ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v CA
G.R. No. 77425/77450 June 19, 1991
DOCTRINE
There is no need for prescription to be applied in cases
where there is stipulation for automatic reversion. Nonetheless,
the stipulation is against public policy and thus, is void.
FACTS
The administrators of the estate of deceased spouses Eusebio
and Martina De Castro filed a complaint to nullify the deed of donation,
rescission of contract, and reconveyance of the property against
spouses Florencio and Soledad Ignao, Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus,
and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.
The administrators alleged that in 1930 the De Castros
executed the deed of donation over their Cavite property to the
Archbishop, said deed allegedly providing that the latter cannot dispose
or sell the property within 100 years from execution. The
administration of the said properties was transferred to the Bishop of
Imus in 1962. And in 1980, the Bishop of Imus sold the property to the
spouses Ignao. The Ignaos were then able to transfer the TCT under
their names.
The lower court ruled that the action had already prescribed
and dismissed the complaint. This was reversed by the CA.
The Ignaos and the Bishops contend that the cause of action
had already prescribed, relying on Art. 764 which provides that "(t)he
donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee
fails to comply with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon
the latter," and that "(t)his action shall prescribe after four years from
the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of
the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs.
ISSUE
WON the action has already prescribed
HELD / RATIO
ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED. Art. 764 is not
applicable in this case. The deed of donation involved expressly
provided for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of
violation of the, as was correctly recognized by the CA.
A judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary
where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for
violation of any of its terms and conditions. This cancellation can be
applied in the case at bar. Art. 732 of the Civil Code provides that
donations inter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions on
contracts and obligations in all that is not determined by the law on
donations.
In contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial
intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial
declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded, but in
order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
Thus, the cause of action has not yet prescribed since an action
to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. Article 764
was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or
contravention of conditions specified in the deed of donation if and
when the parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of such
donation upon the occurrence of the contingency contemplated therein.
That is not the situation in the case at bar.
NONETHELESS, while the action may not be dismissed by
reason of prescription, the same should be dismissed on the ground
that the estates of the De Castros have NO CAUSE OF ACTION against
the Ignaos and other petitioners.
The cause of action of the De Castros is based on the alleged
breach of the resolutory condition that the property donated should
not be sold within the prohibited period. Said condition, however,
constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership
and is, therefore, contrary to public policy and should be declared as an
illegal or impossible condition.
The Ignaos won. The CA decision is reversed.
Danguilan vs IAC
Facts: Apolonia Melad filed a complaint against Felix Daguilan
with CFI Cagayan for recovery of a farm lot and a residential
lot which she claimed she had purchased from Domingo
Melad in 1943 and were now being unlawfully withheld by the
Danguilan. She claimed to be the illegitimate daughter of
Domingo and presented a deed of sale purportedly signed by
the latter. She only moved out in 1946 because Danguilan
approached her and asked permission to cultivate the land
and to stay therein. She had agreed on condition that he
would deliver part of the harvest from the farm to her, which
he did from that year to 1958. Deliveries later stopped thus
the complaint.
Danguilan, on the other hand, is the husband of Isidra Melad,
Domingo's niece. He presented a private instrument which
Domingo Melad also purportedly signed, giving to him the
farm in 1943 another private instrument in which Domigo also
gave him the residential lot, on the understanding that the
Danguilan would take care of the grantor and would bury him
upon his death.
Lower court ruled in favor of Danguilan. Upon appeal, the IAC
modified the deicision and ruled that the conveyance of the
real properties in question were null and void, as they were
donations of real property and as such should have been
effected through a public instrument.
Apolonia Melad alleges that the deed of sale was allegedly
executed when the respondent was only three years old and
the consideration was supposedly paid by her mother, Maria
Yedan from her earnings as a wage worker in a factory.
Danguilan, on the other hand, avers that this contract was
simulated and prepared after Domingo's death.
Issue:
WON Apolonia Melad can be considered as the owner of the
disputed properties
Held: Decision of trial court reinstated. Danguilan wins.
Based on the evidence adduced, it is clear that Domingo did
intend to donate the properties to Danguilan. The fact that
the donation was executed in a private document is not
material because the donation was onerous- the properties
were given to the Danguilan in exchange for his obligation to
take care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for
his burial. Hence, it could not come under the operation of
Article 749 requiring donations of real properties to be
effected through a public instrument.
As to the deed of sale executed between Domingo and
Apolonia, the record shows that the Apolonia Melad did not
take possession of the disputed properties and indeed waited
until 1962 to file this action for recovery of the lands from the
Danguilan. If she did have possession, she transferred the
same to the petitioner in 1946, by her own sworn admission,
and moved out to another lot belonging to her step-brother.
She thus failed to show that she consummated the contract
of sale by actual delivery of the properties to her and her
actual possession thereof in concept of purchaser-owner.
As consistently held by jurisprudence, ownership does not
pass by mere stipulation but only by delivery. That symbolic
delivery was effected through the deed of sale, which was a
public instrument, Addison vs Felix controls:

"in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the

effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had
such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale,
its material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to
confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of
possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control. When
there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold
passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the
vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public
instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of
the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and
material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or
through another in his name, because such tenancy and
enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of another will, then
fiction yields to realitythe delivery has not been effected."

(eventually, the Court said that both claims were weak, but
the presumption is in favor of Danguilan who is in possession)
When a person donates land to another on the
condition that a construction be made, the condition is
akin to a resolutory (not suspensive) one. The non-
compliance to the condition extinguishes the right to
the donation, but it need not occur first in order for the
donation to be effected and validated.
FACTS:
In 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez was a member of
the board of trustees of Central Philippine University
when he executed a donation to the school, stating
that the land must be for exclusive use of a medical
college. 50 years later, The heirs of Ramon Lopez
filed an action to annul the donation, stating the
failure of the school to construct the medical college
over the land. RTC ruled in favor of respondents,
which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether there is a
resolutory condition
RULING:
The donation was an onerous one, where failure of
the school to construct a medical college would give
the heirs the power to revoke the donation, reverting
the property back to the heirs of the donor. It is
therefore a resolutory condition. Although, the
period was not stated, and the courts should have
fixed a period, in this case, 50 years has lapsed since
the donation was executed, thus fixing a period
would serve no purpose and the property must
already be reverted back.
Dissenting Opinion:
Davide considered the donation as "modal"
where the obligations are unconditional, and the
fulfillment, performance, existence or
extinguishment is not dependent on any future and
uncertain event. It is more accurate to say that the
condition stated is not a resolutory condition, rather
a obligation itself, being an onerous donation. Since
this is an onerous donation, it has to comply with the
rules on Oblicon, and therefore the courts should
have fixed a period.x