Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.

Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.

Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte
(Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for
support and damages, and another order denying amendment of the same pleading.

The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:

Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her
complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and
confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as
a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff
had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and
attorney's fees.

Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the
complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial
judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse,
plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled
that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although
as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it,
as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore,
has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose
paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is
only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive
donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in
his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the
testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854,
Civil Code).

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted
by those persons who would legally represent them if they were already born.

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall
be effectual, without prejudice to the right of 'representation.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that
support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere
appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child
shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be
born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at
the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a
condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40
would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the
corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:

Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el

sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que
constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no
determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano),
sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op.
cit., page 271)

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a
woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case)
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for
the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

xxx xxx xxx

 (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a
cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for
failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee
Felix Icao. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and
Villamor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the
marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could
not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of

Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as
she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife
of respondent.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate
ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and
that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for
citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than
the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized
from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying
the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that
their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and
for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE

CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the
latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the
sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for
the purposes of immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development
of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12Another, which is the subject
of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the
intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use
marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that
the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the
United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together,
to determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within
six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary
into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to
wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating
the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x
x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite
true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to
a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to
deceive others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating
that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for
a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage
is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and
have upheld such marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondents marriage not void

In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As
in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering
that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. 26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was
real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial
and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since
it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any
conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not
intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the
absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective,
or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent
because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to
allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent
was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered
into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus,
only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love
one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may
be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude;
(2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No
other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration
benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience;
she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave
the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties,
and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997]

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY,* petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN,respondents.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and
defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee. That
employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really
motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her
employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she
was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being
outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a
Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice
one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.[1] Under the Reliever Agreement which she
signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon
expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19,
1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondents services as reliever were again engaged by
petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both
periods.[2] After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were
terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner
company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job
application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the
portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few
months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.[3]
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two
successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When
petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M.
Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to
explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the companys policy
of not accepting married women for employment.[4]
 In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not aware
of PT&Ts policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not
deliberately hidden her true civil status.[5] Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her
explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29,
1992,[6] which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a
claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.
At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent
volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the
parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She then
executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner.[7] All of these took place in a
formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision
declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee,
was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of the corresponding back
wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed
view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly
insufficient, and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of
her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent
upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that private respondent
had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer,
PT&T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace
de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her
acts which should not be condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the
labor arbiter, including the order for the reinstatement of private respondent in her employment
with PT&T.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent
NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing the
aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well as the denial resolution
of the latter.
1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with love
and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to that injunction with indifference, on
the hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice against
womankind been so pervasive as in the field of labor, especially on the matter of equal
employment opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting, women have traditionally
been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be
safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and
exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all
phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few of the
primordial ones, Section 14, Article II [8] on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at
all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto,
Section 3 of Article XIII[9] (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973
Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of
entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article XIII[10] mandates that
the State shall protect working women through provisions for opportunities that would enable
them to reach their full potential.
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more
frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential
Decree No. 442, largely due to our countrys commitment as a signatory to the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).[11]
Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727 [12] which explicitly prohibits
discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment, promotion,
and training opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955 [13] which bans the mail-order-bride practice for
a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot guarantee protection to the rights
of women workers; Republic Act No. 7192,[14] also known as the Women in Development and
Nation Building Act, which affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into
contracts, and for appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all
military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police; Republic Act No. 7322[15] increasing the maternity benefits granted to women in the
private sector; Republic Act No. 7877[16] which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the
workplace and in the education and training environment; and Republic Act No. 8042, [17] or the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which prescribes as a matter of policy,inter
alia, the deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where their
rights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family Code, [18] womens
rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded.
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles
130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night work while Article
132 ensures the right of women to be provided with facilities and standards which the Secretary
of Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety. For purposes of labor and social
legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar
establishments shall be considered as an employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other
hand, recognizes a womans right against discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of
employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136
explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee.
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee
of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a conditionsine
qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ, to
convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in
dispensing with the services of such employee, ones labor being regarded as constitutionally
protected property.
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within
the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring,
supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as
regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal, and
recall of employees.[19] As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate, according to his
discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment, from hiring to firing, except in
cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law.[20]
In the case at bar, petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from
work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that it dismissed private respondent from
employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the
company were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are
not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by
Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of the
latter, that youre fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic),
as it was verbally instructed to you.[21] Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same
branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the
service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of
that, was her violation of the companys policy against marriage (and even told you that
married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our
company.) Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear in
[22]

the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and
not by its highest ranking officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation. [23]
Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could
not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did
mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she
was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil
status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for
termination of employment, it should not be simulated.[24] It must rest on an actual breach of
duty committed by the employee and not on the employers caprices.[25] Furthermore, it should
never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.[26]
In the present controversy, petitioners expostulations that it dismissed private respondent,
not because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact, does have a hollow
ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks dishonesty hence the consequent loss of
confidence in her which justified her dismissal. Petitioner would asseverate, therefore, that while
it has nothing against marriage, it nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that
fact. This improbable reasoning, with interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private
respondent may well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other
way around.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its policy
against its female employees contracting marriage, what could be an act of insubordination
was inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her concealment of that marriage yet, at
the same time, declaring that marriage as a trivial matter to which it supposedly has no
objection. In other words, PT&T says it gives its blessings to its female employees contracting
marriage, despite the maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for
and which obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses such fact of
marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such employee conceals the same instead of
proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of reasoning does not impress us
as reflecting its true management policy or that we are being regaled with responsible
advocacy.
This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of propositions
which confuse through less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner glosses over the fact that
it was its unlawful policy against married women, both on the aspects of qualification and
retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal her supervenient marriage. It was,
however, that very policy alone which was the cause of private respondents secretive conduct
now complained of. It is then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of
the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Finally, petitioners collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she
supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from
employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly, private respondent admitted
in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of her collections, but that is an
altogether different story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely because of her concealment
of her marital status, and not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds.That
the labor arbiter would thus consider petitioners submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a
mere afterthought, just to bolster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of
experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing that private respondent deliberately
misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remit the same was through negligence
and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely agreed
that private respondent execute a promissory note to refund the same, which she did, and the
matter was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case.
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her
dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was about to
complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary
employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her
probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in
order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.[27] On the other hand, her earlier stints with
the company as reliever were undoubtedly those of a regular employee, even if the same were
for fixed periods, as she performed activities which were essential or necessary in the usual trade
and business of PT&T.[28] The primary standard of determining regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the
business or trade of the employer.[29]
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed
without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent.[30] However, as she had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in concealing
her status, albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month
suspension imposed by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference
that such act should be condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to its
fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act which was not totally justified.Thus, her
entitlement to back wages, which shall be computed from the time her compensation was
withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting therefrom
the amount corresponding to her three months suspension.
4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted
by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or
to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 148,[31] better known as the Women and Child Labor Law, which amended
paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679,[32] entitled An Act to Regulate the
Employment of Women and Children, to Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other
Purposes. The forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which
became law on March 16, 1923 and which regulated the employment of women and children
in shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and mercantile establishments and other places of
labor in the then Philippine Islands.
 It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita, et al.
vs. Philippine Air Lines,[33] a decision that emanated from the Office of the President. There, a
policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective flight attendants must be single and that
they will be automatically separated from the service once they marry was declared void, it
being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to
discrimination against married women. Thus:

Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondents policy or regulation with the codal
provision of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code
applies only to women employed in ordinary occupations and that the prohibition against
marriage of women engaged in extraordinary occupations, like flight attendants, is fair and
reasonable, considering the pecularities of their chosen profession.

We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it knew that the
controverted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential
Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for
the timidity of those affected or their labor unions in challenging the validity of the policy, the
same was able to obtain a momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which
amended paragraph (c) of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the
same provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was promulgated
on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or on November 1, 1974.

It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor Code, all
policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins
the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women
employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to determine
appropriate minimum standards for termination in special occupations, such as those of flight
attendants, but that is precisely the factor that militates against the policy of respondent. The
standards have not yet been established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary
of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight attendants.

It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are as yet to
be established, the policy of respondent against marriage is patently illegal. This finds support in
Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work x
x x.

Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondents proposition that termination from employment
of flight attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their
own health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has been laid therefor. Actually,
respondent claims that its concern is not so much against the continued employment of the
flight attendant merely by reason of marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather
on the consequence of marriage-pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant
appeal the supposed ill effects of pregnancy on flight attendants in the course of their
employment. We feel that this needs no further discussion as it had been adequately explained
by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976.
In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as invoking the
provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and the family as a basic social institution, respectively, as bases for its
policy of non-marriage. In both instances, respondent predicates absence of a flight attendant
from her home for long periods of time as contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure
conjecture not based on actual conditions, considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated
technology has narrowed the distance from one place to another. Moreover, respondent
overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program their lives to adapt to prevailing
circumstances and events.

Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations, or it
should have categorically expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or
ordinary occupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of
non-discrimination on the employment of women.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining & Industrial
Corporation[34] considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case, respondent, in
dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the firm to consider female
employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the moment they get married due to
lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further claimed that complainant was
employed in the project with an oral understanding that her services would be terminated when
she gets married. Branding the policy of the employer as an example of discriminatory
chauvinism tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women simply on
account of their sex, the appellate court struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of
its repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the Constitution.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference or
conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized as a sex-plus
discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other. Further, the same should be
evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is
protected by federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the
employment of married women, but do not apply to married men, have been held to violate
Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job
discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of, among other things, sex. [35]
Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just against
married women. And, where the employer discriminates against married women, but not
against married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is unlawful. [36] Upon the other
hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a
bona fide occupational qualification, or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job
would justify the same, but not on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of
spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it
reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one
case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants, was regarded
as unlawful since the restriction was not related to the job performance of the flight
attendants.[37]
5. Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in
connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending
as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all
accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.[38] Hence, while it is true
that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they
may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.[39] Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that
petitioners policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law
relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations
between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they
are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the common good. [40] It goes on
to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor
impair the interest or convenience of the public.[41] In the final reckoning, the danger of just such
a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals
and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the
foundation of the nation.[42] That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised
or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in
order but imperatively required.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[Syllabus]
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and
papers taken by her from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of
her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence
in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X,
which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him
the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or
those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and
any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay
the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner,
without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and
papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private
respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts decision, petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo
Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes
A-i to J-7 of respondents comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore,
their use by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross
misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondents complaint.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment.
Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case,
charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross
misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against
Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be
impressed with merit:2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he
maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx

4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial
Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from
using the documents Annex A-I to J-7. On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the
said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on
aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the
enforceability of this Courts order, respondents request for petitioner to admit the genuineness
and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably,
petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes. At
that point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioners admission as
evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati?
Respondent submits it is- not malpractice.

Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself
under oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in
evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of
her husbands admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated
as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins
admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive
order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of
the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he
used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily
restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the
prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable3is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.4 Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy
as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he
contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
 First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27,
1994.Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's
residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that
the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who,
as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private
person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was
dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16,
"Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of
having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his
wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal
Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not
seen each other for almost seven years.[1] With respect to the second charge, he maintains that
in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof
applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted
were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.[2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not
been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent
judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the
latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga
states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony
was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A.
Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C.
Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.[3] The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge,
as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him.In their affidavit, the
affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda
in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida
Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor
been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already
dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient
proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the
marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is
clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has
been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it
is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains
married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of
respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or
ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35
of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those
bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court,
in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as
the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of
death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect."

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the
judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the
point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.[4]
 More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his
misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the
basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The
legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a
lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in
the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.[6] It is not too much to expect them to
know and apply the law intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law.While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has
greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void,
there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-
month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous
union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge,
the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in
applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
 G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015

SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA AND LIGAYA CERCADO-BELISON, Petitioners, v. VICENTE CERCADO,

JR., MANUELA C. ARABIT, LOLITA C. BASCO, MARIA C. ARALAR AND VIOLETA C.
BINADAS, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Not too long ago, we were called to pass upon the issue of the probative value of a marriage
contract issued by the church to prove the fact of marriage.1 Once again, it behooves upon us
to determine whether the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial, as it is denominated in this
case, is sufficient to prove the fact of marriage.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the 5 August 2008 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
and its 14 November 2008 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 89585 reversing the 30 January 2007
Decision4of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69, which nullified the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Vicente Cercado, Sr. (Vicente) and Leonora
Ditablan (Leonora).

In their Complaint against respondents Vicente Cercado, Jr., Manuela C. Arabit, Lolita Basco,
Maria C. Aralar, Violeta C. Binadas and the Registrar of Deeds of Binangonan, Rizal, petitioners
Simplicia Cercado-Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya Cercado-Belison (Ligaya) claimed that they are
the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married last 9
October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. Petitioners alleged that during the lifetime of their parents, their
father acquired by gratuitous title a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 7627 Cad 609-D located
at Barangay Kinagatan, Binangonan, Rizal with an area of 6,032 square meters and covered by
Tax Declaration No. BIP-021-0253. Petitioners claimed that upon the death of their father Vicente
and by virtue of intestate succession, ownership over the subject land pertained to them as
heirs; that upon the death of Benita, her share was acquired by petitioners by operation of law.
Sometime in September 1998, petitioners read from a newspaper a notice that the estate of
Vicente and a certain Leonora Ditablan has been extrajudicially settled by their heirs,
respondents herein. Upon verification, petitioners were furnished a copy of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate (Deed) executed and signed by respondents. Petitioners insist that
Vicente and Leonora were not married or if they were so married, then said marriage was null
and void by reason of the subsisting marriage of their parents, Vicente and Benita. Petitioners
prayed for the declaration of the Deed as null and void; for the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Rizal to correct the entry on the marital status of Vicente; and for the payment of damages
and attorneys fees.5

To prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented the following
documents: 1) Contrato Matrimonial or the marriage contract;6 2) Certification dated 19
November 2000 issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente of its acceptance of original marriage
contract;7 3) Certification of non-production of record of birth of Simplicia issued by the Office of
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal;8 4) Certificate of Baptism of Simplicia;9 5) Certification
of non-production of record of birth of Ligaya issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Pililla, Rizal;10 and 6) Joint Affidavit of two disinterested persons attesting that Ligaya is the child
of Vicente and Benita.11

In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and Leonora,
who were married on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate registered with the
Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan, Rizal. They averred that petitioners are not the real-parties-
interest to institute the case because they failed to present their birth certificates to prove their
filiation to Vicente; that the marriage between Vicente and Benita was not valid; that the
document showing that Vicente was married to Benita is not a certified true copy; and that they
are now estopped by laches.12

On 30 January 2007, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The dispositive portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. The Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the deceased Vicente Cercado, Sr. and
Benita Ditablan is hereby declared null and void and therefore no force and
effect;

2. The [petitioners] and the [respondents] are entitled to share pro-indiviso in the
subject property as follows:

a. 2,639 square meters For [petitioner] Simplicia Cercado-Siga;

b. 2,639 square meters For [petitioner]Ligaya Cercado-Belison;
c. 150.8 square meters For [respondent] Vicente Cercado, Jr.;
d. 150.8 square meters For [respondent] Manuela C. Arabit;
e. 150.8 square meters For [respondent]Lolita C. Basco;
f. 150.8 square meters For [respondent]Maria C. Aralar; and
g. 150.8 square meters For [respondent] Violeta C. Binadas;

3. In the event that the property has already been sold by the [respondents], they
are hereby ordered to pay the [petitioners] the amount equivalent to their share,
at the time the subject property was sold;

4. [respondents] to pay [petitioners] the amount of P30,000.00 attorneys fees; and

5. To pay the cost of suit.13

The trial court reduced the issues into three: 1) whether the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate
of the Deceased Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Leonora Ditablan-Cercado is valid; 2) whether
petitioners are entitled to recover from respondents their share in the property; and 3) whether
petitioners are entitled to damages and attorneys fees.

In resolving the issues, the trial court relied on the following material findings:

The [petitioners] are the legitimate children of the late Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Benita
Castillote/Castillo who were married on October 9, 1929, as evidenced by a Contrato
Matrimonial x x x.14

The trial court first upheld the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita and
considered the subsequent marriage between Vicente and Leonora as void and bigamous
before it concluded that the subject property was part of the conjugal property of Vicente and
Benita. Consequently, the trial court held that the Deed is null and void because it deprived
Benita of her share of the property as surviving spouse and impaired the shares and legitimes of
petitioners.15 Thus, the trial court ruled that petitioners are entitled to recover from respondents
their share in the property subject of this action.

Respondents appealed from said judgment and assigned the following errors: 1) the trial court
erred in passing upon the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Leonora; 2) the trial
court failed to consider the probative value of the certificate of marriage between Vicente and
Benita; 3) the trial court failed to consider the probative value of the certificate of live birth to
prove filiation; and 4) the trial court erred when it relied on the baptismal certificate to prove
filiation.16

The appellate court ruled that the trial court can pass upon the issue of the validity of marriage
of Vicente and Leonora [because] no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity and the court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same, as long as it is essential to the determination of the case before
it.17 However, the appellate court found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita,
being a private document, was not properly authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence.
Moreover, the appellate court did not consider the baptismal certificate submitted by
petitioners as conclusive proof of filiation. The Joint Affidavit executed by a certain Mario Casale
and Balas Chimlangco attesting to the birth of Ligaya to Vicente and Benita was not given
credence by the appellate court for being a hearsay evidence. For failure of petitioners to
prove their cause of action by preponderance of evidence, the appellate court reversed and
set aside the Decision and Resolution of the RTC.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied it in its
Resolution18dated 14 November 2008.

Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT
CONSIDER THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT AS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT AND SO WITH ITS DUPLICATE
ORIGINAL. THE CONTRATO MATRIMONIAL BUTTRESSED A CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE IGLESIA
FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE IS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT, [IT] BEING REQUIRED BY LAW TO BE KEPT NOT
ONLY BY THE CHURCH CONCERNED BUT BY THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR AND THE
NATIONAL STATISTIC OFFICE. AND THE DUPLICATE ORIGINAL COPY OF THE SAME IS ALSO
CONSIDERED ORIGINAL (SECTION 4, RULE 130) (AND HENCE ALSO A PUBLIC DOCUMENT UNDER
THE RULE) ON EVIDENCE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED ANOTHER REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHEN
IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE SAID DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE SUBJECT MARRIAGE CONTRACT AS
AN ANCIENT DOCUMENT, BESIDES, THE SAID DOCUMENT, MORE THAN 30 YEARS IN EXISTENCE IS
CONSIDERED AS AN ANCIENT DOCUMENT, OUTSIDE THE NEEDED REQUIREMENT OF
AUTHENTICATION APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE DOCUMENT.

III

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE PROBATIVE VALUE
OF A BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE AND PETITIONERS PARENTS YEARS [OF] COHABITATION. THE
BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE WHILE NOT ADMISSIBLE AS DIRECT EVIDENCE FOR A MARITAL CONTRACT,
THE SAME IS OF STRONG EVIDEN[T]IARY SUPPORT TO THE EXISTENCE OF MARRIAGE OF
[PETITIONERS] PARENTS, EVIDENCED BY EXHIBIT A AND EXHIBIT A-1 AND BY THE CERTIFICATE
OF ITS DESTRUCTION DURING WORLD WAR II, ALSO, BY THE OPEN AND PUBLIC COHABITATION OF
[PETITIONERS] PARENTS, ADDED THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF SUCH MARRIAGE, BOLSTERED BY
THE OPEN AND PUBLIC COHABITATION.

IV

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED ANOTHER REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE WEIGHT
AND PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF TWO (2) DISINTERESTED PERSONS. THE
AFFIDAVIT OF TWO (2) DISINTERESTED PERSONS BEING A REQUIREMENT BY THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR AND/OR THE NSO TO SUPPORT THE EXISTENCE OF [PETITIONERS] PARENTS MARRIAGE,
AND IN THAT SINCE BECOMES ALSO A PUBLIC DOCUMENT OR AT THE VERY LEAST, A
CIRCUMSTANTIAL DOCUMENTARY PROOF, WHICH IF ADDED TO THE BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE
EXHIBIT H-1, THE CONTRATO MATRIMONIAL AND THE CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE IGLESIA
FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE TAKEN TOGETHER, PLUS THE OPEN AND PUBLIC COHABITATION OF THE
[PETITIONERS] PARENTS MARRIAGE, AND THE PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE PROVIDED FOR BY
LAW, BANDED TOGETHER, ARE STRONG EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF [PETITIONERS]
PARENTS MARRIAGE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ANOTHER YET SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHEN IT DID NOT
CONSIDER THE RESPONDENTS PARENTS MARRIAGE AS BIGAMOUS. THE NULLITY OF THE
[RESPONDENTS] PARENTS MARRIAGE, FOR BEING BIGAMOUS, AND BEING THE INCIDENT
NECESSARILY INTERTWINED IN THE ISSUES PRESENTED, AND IT BEING A BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE, CAN
BE COLLATERALLY ATTACK[ED] OR SLAIN AT SIGHT WHEREVER AND WHENEVER ITS HEAD (THE
[RESPONDENTS] PARENTS MARRIAGE) IS EXHIBITED.19

Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it is required by law
to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners
claim to have in their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial which should
be regarded as original. Petitioners emphasize that the certification issued by the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente Church, the joint affidavit of two disinterested persons, the baptismal certificate
presented by petitioners, and the open and public cohabitation of petitioners parents are
sufficient proof of their marriage.

Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain that said
document should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded from the
requirement of authentication.

Petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals should have considered the marriage between
Vicente and Leonora as bigamous.

In their Comment,20 respondents submit that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document
and the fact that marriages are required to be registered in the local civil registrar does not ipso
facto make it a public document. Respondents assert that the certificate of baptism is likewise a
private document which tends to prove only the administration of the sacrament of baptism
and not the veracity of the declarations therein. Respondents moreover refute the certification
issued by the local civil registry arguing that it does not prove filiation but only the fact that there
is no record of Ligaya on file with said office.
With respect to the joint affidavit attesting to the marriage of Vicente and Benita, respondents
assert that it is inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence because the two affiants were never
presented on the witness stand.

The validity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora hinges on the
existence of the first marriage of Vicente and Benita.

In support of the existence of the alleged first marriage, petitioners presented a copy of
the Contrato Matrimonial.21 There is no dispute that said marriage contract was issued by Iglesia
Filipina Independiente church.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early as in the case of U.S.
v. Evangelista,22 it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made
subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 6823 and the passage of Act No. 190 are
no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private
writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in
accordance with the rules of evidence.24

Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court,25 before a private document is admitted in evidence,
it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its
execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after
its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the
instruments had previously confessed execution thereof.26 As observed by the Court of Appeals,
petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her
mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during its
execution nor could she identify Benitas handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is
illiterate.

Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it is a duplicate
original, hence, the original need not be produced. We do not agree. We had previously ruled
inVallarta v. Court of Appeals27 that a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document
executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe
introduced in evidence without accounting for the non- production of the original. But, an
unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent
evidence. It is because there is no public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy. 28

Next, while petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now
argue that it is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners argument
still has no merit. Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than
30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3)
is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract
was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face, there
appears to be no evidence of alteration.

The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.

Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which
they might reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a
legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an
origin probable. If a document is found where it would not properly and naturally be, its
absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for.29
Gibson v. Poor30 cited the reason why it is required that an ancient document shall be produced
from the proper depository:

x x x that thereby credit is given to its genuineness. Were it not for its antiquity, and the
presumption that consequently arises that evidence of its execution cannot be obtained, it
would have to be proved. It is not that any one particular place of deposit can have more virtue
in it than another, or make that true which is false; but the fact of its coming from the natural
and proper place, tends to remove presumptions of fraud, and strengthens the belief in its
genuineness. It may be false, and so shown, notwithstanding the presumptions in its favor. If
found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be
satisfactorily accounted for; but that being done and all suspicions against its genuineness
removed, we can discover no reason why it may not be read in evidence. The real question
which is to affect its consideration is, whether the instrument offered is genuine, and contains a
true statement of what it purports to. In the Bishop of Meath v. Marquis of Winchester, 2 Bing. 183,
Tindal, C. J., speaking of ancient documents, holds this language. "It is not necessary that they
should be found in the best and most proper place of deposit. If documents continued in such
custody, there never would be any question as to their authenticity; but it is when documents
are found in other than their proper place of deposit, that the investigation commences
whether it was reasonable and natural under the circumstances in the particular case, to
expect that they should have been in the place where they are actually found; for it is obvious,
that while there can be only one place of deposit strictly and absolutely proper, there may be
many and various that are reasonable and probable, though differing in degree; some being
more so, some less; and in those cases the proposition to be determined is, whether the actual
custody is so reasonably and probably accounted for, that it impresses the mind with the
conviction, that the instrument found in such custody must be genuine." Some authorities hold,
that the antiquity of the document is alone sufficient to entitle it to be read, and that the other
circumstances only go to its effect in evidence.

In Bartolome v. Intermediate Appellate Court,31 the Court ruled that the requirement of proper
custody was met when the ancient document in question was presented in court by the proper
custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. In this case however,
we find that Simplicia also failed to prove her filiation to Vicente and Benita. She merely
presented a baptismal certificate which has long been held as evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
declarations therein stated with respect to her kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of the
baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized
subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in
the certificate concerning the relationship of the person baptized. 32 As such, Simplicia cannot
be considered as an heir, in whose custody the marriage contract is expected to be found. It
bears reiteration that Simplicia testified that the marriage contract was given to her by Benita
but that Simplicia cannot make out the contents of said document because she cannot read
and write.

On the other hand, the document presented to prove Ligayas kinship is a Joint Affidavit
executed by two persons to the effect that she was born to Vicente and Benita. These two
affiants were never presented in court. Thus, their statement is tantamount to hearsay evidence.

Petitioners also presented certifications from the local civil registrar certifying that the records of
birth from 1930 to 1946 were destroyed by fire and/or war. In said documents, there contains an
advice that petitioners may make a further verification with the NSO because the local civil
registrar submits a copy of the birth certificate of every registered birth with the NSO. The advice
was not heeded. Petitioners failed to present a certification from NSO whether such records do
exist or not.

While we acknowledge the difficulty of obtaining old records, we simply cannot ignore the rules
on evidence, specifically the rule on authentication with respect to private documents which is
precisely in place to prevent the inclusion of spurious documents in the body of evidence that
will determine the resolutions of an issue.

Considering that petitioners failed to prove the validity of the marriage between Vicente and
Benita, it follows that they do not have a cause of action in the case for the declaration of nullity
of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 5 August 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 89585 reversing and setting aside the 30 January 2007 Decision and 16 April 2007
Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69 of Binangonan, Rizal in Civil Case No. R-98-047
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, G.R. No. 186571

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
*ABAD, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The August 11, 2010
SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Respondents. -- -
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

BRION, J.:
 Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari[2]under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian

citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married

respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional

commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to

the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his

wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned

to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of

Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce onDecember 8,

2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to

love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City

Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage

certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics

Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under

Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized

by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6]

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or

declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did

not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the

trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a

similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,

requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

 In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded

that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign

divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can

avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, [8] in order for

him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance

with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of

the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic

v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino

spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married

to the Filipino spouse.[11]

THE PETITION

From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar

to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as

well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the

doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an

interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of

the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to

institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his

Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file

with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective

Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the

Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of

a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURTS RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of
the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void [15] and

voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or

annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other

hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the

marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an

alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom

Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code

to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance

with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
 as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated

into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both

cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a

foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized

that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court

reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered
still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x
cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served.[22]

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd

situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a

divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. [23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of the

Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce

decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino

spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as

dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of

the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a

proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding,

would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a

mode of severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy

against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign

country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the

direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage

between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not

limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree

capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is

likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can

make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the

decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.[26]

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of

the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can

invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no

right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive

evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the

Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this

conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the

unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not

necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign

divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the

aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of

Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a

judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the

judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing;
and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the

judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence

of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to

clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the

recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the

divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the

divorce is valid according to his or her national law.[27]

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the

acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and

laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its

dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.[28] This means that the

foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,

together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien

himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the

purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of

his claim or defense.

 In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the

alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a

sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section

requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal

custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these

must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in

the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)

authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as

well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the

Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition

for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the

case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian

divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26

interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the

petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign

judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of

jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to

state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is

made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res

judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.[33]

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal

recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign

judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not

obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the

foreign divorce decree

As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office

has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based

on the mere presentation of the decree.[34] We consider the recording to be legally improper;

hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil

status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil

registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal

capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more or less

permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or

illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons

legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of

Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status
of persons, in which shall be entered:

(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.

xxxx
 Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their
offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper
entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and

naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the

submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decreesregistration. The

law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign

judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no

judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil

Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the

Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone

of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court

recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion

No. 181, series of 1982[37] both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine

court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but

it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration

of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and

cannot produce any legal effect.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may

extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the

entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil

registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or

corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by

specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may

be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional

and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the

cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others,

that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil

registry is located;[38] that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must

be made parties to the proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be

published in a newspaper of general circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements

have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the

RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two

separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for

recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a

Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the

Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover,

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding [41] by which

the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional

infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,

2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in

accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar

General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.
155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution 2 of the CA, as reiterated
in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of
private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente
lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25,
2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a
resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old,
to be an American citizen7 born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine
Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have
soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca
personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the
Dominican court issuedCivil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's
marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving
them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would
issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an
Agreement10 they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the
"conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property
and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue,
Alabang, Muntinlupa."11

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No.
362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition 12 dated January 26, 1996, with
attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca,
however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment 15 stating under oath that
she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and
that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay
Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court.
In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of
action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001,
Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as
affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to
speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca
commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery
and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with
bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED.
Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby
GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the
duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.19

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to
the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up
during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere
allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal
support.

Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order,
Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court
granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of
which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from
implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094,
upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.23

Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002
resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued.
Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated
September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed
in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively
dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the
case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August
8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the
following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-
admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of
action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca
had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente
declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign
divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to
contract another marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time
the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino
citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still
a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also
did not indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have
that nationality status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events
of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she
applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a
year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil
Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam,
USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an
American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her
citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse
was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of
her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the
implementation of the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final
resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION
IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS

ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN
DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE. 30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the
success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by
an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute
divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.32

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the
propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the
questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether
the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her
divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an
effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative
of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is
followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there;
and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage
certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment 34 in which she
stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification
(ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778
would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-
emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the
affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of
Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and
thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and
whose other particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953

Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown

Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section

1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by
Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by
Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be
deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition
on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from
the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued
on October 11, 1995after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.
5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the
Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only
on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error
with the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court
takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22,
2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be
spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the
affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order
No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec.
3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services
andimplement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the
confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau
is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly
provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the
Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its
date of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the
Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate
shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any
Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall
prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.
(Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13,
2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1 st Indorsement confirming
the order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence
of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation,
Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that
ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No.
RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8,
2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's
passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was
not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of
divorce from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her
original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously
because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of
that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC
on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in
the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition
were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex
"B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is
it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the
petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No.
01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as
attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage
Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's
Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC
9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's
motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly
made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but
represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose,
before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital
relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in
the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of
this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties
MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married,
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x
x, who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN
OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43
years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang,
Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO
TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19 th of
February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila,
 duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this
case.37 (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States
of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and
Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement 38 executed on December 14,
1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil
Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca
was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce
can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under
the national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an
American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in
any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact
admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor
challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with
respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v.
Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x
x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court
(now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a

foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive

evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in

order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction,
our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima
facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to
the contrary.41

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while
Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said
proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the
Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of
the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order
of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured
by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in
determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the
country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at
the time a valid divorce is obtained.42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res
judicataeffect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the
marital vinculumbetween Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed
from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband
and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage
between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x
x leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal requirements."43

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a

husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code, providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second
paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.45
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of
Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during
the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement
executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property
relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their
family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their
marriage consists only of the real property and all the improvements and personal
properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa,
covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati,
Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot,
x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which,
per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that,
"THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14 th day of December 1996
in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged
and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision
of said agreement."47

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus
estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's
conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under
the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept
and elements of a cause of action, thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the
other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the
truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1)
a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.49

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's
motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached
therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
presupposes the existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim
for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous,
indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more
marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to
support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had
discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At
any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority
age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for
declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which
allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for
reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the
earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what
Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall
have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in
G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to
that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably
removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP
No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of
Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly
committed by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters
that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated September 30, 1999
of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial
Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the
order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders partially
set aside the trial courts order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving
issues relating to the property settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children.

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their
marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of
their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25,
1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its order7 dated May 28, 1997.

On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an
order8 dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and
remanded the case to the RTC.

Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.

The decree provides in part:

[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge
van Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4
Nov. 1997:

The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of
Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.

The parental custody for the children

Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981

Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987

is granted to the father.

The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a
decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and
private respondent.

On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioners motion to dismiss.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case
proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of
the properties between petitioner and private respondent.

On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the
petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the
marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had
already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce
had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the
implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code, 10 endowing the petitioner with
the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.

On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her
order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the
spouses as well as support and custody of their children. The pertinent portion of said order
provides:

Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by
petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and considering that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was included as an amendment thru
Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married to his
or her alien spouse though the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because
he/she had obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and
considering further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in
relation to Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the
property relations of the spouses, and the support and custody of their children, the
Order dismissing this case is partially set aside with respect to these matters which may
be ventilated in this Court.

SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by
respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12

Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:

1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not
allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.13

2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration had
recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg,
Germany.14

3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal
assets alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and
the custody of the children had already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15

Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:

 1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order
dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and

2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed
and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has
already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely
inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides:

Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim,
deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied
upon is not indubitable.

In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner avers that a courts action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim,
denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.

Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated July
14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of respondents motion
for reconsideration.

Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.The trial court may set aside
the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may
deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that
the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such
judgment or final order accordingly.

Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.If the grounds for a motion under this Rule
appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in
controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new
trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the
judgment or final order upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that
has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still
be modified. Moreover, in Saado v. Court of Appeals,16we held that the court could modify or
alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire
rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying
or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and
executory17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to do so
when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained finality.

Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that
petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg,
Germany.

In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we consistently
held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case
is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. We held
in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not
been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the
trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private
respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of
the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in
our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children,
must still be determined by our courts.23 Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on
grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title
to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a

right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court
clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a
foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party
and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.24

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment
as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two
children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of
private respondents participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain
unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the
proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.26 Unlike petitioner who
was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said
proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the
German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years,
the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who
the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody
of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of
parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is
in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the childs welfare is
always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. 28

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the
bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property
relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in
Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the
RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any
conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any debts during their
marriage."29 Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall
grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof.30 Given the factual admission by the
parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no
basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the
custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent.
Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property
relations of the parties, which is not at issue.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September
30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial
court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody,
including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for
continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.