commissioner should have expunged the documents from the records, instead of giving them due course. Respondent also
prayed that mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the following: absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of
dishonest or selfish motive; personal and emotional problems; timely goodfaith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of her misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the
proceedings; character or reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior offenses.

The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, deniedrespondents motion for
reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify a reversal of the IBPs findings.14

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago through a letter addressed to
then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against
respondent.15

THE COURTS RULING

After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the parties submissions in this case, the Court
hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.

Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall first dispose of some procedural matters
raised by respondent.

Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are inadmissible for having been
obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was raised in Tolentino
v. Mendoza,16 in which the respondent therein opposed the admission of the birth certificates of his illegitimate children as
evidence of his grossly immoral conduct, because those documents were obtained in violation Rule 24, Administrative Order No.
1, Series of 1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as follows:

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible when it isrelevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or these rules." There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The
only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for
having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the ruleon
confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does itstate that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render
said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of
evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against
unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. In
People vs. Hipol, we explained that: The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State and
its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression and
unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts
complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's office,
can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against
respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.

Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion
from evidence of the birth certificates inquestion, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken
into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.18

Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation
thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly consideredin evidence the other notarized documents submitted by complainant as additional
evidence.

Respondents argument that the Urgent Ex-ParteMotion of complainant constitutes a supplemental pleading must fail as well. As
its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary pleading. Its usual office
is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the
controversy referred to in the original complaint.19 Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by
complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of her charges against respondent is that the latter notarizedincomplete
documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred
from submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that she committed misconduct and grievously
violated her oath as a notary public.

The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has repeatedlystressed that notarization is
not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized
document is, by law, entitled tofull faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity
of a notarized document would be undermined.20

Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the instrument to
be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly
as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be
undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished.21 In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was
not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage
contractdoes not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latters liability for tolerating a wrongful act.
Clearly, respondents conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Respondents explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant sometime in September 199925 is
incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the lessees signatures, she could have given complainant a certified
photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is not a rarityin respondents practice as a notary public. Records
show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or lacking
signatures of the parties. Technically, each document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer
to demand that a document be signed in his or her presence.26

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same ones who executed it and
who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.27 Thus, in
acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.0128 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood.29 Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue
enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to
be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as notaries public.30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and the Court
will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.31 The blatmt disregard by respondent of
her basic duties as a notary public warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law and perpetual
disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is hereby
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the bar and furnished to the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for their
information and guidance.

Rico Rommel Atienza vs. Board of Medicine and Editha Sioson

Facts:

Private respondent went to Rizal Medical Center to submit for a check up due to her lumbar pains. Her diagnostic laboratory test
results revealed that her right kidney was normal while her left kidney was non-functioning and non-visualizing. Hence, she
underwent kidney operation under the care of the four physicians namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin III, Dr. Gerardo
Antonio and petitioner Dr. Rico Rommel Atienza.

The said physicians removed her fully functioning right kidney instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney. Due
to their gross negligence and incompetence, private respondent filed a complaint against the four doctors before the Board of
Medicine. Private respondent therein offered four certified photocopies as her documentary evidence to prove that her kidneys
were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time that she was operated.

The Board of Medicine admitted the formal offer despite the objection of herein petitioner. Petitioner contends that the
documentary evidence offered were inadmissible as it were incompetent. Further, he alleged that the same documents were not
properly identified and authenticated, violate the best evidence rule and his substantive rights, and are completely hearsay.

Issues:

1. Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that it violates the best evidence rule.

2. Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that they have not been properly identified and
authenticated.

3. Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that it is completely hearsay.

4. Whether the admission of the documents violated the substantive rights of the petitioner.

Ruling:

1. No. The subject of the inquiry in this case is whether the doctors are liable for gross negligence in removing the right
functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys.
The proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through
the exhibits offered in evidence.

In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence is allowed. Section 3, Rule 130 provides that when the subject of the inquiry is the
contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the offeror. Since the original documents cannot be
produced based on the testimony of Dr. Aquino BOM properly admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence, and thereafter, the
BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.

2. No, the documentary evidence were properly identified and authenticated. The records show that the exhibits offered by
private respondent were the same evidence attached in Doctor Lantin's counter-affidavit filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in answer to the criminal complaint of the respondent. To lay the predicate for her case, private respondent offered
the exhibits in evidence to prove that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time of her operation.

3. No, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence. The anatomical positions whether left or right, of Edithas kidneys,
and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.

4. No, petitioners substantive rights were not violated when the documentary evidence were admitted. The fact sought to be
proved by the exhibits that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on
is presumed under Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provides that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

The fact sought to be established by the admission of the respondents exhibit need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory
judicial notice. Laws of nature involving the physical science, specifically biology include the structural make-up and composition
of living things such as human beings in which the court may take judicial notice.

SUPLICO vs NEDAG.R. No. 178830; July 14, 2008

FACTS:Triple petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for the issuance of a TRO and/orpreliminary
injunction were filed and consolidated in the SC. The prayers of the said petitions, among others,sought the annulment of the
award of the contract for the national broadband network to respondent ZTECorporation and to enjoin any activity in connection
with the said deal.On October 2, 2007, during a meeting, Pres. GMA, acting in her official capacity informed Pres. Hu Jintao of
Chinathat the Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN project. Later, the Solicitor Generalmade a
manifestation and motion stating that in an Indorsement by the Legal Division of the DOTC, it has beeninformed that the
Philippine Government has decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project. That said, there isno more justiciable controversy
for the Court to resolve. The public respondents then prayed that the presentpetitions be dismissed.The petitioners, in their
respective replies, argued that the Indorsement is self-serving and not a sufficient basisthat the deal has been permanently
scrapped. Assuming arguendo that the petition has become moot, the Court may still take cognizance thereof to educate the
bench and the bar. Further, because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised, the Court should take cognizance of
this case despite its apparent mootness.The petitioners ultimately contended the declarations made by officials belonging to the
executive branch on the

Philippine Governments decision not to continue with the ZTE

-NBN Project are self-serving, hence, inadmissible.ISSUE:WON the Court may take judicial notice of the acts of President
GMA?HELD:The SC dismissed the petition. It held that It has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official act of the
President. Under the Section 1 Rule 129, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official
acts of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further provided in the said rule
that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of
cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the
Chinese President in China as an official act of the executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act
without need of evidence. Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the
executive officials

of informing this Court of the governments decision not to continue with the ZTE

-NBN Project is also presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the contrary. The Court finds no factual or legal
basisto disregard this disputable presumption in the present instance.

DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 142295, PARDO,

FACTS: Accused-
appellant Vicente del Rosario was found guilty of violation of P. D. No. 1866 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos. Allegedly,
sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain
firearms without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, the PNP Criminal Investigation Group inquired from the
PNPFirearms and Explosive Division whether or not the report was true. The PNP Firearms and Explosives Division issued a
certificationstating that per records in his office, the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber.
Armed with thesaid certificationthe police applied for a search warrant to enable them to search the house of appellant.Upon
the issuance of the warrant, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant. Before proceeding tothe
residence of the appellant, the police officers requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman
AurelioPanteleon to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant. Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police
officersintroduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they
had asearch warrant and that they were authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his permission, the police officers
conducteda search of the house. The search yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 with five
magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B and H) found at the master's bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios
(Exhibits C to C-4)found in the room of appellant's daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F)
containing 8 pieces of liveammunition (Exhibit M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess the
firearms, the appellant failedto produce any. This prompted the police officers to seize the subject firearms.For his defense,
appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in his bedroom and that the other itemsseized during
the search including the caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by the police officers. Appellant likewise assails themanner in
which the search was carried out, claiming that the police officers just barged into his house without asking
permission.Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials arrived only after the police already had finished the
search. However, after trialthe trial court rendered a judgment of conviction which decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.HELD:The Supreme Court

REVERSES

the decision of the Court of Appeals and

ACQUITS

petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of thecharge of violation of P. D. No. 1866.Seizure is limited to those items particularly
described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. Evidence
seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial "fruit of a
poisonous tree." In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the
kitchen of petitioner's house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Thus, the seizure is illegal.
True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that
matter,inadvertently found in plain view. However, "[t]he seizure of evidence in 'plain view' applies only where the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object."

Specifically, seizure of evidence in "plain view" is justified when there is:(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who had the right to be where they are.(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and(d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:

Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of
dangerous drugs) after dried marijuana leaves were found in his possession by three barangay tanods who made a search on
him. Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the bus when one of the barangay tanods
approached him and requested to see the contents of his bags. The petitioner was then brought by the three tanods to the
house of Brgy. Captain Mercado, who again ordered to have the bag opened. During which, the dried marijuana leaves were
found. Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal, that his warrantless arrest was
effected unlawfully and the warrantless search that followed was likewise contrary to law.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a warrant supporting the arrest and the search.

Held:

The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower courts. The accused was acquitted by reasonable doubt.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions permitting a warrantless arrest:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The Court held that none of the circumstances was attendant at the time of the arrest.

The Court also posed 2 exceptions to the said rule, to wit: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.

None of the petitioners actuations (i.e. his looking around and alleged fleeing upon approach of the tanods) is adequate to incite
suspicion of criminal activity to validate the warrantless arrest.

However, the Courts decision was not only hinged on this premise but also on the fact that the lower courts failed to establish
the veracity of the seized items by virtue of the chain of custody rule and in view of the contrasting testimonies by the
prosecution witnesses.

Failure of the lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the accused was thus acquitted.

The Court added that the petitioners lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.

ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ ,vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES
FACTS: The People of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commissionon Good Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989
an information before theanti-graft court charging the accused with violation of Section 5, Republic ActNo. 3019,5 as
amended. That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, inMetro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,Alfredo T. Romualdez, brother-in-law of Ferdinand E. Marcos, former Presidentof the
Philippines, and therefore, related to the latter by affinity within thethird civil degree, did then and there willfully and unlawfully,
and with evidentbad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interested and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly,
in a contract between the NationalShipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned andcontrolled corporation
and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company(BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned
byformer President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferredand conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and
all its titles and interests overall equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters,houses, plants and
expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at theEngineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of
itsequipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte neededby BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair
program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.

ISSUE:

Whether the constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was
violated for notspecifying the acts of intervention that he supposedly performed.

HELD:

The Court did not agree with the petitioner's contention.When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy
of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars. The pertinent provision in the Rules of Court is
Section 9 of Rule 116, whichwe quote:"Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before arraignment, movefor a bill of
particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or
informationand the details desired."

The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity as to apprise the accused of what
they are being charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that persons of
ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant by the information. While it is fundamental that every element of the
offense must be alleged in the information, matters of evidence -- as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the
offense -- need not be averred. Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be determined by reference
to the definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes. In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows
that the elements of a violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 have been stated sufficiently. Likewise, the allegations describe
the offense committed by petitioner with such particularity as to enable him to prepare an intelligent defense. Details of the acts
he committed are evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the Information.

Spouses Latip v. Chua (Goodwill money, Baclaran store lease)

Facts:

Respondent Chua is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner
RedemptoristRoad, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City.Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against
petitioners (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract oflease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by
Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.Spouses Latip asserted that Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over
two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg.. According to Spouses Latip, theimmediate payment of P2,570,000.00 would be used to finish
construction of the building giving them first priority in the occupation of thefinished cubicles.MeTC and RTC ruled in favor of the
spouses Latip but CA reversed the decision. CA ,in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment ofSpouses Latip, took judicial
notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.

Issue:

WON Judicial notice was proper.

Held:
No. Judicial notice does not meet the requisite of notoriety.SC reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice
in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, whichcited State Prosecutors:

Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that

it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably bequestionable.

Things of common knowledge, of which c

ourts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course ofthe ordinary experiences of
life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or
otherpublications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so generally understood that they
may be regarded asforming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and
wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot
take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the
appellate court took judicial notice ofdoes not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of
this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former
even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of

common knowledge or notoriously known.

We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that
the amount ofP2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her
petition for review beforethe CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had
paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide
for matters that need not be proved under Rule 129,specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form
of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties. However, in this case, the requisite of
notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies
appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court.

What need not be proved.

Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area.
As was held inState Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be
exercised with caution andevery reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be
promptly resolved in the negative.Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased cubicles,
what remains in evidence is the documentaryevidence signed by both parties - the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing
payment of P2,570,000.00.

State Prosecutors Vs. Muro

FACTS: The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent Judge
Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign
Exchange Restriction in the Central BankCircular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the
report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of
the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The respondents decision was founded on his belief that the reported
announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its
jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement
of the President as published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take
judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.

The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on matters he purported to be a public
knowledge based merely on the account of the newspaper publication that the Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It
was also an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not to accord due process to the prosecutors who were already at the stage of
presenting evidence thereby depriving the government the right to be heard. The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion
by taking judicial notice on the published statement of the Pres. In the newspaper which is a matter that has not yet been
officially in force and effect of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice on the statement of
the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?

HELD: The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It cannot comprehend his assertion
that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which is the basis of the Presidents announcement in
the newspaper, believing that the public announcement is absolute and without qualification and is immediately effective and
such matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a mandatory requirement
that a new law should be published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity. When the Presidents
statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus
it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based
on the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;

(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact cannot be disputed. Judicial notice
is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The
common knowledge contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must come from the knowledge of men
generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and one that involves unquestioned demonstration. The
court ruled that the information he obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant
of a law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the prosecution the right to be heard and
of due process. The court ordered for the dismissal of the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on matters that
are hearsay and groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all
times.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES versus MA. IMELDA IMEE R. MARCOS-MANOTOC

FACTS: After the People Power Revolution in 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino created the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) that was primarily tasked to investigate and recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by the then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and associates.

On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for
Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his
estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong
Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.

Four amended Complaints were thereafter filed imputingactive participation and collaboration of another persons, viz. Nemesio
G. Co and Yeungs (Kam, Ho and Fan) of Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing Corporation Phils.; and, Imelda Cojuangco for the
estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Prime Holdings, in the alleged illegal activities and undertakings of the Marcoses in relation to
the 200 Billion Pesos ill-gotten wealth allegation.

Petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents. However, the latter objected on the ground
that the documents were unauthenticated and mere photocopies. On 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a RESOLUTION
ADMITTING all the documentary exhibits formally offered by the prosecution; however, their evidentiary value was left to the
determination of the Court.
Subsequently, Imelda R. Marcos, Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.; Irene Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Ma.
Araneta III;Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the PEA-PTGWO filed their respective Demurrers to
Evidence.

On 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, granting all the demurrers to evidence except the one filed by Imelda R.
Marcos. The sequestration orders on the properties in the name of Gregorio Maria AranetaIII are accordingly lifted.

With regard to Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos and Gregorio Araneta III, the court noted that
their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was never established; neither did the documentary evidence pinpoint their
involvement therein. The court held that all presented evidence are hearsay, for being merely photocopies and that the originals
were not presented in court, nor were they authenticated by the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed
out that petitioner failed to provide any valid reason why it did not present the originals in court. These exhibits were supposed
to show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotoc in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all three of which she had
allegedly acquired illegally, her alleged participation in dollar salting through De Soleil Apparel and to prove how the Marcoses
used the Potencianos as dummies in acquiring and operating the bus company PANTRANCO.

Meanwhile, as far as the YEUNGS were concerned, the court found the allegations against them baseless. Petitioner failed to
demonstrate howGlorious Sunwas used as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to show that they were dummies of the Marcoses.
Again, the court held that the documentary evidence relevant to this allegation was INADMISSIBLE for being mere photocopies,
and that the affiants had not been presented as witnesses.

ISSUE: THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEMURRERS TO EVIDENCE FILED BY RESPONDENTS MA. IMELDA (IMEE)
R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND (BONGBONG) R. MARCOS, JR.; RESPONDENT-SPOUSES GREGORIO ARANETA III AND IRENE MARCOS
ARANETA AND RESPONDENTS YEUNG CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUN FAN, AND YEUNG CHUN HO

RULING:

It is petitioners burden to prove the allegations; the operative act on how and in what manner must be clearly shown through
preponderance of evidence.

The petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents themselves. It is imperative;
therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove petitioners allegations. Thus, the photocopied documents are in
violation of best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself. Furthermore, petitioner
did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the
court such documents as secondary evidence absent the affiants testimony.

The presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is not validly excepted under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Under
Section 3 (d), when the original document is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, the
original thereof need not be presented. However, all except one of the exhibits are not necessarily public documents. The
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings purportedly before the PCGG may be a public document but what the
plaintiff presented was a mere photocopy of the purported TSN which was not a certified copy and was not even signed by the
stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings. The Rules provide that when the original document is in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office; a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof may prove its
contents.

In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the
original; (2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or
attempt to produce the original. None of the abovementioned requirements were complied by the plaintiff.Exhibits P, Q, R,
S, and T were all photocopies. P, R, and T were affidavits of persons who did not testify before the Court. Exhibit S is a
letter, which is clearly a private document. It is emphasized, even if originals of these affidavits were presented, they would still
be considered hearsay evidence if the affiants do not testify and identify them.

Petitioner having failed to observe the best evidence rule rendered the offered documentary evidence futile and worthless in
alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned.Hence, Sandiganbayan is
correct in granting the respondents respective Demurers to evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. NEIL B. COLORADO (CHUA)

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Colorado was charged with the crime of rape. According to the information, sometime in December, 2002 in
the evening in Sitio x x x, Brgy. Iliw-Iliw, Burgos, Pangasinan, the accused, being the brother of AAA, inside their house, by means
of force, threats and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with AAA, a
twelve (12) years (sic) old girl, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. Colorado pleaded "not guilty" upon
arraignment. During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following:

(1) the existence of the Medico Legal Certificate and the Birth Certificate of AAA;

(2) that Colorado is a full-blood brother of AAA; and

(3) that Colorado and AAA lived under the same roof.

After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. Records indicate that AAA was born on October 10, 1990. She was the second to the
youngest in a family of twelve siblings. Colorado was an older brother who lived with her, their parents and two other brothers,
BBB and CCC, in Burgos, Pangasinan.

AAA testified that sometime in December 2002, her parents attended a wedding celebration somewhere in Hermosa, Dasol,
Pangasinan, leaving behind AAA, Colorado and their two other brothers in the house. When their parents had not yet arrived in
the evening, Colorado committed the dastardly act against AAA. She was twelve (12) years old at that time, while Colorado was
already twenty-four (24) years old. He approached AAA, held her two hands, even threatened her with a knife and covered her
mouth with a handkerchief. He then removed AAAs shorts and panty, inserted his penis into the young girls vagina, then made a
push and pull movement. AAA tried to resist her brothers sexual aggression, but miserably failed despite her efforts because of
her brothers greater strength. Colorado later left AAA, who put back her shorts and underwear, but remained awake because of
fear and trauma with what she had gone through. On that same night, Colorado raped AAA twice more, unmindful of the
presence of their two other brothers who were then sleeping inside the room where Colorado ravished AAA. In both instances,
Colorado still threatened AAA with a knife, removed her shorts and panty, inserted his penis into his sisters vagina, then
performed the push and pull movement. Colorado warned AAA that he would stab her should she report to anyone what he had
done. AAA then did not dare reveal these incidents to anybody, until she had the courage to report them to their mother. Also in
her testimony before the trial court, AAA disclosed that she had been raped by Colorado when she was just nine (9) years old.
She also revealed having been ravished on different dates by another brother, DDD, and a brother-in-law.

A Medico-Legal Certificate prepared by Dr. Ma. Teresa Sanchez (Dr. Sanchez), Medical Officer III of the Western Pangasinan
District Hospital who examined AAA on January 10, 2003, contained the following findings:

=INTERNAL EXAM FINDINGS:

-Nonparous Introitus-

-Hymenal laceration at 6 oclock position with bleeding-

-Vagina admits 2 fingers with slight resistance-

-Uterus small-

-(+) bleeding-

xxxx

Defense: He denied having raped AAA, arguing that he was not living with AAA in their parents house in December 2002.
Allegedly, he was at that time staying with an older sister in Osmea, Dasol. Colorado claimed that on the night of the alleged
incident, he was fishing with his brother-in-law, and that they returned to Osmea, Dasol in the morning of the following day.
The Ruling of the RTC: Finding Colorado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.

CA: On appeal, he sought his acquittal by arguing that the hymenal lacerations discovered by AAAs examining doctor, and
considered by the trial court in determining his culpability, could have been caused not by him, but by the sexual aggressions
committed by their brother DDD or their brother-in-law unto AAA. The CA affirmed Colorados conviction, but modified his civil
liability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused should be acquitted on the basis that the hymenal lacerations discovered by AAAs examining doctor
could have been caused not by him, but by the sexual aggressions committed by their brother DDD or their brother-in-law unto
AAA.

HELD:

No. Colorado was charged with the crime of rape, qualified by the victims minority and her relationship to her ravisher, as
defined and penalized under Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code. During cross-examination, AAA
remained steadfast, unwavering and spontaneous. Significantly also, her testimony is supported by the medical evidence on
record, which showed that she had a laceration in her hymen and was thus in a non-virgin state. The Court finds no cogent
reasons to overturn these findings. Indeed, it was established that Colorado succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the victim,
employing force, threat and intimidation that allowed him to consummate his bestial act. AAA had positively identified Colorado
as her rapist.

Colorado also questions the weight of Dr. Sanchezs medico-legal certificate, arguing that AAAs hymenal lacerations could have
resulted from the sexual aggressions allegedly committed against her by DDD and their brother-in-law. Such contention,
however, deserves no consideration, given that results of an offended partys medical examination are merely corroborative in
character. As explained by the Court in People v. Balonzo, a medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape,
as even a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative
in character and not essential to conviction. An accused can still be convicted of rape on the basis of the sole testimony of the
private complainant. Furthermore, laceration of the hymen, even if considered the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence
of sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In the context that is used in the
RPC, "carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be
penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. Thus, even granting that AAAs lacerations were not caused by Colorado, the latter
could still be declared guilty of rape, after it was established that he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the victim.

DELA CRUZ vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012

Issue:

With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the emerging concerns is the application of the law on
nuisance candidates under a new voting system wherein voters indicate their choice of candidates by shading the oval
corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate printed on the ballots, instead of writing the candidate's name on the
appropriate space provided in the ballots as in previous manual elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of
candidacy had been cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still included or printed in the official ballots on
election day, should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?

Facts:
In this petition for certiorari, Casimira S. Dela Cruz assails COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 considering as stray the votes cast in
favor of certain candidates who were either disqualified or whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but whose names
still appeared in the official ballots or certified lists of candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections.

During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on May 13, 2010, Casimira insisted
that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No. 8844. The
Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-Mayor of Antique-Bugasong showed the following results of the voting:

TOTAL RANK

DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3

DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2

PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1

Consequently, John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of Bugasong.

Considering that Pacete won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes, Casimira contends that she would have clearly won the
elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC properly tallied or added the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes.

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious.

It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to petitions to cancel or deny due
course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to be false).
Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute,
or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or other circumstances or
acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate" are not among those
grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving money or material consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials
performing electoral functions, election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or making prohibited contributions) of
the OEC or Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

In Fermin vs. COMELEC, this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section 68 and a petition to cancel or deny
due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by different rules and have
distinct outcomes.

At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with a "Section 68" petition.
They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. x xx

To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of
the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified
under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course
under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda vs. Abaya, this Court made the
distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because
he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78
cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate. (Additional emphasis supplied)

Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Said votes cannot be
counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed
a COC. But should these votes cast for the candidate whose COC was cancelled or denied due course be considered stray?

The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such under a final judgment was applied by this
Court in Bautista vs. COMELEC where the name of the nuisance candidate Edwin Bautista (having the same surname with the
bona fide candidate) still appeared on the ballots on election day because while the COMELEC rendered its decision to cancel
Edwin Bautistas COC on April 30, 1998, it denied his motion for reconsideration only on May 13, 1998 or three days after the
election. We said that the votes for candidates for mayor separately tallied on orders of the COMELEC Chairman was for the
purpose of later counting the votes and hence are not really stray votes. These separate tallies actually made the will of the
electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate.

But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was not yet final on electionday, this Court also
considered those factual circumstances showing that the votes mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to only the legitimate
candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We further noted that the voters had
constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as a candidate for mayor.

A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. This is, however, not the situation
in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of notification,
the voters were informed of the COMELECs decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate.

In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Court likewise applied the rule in
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray but to count them in favor of the
bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as such was issued only after the elections.

As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day inevitably exposes the bona
fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voters will and frustrates the same. It may be that
the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin
Bautista a nuisance candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the electorate having been informed thereof
through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of election. Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on
the voters will was similarly present in this case, if not worse, considering the substantial number of ballots with only
"MARTINEZ" or"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over five thousand - which have been declared as stray
votes, the invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to overcome private respondents lead of only 453 votes after the
recount.

Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of Resolution No. 4116,
the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner. COMELECs changing of the rule
on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to
private respondent by a slim margin. We observed in Martinez:

Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the
voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate
is faced with the prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of
another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this
manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their
candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.

The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be implemented in the May 2010 elections will lessen
the possibility of confusion over the names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is the apparent failure of the
HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of the electorate determinable, following the precedent in
Bautista. x xx

COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 by enumerating those
changes brought about by the new automated election system to the form of official ballots, manner of voting and counting of
votes. It said that the substantial distinctions between manual and automated elections validly altered the rules on considering
the votes cast for the disqualified or nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez III, COMELEC opines that
these find no application in the case at bar because the rules on appreciation of ballotsapply only to elections where the names
of candidates are handwritten in the ballots.

The Court is not persuaded.

In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local elections, political rivals or operators benefited from
the usually belated decisions by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny due course to COCs of potential nuisance candidates. In
such instances, political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate
on the ballot, but still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.

As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for the same position and putting
the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting system where the voter simply
shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, nine days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the names of disqualified
candidates not just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed, what use will it serve if
COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be deleted from list of official candidates if the official ballots still carry
their names?

We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final
judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, notstray but
counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law.

Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation of COC of Aurelio because
COMELEC published the same before election day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters constructive knowledge of such
cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could
have been intended only for the legitimate candidate. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names of nuisance
candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting
system especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of
the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the same.

Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-ensconced in our jurisprudence
that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. Indeed, as our electoral
experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance candidates from both the Certified List of
Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil sought to be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates
during elections.

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT Petitioners, vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN

FACTS:

Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner, Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the
position of medical technologist under a two-year contract with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.Within a year, Respondent was
terminated for not passing the probationary period which was under the Memorandum of Agreement.Ministry denied
respondents request and she returned to the Philippines shouldering her own fair.Respondent filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint against ATCI forillegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of
respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her$3,600.00, her salary for the three months unexpired portion of the contract.

ATCI appealed Labor Arbiters decision, however, NLRC affirmed the latters decision and denied petitioner ATCIs motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner appealed to the Court Appeals contending thattheir principal being a foreign government agency is
immune from suit, and as such, immunity extended to them.

Appellate Court affirmed NLRCs decision. It noted that under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all
responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker; hence, it can be sued jointly and
severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract specifically stipulates that

respondents employment

shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.

Ruling:

Court denied the petition. According to RA 8042:

The obligations covenanted in the recruitmentagreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal
are not coterminouswith the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement,the
responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at allend, but the same extends
up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employeesrecruited and employed pursuant to the said
recruitment agreement. In international law, the party whowants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law.Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that
foreignlaw is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.

CATALAN V. CATALAN G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

Merope Enriquez Vda. De Catalan, Petitioner

Louella A. Catalan-Lee, Respondent.

Ponente: Sereno J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and Resolution regarding the issuance of letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated August 6, 2004, which
reverse the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the
marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as well as the
Resolution dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated
to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and
Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondentMeropein
Calasiao, Pangasinan.Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with
EusebioBristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against
Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly
not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied. Trial on the merits ensued. On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in
favor of the petitioner. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent before appellate court and ruled in favor of her
reversing the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the appellate
court.Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought embarrassment to her and her
children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her grievances and to protect her family from further
embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage
void despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on
the ground of bigamy.

HELD:

Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has the
personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if
the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce oramensaetthoro;or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the
divorce decree becomes absolute.In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for
being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines,
one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,and the other, in Calasiao,
Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which,
following the national law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that
petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:

Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor should each have the
personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequentlycontract. x x x Viewed from another perspective,
Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlandos subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this
subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas.In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition
to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law
allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage,
then the trial court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant
case.