G.R. No.
140975, Promulgated December 8, 2000 "The resolution of the issues raised does not require the review of the evidence, nor the credibility of witnesses presented, nor
OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, Petitioner.
vs.
PASTORA PIEDAD, Respondent.
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In
the matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"),
Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the
finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings
were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice
to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the
estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioners to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought
the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involving nothing else but questions of law
to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently
with Circular 2-90 of the Court.
In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals belabored the distinctions between questions of law and questions of fact,
thus:
"There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. There is
question of fact when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
witnesses, existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other and to the whole and
the probabilities of the situation."1
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the appellate court, ratiocinated that whether or not the RTC erred in denying the
intervention considering (1) that the intervenor-appellant had a prima facie interest over the case (2) that the jurisdiction over
the person of the proper parties was not acquired in view of the deficient publication or notice of hearing, and (3) that the
proceedings had yet to be closed and terminated, were issues which did not qualify as "questions of fact" as to place the
appeal within the jurisdiction of the appellate court; thus;
"The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their resolution are based on facts not in dispute. Admitted are the
facts that intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within the fifth degree of Augusto H. Piedad; the she is the daughter of
the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad; that as such, intervenor-appellant seek to inherit was published for three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation; that there was no order of closure of proceedings that has been issued by the
intestate court; and that the intestate court has already issued an order for the transfer of the remaining estate of Augusto H.
Piedad to petitioner-appellee.
"These facts are undisputed.
"In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to the truth or falsehood on alleged facts. The question as to
whether intevenor-appellants as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding
which would justify her intervention; the question as to whether the publication of notice of hearing made in this case is
defective which would amount to lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and the question as to whether the
proceedings has already been terminated when the intestate court issued the order of transfer of the estate of Augusto H.
Piedad to petitioner-appellee, in spite the absence of an order of closure of the intestate court, all call for the application and
interpretation of the proper law is applicable on a certain undisputed state of facts.
the existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances. Resolution on the issues may be had even without going to
examination of facts on record."2
Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate court in the instant petition for review on certiorari.
The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate court. But let us set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude
and take on the basic substantive issue. Specifically, can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit
alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated does the rule of proximity in intestate
succession find application among collateral relatives?
Augusto H. Piedad without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-
degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of
the decedent.
The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost complete set of law to govern, either by will or by
operation of law, the transmission of property, rights and obligations of a person upon his death. Each article is construed in
congruity with, rather than in isolation of, the system set out by the Code.
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant
ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of
representation when it properly takes place.
"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of
the full and half blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines."
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and
degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes
of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented
would have succeeded.
"ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and
the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited."
"ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative
does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded."
"ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and
the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited."
"ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative
does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded."
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.
right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children
survive with their uncles or aunts. SO ORDERED.

"ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending.

"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.

"ART. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate shall be made per stripes, in such manner
that the representative or representatives shall not inherit more than what the person they represent would inherit, if he were
living or could inherit."
"ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both
petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and
descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the
surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral relatives, except
only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed
in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives
to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
"Article 966. xxx
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made ancestor and then descent is made to
the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his
uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin and so forth."
Accordingly----
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C.
PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES
PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA
PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro
Manila, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated
April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista,
Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which
dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the
latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or
spurious children and was survived by the following:
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the
fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the decedent. (a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;

The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code (b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:

"Article 1009, Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
succeed to the estate. Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood." Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line." Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
Invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in
the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a (c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:
maternal aunt can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative,
excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in Avelino Pascual
succession to a fifth-degree relative.1wphi1.nt Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the
Virginia Pascual-Ner Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert; portion of which reads:

(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary
rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).
Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such motion was denied.

(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented by the following: Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).

Dominga M. Pascual On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the dispositive part of which reads:
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Domiga P. San Diego
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its
Nelia P. Marquez
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
husband (Rollo, p. 47). interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration,
where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-
101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio
Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the
oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being
acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were
under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to
spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).

On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections
of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise agreement
provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final
determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes
Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual
and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp.
111-112).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil
Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent
their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood
brother of their father.
as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.
Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication
(Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, which
undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the
negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.

In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them SO ORDERED.
(Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.

On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate
children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.

The Court held: G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983

Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner,
descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of vs.
representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK OF PARAAQUE, INC., respondents.
represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation
Porfirio C. David for petitioner.
is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be
argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the
Marquez & Marquez for private respondent.
provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate DE CASTRO, J.:
parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to
the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43476-R, promulgated on February 21,
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 1979, reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in favor of petitioner:
992 the exception.
(a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great grandson and heir of deceased FRANCISCA REYES, entitled to one-half
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation" and in share in the estate of said deceased, jointly with defendant Maria Cailles;
Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate
or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to (b) Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to be the properties of the deceased FRANCISCA REYES and not of
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewen
Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
(c) Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by defendant Maria Cailles in so far as the share of Cresenciano
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in Leonardo are affected;
statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 (d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of this decision, of the properties subject of this litigation, between
SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. defendant Maria Cailles and plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo, share and share alike;
CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who
may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that
exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far
(e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell, within 30 days from the finality of this decision, to render an
accounting of the fruits of the properties, and 30 days thereafter to pay to plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo his one-half share
thereof with interest of 6% per annum;
(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James to pay jointly and severally plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo the amount of
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees;
(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and
(h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim. 1
From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria
and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero
Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint
for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be
declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased
jointly with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes,
described in the complaint, partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the
income derived from said properties from the time defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall have been
made, delivering to him his share therein with legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties and
alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation. For his part, the other defendant,
private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which
Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of
Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963.
After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which was
earlier quoted, finding the evidence of the private respondent insufficient to prove ownership of the properties in suit.
From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as already stated, reversed the decision of
the trial court, thereby dismissing petitioner's complaint, reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, this
petition for review was filed of the following assignment of errors:
I Manila Railroad Co. ('la via ferrea del Railroad Co.')
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO LEGAL
RIGHT TO INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION.
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be the exclusive properties of the private respondents.
There being two properties in this case both will be discussed separately, as each has its own distinct factual setting. The first
was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale (Exh. '60'), which describes it as follows:
. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho Municipio dentro de los limites y linderos siquientes: Por la derecha a la
entrada el solar de Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el solar de Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba citada por la espalda la via ferrea
del Railroad Co., y la frente la dicha calle Desposorio
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes starting from 1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she and her son
Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes managed the property and paid the realty tax of the land. However, for
unexplained reasons, she paid and declared the same in her own name. Because of this, plaintiff decided to run after this
property, erroneously thinking that as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right over the same.
The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria Cailles in 1917 under a deed of sale (Exh. '3') which describes
the property as follows:
. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la sal, que linda por Norte con la linea Ferrea y Salinar de Narciso Mayuga,
por Este con los de Narciso Mayuga y Domingo Lozada, por Sur con los de Domingo Lozada y Fruto Silverio y por Oeste con el
de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea de una extension superficial de 1229.00 metros cuadrados.
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax in 1917 and continued paying the same up to 1948.
Thereafter when she and her son, Narciso Bracewell, established their residence in Nueva Ecija, Francisco Reyes administered
the property and like in the first case, declared in 1949 the property in her own name. Thinking that the property is the
property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed the instant complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the same allegedly represents
the share of his father,
As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of the plaintiff principally because defendants' evidence do not
sufficiently show that the 2 properties which they bought in 1908 and 1917, are the same as the properties sought by the
plaintiff.
Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial judge misinterpreted the evidence as to the identification of the
lands in question.
To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60') of 1908 clearly states that the land sold to Maria Cailles is en la cane Desposorio in
Las Pinas Rizal which was bounded by adjoining lands owned by persons living at the time, including the railroad track of the
With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed, the description fits the land now being sought by the
plaintiff, as this property is also located in Desposorio St. and is bounded by the M.R.R. Co.
With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance that the property described in the deed and in the tax declaration
is one and the same property.
The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since several decades have already passed between the deed and
the declaration and 'during that period, many changes of abode would likely have occurred.
Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in Desposorio St. and they have paid the realty taxes of this
property from May 29, 1914 up to May 28, 1948. Hence, there is no reason to doubt that this property is the same, if not
Identical to the property in Desposorio St. which is now being sought after by the plaintiff.
With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from Tranquilino Mateo in 1917, it is true that there is no similar
boundaries to be relied upon. It is however undeniable that after declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles began paying the realty
taxes thereon on July 24, 1917 until 1948. (Reference to Exhibits omitted.)2
Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings of fact, forgetting that since the present petition is one for
review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. It is a well-established rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases
that findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are, generally, final and conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions are: (1) when
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and
(5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
submission of both appellant and appellee. 3 None of the above exceptions, however, exists in the case at bar, hence, there is
no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.
Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the following findings:
Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters (Pascuala)
of Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that his father, Sotero, who
subsequently died in 1944, survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes by
right of representation.
In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth certificate showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo,
married to Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother.
Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of this vital evidence, We have minutely scrutinized the
same, looking for that vital link connecting him to the family tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes. However, this piece of
evidence does not in any way lend credence to his tale.
This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo
Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation,
plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other
than he himself. Thus, even without taking time and space to go into further details, We may safely conclude that plaintiff
failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance
in question. 4
That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this petition for review in the absence of a clear showing that
said finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court
making the finding of fact.
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by
right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the
Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his
alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still
subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C.
BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND
DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and
grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on
November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife
died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all
surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint
for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in
Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged
successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the
intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No.
1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030,
to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As
such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of
adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27,
1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Saez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants,
being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from
sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28,
1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-
G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from
the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent court is sought on the
ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it
declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been born
on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents
from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who
have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was
in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo
on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish
this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it
became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper parties, what they should
have done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel
from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was
issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the
petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps
petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one
of those provided by law for the revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the
adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not having
been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the
petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made
collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in
a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the
necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be
considered void merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of
some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of
jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the
fact be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the
jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were
not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all
investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court
to have been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must
be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under
Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate
offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in
the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandbly suspect, coming as it did
from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel
is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the
birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of
public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose.
Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by
the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more
fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties,
and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and
Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple,
conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or
age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends
to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring
properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care
even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does
not succeed the person represented but the one who the person represented would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in
their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has
a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981,
quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the
shares of her grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers.
While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these
rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting
parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter
of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents
with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in
the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the
deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs
against the petitioners.
G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00.
She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her
signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C.
Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of
each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary
Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full use of her mental
faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any
influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor
descendants of any kind such that she could freely dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's
niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the
naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The
testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise
disposed of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of Manila
which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an
opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the
testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed
under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene.
The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June
17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of
Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960, admitting the
will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be
vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for reconsideration of that part of the
decision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing
to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the
probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with
regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the
decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion
as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this
instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several errors which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the
following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been duly
admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will
and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene
Teotico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo
The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who would
be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem). On the other hand,
in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an "interested
person." An interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir,
or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well
settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be
a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3370,
August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would she
acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir,
executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears
therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will
either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner
thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long
before the execution of the will.1wph1.t
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left by
the testatrix? She would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is
true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also
an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for,
even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and
Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate
relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; ... ." And the philosophy behind this provision is
well expressed in Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right
of succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does
not recognize it. On this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the presumption will of the interested
parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by
the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived;
the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family.
Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our
law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the
relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is
created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the
adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to his other
relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants
and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption, except that the
law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as
descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend
to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to other members of the family of either; but
the adopted is prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by Justice
Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-
313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding
contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the
same should not have been admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but also because it was procured thru
pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In this respect it is fit that we
state briefly the declarations of the instrumental witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she executed the will for she carried her
conversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and every
page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it was the
testatrix herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later
she gave the will to the witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her to be a
witness to the will; that the testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards
she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses to the will; that he read and
understood the attestation clause before he signed the document, and all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog.
He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their
signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will was duly executed because it was
signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required
by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for
the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the
court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain
legacy is void and another one is valid. (Castaeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)

The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence. On this point the
court a quo made the following observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to
sustain the conclusion that there was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation of the
testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed failure to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the
vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico, to exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the will on May 17, 1951. Although
those fact may have some weight to support the theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the weightier fact
that nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had she really wanted to from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not
in fact reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the
testatrix was often seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on
different occasions, each of them was able to talk with her.
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr.
Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said
pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he
was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the
estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in question has been duly executed
and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a
quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere
claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply G.R. No. L-30455 September 30, 1982
because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from
hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove MARIA LANDAYAN, et al., petitioners,
what the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full consciousness of the vs.
solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must HON. ANGEL BACANI, et al., respondents.
be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as
to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The Anastacio E. Caoayan for petitioners.
burden is on the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here
Felipe V. Avenojar for respondents.
was not done, for the evidence presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of the instrumental
witnesses.
VASQUEZ, J.:

3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been decided
In his lifetime, Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and a house and lot in
by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the following may be cited:
Manila. The said properties were all covered by Torrens Titles in his name. He died intestate in Urdaneta, on March 20, 1948.
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because
On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, the surviving spouse of Teodoro Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar,
its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law." (Palacios
executed a public document, entitled "Extra-Judicial Agreement of Partition" whereby they adjudicated between themselves
v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)
the properties left by Teodoro Abenojar. Severino Abenojar represented himself in said document as "the only forced heir and
descendant" of the late Teodoro Abenojar.
... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor
On March 6, 1968, petitioners herein filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan presided over by the
even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null,
respondent Judge seeking a judicial declaration that they are legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar, and that private
notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even
respondents be ordered to surrender the ownership and possession of some of the properties that they acquired under the
after the will has been authenticated. ...
deed of extra-judicial settlement corresponding to the shares of the petitioners and that the said deed of extra- judicial
settlement and the subsequent deed of donation executed in favor of private respondents, spouses Liberata Abenojar and Jose
From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained, it does not follow that such
Serrano, in consequence thereof be declared nun and void.
provision lack the efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In
the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and
In their complaint, petitioners Maria, Segundo, Marcial and Lucio, all surnamed LANDAYAN (the rest of the petitioners being
must be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals. (Montaano v. Suesa, 14 Phil.
their respective spouses), alleged that they are the legitimate children of Guillerma Abenojar, then already deceased, who was
676, 679-680)
the only child of Teodoro Abenojar with his first wife named Florencia Bautista; and that while Teodoro Abenojar contracted a
second marriage with Antera Mandap and a third with private respondent Maxima Andrada, he did not have any offspring in
any of the said second and third marriages. They aver that private respondent Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of
Guillerma Abenojar. They accordingly pray that they be declared as among the legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar
entitled to share in his estate.
Private respondents, on the other hand, have alleged in their pleadings that Teodoro Abenojar married only once, and that was
with private respondent Maxima Andrada. They claimed that private respondent Severino Abenojar is an acknowledged
natural child of Teodoro Abenojar with Florencia Bautista. They disclaimed the allegation of the petitioners that their mother
Guillerma Abenojar was a legitimate daughter of Teodoro Abenojar and Florencia Bautista, the truth being allegedly that
Guillerma Abenojar, the mother of the Landayans, was Teodoro Abenojar's spurious child with Antera Mandap who was then
married to another man.
As their affirmative and special defense, the private respondents alleged that the action of the petitioners had already
prescribed, the same having been filed more than 18 years after the execution of the documents that they seek to annul.
After a preliminary hearing on said affirmative defense, the respondent Judge issued an Order sustaining the contention that
the action is barred by prescription and dismissing the case as a consequence thereof.
The finding that prescription had set in was rationalized on two main considerations, namely; (1) the action for the annulment
of the deed of extra-judicial partition and the deed of donation is based on fraud, the prescriptive period of which is four years
from the discovery of the fraud, such discovery being presumed to have taken place upon the registration of the documents in
the Office of the Registry of Deeds and the issuance of new titles in the names of the transferees which, in this case, had
occurred on November 21, 1951; and (2) the deed of extra-judicial partition is not an inexistent and void contract the action for
the declaration of which does not prescribe, the said document being at most a voidable contract, subject to the operation of
the statute of limitations.
We find the dismissal of the action filed by the petitioners to be precipitious and erroneous. Although the principles relied
upon by the respondent Judge are legally correct, he had unqualifiedly assumed the extra-judicial partition to be merely a
voidable contract and not a void one. This question may not be resolved by determining alone the ground for the annulment of
the contract. It requires an inquiry into the legal status of private respondent Severino Abenojar, particularly as to whether he
may be considered as a "legal heir" of Teodoro Abenojar and as such entitled to participate in an extra-judicial partition of the
estate of said deceased. This is a most material point on which the parties have asserted conflicting claims. Understandably so,
inasmuch as the question of whether the question document is void or merely voidable depends largely on such
determination.
As stated above, petitioners contend that Severino Abenojar is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar, he being only an
acknowledged natural child of Guillerma Abenojar, the mother of petitioners, whom they claim to be the sole legitimate
daughter in first marriage of Teodoro Abenojar. If this claim is correct, Severino Abenojar has no rights of legal succession from
Teodoro Abenojar in view of the express provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar depends on the truth of his allegations that
he is not an illegitimate child of Guillerma Abenojar, but an acknowledged natural child of Teodoro Abenojar. On this
assumption, his right to inherit from Teodoro Abenojar is recognized by law (Art. 998, Civil Code). He even claims that he is the
sole legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar inasmuch as the petitioners Landayans, who are admittedly the children of the deceased
Guillerma Abenojar, have no legal successional rights from Teodoro Abenojar, their mother being a spurious child of Teodoro
Abenojar.
Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma
Abenojar, he is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar. The right of representation is denied by law to an illegitimate child who is
disqualified to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of Ms father. (Art. 992, Civil Code). On this
supposition, the subject deed of extra- judicial partition is one that included a person who is not an heir of the descendant
whose estate is being partitioned. Such a deed is governed by Article 1105 of the Civil Code, reading as follows:
Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such
person.
It could be gathered from the pleadings filed by the petitioners that they do not seek the nullification of the entire deed of
extra-judicial partition but only insofar as the same deprived them of their shares in the inheritance from the estate of Teodoro
Abenojar; Should it be proved, therefore, that Severino Abenojar is, indeed, not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar, the portion
of the deed of extra-judicial partition adjudicating certain properties of Teodoro Abenojar in his favor shall be deemed
inexistent and void from the beginning in accordance with Articles 1409, par. (7) and 1105 of the Civil Code. By the express
provision of Article 1410 of the Civil Code, the action to seek a declaration of the nullity of the same does not prescribe.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent Judge is ordered to try the case on
the merits and render the corresponding judgment thereon. The private respondents shall pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44051 June 27, 1985
EUFRACIA VDA. DE CRISOLOGO, EUSTAQUIO, VICENTE, ESTELA, CAMILA, MAXIMO, LITO, FELIX, OMAN, CRISPINA and REY,
all surnamed RAMIREZ, TRIUNFO, RUPERTA and CARMEN, all surnamed PASSILAN, and DOMINGO ROQUE, QUIRINO,
MANUELA and ANITA, all surnamed LABOG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANDRES PLAN and BERNARDO MALLILLIN, respondents.
Melanio T. Singson for petitioners.
Juan Durian for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals now the Intermediate Appellate Court which
dismissed the petitioners' special civil action for mandamus for lack of appellate jurisdiction over it. In said special civil action,
the petitioners prayed that the trial court be ordered to approve their record on appeal which was dismissed for having been
filed out of time.
The petitioners filed an action against the private respondent for ownership, annulment of sale, and delivery of possession of
various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and damages. Claiming to be legal heirs of the vendor, they sought the
annulment of four deeds of sale covering seventeen (17) parcels of land and a residential house executed by Lutgarda Capiao
in favor of respondent Mallillin. The latter filed a motion to dismiss which was however denied for not being indubitable at that
stage of the proceedings. The private respondent, therefore, filed his answer.
After termination of the pre-trial proceedings and during the trial on the merits, the parish priest of the Roman Catholic
Church, Rev. Father Roque N. Fidol, testified on the witness stand. He was duly cross-examined by Atty. Aguirre, counsel for
the petitioners.
The private respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on the following grounds:
1. THAT LEOGUARDA(ALIAS LUTGARDA)WAS THE ILLEGITIMATE DAUGHTER OF THE LATE JULIA CAPIAO CONSEQUENTLY
PLAINTIFFS ARE COMPLETE STRANGERS TO HER LEOGUARDA AND THEY (PLAINTIFFS) ARE NOT THE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
AND HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION, MUCH LESS PERSONALITY
TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT PROCEEDINGS; and
2. THAT INSEPARABLY CONNECTED WITH THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE STRANGERS TO THE LATE LEOGUARDA CAPIAO AND
HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION OR PERSONALITY TO PURSUE THE PRESENT PROCEEDING, IT FOLLOWS AS A COROLLARY THAT
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS PRAYER FOR RELIEF
ISSUE AS TO MATERIAL FACT.
The petitioners filed a motion to admit their amended complaint. The private respondent filed his amended answer with
additional exhibits. On the date set by the court for another pre-trial conference, the private respondent filed a motion
reiterating his previous motion for summary judgment.
After the petitioners filed an opposition to the motion and the respondent had filed his reply, the respondent judge rendered a
summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint. The judgment was based on the following findings:
The original complaint and the amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs alleges in quintessence or in substance the following:
'That Julia Capiao who maintained extra-marital relations with one Victoriano Taccad, begot with him one child and/or forced
heir, named Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao who was married to Raymundo Zipagan both of whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in
1970 and 1964, respectively, without any children and/or immediate forced heirs' (paragraph 5 of the amended complaint);
That Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao having died on November 11, 1970 at Cauayan, Isabela, without any will inestate succession
took place and the herein plaintiffs, as relatives within the fifth civil degree to her (Lutgarda [Leogarda] Capiao were
consequently instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs and were legally entitled to inherit all the properties which were hers by virtue
of the extra- judicial partition, Annex "B", (paragraph 15, amended complaint).
The motion to dismiss, particularly the motion is reiteration of defendant's previous motion for summary judgment, contains
as Page 2-A diagram of the family tree of the plaintiffs and the defendant, showing that their common ancestor was Pablo
Capiao ... As shown by the family, tree or diagram, Julia Capiao deceased. who maintained extra-marital relations with one
Victoriano Taccad had one issue, the deceased Leogarda and/or Lutgarda Capiao married to Raymundo Zipagan both having
died without any children and/or immediate forced heir ...
The source of these properties in question deceased Lutgarda Leogarda is undoubtedly an illegitimate child. In fact, her
surname is Capiao and not Taccad, retaining the surname or family name of her mother Julia Capiao Article 992 of the Civil
Code, cited by the movant, the defendant, provides:
Art. 992. Illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;
nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.'
xxx xxx xxx
Going back to the diagram, putting in black and white the family tree of the parties graphically showing their relationship with
the late Lutgarda Capiao the source of the properties in question and their relationship with one another, the question that
arises ... is the following:
THE RELATIVES OF JULIA CAPIAO, NAMELY: THE PLAINTIFFS IN THIS CASE, CAN THEY INHERIT FROM LUTGARDA CAPIAO, THE
ORIGINAL OWNER OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION?
Clearly, they can not because the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao cannot inherit from an illegitimate child of the latter,
because that is the clear and unmistakable provision of Article 992 of the New Civil Code. Neither can Lutgarda Capiao inherit
from the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao who are the plaintiffs in the instant case.
A copy of the above decision was received by the petitioners on April 22, 1974. On May 14, 1974, they filed their motion for
reconsideration. The motion having been denied, they filed their notice of appeal on August 26, 1974, stating that they were
appealing to the Supreme Court from the summary judgment in view of the denial of their motion for reconsideration. they
received the order of denial on August 22, 1974.
On September 18, 1974, petitioners submitted their record on appeal for approval. On October 2, 1974, the same was
approved in open court. The approval was, however, revoked on tile same day by the respondent judge after he received a
telegram from the private respondent's counsel stating that they had just received a copy of the record on appeal through
unregistered mail without a copy of the summary judgment and other exhibits and annexes. The respondent's counsel prayed
for fifteen days within which to file his opposition to the record on appeal.
On January 24, 1975, after considering the motion for approval of the record on appeal, the respondent's opposition thereto
and the petitioners' reply, the respondent judge issued another order dismissing the record on appeal for having been filed
outside the reglementary period. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration. After the motion was denied, they filed a
petition for mandamus before the Court of Appeals seeking to compel the respondent judge to approve their record on appeal
and to annul the latter's order dismissing said record on appeal.
While the petition was pending before the appellate court, the petitioners filed a motion to elevate the case to the Supreme
Court.
In denying the above motion and in dismissing the petition altogether, the appellate court held:
This case is analogous to Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, et al. (8 SCRA 254).
There, a petition for mandamus was denied by this Court which "considered itself without jurisdiction to act on the petition
because it found from the very notice of appeal and record on appeal submitted by petitioner that it was its intention to
appeal the main case directly to the Supreme Court" on questions of law. This Court's resolution was sustained by the Supreme
Court.
It was also contended, in said case, that the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed the petition outright but should have
transferred it to the Supreme Court upon the theory that it was erroneously filed. In short, petitioner believed that the case
should have been certified or elevated to the proper appellate tribunal. However, it was held that this Court was correct as
'Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, invoked by petitioner, only applies to cases that are erroneously appealed and not to
special civil actions ... , (see also Philippine Products Co. v. Court of Appeals, 21 SCRA 870)
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed. No costs.
The legal questions raised to us are: (1) whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
the appeal of petitioners on the ground that the record on appeal was filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the Court of
Appeals in dismissing the petition acted in accordance with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court and
whether or not it departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings as set down by this Court.
With regard to the first issue, we hold that the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the record
on appeal was filed out of time. The records bear out the fact that the petitioners filed their record on appeal nineteen days
after the last day to perfect the appeal. Moreover, it did not incorporate the Motion for Summary Judgment with its Annexes
and Exhibits nor was it accompanied by any motion for an extension of time to file a record on appeal which, if approved, could
have justified its having been filed late. Furthermore, the appeal bond was filed fifteen (15) days late. We, therefore, rule that
no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed against the respondent judge. As we held in the case of Garcia v. Echiverri (132
SCRA 638-639):
xxx xxx xxx
Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory that deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal (Acda v. Minister of Labor, 119 SCRA 309; Agricultural
and Industrial Marketing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 118 SCRA 49; and Santos v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 22).
In the case at bar, it is admitted that the decision of the lower court was received by private respondents on March 9, 1976. On
March 29, 1976 (or on the 20th day) private respondents filed their first motion for reconsideration. On April 29, 1976, private
respondents received the lower court's order denying the first motion for reconsideration, therefore, the last day for
perfecting their appeal would be May 9, 1976. Since private respondents filed their notice of appeal only on June 4, 1976, the
same was filed out of time. Consequently, the decision appealed from is already final and executory.
On certain occasions, this Court has allowed the filing of an appeal outside the period prescribed by law in the interest of
justice. Emphatic in the decisions cited by the petitioner are strong considerations of substantial justice. The present case does
not warrant such liberality because the decision of the lower court is satisfactorily supported by the records. It is clear from the
records that the petitioners cannot inherit the properties in question because of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Being relatives
on the legitimate line of Julia Capiao they cannot inherit from tier illegitimate daughter. Their relative Julia Capiao predeceased
the daughter, Lutgarda Capiao As explained by Manresa, whom the private respondents cited:
xxx xxx xxx
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right
of succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does
not recognize it. In this Article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the presumptive will of the interested
parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by
the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived;
the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family.
Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment. (7 Manresa, 3rd ed., p. 110).
In the case of Castro vs. Court of Appeals (123 SCRA 787) we ruled:
Where the interests of justice would not be served by a policy of liberality, however, we cannot cite a lower court as having
acted with grave abuse of discretion simply because it has correctly but strictly applied the rules, In the instant case, the
decision of the respondent court is supported by the records. A remand for further proceedings, therefore, would only result in
needless delaysa few more years perhaps of a tortuous journey through new proceedings in the trial court, an intermediate
appeal, and another resort to this Court through a petition for review to finally achieve the same result which is an order to
pay an admitted indebtedness.
Anent the second issue raised by the petitioners, we hold that the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for
mandamus on the ground that it had no appellate jurisdiction over the same. It should be noted that the petitioners stated
that they were appealing the main case to this Court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals could not have exercised its appellate
jurisdiction over the petition for mandamus since it was merely incidental to the main case. In the case of Philippine National
Bank v. Court of Appeals (8 SCRA 254), the same case relied upon by the appellate court, we ruled:
It is evident from the above-quoted resolution that the Court of Appeals denied the petition for mandamus because it found
that petitioner unequivocably manifested in its notice of appeal dated September 1, 1960 its intention to appeal directly to the
Supreme Court on purely questions of law and that it reiterated the same intention in the record on appeal it submitted on
September 9, 1960 wherein it prayed that the same be approved and duly transmitted to the Supreme Court. And the Court of
Appeals predicated its resolution on Section 30 of Republic Act 296 wherein it is expressly provided that the Court of Appeals
shall have original jurisdiction to issue, among others, a writ of mandamus when such remedy is invoked merely in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. This has been interpreted to mean that, should the main case be appealed and the appeal should fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, it is only then that said court can act on the special civil action of
mandamus; otherwise, the jurisdiction to act thereon would devolve upon the Supreme Court ...
Similarly, in the case of Philippine Product Co. v. Court of Appeals (21 SCRA 874), we ruled:
Petitioner's submission that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
Before it is well taken. By statute (Section 30, Republic Act 296 [The Judiciary Act]) the Court of Appeals may only issue writs of
certiorari and prohibition "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This phrase has been consistently interpreted to mean that
should the main case be appealed and the appeal fall under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, then
only can it act on said special civil actions concerning a matter incidental to the main case. Otherwise, i.e., if the main case is
not properly appealable to the Court of Appeals, jurisdiction to act on the special civil actions would devolve on the Supreme
Court exclusively. (Miailhe v. Halili, 103 Phil. 639; Albar v. Carangdang, L-18003, Sept. 29, 1962; PNB v. Court of Appeals, L-
18728, May 31, 1963; and Tuason v. Jaramino, L-18932-34, etc., Sept. 30, 1963)
Furthermore, it is an established principle that the writ of mandamus may not be issued to control the discretion of a judge or
to compel him to decide a case or motion in a particular way, the writ being available only to compel him to exercise his
discretion or jurisdiction. (Phil. Air Lines Employees Association v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., 111 SCRA 220). The respondent judge,
therefore, cannot be compelled by such special civil action to approve the petitioners' appeal which was perfected after the
reglementary period to do so had expired. The petitioners contend that the appellate court should have certified the petition
to the Supreme Court, thus leaving the resolution of the issues to this Court. Since the main case is manifestly without merit,
the action of the appellate court cannot be impugned. No considerations of substantial justice which would warrant the
exercise of equity powers exist in this petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendant-appellant.
Antonio E. Lacsam & Cesar A. Azucena, Jr. for appellant.
Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, since the only issue raised is the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the
matter which is purely a legal question.
The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City in Civil Case No. SP-265, and adopted
by the Court of Appeals, show that:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 (Exh. "D") Of this marriage there were born three children
namely: Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead
of her husband Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit "E"). Of this second marriage were born two children,
Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died
on August 19, 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad
Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of
her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months
before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the defendant herein
Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza.
(Rollo, pp. 2-3)
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the
following described five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:
A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 38 fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 1,077, sq.
m. Bounded on the N. by German Garingan; on the E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S. by Bernardino Alina; and on the W. by Feliciana
Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12713 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31232, assessed at
P170.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of
9,455 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Paulino Gajuco; on the E. by Felisa Gavino and German Garigan; on the S. by Esteban
Calayag; and on the W. by Laureano Ambion, Covered by Tax No. 12714 for the year 1948 in the name of defendant Geronimo
Almanza;
C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees and having
an area of 11,739 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Jacinto Alvero, Anacleto Glorioso and Bernardino Alma; on the E. by Bernardino
Alma; on the S. by Rosendo Banaad, Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River; and on the W. by Anacleto Glorioso Covered by Tax No.
12715 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234, assessed at P2,720.00 in the name of defendant
Geronimo Almanza;
D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San Pablo, with an area of 153, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by
heirs of Pedro Calampiano; on the E. by Petronilo Cartago; on the S. by Ignacio Yerro; and on the W. by Melecio Cabrera.
Covered by Tax No. 17653 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 21452, assessed at P610.00 in the
name of Cristeta Almanza; and
E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria, Quezon, planted with 300 coconut trees fruit bearing. Area -
24,990 sq. m. Bounded on the N. (Ilaya) by heirs of Pedro de Gala on the E. by Julian Garcia; on the S. (Ibaba) by Julian Garcia,
and on the W. by Taguan River. Covered by Tax No. 21452, assessed at P910.00.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 4-6)
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b)
the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful
shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the
administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties.
However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and
burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought out the
subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already
been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession
and administration of the same to the defendants.
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs who are hereby declared to be entitled to ten twenty-
fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land in dispute. The defendant Engracio Manese and the heirs of the deceased
Geronimo Almanza, who are represented in the instant case by the administrator Florentino Cartena, are hereby required to
pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959 the sum of P625.00 per annum until the ten-twenty fourth (10/24) share on the five
parcels of land are delivered to the plaintiffs, with legal interest from the time this decision shall have become final.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.
(SGD) JOSE G. BAUTISTA
Judge
Record on Appeal, p. 47
From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The other defendant, Engracio Manese, did not appeal and execution was issued with respect to the
parcels of land in his possession, that is, those described under Letters D and E in the complaint. Hence, the subject matter of
the case on appeal was limited to the one-half undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of land described under
letters A, B and C in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to be only in his possession. 2
On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code,
applied by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the properties left by Maura Bagsic were not the
applicable provisions. He asserts that in the course of the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested defendants to
admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic, died on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14,
1952, Felipa succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the New Civil Code which provides that
"should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares," and he concludes with
the rule that the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code)
On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was not raised as an issue in the trial court.
It was even the subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly shown in the transcript of the stenographic notes that Felipa
Bagsic died on May 9. 1945. 3
The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly established in the trial court and that the only issue left for
determination is a purely legal question involving the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, hence the
appellate court certified this case to Us.
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable to the admitted facts of the case at
bar. These Articles provide:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former
shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.
Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules
laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood.
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code
provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died
intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving
collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of
half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. In Abellana-
Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not
inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or
paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece
of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their right of
succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect,
entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood. Such distinction between
whole and half blood relationships with the deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melanie Baldovino, et
al., No. L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA
610).
The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the
exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an
erroneous factual assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as she died on
May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976
BENITA SALAO, assisted by her husband, GREGORIO MARCELO; ALMARIO ALCURIZA, ARTURO ALCURIZA, OSCAR ALCURIZA
and ANITA ALCURIZA, the latter two being minors are represented by guardian ad litem, ARTURO ALCURIZA, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
JUAN S. SALAO, later substituted by PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator of the Intestate of JUAN S. SALAO; now MERCEDES P.
VDA. DE SALAO, ROBERTO P. SALAO, MARIA SALAO VDA. DE SANTOS, LUCIANA P. SALAO, ISABEL SALAO DE SANTOS, and
PABLO P. SALAO, as successors-in-interest of the late JUAN S. SALAO, together with PABLO P. SALAO,
Administrator, defendants-appellants.
Eusebio V. Navarro for plaintiffs-appellants.
Nicolas Belmonte & Benjamin T. de Peralta for defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
This litigation regarding a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Hermosa, Bataan involves the law of trusts
and prescription. The facts are as follows:
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal begot four children named Patricio,
Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only
child. Valentin Salao.
There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties formed part of Manuel Salao's estate, if any. His widow died on May
28, 1914. After her death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.
It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized on May 22, 1919 (Exh. 21). The deed was
signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her three children, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in
representation of his deceased father, Patricio.
The lands left by Valentina Ignacio, all located at Barrio Dampalit were as follows:
Nature of Land
Area in
square meters
(1) One-half interest in a fishpond which she had inherited from her parents, Feliciano Ignacio and Damiana Mendoza, and the
other half of which was owned by her co-owner, Josefa Sta. Ana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,700
(2) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,418
(3) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,989
(4) Fishpond with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,469
(5) Fishpond with an area of one hectare, 12 ares and 5 centares purchased from Bernabe and Honorata Ignacio by Valentina
Ignacio on November 9, 1895 with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,205
(6) Fishpond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,000
(7) One-half interest in a fishpond with a total area of 10,424 square meters, the other half was owned by A. Aguinaldo . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,217
(8) Riceland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,454
(9) Riceland purchased by Valentina Ignacio from Eduardo Salao on January 27, 1890 with a house and two camarins thereon . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,065
(10) Riceland in the name of Ambrosia Salao, with an area of 11,678 square meters, of which 2,173 square meters were sold to
Justa Yongco . . . . . . . . . .9,505
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 179,022 square
meters
To each of the legal heirs of Valentina Ignacio was adjudicated a distributive share valued at P8,135.25. In satisfaction of his
distributive share, Valentin Salao (who was then already forty-eight years old) was given the biggest fishpond with an area of
50,469 square meters, a smaller fishpond with an area of 6,989 square meters and the riceland with a net area of 9,905 square
meters. Those parcels of land had an aggregate appraised value of P13,501 which exceeded Valentin's distributive share. So in
the deed of partition he was directed to pay to his co-heirs the sum of P5,365.75. That arrangement, which was obviously
intended to avoid the fragmentation of the lands, was beneficial to Valentin.
In that deed of partition (Exh. 21) it was noted that "desde la muerte de Valentina Ignacio y Mendoza, ha venido administrando
sus bienes la referida Ambrosia Salao" "cuya administracion lo ha sido a satisfaccion de todos los herederos y por designacion
los mismos". It was expressly stipulated that Ambrosia Salao was not obligated to render any accounting of her administration
"en consideracion al resultado satisfactorio de sus gestiones, mejoradas los bienes y pagodas por ella las contribusiones (pages
2 and 11, Exh. 21).
By virtue of the partition the heirs became "dueos absolutos de sus respectivas propiedadas, y podran inmediatamente tomar
posesion de sus bienes, en la forma como se han distribuido y llevado a cabo las adjudicaciones" (page 20, Exh. 21).
The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr.
and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-
seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 14). It is also known as Lot No. 540 of the Hermosa
cadastre because that part of Lubao later became a part of Bataan.
The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case.
Plaintiffs' theory is that Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the fishpond business. Where they obtained
the capital is not shown in any documentary evidence. Plaintiffs' version is that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were
included in that joint venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel
Salao, and that those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no documentary evidence to
support that theory.
On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted of lands purchased by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and
Ambrosia Salao in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908 as, shown in their Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 13. But this point is disputed by the
plaintiffs.
However, there can be no controversy as to the fact that after Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao secured a Torrens title for
the Calunuran fishpond in 1911 they exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao.
Thus, on December 1, 1911 Ambrosia Salao sold under pacto de retro for P800 the Calunuran fishpond to Vicente Villongco.
The period of redemption was one year. In the deed of sale (Exh19) Ambrosia confirmed that she and her brother Juan were
the dueos proindivisos of the said pesqueria. On December 7, 1911 Villongco, the vendee a retro, conveyed the same
fishpond to Ambrosia by way of lease for an anual canon of P128 (Exh. 19-a).
After the fishpond was redeemed from Villongco or on June 8, 1914 Ambrosia and Juan sold it under pacto de retroto Eligio
Naval for the sum of P3,360. The period of redemption was also one year (Exh. 20). The fishpond was later redeemed and
Naval reconveyed it to the vendors a retro in a document dated October 5, 1916 (Exh. 20-a).
The 1930 survey shown in the computation sheets of the Bureau of Lands reveals that the Calunuran fishpond has an area of
479,205 square meters and that it was claimed by Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao, while the Pinanganacan fishpond
(subsequently acquired by Juan and Ambrosia) has an area of 975,952 square meters (Exh. 22).
Likewise, there is no controversy as to the fact that on May 27, 1911 Ambrosia Salao bought for four thousand pesos from the
heirs of Engracio Santiago a parcel of swampland planted to bacawan and nipa with an area of 96 hectares, 57 ares and 73
centares located at Sitio Lewa, Barrio Pinanganacan, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 17-d).
The record of Civil Case No. 136, General Land Registration Office Record No. 12144, Court of First Instance of Pampanga
shows that Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao filed an application for the registration of that land in their names on January 15,
1916. They alleged in their petition that "han adquirido dicho terreno por partes iguales y por la compra a los herederos del
finado, Don Engracio Santiago" (Exh. 17-a).
At the hearing on October 26, 1916 before Judge Percy M. Moir, Ambrosia testified for the applicants. On that same day Judge
Moir rendered a decision, stating, inter alia, that the heirs of Engracio Santiago had sold the land to Ambrosia Salao and Juan
Salao. Judge Moir "ordena la adjudicacion y registro del terreno solicitado a nombre de Juan Salao, mayor de edad y de estado
casado y de su esposa Diega Santiago y Ambrosia Salao, de estado soltera y mayor de edad, en participaciones iguales" (Exh.
17-e).
On November 28, 1916 Judge Moir ordered the issuance of a decree for the said land. The decree was issued on February 21,
1917. On March 12, 1917 Original Certificate of Title No. 472 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga was issued in the names of
Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao.
That Pinanganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the Hermosa cadastre (Exh. 23). It adjoins the
Calunuran fishpond (See sketch, Exh. 1).
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. died on November 3, 1931 at the age of eighty years (Exh. C). His nephew, Valentin Salao, died on February 9,
1933 at the age of sixty years according to the death certificate (Exh. A. However, if according to Exhibit 21, he was forty-eight
years old in 1918, he would be sixty-three years old in 1933).
The intestate estate of Valentin Salao was partitioned extrajudicially on December 28, 1934 between his two daughters, Benita
Salao-Marcelo and Victorina Salao-Alcuriza (Exh. 32). His estate consisted of the two fishponds which he had inherited in 1918
from his grandmother, Valentina Ignacio.
If it were true that he had a one-third interest in the Calunuran and Lewa fishponds with a total area of 145 hectares registered
in 1911 and 1917 in the names of his aunt and uncle, Ambrosia Salao and Juan Y. Salao, Sr., respectively, it is strange that no
mention of such interest was made in the extrajudicial partition of his estate in 1934.
It is relevant to mention that on April 8, 1940 Ambrosia Salao donated to her grandniece, plaintiff Benita Salao, three lots
located at Barrio Dampalit with a total area of 5,832 square meters (Exit. L). As donee Benita Salao signed the deed of
donation.
On that occasion she could have asked Ambrosia Salao to deliver to her and to the children of her sister, Victorina, the
Calunuran fishpond if it were true that it was held in trust by Ambrosia as the share of Benita's father in the alleged joint
venture.
But she did not make any such demand. It was only after Ambrosia Salao's death that she thought of filing an action for the
reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond which was allegedly held in trust and which had become the sole property of Juan
Salao y Santiago (Juani).
On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao's death on September 14,
1945 due to senility (she was allegedly eighty-five years old when she died), she donated her one-half proindiviso share in the
two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time she was living with Juani's family. He was
already the owner of the the other half of the said fishponds, having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) The
deed of denotion included other pieces of real property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufruct over the
said properties during her lifetime (Exh. 2 or M).
The said deed of donation was registered only on April 5, 1950 (page 39, Defendants' Record on Appeal).
The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated January 26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that
his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, he refused to give
Benita and Victorina's children their one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000 (Exh. K).
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the
two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in
1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of Ambrosia's one-half share (Exh. K-1).
Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against Juan S. Salao, Jr. on January 9, 1952 in the Court
of First Instance of Bataan (Exh. 36). They amended their complaint on January 28, 1955. They asked for the annulment of the
donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao's supposed one-
third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the Torrens title secured by his father and aunt. He
also invoked the Statute of Frauds, prescription and laches. As counter-claims, he asked for moral damages amounting to
P200,000, attorney's fees and litigation expenses of not less than P22,000 and reimbursement of the premiums which he has
been paying on his bond for the lifting of the receivership Juan S. Salao, Jr. died in 1958 at the age of seventy-one. He was
substituted by his widow, Mercedes Pascual and his six children and by the administrator of his estate.
In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two fishponds in question were adjudicated to his seven legal
heirs in equal shares with the condition that the properties would remain under administration during the pendency of this
case (page 181, Defendants' Record on Appeal).
After trial the trial court in its decision consisting of one hundred ten printed pages dismissed the amended complaint and the
counter-claim. In sixty-seven printed pages it made a laborious recital of the testimonies of plaintiffs' fourteen witnesses,
Gregorio Marcelo, Norberto Crisostomo, Leonardo Mangali Fidel de la Cruz, Dionisio Manalili, Ambrosio Manalili, Policarpio
Sapno, Elias Manies Basilio Atienza, Benita Salao, Emilio Cagui Damaso de la Pea, Arturo Alcuriza and Francisco Buensuceso,
and the testimonies of defendants' six witnesses, Marcos Galicia, Juan Galicia, Tiburcio Lingad, Doctor Wenceslao Pascual,
Ciriaco Ramirez and Pablo P. Salao. (Plaintiffs presented Regino Nicodemus as a fifteenth witness, a rebuttal witness).
The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao
when the Calunuran and Pinanganacan (Lewa) lands were acquired; that a co-ownership over the real properties of Valentina
Ignacio existed among her heirr after her death in 1914; that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it
subsisted up to 1918 when her estate was partitioned among her three children and her grandson, Valentin Salao.
The trial court surmised that the co-ownership which existed from 1914 to 1918 misled the plaintiffs and their witnesses and
caused them to believe erroneously that there was a co-ownership in 1905 or thereabouts. The trial court speculated that if
valentin had a hand in the conversion into fishponds of the Calunuran and Lewa lands, he must have done so on a salary or
profit- sharing basis. It conjectured that Valentin's children and grandchildren were given by Ambrosia Salao a portion of the
earnings of the fishponds as a reward for his services or because of Ambrosia's affection for her grandnieces.
The trial court rationalized that Valentin's omission during his lifetime to assail the Torrens titles of Juan and Ambrosia signified
that "he was not a co-owner" of the fishponds. It did not give credence to the testimonies of plaintiffs' witnesses because their
memories could not be trusted and because no strong documentary evidence supported the declarations. Moreover, the
parties involved in the alleged trust were already dead.
It also held that the donation was validly executed and that even if it were void Juan S. Salao, Jr., the donee, would
nevertheless be the sole legal heir of the donor, Ambrosia Salao, and would inherit the properties donated to him.
Both parties appealed. The plaintiffs appealed because their action for reconveyance was dismissed. The defendants appealed
because their counterclaim for damages was dismissed.
The appeals, which deal with factual and legal issues, were made to the Court of Appeals. However, as the amounts involved
exceed two hundred thousand pesos, the Court of Appeals elevated the case to this Court in its resolution of Octoter 3, 1966
(CA-G.R. No. 30014-R).
Plaintiffs' appeal. An appellant's brief should contain "a subject index index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the
argument and page references" to the contents of the brief (Sec. 16 [a], Rule 46, 1964 Rules of Court; Sec. 17, Rule 48, 1940
Rules of Court).
The plaintiffs in their appellants' brief consisting of 302 pages did not comply with that requirement. Their statements of the
case and the facts do not contain "page references to the record" as required in section 16[c] and [d] of Rule 46, formerly
section 17, Rule 48 of the 1940 Rules of Court.
Lawyers for appellants, when they prepare their briefs, would do well to read and re-read section 16 of Rule 46. If they comply
strictly with the formal requirements prescribed in section 16, they might make a competent and luminous presentation of
their clients' case and lighten the burden of the Court.
What Justice Fisher said in 1918 is still true now: "The pressure of work upon this Court is so great that we cannot, in justice to
other litigants, undertake to make an examination of the voluminous transcript of the testimony (1,553 pages in this case,
twenty-one witnesses having testified), unless the attorneys who desire us to make such examination have themselves taken
the trouble to read the record and brief it in accordance with our rules" (Palara vs. Baguisi 38 Phil. 177, 181). As noted in an old
case, this Court decides hundreds of cases every year and in addition resolves in minute orders an exceptionally considerable
number of petitions, motions and interlocutory matters (Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 395; See In re Almacen, L-
27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 573).
Plaintiffs' first assignment of error raised a procedural issue. In paragraphs 1 to 14 of their first cause of action they made
certain averments to establish their theory that Valentin Salao had a one-third interest in the two fishponds which were
registrered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) and Ambrosia Salao.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) in his answer "specifically" denied each and all the allegations" in paragraphs I to 10 and 12 of the first
cause of action with the qualification that Original certificates of Title Nos. 185 and 472 were issued "more than 37 years ago"
in the names of Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia under the circumstances set forth in Juan S. Salao, Jr.'s "positive defenses" and "not
under the circumstances stated in the in the amended complaint".
The plaintiffs contend that the answer of Juan S. Salao, Jr. was in effect tin admission of the allegations in their first cause of
action that there was a co-ownership among Ambrosia, Juan, AIejandra and Valentin, all surnamed Salao, regarding the
Dampalit property as early as 1904 or 1905; that the common funds were invested the acquisition of the two fishponds; that
the 47-hectare Calunuran fishpond was verbally adjudicated to Valentin Salao in the l919 partition and that there was a verbal
stipulation to to register "said lands in the name only of Juan Y. Salao".
That contention is unfounded. Under section 6, Rule 9 of the 1940 of Rules of Court the answer should "contain either a
specific dinial a statement of matters in accordance of the cause or causes of action asserted in the complaint". Section 7 of
the same rule requires the defendant to "deal specificaly with each material allegation of fact the truth of wihich he does not
admit and, whenever practicable shall set forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial".
"Material averments in the complaint, other than those as to the amount damage, shall be deemed admitted when specifically
denied" (Sec. 8). "The defendant may set forth set forth by answer as many affirmative defenses as he may have. All grounds of
defenses as would raise issues of fact not arising upon the preceding pleading must be specifically pleaded" (Sec. 9).
What defendant Juan S. Salao, Jr. did in his answer was to set forth in his "positive defenses" the matters in avoidance of
plaintiffs' first cause of action which which supported his denials of paragraphs 4 to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action.
Obviously, he did so because he found it impracticable to state pierceneal his own version as to the acquisition of the two
fishponds or to make a tedious and repetitious recital of the ultimate facts contradicting allegations of the first cause of action.
We hold that in doing so he substantially complied with Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court. It may be noted that under the
present Rules of Court a "negative defense is the specific denial of t the material fact or facts alleged in the complaint essential
to plaintiff's cause of causes of action". On the other hand, "an affirmative defense is an allegation of new matter which, while
admitting the material allegations of the complaint, expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the
plaintiff." Affirmative defenses include all matters set up "by of confession and avoidance". (Sec. 5, Rule 6, Rules of Court).
The case of El Hogar Filipino vs. Santos Investments, 74 Phil. 79 and similar cases are distinguishable from the instant case. In
the El Hogar case the defendant filed a laconic answer containing the statement that it denied "generally ans specifically each
and every allegation contained in each and every paragraph of the complaint". It did not set forth in its answer any matters by
way of confession and avoidance. It did not interpose any matters by way of confession and avoidance. It did not interpose any
affirmative defenses.
Under those circumstances, it was held that defendant's specific denial was really a general denial which was tantamount to an
admission of the allegations of the complaint and which justified judgment on the pleadings. That is not the situation in this
case.
The other nine assignments of error of the plaintiffs may be reduced to the decisive issue of whether the Calunuran fishpond
was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao. That issue is tied up with the question of whether
plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had already prescribed.
The plaintiffs contend that their action is "to enforce a trust which defendant" Juan S. Salao, Jr. allegedly violated. The
existence of a trust was not definitely alleged in plaintiffs' complaint. They mentioned trust for the first time on page 2 of their
appelants' brief.
To determine if the plaintiffs have a cause of action for the enforcement of a trust, it is necessary to maek some exegesis on
the nature of trusts (fideicomosis). Trusts in Anglo-American jurisprudence were derived from thefideicommissa of the Roman
law (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abadilla, 46 Phil. 642, 646).
"In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property,
the legal title to which is vested in another, but the word 'trust' is frequently employed to indicate duties, relations, and
responsibilities which are not strictly technical trusts" (89 C.J.S. 712).
A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of
another person is known as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the
beneficiary" (Art. 1440, Civil Code). There is a fiduciary relation between the trustee and the cestui que trust as regards certain
property, real, personal, money or choses in action (Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil. 505).
"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts
come into being by operation of law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest
therein may be proven by parol evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid, Arts. 1443 and 1457).
"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended"
(Ibid, Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546).
"Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by
words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J.S. 72).
"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of
intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matter of equity, independently of the particular
intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).
"A resulting trust. is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or construction of law, but in its more
restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention
as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance (89
C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts are found in articles 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. (See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-
31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179; Martinez vs. Grao 42 Phil. 35).
On the other hand, a constructive trust is -a trust "raised by construction of law, or arising by operation of law". In a more
restricted sense and as contra-distinguished from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words,
either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intension to create a trust, but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy
the demands of justice." It does not arise "by agreement or intention, but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727).
Thus, "if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes" (Art. 1456, Civil Code).
Or "if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called
constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party". Such a constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense. (Gayondato
vs. Treasurer of the P. I., 49 Phil. 244).
Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was presented by the plaintiffs to prove that there was an express trust over the
Calunuran fishpond in favor of Valentin Salao. Purely parol evidence was offered by them to prove the alleged trust. Their
claim that in the oral partition in 1919 of the two fishponds the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao is legally
untenable.
It is legally indefensible because the terms of article 1443 of the Civil Code (already in force when the action herein was
instituted) are peremptory and unmistakable: parol evidence cannot be used to prove an express trust concerning realty.
Is plaintiffs' massive oral evidence sufficient to prove an implied trust, resulting or constructive, regarding the two fishponds?
Plaintiffs' pleadings and evidence cannot be relied upon to prove an implied trust. The trial court's firm conclusion that there
was no community of property during the lifetime of Valentina; Ignacio or before 1914 is substantiated by defendants'
documentary evidence. The existence of the alleged co-ownership over the lands supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao in
1885 is the basis of plaintiffs' contention that the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao.
But that co-ownership was not proven by any competent evidence. It is quite improbable because the alleged estate of Manuel
Salao was likewise not satisfactorily proven. The plaintiffs alleged in their original complaint that there was a co-ownership
over two hectares of land left by Manuel Salao. In their amended complaint, they alleged that the co-ownership was
over seven hectares of fishponds located in Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal. In their brief they alleged that the fishponds,
ricelands and saltbeds owned in common in Barrio Dampalit had an area of twenty-eight hectares, of which sixteen hectares
pertained to Valentina Ignacio and eleven hectares represented Manuel Salao's estate.
They theorized that the eleven hectares "were, and necessarily, the nucleus, nay the very root, of the property now in litigation
(page 6, plaintiffs-appellants' brief). But the eleven hectares were not proven by any trustworthy evidence. Benita Salao's
testimony that in 1918 or 1919 Juan, Ambrosia, Alejandra and Valentin partitioned twenty-eight hectares of lands located in
Barrio Dampalit is not credible. As noted by the defendants, Manuel Salao was not even mentioned in plaintiffs' complaints.
The 1919 partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate covered about seventeen hectares of fishponds and ricelands (Exh. 21). If at
the time that partition was made there were eleven hectares of land in Barrio Dampalit belonging to Manuel Salao, who died in
1885, those eleven hectares would have been partitioned in writing as in the case of the seventeen hectares belonging to
Valentina Ignacio's estate.
It is incredible that the forty-seven-hectare Calunuran fishpond would be adjudicated to Valentin Salao mere by by word of
mouth. Incredible because for the partition of the seventeen hectares of land left by Valentina Ignacio an elaborate "Escritura
de Particion" consisting of twenty-two pages had to be executed by the four Salao heirs. Surely, for the partition of one
hundred forty-five hectares of fishponds among three of the same Salao heirs an oral adjudication would not have sufficed.
The improbability of the alleged oral partition becomes more evident when it is borne in mind that the two fishponds were
registered land and "the act of registration" is "the operative act" that conveys and affects the land (Sec. 50, Act No. 496). That
means that any transaction affecting the registered land should be evidenced by a registerable deed. The fact that Valentin
Salao and his successors-in-interest, the plaintiffs, never bothered for a period of nearly forty years to procure any
documentary evidence to establish his supposed interest ox participation in the two fishponds is very suggestive of the
absence of such interest.
The matter may be viewed from another angle. As already stated, the deed of partition for Valentina Ignacio's estate wag
notarized in 1919 (Exh. 21). The plaintiffs assert that the two fishponds were verbally partitioned also in 1919 and that the
Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao as his share.
Now in the partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate, Valentin was obligated to pay P3,355.25 to Ambrosia Salao. If, according to
the plaintiffs, Ambrosia administered the two fishponds and was the custodian of its earnings, then it could have been easily
stipulated in the deed partitioning Valentina Ignacio's estate that the amount due from Valentin would just be deducted by
Ambrosia from his share of the earnings of the two fishponds. There was no such stipulation. Not a shred of documentary
evidence shows Valentin's participation in the two fishponds.
The plaintiffs utterly failed to measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations (De Leon vs. Molo-
Peckson, 116 Phil. 1267, 1273).
Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence; certainty of proof. Where a trust is to be established by oral
proof, the testimony supporting it must be sufficiently strong to prove the right of the alleged beneficiary with as much
certainty as if a document proving the trust were shown. A trust cannot be established, contrary to the recitals of a Torrens
title, upon vague and inconclusive proof.(Syllabus, Suarez vs. Tirambulo, 59 Phil. 303).
Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony. In order to establish a trust in real property by parol
evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the act giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic
document. Such a trust cannot be established upon testimony consisting in large part of insecure surmises based on ancient
hearsay. (Syllabus, Santa Juana vs. Del Rosario 50 Phil. 110).
The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which, as already noted, allows an implied trust to be
proven by oral evidence. Trustworthy oral evidence is required to prove an implied trust because, oral evidence can be easily
fabricated.
On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A
strong presumption exists. that Torrens titles were regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for
reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and convincing (Yumul vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64
Phil. 13, 17-18).
The real purpose of the Torrens system is, to quiet title to land. "Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without There is the further consideration that the parties were descendants of common ancestors, the spouses Manuel Salao and
the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his Valentina Ignacio, and that plaintiffs' action was based on their honest supposition that the funds used in the acquisition of the
land" (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593). lands in litigation were earnings of the properties allegedly inherited from Manuel Salao.

There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the part of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao Considering those circumstances, it cannot be concluded with certitude that plaintiffs' action was manifestly frivolous or was
and Valentin Salao to create any trust. There was no constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the primarily intended to harass the defendants. An award for damages to the defendants does not appear to be just and proper.
names of Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands of justice it is
necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond " being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin The worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously instituted are not the moral damages
Salao. contemplated in the law (Solis & Yarisantos vs. Salvador, L-17022, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 887; Ramos vs. Ramos, supra). The
instant case is not among the cases mentioned in articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code wherein moral damages may be
And even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintiffs' action is clearly barred by prescription or laches (Ramos vs. recovered. Nor can it be regarded as analogous to any of the cases mentioned in those articles.
Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284; Quiniano vs. Court of Appeals, L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 221; Varsity
Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, 9, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503; Alzona vs. Capunitan and Reyes, 114 Phil. 377). The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages.
The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate; such right is so precious that moral damages may
Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust in this case, the longest period of not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously. (Barreto vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771. 779).
extinctive prescription was only ten year (Sec. 40; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266).
The defendants invoke article 2208 (4) (11) of the Civil Code which provides that attorney's fees may be recovered "in case of a
The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance was made by the clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff" (defendant is a plaintiff in his counterclaim) or "in any other
plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The case where the court deems it just and equitable" that attorney's fees should he awarded.
plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights if they had any rights at all. Vigilanti prospiciunt
jura or the law protects him who is watchful of his rights (92 C.J.S. 1011, citing Esguerra vs. Tecson, 21 Phil. 518, 521). But once it is conceded that the plaintiffs acted in good faith in filing their action there would be no basis for adjudging them
liable to the defendants for attorney's fees and litigation expenses (See Rizal Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
"Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit in the claim, since it is human nature for a L-23729, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 61).
person to assert his rights most strongly when they are threatened or invaded". "Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a
plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be It is not sound public policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award
destructive of the right itself." (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435, 440-441). of attorney's fees to the winning party (Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan, 110 Phil. 1020, 1028; Heirs of Justiva vs. Gustilo, 61 O. G.
6959).
Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer
n to Pass upon the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two The trial court's judgment is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
fishponds The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assil that donation.
SO ORDERED.
Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole
legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945
when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the
daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line,
representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art
972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs.
Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).

The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint.

Defendants' appeal. The defendants dispute the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs filed their action in good faith. The
defendants contend that they are entitled to damages because the plaintiffs acted maliciously or in bad faith in suing them.
They ask for P25,000 attorneys fees and litigation expenses and, in addition, moral damages.

We hold that defemdamts' appeal is not meritorious. The record shows that the plaintiffs presented fifteen witnesses during
the protracted trial of this case which lasted from 1954 to 1959. They fought tenaciously. They obviously incurred considerable
expenses in prosecuting their case. Although their causes of action turned out to be unfounded, yet the pertinacity and vigor
with which they pressed their claim indicate their sincerity and good faith.
G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.
FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
Mateo C. Bacalso and C. Kintanar for petitioner-appellant.
Gaudioso Sosmea and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a pauper's appeal, directly brought to this Court on points of law, from a resolution, dated September 20, 1961,
excluding petitioner-appellant herein, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, as heir in the summary settlement of the estate of
Melodia Ferraris, Special Proceeding No. 2177-R of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, as well as from the order,
dated October 16, 1961, denying a motion to reconsider said resolution.
The facts of this case are not disputed by the parties.
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have
resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary
settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having
elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her
succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued
at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral
relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by
Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's
only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the
nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
The following diagram will help illustrate the degree of relationship of the contending parties to said Melodia Ferraris:
Note: Picture
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is
survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will
the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter?
The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent, exclude the
aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the
latter since nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation, while petitioner-appellant is three degrees distant from
the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the
decedent in accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Against the above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal that she is of the same or equal degree of
relationship as the oppositors appellees, three degrees removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil
Code no right of representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or
aunt, as in the case at bar, but rather the former succeed in their own right.
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three
degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the
common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that
nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters
of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975:
ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujusexclude all
other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004,
1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provided as follows:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-
half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces, who are the children of the decedent's
brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stripes.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall
succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the
other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the
Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
ART. 952. In the absence of brother, or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of the former, whether of the whole blood or
not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of
the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the
Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but
without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.
Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the present Civil Code as declaring that Article
1009 does not establish a rule of preference. Which is true as to "other collaterals," since preference among them is according
to their proximity to the decedent, as established by Article 962, paragraph 1.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation
when it properly takes place.
But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of equal degree. On the contrary, in the
first paragraph of his commentaries to Article 1009 (Vol II, p. 439) (which counsel for appellants had unethically omitted to
quote), Tolentino expressly states:
Other collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate succession are the collaterals other than
brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond this,
we can safely say there is hardly any affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond
the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be understood in connection with the general
rule that the nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of
representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them on account of the whole blood
relationship. (Emphasis supplied)
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab
intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. 189697 June 27, 2012
ELEUTERIO RIVERA, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Rosita L. Rivera-Ramirez, Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERT RAMIREZ and RAYMOND RAMIREZ, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a courts adjudication of non-issues and the authority of the administrator to examine and secure evidence
from persons having knowledge of properties allegedly belonging to the decedents estate.
The Facts and the Case
The spouses Adolfo Ramirez (Adolfo) and Rosita Rivera (Rosita) were married in 1942. Their only child died in infancy. They
acquired during their lifetime the Sta. Teresita General Hospital and other properties. Rosita died in September 1990, followed
by her husband Adolfo in December 1993.
On February 7, 1995 petitioner Eleuterio P. Rivera (Eleuterio) filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City covering the estate of Rosita, who allegedly died without a will and with no direct
ascendants or descendants.1 Eleuterio claimed2 that he was Rositas nephew, being the son of her brother Federico. Eleuterio
submitted to the intestate court a list of the names of the decedents other nephews and nieces all of whom expressed
conformity to Eleuterios appointment as administrator of her estate.
On March 28, 1995 the RTC issued letters of administration appointing Eleuterio as Rositas estate administrator.3On
September 6, 1995 Eleuterio submitted an initial inventory of her properties. On April 18, 1996 he filed in his capacity as
administrator a motion with the court to compel the examination and production of documents relating to properties believed
to be a part of her estate, foremost of which was the Sta. Teresita General Hospital that respondent Robert Ramirez (Robert)
had been managing.4 Robert claims, together with Raymond Ramirez (Raymond) and Lydia Ramirez (Lydia), that they were
children of Adolfo by another woman. Robert opposed the issuance of the subpoena.
On joint motion of the parties, however, the RTC issued an order on March 26, 1998, suspending the proceedings in the case
pending the resolution of a separate case involving the properties of the estate.5 Four years later or on May 16, 2002
Eleuterio, as administrator of Rositas estate, moved for the revival of the proceedings and requested anew the production and
examination of documents in Roberts possession relating to Rositas estate. The RTC apparently never got to act on the
motion.
Meantime, on March 25, 2005 administrator Eleuterio moved for the joint settlement in the same case of the estates of Rosita
and her husband, Adolfo6 considering that the spouses properties were conjugal. Eleuterio expressed willingness to co-
administer the late spouses estate with Adolfos heirs, namely, Raymond, Robert, and Lydia Ramirez. Robert agreed to the
joint settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses but insisted that the court also probate the deceased Adolfos will of
October 10, 1990 which Robert presented.
As a side issue, Robert initially retained the services of Atty. Antonio Pacheo to represent him in the estate case. The lawyer
had previously counseled for the late Adolfo and the hospital. But Robert and Atty. Pacheo soon had a parting of ways,
resulting in the dismissal of the lawyer. Raymond, who did not see eye to eye with his brother Robert, subsequently retained
the services of Atty. Pacheo to represent him in the case. This created an issue because Robert wanted the lawyer inhibited
from the case considering that the latter would be working against the interest of a former client.
On July 17, 2006 Eleuterio, as administrator of Rositas estate, reiterated his motion to compel examination and production of
the hospitals documents in Roberts possession. On February 12, 2007 the RTC granted the administrators motion and
ordered Robert to bring to court the books of account, financial statements, and other documents relating to the operations of
the Sta. Teresita General Hospital. The RTC also declined to inhibit Atty. Pacheo as Raymonds counsel. Robert moved to quash
the subpoena on the grounds that the documents belonged to the hospital, which had a distinct personality; that the hospital
did not form part of Rositas estate; and that Eleuterio, as administrator only of Rositas estate, had no right to inspect and
have access to Adolfos estate. But the RTC denied Roberts motion on June 19, 2007.
Robert filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA),7 imputing grave abuse of discretion by the RTC
for allowing the production and examination of the subject documents and for not inhibiting Atty. Pacheo from the case. On
February 17, 2009 the CA rendered judgment,8 annulling the RTCs orders insofar as they granted the production and
examination of the hospitals documents. Essentially, the CA ruled that Eleuterio and Rositas other collateral relatives were
not her heirs since she had an adopted child in Raymond and that, consequently, Eleuterio, et al. had no standing to request
production of the hospitals documents or to institute the petition for the settlement of her estate. The CA affirmed, however,
the non-inhibition of Atty. Pacheo from the case. Eleuterios motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed the
present petition for review.
Issues Presented
The case presents two issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Eleuterio and his relatives were not Rositas heirs and, therefore, had no right to
institute the petition for the settlement of her estate or to seek the production and examination of the hospitals documents;
and
2. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Eleuterio, et al. had no standing to subpoena the specified documents in Roberts
possession.
Ruling of the Court
One. The CA held that based on the article Women Physicians of the World9 found in the record of the case before it, the late
Rosita, a physician, had adopted Raymond as her child. An adopted child, said the CA, is deemed a legitimate child of the
adopter. This being the case, Raymonds presence barred Eleuterio and Rositas other collateral relatives from inheriting
intestate from her.10 A further consequence is that they also did not have the right to seek the production and examination of
the documents allegedly in Roberts possession.
But, whether or not the late Rosita had judicially adopted Raymond as her child is a question of fact that had neither been
considered nor passed upon by the RTC in a direct challenge to the claim of Eleuterio and Rositas other collateral relatives that
they have the right to inherit from her. The relevant issue before the RTC was only whether or not the duly appointed
administrator of Rositas estate had the right to the production and examination of the documents believed to be in Roberts
possession. Indeed, one of the reasons Robert brought the special civil action of certiorari before the CA is that Eleuterio had
no right to inspect the requested documents and have access to Adolfos estate when Eleuterios authority as administrator
extended only to Rositas estate.
The Court understands the CAs commendable desire to minimize multiple appeals. But the issues regarding the late Rositas
supposed judicial adoption of Raymond as her child and the consequent absence of right on the part of Eleuterio, et al. to file a
petition for the settlement of Rositas estate were never raised and properly tried before the RTC. Consequently, the CA
gravely abused its discretion in adjudicating such issues and denying Eleuterio and his relatives their right to be heard on them.
Two. As for the right of the administrator of Rositas estate to the production and examination of the specified documents
believed to be in Roberts possession, Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court provides that these can be allowed based on the
administrators belief that the person named in the request for subpoena has documents in his possession that tend to show
the decedents right to real or personal property. Thus:
Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. If an executor or administrator, heir,
legatee, creditor, or other individual interested in the estate of the deceased, complains to the court having jurisdiction of the
estate that a person is suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods or chattels of
the deceased, or that such person has in his possession or has knowledge of any deed, conveyance, bond, contract or other
writing which contains evidence of or tends to disclose the right, title, interest, or claim of the deceased to real or personal
estate, or the last will and testament of the deceased, the Court may cite such suspected person to appear before it and may
examine him on oath on the matter of such complaint; and if the person so cited refuses to appear, or to answer on such
examination or such interrogatories as are put to him, the court may punish him for contempt, and may commit him to prison
until he submits to the order of the court. The interrogatories put to any such person, and his answers thereto, shall be in
writing and shall be filed in the clerks office. (Emphasis supplied)
The production and examination is nothing to be afraid of since the intestate court has no authority to decide who the
decedents heirs are in connection with such incident which is confined to the examination of documents which may aid the
administrator in determining properties believed to belong to the decedents estate. What is more, that court has no authority
to decide the question of whether certain properties belong to the estate or to the person sought to be examined.11
In fact, if after the examination the court has good reason to believe that the person examined is in possession of properties
that belong to the deceased, the administrator cannot detain the property. He has to file an ordinary action for recovery of the
properties.12 The purpose of the production and examination of documents is to elicit information or secure evidence from
persons suspected of having possession of, or knowledge of properties suspected of belonging to the estate of the deceased.
The procedure is inquisitorial in nature, designed as an economical and efficient mode of discovering properties of the
estate.13
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 100203 dated
February 17, 2009, and REINSTATES the February 12, 2007 order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Special
Proceedings Q-95-22919 granting petitioner Eleuterio P. Riveras motion to compel examination and production of document
dated July 17, 2006.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193161 August 22, 2011
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA PARREO, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of the April 30, 2009 Decision1 and July 21, 2010
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN, entitled Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencia Avila
Parreo v. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC (Branch 2), Tagum City, and Diosdado Salinas (Manungas). The
CA Decision set aside as null and void the Order dated November 4, 20023 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2 in Tagum
City, Davao del Norte, in Special Proceedings No. 708 entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Engracia N.
Vda de Manungas, Diosdado Manungas, petitioner, wherein the RTC reversed its appointment of respondent Florencia Avila
Parreo (Parreo) as the special administrator of the estate of Engracia Manungas and appointed petitioner Diosdado Salinas
Manungas (Diosdado) in her stead.
The Facts
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no children. Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila
(Avila) on August 12, 1968. Florentino Manungas died intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his adoptive
mother.4 Avila was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on March 31, 1980 in the intestate estate proceedings of
Florentino Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. There, she stated that there are no other legal and compulsory
heirs of Florentino Manungas except for herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged as the natural son of
Florentino Manungas.5 Meanwhile, Avilas widow executed a Waiver of Rights and Participation on October 29, 1980,
renouncing her rights over the separate property of her husband in favor of Engracia Manungas. Thereafter, a Decree of Final
Distribution was issued in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas distributing the properties to Engracia
Manungas and Ramon Manungas, the surviving heirs.6
On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch 4 in Panabo City, appointed Parreo, the niece of Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial
Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent aunt.7
Engracia Manungas, through Parreo, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96 against the spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas
and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Panabo City. In their answer, the
spouses Salinas claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas. However, the answer was filed beyond
the reglementary period and was not considered by the MTC. Thus, the MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia
Manungas, ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and to restore possession to Engracia Manungas. The Decision was
appealed by the spouses Salinas to the RTC of Tagum, Davao City which affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTC.8 On appeal
to this Court, defendants petition was denied for having been filed out of time in a Resolution which became final on April 20,
1998.9
Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the Estate of
Engracia Manungas (Estate of Manungas) in his favor before the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao. He alleged that he, being
an illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas.10 The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila
Loreto (Loreto) and Parreo alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming
that he was not a Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas, he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or her
estate and that he was in fact a debtor of the estate having been found liable to Engracia Manungas for PhP 177,000 by virtue
of a Decision issued by the MTC in Civil Case No. 5196-96. On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order appointing Parreo as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Florencia A. Parreo is hereby appointed as Special Administrator of the property of the
late Engracia N. Vda. de Manungas. The Special Administrator is hereby directed to post a bond in the amount of P200,000.00
pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 81.
SO ORDERED.11
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.12 In his
motion, Diosdado argued that Parreos appointment as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas was by virtue of her
being the judicial guardian of the latter but which relation ceased upon Engracia Manungas death, concluding that her
appointment as special administrator was without basis. He added that Parreo was not fit to become a special administrator
having already been fined by the court for failing to render a timely accounting of Engracia Manungas property as her judicial
guardian. Diosdado also reasoned that Parreo is a mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia Manungas, while he is the
illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.
On November 4, 2002, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering the revocation of its earlier appointment of
Parreo as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the Special Administrator.13
Parreo and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. The CA issued its assailed April 30, 2009 Decision finding that the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking its earlier appointment of Parreo as the administrator of the Estate of
Manungas and appointing Diosdado instead. The CA further reinstated Parreo as the special administrator of the estate. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated November 4, 2002 setting aside the
appointment of Florencia Parreo as special administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de Manungas, and denying
the property bond posted by Florencia Parreo [is] hereby declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE as having been issued by
Public Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, Davao del Norte with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.14
Diosdado assailed the CA Decision in a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 15, 200915 which the CA denied in the July 21,
2010 Resolution.
Hence, We have this petition.
The Issues
Diosdado raises the following issues:
The Court a Quo utterly disregarded the jurisprudence that certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal where the latter
remedy is available.16
The Court a Quo in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration grossly violated the rule that once a decision or order is
final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.17
The Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the appointment of petitioner, Diosdado Manungas as judicial
administrator and reinstating the appointment of Florencia Parreo as special administrator.18
The Court a Quo gravely erred in [giving] due course to oppositors petition that is flawed.19
The Courts Ruling
The petition must be denied.
The RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order
The first two issues raised by Diosdado revolve around the issue of whether the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an
interlocutory order.
Diosdado alleges that, following the ruling of this Court that Certiorari cannot be the substitute for a lost appeal, Parreo
should have appealed the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 to the CA through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. Diosdado contends that the Order dated November 4, 2002 became final and executory, Parreo
having failed to file the petition within the reglementary period; thus, the Order cannot be the subject of review even by this
Court. However, Diosdados position assumes that the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is a final order instead of an
interlocutory order.
In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua,20 the Court stated what an interlocutory order is:
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain
to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory", e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x. Unlike a
final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal
except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
The Court has considered an appointment of a special administrator as an interlocutory or preliminary order to the main case
for the grant of letters of administration in a testate or intestate proceeding. In Ocampo v. Ocampo,21 the Court succinctly
held, "The appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court."
With such categorical ruling of the Court, the Order dated November 4, 2002 is clearly an interlocutory order. As such, the
order cannot be the subject of an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as argued by petitioner. The proper remedy is the
filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, Section 1(c) of Rule 41 states:
Section 1. Subject of appeal.
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65.
Verily, respondents made use of the proper mode of review by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA.
Respondents filed the petition well within the prescribed period under this rule.
There was no necessity to file a motion for reconsideration
As properly noted by petitioner, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is required before a decision may be
appealed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under the rule, there must be no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for reconsideration, to justify the filing of a petition for certiorari. Thus,
petitioner argues that respondents failure to move for the reconsideration of the Order dated November 4, 2002 is fatal to an
appeal from it. Such general rule, however, admits of exceptions as explained in Delos Reyes v. Flores:22
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and mandamus are available only when there is
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for reconsideration. The writ of
certiorari does not lie where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error. x x x However, there are
several exceptions where a petition for certiorari will lie without the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration, to wit:
xxxx
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (Emphasis supplied.)
The instant case is clearly an exception to the general rule. An examination of the issues raised by respondents in appealing the
Order dated November 4, 2002, reveals that the issues are only questions of law. Ergo, there is no need for a motion for
reconsideration.
In addition, the Court has even allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari despite the existence of an appeal or other
appropriate remedy in several instances, including when the court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order.23
Thus, while respondent failed to move for the reconsideration of the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC, a petition for
certiorari may still prosper, as in this case.
The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
The lower court stated in its November 4, 2002 Order that:
After carefully scrutinizing the arguments and grounds raised by both petitioner and oppositors, this Court finds merit in the
contention of petitioner. In the case of Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 324, the Supreme Court ruled:
The presence of illegitimate children precludes succession by collateral relatives to his estate;
Diosdado Manungas, being the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas inherits the latters property by operation of law;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the order appointing Florencia Parreo as special administrator of the estate of the late
Engracia Vda. de Manungas is ordered set aside.
Such reasoning is a non sequitur.
The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean that he is entitled or even qualified to
become the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion of the court. In Heirs of
Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel,24 it was stated that:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of
administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or
administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special
administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the
appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must
be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.)
This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Court ruled that:
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint
special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or
removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The
probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its
discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order
of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as
the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by
higher courts is unwarranted.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such discretion must be
exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to
reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in
Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:
Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of the
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executors or administrator
afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such
perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
deceased unless so ordered by the court.1avvphi1
Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone
interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would
not expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and
depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a
stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the November 4, 2002 Order, acting with grave abuse of discretion in
appointing Diosdado as the special administrator of Engracia Manungas estate:
In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreo as Special Administrator on the ground
that it found merit in Diosdados contention that he is the illegitimate child of the late Florentino Manangus. The evidence on
record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and so he is not interested in preserving the latters estate. On
the other hand, Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and who is also the niece of the
latter, is interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so she would reap the benefit
of a wise administration of the decedents estate. Hence, the Order of the lower court revoking the appointment of Florencia
Avila Parreo as special administrator constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court exercised its power in a despotic, arbitrary or capricious
manner, as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas. It must be remembered that the
estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate proceedings that have long been terminated with the
proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution.27 With the termination of the intestate
estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of
Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate
and would have no interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. The trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas. The CA
correctly set aside the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.
Consequently, with the setting aside of the November 4, 2002 Order of the trial court, reversing its May 15, 2002 Order and
appointing Diosdado as the special administrator of Engracia Manungas estate, the May 15, 2002 Order is necessarily
reinstated and Parreos appointment as special administrator is revived.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The CAs April 30, 2009 Decision and July 21, 2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
74531-MIN declaring as null and void the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC in Special Proceedings No. 708 are AFFIRMED.
Consequently, the Order dated May 15, 2002 of the RTC is hereby REINSTATED and Florencia Avila Parreo is REINSTATED as
the special administrator of the estate of Engracia Manungas.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.
Francisco D. Rilloraza, Jr. for petitioners.
Angel A. Sison for private respondent.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, First Division,1 promulgated on May 4, 1973 in CA G.R. No.
36523-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated December 15, 1964 and allowed the probate
of the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel. *
It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition with the Court of First Instance
of Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased
Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal beneficiary and executrix.
There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow and without issue in the municipality of
Navotas, province of Rizal her place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five (85), having been born in 1876. It is
likewise not controverted that herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces
of the deceased, and that private respondent, with her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latters residence
prior an- d up to the time of her death.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have been executed in Manila on
the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages, including
the pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The signatures of the
deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages. The attestation
clause, which is found on page four, reads as follows:
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Kaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming mga tinitirahan ay nakasulat sa gawing kanan at kahilira ng aming
mga pangalan sa ibaba nito, ay pagpapatutuo na ipinakilala ipinaalam at ipinahayag sa amin ni Isabel Gabriel na ang kasulatang
ito na binubuo ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages) pati na ang dahong ito, na siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT HULING HABILIN,
ngayong ika 15 ng Abril, 1961, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing testadora na si Isabel Gabriel ang nasabing testamento sa ibaba o
ilalim ng kasulatan na nasa ika apat na dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at
bawat dahon (and on the left hand margin of each and every page), sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, at kami namang
mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing testadora, at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng patunay ng mga
saksi at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon ng testamentong ito.
At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and
Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence, 961 Highway
54, Philamlife, for Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two Gimpayas. Their signatures also appear on the left
margin of all the other pages. The WW is paged by typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" and underneath "(Page
One)", "Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath "(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each page.
The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the
rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to be paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be paid; that
legacies in specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her brother Santiago Gabriel, and her
nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and
Evangeline, Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago. To herein private respondent Lutgarda
Santiago, who was described in the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na aking pinalaki, inalagaan at minahal
na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" and named as universal heir and executor, were bequeathed all properties and estate, real
or personal already acquired, or to be acquired, in her testatrix name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and legacies as
aforementioned.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing the document purporting to be the will of
the deceased on the following grounds:
1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative
2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by law;
3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to old age
and sickness; and in the second alternative
4. That the purported WW was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the principal
beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit.
Lutgarda Santiago filed her Answer to the Opposition on February 1, 1962. After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment, the
summary and dispositive portions of which read:
Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the oppositor, this Court finds:
1. That there is no iota of evidence to support the contentio that the purported will of the deceased was procured through
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner, or of some other person for her benefit;
2. That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention that at the time of the alleged execution of the purported will,
the deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;
3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively the fact that the purported will of the deceased was not
executed and attested as required by law;
4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document presented for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not the purported win
allegedly dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested by her three attesting witnesses on April 15,
1961.
WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented for probate as the last wig and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel is
here by DISALLOWED.
From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to respondent Court, hence, the only issue decided on appeal
was whether or not the will in question was executed and attested as required by law. The Court of Appeals, upon
consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under review, holding that the will in
question was signed and executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of the
deceased and of each other as required by law, hence allow ed probate.
Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration 3 of the aforesaid decision and such motion was opposed 4 by
petitioner-appellant Lutgarda Santiago. Thereafter. parties submitted their respective Memoranda, 5and on August 28, 1973,
respondent Court, Former Special First Division, by Resolution 6 denied the motion for reconsideration stating that:
The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of evidence shows that the supposed last wig and testament of
Isabel Gabriel was not executed in accordance with law because the same was signed on several occasions, that the testatrix
did not sign the will in the presence of all the instrumental witnesses did not sign the will in the presence of each other.
The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for reconsideration hinges on the appreciation of the evidence. We
have carefully re-examined the oral and documentary evidence of record, There is no reason to alter the findings of fact in the
decision of this Court sought to be set aside. 7
In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales contends that respondent Court abused its discretion
and/or acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court. The
Court, after deliberating on the petition but without giving due course resolved, in the Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1973 to
require the respondents to comment thereon, which comment was filed on Nov. 14, 1973. Upon consideration of the
allegations, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the Comment 8 of private respondent
thereon, We denied the petition by Resolution on November 26, 1973, 9 the question raised being factual and for insufficient
showing that the findings of fact by respondent Court were unsupported by substantial evidence.
Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rim Gabriel Goes fried a Motion for Reconsideration 10 which private
respondent answered by way of her Comment or Opposition 11 filed on January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply
followed. Finally, on March 27, 1974, We resolved to give due course to the petition.
The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F" was executed and attested as required by
law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witness
II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the lower court that the preparation and execution of the win Exhibit
"F", was unexpected and coincidental.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Atty, Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence
certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F".
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "Pangalan"
and "Tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion.
V. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated
the wilt Exhibit "F , without any note or document, to Atty. Paraiso.
VI. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the trial court that Matilde Orobia was not physically present when
the Will Exhibit "F" was allegedly signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya.
VII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the
win was improperly executed.
VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions, and misrepresentations of witnesses
(subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away, and that the trial court erred in rejecting said
testimonies.
IX. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision.
X. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the alleged last
will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same are substantially factual in character and content. Hence,
at the very outset, We must again state the oft-repeated and well-established rule that in this jurisdiction, the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals are not reviewable, the same being binding and conclusive on this Court. This rule has been stated and
reiterated in a long line of cases enumerated in Chan vs. CA (L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, 743) 12 and Tapas vs. CA (L-
22202, February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA 393), 13 and in the more recent cases of Baptisia vs. Carillo and CA (L32192, July 30, 1976,
72 SCRA 214, 217) and Vda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque (L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88). In the case
of Chan vs. CA, this Court said:
... from Guico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being penned by the then Justice Recto, it has been well-settled that the
jurisdiction of tills Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law
imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. More specifically, in a decision exactly a month later, this Court, speaking
through the then Justice Laurel, it was held that the same principle is applicable, even if the Court of Appeals was in
disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of the evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact ...
Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantive evidence are not reviewable on
appeal by certiorari. Said findings of the appellate court are final and cannot be disturbed by Us particularly because its
premises are borne out by the record or based upon substantial evidence and what is more, when such findings are correct.
Assignments of errors involving factual issues cannot be ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals because
only legal questions may be raised. The Supreme Court is not at liberty to alter or modify the facts as set forth in the decision
of the Court of Appeals sought to be reversed. Where the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court, a minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order, and resort to duly-proven evidence becomes necessary. The general
rule We have thus stated above is not without some recognized exceptions.
Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We now proceed to consider petitioner's assignments of errors.
Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit
"F", was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses
were credible witnesses. She argues that the require. ment in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be credible is an
absolute requirement which must be complied with before an alleged last will and testament may be admitted to probate and
that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that
he is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. According to petitioner, unless the qualifications of the
witness are first established, his testimony may not be favorably considered. Petitioner contends that the term "credible" is
not synonymous with "competent" for a witness may be competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be
credible as required by Article 805 of the same Code. It is further urged that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code
should receive the same settled and well- known meaning it has under the Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred
legislation with the Civil Code provisions on wigs with respect to the qualifications of witnesses.
We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness
to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a witness to a win. These Articles state:
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read
and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of this Code. "Art. 821. The following are
disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good
standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that
his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of
the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the
questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently
proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction
of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's contention
that it must first be established in the record the good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the
contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should be given the
same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be
supported by two character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation for trustworthiness
and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for naturalization are character witnesses in
that being citizens of the Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of
time required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that said petitioner has in their opinion
all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of
the Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended).
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or
testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. And We agree with the respondent that the rulings laid down
in the cases cited by petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not applicable to instrumental
witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the
respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has
not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18
years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another,
While the petitioner submits that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of a witness due to his
qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications under the second Article, whereas Article 805 requires
the attestation of three or more credible witnesses, petitioner concludes that the term credible requires something more than
just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under Articles 820 and 821 must also be a
credible witness under Article 805.
Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of a witness are not synonymous terms and one may be a
competent witness and yet not a credible one. She exacerbates that there is no evidence on record to show that the
instrumental witnesses are credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good standing in the community since one was a
family driver by profession and the second the wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It is true that Celso Gimpaya was the driver of
the testatrix and his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a housekeeper, and that Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher to a grandchild
of the testatrix But the relation of employer and employee much less the humble or financial position of a person do not
disqualify him to be a competent testamentary witness. (Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344;
Testate Estate of Raymundo, Off. Gaz., March 18,1941, p. 788).
Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or more credible witnesses mentioned in Article 805 of the
Civil Code are those mentioned in Article 820 of the same Code, this being obvious from that portion of Article 820 which says
"may be Q witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code," and cites authorities that the word
"credible" insofar as witnesses to a will are concerned simply means " competent." Thus, in the case of Suntay vs. Suntay, 95
Phil. 500, the Supreme Court held that "Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at the time of, and
not revoked before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost wig must be clearly and distinctly proved by at
least two credible witnesses. 'Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts from or upon
hearsay. " emphasis supplied).
In Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344, the Supreme Court held that "Section 620 of the same Code
of Civil Procedure provides that any person of sound mind, and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf, or
dumb and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will. This same provision is reproduced in our New
Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The relation of employer and employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a win, does
not disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other qualifications
as to age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may be
entitled to credence. There is a long line of authorities on this point, a few of which we may cite:
A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to testify by mental incapacity, crime, or other cause. Historical Soc of Dauphin
County vs. Kelker 74 A. 619, 226 Pix 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340).
As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will means a 'competent witness.' Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114
Me. 105, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 837. (lbid, p. 341).
Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wins means 'competent witness that is, one competent under the law
to testify to fact of execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ St. art. 8283. Moos vs. First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex . Civ. App. 60 S.W.
2nd 888, 889. (Ibid, p. 342)
The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a will shall be attested by two credible witnesses means
competent; witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally competent to testify, in a court of justice, to the facts
attested by subscribing the will, the competency being determined as of the date of the execution of the will and not of the
timr it is offered for probate, Smith vs. Goodell 101 N.E. 255, 256, 258 111. 145. (Ibid.)
Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating to wills, means competent witnesses that is, such persons as are not
legally disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental incapacity, interest, or the commission of crimes, or
other cause excluding them from testifying generally, or rendering them incompetent in respect of the particular subject
matter or in the particular suit. Hill vs. Chicago Title & Trust co 152 N.E. 545, 546, 322 111. 42. (Ibid. p, 343)
In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute, that is Art.
820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends On the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and
conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo
Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one thing,
and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person
to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to
believe his testimony." In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to
have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their
testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established
on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the
instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the
will they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior
and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the
community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of errors, petitioner disputes the findings of fact of
the respondent court in finding that the preparation and execution of the will was expected and not coincidental, in finding
that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to
type such data into the document Exhibit "F", in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten
words "pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in
the same occasion, in holding credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will without note or document to Atty.
Paraiso, in holding that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased
Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, in holding that the trial court gave undue
importance to the picture takings as proof that the will was improperly executed, and in holding that the grave contradictions,
evasions and misrepresentations of the witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained
away.
Since the above errors are factual We must repeat what We have previously laid down that the findings of fact of the appellate
court are binding and controlling which We cannot review, subject to certain exceptions which We win consider and discuss
hereinafter. We are convinced that the appellate court's findings are sufficiently justified and supported by the evidence on
record. Thus, the alleged unnaturalness characterizing the trip of the testatrix to the office of Atty. Paraiso and bringing all the
witnesses without previous appointment for the preparation and execution of the win and that it was coincidental that Atty.
Paraiso was available at the moment impugns the finding of the Court of Appeals that although Atty. Paraiso admitted the visit
of Isabel Gabriel and of her companions to his office on April 15, 1961 was unexpected as there was no prior appointment with
him, but he explained that he was available for any business transaction on that day and that Isabel Gabriel had earlier
requested him to help her prepare her will. The finding of the appellate court is amply based on the testimony of Celso
Gimpaya that he was not only informed on the morning of the day that he witnessed the will but that it was the third time
when Isabel Gabriel told him that he was going to witness the making of her will, as well as the testimony of Maria Gimpaya
that she was called by her husband Celso Gimpaya to proceed to Isabel Gabriel's house which was nearby and from said house,
they left in a car to the lawyer's office, which testimonies are recited in the respondent Court's decision.
The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya obtained residence
certificates a few days before Exhibit "F" was executed. Celso Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114942 was issued at
Navotas, Rizal on April 13, 1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114974 was issued also at Navotas, Rizal on
April 14, 1961. The respondent Court correctly observed that there was nothing surprising in these facts and that the securing
of these residence certificates two days and one day, respectively, before the execution of the will on April 15, 1961, far from
showing an amazing coincidence, reveals that the spouses were earlier notified that they would be witnesses to the execution
of Isabel Gabriel's will.
We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the excursion to the office of Atty. Paraiso was planned by the
deceased, which conclusion was correctly drawn from the testimony of the Gimpaya spouses that they started from the
Navotas residence of the deceased with a photographer and Isabel Gabriel herself, then they proceeded by car to Matilde
Orobia's house in Philamlife, Quezon City to fetch her and from there, all the three witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia)
passed by a place where Isabel Gabriel stayed for about ten to fifteen minutes at the clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before they
proceeded to Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's office.
It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso, that previous to the day that. the will was executed on April
15, 1961, Isabel Gabriel had requested him to help her in the execution of her will and that he told her that if she really wanted
to execute her will, she should bring with her at least the Mayor of Navotas, Rizal and a Councilor to be her witnesses and that
he (Atty. Paraiso) wanted a medical certificate from a physician notwithstanding the fact that he believed her to be of sound
and disposition mind. From this evidence, the appellate court rightly concluded, thus: "It is, therefore, clear that the presence
of Isabel Gabriel and her witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya including the photographer in the law
office of Atty. Paraiso was not coincidental as their gathering was pre-arranged by Isabel Gabriel herself."
As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of
the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit ' L which the petitioner assails as contradictory and
irreconcilable with the statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso was handed a list (containing the names of the witnesses and
their respective residence certificates) immediately upon their arrival in the law office by Isabel Gabriel and this was
corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who testified that it was only on said occasion that he received such list from Isabel
Gabriel, We cannot agree with petitioner's contention. We find no contradiction for the, respondent Court held that on the
occasion of the will making on April 15, 1961, the list was given immediately to Atty. Paraiso and that no such list was given the
lawyer in any previous occasion or date prior to April 15, 1961.
But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses on a prior
occasion or on the very occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when the will was executed, is of no moment for such data appear
in the notarial acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to by the witnesses on April 15, 1961
following the attestation clause duly executed and signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. And since Exhibit "F" is a
notarial will duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary public, the same is a public document
executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public and as such public document is evidence of the facts in
clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there
must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. (Yturalde vs. Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no
such evidence pointed by petitioner in the case at bar.
Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten
words "pangalan ' and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in
the same occasion merits Our approval because tills conclusion is supported and borne out by the evidence found by the
appellate court, thus: "On page 5 of Exhibit "F", beneath the typewritten words "names", "Res. Tax Cert. date issued" and place
issued the only name of Isabel Gabriel with Residence Tax certificate No. A-5113274 issued on February 24, 1961 at Navotas
Rizal appears to be in typewritten form while the names, residence tax certificate numbers, dates and places of issuance of
said certificates pertaining to the three (3) witnesses were personally handwritten by Atty. Paraiso. Again, this coincides with
Atty. Paraiso's even the sale must be made to close relatives; and the seventh was the appointment of the appellant Santiago
as executrix of the will without bond. The technical description of the properties in paragraph 5 of Exhibit F was not given and
the numbers of the certificates of title were only supplied by Atty. Paraiso. "
It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of the properties disposed and the docket number of a
special proceeding are indicated which Atty. Paraiso candidly admitted were supplied by him, whereupon petitioner contends
that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will Exhibit "F" without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso,
considering that Isabel Gabriel was an old and sickly woman more than eighty-one years old and had been suffering from a
brain injury caused by two severe blows at her head and died of terminal cancer a few weeks after the execution of Exhibit "F".
While we can rule that this is a finding of fact which is within the competency of the respondent appellate court in determining
the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and is, therefore, beyond Our power to revise and review, We nevertheless hold that
the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum appears
to be fully supported by the following facts or evidence appearing on record. Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her age, was
particularly active in her business affairs as she actively managed the affairs of the movie business ISABELITA Theater, paying
the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3 days before her death. She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval, former Governor
of Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the Intestate Estate of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win
was in Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by her and in the light of all the circumstances, We agree with the respondent
Court that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum, a fact unanimously testified to by the three
attesting witnesses and the notary public himself.
Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The evidence, both testimonial and documentary is, according to
the respondent court, overwhelming that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by
the testatrix and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. Such factual finding of the appellate court is
very clear, thus: "On the contrary, the record is replete with proof that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will
was signed by Isabel Gabriel on April '15, 1961 along with her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. The trial court's
conclusion that Orobia's admission that she gave piano lessons to the child of the appellant on Wednesdays and Saturdays and
that April 15, 1961 happened to be a Saturday for which reason Orobia could not have been present to witness the will on that
day is purely conjectural. Witness Orobia did not admit having given piano lessons to the appellant's child every Wednesday
and Saturday without fail. It is highly probable that even if April 15, 1961 were a Saturday, she gave no piano lessons on that
day for which reason she could have witnessed the execution of the will. Orobia spoke of occasions when she missed giving
piano lessons and had to make up for the same. Anyway, her presence at the law office of Atty. Paraiso was in the morning of
April 15, 1961 and there was nothing to preclude her from giving piano lessons on the afternoon of the same day in Navotas,
Rizal."
In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya that Matilde was present on April 15, 1961
and that she signed the attestation clause to the will and on the left-hand margin of each of the pages of the will, the
documentary evidence which is the will itself, the attestation clause and the notarial acknowledgment overwhelmingly and
convincingly prove such fact that Matilde Orobia was present on that day of April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the will by
signing her name thereon and acknowledged the same before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The attestation
clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of signing because it preserves in permanent form a
recital of all the material facts attending the execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause which is
made for the purpose of preserving in permanent form a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case
of failure in the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2nd ed.,
Sec. 132; Leynez vs. Leynez, 68 Phil. 745).
As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in holding that the trial court gave undue
importance to the picture-takings as proof that the win was improperly executed, We agree with the reasoning of the
respondent court that: "Matilde Orobia's Identification of the photographer as "Cesar Mendoza", contrary to what the other
two witnesses (Celso and Maria Gimpaya) and Atty. Paraiso said that the photographer was Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is at worst a
minor mistake attributable to lapse of time. The law does not require a photographer for the execution and attestation of the
will. The fact that Miss Orobia mistakenly Identified the photographer as Cesar Mendoza scarcely detracts from her testimony
that she was present when the will was signed because what matters here is not the photographer but the photograph taken
which clearly portrays Matilde Orobia herself, her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya. " Further, the respondent Court correctly held:
"The trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was
improperly executed. The evidence however, heavily points to only one occasion of the execution of the will on April 15, 1961
which was witnessed by Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. These witnesses were quite emphatic and positive
when they spoke of this occasion. Hence, their Identification of some photographs wherein they all appeared along with Isabel
Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso was superfluous."
Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the second picture-taking was disclosed at the cross examination of
Celso Gimpaya. But this was explained by Atty. Paraiso as a reenactment of the first incident upon the insistence of Isabel
Gabriel. Such reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no longer present was wholly unnecessary if not pointless.
What was important was that the will was duly executed and witnessed on the first occasion on April 15, 1961 , " and We agree
with the Court's rationalization in conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence which do not require picture-taking as one of
the legal requisites for the execution or probate of a will.
Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of witnesses in their respective testimonies
before the trial court. On the other hand, the respondent Court of Appeals held that said contradictions, evasions and
misrepresentations had been explained away. Such discrepancies as in the description of the typewriter used by Atty. Paraiso
which he described as "elite" which to him meant big letters which are of the type in which the will was typewritten but which
was Identified by witness Jolly Bugarin of the N.B.I. as pica the mistake in mentioning the name of the photographer by Matilde
Orobia to be Cesar Mendoza when actually it was Benjamin Cifra, Jr. these are indeed unimportant details which could have
been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory such that by themselves would not alter the probative
value of their testimonies on the true execution of the will, (Pascual vs. dela Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be expected
that the testimony of every person win be Identical and coinciding with each other with regard to details of an incident and
that witnesses are not expected to remember all details. Human experience teach us "that contradictions of witnesses
generally occur in the details of certain incidents, after a long series of questionings, and far from being an evidence of
falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. In as much as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like
manner, it is but natural that in relating their impressions, they should not agree in the minor details; hence the contradictions
in their testimony." (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).
It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court should not have been disturbed by the respondent
appellate court because the trial court was in a better position to weigh and evaluate the evidence presented in the course of
the trial. As a general rule, petitioner is correct but it is subject to well-established exceptions. The right of the Court of Appeals
to review, alter and reverse the findings of the trial court where the appellate court, in reviewing the evidence has found that
facts and circumstances of weight and influence have been ignored and overlooked and the significance of which have been
misinterpreted by the trial court, cannot be disputed. Findings of facts made by trial courts particularly when they are based on
conflicting evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of credibility of contending witnesses hes peculiarly within the
province of trial courts and generally, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. In the instant case, however, the
Court of Appeals found that the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts and circumstances established in the
record. Whereas the appellate court said that "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel
dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso;" that the trial court's conclusion that Matilde Orobia could not
have witnessed anybody signing the alleged will or that she could not have witnessed Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sign
the same or that she witnessed only the deceased signing it, is a conclusion based not on facts but on inferences; that the trial
court gave undue importance to the picture-takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly
executed and that there is nothing in the entire record to support the conclusion of the court a quo that the will signing
occasion was a mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel made an appointment only with Matilde Orobia to witness the signing
of her will, then it becomes the duty of the appellate court to reverse findings of fact of the trial court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over the lower courts.
Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the rule that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive
as to the facts and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Again We agree with the petitioner that among the exceptions
are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the presence of each other
as required by law. " Specifically, We affirm that on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, together with Matilde Orobia,
Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya, and a photographer proceeded in a car to the office of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at the
Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in the morning of that day; that on the way, Isabel Gabriel obtained a medical certificate from one
Dr. Chikiamko which she gave to Atty. Paraiso upon arriving at the latter's office and told the lawyer that she wanted her will to
be made; that Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel Gabriel to dictate what she wanted to be written in the will and the attorney wrote
down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by her; that Atty. Paraiso read back to her
what he wrote as dictated and she affirmed their correctness; the lawyer then typed the will and after finishing the document,
he read it to her and she told him that it was alright; that thereafter, Isabel Gabriel signed her name at the end of the will in the
presence of the three witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya and also at the left-hand margin of each
and every page of the document in the presence also of the said three witnesses; that thereafter Matilde Orobia attested the
will by signing her name at the end of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of pages 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the document
in the presence of Isabel Gabriel and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya; then, Celso Gimpaya signed
also the will at the bottom of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of the other pages of the document in the
presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Maria Gimpaya; that Maria Gimpaya followed suit, signing her name at the foot
of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of every page in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Celso
Gimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso notarized the will as Page No. 94, Book No. IV, Series of 1961, in his Notarial Register.
On the occasion of the execution and attestation of the will, a photographer took pictures, one Exhibit "G", depicting Matilde
Orobia, the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya, Maria Gimpaya and Atty. Paraiso, taken on said occasion of the signing of
the will, and another, Exhibit "H", showing Matilde Orobia signing testimony that he had earlier advised Isabel Gabriel to bring
with her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas, Rizal to be her witnesses for he did not know beforehand the Identities
of the three attesting witnesses until the latter showed up at his law office with Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's
claim which was not controverted that he wrote down in his own hand the date appearing on page 5 of Exhibit "F" dissipates
any lingering doubt that he prepared and ratified the will on the date in question."
It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will,
Exhibit "F", without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso as against the contention of petitioner that it was incredible. This
ruling of the respondent court is fully supported by the evidence on record as stated in the decision under review, thus:
"Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to
Atty. Paraiso. On the contrary, all the three attesting witnesses uniformly testified that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will to Atty.
Paraiso and that other than the piece of paper that she handed to said lawyer she had no note or document. This fact jibes
with the evidence which the trial court itself believed was unshaken that Isabel Gabriel was of sound disposing memory
when she executed her will.
Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not complicated but quite simple. The first was Isabel Gabriel's wish to
be interred according to Catholic rites the second was a general directive to pay her debts if any; the third provided for
P1,000.00 for her sister Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and P2,000.00 for her brother Santiago Gabriel; the fourth was a
listing of her 13 nephews and nieces including oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel and the amount for each legatee the fifth
was the institution of the petitioner-appellant, Lutgarda Santiago as the principal heir mentioning in general terms seven (7)
types of properties; the sixth disposed of the remainder of her estate which she willed in favor of appellant Lutgarda Santiago
but prohibiting the sale of such properties to anyone except in extreme situations in which judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. (Roque vs.
Buan, et al., G.R. No. L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., G.R. No. L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967; Hilarion Jr. vs.
City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967).
Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar does not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated
above. We likewise hold that the findings of fact of the respondent appellate court are fully supported by the evidence on
record. The conclusions are fully sustained by substantial evidence. We find no abuse of discretion and We discern no
misapprehension of facts. The respondent Court's findings of fact are not conflicting. Hence, the well-established rule that the
decision of the Court of Appeals and its findings of fact are binding and conclusive and should not be disturbed by this Tribunal
and it must be applied in the case at bar in its full force and effect, without qualification or reservation. The above holding
simply synthesize the resolutions we have heretofore made in respect ' to petitioner's previous assignments of error and to
which We have disagreed and, therefore, rejected.
The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be rejected by Us as We find the respondent Court acted properly
and correctly and has not departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of the
power of supervision by the Supreme Court, and as We find that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the decision of
the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its summation and evaluation of the evidence on record is
unassailable that: "From the welter of evidence presented, we are convinced that the will in question was executed on April
15, 1961 in the presence of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya signing and witnessing the same in the the will
on a table with Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sitting around the table. Atty. Paraiso, after finishing the
notarial act, then delivered the original to Isabel Gabriel and retained the other copies for his file and notarial register. A few
days following the signing of the will, Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and another photographer arrived at the office of Atty.
Paraiso and told the lawyer that she wanted another picture taken because the first picture did not turn out good. The lawyer
told her that this cannot be done because the will was already signed but Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture be taken, so a
simulated signing was performed during which incident Matilde Orobia was not present.
Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the testimonies of the witnesses for the proponent of the
will, their alleged evasions, inconsistencies and contradictions. But in the case at bar, the three instrumental witnesses who
constitute the best evidence of the will making have testified in favor of the probate of the will. So has the lawyer who
prepared it, one learned in the law and long in the practice thereof, who thereafter notarized it. All of them are disinterested
witnesses who stand to receive no benefit from the testament. The signatures of the witnesses and the testatrix have been
identified on the will and there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less the petitioner, that they were not genuine. In
the last and final analysis, the herein conflict is factual and we go back to the rule that the Supreme Court cannot review and
revise the findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995
BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL,
AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR
and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate
without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with
Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several
years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively, 06
August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter
nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-20594
was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer
Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with
a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into
their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter".
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year
period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21
February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for
herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan
Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles
(OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, TCT No. 184223,
TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992, Modesta
executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-
half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980
Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a quo for summary judgment.
The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision, dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being
heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.
Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and severally (solidarily) pay
(a) respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages,
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for litigation expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for moral
damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and P500.00 for attorney's fees.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.
The petition before us raises the following contentions: That
1. THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 994 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, AS THE
CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE BY VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED FACTS, AND NOT ARTICLE 992 OF THE SAME CODE.
2. THE LOWER COURT, IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS OF, AND VOIDING ALL DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY, RESPONDENT
MODESTA BALTAZAR, WHO ARROGATED UNTO HERSELF THE RIGHTS OF AN HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN
MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY GRANTED SAID RESPONDENT THE STATUS OF AN HEIR MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS
AND PUBLIC POLICY.
3. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED IS NEVER A LEGAL WRONG.1
Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to
Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly:
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be
entitled to the entire estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the
estate, and the latter the other half. (Emphasis supplied)
refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and
sisters. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain", firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie3 and, then, in the
relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court4 and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals.5 In Diaz,we have said:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this
is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of
the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment.
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the
illegitimate child had
half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance;6 that the legitimate collateral relatives
of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child;7 that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the
succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent;8 that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her
deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father;9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father.10 Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform
general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative11 by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other
part as to produce a harmonious whole.12
In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in
Article 978 through
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:

Order of Preference Order of Concurrence

Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or (a) Legitimate Children and (a) Legitimate Children and
mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (Emphasis supplied)
Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of
absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in Children and Descendants,
the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not
totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no
and Surviving Spouse
application, however, on testamentary dispositions.

This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted civilist.2 His (b) Legitimate Parents and (b) Legitimate Parents and
thesis:
Ascendants Ascendants Illegitimate
What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an
illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate Children and Descendants,
family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well
as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate and Surviving Spouse
child. Consequently, when the law speaks of "brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it
 (c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children and G.R. No. L-5075 December 1, 1909

MAURICIO RAMIREZ, administrator of the estate of MOISES RAMIREZ, deceased, plaintiff-appellee,

Descendants (in the absence Descendants and Surviving
vs.
SIMEON BAUTISTA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
of ICDs and LPAs, the Spouse
Perfecto J. Salas Rodriguez for appellants.
Illegitimate Parents) Teodoro Gonzalez for appellee.

(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and

ARELLANO, C. J.:
Illegitimate Parents
The subject of this complaint is two fish ponds, left by Moises Ramirez on his demise, and subsequently illegally sold. This
action was brought for the purpose of having the sale declared to be void, to secure the recovery of possession of the fish
(e) Brothers and Sisters/ (e) Brothers and Sisters/
ponds, their restitution to the administrator of the estate of the deceased owner, and indemnity for damages.

Nephews and Nephews and Nieces Moises Ramirez, who died intestate in February, 1900, was married twice. By the first marriage he had five children, named
Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia; by the second marriage three, to wit, Cirila, Isabel, and Serapio, of whom Isabel
Nieces and Surviving Spouse alone survives. At the time of his death he left two fish ponds in the sitio of Tagalag, in the municipality of Polo, Province of
Bulacan, the specific details of which are described and admitted in the case. The two wives are also dead.
(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone
The children of the first marriage, Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia, sold the two fish ponds on the 28th of
November, 1901, to Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran for the sum of 1,100 pesos. The only surviving child of the second
(within the fifth civil degree)
marriage, Isabel, was not a party to said sale, hence the suit now filed by the administrator of the intestate estate to have the
sale declared null and void and the fish ponds restored to the intestate estate of Moises Ramirez.
(g) State (g) Alone
The two purchasers proved their purchase by two documents, one of which was a private and other a notarial one executed
In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is for the purpose. When summoned to answer the complaint they requested that the vendors be cited also, but the latter
right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir.13 although so summoned did not appear at trial.

We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed
by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa
Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest"14 in the case, had
neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees and litigation expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to
justify an assessment of damages against the actor.15
The action was proceeded with against the purchasers and the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, before whom the matter was
heard, rendered judgment holding that the fish ponds in question pertained to the intestate estate of the late Moises Ramirez,
and that the sale effected by the said Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia to the defendants, Simeon Bautista and
Raymundo Duran, was null and void. The court decreed that possession of the fish ponds be restored to the plaintiff, Mauricio
Ramirez as administrator of the property of the late Moises Ramirez, and accorded him the right to recover from the
defendants 200 pesos per annum, as loss and damages, to commence from the day they were notified of the complaint,
without prejudice to their right, which was reserved to them, of action against the said vendors; the court also sentenced the
defendants to pay the costs.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has
From the above judgment the defendants appealed. The appeal having been heard before this court, together with the
awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private respondents,
respective allegations of the parties, it appears that the appellants have made the following assignments of error to the
which portion is hereby DELETED. No special pronouncement on costs.
judgment of the lower court:
SO ORDERED.
I. In that it was not in the judgment the children of the late Moises Ramirez, of both the first and the second marriage, had
become owners in common of the two fish ponds in question by reason of the death of their ancestor.

II. In that it was found therein that, without a partition having been made of the property left by Moises Ramirez, the children
of his first marriage could not validly have transmitted their rights of partition in common to the property which is the subject
of this suit.
III. In that sale of the thirteen-sixteenths of the two parcels of land in question was not declared valid, and void as to three-
sixteenths thereof.lawphi1.net
IV. In that it was not found that, as a result of the evidence, the plaintiff had no legal capacity to bring suit.
The appeal having been heard and the evidence reviewed, the following facts must be held to have been proven:
That Moises Ramirez was first married to Apolinaria Guillermo and by her had the above-mentioned five children, Rosa,
Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia Ramirez.
That by his second wife, Alejandra Capistrano, he had three children, as already stated, named Cirila, Isabel, and Serapio
Ramirez.
That Moises Ramirez and his two wives are now dead, as are also the two children of the second marriage, Cirila and Serapio.
Isabel, a girl of about eight years of age, alone survives.
That the two fish ponds in question were acquired by Moises Ramirez during the time of his first marriage with Apolinaria
Guillermo, on the 17th of March, 1895, which is the date of the title by composition with the Spanish Government that
constitutes his title of ownership.
On this supposition, the two fish ponds in litigation belonged to the conjugal partnership between Moises Ramirez and
Apolinaria Guillermo. (Civil Code, art. 1401, par. 1.)
By virtue of the conjugal partnership, these two fish ponds belonged half to the husband and half to the wife upon the
dissolution of the marriage by reason of the death of either of them.itc@alf (Civil Code, art. 1392.)
Consequently, upon the death of Apolinaria Guillermo one-half of the fish ponds belonged to Moises Ramirez, and the other
half, that belonging to Apolinaria Guillermo, to the children of the said married couple, Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and
Ignacia, as the lawful heirs of their mother. (Civil Code, art. 931.)
Inasmuch as the said property continued undivided between the father on the one hand and the children on the other, and as
the conjugal partnership had terminated, a community of property maintained the father and the children in the joint
dominion. (Civil Code, art. 392.)
By the second marriage three additional children survived the father, and upon his death the first five children, together with
the latter three, became his heirs, and all are entitled to divide the said half share belonging to their father into eight parts.
By the death of two of these last three children, their respective shares fell to Isabel sole heir, inasmuch as they were children
of the same parents. (Civil Code art. 947.)
In view of these considerations, the claim of the appellants is entirely legal that thirteen-sixteenths should be apportioned
among the children of the first marriage to wit, eight as their own, already inherited from their mother, Apolinaria
Guillermo, and five subsequently inherited from their deceased father, Moises Ramirez and three-sixteenths should be the
share of the three children of the second marriage, which accrued to Isabel Ramirez.
Therefore, in the succession of Moises Ramirez that is now opened the whole of these fractional parts can not be included, but
only the eight which actually constitute his share in the community of property maintained by him with his children of the first
marriage, Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia, since the death of his first wife.
The above children of the first marriage, upon the death of Moises Ramirez, continued the aforesaid community of property
with their three half sisters and brother, Cirila, Isabel, and Serapio; that is to say, now with Isabel, their share being thirteen-
sixteenths, and that of Isabel three sixteenths.
The present status of the two fish ponds in question is that of community of property.
It is certain that when two or more heirs appear at the opening of a testamentary succession, or during the progress of the
settlement of an intestate estate, and each turns out to be an owner pro indiviso of the inheritance, by reason of the share he
may be entitled to receive, a community of property then exists between the participants as long as the estate remains
undivided . . . and nothing more tangible can be imagined than this necessary community, which arose at the moment when
the coheirs assumed the entire representation of the person of the deceased with respect to all of his property, rights, and
actions, both active and passive. (3 Manresa, 357.)
With regard to the community of property the Civil Code provides that
Every coowner shall have full ownership of his part and in the fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and he therefore may
alienate, assign, or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question.
But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with regard to the coowners, shall be limited to the share which may be awarded
him in the division on the dissolution of the community. (Art. 399, Civil Code.)
If Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia Ramirez could lawfully alienate their respective shares in the joint ownership
of the two parcels of land sold to the defendants, Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran, it is evident that the sale of thirteen-
sixteenths of the said two lands could not be void; the sale of the three-sixteenths which belonged to Isabel alone is illegal, as
alleged in the third assignment of error.
Therefore, the sale described in the public instrument of the 29th of November, 1901, of the thirteen-sixteenths which
belonged to the vendors is valid, and that of the three-sixteenths which pertain to Isabel, who neither by herself nor by means
of another took part in said sale is null.
Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran succeed to the vendors and are subrogated thereto in the joint ownership of the two
fish ponds sold; their shares are the same that were owned by the vendors, that is, thirteen-sixteenths.
The whole of the two fish ponds can not pertain to the intestate estate of Moises Ramirez, but merely the half that belonged
to him and which at his death became a part of his intestate estate.
Intestate succession can not disturb the lawful holder in his possession of property, which it is thought should constitute a part
of the hereditary property.
Only in the event of a division of the common property, or upon dissolution of the community of property now existing
between the purchasers, Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran, on the one hand and Isabel Ramirez on the other, can the
fruits, rents, or benefits received, and the part thereof, as well as of the expenses, corresponding to the coowner Isabel
Ramirez in maintaining the community, be considered, as well as of the rights and actions that may pertain to the purchasers
as against the vendors (who have taken no part in these proceedings), by reason of the total consideration paid for the two
properties, and other obligations which may have arisen because of the sale.
The present cause of action and the complaint based thereon being limited to the recovery of the two properties in question,
and the restitution of the possession thereof to the administrator of the intestate estate of Moises Ramirez, in consequence of
the latter's hereditary succession, it is evident that neither recovery of possession nor the restitution asked for can be granted,
as the defendants are the legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the greater portion of the common
property claimed.

While the question of the nullity of the entire sale was previously raised in the action, the illegality of the sale of three-
sixteenths of the common property made by the vendors is evident.

In view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should only be affirmed in so far as it declares that
the sale made by Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia Ramirez of the three-sixteenths parts belonging to Isabel
Ramirez in the two fish ponds claimed is null and void; in all other respects the said judgment is hereby reversed, without any
special ruling as to the costs of both instances. So ordered.