120 The American Review of Public Administration

their own conclusions about this controversial suite of policies as well as a firm foundation
for researchers wishing to build this body of literature and a step toward improving the
quality of discourse about the interplay of religion, social welfare, and public policy.
Christopher S. Horne
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

Birkland, T. A. (2006). Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change After Catastrophic Events.

Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
DOI: 10.1177/0275074007307512

Thomas Birkland addresses an important question: how and why big events (i.e., disasters)
influence policy change. The book provides (a) a theoretical model of policy change and
learning; (b) case studies on aviation security issues, culminating in the 9-11 tragedy;
(c) case studies on natural disaster policy leading up to the Hurricane Katrina debacle; and
(d) an analysis of how the U.S. political-policy process learns from disasters. The author
makes a strong case that learning from disasters is not a given outcome. Effective learning
and policy change following a catastrophe depend on a strong commitment from a relatively
unified policy community, willingness on the part of the media to cover and promote policy
discussion, and an operational plan on which legislative bodies can focus.
Birkland first presents a theoretical model of policy change and learning that emphasizes
not only how a disaster elevates an issue on the agenda but also how a disaster can overcome
resistance and steer decision makers to accept fundamental policy change. The model makes
a distinct contribution to the literature by identifying six propositions to differentiate why
and how some disasters lead to learning and policy change, while others do not. The body
of the book is an in-depth analysis of the propositions as they relate to human and natural
disasters.
Lessons of Disaster is designed to aid the policy community, particularly those active in
homeland security and natural disaster management. Its methodology is straightforward,
relying heavily on content analysis of congressional hearings, congressional debates, and
national media news coverage as surrogate measures of policy change (i.e., statutory
and regulatory rules changes), policy community involvement (congressional committee
testimony), and public interest (media reportage) in policy change.
September 11 yielded rapid and substantive change in the policy environment for aviation
security, whereas prior incidents such as hijackings in the 1970s Pan Am Flight 103 and
TWA Flight 800 did not. The evidence presented indicates that one major factor in the varying
response was that the September 11 tragedy was of such magnitude that it could not be
ignored, and there was general agreement that any policy response required a broad and
comprehensive menu of immediate policy changes. Following September 11, the traditional
route of establishing commissions and studies would not suffice in meeting demands of the
public for an effective policy response. Pre-9-11 incidents had generated a substantial body
of literature and recommendations, so much of the groundwork had already been laid and
the policy community was relatively unified in considering what needed to be done.
 Book Reviews 121

Birkland underscores that natural disasters, such as hurricanes, operate under a dynamic
different than that associated with aviation security. There is the recognition that natural
disasters cannot be prevented, only mitigated, and following natural disasters, public officials
are judged not by their prior mitigation efforts but rather by their ability to provide effective
immediate relief. In the case of 9-11, the public and policy communities were of one mind:
that such an event should never occur again. In the case of a natural disaster, most stake-
holders agree that nothing could be done to prevent its occurrence. Widespread appreciation
that the impact of a disaster can be substantially reduced through effective mitigation
programs is often missing.
Following a natural disaster, public and policymaker attention tends to focus on failures
or weaknesses in relief and recovery efforts (e.g., Hurricane Katrina) rather than on failure
to execute effective mitigation activities. New policy responses require strong consensus on
the part of the federal policy community that mitigation is important. As the author under-
scores, the earthquake policy community, which has a significant federal component, has
been much more effective in drawing attention to and implementing mitigation activity
following a disaster than the more state and locally dominated hurricane community.
The authors primary conclusions are that disasters lead to policy change when there is
sustained and intensive media attention, the issue is salient for broad sectors of the population,
the advocacy coalition is united and has a national constituency, and change is politically
acceptable for decision makers. For man-made disasters, a single event can mobilize the
public and decision makers to undertake action and adopt a comprehensive policy program.
For natural disasters, however, learning tends to be incremental.
Birklands Lessons of Disaster makes an important contribution to the literature on
disaster management in the United States. It is well written and researched and has a well-
developed bibliography. It can be a very useful text for generating ideas and discussions
in graduate classes and within the disaster management community.
Nevertheless, Lessons of Disaster is far from being the final word on the subject. It was
designed to provide an explanation of why and when new policy actions or directions are
considered. For that purpose, this text serves admirably. What is needed next, however, is
some type of manual to assist policy communities and advocates in developing a strategy
for policy change based on the findings and research presented in this book.
Jim Seroka
Auburn University