U. S.

ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS HISTORICAL STUDIES

GAS WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I

THE 1st DIVISION IN THE MEUSE-ARGONNE

1-12 October 1918

U. S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office
Office of the Chief Chemical Officer
Wuhington, D.C.
No. 3 Au,ust 1957
 The lst Division in the Meuse-Argonne
l-l2 October l9l8

by

Rexmond C, Cochrane

U,S, Army Chemical Corps Historical Office

Offioe of the Chief Chemical Officer
Army Chemical Center, Maryland
1967
 The lst Division in the Meuse-Argolllle
October 1918

Prepared by

Rexmond c. Cochrane, Ph.D.

Under oontraot DA-18-108-C!ll.-6214

with
u.s. Army Chemical Corps

'J:h1.s is an aooepted dra1'~ a~udy on g,u w..r:f',.ro in World Wo.r I

~;2~"'
Brigadier General, USA
Asst CCmlO !'or Planning &, Doctrine
 '

Foreword

This is a tentative study of the gas experience or

the lst Division in the Meuse-Argonne during World War I.
This study i s ~ presented as a definitive and off1o1al
history, but is reproduced for current rererence use w1th-
in the Military Establishment pending the publication of
an approved history.
The author was assisted in his research by Mr, Walter

0, Moeller and Mrs. Charlotte Bolin.

Note to Reader, Co111D1ents and suggestions relative to

Qccuracy and ~dquaoy or treatment are invited, and may be
transmitted to the Chief, U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical
Office, Army Chemical Center, Maryland.
 '1'.B1 lit DIVISION IN THI MBUSi-ABOOi.llll

. b;y a-n4 c. Cochrane

Narrative

The .First Diviaion CODLea Up to the Line. , , , 2

Bursts of Gas, , , , I I I I I I I I I 7

The Gae Casualties, , 13

The Ad.,e.noe is Ra aum.ed *' , II I Q 19

. . .. . 32

The Argonne .lore et is Reduced, , , ~ 40

Anal711s
Shook D1v111on I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 50

HE and Gas Casualties I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 52

First Division Gas Operations and German Gas Casualties , , , , , 58

Sketch and llaf

lllap No, l Operation West ot the Meuse, Oct 1-12. 5a

Map No, 2 Group Argonne Situation Map, l Oct , ' 6a
Kap No, 3 ~~ Pivilllion Situation Map, 2 Oot, &,oo a,m, 6b
Map Ho, 4 000 Map Showing Enemy Gae Attack, ot' 12 Oot , 15a
Map No, 5 1st Dtvlaion Combat Seotor 24a
Map No, 6 0-2 Situation Map, 5 Oct , . .. 24b
Map No, 7 Order ot Batt le, ht Div, 49 Oot, . 26a
.Map No. 8 Group Argonne Infantry D1spo11t1on1, ll Oot, 5100 a,m, 47a
 THlil ht DIVISIO?: IN THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
112 OCTOBER 1918

As a result of gas attacks on the tour succeeding nights at'ter its

..rrival in the sector, while awaiting orders to advance, the lat Division
suffered more then 900 gas casualties, Many ot the 480 additional gas
casualties incurred during the week ot operations that followed appear to
rPpresent delayed cases or new casualt1es as a result or occupying pre-
viously oonte.minated terrain,
In the attack ot First Army on 4 Ootober, the lat Division was

charged with flanking the enemy out or the Argonne Forest, The advance

made by the lart flank ot lat Division on the first day represented its
maximum effort until 9 October. Without the assistance of its neighbor-
ing divisions, it drove the wedge for the flanking maneuver, but had to
leave completion of the maneuver to the 82nd Division, while it fought to
hold the ground over whioh 1t had advanood,
The focus or this narrative is on the series of gas attacks on the
division prior to the assault, when the attack and support battalions of

the division were held in ravines that were natural gas traps, within

easy reach or the enemy artillery. These gas attacks were unquestionably
a contributing factor not only to the 1nab1l1ty of the d1v1a1on to effoot
the decisive flanking maneuver, but to excessively high casualties it had
to take subsequently when it proved unable to assault and silence the

- l -
 The lat Division Comes Up to the Line
On 14 September, having advanoed fourteen kilometers in less than a day
in closing the st. Mihiel salient, the 1st Divison, under Major G-eneral
Charles p. Summerall, bivouacked in the luxurious former German rest oamp
in the Bois de la Belle Oziere. Five days later it was placed in .A,;-my re-
serve at Benoit-Vaux as plans were made to use the division east of the
Mense in the coming Meuse-Argonne offensive.

The first objective of Foch's "greatest or battles" that opened on 26

September was the breaching of the Hindenburg Line. The British armies
~

stood before that line in the CambraiSt. Quentin sector, but in the Meuse
Argonne sector, the American army was eight miles from the Hindenburg Line,
represented in that sector by the Kriemhilde Stellung.
Of the nine American divisions along the line of assault, only one
was a regular army division and only three had had previous battle ex-
pertenoe. Nevo,rtho,less, PerHhing expected hia troop11"to reaoh and broak

through the Kriemhilde line on the first day, , ,and to eJtploit the success
during the night, so that the second morning would find them in open
country, and almost half-way to Sedan and the lateral railway," 1
The natural obstacles of the terrain, the d1ff1oulties of supply, the
stubborn defense of the German forces. and the nature of the German defenses
1n the sector thwarted the plan, In midl917, the Germans had largely
abandoned the linear system of trenches for a system of d1soonneoted strong
pointe distributed in great depth. Maoh1ne guns, thlckly sown, held these

l
Liddell Hart, The Real War, 1914-1918, P 464,

- 2 -
forward stellugen or fortified positions, with troop reserves concentrated
in the rear for oounterattack.
In ita first two deya, the 35th Division, like the other divisions
along the front, had overrun, at high oost, the foremost of these positions,
penetrating four miles or more, but as Liggett was to say, the Germans, al-
though surprised, were able to throw in reserves so rapidly as to blook the
original breach by th- third day, As a roault, tho J.m,erican attack came to
a standstill on 28 September. This was nowhere more evident than in the
1st Corps sector, where, even before the German oounterattack, the dis-

organization of its divisions made a halt at onoe imperative,

The initial German forces before'the American army were war weary-
they had been sent to that eeotor for rest and re-organ1zat1on-and Lhey

were temporarily demoralized by the onslaught, They held on while reserve~

were rushed to them from Metz, even aa the American forces waited for help
from the veterans of St. Mihiel, The attack, which lost its impetus on 28

September, was not to be resumed until the morning of 4 October,

'Still in the 3rd Corps sector, near the Meuse, on 29 September and
'
still uncommitted, the 1st Division was suddenly assigned to 1st Corps and
ordered to move that night by truck to Neuvilly, on the fa.r side of the
F'ir11t Army front. Eo.rly on tho morning or the Soth, Generd Summerall Br

rived at the 35th Division CP at Cheppy with orders to relieve that division
by 6100 a,m,, l October,

The position reported occupied by the 35th Division extended from

Baulny to near the ApremontEpinonville road, one kilometer east of Chaudron
Ferme, and thence to Ecl1stonta1ne a front of more than four kilometere.

- 3 -
Messages were dispatched ordering three lines ot the lat Division into the
ravines in the seotor, the Baulny-Serieu.x Ferme ravine (the reported firat

line of the 35th Division), the Charpentry-!oliafontaine ravine, and the

Very ravine (Nap No, l). 2
The inf11Dtry columns approached the Varennes-Cheppy line at dark on
30 September, the 16th andl8th Regiments of the lat Brigade, under Brig,
Gen. Frank Parker, and the 28th and Zoth Kegiments of the 2nd Brigade,
under Brig. Gen. Frank E. Bamford, in line trom left to right. They ad-
vanced until a battalion of each regiment was in position in the three

ravines, with the lat Engineers in reserve southeast of Very.

At midnight, the lat FA Brigade under Col, Henry w. Butner reached
the vicinity of Cheppy and the next night began the rel1er or the 35~h

Division artillery, The batteries of the 6th FA Regiment were put on the
western slope ot the eeotor where, though screened trom frontal fire, they
were exposed tu direct fire from the rgonne, just aeroaa the river Aire.
The 7th FA went into positions southwest of Eolistontaine, and the 5th FA
(155) took up positions near Charpentry and Very, At the former poa1t1ons
of the 35th Division artillery, the incoming brigade found 3,000 gas shells
and 3,000 smoke shells neatly stacked in their caaea, 3

Hist Sketch of the 1st Div During the World War, compiled by lat DiT
Society (214 pp.), n.d., pp. 138-146 (lat Div Box ll, ll.4). This mimeo-
graphed account appears esaentially unchanged in the published Histori of
the lat Division During the World War (Phila1 J, c. Winston Co., l92 ).
3
All 6,000 rounds were expended on 4 Oct, per lat FA Brig Ammo Rpts, 20
Jan - ll Nov; they were expended on 6 Oct. per Rpt, Spec Shells Fired by 1st
FA Brig, Jan - Nov l91B, See World War Records, lat D1v1a1on, Vol. 14. Theeo
bound vole with preface by General SU111111erall, dated 28 Mar l92B, are here-
a:t'ter cited as Records.

- 4 -
 The 1st Division oame into the line with orders to continue the First
Anny attack immediately upon eomrletion of the relief. The assault battal-
ions were to assemble by midnight on the Charpentry-Eclisfontaine road, and
proceed through the foremost line of 35th Division troops, ready to continue
the adve.noe to the Combined Army First Phase line (Chehery-Fleville-Cote do

Maldah) at 5s30 a..m. on l Ootober. At 8100 p.m,, Army orders cancelled the
attPck, but the troops, in line between B,mlny e.nd EcliafnntRine, remelned

in place. 4
In affecting the relief, the 1st Division commented on the disorgani-
zation of the 35th Division, and reported that a patrol of its 26th Infantry,
probing while the relief was in progress, found a nU111ber of men from the 35th
lo"t lu the R,.,i,. d" Xyah, aoath ot Tronaal Ferme, 6
The German 5th Guard Division also reported the capture that day of ll
men from the 137th, 138, and 139th Infantry, found inside its lines, 6

4
FO 43, 1st Div, 30 Sep (Records 3), Jnl of Opns, kept by Lt A, B. Butler,
ADC to Gen, S11D111terall, 30 Sep (ieoords 11). Hereafter ADC Jnl Opns.
Shipley Thomas, The History of the A,E.F,,pp, 288 - 289, says, The ~n-
suing7 delay was due to the necessity of building roads, , ,for the transport
of artillery and ammunition. -
5
:ro 4:S; "Foul'id an awful mes11 at Charpentry" J Bxtraots from Diary of Maj.
Bdw Ro Coppaok (CO 18th Inf), 1 Oot (lat Div Box 12, 11. 4/9).
6
Noon rpt, l Oct (ItEIIII 'i!7, 5th Gd Wlli!,:JI.),
NOTE, The principal source or German data for this narrative is the bound
volU111e, World War Raoords, lat Division-German Doownents, Vol, 4s Meuse-Argonne
(prefaoe dated SO Mar 1933). All refs to German reoorda, unless olhel'Wise
specified, are to this volume.
Most of the volume oonaiste of the translated reoords and diaries of the
5th Gd Div and its units, with scattered data for the 37th, 45th Res, 4~sti and
52nd Divs at the baok. Kore eomplete records of the 51fiiif1>iv are said n his
volume to be in the War Diarie1 ot German Units Opposing the Seocnd Division,
but the 2nd Div projest ts translate these war diaries apparently ceased with
the Chateau Th1erry e1111pa1111111,i no records ct the 52nd Div are to be found there,
It has therefore been 11.a.o.euu,r to translate pertinent material for the 52nd
~ from its available reaords 1 the Gennan Files of the National Archivl'lr."

- 5.
 ~,
'

84--

81.-

Bois MA f' No.1
d' Apr:el'l'\o~t
0 ~.
Tl- ...

Scale I: 50,000
 Reconnaissance patrols of the 1st Brigade quickly learned that Chaudron
rerme and Montrebeau woods were strongly held by 5th Guard Division elements,
Facing the 2nd Brigade with multiples of machine guns and supporting troops
above the L'Esperanoe-lol1sfontaine road was the 52nd Division (see Maps Nos.
l, 2, 3). 7 Although the onnditlon or the 52nd Division, fully committed tor
the first time on 1 Ootober, in relief of the 1st Guard, was "effective and
e,:cellent, the 5th Guard, to its left, was soon to be reported wcompletely
exhausted, and the 2nd Landwehr, facing the 28th Division, was still
"effective despite losses and fatigue. 8

The first two positions of the German forces on the First Army front
had been penetrated. and on l October the Army faced the Giselher Stellung,
the eneay defense line through the Argonne near Binarville-south of Apremont-
Ecliefontaine-Nantillois-Brieulles sur Maise. Despite their recent success
against th left flank of First Army, the German forces opposite the 1st
D1v1s1on on l October Wfilre not sanguine the operative s1tuat1ons eeoma

indicative that a further withdrawal is not unlikely, reported Group Argonne,

and that sute day a German Third Army memo saids "Army Headquarters has only

a very limited nUlllber or reserves at 1ta disposal and cannot count upon further
9
reinforcements." "Anny reserve elements inserted for counterattack must be

Iteme 102-104, 5th Gd War Diary~ Annexes, how the arty support of the
ol the 2nd Ldw and 52nd Div, and St.h Gd At'ty support
6th Gd Di by the ....4:y
of those two divisions.
8
Est of' situ, Gp Arg to 3rd !, hl5 p.111., 4 Oct (Itam 25, Annexes to War
Diary, Gp Arg); of Survey of situ, 5 Oct, Item 121.
9
Gp Order, 1 Oct (Itea ST, Annexes to WD, Gp Arg); Item 199, 3rd Army
Wll!:A.
 I Scole. \, 80, oo o
\ S1tu ..t10.. '::hu. Pl'" a ,c:,onMV'\
1 :10.1Qlf T110.c1"' fvom IY\e>p 18
'cl ,u.pp, f'.l,1'"'"" H"" bit 1 ~\8

st.
I
I
~
~
( ~.G
"' "'
~:----.:I.\.:_.W::.:__:L:,_,~
\ '-""".. ..

\
\ .
,' '

/\IA r" NO. 1.

Scur~e, E,,..1 .,
N.'1
Gp "-, F,1, a,o. ,u
Gcrmch\ f\1t$ 1301 '2&

6a
 Soutce 1 .rhwi 23,
s"'GdWD?.A
Coyt ">lb ]QS 'hi, +

I
(

MAP NO . .!>

6b

----------------
rolieved immediately a.tter.,,.Gravity of situation demands sparing use. 10
The mission of the 1st D1v1a1on wae to drive a deep wedge into the high
ground east of the Aire valley, foro1ng the eneiw.y to loosen his hold on the
Argonne, and so carry the whole of the Army line forward. 11 The principal

obstacles before the let Division were Montrebeau woods, Exerm.ont re.vine,
Montrefagne woods with Hill 240, and as a culminating barrier, the great
ridge of Hill Z72o Th tak~n, the Argonne would bo fle.nkod and Firat A;t-r,ry

would be ready to assault the Kriemhilde Stellung, But, as Group Argonne

said, "The enemy, cautious since the 29th of September, will have to silence

the enfilade fire from the Argonne before he again renews his attacks east
ef the Aire.n Thia miesion Army assigned to the 28th Division, to the le~
of 1st Divisio. 12 Meanwhile, the troops oonsol1dated their positions,
brou,ht up supplies, aad waited tor the order to attack,

Bursts of Ga1
"The Army, Lt. Jlltler, Aide de Camp to General Summerall, wrote in his

journal, says the Bo11h ha withdrawn, but we know better, We found the

10
Item 23, Anna:es to WD, Gp .A.rg,
11
Hist Sketoh, P 161, Shipley Thomas, P 291, adds, disregarding the
intervening 77th and 28th Divas "&nd to effect a junction with the French
Fourth Army at Grand Pre.
12
Gp Arg WD, 3 Oct, FO 33, ht A, 12 Hr, l Oct, said lat Corps (J.e., lat
D1vJ wu to continue the attack and capture the heights NE and N of Exermont,
thus e.ss1st1ng Ith Corps 1n th<> oaptur.o of the heighta W of Row,.gne. It /r.e.,
28th Div../was to seize utd hold Hill 180 S of Cornay, Hill 244 W of Che.te'f
Chehery, an the main ereat 1f the Foret d'Argonn, "thereby cutting oft
hostile enfil4 fir a1ain.t th atte.ok es.st of the Aire River."

- 7 -
enem;y- with 111&ohine guns 1n the Montrebeau woods & 1n the woods to the east
of the Montrebeau woodm~ ~ere.]'k1lled and ,rounded 1n the patrols.u
But the enemy artillery wa.a to take a greater toll of troops. For four
nights and three days. while the division waited, the German guns pounded
the area. The troops, a Lt. Butler said, were concentrated along the front
line, without oover, and the enency-s batteries on the front and those in the
Argonn", west lllld nonh of Apromont, ,,...r., highl;r ei':fectiva. On 2 Oetober,
he aaid1 11 It' we are not to attack it 1s poor business to leave our men in
attack formation subject to this heavy artillery t'ire. 11 Not until the 3rd
did he report that some of the units had been moved back.
The lllt Division 1".B not aware ot the en9111y's range-finding on 30
September, in preparation for gas shoots on Baulny and Ernst. ravine to the
northeast. nor did Major Wise, the 36th Division Gas Officer, apparently
mention to the ino0111ing dlviaion his susp1o1on, following a tour on the
30th of the troop Utd al!'t.lllery positions in the Charpentry area, that
"conditions were molt. favorable for the enemy to use Mustard Gas on these
positions and lines of supply.1 3
The Gauohieaaen began normally enough. Lats in the evening of the
30th, while the relief was still in progress, Lt. Butler wrote1 rt 1s a

over single gaa 1helh from time to time to haraes.~ By morning it was
obvious that. aome sort of ayatematio gas shelling was under way, and orders

13
5th Gd .lrty Order 12, OHO, 30 Sep (Item lll, 5th Gd War Diary, German
Filas Box l61). Rpt, Wl, n.d., 36th Div Box 10, 63.33
B
 went outs 9
Regimental commanders will issue the necessary we.ming to their
troops that the en~ is shelling along the entire front with phoegene and
mustard gas, 14 Between 3100 and 6s30 a.m., l October, a battery of the
Jerman 1st Guard heavy artillery had put 300 rounds of yellow cross on
li:rnst valley, from Buanthe creek at Baulny up to Serieux Fenne, while
another battery, between 4130 and 6100 a.m.,fired two sudden bursts of gas
totaling 70 blue orose rounds (d1phenylohlorarain") and 40 g;n,.,i, cross

(phosgene) on Baulny.16
Expecting a renewal of the Amerioan attack on 2 October, Group Argonne
ordered continuous harassing fire through the night of l - 2 October, the fire
to be 11 inoreaaed from 6100 11111, At that time gas will be delivered on the pro-
bable assembly areas; this gas will be delivered as close to our l1nes as
weather conditions permit.,,,of primary importances ravines at Bouzon,
Ernst ravine, commune woods of Baulny, commune woods of Cierges, The gas
must be 3uft'ic iont l)" denH 1 11 16 The 5t:h lluArd &rt i llery order, prepared two

14
Memq,2nd Brig 1st Div, l Oct subs Gas Shelling (Records 8), Sent to all
orgns; see 1st Div Box 65, 32.15.
15
Arty O 14, 8 pm, 30 Sep (Item 99, 5th Gd WD&A), ttDuring the night, assem-
bly plaoes gassed, especially ravine near Bouton, Ernst ravine, Conunune Baulny
woods, ComJDune Cierges woods" (Gp J.;rg War Diary, l Oot). "Yellow crORA fl.res
..,.,,.., carried out en t:h .. southern p&rt of the Ernst draw" (5th Gd !rt Comdr to
5th Gd, noon rpt, l Oot, Item 105. See also 3rd Gd Foot Regt, Diary, l Oct
(5th Gd-Regts-Wll!<A),
Unaccounted for in arty orders is the evening rpt, 4th Gd FA Regt l Oot
which said the 2nd Bt;)'. lat Gd Regt delivered 270 rounds of yeilow oro:ss !'rom
8-9115 on southern part of Ernst ravine. Similarly, lst Bn let Gd Res Foot
FA, Diary, l Oct rpta 204 rounds of gas and harassing fire during the day
'"(both items 1n 5th Gd-Sub Units-wmrAl.
16
OP Order, 10,so p.m,, l Oct (Item 39, Annexes to WD).

- 9 -
hours earlier, called for 450 rounds of yellow cross to be fired from ls30-
3sOO a.m. by two heavy batteriee of lat Guard artillery on the valley from
Baulny to the entrance of Karl L'Ji'uantheJravine. In addition, sudden bursts
of lethal gas -- 20 rounds of blue cross by each of five light batteries, 30
rounds of green cross by a sl.Xth battery -- were to be fired at lls30 p.m.,
12115, 12130, 2sl5, 2t30, and 4sl5 a.m. on Baulny -- a total of 780 lethal
shells. 17 In his morning report on 2 October, the artillery ooJDlll8llder sald
~From lsOO aomo the valley between Baulny and Charpentry was gassed with
yellow cross; bursts of gas were delivered on Baulny 1tselfo" 18
The extent of German gas intentions then in progress is evident in the
instructions issued tor the continued defense of the 6th Guard sectors
Preparations will be made for the delivery of gas so that they can be
oarried out at any time, particularly against Hoftung valley @,ove Chaudron
Ferme_7to Chaudron farm, Baulny and Charpentry ravines, Ernst ravine /north-
east of Baulny_7 to Serieux t'arm, :rranz draw 2Ji'orth oJ: Charpentry 7, l'arl
ravine LB"uanthe ravineJ -
During thtt gauing of rav1nea '\>he surrounding hel.gh't will be sy1rbenu,:h
ioally covered with harassing fire or HoE at the same time.
If possibl, dur!.ng the haraeaing fire import&lf traffic points will be
gassed frequently and thoroughly with yellow oroaso
All during the day ot 2 October, the troops and batteries in the ravines
of the 1st Division seotor were pounded with high exploa1veo Ill enemy report

7
Arty O 16, 8,30 p.m l Oct, Item 74060
18
Item 76J 5th Gd Morning Rpt, 2 Oct, Item 730 The morning Rpt ot the
4th Gd FA said 185 row,.ds ot yellow orose were put on Baulny valley and
Baulii.y, 262 rounds on :suzano;y valley to the entranoe of Karl ravine (in 5th
Gd-Sub Unita-WD&A). -
19
Inatruotioaa, 2 On, J'ar VIo5 (Item 63/4, 5th Gd wmi).
- 10
 that night saids "The attack that ns expected today d1d not develop, ap-

parently on account of the oop!oua harassing f1re during the night, gassing
and due to the waves of !lllll1hilat1on fire.n20
That evening the gassing _, resumed when a singl& heavy battery was
ordered to fire 160 rounds of green nroA in "Audden bursts.,.on Charpontry

about 9s30, l0s25, 10145, and lls50, 11 40 rounds each time. Another 195
r~unda of green cross were to be fired in sudden bursts on Baulny at 3100,
3130, and 4il6 a.m, by two heavy batteries. Then, !!bout 4t40 a,m, on the
3rd, six batteries were to fire bursts of gas, auddenly.,.on the road
torka and bridges 200 meters southeast of Baulny, 11 Four light batteries

would tire 50 rounda of blue cross each, two heavy batteries would fire 25
rounds of blue oron and 40 rounds of green cross between them, for a total

of 265 rounds. 21
Reports on the 3rd oonfirmed the "Harassing fire ,against batteries,
.
bursts of gas on Charpentry and Baulny, 11 with later "bursts of gas on tho

roadforks southeast of Baulny and on Ba~lny. 1122 In response to requests of

the infantry, two batteries of the 4th Guard FA fired an additional 200
rounds of blue cross on Baulny between 4t30 and 630 on the e.tternoon of tho
3rd,23

' 20
5th Gd Art Comdr to 5th Gd, Evening Rpt, 2 Oot (Item 82,l, 6th Gd WP!:A),
21
Arty O 17, 7130 p,m., 2 Oct, Item 53.
22
5th Gd Morning Rpt, 3 Oot, Item 129; Noon Rpt, l2s40 p.m., 3 Oot, Item
142; 5th Gd Art Comdr, Noon ~pt, 10=10 a.m., Item 54. 1st Bn 1st Gd Ros Foot
FA, Diary, 3 Oot, confirms burst of gas on Baulny, 40 rds, 3s00 a.m., bursts
of gas on Baulny le brldg, 113 ,de, 3i50-h40 aemo
23
Supplement to final rpt, 5 Oet (in 5th GdSub UnitsWDl:A)

- 11 -

- - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - , , , .. ,, ..
,,,., ........., ____ ,-----------------
 Warning that an imed1ate resumpt1un of the a'btaok muot be e:,cpeoted, ,.
German divl.alonal order tor 3 October asked for additional "Yellow oroaa on
Baulny, and 1r the ammunition situation permits, on the Ernst ravl.ne."24 The
artillory order that e,,..,ning said that "sudden bursts of gas, at the ma:icimum
rate or fire -re to be put on the region between the two bridges at the
southwest corner ot Charp.,ntryo A heavy battery would f'irA 25 rounds of
green oross at 9130 and agaln at l0r24, 10145, and 11150 p.m. Eaoh of two
light batteries would also fl.re 50 rounds ot blue oroaa at 10s45 and lli50,
for a total of 300 lethal gas shells.
In addition, from ltOO to 3t00 on the morning of 4 October, a light
battery, moved from northeast of Fleuville into an advanced position east
of Montrefagne for that purpose, was to fire 580 yellow oross shells on
the northwes+. dope and bottom of Ernst ravine, from the BaulnyCharpentry
road to 700 meters north. Farther back, a heavy battery would fire another
330 roundo of ;yollow oroa on Baulny from 2&00 to 4t00 aomo 26
Completion of this gas mis1ion was confirmed in the 5th Guard morning
report of' 4 Ootobers "Burata of 151.s e.gainat the brldgAs or, the southwest
corner of Che.rpentry. From 2s00 to 4s00 a.111. gas firing on Baulny,,,.Search~
1ng and sweeping fire into the rear area w1th gaa.26

24
5tl Gd Div O, 3 Oat par 5d, Item 37,
25
Arty O 18, 8130 pomo, 3 Oct, Item 34.
26
Item 174, Annexes to WD, Gp krgJ aha 5th Gd Morning Rpt, 4 Oct (Item
,.3, 5th Gd WDU)
4th Gd FA, )(orning Hpt, 4 Oot (15th Gd-lSub Unita) oonflrm tiring of 40
rds blue orou by 9th Bt~ 270th l'A betw 9130-ll100 p.m. against Amer arty,
3rd Bn 4th Gd FA, Diary, 3 dot, oonfirm1 displacement or three guns of
7th Bty to fire yolla,r oroao botwoen 12 111-1146 a,m, 5th Gd Art Comdr. Morning
Rpt, 5e56 a.m., 4 Oot, Item 35, confirm, the 330 rda yellow orosai 1st Bn lat
Gd Rea Foot FA, Diary, 4 Oct, says 344 rds yellow oro11 were fired between
2-4 &omu Pn Baulny and Charpentry bridiea.
Unaooounted for 1~ 3rd Gd Foot Reils Diary, 3-4 Oct (5th GdRe~e-WD&A)s
During the night of 3/4 Oot,tnl Montr eau and the ravl.nel ot the Jrctor had
been gasaed."
- 12 -

 It is stimated that before the 1st Division began its attack on the
morning of 4 Ootobr, it had been shelled with at least 1660 yellow arose
rounds, 1135 blue orose, and 675 green orosa, or a minimum total of 3470
ga, ahll10

The Gas Casualties

The divisional Su:a11&1'1es of Intelligenoe for the period tend to mini-
mize the extent of thi1 ,aasingo The report for the 24-hour period ending
4100 pom,, l October, admitted heavy HE ire that day frcrrn north of Cornay

end Rills 233, 240, 212, and 269, but said the "gas uiells,,.mixed in with

H,t.s fYereJ not in sufficient nUllbers to cause damage," On 2 October

the division reported only that "Gas shells, mi.Xed in with R.E,'s and
occasional shrapnel were coming in "to the rear as far as the Divisional
PoCo" And on the 3rd, "Many gas shells fell on all of our poitlona. Fow

c&su&lties," 27
Th divilional Operations Report for l October, mentioning "A few ge.s
shall" in addition to the HE fire, said that nine men had been reported

killed, twenty-eight wounded and only two gassed up to noon that date. 28
Earlier that morning, a 26th Infantry battalion commander, below Serieux
Ferme, reported that "Mustard gas he.a been fired intermittently on my left
front OQmpany.M29 At noon, howeTer, a platoon leader of the 3rd MG Batte.lion,

SOI 16 h to 16 h, 30 Sep-3 Oct (Records 4).

2S
Opna Rpt, n ton, 30 lp-1 Oct {Records 13), NOTEs DORs after m1d-Sep-
teinber cease to eatiaate the number of its own and enemy arty HE and gas
rounds fired each dayo
29
FM CO lat In 26th Iaf. 9e26 a.m., l Oct (Records 15). NOTEs Almost all
Fl.ls in 1st Div files are true copies.They have been edited, and there
are few or no or1g1nala.
13
with the 2nd Briga.d.e, signalleds Please send over l Sgt & 3 runners. Every-

body over hre is gassed 4 or 5 officers and quite a few men have evacuated

includix:grunner. Moat everybody /JioJ the Bn will not be able to make an at~
taok in this shape. The Major & Adj.have both been evacuated (FM CO 2nd Plat
to CO Co D Srd MG B~ ~ate supplied in poet-war note,.::7!eoorda 15)." Thar
are ro mea,ages .from the moat heavily gassed unit on l ~ 2 October, the 18th
Infantry.
If the SUllllll.llry of Intelligence tor l October did not report sufficient
gas shells coming in that day to cause damage, it added that Company L, 18th

Infantry, had been gassed while digging in. There were "few oe.sualties.n Lt.
Butler, in his journal entry for that sll!le day. wrote, "Some of our men dug
into ground saturated with gas & beoam.e well saturated before they realized
it we have about 400 casualties this first day. Mostly ga,. The com-
mander of the 18th Infantry we.a more explicit,
150 mn, 98 being rrom one company were evacuated th1a ai'ternoon, all
having been gassed with mustard gas. This company moved into trenches as
support company this morning about 3t00 a.m. and l_Iug 1nJ while there was
some shelling, mi.ed lioEo ,wd Gaeo About lOO gaa shells roportod in an aroa
of about a kilometer square. It Y&s neoesaary for the whole battalion to
pass through the gassed area. They all adjuated their masks and none showed
signs of being gassed aa a result. But thi, &t'ternoon this whole company
showed signa of being gassed with mustard gas, burning eyes and vomiting,
No gas shells had hit at the particular place where this company dug in nor
yet to windward of it l,pparently this place had been bombarded with gas
and throwing the earth up in digging and this being exposed to the sun the
gas was given off, as there was no sign of gas when the company took it
positiono soon as it was noticed that there we.a gas, the company took
up position out or the gassed area. 30

30
Ltr, Hunt CO 18th Inf to CG lat Brig, l Oct, subs Rpt on Gas (Reoorda 13),
let Ind to CG lat Div, 2 Oct, suggested that the men had dug in saturated
ground and became subjected unaware to the accumulated influence of
mustard fume So

- 14
 On 2 October, Major Coppaok, commanding the leth Infantry, wrote in his

diary of gas shelling some hours before 6100 a.m., the hour Group Argonne
ordered gu on the Baulny area. "My headquarters is only 1500 yards from
tho enemy. Last night he shelled ua with gaa, HoEo and shrapnel. We wore
OW' masks :rorn midnight at 2 AoJ.!o Yot thoro ..,..ro 70 ca15ualtios from gaso I

am sick at my at011ach today on account or it." At 6J00 a.m. on the 2nd, the
lat Division reported 254. gas ca1ualtieso 31 By noontime, a total or 409 gas
cases had been reported.32

Capt. G. J. Sielaff, the Division gas Officer, in his first gas attack
reports, makes no mention of gas on the morning of l October, but refers to
the gassing between lOsOO pomo and 3J00 a.m. on l-2 October. Following that
attack, he says, there were 392 mustard gas casualties out of a thousand men
exposed in the 18th TnfAnt:ry, ~s e reoult of failure to reBogni&e the

pre1enoe of the gas, and 17 out of two thousand men, ta.ken by surprise, in
the leth Infantry. lb hundred yperite shells were said to have fallen on
33
the 16th Infantry reserve position.

3l
Tele G-3, 2 Oct (Records 13) reports 118 wounded, 254 gasaed, 6 PN, 44
sick for period 12m-6am 1-2 oct.
32
Opns Rpt, 1-2 Oct, reporting "Heavy harassing flre especil.lly during
night on front 11neo HoEo ehell and gu,n shmrs 14 kllled, 97 wounded,
409 gassed.
Lt, Butler, at Cheppy, noted on 2 Oat only that that tmrn "was shelled
slightly last night with ingle gas shells, and on the 3rd, that "The enemy
is dropping a gaa shell in Cheppy from time to time. Just enough to cause
'Ga5 Alarmis'(t"

33
Rpts on Gu Atk, 2 Oot (GAF-lat Div Atka). Spsncer, Pt I, p. 75, re-
peating these s11111e DGO rpta adds 700 gas shells in the 18th Inf aeotor, not
in DGO rpto
- 15 -
 \

\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\. \
\

ot

Mop :51,.,..,,.,., fht"''f Gos Off,ns,v,

~run sf 1sl D,r Oct I, 2. 1i,18
/j'ekeJ ,ca/e ': 2.0 0

S01m:e, :S/IC!1tcer. EIICP 460. R.rt ,r (''iii, a,J MAP NO. 4

{or,,,.,../ ...., ot<J,4 -ft, """"" DGO IH)ff 'fl
C CWJ', ,a o..r-. ;~ l',I/IF-, .. P,lf A'tr:t)
 The itemized caeualty lists of the division field hospital show by
aotual count 189 men gasaed in the 16th Infantry, 3 officers and 117 men in
the 18th Infantry, 52 men in the 26th Infantry, and 3 offioers and 105 men
,;asaed in the 28th Infantry -- a total of 469 casualties among its admissions
on l-2 Octobero34

It appears that Capt!Lin Sielaff was confused about the extent of the gas
E<ttacks, as well as in error about when and whore they ooourrodo Thie is
cloar from his post-action a.coount of the gs.Hing, with attached map (see
Map Noo 4), wherein he dates the relief of the 35th Division and the first
gas attack as the night of 1-2 October, instead of 30 September-I Octobero
On the night of the relief the enemy began shelling at lOsOO pomo
October lat and continued until 4s00 a.m. of the 2ndo In the area of Char-
pentry the ravines were shelled with yellow cross containing a large amount
of high explosive, making it impossible to distinguish the gas shells from
the high explosiveo The fuses used were probably alight delay, as in nearly
all cases small craters showed that the shells had ponotratod the Ot\J'th from
two to four fe.t before exploding.
It was in this ..,...,.,.. the,b tho 16th Infantry was bi vnu1teked and their
casualties were caused by surprise and then by not keeping on the gas masks
long enougho The night was cold and the odor of the gas was very. very faint,
btrll ahooa and clothing w.,r., evidently contaminated, The troops were moved
fonra.rd over ground that had been shelled with yellow cross,
The 18th Infantry in passing toward the front lines, one battalion was
oompelled to dig in on the brow of the hill ["east of Chaudron FermeJ at
the edge of the small woods, This ground we.a shell torn and a.bout one hun-
dred gas shells were fired on them along with the high explosive shells,
They dug in without wearing their masks, not knowing that gas was being usAd.
The 26th and 28th Infantry apparently did not suffer casualties until the
foll.,,,.ing day when they pasad o,,.,r ga~sed ground. The 28th passed gver flat
ground covered with tall grass which had been shelled with mustard. 3

34
Med Dept Box 3406,
35
Memo, DGO to C CWS, 18 Oat, subs Rpt of gas attacks from Oct 2nd to
11th, 1918 (GAF-1st Div Atka),

- 1e -
 Resuming the ht Division acco1mt of' the gu attacks, on the night of'

2-3 October, it reported "th ravine northwest of' Cha.rpentry C-s againJ

shelled with mustard gas, Roads lea.ding to Very and Cha.rpentry ["wereJ
shelled continuously throughout the day and night. 36 At 6s00 a,m., 3
October, the divhion triage at Cheppy recorded a cumulative total or l, 162

casualties to date, of' which 84 were lat Division 1JOunded, 561 gassed, with
another 220 wounded and 164 gaased belonging to .other divisions, principally
35th Division artillery, 37
In the neict 24 hours, another 27 wounded and 66. gassed were reported
38
by the triage, as well as 79 wounded and 9 gassed from other divisions.
During the night of' 3-4 October, Major Coppa.ok wrote in his diary, "My PC
was hit twice with ahells and gassed twice .An awful night ,Bef'ore we

started [the atta.okJ 192 mn f:oi' th 18th Inf'antryJ ha.d been ga.ssed,"
Reports ot oaualties resulting from men digging in mustard-contaminated
ground, as had th l&th Infantry earlier, continued to come ino A oompany

36
OR 2-3 Oot al10 rpted approx 5 killed, 100 wounded, 150 gassed as a
result.
37
Ltr, CO Field Hosp 3 to Div Surg, 3 Oct, sub1 Rpt of' Casus thru Triage
(Rer.nrdR 13). The DGO reports on gas atks a.f'ter 2 Oot are all on a noon to
noon basis a.nd make no attempt to give the number of' rounds fired or units
affected. His rpt tor 2-3 Oot shows 409 gas oases (as in the Opns Rpt f'or
the day before), all mustard gas, occurring Ni of Charpentry. Spencer, Pt
l, p, 77, recording this same rpt says 600 77mm. shells were fired in that
e.tk.
38
Ltr, CO Field Hosp 3 to Div Surg, 4 Oat. The DGO rptd 50 gas oe.su f'or
3-4 Oot a.nd 38 for 4-5 Oot (produced, adds Spencer, by 500 gas shells), with
a note to ee his rpt1 1t 2 and 3 Oct for further details.

- 17 -
of Engineers reported 16 of its men Wllre slightly gassed on 4 October while
working on the roads between Charpentry and Baulny and Route 46, 39 On 6
October, the- Gas Officer of the lngineera reported 80 casualties from mustard
in law oonoentration in the valley south of Charpentry, where the men had
sought shelter 1n shall holaa during bombardment of H.E.S.," and where
troops were continually passing through the area. 40 And on 6 October, the
Engineers reported additional ca1ualt1es, When approx1mately 120 men 1n
Company C were burned while working on the road near Baulny without their
masks, The area had been subjected t'o yellow orou, said the report, about
ten hours previous to their arrival. The officer in charge had been in
France only two months and had had no gas experience, and was therefore
unaware that subsequent shelling with h~gh explosives could volatilize
41 '.
must&rd gas in contaminated ground. '
The 1st Diviaion was later to say, soinewhat 1eleotively, that during
thi.a period "Th rill.vine northe&at of Ch,&rp<!lntr:y waa oonatantly drenched with

mustard gas," although the gauing was not limited to that area. 42 Unquestion-

39
Rpt of Co D 1st Eng during Reoent Opna, 14 Oot, See ltr CO 1st Eng
to CG lst Div, 20 Oct, Rpt on Reoent Opns, which said nothing of gas or gas
attacks but reported total oasua for the period of 21 killed, 72 wounded,
and 166 gaHedo
40
Ltr, RGO lat Eng to DGO 1st Div, 6 Oot (Reoorda 14),
41
Ltr, RGO 1st Eng to CO 1st l!lng, 6 Oct, aubs Rpt (1st Div Box 114, 66,
3)o This gaa1ing ie confirmed in DGO ltr of 18 Oot, It appears to be the
sam" that is said to have ooour:i-ed c:,n 4 Oot, in ltr, co 1st Bn lat Eng to co
1st Erg,14 Oot, Rpt on Opn1 in Atkt W of Meua, Sep & Oot 1918 (Records l4)o
42
Hist Sketch, P 161,

18 -
a.bly, many o:t the ouue.ltiea that reaulted :from the succesaive attaoka were
owing to the :failure t~ recognize the potential e:tfectiveneaa of yellow cross
when m.iXad with harraaing fire, particularly when muoh or perhaps all of that
yellow oroas was in the new German mustard-HE shell. The Summary c:t Intel-
ligence for 4-5 October guessed a.t the haze.rd when it reported that "Many
HoE contain CaJ strong mueta.rd gas composition.
In ita three-day wa1t tor the order to attaok0 the division had La.km

almost 1,500 casualties, o:t which over 900 were caused by gas. 43

The Advance is Resumed

Resumption 01' the Army offensive was ordered for 6130 a.m., 4 October.
For the attaok. two companies of tanks (aotually, 47 1n number) and three
troops o:t caTalry were ma.de available to the division. Campany C of the
1st Gas Regiment was attached, to put down a smoke mcreon along the southern
edge o:t the Bois de Montrebeau :tor four minutes beginning at H hour, but
this was apparently cancelled. 44

43
Opn1 Rpt, 3-4 Oct, gives only the eat. o:t total casus. The Amer Battle
Menu Comm study, let Division Sum o:t 21:na (1944), P 96 ahowa 125 killed,
107 died of wounds, and 1,257 wouiide~n the period 29 Sep-3 Oat. The
wounded apparently inolude gas casualties. The DGO reports through 4-6 Oct
indicate a total of 906 caaualtiea,all represented a.a mustard gas cases. No
mention 1s made 01' phosgene or d1phenylchlora.rs1ne oases,
In his gas atk rpts, the l)(l() notes a total of 223 gas oases at the
triage :from other divisions, but does not indicate whether these a.re included
in his daily tiguroao Thoy aro apparontly .,.oluded in hi~ ltr to C CWS, 5
Oct, subs :Preliminary Rpt on Gas Atk of Oat 1st and 2nd (1st Div Bo:a: 57, 63.
33}, which rpte 863 casualties suffered by the first Division," as reported
between 2-4 Oot. .
44
FO 47, 1st Div, 2 Oot, pa.rs 3B, 3G; Memo G-3, 1058, 3 Oct (leoords 3).
The Co C mission waa ohanfd twice in orders but Hist of 1st Gas Regt, Pt
III, po l7, makoo no !Mint on of this 111110ke miaion. Yet Hilllt Sketoh, P 160,
said, "The Chemical Warfare Company.,,aided powerfully at the initial assault
but the casualties soon became disabling for so small a unit."

- 19 -
 The divieional artillery was augmented by the 2l9th 1'.l (Frenoh), making
a Nlatinly am.all total of 84 '71lmm. guns and 24 155mm. howitzers. Thue were
to open th attack: without any preparation other than a standing barrage, to
allow the troops to close up before both advanced. Two field pieces were
put a:t th" dhpns,._l of .... oh a:tta.ck battalion for uae as forward gunSo 45
Counter-battery and interdiotory fire were to be conducted by two groups of
106' and one group of 155 1 a of the 1st Corps Artillery Grouping, in liaison
with divisional artillery.
In the assault. the first ini'antry objective was a line along the

northern edge of :ontrebeau woods, where the barrage would stand for thirty
minutes, to stun the enelliY on the crests of Exermont ravine and to permit
the troops to reform after pa1aing through the woodso The second objective
was a line along the base of the northern 1lope of :ontrefagne woods, where

another barrage would stand for thirty minutee. The final objective for
the day was a line just north of' Flev1lle, where the barrage would rall ror
twenty minutes and then cease while the guns came forward. 4 6
The order, that "Noo 5 shells (Lethal gas) will be used freely on favor-
47
able targets and under favorable weather COX1dition1n was carried out by the
attached 219th FA which, on the evelling of 3 October, began flthrowing over

46
Forward gun were ordered in FO 63, 1st C, 1'7 br, l Oct and implemented
ln Attack Order Opn11 Noo 4, let FA Brig, 2 Oct {Record.a 9). Momo 00 l&rl, FA
to CO 6th and '7th PA, 6 Oct, reduced this to one gun per bn.
46
FO 4'7 J Hilt Sketch, PP 163 - 164.
47
FO 33, 1st .l, 1 Oct; FO 63, lat C, l Oct;FO 47, 1st Div.

- 20 -
conoentrat1ona of' l.thal gaa from time to ti1U, [:to continueJ until 2t00
48
AoMo tomorrow morning.

Both the 6th Guard and 62nd Infantry Divi1ion, reported the heavy gas
and incendiary fire on their forward lines and rear areas on 3-4 October.
Elisabeth Regiment of the 5th Guard reported. At 2 am the enemy commenced to
shell the entire terrain below the front line and north of' Fleville with gas
~nd IIID.Oke , ,At 7 am the terrain had been so heavily gaued a.nd smoked that
there was no observation from the Ragilll8ntal CP. It was possible to see for
only 5-10 paoea. The gas and art1f1a1al fog moved to the north in heavy
swathe, making any observation impossible." The 3rd Battalion of' the same
regiment 1aid1 "At 5t30 am the preparatory fire of the enemy commenced
suddenly, ,Our men had to ,utter much from laohrymatory gas with which the
rear area wa, shelled 1n particular.~49 Yet a summary report of losses in the

5th Guard D1v11on between 17 October shows only a single gaa casualty for
the period. a m91Dbar ot th Bllaabeth Regimen~. 60
At 5s25 a,m. on the morning of' the attack, the barrage opened 200 meters
above the L'Eaperanoa"Chaudron Ferm.e road and then northeast to the Bois

48
ADC Jnl Opnai Rpt, Spec Shells Fired by lat FA Brig, shows 1620 gas
rounds fired on 4 Oct by the French unit. Hanal1an, Der Chemhche Krieg,
P 45, says it was 1BOO phoagene shell
49
3rd Gd Grn
Regta-D{arlea and
Rm War D1ar;y, 4 O<>t; 3rd Bn
exes).
War Diary, 4 Oct (6th Gd-

50
Items 112. 113, 5th Gd WD&A A 1ummary of ouus in the 2oth Inf
fTauentzein) Regt, 5th Gd, for 21 Sep-10 Oct, showed 24 killed, l81 wounded,
75 missing, none ga, ..d (5th GdRegta).

- 21 -
 COJ11111unal de Baulny. When the barrage began to lldvanae five mlnuhs later, the
brigades moved with 1t. At onoe enemy batteries that had been brought up and
emplaoed in aeoret during the week opened up on the advancing troops and imme-
cUe.tely knocked out at leaat two of the 76mm, guns moving up with the assault
battalions. The others found no opportunity to fire in the subsequent action, 51
Interlookirtg machine guns and a determined thin line or supporting troops
met the advanoih.g waves. It was the impression, repeated again and again later
that day, that ,11 the Bosch who didn't have maohine guns had oannons,"52
"llodl.ee of Am"rioan aoldiora dottd th ground over whioh the 1t+.tank pro-
gressed," and there was evidence in the bandaged dead "that many of the wounded
of the 36th Division had been left by the enemy to die.wt,.ere they feli. 53

u---- --- -----

G-3 M9111o, 17 Oat, Rpt on Opn1 of lat D1v,,,Oot 1-10 inol (Records 13),
said these guns were too often lost or dhe.bled and in general they are not
oons1dered efeot1ve,u
The diffioultiee of advancing in an infantry attack with a gun, 2 caissons,
18 horses, and 19 men are deeoribed in ltr, 2nd Lt, Crose, 7th FA to CO 7th FA,
25 Nov, aubc Rpt ntt aonompanying gun (Records 14), He moved out about 2 e.m, 4
Oct, to advance with the 3rd Bn, 28th Inf,' aarry1ng HE and gas shell, was gas-
sed in Epinonville, reached poaition an hour late, was not allOlfed to fire, and
at l pm the next day returned the gun to the battery, See alaa ltr, lat Lt.
:U:cVicker, 7th FA, 26 Nov, subs Aoat of forward gun, Who reports a simlle.r ex~
perience at St. Mihiel, where he could not follow the infantry and did not fire
a shot, and in the Argonne with the lat Bn, 26th Inf, wher~ h~ at onoe lost his
gun in the attack, 11 of his 12 horses, and 9 of his 13 men.
52
ADC Jnl Opnc.

53
Hist Sketoh, P 155, "The fields between the lb:ermont ravine & our jUlllp-
ing off line are covered with the dead bodies of men trom the 35th Div which
fell back aorose it, Many of these had on their first aid bandages, showing
they ha.d been wounded & died after falling back, The Basch does not loo~ after
our wounded" {ADC Jnl Opna, 5 Oat), The d1v1s1on waa later to say that "Due to
the number of dead left by the preceding division, burial of the dead was not
completed until after th diviaion left the line" (0-3 Memo, 17 Oot, Rpt on
Opns or 1st D1v, ~ ~)

- 22 -
 Despite high 01ualtie1, the 1st Brigade re.ohed its first objective,
above montrebeau woods, at 7s00 oolook. In the first hour of the attack,
both battalion comm.anders and all company oOJIUJlanders of the 16th Infantry
were wounded, but the regimental units continued their adva.noe. 54 On the
ri5ht. the 2nd Brigade met greater resistance from the machine gun nests and
the entrenched enemy troops than it had anti~ipated and did not reach
Exermont re.vine until 7130 &om.
The second barrage began on schedule and the line moved out. Braving
the flanking fire from the Argonne heights, the assault battalion of the
16th Infantry oleared the enipers a.nd machine guns out of Ferme des Granges,
crossed Exermont ravine, and entered Fleville .Anticipating the bombardment
of the town, at lsOO p.m. the troop, withdrew to the reverse dope below

Fleville. The battalion had lost 18 of its 20 officers and 560 of its 800
men that morning, but it was 11 the only unit in the First .American Army to
reach its 1'1nal position" on ~ohedule '\:hat day. 56 Its support battalion
came up to the north slope of Jxerm.ont re.vine, while working parties of
Engineers were sent up that night to consolidate the position, four kilo-
meters from the line of departure. And there the 16th Infantry waited for
the other regiments to come abreast of it.

54
Coppack Diary.
55
Hist Sketch, PP 155-157. Gp Arg WD, 4 Oat, said the oounterattaok
by~ part of the 45th Div and the 37th late that at'ternoon retook Montre-
fagne and drove the enemy out of Flevilleo But aa a result of the "acute
danger for the Aire ve.lley,,,,the withdrawal of the Argonne front to in
rear [nad to be J
taken under oonsidere.tion,n

- 23 -

-----------
 To the right of the 16th Infantry, the remains of the assault and sup
port battalions of the 18th Infantry beo1.111e embroiled on the slepes of
Montrefagn woods, a:t'tlt!' having 1uffered at J!lxermont the close range pUilish-
m.ent that the 35th Division had met there f.'l'om the ridge above the town and
from the gun, 1n the Argomui. Only remnants of oompaniea were left as the
two battalions penetrated the denae growth on the slope of Cote 240, Ele
ments that reached the summlt were beateu back and at nightfall the &ss,.ult
forces dug in on the south and west slopes of Cote 240. Two companies of
the reserve battalion of the 18th oroased J!lxermont ravine, on the left of
the main force. and dug ia to support a possible oounterattaok. 56
In the 2nd Brigade Heter, the 28th Ini'aatcy had advanced that morn-
ing across 0pen fields against a 77 battery above l!lltermont ravine and a net-
work of machine gun nests around La Neuv1lle le Comte Ferme. When these
were finally taken late in the after:noon, the assault battalion dug in be-
tween Bo&urogard and l Comt arm and eatabliahed liaison with the re~i-
57
ments to its left and right.
The assault battalion of the 26th Infantry, on the far right, was so
badly mauled by frontal fire, as well as by flanking fire from the hills on
its right, that it had to halt at the first objeotive, in line with the top
or )lontrebeau woods, and let. 1te upportiing be,lrto.15.on pa"" through to Mn-

tinue the assault. Like the 28th Infantry battalion to its le.ft, the

56
Hist Sketch. PP 157-158; ADC Jnl or Opns, 4 Oct; Gp Arg WI>, 4 Oct,
57
Hist Ske1.ch, P 158.

-:- 24
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MAP No. 5

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24b
support battalion a'li onoe Ollllle under fire from the artillery above Exermont
rav1no and the maoh1ne guns at le Comte Ferme. When those two sources of
fire had been s1lenoed with the help of thermite fired by First Gas Regiment
troops, the 26th Infantry troops turned and attaoked the enemy position in
tho wood to tho oa ..t, outddo tho ln Division eoctor. At nightt'o.11, the

26th Infantry was dug in between le Comte Fermo and the edge of the Bois
de la Morine, two kil0tneters frOln the line of departure.58
That evening, with all troops holding fast, the gap between 1st and
2nd Brigades was filled by the 18th Infantry at Montrefagne. "There was
no oonfusion or disorganization."5 9 The division reported its line from
Fleuville-south slope of Cote 240-aouth edge of Boie de Boyon-Ferme Beaure-
gard-Hill 212 (see Kap Noo 5; ot. Map No. l). On its lei't, said Lt, Butler
in his journal, the 28th Division, between Ferme des Granges and Apr81110nt,

and on the right, the 32nd Division somewhere below Gesnea-Cierges, ''were
far behind" (aee Map loo 6)~ 60
The statement in the divisional history for 4 October that "During
..
the atternoon and night,o,the battery positions and valley suffered especi-
ally from gas" probably referred to the effeots of the 900 rounds of yellow
cross fired just prior to the attack, and was reflected in the report from
the triage at Choppy of 318 wounded and 94 gassed in the Division that day,

58 ---- - -. - ~
Hist Sketoh, pp, 158-159; 0-3 Memo, 4 Oot (Reoords 3)o Thia thermite
mission does not appear in the Hist of the lst Gas Reg\;, Ft, III, P 17,
59
Hist Sketoh, p, 161.
60
ADC Jnl Opal; FM 2039 lat C to 1st A, 2215 hr, 4 Oot (Reoorda 15),
- Ztl -
 61
with another 103 wounded and 39 gaa oases from other divisions, The emer-
gency triage at Varennes on the 4th reported an additional 800 wounded and
82 gassed in the 1st Division, 86 wounded and 7 gassed from other divisions.
That triage was later to say that it had treated but not recorded another
177 wounded on the 4th and had had to send 400 or more wounded back to the
hospitals at Clermont and Lea Islettes without treating them.62
Of the 47 ta.nke that had accompanied the assault forces that day,
only three remained.63 The accurate and wellsited German guns had taken
them out one by one. But the German troops on that front had been pushed

back a distance of between two and four kilometer so The gaps made on both
flanks of the ltt;h Guard that day were to be filled the next day by two
regiments of the 37th Division and elements of the lat Guard Division, sent

Ell
Hist Sketoh, po l62J SOI l6h 4 Octl2h 6 Oot; ltr, CO Fld Hosp 3 to
Div Surg, 5 Oct, tor period 6 a.m.-6 a,m., 4-6 Oct.
62
Triage rpt, F1d Hosp 2, 5 Oat, for period 10 a,m,5 p.m,, 4 Oct;
ltr aupplomont, Fld Hosp 2 to Div Surg, 6 Oot, anti lAt Ind to G-3 1st Div,
6 Oct (1st Div Box 16, 12.3), Opns Rpt, 4-5 Oct, was to estilllate casus at
800, with total oasus to date of approx 2300.

63
Memo, Capt C, H, Barnard, Tank Corps, to CG Camp Dix, N.J., 17 Dee
20, subs Opns of 1st Brig Tank Corps, with 1st Div in A Offensive (1st
Div Box 48, 33.6/ll}o On Z6 llep h1a gp had 96 tanks On l Oct tb<1 r"1llain-
ing 47 were put at 1st Div disposal. At the close of 4 Oat the brigade had
suffered "almost ocmplete annhilation," with 84~ of its officers and men
killed ur wuw,,dodo

- 26 -
 fi
Sommer~
ORl)E.l'l

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r,\i\l' NO. 7
 64
in to oounterattaok Montre1agne and i'lev1 lle (see Map Noo 7),
The order for the attaok on 5 October direoted the lath Inrantry and
the 2nd Brigade to advanoe to a line parallel with the 16th Infaiitry at
Fleville snd then prooed to the Corps Objeotive (which was also the Com-

bined Army First Phase line), one kilometer above Flev1lle to the Cote de
Maldaho 65

SOI, 5-6 Oct {Reoords 4). The next day, 5 Oot, von Kleist' s Op Arg
(a part of von Et.em s 3rd lrmy) we.a trfd to von der Marwitz' s 5th Army
(Item 19, 3rd A Wnr Diry). The trf may have resulted from a difference in
the oonduot of defensive tactics, as 1a auggeirted 1n Army Group Commander
von Gallurh's statement, "More than once before I felt the neosasity of
olose oooperation between the West Group of the Firth Army and GroaF Argonne
of the Third A:::!f!l It was for this reason that tHe"'iiupreme oomman ordered
Group Argonne to be attached to the Fii'l:h Army," (As They Saw Us, editor
G,S, Viereck, po 250),
"With the trr or Gp Arg too.ay, rpt or losses and of booty, .final rpt
and spec rpt of' 3100 p,m, are done away with" (Memo, Op Arg to 52nd, 37th,
7i
2nd Ldw Divs, 2136 p,m,, 5 Oot /J.tem lOO, AnneJl'.ea to WD, Op Arg7f: -
:Gi estimate of the Gp div oa 5 Oct reported the lat and 5th Gd Diva
/on the let!; front of lst Div no longer ef'feotive for defensive action; Zon
the right front of' lat Div.;]'t; e 52nd Div was still fully effective, but the
46th Res Div behind it lf8.B etf'eot1ve for defense only (Item 16, 3rd A WD&A).
On th left f'rent, the 37th Div was inserted on 4 Oot and replaced the
lat and 5th Gds th next day (Div o. l0s30 p.m., 4 Oot /Ytem 17, 5th Gd
11".DL\_7), All thr regts of' the 41st Divi the counterattack div of Gp Meuse-
Weat, were rollJld on the north slope of Hi l Z7Z on 10 Oct (FM Z797, 1st c to
1st A, 4!50 p.m., 10 Oot),
On the right f:ront, the 2llth Re~ 46th Res, the counterattack div of'
Gp Arg, was first identified on the n!g t of 9 Oot (Dl G-2 to G-2 5th C, 9
Oot). Though exhausted, this div replaced the 2nd Ldw on 12 Oot (Gp Order,10
pomo, ll Oct /Ytem llO, Annexsa to 'IID, Op Arg,. The 109th Regt, 28th Div,was
first identifTed in L~eti t Bois 0111 9 Oct, nnall N>gts the n"xt morni"','!; when
the counterattacked ~ill 269 (FM 1st Div to 5th C, 14 hr, 9 Oct; SOI 9-10
Oct). The 115th Divlt'as used briefly in the unsuooessful oounterattaok on Hill
269 on 8 Oot (iht Div Order, 2 a.m., 7 Oct tJtem 4, Annexes to WD GP ArgJ),

65
FO 48, lat Div, 5 O..t: Memo, G-3, Item 1068 for CG 2nd Brig, 4 Oct
(Records 3),
Army'' s F0 36, 4 Oot, that llrd C by a maneuver to the west and 1st C by
a maneuver to the east. nrt to assist 5th C 1n oapturing the heights west of
R8lllogne, was not put into etf'eot until 9 Oct.

- 27 -
 At 6sl5 a.m., in heavy fog, the 26th Infantry moved up to Hill 212,
the support battalioa passing through the assault battalion on its crest, and
oontinued to the edge of.' the Bo1a de .lloncy before it was stopped. To its left,
the 28th Infantry advanced 1a the valley east of.' :Montref.'agne woods against
ene"'ir positions above Be~uregard Ferme and inten9e enamy Artillery fire froru

the crests of.' the valley. Climbing the slopes of.' Montref.'agne to Cote 240,
the 28th Infantry joined the 18th and aeeaulted the oounterattaok: battalion of.'
the German ~ that had oome up during the night, 66
Clearing the hilltop at high cost, the 1st Division, in line age.in, at-
tempted to continue on towards its second objective that day. Assault troops
of.' the 26th Infantry captured Arietal Fenne but got no farther as heavy fire
poured down from Hill 272. On the right, the 32nd Division had relieved the
91st Division that moraing, and to assist its advanoe, in accordance with
Corps order, the 26th Infantry proceeded to extend its line well over a kilo-
meter, from Are1tal Farms east to the Bois de Monoy. 67 In the maneuver, a
patrol was put on the heights of Cote 269, found partially unoccupied, in the
rear of.' the enemy position. During the afternoon, another patrol of the 26th
Infantry appears to have got as far as Cote 263, from whose heights they an-
nounced that if someone would give them a brigade, they would "clean out the
whole businesatt that evening. 68

M
Hist Sketch, ppo 163-1640
67
FO 65 lat C, 2300, 4 Oot, said 1st Div was to assist the 32nd by
"carrying the west edge or Bois de ROIU.gne."
68
6th C ooD.8idrd ruling reinforcements to the patrol, See FM (Tele
rpt) lat C to lit!, 448 p.m., 6 Oct.
- 28 -
 The 28th Infantry, advanoing with the 2et.h and 18th to its right and
lei't, was stopped by intense maohlne gun and artillery fire from Cote 272 and
from th woods and trenches north of Montrefagne. The 18th Infantry too was
stopped ln the low ground beyond Montrefagne woods. With the 16th Infantry
immobile, th~ let Olvi~ion had come to a halt from Fleville to Arietal Ferme

and the Bois de Money. But "the wedge was driven and the Argonne was
fle.nked. 1169
The Argonne was flanked but it was not reduced. The division was
pinned down all along the front, too depleted by gas and HE casualties, too

battered by the two days of fighting to exeoute the movement that would
aotually rout the enemy out of the Argonne. Its line, along the north slope

of the ridge southeast of Fleville, north edge of woods on the north slope

of Hill 240, through the woods northeast to Arietal Fe:rme, oould only be
held until help oa:me to extrioate the division. 70 Equally battered were
the German lllt and llth Guards on the :rleville t'ront, replaced that after-
noon with the ineertion of the 37th Division and moved to the vioinity of
Corne.y for rehabilitation.

No estimate of the oasualties oould be made for that seoond day of

battle, Throughout the day, ensmy artillery had been highly active with
"H,E' s, 77' s, Gas .. oohis artillery strength greatly superior to our

6
Hist Sketch, ppo 166-1670
70
FM 2193, lat C to lat A, 2230 hr, 5 Oct (Reaords 15). FM 2183, lat
C to lat A, 6s35 p,mo, mald that 1st Div connected with the 28th Div one
or two km So of Fleville on Rt 46,

- 29 -

----------------
ownc 1171 In particular, "The 16th Infe.ntry {:a.t Flev1lleJ lay under a. con-
stant rain of shell e.nd ge.11 from the ene!J1 1 s well ple.oed batteries, The

losses mounted high 1172 The Division Gas Officer, reporting 162 gas casu-
alties among troops back in the gassed ravine ea.st of Charpentry, said the
onomy had 11 ho.raooed the e,:rl;ire sector, eapeoially o.11 roads and ravines, ,u

far back as Charpentry, with Yperite. Some phosgene was used on roads be-
tween Ba.ulny and Fleville.n73
The Operations Report for the day said nothing of gas or HE casualties,
but only that to date it was estimated that 600 men had been killed, 3 9 000

wounded in the division. An estimate the next day was at considerable vari~
a.nee when it said that up to midnight, 6 October, there were approximately
5,060 wounded, 200 dead and buried, and 600 unburied. 74

7
SOI, n to n, 6-6 Ooto No German arty records have been found to confirm
this gassing or that ot the night of 4-6 Oct. There is, however, a memo from
von Klei..-t to tho 2nd Ldw, 37th, and 52nd Divs, 10 aomo, 5 Oct (Item 81, An-
nexes to WD, Gp, Arg), saying1 "I desire that the pauses in the combat be
utilized to fortify and methodically organize the defenses,,,as well as to
oruah the enemy 11 will to attaok by he.ving the o.rt;r go.o the aesombly aroaa and
harass the hostile arty.n The next evening, 6th A signalled Gp Arg (Item 163)1
"Attention is again direoted to orders for the most persistent artillery
oounterbattery work (H.E. - gas fl111111Unition and with the use of our long range
artillery)."
'72
Hist Sketoh, P 167. Major Coppaok wrote in his diary that day1 "My
regiment is the most adve.noed of the Division, ,Loss has been heavy -- about
20 officers and l,000 men from the 16th Inf. 11

73
Rpt on Gas Atk, 6 Oct, for period noon to noon 5-6 Oct (GAF-1st Div
Atks.) Spenoer, Pt. I, P '79, 11.dds to his '"'PY of the DGO Rpt that possibly
500 '77mm, 105mm, & 150mm ga, shells were fired.

74
Opns Rpt 6-6 Oot; Memo.1st Div to 0-3 1st C, rec'd 1st A 9 Oct{Records
13) 0

- 30 -
 On the evening of 5 October, J,.rm.y ordered all three corps to halt and

prepare for a oounterattaok, The whole line had been hit hard by heavy

gas and HE oaeualties, and German infantry and artillery rein.f'oroements were
reported moving dawn, preparatory to a general oounterattaok, Army was parti-
milarly conoerned for its left fle.nk:, then threatening the strategic German

position in the Argonne-Aire sector, and the possibility of another setback

like that suffered the week before, While holding their forward positions,

the corps were at once to organize for defense a general line of resistance
to their rear1 from the advance position qt' the 77th Division-Le Chene Tondu-

Apremont-Montrebeau-Bois de Baulny-Bois de Cierges-Bois de Emont-Bois de

76
Beuge-Nantillois-Bois de Brieulles,
The 1st Corps order implementing this deoision referred to its order

to the 35th Division on 30 September and said the line of resistance was to
be le Chene Tondu-Apremont-Esperanoe-Chaudron Ferme-Serieux Ferme-Cote 231. 76
Lt, Bu~htr wrol.t1 in his journal of ll Oatober1 flWe,.,reoe1ved orders ton1ght

to organize the line from which we originally jumped oft & to be ready to
fall baok to it. This order makes us all feel exceedingly low, Let us hope

we are relieved before our men have to drop baok. We never yet have fallen
baok. 11 That night the 1st Engineers were brought up to Charpentry and Baulny
and began construction ot a defensive ll.ne between Chaudron and Serieux
Fermes. 77

76
FO 43, 1st A, 22 hr, 5 Oot,
76
FO 66, lat c, 24 hr, 6 Oct; Cf FO 61, 1st C, l hr, 30 Sept,
77
ADC Jnl Opns; Hist Sketch, P 168; Memo, Capt Johnson to Col Fiske, 6
Oct (Records 14),

- 31 -
 .A.ware that the American forces hell been hurt, the German Third Army

indeed planned a large-scale counterattack on the 6th, determined to regain

the Exermont-Gesnee line, but at the last moment cc11ld not execute it "be~
76
cause of the unfavorable ammunition situation." All along the front, the
.American forces were now at the approaches to the Kriemhilde Stellungo Six-
teen German divisions had arrived or were on their way to stop the American
advance, and despite the temporary ammunition situation, the Germau oomman1
for a time had hopes that it could hold out in the trenches and strong
points there through the winter, protecting its vital communioations, and

perhaps regain lost ground in a successful spring offensive.

Conforming to Corps orders for 6 Ootober, the 1st Division held its
positions without trying to adve.noe that ds.,, and brought its 7th FA up to

La Neuville le Comte Ferme. Efforts to push patrols to the front and infil-
trate from .Arietal Ferme towards Hill 272 were promptly repulsed, but else-
where small gaina wore made ae tho enomy counterattack railed to develop,

Lt. Butler wrotes "We will not have to drop back:. 2nd Brigade advanced
about 500 metersooo,The Divisions on our right and le!'t; are doing nothing,"

East of the Argonne and West of the Meuse

The divisional history was later to say that "There was never a more
trying period than October 6, 7, and 8, when the 1st Division waited for
Firnt Al'll1y to renew the assault f,ruring which ti.me th<> tl'OoPaJ lay under
a ceaseless downpour of shell, gas and bullets Every valley was drenched

7
Gp .A.rg War Diary, 6 Oct.

- 32 -
 79
with gt.a." The Division Gt.a Oi':f'icer reported 68 gas casualties, mostly
from mustard gas, with some phosgene, occurring throughout the division

sector on 6-7 Ootober, t.s a result or the inability of troops to evacuate

contaminated ground. Another 24 mustard gas cases were reported for 7-8
Ootober. All these o&sAs, like the 31 reported for 8-9 October, BD1ong

troops advancing over shelled areas and lying in shell holes, seem to in-
dicate the effects of residual mustard rather than new attacks.
No German record has been found of any gassing on 6-7 October, but
on the 7th a German artillery order said that between 6;30-9;00 a,m, on 8

October, 11 the 10am and the 16cm gun batteries will neutralize the annoying

hostile batteries with blue cross -- in oase of laok of this ammunition --

with high explosive amJIIUlllition. 1160 There is no further mention of this

shelling in either Gel'lllan or 1st Division records, but 1st Division casual-
ties tor 7-8 October were variously reported as 4 killed, 94 wounded, 24
gassed, and 122 WOW\!.ded, 36 gassed, 81

If the enemy fired no gas on 6 October, early that morning the French
and Ai,,.t,rican batteries of the 1st Division reportedly fired the 3,000 rounds
of gas shell left by the 35th Division putt1ng it on Liohtenauer Hill LHill

79
Hist Sketch, PP 170-171.
80
Iten 7, ,6.nnexeo to WI>, Gp ArgJ alao Itoro 28. Ite111 103 1 0 0o1; re-
peated the order to engage.hostile batteries with blue cross,
81
Opns Rpt, n ton 7-8 Oct; FM G-3 1st Div to 0-3 5th C, B,30 a.m.
8 Oct.

- 33 -
 82
272.:J', the ravine to its north, and around Sommeranoe. The artillery report
that day, however, shows but 300 rounds of gas scheduled for eight enemy te.r
gets "some time before 6s00 PM, 11 as direoted by the regimental oomme.nders. 83
To the 1st Division, its troops exhausted and with thinning ranks, it
seemed that the i'ate oi' bD:btle rooted on th oa.pture of th'" guns ..t Corna:y,

aoross the Aire, e.nd the capture or Hill 272, It was obvious that tho enemy,
whose flanking fire had mauled the 16th Infantry sinoe the 4th, must be
cleared from the north end or the Argonne if Corps and Army were to advance.
To this end, Army ordered the 82nd Division to move into the right seotor or
the 28th Division, to the immediate lert of 1st Division during the night or
6-7 October, with orders to assault the heights of Cornay along the lins Che.tel
Chehery-Hills 160-223-244, the strong points of the Aisne Switch in the
Argonne, end then turn south and link up with the 77th Division. All the
rest of the front was to remain in ple.oe while this maneuver was executed. 84

62
Rpt, Spec Shells Fired by let FA Brig,.!E! ~ ; 37th Div War Diary,
6 Oot (37th Div & Sub Unito, W'D&A),

83
Memo 00, let FA Brig to COs 6th & 7th FA, 6 Oot (Records 9). The
tracing showing the targets is rptd lost,
84
FO 44, 1st A, 18 hr, 6 Oct. FO 67, 1st C, 18 hr, 6 Oot, said the
82nd would rel1eve the 28th Div before midnight on 6 Oct on the line Le.
Forge-north to Fleville. See also Gp Arg War Diary, 7-8 Oct; Hist Sketoh,
po lf:16.
Coppaok, CO 16th Inf, wrote in his diary on the 7th1 "Only half a
regiment lert ,,Our mission is to hold on till the balance of the Division
can 0<>1110 up, Tho 28th Division on our right has tailed to come up to us.
They are being relieved b:, the B2nd Divhion,"

- 34 -
 While the B2nd Division worked its way north through storm and rain

up the edge or the ll:'gonne on 7 Ootober, the let Division fought off local
counterattacks and olung to its position without advanolng. With the arrival
of the 82nd at Hill lBO-Chatel Chehery late that morning, the flanking f'ire
1'rom th wa..t ceased. 85 Group ,Argonne confirmed the disaster, "The occupa-
tion of the heights at Che.tel [hasJ limited our flank observation Md
artillery ef.t'eot in the Aire valley." More than that, the Argonne was now

effectively flanked, and without sufficient fresh troops to oounteratte.ok.,

the German~ and ~ Armies agreed that evening to withdraw the defense
line to Humberg [:'road junction 11' o.t' Corne:y.:J'-Corne.y valley-Bavarian ridge
86
['NB of LanaonJ on the night of 8-9 October.
The fall of Schoene Aussioht i[lrill 180..:J' and the consequent flanking
threat to the German 37th Division was the vital preliminary to the battle
of 9 October which, as Group Argonne was to say later, was an attempt "to
penetrate both eid of tho Aire towards Juvin e.nd Le.ndre, out off the
Argo:t1na front, l!lild attack in rear of the Brunhild position to effeot decisive
action on the Group f:Argonne.:J'"B7
At noon on the 7th, in a planned ohe.nge of front, First Army transferred
the lat Division to 5th Corps and the 181st Brigade, 91st Division (relieved
in the line by the 3Znd on 4 Ootober), was attached to lst Division, to enable

~!;
ADC Jnl Opna, 7-8 Oct, also rptd that "the six companies of the 77th
Division (i.e. the Lost Battalion) cut off i~ Apremont Forest for several days
a.re now relieved. 5th Jtrmy War Diary, 7 Oct, said the 2nd Ldw gave up Chatel
at 10130 aomo

86
Clp .A.rg War Diary, B Oot
B7
Rpt, Corp1 Hq to l!tlh J.rmy, 10 Oct (Item 14, 6th A Wll&A),
- 35 -
it to extend its right to the line Hill 269-Tuilerie Ferme, and so assist the
32nd Division on the right by clearing Le Petit Bois, Hill 263, and the Bois
de Romagne. The p lu to advance 5th Corps in the center the next day, while
1st e.nd 3rd Corps held their positions, had to be postponed, to allow the
82nd to oonsolidate its gains on the heights east of the !isne e.nd west of

the !ire. 88
That night all lllgineer work on the Chaudron F~rme defense lino ceased

as the entire regiment was ordered to move up to Tronsal Ferme and advance
to relieve the companies of the 127th Infantry (32nd Division) as well as the
26th Infantry patrol on Hill 269. 89 The relief was completed before morning
of the 8th, but as the Engineers discovered, only several of the knobs on the
hill were occupied by friendly forces. There were "Germans ail around up

there,M e.nd although they were finally cleared from the summit that day, they
oontinued to hold the slopes of the hill. To support the Engineers, the
101..-t Brigade (91..t. DlTieion) we.a oent to hold the line Hill 255-Hill 269

(see Map No. l). 90

That day, B October, 5th Corps issued orders to renew the assault the
next mornillgo In the advance, the change of front was to be completed,

88
FO 46, 1st A, 12 hr, 7 Oot1 FO 64, 5th C, 18 h~, 7 Oot; FO 49, 1st Div,
21 hr, 7 Oct; Hist Sketch, PP l68l69.
FO 65, lat C, 18 hr, 6 Oct, said it had info that the enemy was with-
drawing to the Kriemhilde Stellu.ng from the Aisne to the Meuse.
89
FM CO 26th Inf to CO lat Bn 26th Inf, 2160, 7 Oct.
90
Ltr, CO lat Bn lat Ing, 14 Oct, Rpt on Opna; Ltr, Div Eng to Ci 5th C,
9 Oot, Rpt of Eng 8pna (Ieoords 14). Memos 1084, 1086, G-3 lst Div, 8 Oot
(Reoords 3).

- 36 -
releasing the .Aire valley to lat Corps by extend1ng let Division ~wo kllu-

meters easto To do this, the 1st Brigade was to attack between the sensi

tive line Fleville-Sommere.noe Bnd Hill 272,. the 2nd Brigade attacking to-

wards the northee.ot betWAAl'I Hill 272 and the line Hill 269--Tuilerie Ferc1e,, 9 1.

The 1st Engineers would hold their position on Hill 269 and olee.r the Bois

de Money" The 361st Infantry (181st Brigade, 91st Division) was to Mld the

gap between the 2nd Brigade and 1st Engineerso

The initial objective of the lst Division we.a a line north of' Hill

272, it oecond objective e. line north 0 Cote de Me.ld<th and t.he HolR de

Rome.gne, The reserve battali.on of the 16th Infantry, nearly 1,000 strong,

whioh up to this time had been held intact near Charpentry and was the on1y

unused element in the division, was placed under Lt, Col, Hunt, commander

of' the 18th Infantry, and assigned to take Hill 272, whose defenders had so

successfully stopped the advam,., of the divisl.ouo ThiB batt.alion would

pass through the 28th Infantry on its way to Hill. 272, whereupon the line

would reform, with the 26th Infantry at J.rietal Ferme and the 28th Infantry

~+. St,, GArnutin Fermeo

92

In preparation for the assault on Hill 272, the artillery was ordered

to keep the hill under shell, shrapnel, and non~peraistent gas fire through

out 8 October., while a battery eaoh of the 317th FA (155mm) and 451st FA

91
FO 51, 1st .A, 18 hr,,, 8 Oct; FO 66, 5th C, 22 hr., 8 Ooto
92
FO 49, 1st Div, 8 Oct; Opns Instr 72., 1st Brig, 8 Oat (Records 8)0
This maneuver was not unlike thRt exeauted by the 1st Div in the race for
Sedan early in November, when the whole division, in center oorps, raced
through the 42nd Div (capturing its oomdr in its enthusiasm), only to be
stopped before the city by J..iggett, in order to lat the French have the
honor of' taking Sedan, See Hart, The Real War, po 469,

~ 37 -
(105mm), brought up to the Ravine de Maya.cha for the attack, fired on the

Sommerance area and north of St Georges et Landres, Juvin, Marcq, and

93
Champigneulle,
Compwiy c, 1st Gao Regiment, was ordered to Hill 240 on the nip;ht of
8 October, to fire thermite for 15 minutes preceding H hour on the woods
94
south and east of Hill 176 and into the trenches east of Hill 176,

Instructions for the assault reported the German line 200 to 600
meters to its front, the enemy troops showing great vigilance and alert-
ness, confirming information that the forooG on that front had orders to
hold at any oosto The depletion of 1st Division troops was indicated by
the order that regimental conunanders were to utilize every man in their
hA9rlqu ..rters oompa.nies and similar elements in order to strengthen their
fighting units. 95
That night, the reserV11 battalion of the 16th Infantry took its
position at the north base of Montrefagne woods. Before it was a valley
with no V11stige of cover, every foot of it swept by tiers of machine gun
pill boxes and hidden b~tterias ~r field v-,ns and trench mortars, and
flanked east and west by patches of machine gun-infested woodao It was
expected that the advance of the troops on the right and left would clear

the woods and protect the battalion's flenkso The 28th Infantry, on the
right of the battalion, was to pass through the 26th Infantry and attack

93
Hist Sketch~ P 170, Rpt, 19 Oct, Employ of Heavy Arty of Groupement
C (Fr,
) Opn of 9 vet (Records, l4Jo
94
FO 49; Hist Sketch, P 170. Hist of 1st Gas Regt, Ft. III, p, 17, says
60 rds thermite were fired with success on three MG nests on 7 Oct. There is
no mention of m1ss1ons on 4 Oct or this one on the 9th,
95
Op12s Instru 72.
- 38 -
Hill 2630 Further to the right those units of the 26th Infantry in the
Bois de Money were also to advance to Hill 263. The 18th Infantry on the
left was to attack Hill 176 and along the valley between that hill and Hill
2720 On the far lef't, the 16th Infantry would continue through Flev1lle

and advance with the rest of the line, 96 In order to secure density ot

fire., the entire artillery ave.ih.ble would assist, l.n suooession, the !lt~
tack battalion of the 16th Infantry, then the 3rd Brigade, !llld finally the

2nd Brl.gadeo 97
During the night of 8-9 October, ""'11 gas on hand," approximately
3,000 rounds, was fired into the German positions, except for 100 rounds

which were put into the Bois de Geanes just before the attaok, 98 The
Genn~n ga~eing in roturn wa~ not so much rotaliatory a3 dofonBiTo~ A

Group Argonne order S!lid1 In view of the general situation the line {?f the
2nd L!llldwehr, from hill north of Wolf ravine (south of Marcq)-Huserberg (west
of Cornay)~Cornay-Aire_lmust be held no matter how many troops have to be in-
serted,ouThe artillery (yf the 2nd Landwehr and 37th Infantry 7will heavily
gas the most important pointa occup18d by th" ,nu,my, ass.,mbly points, stco,
w1th tha ava1l!lble yellow cross eunmu.1tion. 99

96
Hist Skatoh, PP 172~1730
97
See note on this technique in Dupuy, Military Heritage of America (NY,
McGraw Hill, 1956), ppo 39lm392.
98
1st FA Brig, Rate of Fire for D Day (Records 9); Firing schedule, 1st
FA Brig, 9 Oct. Rpt, Spec Shells Fired by lat FA Brig, Jan-Nov 1918 (Reoords
14), shows 366 rounds fired en 8 Oct, 2617 fired on 9 Octo --- - --
37th Div Diary, 8 Oct (37th Div & Sub Units) rpt heavy fire mixed with
gas on Lichtenauer Hill L'.!iill 272.:J'as well as on forward lines and rear areas,
On the 9th, it rptd that th" ravim,s in its ssct.or were gassed duririg the nighto
There is no report of oaeualt1es.
99
Gp Order, 12,30 a,m., 9 Oot (Itom 113, Aru,exe3 to WD, Gp Arg)o
39 -
 Major Coppack, reporting on the experience of the 16th Infantry that

night, said in his diary under 9 October; "This place was one hell last
nighto Big 6 inch HoEu's fell on our position at intervals all night.
Go.a sod 'bwioe o Maoks saved ue" 11 100 Th 0.rmQ.n 37th Pivi sio:n o.cknnwledged

that its artillery had gassed the 1st Division ravineao

Division reported both the 1st Division gas attack and its own gas fire,
-
The Germen 52nd

"During the night "enemy artillery put dowaJ strc11.g harassing fire mixed
with gas, especially in the Kleiner Wald "le Petit BoisJ, on account of
Wh1oh the 18th In.f Regt L.4lat P1v1don 7sufered considerable lo"""""""

Our own artillery .. ,,gassed,.othe .Morine wood. 111 01

The Divisio11. Gas Officer reported 134 mustard gas casualties for the
period 9-10 October and another 57 the next day. The casualties were among
troops in the woods above Hill 272 and reportedly resulted from their failure
to wear masks 1n low concentrations of' the gas. lie added that the division

medical gas officer believed many of the first group of oasualties were
fatigue cases rather than gas oases.102
The .A.rgo:nne Forest is Reduced

At 8130 aomo on 9 October, in heavy fog and with the howitzers pounding
Hill 272, the assault battalion of the 16th Infantry crossed the valley to

IOo
SOI 8-9 Oot rptd only "Gas milted with H.E. shells."
101
Noon rpts, 37th & 52nd Divs, 9 Oot (Item 111, Annexes to WD, Gp Arg).
Noon rpt, Gp Arg, 9 Oot (Item 32, WD:U Gp Arg), saids "Assembly areas of the
enemy were gassed upo several oocasionso 11
No arty orders or firing rpts for the 2nd Ldw, ~ or 52nd have been
found to show the auaber a.d kinds of rounds firedo
102
Rpts on Gas Attack, lO, ll Oct (GAF-lst Div Atks).

- 40 -
the base of the hill. reportedly captured more than 50 maoh1ne guns on its
slope ud took the hill on schedule. 103 On the left;, the remainder of the
16th Infantry and the 16th I.fantry, "with cooks 111td mule drivers in the
line, adve.need against heavy mRnhine gun And artillery fire and despite

great losses reached their first objective above Fleville. 104 On the right,
the 2nd Brigade jumped off at 6152 aomo and assaulted Hill 263, with the 1st

Engineers completing the capture of Hill 269, assisted by a company each of

the 361st (91st Division) and 28th Infantry. But that af't;ernoon, only the
16th Infm~y battalion waa on its objootivo line, north of th<> Cot<> de

Maldaho The remainder of the 1st Brigade curved up to join the line.l05
At lsOO pomo that day, von Kleist frantically signalled his division

ool!l)]landers 1
The gravity of the situation demands the expenditure of the last
effort by officers and men as well as the sharpest decisive action so that
r1\ sot 'l llne w1ll not slack" and ther morale uink:e Ot1u,nri11e t h e r e
w i l 1 be a oat as t r op he, There is no time now for
fatigue and weaknesaoo,,The artillery, even though it only has gas ammuni-
tion, must be so ~ctive that it takes the burden off the infantry bery5~
the enemy assaulta ,.Bring all available rifles in rear into action,

103
Hist Sketch. po 1731 Gp Arg War Diary, 9 Oct, said Liahtenauer Hill
/Hill 272 7tell at 2 p,m. when enveloped from the east, FM 2739 G-3 1st C
to Q..-3 1st A, 1155 hr, 10 Oat, said Hills 272 and 263 were finally captured
as of 9145 a,m. en 10 Oot.
104
Coppack Diary, 10 Oot,
105
!Ii ~t llketoh, pp o l 74-1750, ,At mi<l.- .. :rteroon, aald Ll., l:lut lt1r on the
9th, the line was Fleville-So of Cote de Maldah-Cote 263-Cote 269, and the
181st Brig had been put between Hills 255 and 269 to olose the gap between
the lat and 32nd Dhti doll, '
Ltr., CO let Bn lat Eag to CO 1st Eng, Rpt on Opns, .. (Records 14), said
the Eng reverted to their orm.al status at dark on ll Oct, when they were
relieved on Hill 269 by VOCO 2nd Brig,
106
GHQ Op Arg to Comdrs 2Jld Ldw, 45th Res, 41st, 37th, 52nd Divs ( Item
115, ArmAYAs tn WD. Gp Arg),
- 41 -

- -- - -- ------
 Neither s1de yielded, but the enemy position was no longer tenable,
The position of the 1st Division at the end of the day ran from a point half
a kil0111eter orth of Fleville, along the top of the Cote de Maldah, the north
edge of: Le Petit Boie, through the Boia de Romagne, to the line Hill 269-

Tuilerie Fenue. That aight a regiment of the 82nd Division took over the
left sector above Fleville, and the light guns of the 1st Division ca~e up

to th line Fleville-Hill 212. 107

The Operations Report admitted that it had been the "bitterest day of
1'1ght1ng yet," and even an approximate estimat" of: th" oasualti"s wa8 im-

possible, although they were reported to be above normal, partly as a result

of the intnse barrage, counter-battery, destructive, and harassing fire
t.hrone;hrmt the sector. Casualties for the period noon to noon, 9-10 October.,
were later estimated at more than 160 killed or missing and 19 officers and
934 men woundad. 108 There was no mention of gas or gas casualties other than
in the Division Ga, Officer's reports, previously cited.
What the 1st Division -- and First ,American Army -- lacked in artillery
"'1d machine guns, by comparison with the "-"my forces on that front, it made

up in superior numbers of troops, and it had succeeded in "S1Rashiag the front

by incessant blows without regard to ,,losses,,,,Eaoh day at least one

{:German.]" divisioa {:was.J"withdrawn as no longer effective for defensive

l07
IliB-1. Sko-1.oh., ppo 174-171:io

106
Opns Rpta, 8-10 O~t; Memo, G-1 1st Div to 0-l 5th C, which gave the
9-10 data, 1s dated 9 Oct (Records 13), Total oasus to date were sai.d to be
1,003 killed, 5,995 woundd

- 42 -
 100
action," That day, 9 October, as Group Argonne later saids

The turn1ng,.J'oint 08l11e with the overruning of Cornay, the oapture of

Lichtenauerhohe LHill 272:l and the Marienhohe ;-Hill 269_.7 ,,Due to the
influence of his failure ~to effect decisive action on Group Argonne~ the
enemy ceased his infantry attack in the evening ["of the 9thJ, did not
onoe feel forward ,md so me.do it poooible for us to diengage ,9ni 1~ith-
draw on the whole Group front to the Brunhild-Kriemhild position,

'l'h at n i.ght the 2nn Le.nnwahr e.nn 37th Infantry wi thdrAW to the forward

edge of the Brunhilde position on the north edge of the Aire valley, the

52nd Division., with the 41st inserted on its left, to the Brunhilde-
Kriemhilde position, as Group Argonne moved its headquarters back from
Buzanoy to Beaumont, 111

Since the 5th Army, contrary to the 3rd A~, deems it expedient to
withdraw the Argonne front rapidly in rear of t~Aire troo?s of the 3rd
~ will withdraw to in rear of the Aire the night of the 9/10, the re.;;=
guards the ight of the 10/ll ~and.]'Group Argonne will retire in conformity
t?,erewitho The main line of resistance for the night of the 10/ll ["is 7
Hutten farm ["Ferme des Lo~s~-St Juvin-Sommeranoe-Sommerberg-Kleiner W'ald-
Moncy wood-Robinette farm l north of Gesnes~,112
During the night of' the 9th, "the Kriemhild position Bois des Loges-
south limit 0 Juvin-hill south 0 St Goorge3-0oto de Ohatlllou-Romagm, was

109
3rd Army War Diary, 5 Oot.

llO
Rpt, Item 14, Corps Hq to 5th A, 10 Oct (5th A WD Annexes), See also
draft of this Rpt, 10 Oot, Item 41i:'"""""
lll
Gp 0, lls45 p,m,, 9 Oot; Gp O, 7s30 pom,, 10 Oot (Items 130, 35, Annexes
to WD, Gp Arg).
112
Army Order extracted in 5th A War Diary, 9 Oct, Cf, Army Order, 11,45
p,moo 9 Oct (Item 108, Annexesto"'WD, Gp Arg) ordering withdr,.wal of C.p ,A.isne
and Gp Arg,

- 43
oooupl.ed without interterenoe from the enemy," 113 The Brunh1ld" pusitlun in
the zone of Group Argonne had previously been designated as the Krielllhilde
positioa, with Group Argonne responsible for its reinforcement, and the
Fl!'eya pnit!on was to be commenced without delay on the line Authe-Buzanoy-

Bayonville,, 114
With considerable elation, First Army reported late on 9 October that

th enemy was retreating before the British on a fifty-kilometer front at

Cea.bra!., just as it was retreating in the Argonne Forest. The Army would
continue the attack tho n""t day on the entire front from the Aisne to

Baaumonto 11 No objectives are assigned, All troops will take advantage of

the enemy's retreat,,,, On the night of the loth, lat Corps announced,
"The Font d'Argonne has been reduced, and Army said the hostile third
position in the vicinity of Romagne and Cunel had been pierced and its
troops were north or the line l:lu1Wner1Woo-Marcg_, First Army would oontlnue

with all speed its advance towards Brlquenay-Buzanoy-Clery le Petit,115 The

British had the nay in seeming full retreat, and First Army must match them,

But the end of the war wasn't that near.

On lO October, badly used up. the Division intended to remain in plaoe,
from just west of SommeraJ11oe to the oroaaroads in the Bois de Romagna. But
Corps ordered it to continue its advance by axpliotation, Patrols prodded
the front along the line Sol!DlleranoeTuilaria Ferme and held points of vantage

113
Gp Arg War Diary, 10 Oct.
114
Army Memo, 6 Oot (Item l, 6th Army WD Annexes),
115
FO 53, lst i, 21 hr, 9 Oot; FO 71, 1st C, 20 hr, 10 Oct; FO 56, 1st A.
18 hr, lO Ooto

- 44 -
until the .forward ba.ttalions oame up One hundred roll.Ilda of gas were fired
during the expliotation by the 7th FA. 116 An a.dvance of between one and two
kilometers was made in this fashion, and by nightfall the line ran from just
north of Sommerance to the northern edge of the Bois de Romagne. 117
How badly used up the division was may be seen in the messages of the
26th Infantry that day. The 1st Ba.ttalion reported 192 men and 23 machine

gunners left on the morning of the 10th. The 2nd Battalion had 200 rifle~en.
with 70 men rema.ining in its machine gun oompe.ny, They were without water or
rations. The 3rd Battalion, in the line, was down to 245 men and 55 machine
gunners, with only 7 officers. All its companies had become badly mixed up

and disorganized by the enemy fire the day before, 118 That evening the 3rd
Battalion reached the foot of the hillo oouth of the Boio do Romn6no nnd

found them "powerfully held with machine guns." By the morning of the 11th,
its commander thought his men were approaching exhaustions "Most of the men
have had nothing to eat in 48 hours and no water. Some of my officers and
many of my men are sick and cannot go much farther. I do not want to complain
but I would like the CO to know tho aitua.tiDn w" ar" in, Will move forward o.s
soon as possible, 11 (FM Frasier to CO 26th Inf, 6135 p.m., 10 Oot; 1 Frasier,
8115 s,m,, 11 Oot), Nevertheless, that forenoon it was the 3rd Battalion that

F'O 67, 5th C, 2300 hr, 9 Oct; Rpt, Spec Shells Fired by 1st FA Brig,
117
Memos, Items 1092-93, G-3 lat Div, 9 Oct (Records 3); FO 50, 1st Div,
2330 hr, 9 Sep; Hist Sketch, P 175,
At 11130 p.m., the front line was rptd from north of Sommerance-Ravine
de Gras l!'aux-northern part of Bois de Romagne-est edge of Bois de Romagna
(FM 1st Div to G-3 5th C, 10 Oot),
118
. FM Legge CO 1st Bn to CO 26th Inf, 8145 a.m., 10 Oct; FM Youell CO 2nd
Bn, 6130 a,m,, Fl,! Frasier CO 3rd Bn, 6153 a,m,

- 45 -
continued as assault battalion, when the 362nd Ini'antry (91st Division},
itself down to 200 men and no machine guns, came up behind it to relieve

the 2nd Battalion. 119

The only meaaage in that period indicating even moBentary panic was

on the afternoon of the 9th, when the 26th Infantry CODD!lander admitted some
straggling1 "Lt, Hyde reports Bosche coming in on his left, He seems very

much excited on accou.t of this. Several of our men have straggled to the
rear, Not enough of officers l\lld NCOs to watch them (FM CO 26th Inf to CO
2nd J:ln Z6th In1', Z150 porn,, 9 Oct) " 1Straggl1og io ~h .. G<,rman nulk "'"" a

far more pressing problem at the time, as their division reports indicate,
1'he order to retire on the night of 9 October started a rearward movement
cleArly depicted in a 52nd Division order of 11 Oct.1 "Stragglers will be
assembled in Bayonville by regiment and forwarded to their regiments in
120
detachments of 50 men esoho"
The order to continue the advance by exploitation was repeated for 11
October, the division pushing out patrols, supported by artillery, to the
second line of exploitation at Landrea et St. Georges. Lt Butler wrot~ in

his journal that night1 "With less than 2,600 effectives we were unable to
gain much grou.ndo It was wicked to order our men to attack again this
morning,,,,Since we entered this seotor,,,,we have lost between nine and ten
thousand men. During those two days of expliotation, enemy artillery

119
FM CO 26th Inf to CG 2nd Brig, 10 a.m., 11 Oct; FM Ridgely 00 26th Inf
to CO 26th Inf, 11 a.m., 11 Oct.
Lt Butler (ADC, ~ Opns, 11 Oot) was to report that one company of the
18th Inf came out of the line on the 11th with only 4 men,

120
Item 117, .Annexes to WD, Gp Arg,
- 46 -
activity w~s ~confind principally to the advanced battalions with gas and
HE," and it was probably thie as muoh as aotual encounter with the enemy
121
that resulted in 210 men killed, 134 wounded, and 57 gassed.
In the absence or German artillery records, the only indication that

enemy artillery fired gas on both 11 and 12 October is a series of messages

in the War Diaries of the 37th and 45th Reserve Divisions and in a combat
repnrt nf the 52nd Division that a number of gas rounds fell short both 1ays
and presumably gassed their own troops.
This morning our artillery o~en fired too short, The men had to put
on their gas masks early today on acoount of similar short firing (FM CP to
l5oth Regt, 9140 a,m,, 11 Oot, Item 189 b, 2, Hq 150th Inf Regt).
The 211th IJl.f l":46th Res 7has
retired,,, ,The retiremert is said to have
been caused by our own artillery and gas, which, however, ca.me from the
enemy {FM 2nd Bn l5oth to 150th Regta, lltOO ~.m., 11 o~t, It<>m 189 b. 6)0

Our artillery fired too short, at times delivered gas shells in rear
of our line (Combat Rpt, 1st Bn l7oth Regt, ll Oct l":52nd Div & Sub Units 7)"
Our artillery fired/as and HE considerably too short (2nd Bn 211th Inf
Diary, 8150 aomo, ll Oct 45t.!i_,Re_s WD&AJ),
Our artillery placed annihilation fire on hostile positions from 5 a,m,;
in doing so several rounds, including gas shells, fell on and in rear of our
line (1st Bn 101st Regt Diary, 12 Oot),
At 5;00 a,m, our artillery shelled the hostile line with ~as, The gas
drifted towards our troops. Gas masks had to be put on (~Bn, .. ,~5lst Regt
Diary, 12 Oot)
Just below Landres et St, Georges and St, Georges, et the approach to
the Kriemhilde Stellung, patrols met such determined resistance that it was

Opns Rpt, 10-ll Oct, also estimated total killed and missing during the
opn as 1,913, t.oilal wounded. 7,l:43, or ,. grand tot.al of 9 1 066, Memo, G-1 bo
G-1 5th C, 11 Oct, estimated 210 killed, 4 officers and 244 men wounded be-
tween n-n 10-ll Oct. Total oasualties to data were estimated at 1,213 killed,
6,243 wnundad, or 7,451! men {1st Div Bo,c 16, 12.3 Cruu Rpto).

- 47
 Souf.: Gp A., 'Siti..t,..,
GRoup AriGoNNE. 1111..,. T ,...~,..,
[NFANTR'f D1spos1T10Nf <affn,.,. hler ~ 15

ON 11-10-11.S':OOAM

l
\
I I
~
\

q45. \
\ I

\
\
I
\
\
1\~1111, \
\
+ 52
' \
\
.::;- \ \ y3 M.G. S'S. Abt. 7, ...~.,,
"' ;- Krttt11h1ld - -Bru.t1 n,l<l. - po 11hon-
l. 0 00 ,\
gy.. ~ l"fil. ss. ,.,1:,-t. \l, \
14a
,a <E)
~. .. ,. "I c..,
J.
'"'" /, . ..,.~. ,;.'>
....... ,,, . I
\
'-11.0 i.t. 47 \ I
- !52.,z. ~:'I-~
.......
.. ..... l"'". ... "'"\ ..... '\ ..............
_
,o-\0-\~)_. (q.W.L. o
'[' ..
- .... --~---
I :; 2. a.m.
11. arri. \ 1. QITI.
8 2. GITj, I
\ i"\AP NO. 8
olear that a special .preparation wo1ld be necessary before e.n 1nl'antry assault
could be made against this position (see ~ap No. B), 122 At the time, that
resistance was probably relative, for the German command in the Kriemhilde
wa~ much eonoo;nod about the continued effeotiveness or its divisions, re-

duced "in part by bloody losses and sickness, in part by the morale or the
troops that, in view of the political situation, is continually decreasing

slightly." The German Fl_:l'ilh_.A~ had only two effective divisions left on
11 October, the newly arrived 1st Landwehr and the 123rd Se.xon. The next day,

however, "a number or n<JW divisions L""'"J placed at tho diopoo"l of

Army." 123
On the night of 11 October, First Army kn<JW there was to be no further
pursuit of the enemy and ordered its division to "hold the ground gained and
prepare for further attaok," The next night Army ruefully reported:
The enemy ls resisting our advance between the Meuse and the A1sne by
the skillful use of me.ohine guns and artillery, The Allied armies to our
left are continuing their advanoe and the enemy is giving way before them" .. ,
Firist Anny, oowill ..tt ..ck on 14 October at H hour Corps &nd division oom-
manders will utilize to the fullest extent possible the advantages of lethal
gas in preparing for and assisting the infantry attack, and in causing oasu-
Qltts in the raar arAao And ~lone lines of communication,124

122
FO 51, 1st Div, 2230 hr, 10 Oct; FO 33, 26th Inf, 11 Oot, (Records 10).

123
5th Armt
War Diary, 11, 12 Oct, Rpt on battle err or Gp Arg Divisions,
Item 7, 11 Oc, said the 37th, 41st, 45th e.nd 52nd Divisions were all thoroughly
exhausted. A detailed survey oJ"l;p' Arg strengtli"'"appears in postscript to Even-
ing Rpt, lt Ooi>, Ii>om 34, WD&.A, Op Arg.

124
FO 58, 1st A, 21 hr, 11 Oct: FO 59, 1st A, 11 hr, 12 Oct. esp, par,

- 48 -
 On the night of 11-12 October, the exhausted an<1 <lapleted 1st Divlsion
was relieved by the 42nd Division. 12 6 It oMJ.e out;, as its historical accounts
sugga sted without irony, "with an exoe llent nuo leus as a fighting ull.l. t. 11 The
troops asoembled near Cheppy that night, went on to Les Islettes on the 13th,

and continued their march to Vav1noourt, 75 kilometers south, arriving there

on 16 October, There it received more than 8,000 replaoements to fill its

ranks again and on 31 October the division was pronounced ready for combat
"gain,
The lat Division wa.s plaoed in resorvo nt G8snes-Cieri;<>s e.nd on 6
November relieved the Both Divisien on the Stonne-Beaumont road, from whence
it took part shortly after in the wild race for Sedan.1 26

l25
FO 52, 1st Div, 11 Oct, In his diary for 11 & 19 Oct, Maj Copp aok
said his 16th Inf.went in with 66 officers, 3,650 men, and came out with 32
o1'1'1cers, l, 71/il men, a loss or 36 off1oars, 1,661 men, A later r<>ckoniug
revised this loss to 35 officers, 1,540 men, as follows, 7 officers and 129
men killed, 23 officers and 812 men wounded, 4 officers and 296 men gassed, l
officer and 301 men missing
. Memo, 2nd Brig to G-3 1st Div, 4 p.m., 10 Oat (Records 13), rptd 32
officers, 713 men le~ in the 26th Inf, 28 officers, 665 men left in the 28th
info

126
Hist Sketch, PP 176, 163, 189.

- 49 -
 Shook Division
It seems evident, oonsidering the nature and oondition of its oppo-
sition, and the degree of assistance that the division required, that tho

Meuse-Argonne e:iq,-loit of the 1st Division was not in the same class with
its earlier suooosses, Liddell Hart has said of the operations
A renewed general attack on October 4 made little p1o~reas, e,ccopt
on the lai't, and revealed onoe more the folly of trying to overthrow
machine-guns by sheer weight of human bodies without adequate fire support
or ourpriaeo But the value of training was also ah01lll'Jl by the regular 1st
Division in Liggetts Corps whioh drove in a deep if ne.rraw wedge on tho
east bank of the Aire. This enabled Liggett, on October 7, to try a
manoeuvre both original and daringi bringing the 82nd Division up in the
wake of the 1st, he swung it against the enemy's flank west of the Aire and
than northward, If the execution fell below the conception -- only a tithe
of the division came into aotion -- so that the ohanoe of cutting off the
enemy troops in the Argonne was lost, the threat at least persuaded the
enemy to retire from the forest while there was time, and by Octobyr 10 the
American line had passed and was olear of this hampering obstacle, 27
This account emphasizes rightly the contribution of the 1st Division
in reaohing Fleville on the first dsy of the sttaok snd staying there. Per-

haps only the 1st Division, with its vaunted pride, could have remained so

relatively immobile for so long a while, enduring such oasualties. The gas
casualties of more than 1,400, with the 5,226 killed and wounded, which it
took in three days of advanoing and five of holding or exploiting, were oom-
po..rable to the l,360 gao oaoualtioe and 6,100 killed and woundod suorod by
the 35th Division in a similar advance in the sector.
The comparison with the 35th Division is inevitable, because the histories

of th 1st Division, reoouw.ting this operation in the Meuse-Argonne, seem

l27
Liddell Ht.rt., the Real War, 19141918, p, 466,

- 60 -
almost to have been written as a deliberate counterpart to the reaord of the
128
35th there, The aumber of ooinoidenoes in the experience of the two divi-.
sio11s, and the emphasis given those aspects of preparatioa and perfonnanoe
that distinguish well trained from poorly tra1ned troops, sefflll too g,,. ..t to

be accidental.
With half the guns that had been available to the 3~th Division for

its preparation, the 1st Division began its assault with no other prepar~tion

than a barrage, But field pieces accompanied each assault battalion with
some psychological, if not aotual, benefit, and the remaining artillery ad-

vanced begiJllling three hours after H hour and remained in close support of

the infantry throughout the operation.

Advo.noins in fog and rain against the same formidabla enamy positions

attempted by the 35th, the 1st Division maiatained tight control over all
its units. Forward elements were halted and reorganized after penetrating

woods, before advancing again, Despite decimating casualties, companies and

battalions held the ground they had taken. Corps, consequently, was willing
to send re1n!orcem,mts tu the division, as it would not to tbe 3Sth. 129

Although the 1st Division took more HE and gas casualties than the

3Sth Division, e.s the self-styled 11 shook division" of the AEF, the "Wheel-
horse" of the Corps, it could not retreat. It l.s interesting to note that,

128
c.r. Shlploy Thomae, The History 0 the J..lll.F, pp 290-297. (Co.pto.iu
Shigley Thomas was RIO, 26th Infantry.)
129
A number of items in lst Div orders and memos for this opn are either
not found in previous diviaione.l orders or appear to receive more detailed
treatment, seemingly as a result of the 35th Div experience, See for example
the warning against mi~if.15 or uni.to (FO 47, 2 Oct, par. 2), the order to re-
form and report at each objective, halting for two hours e.t the objective for
that purpose (FO 48~ 6 Oct, par. 3,), the order to reorge.niie battalions after
engAging the enemy Memo G-3, Jtem t073, 5 Oct), and the special instructions
to RIOs (Annex to SI, 1-2 Oo,).
- 51 -
unlike the 35th Division, the 1st Division in its history freely aoknowledged
(narrative, ppo 16, 25) and perhaps .even exaggerated (ppo 29, 33) the emount
and the effects of the gas fired into its sector.

HE and Ge.a Casualties

If fairly complete gas shell data are possible for the gas casualties
in.the 1st Division between l-5 October, similar data for its machine ~un

and artillery casualties are at best fragmentary, No esti.mate 1B possible

for the fire of the thickly-sown German machine guns, and only two of the
four 5th Guard Division artillery orders in the period show the number of
HE rounds to be fired on speoifio days, The artillery order prepared on
the evening of 30 September gives only targets and hours for night-long
harassing and annihilating fire waves, That on the evening of l October

is the same, with the note that "The sub-group commanders will determine
the expenditure of emmunition according to the supplies of their bat-
teries..., ''

The first artillery order giving detailed HE data is that issued at

7130 p,mo, 2 October, which ordered1

150 rds, harassing fire, Hoffnung valley, night of 2-3 Oct.

150 rds, harassing fire, Ernst Ravine, night of 2-3 Oot,
No rds given, harassing fire, on 4 targets, night of 2-3 Oot,
20 rds, each battery, on Esperanoe ravine, at 5120 a,m.
30 rds, each battery, on the whole front, at b130 a.m,
50 rds, long range fire, Hoffnung valley, no time given,
50 rds total, long range fire, on 4 targets in Charpentry area, 130

Thus, something over a thousand HE shells of large and small oaliber were fired
on the night of 2-3 Ootober,

l30
Arty O 17, 7cSO p.m, 2 Oot. Available to the 5th Gd in its three olooe
range groups were a total ot 12 batteries; in its long range group, 4 batteries
{5th Gd Div 0, 3s30 p,m,, l Oct, Item 94),

- 52 -

 ~or the night 01' 3-4 October, the !'ire m1Bs1on w11.ss

300 rds, harassing fire, on lO tar~ets during the night,

20 rds, each battery, a:11J1ihilation fire, on Esperance draw, at 5130 a,m.
30 rds, each battery, annihilation fire, on the whole fio~t, at 6s00 a,m.
90 rds, long range fire, on 6 targets during the night, 31
Again, approximately 11. thousand rounds of large and small caliber HE were fired

during that night.

In the absence of other data in these relatively complete records of
5th ~uard artillery, it may be assumed that a minimum 01' between 4-~ooo rounds

of HE were fired into the 1st Division ravines during the four nights while
the troops there waited for the order to attack, (There are no records avail-

able for the German 52nd Division artillery, which may or may not have had

fire missions for the right flank of lat Division,) On the Sllll16 four nights,
'
approximately 3,470 gas shells, divided almost evenly between mustard gas
and nonpersistent agents, fell in the sllllle area,
While machine gun and rifle casualties 111110ng the patrols during this
period cannot be di.utinguished, their numbero w...ro probably amall by compari-

son with the casualties caused by the Germ.an artillery, The reports of the
two hospital triages for the early period shows

lat Divido Other Divisions

Wounded Gassed Wounded Gassed

FH3, 6am-6am 2-3 Oot 84 561 220 164

FII3, 6""1-0am 3-4 Oct 27 615 79 l1
FH2, 10am-5pm 4 Oat (BOO) 82 (103) 7
F!i3, 6am-6am 4-5 Oot
'~U'
(1118)
94
'!RI!' <.JV
(188)132
39
ID"

l.3i
Arty O 18, 8130 p,m., 3 Oct.
132
A large pro't)ortion of the figures in parentheses unquastic>nAbly repre-
sent casualties in the assault on 4 October. NOTE, The triage opened on l
Oot and began reoording oases oa 2 Oat, Gas oaaus on 4-5 Oat probably repre-
sent for the most part delayed oases.

- 53 -
 In this tabulat1on, the gas oas,ialt1es 1n the 1st D1v1S1on and among

the 35th Division artillerymen between 30 September and 4 Ootober total

1,022, produced by approximately 3,470 gas shells. The wounded prior to
the hour of attack total 410 (incomplete Operation Reports show only 28
killed., 225 wounded between 30 September-3 October), as the result of :,p-
proximately 4,000 HE shells, Some proportion of the 1,306 total wounded on

4-5 October doubtless should be considered, but it would appear that it r~-
quired but three gas shells to produce a gas casualty, e.s opposed to eight
to ten HE shells to produoe a wound oasualty.

The total casualties reported for the lat Division in the Meuse-
Argonne campaign from l-12 Ootober range between 8,554 and ,,387,
9 133 Only

the total of 8,554 is broken down to distinguish gas casualties, as follows1

35 offioers and 816 men killed, 103 officers and 4,271 men wounded, 29 of-
!'icera and l," 566 men gaased, lO ot'i'1oors and l, 705 mon captur"d or missing,

l33
Memo, 21 Dec 18, Brief His of Opns of 1st Div (1st Div Box 11, 11,4;
also Records 13) has a total of 177 officers, 8,377 men, or 8,554, This
total is attributed to the Div Stat Seo in the Hist of the Med Dept, lat
Div,,,1917-18, forwarded by ltr, Div Suri; to Hist Br, War Plans Div, GS, 14
Jan 20 {Med Dept-1st Div, Box 3398 fol,l),
Opns Rpt, 10-ll Oct, estimates casualties of 1,613 killed,7,243 wounded,
or 8,856, Hist Sketch, p, 178, estimates 49 officers and l,480 men killed,
175 officers and 6,951 men wounded, 280 men captured or missing, for a total
of 8,935, G-3 Memos, 17 Oct & 24 Nov, sS111e sub, Rpt on Opns of 1st Div
Oot l-l2 incl (Rooordo l31 let Div Box 48, 33,6/lO), show t.otal oasus of
9 0 387 officers and men, This is the figure used by Shipley Thomas, p, 317,
who says it represeats "the heaviest casualties suffered by uy American div-
ision in the Meuse-Argonne offend ve."
Frederick Palmer, Our Greatest Battle (NY1 Dodd, Mead, 1919) pp, 307-
08, accepts 8,554 oasus, sayings "Three-fifths of its infantry was out of
action from death and wouadeJ the remainder had been fully expended' in ex-
haustion and sioknoss, Surely no division in all our history had ever
auffered more lon ia a inglo action."

- 54 -
 A lat.er compilation, reportedly based o records in the Surgeon

General's Office, indicates a still smaller total of 7,726 casualties, but

with a aurpriaing nUlllber of gaa oases, 1,252 killed, 4,576 wounded, and
1,698 gaasedo 134
Neither the gas oasualty tcrtal of 1,698 aor that ot l,614 (29 f- 1,585)
is borne out by other record of the lat Division, In the eleven gas attack

report, by Captain Sielaff, DGO, the gas casualties total 1,382. His m1'llthly
Gas Casualty Report, how.ver, shc:,wed 32 officers and 1,394 men gassed, for a
total of 1,426 of which 182 or 15% were later returned to duty, 1~5 A oompe.r1-

son of these two totals is as follows,

Date Gas Atk Rpts Gas Casu Rpt

Casus Rtn to l)ty
l October 392 409 28
2 17 404 29
3 409 50 6
4 50 38 13
5 38 162 17
6 162 78 13
7 68 24 l1
8 24 :n 12
9 31 134 10
10 134 57 21
11 57 36 15
12 no rit 13 7
l!r2 ms m
134
Battle Losses, 14 Deo 21 (lat Div Box 15, 12.3). By comparison the
.Alnerican Battle onUll18nts Commission study, 1st Division Summ~ of ~era-
tions (1944), po 95, has a total of 7,803 oe.sualties, 1,296le<l, 72
-a,:;;;r-or wounds, 6,035 wounded (IUl.d gaesed),

135
Gas Casu Rpt, 31 Oot, with aote, 11 Not pouible to get the casus by
separate Ullite~ (GAFlat DiT Kise). This is also the total reported in ltr,
DGO {Capt Ao H, Bec) to C CWS, 27 Jaa 19, eub1 Rpt on Ciro Ltr 89 (GAF-
lst Div ll1Bc),
- 55 -
 gas re11ada Ciredo
lJl ILll effort to explain the large number of gas casualties suffered by

the d1Tis1oa, the medical hi1toriNL ef the diTi1i01t was later to 1ay that the
ga.a caaualtiea. for the most part,
-r
incurred in the narrow ravines in the vioinity of Charpeatry; the
enemy knowing these positions well ud what perfect gas traps they made, fre
quently filled these ravines Wl.th gas, especially during the night hQuri;, tml,
as the gas ahells were also aooompt.aied with high explosive shells, or the gas
was in the high explo11V9 shells, it was impossible to recognize the fact t~at
g1u1 uellr, ....,r., being uacd until the odor of the gaa wa" actuall7 detected. 37

Ill ext.enuation, the DiTisi Gas Officer saids "Quite a number of junior offi-
cers,oof:oameJ to the division without t.ay g~s tra.iai:ag, ...f:andJ mostly
through ignorance of the subject, {:didJ not appreciate the full danger of
gas, especially low 0011.oentrations," 138
The ract or 11 868 mustard gas oaaua.lt1es over a period or three days"
was brought to the attention of the ArrrJ: Inspector General, &11.d there was
talk of am investigation of the gae dieoipliae and gas defense procedure of
the 1st Di,riaiona J.a the Army Gas Of'fioer naid, t:hea" gan oasuaH::'i.,s

" the gaaaredisoipli:ae

a striking x:amp le of what cu be opected in opeJ1. warfare unless
is enforced evea more rigidly the.a heretofore. It is be-
lieved that an inf'ormal inquiry by your departwent may be of assistance in
directing attention of officers to the import1111oe of ta.Icing the proper pro-
teot1ve measures.
Mustard gas is the most da.:ageroua gas used to-day, as it causes more
.. casualties than any other. Its odor is fairly difficult to detect, ILlld men
hove a tendeaoy to te.k:e ohaaoea with mustard gae, goiag without maeka, nog-
l looting (freque:atl;r unavoidably) to ta.Ice proper prophyla.otic measures by the
i.--
l37
Ltr, Col W, Mo Phelps, lledioal History of the 1st Div, P 46 (Med
Dept- 1st DivBo.x 3398. fol,l).
138
Ltr, DGO ,. C CW&, 31 Oct, subs Monthly Rpt-Oot 1918 (Records 13).

57 -
 use of sag ~aste, bath1ag the haads ad body, eto. Its efteote are oumulative
ao that a man OIi.iil remain in a light oonfg)tration for some t1me before be-
ooming a casualty, o~ . . a serious oe
No more has been fou.d oonoel'Jlig this investigation.

lat Divisio Gas Operation, and Genna Gas Casualties

FiruL D1vh1oa artilbry, wk1<lh fired Qvcrr 7,700 ga~ 5h"ll~ duriag 4, 6,
8, 9 and 10 October for ita OWll troop operations oontiued gassing enemy
positions for the 42nd Division, which was brought up on 11 October to orM't
the forward positions of the Kriemh1lde Stellung. In its operations through
31 October, the 1st FA Brigade fired an additioal 8,097 gas rounds, tor a
grand total of 16,228. 140 A ote in its report on the firing of special
shell saids "#5, 6, 9, 14 employed effectively. Prisoners continually com-
plained of gas casualties in great numbers. Conoentrat1ons on ravines,
villages, guarries, woods, eta, b:y guick surpriae fires. 11 A post--r lett ..r

on the offensive uae of gas by the 1st FA Brigkde sa1dt

Very st.tisfaatory results were obtaillled from the exteaiTe use of gas,
{:"rt fired a total of 66,706 gas shells during the war ..:J' I fact its value
was considered so great that ammuaitio of this nature was 1 aotiaual de-
lll&lld RBd was .,....,r supplied 1 the quaat1t1es des1redo Th1s was espeo1ally
true before the Meuse-ArgonAe Offeasiv.. Special ehells ff. and *5 were the
most extensively employed, #3, :j/!lo, #e, ...d ,jje followed ia the order enumerated,

139
Memo, CGO lst A for Insp Gen, 21 Oot {lat ACGOBox 340, let Div),
140
Rpt. Speo Shell Fired by lit FA Brig, Jan-Nov l91B (Records 14), shows
4483 gaa rounds fired by 6th a.nd 7th FA, 3220 by the 219th Fl beiw 4~10 Oat,
and a <lO!llbiaed total of 11,!29 11111oke rouada la that 1a111e period.
This rpt seems denied by memo 6th FA /Jo J,
CofArty J.IF 24 Ju 19, whioh
rptd firing only 1200 rds, all on 11-12 Oct, e:nd by similar memo 7th FA, 23
Jan, report1ag only 1000 rds o the moriag of ~-4 Oot agaiallt maohine gun
positions behind the Germ.a. treaohes.
IR these slll!le m8lll01 the 6th FA rptd o record of gas atks against it dur-
ing th opn, th" 7th PA rptd S me gas,ed due to 200 gae ohells on l Oct, 3
casua on 3-4 Oot due to 200 pho1gene lhells, and o oasus ia atks of 56 Oot
and 8=10 Oot with mustard, phosgene, and saeegiag gas. Memos 1n GAF-1st Div
Misoo

- 58 -
 These proportions were governed by the supply, not by the needs of the oooa-
sion. NU111bers 4 and 5 were considered as being better than nothing and hence
employed in considerable quantities beoause of the fact that no other vari-
eties were obtainable,
The uae of gas by the /1,rtlllery is cone1derad an unquestionable value,
especially when defensive miasiona are assigned. For rapid neutralization of
enemy b&tteries, for haras1ing fire, for use against the enmny in probable
assembly points during periods when attaok bv the enemy is imminent, exten-
sive employment of gas concentrations constitutes a means of injuring the
enemy which should never be disregarded, The value of smoke screens during
offensive operations is too generally recognized to warrant comment here.
The use of smoke was generally limited by the supply, as in the oase o~ gas 141
Of interest is a word 01 adv1ce on good relations by the 6th FA liaison
officers "When the infantry reports that the enemy is sending over 500 shells
of gas let them know that we are sending back a thousand. That is what he

likes to know," 142 But this concern for g.as retaliation did not extend to the

proper employment by the division of its oompsny of gas troops. According to

the History of the First Gas Regiment, Company C fired a single mission of'
60 thermite bombs in its 12 days with the lat Division. Its casualties, said
the division history in extenuation, "soon beoe.me disabling for so small a
unit" ( oee no.rrative, pp" 19, 26, 37-38). A postwar noto by a division Chiof'

of Staff who had not been there was not so kinds "One gas company was as-
signed, but so far as known was of no benefit, 11 143-

The Chief Gas Officer, 5th Corps, was to say of the lat Division s at-
titude towards its gas troops1

141
Ltr 00 lst FA Brig to DGO 1st Div, 12 Feb 19, subs Offensive Use of
Gas by lat FA Brig (Records 14).
142
LO Instructions, Some Helpful Hints, no date, oa :May 1918 (Records 14) 0

143
Hist Sketoh, p, 160, Fuqua CofS 1st Div, Rpt on Opns of 1st Div.,,Oot
1-12, 24 Nov 18 (1st Div Box 48, 33,6/10),

- 59 -
 A general lack ot information ~hted oonoeraing the use of special
gas troops in connection with an infantry advanoe, 8.lld this the lnsneoting
Offioer aought to remedy in part by a talk to the officer of the 16th In-
fap.try, arrugement tor HIH talk to the offio11rs of the 28th Inf'11J1try the
following day, and for a demoaatration before both regiments of the use of
Stoke, mortar with high explosive, thermite t.Jld smoke soreen. to take plaoe
Ootober 3oth. 144
The instructions for this demonstration would seem to imply that the usQ of
gas by the 1st Gas Regiment had been ruled out of consideration by late
Ootnber l 918 r
Your attention is invited to the plan of introduoing to troops,
where practicable, the use of Thermite. smoke screens ~nrl high .n:plosive
bombs, as used by the special Gas and Flame troops, prior to the actual
attack in which these weapons are employed for the purpose of masking an
advance or eliminating machine gun nests or strong-points ,,The object
sought is familiarization of the Infantry with the activity of the special
troops so that they will aot hesitate, as they heretofore have on several
occasions, to take full advantage of the very effective preparation afforded
by ol<>monte 0 the Gai, R"glm"n~ which may be assigned to their orge.nizationo

Although more than seven thousand gas shells fell on enemy positions
during the period under discussion, even the most complete collection of
German records (i,e,, that of the 6th Guard Division) offers only question-
able or incomplete data concerning their effectiveness, All examination of

the records or both the 5th Guard and 52nd Divisioa, does not reveal more
than a total of 40 or 50 admitted gas oasualties as a result of the 7,700
gas shells fired by the lat FA Brigade, These questionable figures are
11.ke the total oasualties reported by the 5th Guard Divillioa, which eeem,
by oouparison with lat Division losses, disproportionately meager, even al-
lowing i'or the skeletal composition of the Germu u:aits, The 3rd Gus.rd

Foot Regiment of 5th Guard Division, for example, admitted loaaes between

Ltr, CGO 5th C to CofS 5th c, 29 Oct, uubJ Inspection 01' 1st Div (1st
A~CGO-lst Div Beac 340),

- so -
 l-10 Oot~ber or 10 m.ore tnllll lO mea killed, 4 ett'ioora aad 68 ,aea wounded,
and 5 men gasaed. 146
The stathtioa of' a aaoh1ae gun llhe.rp shooter dete.ohment, of which
t.hore were at 1.... st: four e.t'l:e.ohed to the German u.nita opposite 1st Division,

e.re lnterest1ngo By 12 October, 8S Detachment No. 47, which he.d come into
the Group Argonne sector on 6 October, bad lost 2 officers, 17 NOO', SB
men, and 12 me.chine guns, causes not specified. The remainder of the de-
tachment, completely exhausted on 12 October, were combined into two
oompa.nioa with oix ma.ohine guns and consisted of' 2 officers, 9 NCOs, and

44 men, "including the men who are slightly siok on account or gas e.nd are
,able to remain on duty." 146
Eltoeptional 1s the report of' the 16th Infantry Regiment, 41st Divis"ion,
which admitted 29 gas oe.sue.lties on 9 October, following the 1st FA Brigade
gas boot with 2,617 round on ite pooitione.1 4 7

141
3rd Guard Diary, 10 Oct (5th Gd-Regta-'IID&J.).
146
Rpt on Condition of Det, 12 Oot (Item 174, ,Annexes to WD, Gp Arg),
147
16th Inf Annexes to WD (Item 197, 74th Brig C,4lst Div '1)

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